



Security in an Uncertain World

A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept



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A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept

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In July 2009, with a view to releasing a new Strategic Concept for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the Alliance's Summit to be held in Portugal in late 2010, the Secretary General of NATO tasked a Group of Experts, headed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, with addressing the issue and proposing recommendations by the spring of 2010.

In the fall of 2009 members of the Ottawa-based Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute) came together to articulate a way ahead for NATO. The aim was to provide a public domain contribution to the work of the Group of Experts that would outline, from a Canadian perspective, the most salient challenges and opportunities facing the Alliance.

In early 2010 the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) of Calgary acknowledged the importance of the work the CDA Institute was undertaking, recognized its links with its own priorities and therefore chose to formally join the undertaking as a partner by offering the help of several subject matter experts.

The group of contributors to this project is a *mélange* of military, diplomatic and policy practitioners and academics. The range and weight of their experience—a former Minister of National Defence, three former Chiefs of the Defence Staff and a former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, a former Ambassador to NATO, a Clerk of the Privy Council, NATO field commanders, strategists and staff officers, former Ambassadors, public servants and politicians, academic experts, among others—deliver what we hope to be a paper that offers a vision for NATO's future that is grounded in the art of the possible.

Over the course of three workshops held in Ottawa, Ontario and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec, members of the group came together to advocate, discuss and refine their views. The result is a paper that reflects the collective opinion of the group, and not that of any one individual.

As lead author, Paul Chapin calmly and rigorously collected, expressed and refined the views of the various collaborators. We are most grateful for his outstanding work.

Additionally, special recognition is due to those individuals who contributed something extra to the production of the study:

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This is, in conclusion, a remarkable document. A Canadian perspective of the world all NATO members inhabit, informed by some of the most prominent minds Canada has to offer in defence, security and foreign policy. It is our fervent hope that this paper contributes to a betterment of the Alliance.

Alain Pellerin

Executive Director

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Executive Summary

Maintaining the security of liberal democratic states everywhere will pose great challenges in the 21st century. Freedom from physical attack or coercion, from internal subversion and from erosion of the political, economic and social values essential to people's way of life will all be under threat.

Problems will arise from great power ambitions, regional disputes, the collapse of states and ecological disasters. But widely accessible new technologies, the spread of weapons of mass effect, and a high degree of global mobility have increased the vulnerabilities of democratic states to adversaries with trans-national ideologies willing to use violence to achieve their aims. Radical Islamism is currently the most visible ideological opponent to have adopted methods which exploit these vulnerabilities, but it is not alone and certainly unlikely to be the last. Small numbers of persons can now deal potentially lethal blows to any society.

The security interests of liberal democratic states have become so interdependent that a global effort is required to protect these states, wherever they may be, from global or particular threats wherever they may arise. NATO has expanded to take in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, but it has been slow to partner with major democracies elsewhere.

During the Cold War, NATO endured because its members shared common interests and values they were prepared to defend against an existential threat from Soviet communism. Allies today do not perceive threats the same way and do not always seem to care enough about what unites them to forego the gratification of pursuing national interests that may undermine the security of others.

NATO decision-making is unnecessarily ponderous and afflicted by a "UN syndrome" according to which governments often authorize action without committing all the resources required for success. Furthermore the



Alliance still finances its peace support operations by relying on archaic arrangements which penalize those most willing to help.

Members' enormous military resources are designed mostly for static territorial defence and are, therefore, not suited to expeditionary campaigns. Non-military resources for policing, governance and reconstruction remain underdeveloped despite the importance of their role in the development and execution of the “exit strategy” for military engagements.

The current campaign in Afghanistan exemplifies all that is good in NATO. It also demonstrates that NATO needs a major overhaul. This paper proposes that the renewal of NATO be guided by four main concepts:

- (1) commitments must be supported by resources;
- (2) NATO and member-states must have well developed civil affairs capacity;
- (3) the costs of peace support operations must be commonly funded; and
- (4) NATO must enhance its special relationships with key democratic states outside the Euro-Atlantic region, especially those helping out in Afghanistan.



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Foreword

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The Canadian public has always been of two (or more) minds about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but the reasoning behind the ambivalence has shifted somewhat over time. For the first forty years of NATO, there was some constancy amongst the naysayers. After any major military conflict, including both World Wars and Korea, Canadians have had an understandable reaction to draw back from any prospect of armed conflict. Furthermore, we have spent some effort mythologizing ourselves as a non-military people. Plus, many Canadians are just plain cheap, particularly when it comes to security and defence. And others wondered how much effort we needed to put (again) into defending Europe. There was an inclination to fall back on the outdated but visceral sense that our geography might permit a benign isolationism.

On the other hand, most agreed that the Soviet Union and its allies did threaten us, both ideologically and militarily, and NATO was a key element of our response. Ironically, some of those who were rather less concerned about that threat, and who were uneasy about being too close to the United States, saw our involvement in NATO as a partial antidote to what would otherwise have been a defence relationship exclusively with the Americans. Canadians have made multilateralism almost into a religion, and NATO suited that in our sense of self. And for some, links with Europe via NATO helped to maintain a relationship with the lands from which they or their parents and grandparents had come.

But living in NATO was never easy. The consensus requirement in most aspects of NATO governance is notoriously ponderous and frustrating. And then the Cold War ended, a bit abruptly for some. NATO, while seeming on the surface to continue as before, shifted focus. So today, its tool kit doesn't perfectly align with its tasks. And, in its elephantine fashion, NATO now seeks to update its Strategic Concept.

Clearly, Canadians still need NATO to give effect to their



attachment to multilateralism. Indeed, NATO has in some ways also become the implementation device for UN decisions. But Canadians sense that a renewed NATO needs to become more relevant to Canada's interests and more responsive to the changing security situation. We feel acutely the imbalance in burden sharing in Afghanistan. And while the NATO community is a core grouping that reflects and represents the ideas of the world's developed and democratic states, it risks being too Eurocentric. Securing the Euro-Atlantic community is important, but the Alliance also needs tangible links with a few comparable states or groupings outside of Europe, particularly in the Pacific where Canada has vital interests. Some wonder if a whole new alliance might be the answer but, empirically, one has a better chance of success building on what exists than one does starting from scratch.

Furthermore, some commitment of resources in advance on some agreed ratios is desperately needed to enable more timely responses. Indeed, with the modern evolution of threats, most critical NATO responses lie somewhere between the situations envisioned in either Article 4 or Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. And there is no Article 4.5 to facilitate a robust response to serious threats which are just short of existential. NATO will need to invent both the strategic framework and the rapid response tools to nip such threats in the bud, and to serve the broader ideals espoused in the ringing words of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute hope this paper, written from a Canadian perspective, contributes to that evolution.



Introduction

NATO was born in crisis and has endured through sixty years of controversy and calamity. From that day in Washington in 1949, when the founding states signed the organization into existence, and in every decade since, some of the greatest statesmen of the times have predicted NATO's demise.

Through forty years of the Cold War, NATO was rocked by disagreements over Suez and Hungary, France's withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated military command, détente with Moscow, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Poland's effort to throw off the yoke of communism, nuclear policy, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, energy dependency, the reunification of Germany, the Balkans, and combating terrorism. With the end of the Cold War, some argued NATO no longer had a purpose. For a brief moment after 9/11, the Alliance stood united as never before. Barely a year later many wondered whether the organization would survive the pitched verbal battles fought among its members in the North Atlantic Council chamber in Brussels, in the corridors of the United Nations in New York and in the capitals of states undecided over the invasion of Iraq.

Why NATO has endured is one thing. Why it should continue to do so and how it needs to adapt to meet the challenges of the 21st century is the subject of this paper.

Periodically in its history, after bruising encounters had alarmed Alliance leaders over the future viability of the organization, NATO has paused to take stock. The first two of these reviews are still reckoned to have been the best: the 1956 *Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO* and the 1967 Harmel Report on *The Future Tasks of the Alliance*. With the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO sought to articulate its future purpose and direction in the Strategic Concept of 1991, in a further Strategic Concept in 1999, in the *Comprehensive Political Guidance* of 2006, and in the *Declaration on Alliance Security* of 2009. These helped to better focus NATO's efforts, restructure the



organization, streamline command arrangements and generally improve the Alliance's responsiveness to the evolving security environment, but did not dispose of some of the more persistent problems related to how NATO conducts its affairs.

In April 2009, at their most recent summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, NATO heads of state and government tasked the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept to guide the Alliance in the years ahead. Anders Fogh Rasmussen has since appointed a group of twelve experts, representing large and small NATO member-states, the private sector, think tanks and academia, to consider the issue and present its findings in the spring of 2010. The group is chaired by Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, and includes Marie Gervais-Vidricaire, former Permanent Representative of Canada to the International Organizations at Vienna and Canadian Ambassador to Austria. The work of the Group of Experts, including their conclusions and recommendations, will help inform a report the Secretary General will prepare for Allies' consideration. The draft Strategic Concept will then be negotiated over the summer for agreement at a NATO Summit expected to be held in Portugal in November 2010.

The paper that follows is offered as a contribution to NATO's current deliberations on the future of the Alliance. It is the product of collaboration among military and civilian members of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute in Ottawa and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute in Calgary: military, diplomats and academics working together.

The paper is not intended to be a comprehensive review of NATO's past or current record. Our purpose, rather, is to offer an appreciation of the current obstacles to NATO's fulfilment of its mission "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization" of member-states, and to outline what we believe to be the most important avenues of inquiry in developing a new NATO



Strategic Concept. The paper is driven by a desire to see the Alliance continue to deliver effective collective defence and security for its members and to contribute to international peace and security. It is informed by Canada's experience as a longstanding member of the Alliance, extensive engagement in international stability operations, and active contribution to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.





An examination of Canada's experience in NATO helps to shed light on the origins of the Alliance and on the national interests all members have in ensuring the Alliance is able to deal with the security challenges of the 21st century.

CANADA AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Canada is a founding member of NATO. It can also lay claim to being one of the earliest advocates of collective defence against Soviet aggression in Europe. In September 1947, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, warned the UN General Assembly that if the Security Council remained frozen in inactivity, some members "may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security."

In March 1948, the United States invited Britain and Canada to participate in secret conversations in Washington to consider defence options for the future. Among the options explored, three were accorded particular consideration:

- (1) an extension of the Treaty of Brussels among Britain, France and the Benelux countries to include the United States and Canada;
- (2) a broader Atlantic Pact involving all the democratic states of Europe and North America; and
- (3) a worldwide alliance of free nations.

After some deliberation, the parties agreed on the second option and established a working group to produce, by September 1948, the first draft of what would become the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949.

Having advanced the idea of NATO, Canada almost did



“Canada can claim to be one of the earliest advocates of collective defence.”



“Since the inception of the Alliance, Article 2—the affirmation of democratic principles—has been known as the Canadian article.”

not join. Canada had been a major wartime military power. Out of a population of just over 11 million, 1.1 million Canadians had served in uniform. Canada's 400-ship navy had fought the Battle of the Atlantic. Almost fifty squadrons of Canadian fighters and bombers had helped win the Battle of Britain, establish air superiority over Europe, and bomb Hitler's Germany. The Canadian army played a major role in the liberation of Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In June 1944, one of the five beaches in Normandy was Canadian; in March 1945, two Canadian divisions crossed the Rhine at Rees; in April 1945 five Canadian divisions liberated the Netherlands. More than 45,000 Canadians died in that war, and once it was over Canadians wanted nothing more than to return to the peace and security of their homes across the Atlantic. By the end of 1946, the regular forces numbered under 50,000 and not a single Canadian military unit remained in Europe.

In the circumstances, the government knew it would be difficult to convince its citizens that Canada should join yet another military alliance to defend Europe. Some larger purpose would have to be served if Canadians were to enter into new obligations towards the old continent. The answer lay in the concept of an Atlantic Community, a coalition of democracies united not only to deter Soviet aggression but also to offer hope to the defeated and impoverished populations of Europe. With the United Nations already proving incapable of protecting and promoting the liberal values it espoused, NATO would demonstrate there was in fact a viable democratic alternative to Soviet communism. The US government and Congress opposed assigning NATO any purpose other than a military one, fearing the obligations it might entail. When it became clear, however, that Canada would be hesitant to join a purely military pact, a strong statement of democratic principles and an undertaking in Article 2 (later known as the Canadian article) that members would strengthen their free institutions and cooperate for the general welfare, were included in the North Atlantic Treaty.



“How are Canada’s interests in security, economic well-being and a stable world order served by being a member of NATO?”

Such was the NATO Canada wanted and joined, and such is the NATO that has so appealed to its newest members. As Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Solomon Passy noted in April 2004, “NATO enlargement ... laid the foundations of an historic process: the return of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to their natural environment of civilization and their affiliation with the common values of the Euro-Atlantic area.”

CANADA'S SECURITY INTERESTS

Traditionally, for its security, Canada could count on two oceans, an impenetrable north, and a usually benign neighbour to the south. The pillars of national defence were the Royal Navy and, after 1940, alliance with the United States. These were natural arrangements for Canada to make, given the country's focus on growing its economy, its concern with national unity and the minimal threats to its people and territory. In contrast, taking out membership in the broader defence community of NATO and thereby committing Canada in peacetime to expensive military obligations in distant lands was a remarkable step for the country to take, not just in the context of the costs of the Second World War but also from a larger strategic perspective. Only the parlous condition of democratic Europe at war's end could have justified such a course.

Today, Europe is secure and more than capable of defending itself. Canadians in some respects have returned to “square one,” asking questions of the kind others did when contemplating joining NATO in the years after it was founded:


- How are our interests in security, economic well-being and a stable world order served by being a member of the Alliance?
- What is NATO's contribution to addressing the global threats we face such as terrorism and extremism, the political and economic instability of the world order,




“Canada is a North American, Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific nation, with longstanding ties to Central and South America.”

Canada in Afghanistan


High Incidence Zones



Canadian Contribution



7% of all non-US NATO Troops



24% of all non-US NATO Casualties

Source: *icasualties.org* (1 Jan 2010)

regional conflicts, the spread of weapons of mass effect, resource scarcities, the fragile environment, health pandemics, uncontrolled migration, illegal refugee flows and organized crime?

- What obligations does membership require us to assume towards others and what help could we expect from them in return?

Canada, a North American, Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific nation with longstanding ties to Central and South America, is neither a military superpower able to go it alone nor a member of the European Union—a political and economic grouping of over 500 million people. Our national interests therefore will never be fully secure, our policy choices will always be subject to change and our relationships will constantly be under scrutiny. For Canadians, NATO is a means to an end—not an end in itself. Should the Alliance cease to serve Canadian interests or the opportunity costs of membership become too great, it would be incumbent on the government to consider other avenues of security.

Current trends within the Alliance are not particularly promising for Canadians. One seldom hears the term “Atlantic Community” anymore in the corridors of NATO. The talk is of relations between the United States and Europe, the role of the European Union in NATO, and further extending NATO membership to other countries in Europe. “Canada” does not feature much in these conversations.

There is talk in Canada about Europe, however, and it is not always complimentary. Canadians understand that wars entail casualties. What they do not understand is a war conducted by an Alliance, some of whose members seem little disturbed by the inequitable sharing of the burdens of war. For Canada, the financial cost of Afghanistan has been enormous, by some estimates approaching 2 billion dollars a year. But it is the human toll most Canadians care about.



Canada's continued membership in NATO is not in question—for the present. In a recent opinion poll, some 82 percent of Canadians favoured remaining in NATO. But as allied governments proceed with the development of a new Strategic Concept, they may wish to consider the following.

Canada's interests are not served when NATO:

- limits its mission and objectives to the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic region, forgetting that NATO's borders extend to the Arctic and the Pacific and disregarding security interests shared with democratic states in other regions;
- delays building an Alliance capacity to coordinate and manage the non-military aspects of NATO-led peace support operations;
- avoids dealing with the issue of burden sharing within the Alliance;
- continues to pursue a “wide open door” policy focused on expanding NATO membership to the east;
- accords the European Union preferred status within NATO; and
- compromises the sovereignty of individual members and undermines the authority of the North Atlantic Council when the European Union and the United States “consult” on an issue and then present to the Council a *fait accompli*.





Weapons of Mass Effect

As globalization spreads and technological acumen increases, barriers erode to the acquisition of the knowledge, resources, components and materials required for the production of weapons of mass effect (WME). Compounding the difficulty of control is the fact that WME constituent elements have multiple uses and can, with relative ease, be converted from legitimate to nefarious uses.

When the capability these weapons represent is coupled with the motivation of entities or states challenging and defying the world order through violent means, proliferation poses a clear and present danger.

The prevention of proliferation is inherently political in character while protection against the use of WME resides in security structures. Both prevention and protection will require wider and deeper synchronization between the political and military structures of democratic states.

WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Refusal of human beings to be bound either by a fatalism about their circumstances or by servitude to others is at the root of Western civilization. It is these values of hope and belief in the dignity of the individual which have, since Greek and Roman times, most distinguished democratic states from the *dirigiste* and totalitarian models of human organization so appealing to autocrats. Unfortunately, no more than a small portion of humanity has ever enjoyed life under justice and liberty. Having secured such a life, people all too often have lost it.

The United Nations was created to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to expand the writ of justice and liberty throughout the world. In the preamble to the UN Charter, the founding nations reaffirmed their faith “in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” Regrettably, within four years of the founding of the world body, the Soviet Union had annexed parts of four countries, taken control of some 92 million people in seven states and blockaded Berlin. In response, democratic states in North America and Europe, still believing in the goals of the United Nations, set out to do what they could in their own region to achieve them. When they formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, they declared their continued faith in “the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” while expressing their determination “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

With the onset of the Cold War, it was not clear that the European democracies would actually have the will to prevail in what John F. Kennedy would later describe as “a long twilight struggle” with Soviet communism. In



The Bear and the Dragon

Russia, which once constituted an existential threat to Western civilization, today is a partner in the fight against terrorism, in non-proliferation, in counter-narcotics, in civil emergency planning, and in military-to-military cooperation. But Russia's military action in Georgia, suspension of implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, rebuilding of its military, and manipulation of energy flows to Europe illustrate that there are still serious security issues to be resolved. The fragile state of democracy in Russia places severe limits on the extent of possible cooperation in the future.

China has been "westernizing" at a rapid pace and its economic ties with the rest of the world are a promising development. China, however, remains a one-party state with a government accountable only to itself, and it has been exploiting its newly acquired economic wealth to finance a major expansion of its military and to invest in oil and mineral resources across the globe. Its future intentions are unclear.

1951, Barbara Ward of *The Economist* wondered why “the crusaders for freedom and progress, for man's ever-renewed struggle to build a just and holy society, appear to be on the defensive before those who seek to eliminate human freedom and restore the twin tyrannies of fate and government.” Her explanation was that too many in the West had sloughed off their society's traditional idealism and she warned that “an idea has never yet in human history been defeated by no idea at all.”

Détente and arms control allowed a measure of “peaceful co-existence” to prevail, but there is little question now that the Cold War only ended after democratic states renewed their faith in Western values and helped rekindle the spirit of freedom and democracy among the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. One wonders today whether that spirit is waning again. As the late French philosopher Jean-François Revel remarked, “Clearly, a civilization that feels guilty for everything it is and does will lack the energy and conviction to defend itself.”

The 20th century was the most violent in history because of ideas that challenged the basic principles of Western civilization. Wars between nations killed millions, but it was state-sponsored killings that gave the century its special notoriety. Some 135 million people were murdered by their own governments, and it was ideas, not grievances, that were at the root of the violence. As the eminent British historian of the 20th century, Paul Johnson, has written:

By the year 1900 politics was already replacing religion as the chief form of zealotry. To archetypes of the new class, such as Lenin, Hitler and Mao Tse-tung, politics—by which they meant the engineering of society for lofty purposes—was the one legitimate form of moral activity, the only sure means of improving humanity. This view, which would have struck



International Terrorism

Widely accessible new technologies, the spread of weapons of mass effect and a high degree of global mobility have increased the ease with which adversaries, including non-state actors, can disrupt open societies. As a result, any transnational group willing to use violence for whatever reason – religious extremism, aversion to the wealth and resources of the industrialized states, a desire to assert power, or for other reasons – risks becoming a formidable threat to democratic states.

Many of the world's most noxious ideologies are currently at a low ebb and are unlikely to be able to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of open societies. But some are demonstrably able to do so, radical Islamism currently being the most visible example. It is not alone, however, and is unlikely to be the last.

an earlier age as fantastic, even insane, became to some extent the orthodoxy everywhere: diluted in the West, in virulent form in the Communist countries and much of the Third World.

Notwithstanding the tragedies of Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur, organized mass murder has not continued on anything like the scale it once reached. But the idea of improving humanity using the instruments of the state lives on despite its discreditable record. Both Marxism-Leninism and fascism remain dangerous, absolved of their “excesses” and controlling dozens of states across the globe. Meanwhile, ideology has taken a violent new form in radical Islamism, the outgrowth of a corrupted version of one of the world's great religions whose adherents aspire to establishing a new worldwide community antithetical to democratic notions of human rights and government of, by and for the people. Fringe elements are waging a *jihad* that has wrought havoc on Muslim and non-Muslim states alike and will likely remain a challenge for years to come.

THE CHANGED SECURITY DYNAMICS

The 20th century witnessed not only world wars and the rise and fall of empires and ideologies, but also a quantum increase in the complexity of world affairs. The result has been a corresponding reduction in predictability and a greater risk of strategic surprise. In earlier times, the dominant players were few, people and events moved in a relatively linear fashion, and possible outcomes were finite. Today, the interaction of states, peoples, cultures, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, transnational crime syndicates, terrorist groups and a global media have vastly complicated the business of understanding events and trends, anticipating problems, and reacting in a timely and effective manner.

The security problems that confront NATO members today take many forms and are no longer confined to the Euro-Atlantic region. Some are both substantively and



Effects of Climate Change

Geo-strategy is the effect of geography and demography on strategy. Climate change, irrespective of its genesis, is having an indisputable effect in redrawing our world and affecting geo-strategy.

On the one hand, previously impassable maritime zones are now open, creating friction between states as competitive access to fishing, mineral and energy resources increases. This friction manifests itself in assertions of sovereignty over previously ignored or inaccessible waters and potential conflict over disputed continental shelves, notably in the Arctic.

On the other hand, with 80 percent of the world's population living within reach of the sea, rising sea levels and consequent flooding may induce wholesale displacement of certain populations. Equally, reduced rainfall may increase the size of drought belts and areas affected by desertification, change patterns of food production and create regional resource competition – security concerns for the whole world.

geographically different from those posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies during the Cold War. Great power ambitions are a perennial source of concern, as are the disputes over territory and resources that have long plagued so many regions of the world. In the future, however, NATO is likely to find itself preoccupied with a much broader range of issues of global reach. The failure of states and their spill-over effects, the clandestine market in weapons of mass effect and their means of delivery, degradation of the environment, dependency on foreign sources of energy, transportation and communications interdependence, all represent growing problems for the continued political and economic well-being of Alliance members. As a consequence, NATO will have to become a far more outward looking organization and equip itself with a wider spectrum of tools, both military and non-military, to protect its interests effectively. In the case where threats defy conventional response, ingenuity will be required.

Widely accessible new technologies, the spread of weapons of mass effect and a high degree of global mobility have increased the ease with which adversaries, including non-state actors, can disrupt democratic societies. Open societies, as the world has learned, are particularly vulnerable in these new times. Not only are their internal jurisdictions and international frontiers—terrestrial, spatial, spectral, virtual and psychological—porous, they are porous by design and intended to remain that way.

This opens the door to any transnational group, willing to use violence for whatever reason, becoming a formidable threat to developed democratic states, even if the states that sponsor them are themselves relatively weak by classical standards. Many of the world's most noxious ideologies are currently at a low ebb and unlikely to be able to take advantage of the new vulnerabilities of open societies, but some are demonstrably able to do so. Hence the relative ease with which Al Qaeda teams were



Failed and Failing States

Global stability is shaken when states fail or are failing. Characteristics of such states include the loss of physical control of territory, violent armed internal unrest, and the limited ability of a state to exercise its legitimate authority and provide basic services to the population. Warning signs include corruption, displacement of populations and sharp economic decline.

The Fund for Peace Failed State Index classifies 38 of 177 states as meriting alert status. Many of these are located along the fault lines of security problems related to energy dependence, proliferation of weapons of mass effect, territorial conflict, great power boundary disputes and climate change.

Containing the spillover effects of failed and fragile states and rebuilding war-torn societies are primary concerns of the Alliance.

able to penetrate advanced states possessing well-equipped military and police forces and kill civilians in the streets, metros and railway stations. Radical Islamism is currently the most visible ideological opponent to have adopted methods which rely upon the vulnerabilities of open societies, but it is not alone and certainly unlikely to be the last. Armed with modern technology and weapons of mass effect, small numbers of persons can now deal potentially lethal blows to any society.

For democratic states, freedom from physical attack or coercion, from internal subversion and from erosion of the political, economic and social values that are essential to people's way of life will all be under threat in the 21st century. At stake is the continued ability to maintain open civil societies in the face of assault from both outside and inside.

THE DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE

One of the principal policy questions of our time is how democratic states ought to respond to the new security environment.

In April 2009 a study by NATO's Allied Command Transformation, entitled the *Multiple Futures Project*, concluded that the Alliance was unlikely to face a large-scale conventional confrontation but forecast trouble due to "unbridled extremism, uncontrolled and illegal migration, and friction caused by resource scarcity," much of it originating in unstable societies with little or no functioning government. Technology would increase both the breadth of Alliance vulnerabilities and the ease with which adversaries could disrupt Western societies. Adversaries would focus less on external attack than on targeting populations, centres of commerce and economic and social networks.

This means that NATO will have to devise solutions to a wide variety of security problems, whatever the motives



Cyber Challenges

States and businesses worldwide increasingly report cyber attacks known to be costly to defend against. The disruption to infrastructure by such attacks risks being catastrophic.

In May 2007 Estonia suffered disruptive cyber attacks against its infrastructure, allegedly from Russia. China-based hackers have been implicated in cyber attacks against Western states and commercial interests. Most recently, alleged Chinese hackers targeted Google's operations in that country.

Many nations and groups have developed offensive cyber capabilities. These capabilities can rival conventional military power because of the low acquisition and development costs as well as their destructive potential.

Because tools to pinpoint the source of cyber attacks remain imprecise, provisions for the collective defence of the Alliance against such attacks are difficult to apply.

of an adversary might be: religious extremism, aversion to the wealth and resources of the industrialized democracies, a desire to assert power or other impulses. The main challenge will be to deal with hybrid attacks that combine traditional and irregular methods of warfare, terrorism and subversion, exploit alliances with organized crime and the proceeds these generate and use mass media to try to reshape values and behaviours. In the circumstances, the response strategies will also have to be hybrid, combining a “home” game of domestic measures and an “away” game of engagement and intervention, force and persuasion, military, police and civilian resources and multi-track approaches.

The future is not going to be easy for NATO. The evolving nature of the security environment will challenge efforts to reach consensus on what constitutes a threat, gives rise to an obligation to consult about when security is threatened under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or compels a response to an attack under Article 5. It will require allies, individually and collectively, to act outside NATO's traditional areas of responsibility, to engage in the “battle of the narrative” with adversaries disputing the values and ideals at the heart of democratic society, to transform their militaries from stay-at-home territorial forces to go-abroad expeditionary forces, to build police and civilian “surge” capacity that can partner with the military in security sector reform of failed states, and to leverage relationships with other countries and institutions contributing to international peace and security.



Strategy for the Alliance



“NATO succeeded where the United Nations failed for the simple reason that it could not afford to fail.”

The successful defence of Alliance interests will be a function of several factors. Among the most important will be intellectual leadership, common effort among democratic states, and institutional architecture suited to dealing with the security challenges confronting democracies in the 21st century.

INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP

Intellectual leadership will be critical. Democratic leaders today face policy challenges not unlike those that confronted statesmen and strategists after the First World War and again after the Second World War, when the best minds of the day struggled to make sense of political, economic and social forces for which there were few precedents and traditional policies were patently inadequate.

In 1945, it was the United Nations that was supposed to provide the leadership; when it could not, the task fell to NATO. NATO succeeded where the United Nations failed for the simple reason that it could not afford to fail. NATO's founding nations knew what was at stake and how much depended on “getting it right,” in other words realistically appraising the facts that confronted them and developing a strategy suited to those facts. Allies today are less clear about their common interests, what threatens them, and how to secure them.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the subsequent emergence of more than two dozen new democracies justifiably generated a good deal of optimism about the future. In place of historic enmities and ideological conflicts, there would be a new world order governed in accordance with liberal democratic principles. In due course reality intruded, but hopes and dreams die hard. Some cultivated a studied ignorance of the new dangers that were gathering, others were sure problems were of the West's own making, caused by a failure to connect with those nurturing grievances against democratic society or by the overweening ambition of



“...the founding nations had declared the purposes of the Alliance to be ‘to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples.’ ”

the remaining “hyperpower.” Instead of a cold-eyed appreciation of Alliance interests and what imperilled them, fixed ideas trumped analysis: Americans were aggressive and impulsive, Europeans were self-absorbed and complacent, disarmament was the road to peace, multilateralism was essential.

NATO was the one constant in an otherwise unstable and disorienting time. But even NATO displayed some uncertainty about its mission, issuing a battery of guidance documents to account for changes in the international security environment and prescribing various course corrections. In the process, NATO leaders revised the mission of the Alliance—and re-wrote the North Atlantic Treaty without acknowledging they had done so. In the preamble to the Treaty, the founding nations had declared the purposes of the Alliance to be “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,” “to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area,” and “to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.” In the Strategic Concept of 1991, the purposes had become “to safeguard the freedom and security” of members and to establish “a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.” This formulation was repeated in the Strategic Concept of 1999.

The Alliance is overdue for a new grand strategy that confirms the continued relevance of the 1949 goals, clarifies NATO's purposes in the 21st century, addresses the new security realities dispassionately and without illusion, lays out the objectives that will drive its efforts, and outlines a course of action to protect and promote the interests of its members.

COMMON EFFORT AMONG DEMOCRATIC STATES

Individual democracies cannot hope to protect their security interests successfully on their own. Only a collective effort can ensure that the measures and



“Today, the security interests of liberal democratic states are so interdependent that a global effort is needed to protect these states.”


resources necessary to dispose of security threats will be mobilized and deployed to best effect. Since liberal democratic states throughout the world share the same security concerns, a global effort is needed to protect these states wherever they may be from global or particular threats wherever they arise.

A number of options are conceivable. One is to assign the task of defending the security interests of democratic states to an organization with a broader mandate than that of NATO, such as a reformed United Nations or a new global security organization. Strengthening the security role and operational capabilities of the United Nations would clearly be desirable, but recent failed efforts at reform suggest little improvement should be expected in the foreseeable future. Nor is there any prospect that key states would be willing, any time soon, to undertake the monumental task of establishing a new worldwide institution.

More feasible would be to consider expanding NATO membership beyond the Euro-Atlantic area to include states that share NATO's democratic values in regions where NATO's interests are engaged. A number of these states have been making substantial contributions to NATO purposes and missions, as well as to international peace and security more broadly, and NATO would clearly benefit from their joining the Alliance. In return, of course, NATO would be assuming additional security obligations at a time when its capabilities are already stretched. In light of the change agenda facing the organization, an early move towards membership for states outside the Euro-Atlantic area would likely be “a bridge too far.” At minimum, NATO should provide key democratic states better access to its decision-making process, establishing standing mechanisms that would transform these states into real partners closely involved in NATO's political deliberations and planning for security contingencies. The list could include but not be limited to states which have made contributions to NATO missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.



“...the intention to expand NATO further eastward deserves a serious rethink.”



- NATO Countries
- NATO Countries that have joined since fall of Soviet Union
- Slated for membership between now and 2012
- Under consideration for membership



Meanwhile, the intention to expand NATO further eastward deserves a serious rethink. Even the most rudimentary cost-benefit analysis suggests doing so is fraught with risks, now and in the future, and to little discernible gain. The current list of prospective members is problematic from two perspectives: it represents a heavy net burden to the Alliance, and it carries the potential for NATO becoming enmeshed in internecine disputes of the very kind NATO's founders worked hard to keep the Alliance out of. Given the very serious security problems it already faces and the limitations on its existing capacity, the Alliance has nothing to gain from allowing its attention to be diverted by third-tier problems at least as vexing as those between Turkey and Greece which have encumbered the organization so long and so pointlessly.

The issue of Ukraine's possible membership in NATO is of a different order. Membership would be desirable, but only if there were strong support for the idea in Ukraine itself and only if it helped advance international peace and security in the region. Russia can claim no veto on the issue, but it has legitimate security interests in the matter that should not be dismissed lightly.

INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Every age needs institutional architecture designed for the specific security challenges it faces. The United Nations and NATO were the products of their time and both—the former less successfully than the latter—have served the cause of international peace and security. In addition, regional and functional organizations of many kinds have appeared since 1945 to help address security issues of great variety. International law has barely kept pace.

Few would argue that the United Nations should continue to provide the foundation for the security regime of the 21st century, much as it desperately needs reform of its political and collective security functions

“If NATO is to undertake complex peace support operations, it is imperative that it improve collaboration with the other international organizations it encounters in theatre.”

and of its bloated and costly humanitarian and developmental operations. This paper argues strongly for retaining NATO as the primary means for ensuring the security, defence and economic well-being of the democracies of the Euro-Atlantic region, much as NATO too needs reform.

One area requiring particular attention is NATO's relationships with other international organizations. If NATO is to undertake complex peace support operations, it is imperative that it improve collaboration with the other international organizations it encounters in theatre, notably the United Nations, the European Union, regional organizations in Asia, Africa and the Americas, and the world's foremost humanitarian non-governmental organizations. Strategic alignment holds the potential for dramatic improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, through joint planning for contingencies, coordination of effort in the field and judicious utilization of the resources committed by NATO members for security and reconstruction.

Engineering an effective division of labour among institutions with overlapping and sometimes conflicting mandates is a daunting task, but not an impossible one. NATO member-states are typically also members of other international organizations and in a position to exercise considerable political and financial influence over those organizations whose cooperation NATO needs. In the final analysis, an operation will be “joint and combined” to the extent national capitals insist on it.







THE NEW FACE OF THE ALLIANCE

NATO has been history's most successful alliance. Led by the United States which contributed most of the personnel, money and strategy, NATO has delivered sixty years of unprecedented peacetime collaboration among Western democracies, providing a trusted means for its members to discuss security issues affecting one or more of them and developing effective responses when required. Given this record, NATO clearly ought to be the instrument of choice for defending and promoting the security interests of democratic states in the years ahead.

Not everyone believes this. Some have characterized NATO as a relic. It served its purpose during the Cold War, but it is now an obstacle to progress and should be closed down. If there were no NATO, it is argued, there would still be a transatlantic dialogue, just not in the institutionalized form of today. Others believe NATO could remain useful in the short term by continuing to provide stability in Europe while the European Union builds up its defence capabilities. But if it is to have any value in the longer term, they believe NATO needs to be transformed into a global collective security organization, possibly including Russia, China and other states. Still others are resigned to NATO continuing in much the same form as exists today, but they doubt its ability to adapt to the new security environment.

In fact, NATO has demonstrated an admirable ability to adapt:

- from twelve original members, the Alliance has grown to twenty-eight with still more states expressing a desire to join. NATO also has partnership arrangements with twenty-two other countries and an active security dialogue with seven states in the Middle East and North Africa;

- just twenty-five years ago, the Alliance devoted its efforts entirely to preparing to defend against a



“The very fact the Alliance finds itself deeply involved in a war in Afghanistan described as an ‘out-of-area’ operation is testimony to the obsolescence of NATO's current Strategic Concept.”

high-intensity attack from the Warsaw Pact, relying on hundreds of thousands of military personnel and materiel to be available on short notice, on many hundreds of military bases, and on long-developed infrastructure, logistics and communications systems. It has since shed great numbers of personnel, closed bases, and decommissioned thousands of pieces of unneeded equipment, while increasing the deployability of its forces and upgrading its equipment.

Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance's defence effort was focused exclusively on Europe and the North Atlantic; NATO conducted no operations or exercises outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, it is conducting operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, training Iraqi security forces, monitoring the Mediterranean for terrorists and illegal arms shipments, supporting the African Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Sudan, and combating piracy off the Horn of Africa. NATO has also provided assistance to natural disaster relief operations in Pakistan and the Philippines.

It is incontestable that the Alliance was created to counter the threat of Soviet communism and that its members face an entirely different set of challenges now. But if the threat has changed, NATO's mission to protect the security and territorial integrity of its members remains the same—and its continued existence remains essential. No other organization binds together the North American and European democracies, presents the common front that deters aggression, marshals the resources to respond to threats effectively, and provides the means for nations great and small to participate in decisions affecting their vital interests.

But the very fact the Alliance finds itself deeply involved in a war in Afghanistan described as an “out-of-area” operation is testimony to the obsolescence of NATO's current Strategic Concept. Afghanistan exemplifies all that is good in NATO—the noble intentions of its governments, the professionalism of its soldiers, the



“Merely refining procedures created to counter a totally different threat could leave NATO in a weak position when strength and nimbleness will be critical. In brief, the organization needs a major overhaul.”

concern for the civilian population, the spirit of self-sacrifice. But it also tells the story of the further changes NATO must make to respond to the new security realities. Afghanistan represents a transformative challenge for the Alliance.

If NATO is to endure with an altered mission, a whole series of questions arise relating to its members' commitment to a common cause, their decision-making process, the resources they are prepared to devote, their willingness to share burdens evenly, how they manage operations, and their responsiveness to crises. Merely refining procedures created to counter a totally different threat could leave NATO in a weak position when strength and nimbleness will be critical. In brief, the organization needs a major overhaul.

THE CHANGE AGENDA

(a) The obligations of alliance

Democratic states share interests and values that reflect their “common heritage and civilization.” Seldom, however, do they all agree on the precise character of the security problems they face or the dangers these pose. Part of the reason is that states almost never face the same threats in the same way at the same time. Additionally, disagreement and debate are embedded in the DNA of democratic societies: opinion ranges across the political spectrum from left to right, which in turn informs how individuals view the world and how they respond to events.

NATO has experienced much dissension, but rarely have members pushed disputes to the point of damaging the security interests of fellow allies. NATO endured for sixty years not just because its members shared common interests and values they were prepared to defend together, but also because they recognized that the things about which they agreed needed to constrain the intensity and duration of their disputes over the things



“Absent greater respect for the obligations allies assume toward each other, the predictions of NATO’s demise may one day be finally realized.”

about which they disagreed. In due course, changes of government helped to bury old quarrels and repair relationships.

Most agree today that what unites allies continues to dwarf what divides them. But it is not clear that governments always care enough about what unites them to forego the gratification of pursuing national interests that may undermine the security of others. Such, arguably, was the case in respect of Suez in 1956 and Iraq in 2003. The latter dispute was all the more surprising for having occurred barely eighteen months after 9/11 when NATO allies were never more united. “Today, we are all Americans,” wrote the editor of *Le Monde*.

What the Iraq dispute demonstrated is how circumscribed can be NATO members' understanding of the role of respect, deference and compromise in sustaining viable partnerships over the long term: the obligation to consult has long been recognized, but the broader obligations of alliance remain to be defined. Tempers have cooled since 2003, new leaders and political parties are in power in most of the countries involved in the Iraq dispute and the opportunity should be seized to define the principles that ought to guide Alliance membership. A reaffirmation of the obligations allies assume toward each other and NATO on entering the Alliance would undoubtedly benefit NATO's common effort in Afghanistan. Absent greater respect for these obligations, the predictions of NATO's demise may one day finally be realized.

(b) Decision-making

In contrast to the United Nations, NATO has been described as the place where the serious people gather to discuss international security problems and decide on the appropriate action. As a forum for dialogue on security and defence matters, it is unmatched. NATO provides member governments great and small with enhanced access to information on international



“Decision-making today is too often argumentative and ponderous...”

developments and exposure to the policies, programs, activities and intentions of fellow members of the Alliance. And when NATO makes a decision, action follows.

For all that, NATO must improve how it makes decisions. Decision-making today is too often argumentative and ponderous, as representatives in Brussels debate principles and precedents while national capitals proceed cautiously in approving action that may be laden with cost and political controversy at home. As NATO's attention has shifted increasingly to peace support operations outside the Euro-Atlantic region, there needs to be a corresponding shift in how NATO makes decisions and manages crises.

Four dimensions of decision-making require attention:

The consensus principle

The first is the Alliance's longstanding tradition of making decisions by consensus. At the United Nations, majority rules—and often misrules. In NATO, out of respect for the sovereignty of member-states and their determination to reserve to themselves decisions on such consequential matters as war and peace, the principle is that decisions require the unanimous approval of all the members. It is a formula that has served the Alliance well if not without controversy for a long time. NATO has achieved greater unity of purpose over a longer period of time than any other security-mandated organization ever established, and the consensus principle has helped ensure that when allies agree, especially on contentious issues, the course of action they decide on can be sustained over an extended period of time.

Securing all-nation agreement can be a challenge even when an issue is not contentious. It is often a time-consuming process and it sometimes requires allies to settle for a decision that satisfies almost no one. But over



“Some modification of the consensus principle may be warranted in light of the expeditionary tasks the Alliance has been taking on.”

time nations have taken a nuanced approach to decision-making by which members most affected by a problem assume the lead in fashioning the solution and less-affected members “join the consensus” or remain silent even in cases where they may have reservations about the action proposed. From time to time, individual members have blocked consensus for spurious reasons in order to extract a concession on an unrelated matter or to give vent to disputes between governments. In the final analysis, however, consensus works.

Some modification of the consensus principle may nonetheless be warranted in light of the expeditionary tasks the Alliance has been taking on in recent years. As long as NATO was focused on the defence of territory, planning and management were not much hindered by the requirement for unanimity. But deployment of forces on operational missions is another matter.

Clearly, consensus must prevail when the North Atlantic Council approves a mission, sets its strategic objectives and agrees on rules of engagement. But once these steps have been taken, it is not always clear that unanimity is either necessary or desirable. It would seem self-evident that the Alliance as a whole suffers when the requirement for consensus serves to stifle debate below the levels of the Council or the Military Committee, prevents valuable information or views from informing their deliberations, allows only lowest common denominator recommendations to go forward, and slows action in theatre.

When and how the principle of consensus ought to be waived requires study.

There is an intangible quality to consensus that serves as glue for collaboration that must not be jettisoned too freely. Whenever NATO decides, allies retain an interest in the outcome regardless of subsequent involvement. But when the stakes are higher for some than others, the views of those with the most to gain or



“Too often, NATO successes have come to depend on the near unilateral infusion of US assets.”

lose deserve greater weight. Conversely, members with little at stake ought not to be able to block consensus or delay progress through obstructive action in the low-profile committees of the Alliance where the critical work of mission planning takes place. At the very least, they should be held to account and required to defend their positions at the highest levels of the organization.

The UN syndrome

A second dimension of NATO decision-making requiring review is the practice of governments approving operations without committing the resources necessary to achieve their objectives. Too often, the Alliance has been afflicted by the so-called “UN syndrome”: crises have driven the North Atlantic Council to authorize action by the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe without also ensuring that the military, civilian and financial resources required to execute the operational plan were available. While the onus should have remained on governments, NATO authorities have found themselves in the unenviable position of begging for the resources they needed to do what was asked of them. When political imperative overrides military advice and compels military action to proceed without the minimum resources needed, the Alliance risks both lives and the achievement of its objectives. In relatively benign peace support operations, when members limit their contributions of low-level tactical resources and commit them incrementally over time, the risks are low. In high-intensity combat operations, they are anything but. Too often, “NATO” successes have come to depend on the near unilateral infusion of US (particularly theatre-level) assets.

In an international organization such as NATO, it is to be expected that member-states will insist on constraints being applied to the action the Alliance proposes to take, to the kind of resources individual allies will make available, and to the use to which those resources will be put. But the disconnect that too often has prevailed



“It is important that NATO decision-makers be able to draw on the enormous non-military capabilities of member-states.”

between ends and means has not only undermined the pursuit of operational objectives, it has also given rise to disputes between allies that have done damage to the Alliance itself. A study about joining ends and means, allocating resources before deployment and not after, and agreeing on norms, rules and processes, would appear to be in order.

Whole-of-government decision-making

Consideration might also be given to exploring whether NATO decision-making fully captures the potential that non-military resources hold for contributing to the success of NATO-led peace support operations. There is little disagreement that “comprehensive” or “whole-of-government” strategies are critical both to the initial security phases of an operation and to the follow-on governance and reconstruction phases. Clearly, the best “exit strategy” for NATO military forces is to effect a successful handover to local government, local police and local civil society.

At issue is whether, in their deliberations and decision-making, the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee are sufficiently seized of the importance of harnessing the collective strength of the full range of crisis management instruments and capacities possessed nationally by allies. To give full effect to Articles 3 and 4 in their modern context, it is important that NATO decision-makers be able to draw on the enormous non-military capabilities of both member-states and the European Union and other regional organizations.


Scope of decision-making

A study into the scope of decision-making available to the Alliance is also warranted. Notwithstanding the central role NATO plays in the security and defence strategies of its members, the current reality is that military decision-making in NATO constitutes only a small part of decision-making among many larger NATO countries about the



use of military instruments of power. The United States, Britain, France and even Canada subject only a small minority of their military decisions to NATO processes. Since operations in Kosovo in 1999, these nations have increasingly made political and military decisions on security issues outside of NATO circles. One of the biggest challenges to NATO legitimacy in the future will be its ability to secure a larger role in influencing the decision-making of member-states.


NATO Defence Spending
by Nations by %GDP (2008e)



Source: NATO/MacDonald/Petrolekas

(c) Resources

NATO military expenditures peaked in 1986 and began a long period of decline. In the five year period 1985-1989, the average for NATO counties combined was 4.5% of GDP. By 1995-1999, it was down to 2.7%—about where it remains today. These numbers tell only part of the story. In recent years, US and Canadian defence expenditures have risen significantly while those of European allies—with notable exceptions—have continued to drop. Canada, historically below the NATO average and still so today, has seen its annual defence expenditure grow from C\$14.9 billion in 2004 to C\$21 billion in 2008.



Source: NATO/MacDonald/Petrolekas

Explanations abound as to why the trend lines diverge between North America and Europe; at issue is whether they portend a divergence in policy direction. Clearly, if the new Strategic Concept is to articulate a purpose and direction for the Alliance, it will need to secure allies' agreement on the level of financial support consistent with the goals it identifies.



“As a priority, NATO needs to improve its capacity to deploy a rapid reaction force to intervene in an humanitarian crisis.”

NATO does not lack resources; rather, it lacks the resources and mandates for the kinds of tasks it has been setting for itself. In particular, it lacks sufficient military resources for expeditionary campaigns and it lacks the civilian resources it needs to rebuild war-torn societies.

NATO is currently conducting the most ambitious and complex operation outside Europe in its history, one where its credibility is often described as being “on the line.” But from the outset, the Alliance has struggled to sustain sufficient manpower in Afghanistan. It has also encountered great difficulty in finding and operating the number of transport helicopters and other theatre enablers it needs there. The explanations for why NATO should find itself in this situation are many and varied, but they surely include the dearth of expeditionary mindset and forces among most NATO members.

Few members of the Alliance are capable of deploying an independent force outside their national territory, sustaining it in theatre, and fielding replacements over multiple rotations. Of the two million men and women under arms in Europe today, only a few hundred thousand can be employed effectively and turned into a modern and effective expeditionary force. The uneven capacity of allies to contribute to peace support operations may take time to correct, but the military tasks NATO will be required to undertake in future make it imperative to begin to address the issue immediately. As a priority, NATO needs to improve its capacity to deploy a rapid reaction force to intervene in an humanitarian crisis.

(d) Civilian resources

In addition to adequate military resources, future tasks will require NATO allies to be able to draw on a complete toolbox of non-military capabilities. NATO must proceed cautiously when it ventures into the domain of governance and reconstruction, but in Afghanistan and elsewhere there is now little doubt that success requires the Alliance to use military resources to “clear” and



“While individual nations hold the requisite expertise, NATO as a whole has been learning on the job how to conduct multi-disciplinary operations.”

“hold” and non-military resources to “build,” in equal measure.

While individual nations hold the requisite expertise, NATO as a whole has been learning on the job how to conduct multidisciplinary operations, moving outside the comfort zone of area defence into peace support operations necessitating cooperation with diplomats, government officials, journalists, representatives of local governments at the national and district level, and the staff of other international organizations and humanitarian non-governmental organizations. NATO's capacity to design, manage and contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management has improved significantly over time, but there are relatively few staff at headquarters engaged in the effort and there is much work still to be done to integrate military and civilian operations. A starting point could be the establishment of a division at NATO headquarters charged with civil operations planning and coordination; in due course, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and NATO's deployable headquarters could acquire similar capabilities.

Equally important, individual allies should replace the *ad hoc* arrangements most now rely on with institutions and systems dedicated to preparing their nationals with the expertise, administrative skills and personal safety training they need to operate effectively in war-torn societies. Those who have objected in the past to expanding NATO's mandate to include non-military responses to security challenges will have to be convinced that the Alliance cannot operate successfully without such a capability.

(e) Burden sharing

In the early years, when the threat to Europe was greater than European allies themselves could handle, a disproportionate share of the burden of defence necessarily fell to the United States. Fully equitable



“Fully equitable burden sharing is now not only possible but imperative.”

burden sharing is now not only possible but imperative. In its absence, partnerships sour and eventually dissolve.

The time has certainly come to put an end to NATO's archaic practice of allowing the costs of contributing to peace operations to “lie where they fall,” in other words to remain the responsibility of those who incurred them rather than being shared equitably. It is both unfair and short-sighted to expect allies willing to risk life and treasure in a common cause to underwrite the entire cost of their contribution. The practice has been particularly onerous for the United States and Canada who have had to deploy, sustain and repatriate personnel and equipment at much greater distances than European members in order to contribute to NATO operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq (training), the Horn of Africa (anti-piracy) and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, dozens of NATO infrastructure projects in Europe continue to benefit from common funding, including Cold War-era legacy programs such as multiple pipelines and layers of redundant headquarters long past their usefulness.

At minimum, an arrangement similar to that which underwrites UN peacekeeping (through annual mandatory assessed contributions based on the existing formula for financing NATO's civil and military budgets) should be instituted as a means of financing members' operational deployment costs.

NATO might also consider establishing political and military command arrangements for peace support operations that accord a privileged place at the table to troop-contributing nations.

(f) Command and control

Unity of command is a principle of war that has been much forsaken in the conduct of NATO stability operations, especially in Afghanistan. The explanation may lie in the novelty of these operations for NATO, in the mixed military and civilian dimensions of such operations,



“In Afghanistan, the ISAF chain of command controls only the military components of the 26 nation-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams and exercises little sway over either the PRTs or the national aid programs in encouraging coherence in the delivery of strategic effects.”

and in the political pressures applied to them. But with twenty years of experience to draw on, the Alliance ought now to be replacing *ad hoc* arrangements with a NATO operations doctrine to guide future missions. The starting point is an effective political-military command structure, subordinate to the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, charged with translating political guidance into an agreed campaign plan and with overseeing its execution.

Issues bearing on unity of command also manifest themselves in the field. For some time, it has been argued that the practice of having an headquarters operate between Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the in-theatre headquarters is redundant, delay-inducing and even an obstacle to success. In theatre, a single combatant commander armed with the proper set of authorities ought to be responsible for strategy and operations and exercise operational command of all NATO forces in theatre. Only operational command allows the NATO commander the ability to re-task forces and send them where the need is greatest.

Unity of command is also poorly practiced in respect of the civilian components of NATO operations. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force chain of command controls only the military components of the twenty-six nation-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams and exercises little sway over either the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or the national aid programs in encouraging coherence in the delivery of strategic effects. To this end, it is welcome news that NATO has established a high-ranking civilian post in Kabul to ensure that non-military reconstruction activities focus on priorities.

Of special concern is the continuing disconnect between the NATO and US strategic processes. Neither the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee nor Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe have comfortable working relationships with such US entities



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as the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the combatant commands including European Command. Since 2001, NATO discussions have rarely addressed strategy formulation, campaign design or theatre command and control; for the most part, these have been formulated in the executive branch of the US government and implemented through US combatant commands.

NATO's contribution to US-run peace operations has been to send tactical troops. Most NATO members are engaged in operations with well-protected mandates of limited liability and they tacitly support complete American control of operations, strategy and command. NATO members seem happy to forego combined strategy formulation—knowing it might lead to greater troop requirements or greater accountability for failures—in favour of submitting to *ad hoc* command structures and the minimum level of tactical forces to show political support. This precludes the benefits accrued from mutually derived strategy—which leads to circumstances where member-states must sustain obligations that have been collectively agreed to for long periods despite pressures of domestic politics. It may also have the effect of furthering limited whole-of-government participation.

The time has come for collective definition of threats, collective agreement on force employment against such threats and reconciliation of command structures.

(g) Improving responsiveness

Improved command and control would shorten NATO's response time in crisis situations, but other measures should also be considered. NATO governments should allow, even encourage, civilian and military planners to anticipate possible threats to the Alliance and to plan for appropriate responses. Such planning would both accelerate the development of mandates to respond to crises and contribute to more



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timely and effective action in support or in defence of allied interests as specified in Article 4.

There is a requirement for all allies to support with funding and personnel any initiative to build the NATO-owned and operated multinational components that enable rapid start-up of operations. This would involve, in particular, the logistics, command and control and reconnaissance units that precede and prepare the ground for the arrival of main forces.

NATO must also finally abandon the outdated concept of allies remaining entirely responsible for their own logistics in theatre. In Afghanistan, allies have all been required to set up their own national support systems and are having to deal with steadily worsening tooth-to-tail ratios. Unnecessarily duplicating facilities consumes limited air and sealift assets that are at a premium both in peace support operations and in humanitarian relief operations. NATO needs to develop a robust multinational deployable logistics capability and strengthen its critical communications and interoperability support agencies.





The New Strategic Framework



“This is not the time to settle for modest adjustments. Fundamental change is in order.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization exists because its members are determined “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” This interest was first articulated by the original twelve members of the organization; it has been endorsed by the sixteen states which have joined since 1949; and it remains today without modification the *raison d’être* of NATO.

From this shared interest derive the obligations that members have accepted for collective defence—to consult together on developments that could threaten the security or territorial integrity of member-states; to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity for action; and to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by collective action.

The “long twilight struggle” with Soviet communism is over, many “captive nations” are now free, no small number have joined the Alliance and others have expressed a desire to follow in their footsteps. But the world remains a dangerous place for those who believe in the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

In 2010, there is an opportunity to begin building institutional architecture for materially enhancing the freedom and security of people both in the Atlantic Community and beyond. At issue is whether the political will exists to address core issues, to discuss problems frankly, to prescribe real remedies, and to take decisions that will drive change in the months and years to come. It is always a challenge to change an organization from the inside. But the time is right for frank discussion about the problems that beset the Alliance. This is not the time to settle for modest adjustments. It is time to renew the Alliance, to transform NATO into a 21st century organization with the vision and the means to protect and advance the security interests of democratic states.



This paper argues that the following concepts should inform the renewal of the Alliance:

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is founded on the principle that member-states protect and defend other member-states and enhance the security of all through the collective actions of the Alliance. This principle must continue to be the cornerstone upon which the future of the Alliance rests.
2. Allies' individual actions must be guided by the obligations they assume towards each other and to NATO when they become members of the Alliance.
3. Alliance decisions must continue to be governed by the consensus principle, but below the level of the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee, the weight of opinion must settle decisions on agendas and recommendations.
4. Commitments made by the Alliance must be supported with resources commensurate with the military and other operational needs of the mission, as determined by the North Atlantic Council acting with the advice of the Military Committee and major NATO commanders.
5. Member-states must declare caveats they wish to impose on their participation in a NATO mission before the North Atlantic Council agrees to make a military or other substantial commitment.
6. Military-civilian interoperability must work effectively throughout NATO, supported by international staff at headquarters in Brussels charged with civil operations planning and coordination, and member-states must have well-developed national civil affairs capacity in policing, governance and reconstruction.



7. Allies must be committed to a level of financial support consistent with the goals they have set for the Alliance. The NATO funding and budgeting process must be administered within a single, comprehensive, whole-of-alliance financial management system embracing all Alliance programs and operations.

8. NATO must put in place standing mechanisms to allow key democratic states outside the Euro-Atlantic region to participate more fully in NATO's political deliberations and planning for contingencies, and must effectively coordinate its missions and operations with those of the United Nations, other international organizations and leading humanitarian non-governmental organizations.

9. Allies' military forces must all have expeditionary capabilities, supported by effective multinational support arrangements such as an integrated NATO-managed logistical support system and NATO's strategic airlift program, to improve Alliance response times and ensure that the Alliance is able to deploy a robust rapid reaction force to intervene in humanitarian and other crises.

10. Every aspect of a NATO military mission must be organized within a "theatre of operations" concept, with the NATO-appointed military commander exercising operational command authority over all deployed national military forces in theatre in the execution of NATO-approved operational plans.





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