



Conference of Defence Associations Institute

OPENING STATEMENT

TESTIMONY OF

Ferry de Kerckhove

Executive Vice-President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Colin Robertson

Board Member, Conference of Defence Associations Institute

TO THE

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

10 FEBRUARY 2014

[check against delivery – extracted from Senate website]

...

The Chair: Thank you. I would like to thank the witnesses for coming here this afternoon. It has been a very worthwhile committee hearing. You've brought a fair amount of information to the hearing and I think it will help us going forward in understanding the problems you face. As I said at the beginning, the purpose of these hearings is to see where we can be of some assistance in ensuring due process occurs and ensuring that those people being asked to do their job under the legislation can do it and do it to the best of their ability.

Colleagues, you will recall that on December 12, 2013, the Senate adopted the following study reference — and I want to quote for the viewers who have tuned in to this particular hearing:

That the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the status of Canada's international security and defence relations, including but not limited to, relations with the United States, NATO, and NORAD; and

That the committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2014, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.

Colleagues, today we will commence our study into the area of ballistic missile defence. Through the study, our goals will be to explore the subject of ballistic missile defence, including the government's policy decision, the threat environment and the relevance to our international security and defence relations, and to report back to the Senate with specific recommendations.

Colleagues, we are all aware that strategic and military threats are increasing, especially in the face of non-state and state actors such as Iran and North Korea. Beyond nuclear weapons, the threat of an electromagnetic pulse, EMP, attack is also credible and could have a devastating impact on Canada or one of our allies. At the same time, those opposed to ballistic missile defence indicate that the systems do not work, the costs have not been clearly defined, and the benefits have not been well articulated to Canadians.

To begin our study, I'm pleased to welcome Colin Robertson, Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and Ferry de Kerckhove, Executive Vice-President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute, to lead off our study on ballistic missile defence.

Gentlemen, I understand you each have an opening statement. We have until five o'clock for this session. Mr. de Kerckhove, please proceed.

Ferry de Kerckhove, Executive Vice-President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute: Thank you for the invitation. I'll explain why I was insisting on being presented as the executive vice-president of the CDAI. It's because we publish a yearly document called *Canada's Strategic Outlook*, and ours for 2014 comes out in about a week and a half. I thought it would be important to highlight that, in case you might be interested, but I'm also a fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and therefore a colleague of Mr. Robertson's. I think we have been colleagues for years.

I'd like to try to give a broad picture and discuss BMD within the large context of what it is, a threat analysis. I think this Senate session is timely. In fact, our document called for a full-fledged study by the government of BMD. I hope your report will energize the government in that direction, because in fact we've been recommending for the past two years that the government look at BMD in earnest, rather than avoid the issue, so we're all on the same page on that one.

In terms of the strategic perspective, we tend to think that the world is more dangerous than ever, but it's not just more dangerous than ever; it is also because what I would call "the Western resolve" is waning after all the crises they've gone through. I would say there's a pervasive quasi neo-isolationism atmosphere in the West. You have a strong feeling of wariness throughout the system. Maybe the French are slightly different, but I'll get to that a bit later. There's a trend towards a retrenchment and towards engagement overseas. In this day and age, "no boots on the ground" has become the mantra, if anything.

On top of that, I think we've all recognized that there's a general social malaise permeating most of the countries, the democracies and otherwise. There's not a day where there's not some kind of demonstration in a country, even towards elected government; and inequalities are crippling the natural social compact, which adds to the general feeling of malaise. The Snowden revelations have added angst between leaders.

I am talking about a general absence of leadership throughout the Western world. We've seen it in the Arab Spring. We've seen the U.S. political logjam, which is really blurring the perception of the importance of the U.S. for our security in the world. And there's a general absence of strategies.

If you look at NATO, there's an increasing risk of NATO becoming a two-tiered alliance with countries that are still pulling their weight within it, whether it's the French, the British, or even the Germans. On the other hand you have countries that are bailing out of their responsibility within NATO, which of course is a threat to general alliance solidarity. There are a lot of uncertainties out there.

Our perspective is that if we don't get the right structure and financial backing, even for our own defence, I think the Canadian Forces could become limited to continental defence with reduced expeditionary capabilities.

On the other hand, we are looking at U.S. continental perimeter defence, ballistic missile defence, cybersecurity. All three elements are fundamental to our security, hence we've got to look at it in earnest and also look at BMD, but in that broader context because we do have a very clear interest in addition to those three.

We have the fight against drugs in Latin America. We also have the expansion towards Asia and the Pacific, which has some defence implication, and in our report we go into more detail. For instance, what kind of navy do you need when you have more extended trade orientation towards the broad Asia-Pacific region than the more traditional one we've had in the past? The Atlantic is the past; Asia-Pacific is the future.

If you look at the crisis in the Middle East, Syria and North Africa and our specific interest for Israel's security, we could consider, for instance, helping Israel if there were to be an agreement between the Palestinians and Israel. We could even be contributing a potential transitional disengagement force to Israel.

I'm mentioning those aspects of defence to give you a sense of the broad pictures of our interest. We have interests in Africa in the mining sector now. The bottom line is that despite this retrenchment that we feel, this kind of disengagement, the armed forces remain essential for our security and sovereignty. We cannot just pick and choose à la carte. We have to look at what enhances that security, particularly when you have the priority on the Arctic,

when you have cybersecurity, which has been designated as the fifth domain of war. All these factors add up to looking at BMD as part and parcel of our contribution to North American defence and to our sovereignty.

I put aside the argument that the more we get involved in that, the more we lose our sovereignty. Quite to the contrary, my sense is that the more we involve ourselves in that kind of mutual defence, the more we accredit the value of our contribution to North American security.

The chair mentioned some of these, but if you look at the threats out there, like North Korea mindlessly pursuing its nuclear option and already compelling the U.S. to enhance its BMD capacity, and at what goes on in the negotiations with Iran, we're very hopeful. On the other hand, if it fails, what would Iran do? Would it follow suit on its nuclear program? It would foster a nuclear proliferation in the broad region, in the Middle East. This could be an even more dangerous game further down the road.

If you look at the debate within NATO, BMD itself is now pitting Russia against the U.S. as NATO installs the theatre missile against rogue non-state actors close to Russia's area of influence.

Mr. Robertson will be much more detailed about this, I'm sure, but we do make a distinction between the BMD participation in Europe and the BMD deployment in continental North America. However, the bottom line from my perspective is that we should participate in the latter.

Let me quickly highlight some of the dangers I see that justify even more the uncertainties as to both China's long-term ambition and the future of a multipolar world. Indeed, if you see the imposition of the ADIZ, the aerial defence zone, China is evidently continuing to incrementally test the international resolve, and there is a great risk when it comes to Japan.

The failures in managing the crises in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan — particularly post-foreign troop withdrawal — and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, all of these are areas of danger. I mentioned cybersecurity and also a general weakening of the multilateral and international system. Some of these institutions, like the G8, are becoming obsolete.

The point is that the U.S. will not intervene from a political and moral basis in all crises to come. The days of humanitarian military interventions are over, and the question is whether China will be a partner or a threat. We should try to consider China a partner, but there is a long way to go before that.

As well, one of my serious concerns is Russia. In a way, Russia is reinventing a new version of the Cold War. I strongly recommend everyone read the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation's statement on their concept of foreign

policy. When you read that document, you wonder whether you flipped a page back in time. It looks like revanchism Cold War talk to an amazing degree; it's quite fascinating, in fact. Russia is trying to rebuild its glory, its aura, by creating this concept of Eurasia where it would play a pivotal role between the European, which it despises, and the Asian, which courts.

Meanwhile the threats that know no frontier continue to create more problems with climate change, pollution, resource depletion, et cetera.

Basically my take on it all is that even though every crisis we see could engage Canada, at the present time it's doubtful that Canada would engage much in some of those crises. But I think the review of our own interests within our own defence and security perimeter, including BMD, is absolutely essential.

On those words, Mr. Chair, I would pass the floor on to my dear colleague, Colin Robertson.

[Translation]

Colin Robertson, Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, as an individual: I would like to share some information about my background. I worked in Canada's Foreign Service for nearly 33 years. I then worked as vice-president for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, a non-partisan research institute based in Calgary. This institute is connected to the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy, where I am a fellow. I am a member of the board of directors of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, of which Ferry is the vice-president. I am also a senior advisor at McKenna Long & Aldridge, a legal firm in Washington. I am proud to volunteer as honorary captain at the Strategic Communications Directorate of the Royal Canadian Navy.

That gives you an overview of my background. However, I would like to say that my comments in no way reflect the opinions of the various organizations I work for.

[English]

It is time for Canada to join the rest of the Western alliance, our 27 partners in NATO, and our friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific — Australia, Japan and South Korea — under the umbrellas of ballistic missile defence.

We need to be prepared for the threat of missile attacks.

Continental defence has been integral to Canadian national security since Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt parleyed at Kingston in 1938.

Led by Louis St. Laurent, we were architects of NATO because of our belief in collective security. A decade later we would create NORAD, our binational aerospace defence agreement that now includes aspects of maritime warning.

Today our security is again threatened. North Korea has conducted several ballistic missile tests under the guise of peaceful satellite launches. It has stated its long-range missiles will target the United States, and it has developed a road-mobile ballistic missile capability. Iran has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles. We hope that the current Geneva discussions will stop Iranian nuclear development, but their outcome is uncertain. The six-party talks with North Korea broke down in 2009 after North Korea repeatedly broke its commitments.

As John Baird observed, before we trust, we need to verify.

While Iran does not have the capacity today to strike Canada with missiles, the evidence is that they are trying to build that capacity.

We don't know what new threats are coming down the pike. What happens if Pakistan goes rogue? Risk assessments forecast more bad actors with access to warheads, intercontinental missiles and weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological. Despite our best efforts, the genie is out of the bottle on proliferation.

Participation in BMD is both an insurance policy for our homeland and a renewed commitment to contemporary collective defence. Through NORAD, we currently share information and early warning and attack assessment with the U.S. But when it comes time to make critical launch decisions, our officials literally have to leave the room. The algorithms that U.S. Northern Command has developed to protect the U.S. homeland do not include Canadian cities like Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto or Montreal. Membership brings the privilege of being in the room and being part of the conversation on how to protect Canadians.

Canada has a conflicted history when it comes to nuclear weapons and domestic air defence. Although we were present at the creation of nuclear energy research during the Second World War, and Canada was vital, we eschewed the development of nuclear arms for ourselves. Instead we opted to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes through the CANDU reactor. We sold it around the world on condition of non-proliferation.

We would be deceived by India. It developed its own nuclear weapons, using plutonium derived from a research reactor provided by Canada. The Indians argued that in a nuclear neighbourhood, they had to be prepared.

Placement of nuclear warheads on Canadian soil as part of our alliance commitment tormented John Diefenbaker. The resulting Bomarc controversy contributed to the government's undoing and the election of Lester B. Pearson.

Lester Pearson, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize over the Suez crisis, concluded that our obligations to NORAD and NATO required participation. The decision was controversial. A young Pierre Trudeau called Pearson "the defrocked prince of peace."

Two decades later, now Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau faced similar divisions within his own cabinet over the testing of cruise missiles on Canadian soil. Trudeau agreed to the testing, arguing that "it is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a hand when the going gets rough."

Notwithstanding his friendship with Ronald Reagan, Brian Mulroney joined with Australia, France and other allies in rejecting participation in the U.S. Star Wars missile defence program because Canada "would not be able to call the shots." When a new and much more modest ballistic missile defence was developed under George W. Bush, Paul Martin dithered and then opted out, to the confusion of his new Chief of the Defence Staff and ambassador to the United States. Advised that newly elected Prime Minister Stephen Harper would not welcome a request, Mr. Bush found this puzzling. He reportedly asked Mr. Harper what would happen if a North Korean missile aimed at Los Angeles or Seattle wound up heading toward Vancouver or Calgary.

Criticism of BMD boils down to the following: First, according to critics, it does not work and weaponizes space. It's a latter-day Maginot Line, being costly, unreliable and provocative. NORAD, they argue, provides sufficient defence. But they forget that at the critical moment we must leave the room.

BMD is not Star Wars, with its improbable futuristic weapons and enormous cost. The current system has no space-based weapons; instead, it uses kinetic energy to stop warheads.

With this system essentially in place, participation does not come with an admission charge. Any future costs can be scaled and shared within the alliance. Technology, research and constant testing have made BMD a reasonable shield. The Israeli's Iron Dome demonstrates the defensive worth of anti-missile technology.

The second criticism of BMD is that it makes us too reliant on the U.S. This tiresome argument is also applied to trade and commerce, but who would argue that freer trade has not benefited Canada? In terms of defence, the whole point of collective security is to contribute according to our capacity for mutual security and protection. Protecting Canadians and Americans was the logic of the original DEW Line and NORAD.

Shouldn't Canada have a say in the development of the North American BMD architecture in advance of the actual emergence of a combined ICBM or nuclear

threat? Moreover, is it logical to have a say in the establishment of that architecture in Europe but to exclude ourselves from having that say in North America? At what point is the Canadian national interest put in jeopardy by not having a say?

During the cruise missile debate, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau remarked that some Canadians "are eager to take refuge under the U.S. umbrella but don't want to help hold it."

The rest of NATO has signed onto missile defence. So have Australia, Japan and South Korea. While the U.S. has a general invitation to its allies to join the shield, it has not put any pressure on Canada.

The third criticism is that BMD is morally wrong. But we live in the real world, not Elysium. We can't be sure whether something aimed at the United States isn't going to strike Canada. The Senate report by this very committee in 2005 concluded that an effective BMD could save hundreds of thousands of Canadian lives.

The moral argument should be reframed to ask why the Government of Canada does not have a voice in how BMD may be used. One could argue that it is a moral imperative for the government to have such a say when the potential target is a Canadian city.

By being part of the defensive shield, we strengthen the deterrent effect of BMD. Taking part in surveillance for BMD is part of the continuum of capabilities that contributes to the alliance. This could include missile defence capacity in our new warships and using our submarines to track potentially hostile attack submarines. Participation in BMD is both an insurance policy for our homeland and a renewed commitment to contemporary collective defence. By being part of the defensive shield, we strengthen the deterrent effect of BMD.

In putting these remarks together, I sought the advice of friends and colleagues. British defence scholar Professor Julian Lindley-French pointed out that BMD should be seen as part of the modernization of NATO's Article 5 and thus part of the need to create 21st century collective defence. As Lindley-French observed:

In that light, BMD sits at the crux of two axes of future defence. The first axis links NORAD to a 'NATO' Advance Defence as part of an evolving umbrella, even if the Russians do not like that.

The second axis concerns the development of complementary advanced forces and cyber-defence, amongst other efforts.

As part of this effort, which is reflected in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, BMD would be part of a defence 'cornerstone' which would underpin collective

defence, crisis management and, of course, co-operative security.

Indeed, the ability to project civil-military influence to stabilise societies can only take place if the home base is secure — BMD is thus part of a new balance between protection and projection.

Russia should be invited to be part of this effort because BMD is counter-technology rather than counter-state.

This is good advice. Collective security means preparation and commitment. "For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt," observed John F. Kennedy, "can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed."

Collective security through NATO and our alliance with the United States has guaranteed the peace since 1945, contributing to the greatest growth in commerce and development in world history. Canada has been a beneficiary, with marginal premiums. Changing circumstances, alliance solidarity and self-preservation oblige us to update our security policy. BMD must be incorporated within our Canada First Defence Strategy for security policy.

The Chair: I will lead off with a question. It's an area of study that I'm new to, and we're relying on people such as you to broaden our understanding of the missile defence program — exactly what it does, what the implications are, whether Canada's security is being affected by not participating, and whether we will be in a better position if we do participate.

At the inception of the ballistic missile defence program back in 2005, if not before, there was a lot of criticism that the technology did not work; in other words, it was a program that was being undertaken, but there was no certainty regarding its capabilities. My question is simple: Does the technology work?

Mr. Robertson: The technology does work. We've seen a demonstration of it in Israel. Is it 100 per cent? No. Is it improving daily with technology and research? Yes.

You can't guarantee absolute insurance, but it's like going out in a storm with an umbrella. You are far better to have that umbrella than not.

Mr. de Kerckhove: During the First Gulf War, you had the Patriots. Some of them worked; some did not work. Progress has been made. It's no wonder that the Turks have asked to be protected by Patriot anti-missile stations because of the crisis in Syria.

There is a healthy debate, as always, in this world about the success of the Iron Dome. Of course, there have been mis-hits in all of that, but a hell of a lot of rockets went down just a week ago in Eilat, and they could have done a lot of

damage to the city of Eilat.

There is a lot of stuff in your kitchen that does not work. You fix it, but the kitchen is improved day after day, and I think it is part of the arsenal that we must have.

[*Translation*]

Senator Nolin: You just used the word "arsenal." I think it's important to explain to the Canadians watching this that we are truly talking about defensive measures, for example, protecting ourselves against missiles targeting the United States that pass over Canadian territory.

To what degree do you think we should be concerned? We hear a lot of aggressive words from North Korea, a bit less from Iran, although our Israeli friends would have us believe that Iran is more of a threat.

Mr. de Kerckhove: My colleague mentioned that we are living in an increasingly complex world, especially in terms of non-state actors that I believe are the real threat.

There are two ways to look at things. How do you expect a terrorist to get access to a nuclear missile and be able to launch it? A lot of technology is needed.

Do the Koreans, even now, have comprehensive miniaturization technology that would allow them to more easily launch a long-range missile? Right now, it falls as a result of gravity. Once again, this is a day-to-day thing; not a long-term thing.

That is the debate going on in Israel. Is the Iron Dome enough right now? In five years, in light of the ongoing challenges with Hamas and in Gaza and elsewhere, at some point, will there be a stronger, stealthier missile that will cause even more damage?

We do not feel that same anxiety here in Canada directly, but it is still a growing concern because of non-state actors. I am not saying that tomorrow we'll see a missile, but I think that overall, in terms of policy, we are committed to doing things with the United States.

For the time being, the United States is not really worried that they will be hit by a Korean missile, but every time that the Koreans make technical advances, they may have the capacity to make it all the way to California. That is not possible right now, but one day it will be. Why wait for a missile to show up before we find a way to defend ourselves? This is very much about defence. It is a long-term political, military and technological commitment.

[*English*]

Senator Nolin: How long can the situation work if it's only defensive? We are basically saying, "We will not attack you, so don't worry. We will not blow you up, but we will definitely defend ourselves with the kinetic force of our missiles to intercept whatever you send us."

Mr. de Kerckhove: Nowadays, they are not nuclear-tipped. They are kinetic. That is a huge difference. It is very important to highlight because a lot of people are thinking those missiles are nuclear-tipped.

[Translation]

Mr. Robertson: The concerns are real. There is a threat. We must be prepared, which is why I recommend defence. There is an increased threat to Canadians because North Korea has improved its technology.

[English]

Also Iran and Pakistan — there are other places where you cannot predict the longer term, so you therefore should be prepared.

Senator Nolin: I understand that you are highlighting the contradiction of Canada's being a member of the 28 NATO countries supporting BMDs in Europe but not in North America. That's basically one of the highlights of both of your presentations.

However, we cannot avoid trying to explain to Canadians how we could remove that ambiguity and be on one side totally or on the other totally. Do you have a comment? In less than 18 months we will have an election. It's probably not good timing to talk about that, but it is never good.

Mr. de Kerckhove: I find it interesting because the message to Canadians about the fact that we're talking about a defensive element of arsenal should be reassuring.

The argument that we're still part of the system of nuclear deterrence is also defensive, the nuclear deterrence of BMD. I will make a distinction because in the case of BMD, it is strictly defensive in the sense that you are not going to launch BMD against a country. The only way to use BMD is if you have a missile attacking you.

So, for me, the message to the Canadian public should distinguish between nuclear deterrence with the overarching umbrella, which is part of what we have done for umpteen years. And, so far, I still think there is more and more nuclear power, and you have to continue to have that deterrence, but there is a big debate about that.

On BMD itself, it is a straightforward message to the Canadian population. Are we ready? I think Mr. Robertson put it well when he said it has to be part of the Canada First Defence Strategy we set because that's the time to make the fundamental decision of at least implementing it, and then you do it over time. I'd be interested to see what the Canadian public would say if we don't explain it well. You are right. It has to be told well to the Canadian public, but it is strictly defensive and kinetic. I don't know how to say it differently.

Mr. Robertson: That's correct. It's kinetic. It's not nuclear, and as for timing, well, unfortunately, we're not in a position to be able to predict when bad things will happen to us. Just think of 9/11.

Senator Nolin: Insurance policy.

Mr. Robertson: Insurance policy.

I gave a capsule portrayal of Canadian history to illustrate to the committee that it has been something that has tormented our parliamentarians for many years, and it's not a partisan issue. That's one thing I also want to underline. It has conflicted John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister Harper and Prime Minister Mulroney. But we can't predict when something might happen. You pointed out we're perhaps not far from an election. It was an election issue in 1962; it was an election issue to some degree in 1984, as you came up on cruise missile testing. Certainly, Mr. de Kerckhove and I were part of that time.

Senator Nolin: Do you remember the camp in front of Parliament?

Mr. Robertson: I remember.

I also want to underline a point you made, and that is the importance of getting out ahead and presenting to the public the reasons you would want to do this. We did it around cruise missile testing, we did it around Bomarc, and I think that is important, which is why I applaud this committee because it is important that the public has an opportunity to hear both sides of the argument. Too often, it becomes utterly emotional, and you start dealing in slogans.

I think you have to start looking at whether the threat has changed. In my view, the threat has changed. This is defensive. It is kinetic. It is not nuclear. We're talking about a different thing than we talked about in the case of Star Wars and the expense.

It is something that we should be doing, and, as you pointed out, out of 27 of the 28 allies, we are the outlier on this one. Yet, for North America now, because of changed risk assessment, because of advances made in technology by the North Koreans and potentially by the Iranians, we can't wait until something is headed

in our direction and then hope that the missile for which the algorithms aren't triggered are able to stop it.

[*Translation*]

Senator Dagenais: If Canada decided to become more involved in the missile defence program — beyond the symbolic exchange of personnel working at the primary facilities, such as the American platforms — we would perhaps be forced to make some decisions with respect to cuts to the defence program.

In your opinion, where should Canada make cuts to its defence program in order to make the necessary resources available?

Mr. de Kerckhove: Thank you very much for that question. This is not about playing around with the abacus. I think that the biggest opportunity we have with the review or examination of the Canada First Defence Strategy is that we can truly take a look at the various aspects of national defence. I could bore you for hours with all the different scenarios being discussed. Will the Canadian government tell us that it will not cut staff and will maintain spending — the procurement or capital program — in which case it is certain that the forces' state of readiness and training will suffer greatly overall?

If you add the antiballistic missile into this operation, it becomes part of the debate, but it needs to be debated seriously. My big concern is that the government will quickly review the strategy and simply make a few more cuts, without truly asking itself what kind of defence we want to have. Will the accountants be running it, or will it be run based on Canada's current threats? I think that a review of the antimissile defence system needs to be integrated into this review. I cannot respond by telling you, "we'll take 10,000 people out of Goose Bay, stick 4 or 5 here and there, and we'll save \$20,000 to help make a little contribution to AMD."

I'm glad you asked me that question, because that is how it needs to be presented to the Canadian public. Our entire defence policy must be extensively reviewed because, from the beginning, the Canada First Defence Strategy never had the funding it needed to be effective. Making decisions takes courage. Are we or are we not more efficient if we cut staff? Are we using the reserves in a better way? There are many things that need to be done within this debate.

As for an answer to your question, it is part of the whole thing. Do not ask me to remove 10,000 men so we can pay for ballistic missile defence. Instead, tell me whether you agree to have an extensive review, and a missile defence policy would, in principle, be created as part of that review.

Senator Dagenais: Mr. Robertson, do you have anything to add?

Mr. Robertson: I think that the biggest thing with defence is to ask questions. It is not so much about what we want as what we need. I think that we need a missile defence system because of existing threats and because our environment has changed.

[English]

Senator Wells: Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I'm going to switch tracks a little bit, because you've both had such a long history working on behalf of Canada in this area. I'm going to ask you about our foreign policy; it's tightly linked with our defence policy, clearly. I agree that a suite of defences is necessary for the protection of our country.

You know that we have an emphasis now on economic partnerships throughout the world. To what degree is this a key part of our defence strategy, in your opinion? You've both had postings on behalf of Canada at many embassies and in many areas. Economic partnerships that protect us on another front, how would you view those or the importance of them?

Mr. Robertson: Senator, in my view, you have to have conditions of stability and peace before you can do your trade and commerce. So the first set is to establish the means for commerce.

If you look back to when we created NATO, NATO was set up as defensive, but the Canadian article, so called, is the economic argument you're making. By our design we said it's fine to have peace and security, but, more importantly, we have to have trade and commerce so we can prosper. The two, to me, are not at all incompatible.

There has been some criticism of the government's new effort and focus on economic diplomacy. Mr. de Kerckhove and I would both say that was our primary purpose because we assure this with peace, and we were there to try and find trade opportunities so Canadian businesses could do trade, and that contributes to the prosperity of the country. This is a country that has to trade in order for us enjoy prosperity. Before you can do trade, you have to have the conditions of peace and security, and that means a reasonable contribution towards a defence policy.

To me, you can't separate defence policy from your broad economic policy, which includes your foreign policy. Your foreign policy, in a sense, represents the various strands: defence policy, trade policy and development policy. Development fits into this as well. Again, you want to create conditions of peace and stability in a country so you can trade with them. If it's difficult, as we know from the experience in Afghanistan and other places where the conditions are awful, that's where we are most likely to see things go badly for us.

Mr. de Kerckhove: If I may just add a quick point, because I agree with everything Mr. Robertson said.

I'm always amused by this emphasis on economic diplomacy because in my career I think, even though I was supposed to be on the political or foreign affairs stream, I spent 60 per cent of my time on trade in every posting I had, particularly at the highest levels.

What I would like to add is that not only should there be a total integration between foreign policy and defence but, as I said earlier, the more you're going to alter your patterns of trade, the more you're going to focus on the Asia- Pacific, and the more you're going to need to adapt some of your defence capabilities in order to meet some of the more blue sky, blue water and some of the different kinds of capacity that you will want to have. I think that's the key point.

Really the government has to say what it is that you want Canada to be on the international stage. If the government answered that question, then we should be able to say what it is you need from a defence perspective.

I can tell you, let's have an amphibious capacity, fine, but what will you do with that capacity? There are all kinds of questions there, but it's up to the government first to tell us what that broad foreign policy is that we're talking about. The link with defence is very clear, and the economics matter even more as we look toward the Pacific.

Mr. Robertson: If I may just add, it's now trade negotiations with Japan and Korea. One of the issues from the Korean side, and what they're interested in knowing about where we stand, is where we are on defence policy. Are we making a contribution to the collective security? We are not just an Atlantic nation; we are also a Pacific nation.

As Mr. de Kerckhove has pointed out, the Pacific side of the trade dimension is very important, but there is another dimension to that, and that is the defence side of it. That's what predicated the American pivot to the Pacific, and they're looking to us to be part of that as a Pacific nation.

Senator Campbell: I suppose my question to Korea is, "So what do we get for this at the end of day?" We went the last time, and that's obviously what they want.

Do you think it's possible that the whole issue of missile defence is because the definition of war and peace is gone, has changed? There's no such thing as a permanent peace à la World War II. We just have to look at Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Africa; it just goes on and on. Perhaps what we need to do, to get to the point where you would like us to be, is to educate Canadians about what's going on.

There's never been a hope of a lasting peace in Afghanistan. I don't even know why we were there. Do you think this is what we need to be doing?

For instance, I had no idea there weren't nuclear tips on those weapons, and I'm sitting here. I don't pay too much attention to this, to tell you truth. I mean, once it's out there, you wonder, what happens when this happens? Well, it just blows up and goes down.

Do you think one of the things we have to do is talk to Canadians about war and peace? We have three submarines. Hello. I have no idea why we have three old submarines, but we have them.

Do we need to readdress who we are and what our function is?

Mr. de Kerckhove: You fell into what I said earlier. That's exactly the point. Tell me what you want Canada to be, and I'll tell you what we need to do.

Let me make two quick points. I could stay at \$18 billion with 70,000 troops and all that and have strictly continental defence. That's what we could afford now. Even in a time of retrenchment and fiscal responsibility, I could see us implementing all the recommendations for transformation made by General Lesley. As well, I could see an increase to meet what the Canadian government wishes to have as Canada in the world.

You're absolutely right. In fact, one of the most amusing sentences we have at the beginning of our report is "Gone are the days when we could trust our enemies" — that we had enemies we could trust.

Mr. Robertson: Or even know who they are.

Mr. de Kerckhove: Exactly. On the definitions of "war" and "peace," it's fascinating because your question is so well put.

Go back a few decades and imagine a president who can say that next year at this time the war will end. That is what Obama said about the war in Afghanistan; so hooray. There is a crystal ball that no one else has. How can you determine that the war will end, unless, of course, you've said that it doesn't matter a hoot and you'll walk out?

Senator Campbell: He's going by old definitions.

How do we decide what we want?

Mr. Robertson: How do we decide what we want? The first thing we do is assess the risk. What are the risks to Canada? That then trickles down to our partners in the alliance. What are the risks to Canada? There is now a risk to

Canada that an errant missile could strike one of our cities. That, to me, is why we should rethink our position.

We should be rethinking constantly where we are. Your question earlier was about what we need. We have to decide what the risks are so we can determine what we need to defend ourselves from those risks.

You've talked about the submarines. In my view, the submarines are quite useful because one of the threats is missile launch attack submarines. If a North Korean submarine was headed in our direction and they knew we had a submarine out there, they would be much less likely to head our way. This has been proven over time. The submarine is the ultimate stealth weapon. Just the very fact that we have submarines and no one knows where they are serves as a deterrent. Ultimately, that's what we're trying to do — we're trying to deter threats to Canada.

We contribute because we have found that collective security is by far the best means to defend our vast land mass with like-minded allies, particularly in Europe, through NATO, and the United States, obviously, in continental defence. Now, as you pointed out at the outset of your question, we look to South Korea and why we got involved there 60 years ago. Actually, they'll say that it's given us a great deal of goodwill. The Koreans have not forgotten that we served there and defended them; and that works to our advantage.

Senator Campbell: I know where two submarines are: in dry dock, so they're not helping us very much.

My last question is this: Many times Canada and other countries in the world look to the UN. Now, as far as I'm concerned, the inmates are running the asylum at the UN, and more and more so. What will be our alternative body? NATO? I don't know. The UN is the reason we went to Korea. Many of the instances that we've been involved with militarily have been UN missions. Well, I simply would not put a Canadian soldier under a UN mission. What are we going to be looking at as the alternate group for the world to get together?

Mr. de Kerckhove: Here we're launching a much broader debate. I think the present government has belittled the importance of the United Nations. This being said, it is true that it is an institution in dire need of a remake, though it tried in 2005. That being said, let's divide the multilateral system into three categories. Functional organizations, such as the World Health Organization, are still doing stellar work despite some of the politicization. Through it, a lot of good work is being done.

Then you have the political institutions, such as the General Assembly, the UN Security Council, which the present Government of Canada bemoans and despises because it compromises the default position as opposed to the high

moral ground. It is true that some countries there are dictatorships, but most of the countries in the UN are democracies, at least to a certain extent. The real issue is that we have never managed to change the way in which decisions are taken at the UN, particularly in the Security Council. The right of veto that continues to apply throughout, including humanitarian issues, is responsible for the fact that we haven't done anything in Syria. People will tell you that we should thank the Russians for preventing us from going into the quagmire. That is certainly true today, but not in the early days when we might have been able to do something sooner. With a no-fly zone or something like that, we could have prevented jihadists, and they are the ones I worry about for Canada, and, therefore, I am in favour of BMD. That's the second category.

The third category is the multilateral systems like the G8, the G20 and others that are also in bad need of repair. I'm sorry to say it, but the G8 has become a fairly obsolete and stale organization. Why? Because it doesn't include the critical countries that should be there, which are India and China. You're going to tell me that China is not a democracy. Well, Russia is a para-democracy and is not the best democracy in town. There is graduation. India is a democracy, but we haven't included India in the G8, so we have a problem there, while the G20 is a more scattered group.

You've got all those different institutions that clearly are in need of a remake. However, that doesn't change the fundamental truth that if you didn't have those organizations, you'd have chaos on a larger scale. Take, for instance, what happened in the Sahara and in central Africa. These are areas where the UN is trying to make a difference but where Canada has been AWOL for quite a long time. So please, don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Change the water, but keep the baby inside.

The Chair: I just want to follow up on Senator Campbell's question. What is in it for Canada? I want to refer to Mr. Robertson's comments, and I quote: "The algorithms that U.S. Northern Command have developed to protect the U.S. homeland do not include Canadian cities like Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto or Montreal."

I'd like to know from you if that information is direct from U.S. Northern Command, and is it information that has been available to Canada? A body of opinion out there would suggest that the ballistic missile defence will adequately protect Canada, and we really don't have to join it to ensure that Canada is covered if there were an attack.

The question has to be, how accurate is this statement and where did you get it from?

Mr. Robertson: Senator, that information is reliable. It comes from sources in the United States and from highly reliable sources within Canada.

Remember, they've designed their system through Northern Command to defend the United States. Senator Campbell said, "What about Vancouver?" Well, in fact, Seattle is one that's protected. The algorithms used for protection of Seattle may well apply.

That's why I did not include Vancouver, for example, in that because, in discussing this with the various experts, they said that Vancouver they could probably stop, but, if it kept going, there's no surety. Again, there's no guarantee, but there's a much higher percentage if you've prepared ahead of time because when the time comes to launch these things, you've got literally seconds. Far better for Canada to be there and have this built in as part of the system because the system is now using this kinetic energy, and non-nuclear warheads can stop this. Not 100 per cent, but it's sure better than what we have today. The threat is now there.

The Chair: I just want to get it on the record. Our lack of involvement puts Canada, to some degree, at risk in view of the fact that we're not there to be able to put forward the prospect that we have other areas that need defending with respect to ballistic missile defence as it stands today.

Mr. Robertson: I'd be more definitive; I'd say that we are at risk.

The Chair: Could I just go into another area? There is a position that's put forward. I don't know if it has merit or not, and I'd like to hear your opinion. The installation of a ballistic missile defence program causes a destabilizing factor in arms control. That was an argument that was put forward back in 2005. Could you tell us if that argument still has merit?

Mr. Robertson: The argument was certainly used around Star Wars that it destabilizing because of its potential for attack capacity, but this is not an attack. This is defensive. This is simply like a shield. Is the shield destabilizing to the environment? No, that's not the case with this.

Mr. de Kerckhove: You're talking about arms control and disarmament. In the technical sense of the word, I don't think there's any problem. If you look at the politics of it, the push by NATO toward installing BMD in NATO in the area closer to the so-called area of influence of Russia may have a political impact on Russia's contribution to the general arms control and disarmament.

This being said, at the senior level, between Russia and the U.S., arms control, reduction of nuclear capacity and all of that is definitely taking place. This is why we highlighted the fact that we're talking about North American ballistic missile defence, which is different, although we are participating also in the European one.

In a way, the North American one is far less destabilizing — if it is at all —

compared to the political concern that would be looked at by Russia as legitimate given that NATO's progress is getting closer and closer to their range. That might be, in their sense, destabilizing. On the other hand, the closer they get, the more there might be an inducement to go further into arms control and disarmament in order to jointly ensure the defence against rogue states, which was the general object of the debate within NATO and with the U.S. and Russia. Russia stalled on that as the rogue state development missile systems were advancing closer to the border of the former Soviet Union.

Senator Nolin: I want to go back to Senator Wells' question about trade. I'm convinced that both of you will agree with me. It's not new for Canada to mix trade and stability and peace. If we go back to the Washington treaty, the Canadian amendment was referring to that as evidence of stability. If we have our enemies getting rich and stable, we'll have peace. So that's why it was quite a valid question.

Talking about trade, Canada is in the midst of a huge negotiation with South Korea. So what's your assessment of the instability in the region for the moment and the need for Canada to get involved and push for stability and peace in the region?

Mr. de Kerckhove: Mr. Robertson has lots of views on that one also.

Senator Nolin: I have not only North Korea in mind but also China.

Mr. de Kerckhove: What is interesting about Korea is that, were there to be an attack by the North Koreans on South Korea, we are still tied to the post-1952 arrangement. Therefore, we would be a partner in the alliance on that side in terms of forestalling the North Korean advance.

On the other hand, in terms of the actual trade — and, again, I'll defer to Mr. Robertson on that one — my sense is that there's a limited impact on the conduciveness of our discussion with South Korea on the trade agreement. As for the distraction that I would call North Korea, with all the danger that it imparts, I'm worried about the nuclear weapons of North Korea, but I'm also worried about the potential collapse of that country, which brings us to what extent we help them to get out of their mess.

In terms of the relationship with South Korea and the general area, I think the Pacific is becoming a common border as opposed to an area of danger, apart from the North Korean issue and the concern I have about the ADIZ that China has imposed. I really think that, in terms of the relationship with the TPPs and all of those trade negotiations, we're going into a fairly reasonably solid base.

Mr. Robertson, don't you think so?

Mr. Robertson: I would just say that in the case of Asia you have 19th century nation states with 21st century economics and unfortunately, in some cases, 19th century politics because there are still frontier challenges, as we know. Think of China, Japan, the Philippines and others. Certainly, in the case of the Koreans, there is an unsettled situation.

Put this in the context of the Canadian efforts to secure a trade agreement with Korea, which is very much in our interest and something I believe we should do. That said, what can we do to be helpful?

There is actually something we could do. Our current policy on engagement, for example, with North Korea — because the South Koreans depend a lot on others to listen to what's going on — only permits us to talk about nuclear proliferation and human rights. I understand why we've done it, but it means that we don't have any discussion with the North Koreans. The South Koreans relied on us as one of the *interlocuteurs valables*. In the past, in discussions with the North Koreans, as irrational as they may appear to us, our ambassador could go up there because they could discuss other things. You weren't talking, necessarily, to the person directly across from you, but you were talking to the person who was also in the room — the younger generation.

We should rethink our policy on that. I understand why we put it in, but that engagement part is something that the Koreans are very interested in and that would serve our commercial ends.

Senator Nolin: Basically, if I understand you correctly, if we don't publicly talk about BMD for our own continent, we're less credible protecting or defending our trade partners.

Mr. Robertson: To a degree, yes, because they look at us and say, "Well, what are you doing?"

Senator Nolin: As an *interlocuteur valable*, and that includes protection and defence of our own territories.

Mr. Robertson: We often accuse the Americans of not being a reliable trade partner — and we've seen that — but they expect us to be a reliable security partner. In my view — and you've just heard this — we are a very reliable security partner. We've created the perimeter that the Americans have asked for, but we are saying to the Americans now, "Okay, we want you to be a reliable trade partner. We have done what you've asked on the security front."

Senator Nolin: That's good. I think we will have to explore that a little bit more. I think the relationship between security and trade is a good point.

Senator Wells: I want to go back to Russia. You mentioned it, Mr. de Kerckhove,

in your opening remarks. I find it interesting when we look at the history of the 1930s and at Germany, which was decimated after the First World War and regrew 20 years later to be, as they style themselves, perhaps, and as we may style them as we look back, a super power.

In the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, something similar happened on a different scale. I don't think anyone would be fooled now to think they're not regaining their strength as a superpower and showing a certain global swagger.

How concerned should we be? They're trying to maintain or grow their areas of influence with Syria, the Ukraine, and with Poland some years ago and now. How concerned should we be about the re-strengthening of Russia?

Mr. de Kerckhove: I lived in Russia for three years and have a lot of sympathy for Russia's desire to regain its status post-humiliation of the downfall of the Soviet Union. Maybe I tend to ascribe more to President Putin than to the rest of Russia. What I find worrisome — because that's really what you're asking me — is his anti-West attitude. Of course he'll cooperate and gloat about his success in Syria, and all of that, but there is something confrontational at every level, and there's still a modality of a kind of East-West approach. It is worrisome because with what is going on in Europe — for instance, Ukraine in Russia versus the European Union — you find the stability in front of that. You take other countries that would like to have a bit more breathing space and cooperate. Take Armenia, who would like to incorporate with Europe but has been strangled into the Eurasian concept.

Take all the former republics — the ``stans" — and Russia's desire to exercise control over them. For example, look at the pipeline wars that you don't hear about between the Turks and the Russians. The Russians are now encouraging the export of gas from Turkmenistan to China so there is less gas going through the Nabucco pipeline in Turkey so that more gas, even at a higher cost, can be pumped through Russia into Europe to the Ukraine. Does that sound Machiavellian? I don't know, but it is worrisome because it's a non-cooperative mode. To that extent, as I said, they're rewriting a new kind of Cold War.

There are other areas where cooperation is great, for example, on the reduction of nuclear weapon capacity. In the Arctic there is real, solid cooperation. Why? Because anything going on in the Arctic has an expeditionary nature, which means that we better cooperate if we don't want to drown.

For instance, the Norwegians are delighted that there's more and more Russian military in the Arctic. That will be less mess than they'll do elsewhere and that is one organization that knows how to do its work.

The general tone, at a time when we should be cooperating against the rogue state, the rogue actors and the non- state actors and all of that, is this sense

coming from Russia, which is a wonderful country — I've lived there, so I know the country — that you've got to be against to re-establish glory, your past history and all of that.

This notion of a Eurasia of contours that I don't know how to define is also worrisome because then you will have some various places, particularly in the "stans," whether it's Kazakhstan, Tajikistan or the five or six that are there. So there's a certain inherent instability that is not helpful at a time when there is a retrenchment and also, if I may repeat what I said earlier, a lack of leadership on the part of the Western world which goes back to some of your points earlier, namely, "Tell me what you want; I'll tell you what you need. But if you don't have enough leadership to tell us what you want, I won't be able to help you define what you need."

Senator Wells: I'd like to hear from Mr. Robertson on that same question regarding Russia.

Mr. Robertson: Going back to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, there've always been the two sides: that side of Russia that looks to the West and that side that, in a sense, wants a stand-alone Russia. I think under President Putin it's the latter. He's positioning himself as less European and more of a greater Asian power, and that presents us with challenges. We have to play the long game with Russia, because it is a long game. You play to that which you saw at the opening ceremony of the Olympics, the history alluded to there, the wonderful culture that has made a contribution. Part of my observation of Russia is that there is a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the West. As much as we can, that is what we have to work against.

A great Canadian diplomat, Robert Ford, was posted there for 25 years. He really understood, and because he understood Russians, the Russians had a much better appreciation of Canada and looked to Canada as a kind of partner or friend. The current Russian ambassador to Canada, for example, is now the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps here. He is very shrewd and has some weight back in Russia, so we should be working with him, and others, to try to reduce the chances of misunderstandings because I think that's the biggest threat we face vis-à-vis Russia, namely a misunderstanding rather than, on the part of the Russians, an overt effort at aggression.

Traditionally, Russians were attacked — whether we're talking Napoleon or Hitler. They have that in their psyche. That's very much part of the Russian mentality and something we have to be conscious of, but we can actually play a positive role, I think.

Senator Wells: Thank you. That's helpful.

[*Translation*]

Senator Dagenais: You alluded to the economic situation in North Korea. Do you think that its capacity to produce missiles enables it to exert pressure to acquire foreign currency?

Mr. de Kerckhove: I think that, in general, we have economic concerns about North Korea. After the current leader's uncle was killed in cold blood, we have every reason to believe that we will be seeing strict controls over the economy. Taek, the uncle in question, was relatively close to Deng Xiaoping and was trying to bring in economic reform in North Korea. The decision to come in and kill him was obviously a quick way to fix the country's economic management problems, and it likely means that we will see more of an emphasis on defence and less on the economy.

Does that give us a way to exert pressure? For example, in spite of all of Kim Jong-un's posturing, we have still seen an opening for the two countries to come closer together. In other words, does the western world tend to consider him as too unpredictable? Should we try to better understand the medieval mentality of the current North Korean leadership to be more concerned about what is going on? Perhaps, in the spirit of what Colin was saying, by trying to talk to them and create a space for debate and dialogue? That will take a lot of time. Right now, I have very little hope for the Korean economy's recovery and for the influx of foreign currency.

Senator Dagenais: Mr. Robertson, do you have anything to add?

[English]

Mr. Robertson: I would say the country with greatest influence on North Korea is China. There are other six-party talks that we talked about which are dormant, but China wants to play now and wants to be seen as a great power. I think that's fair. Certainly economically they're finding their way now in the international organizations. The architecture we've designed — and here, Senator Campbell, I think the United Nations still has an important role to play — is not perfect, but it beats any alternative that we could create.

Going back to China, if China wants to be accorded great power status, then China has to take on some of the responsibilities of a great power. North Korea is largely a creature of its making. It sustains it. Its economy depends entirely on the lifeline provided to it by China, a bit like Cuba used to depend on Russia.

My sense is that the current Chinese leadership, with the change, is very disappointed about what is going on in North Korea, and they have let that be understood in the north. That's probably the best way for us to seek any kind of resolution in North Korea — working with China and letting China play the leader's role in the six-party talks and what goes on further, because China is in the best position to have influence on North Korea.

The Chair: Colleagues, could I ask one more question before we adjourn? One area we have not touched on is the possible threat of an electromagnetic pulse attack, a phraseology that most Canadians have never heard of. Do you have any knowledge of that? If you do, would you perhaps let us know what you do know?

Mr. de Kerckhove: I feel myself very cybernetically attacked.

Mr. Robertson: This is uncharted territory. The people to whom I have spoken all suggest to me that cyber threats are the great threats of the future. I've been to enough conferences of late to come back feeling very disquieted; and people I talk to who understand, no one is particularly well prepared.

We've seen demonstrations of cyber and, if you like, electronic pulse in a couple of instances. The Russians have used it on three or four occasions, Romania and a couple of others; the Iranians used it on Aramco; and there was the likelihood of perhaps an effort in the United States, until we came to the latest Iranian sessions.

It certainly is the one area where, again, the experts I talk to who understand this feel that we are not at all well prepared, but there is something that applies not just to the government side but also to the business community. Think about if all our ATM machines got shut down. We have seen ice storms in Quebec and here in Ottawa. We know what happens when things go down. If this were done by a hostile power, or simply a non-state actor, how do we cope with this? This is an area that requires a lot more attention.

The Chair: I want to follow up with one short question. The ballistic missile defence program that we've been referring to over the last hour and a half, is that the type of program that will be able to at least negate, in part, that kind of attack vis-à-vis the other types of attacks?

Mr. Robertson: No, sir. That's a different threat.

Mr. de Kerckhove: Can I make a quick point on the cybersecurity issue? But that would carry us much further. There is an issue out there. I tend to look at cybersecurity the way you look at arms control and disarmament. Is there a possibility of establishing a code of conduct when it comes to cybersecurity?

As I mentioned, the Americans call cybersecurity the fifth domain of war. How does one define, if at all, a cyberattack as an act of war? There are some who propose that we should do that in order to know what we are talking about. Are we talking about at the level of privacy or the industrial level, or are we talking about an attack against the state? Those distinctions are fairly academic, in the sense that they could be blurred. If you have a massive attack against your industry, in a way it's an attack on the state itself, and to the extent the Secretary

of Defense, Chuck Hagel, will say, "I don't care about the definition. This is war and we're responding."

The countries that are attacking are also the countries that will be attacked. At a certain state, is there a way to establish some confidence-building measure in that field in order to advance our general understanding of the issue? As Mr. Robertson says, this is very early days, but it is pretty ominous and dangerous.

The Chair: Gentlemen, it is five o'clock. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today. It has been very informative. We will now adjourn.

(The committee adjourned.)