



ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute · L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

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Ever Vigilant

Defence Policy Statement 2005: A Defence Policy for the 1990s?

Strong and Cohesive - The Canadian Army Ethos and Culture

e-Capabilities: Canadian Military Transformation in the Face of 21st Century Challenges

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Ret), OMM, CD

This edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of operations, defence policy, transformation, recruiting, and ethos. These articles have a bearing on the defence of Canada and the security of its citizens. Whether ensuring the security of Canadians at home, protecting national sovereignty, or defending Canada's interests abroad, our Canadian Forces (CF) continues to be a unique and essential national asset.

According to a number of polls, over the past year, the CF is viewed more favourably than it has been in the past. It is worthwhile to note that, in a government-sponsored opinion poll that was just released, over three-quarters of those surveyed said the Canadian Forces was underfunded, and 44% believed that a decade of government cuts to the defence budget had hurt Canada's international reputation. According to 43%, the cuts have put the safety of the soldiers at risk.

The polling results are in line with the conclusions of studies that have been published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), in recent years. We would like to see this improved image of the Forces translated into a greater resolve on the part of the Government to provide the direction and support for the Forces' transformation.

The front cover of *ON TRACK* has been provided to us by the soldiers of Task Force Kabul - Op ATHENA Roto III. The cover photograph features members of the Task Force Kabul (TFK) Force Protection Company (FP Coy) conducting a foot patrol of a local Afghan neighbourhood near Camp Julien, 15 March. The FP Coy conducts patrols in the neighbourhoods around Camp Julien on a frequent basis. These patrols are important as they provide a Canadian/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) presence as part of Operation ATHENA. They also establish personal links with the local Afghans, gaining their confidence, as well as gather information.

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MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel Alain Pellerin (ret.) OMM, CD

Le présent numéro d'*ON TRACK* vous propose des articles d'intérêt courant dans le secteur des opérations, de la politique de défense, de la transformation, du recrutement et de l'éthos. Ces articles influent sur la défense du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Qu'il s'agisse

d'assurer la sécurité des Canadiens chez eux, de protéger la souveraineté nationale ou de défendre les intérêts du Canada à l'étranger, nos Forces canadiennes (FC) représentent un élément unique et essentiel de notre patrimoine national.

Selon plusieurs sondages menés au cours de la dernière année, le public a une impression plus favorable des FC que par le passé. Il est intéressant de souligner que dans le cadre d'un sondage d'opinion commandé par l'État dont les résultats viennent tout juste d'être publiés, plus des trois-quarts des personnes interrogées ont déclaré que les Forces canadiennes n'étaient pas dotées de fonds suffisants, et 44 % d'entre elles estimaient que 10 ans de réductions du budget de la défense par le gouvernement avaient nui à la réputation du Canada à l'étranger. De l'avis de 43 % des personnes interrogées, ces réductions posent un risque à la sécurité de nos soldats.

Les résultats du sondage coïncident avec les conclusions des études publiées au cours des dernières années par l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la défense (ICAD). Nous aimerions que l'image améliorée des Forces se traduise par une détermination accrue de la part du gouvernement de fournir appui et sens à la transformation des Forces.

La page couverture du présent numéro nous a été fournie par des soldats de la Force opérationnelle à Kaboul – opération ATHENA Roto III. Sur la photo figurent des membres de la compagnie de protection des Forces (cie PF) de la Force opérationnelle à Kaboul (FOK) menant une patrouille à pied dans un quartier afghan local, près de camp

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.

The views expressed in *ON TRACK* are those of the authors.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

Les points de vues exprimés dans *ON TRACK* reflètent les vues des auteurs.

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Our Cover

La couverture

Members of the Task Force Kabul Force Protection Company conduct a foot patrol near Camp Julien on 15 March/Les membres de la compagnie de protection des Forces de la Force opérationnelle à Kaboul menant une patrouille dans de reconnaissance à pied près du camp Julien, le 15 mars dernier. Photo: Corporal Sylvie Roy

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The mission of Operation ATHENA, Canada's contribution to the NATO-led ISAF, is to help maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, while the Government of Afghanistan and UN agencies rebuild the country. ISAF currently comprises approximately 8,000 troops from 36 nations, mainly from NATO countries, of which 700 are from Canada.

Private Michael Freeman, an infantryman with the "Duke of Edinburgh" Company, First Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment, from Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, has provided us with a patrol report, *Ever Vigilant*, following a mission to conduct a foot patrol of the neighbourhoods immediately surrounding Camp Julien.

As Matthew Fisher has reminded us, in a recent *National Post* article, Canada's Afghan adventure is about to change when, late this Autumn, Camp Julien will be moved to Kandahar. The move will be part of an attempt by ISAF to shift its focus away from the relative safety its troops have created in Kabul. The Canadian army is one of the reasons that the operation in Kabul has been such a success.

The danger factor for Canadian troops will increase appreciably this August when Ottawa deploys a small Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Kandahar. Our readers may appreciate that any Afghan assignment near the border with Pakistan is dangerous. This one will be especially perilous because Kandahar is home to many Afghans who remain loyal to their fiery Taliban leader, Mullah Omar and the even more notorious Osama bin Laden.

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Julien, le 15 mars dernier. La cie PF mène fréquemment des patrouilles dans les quartiers aux alentours de camp) Julien. Elles sont importantes car elles fournissent une Force internationale/canadienne d'assistance à la sécurité (FIAS) dans le cadre de l'opération ATHENA. Elles contribuent également à établir des rapports avec la population afghane locale en s'attirant sa confiance, et elles permettant ainsi de réunir des renseignements.

La mission de l'opération ATHENA, qui représente la contribution canadienne à la FIAS menée par l'OTAN, est de maintenir la sécurité à Kaboul et ses régions avoisinantes, pendant que le gouvernement de l'Afghanistan et les organismes de l'ONU s'affairent à rebâtir le pays. La FIAS comprend à l'heure actuelle quelque 8 000 soldats provenant de 36 nations, principalement des pays de l'OTAN, et quelque 700 d'entre eux sont des Canadiens.

Michael Freeman, un soldat d'infanterie de la compagnie du duc d'Édimbourg, premier bataillon du Royal Canadian Regiment, établi à la base des Forces canadiennes de Petawawa, nous donne un compte rendu de patrouille à pied des quartiers qui entourent camp Julien, intitulé *Ever Vigilant*.

Comme nous le rappelle Matthew Fisher, dans un article paru récemment dans le quotidien *National Post*, l'aventure canadienne en Afghanistan est à la veille de changer, car à la fin de l'automne, camp Julien sera transféré à Kandahar. Ce transfert fait partie des efforts de la FIAS de

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Canada's PRT of some 250 CF personnel, which will include engineers, infantry and medics as well as a few members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, diplomats and aid specialists, has been given the task of getting Kandahar back on its feet. A much larger and more robust follow-on infantry force will arrive in Kandahar early next year.

Canadians who follow foreign and defence affairs were delighted with the long-awaited and much anticipated release of the Government's International Policy Statement, along with the Defence Policy Statement (DPS 2005). Colonel (Ret'd) Howie Marsh, the Institute's Senior Defence Analyst, examines the relevancy of DPS 2005 for these times, in *Defence Policy Statement 2005: A Defence Policy for the 1990s?* Colonel Marsh provides us with a reflection of the potential for international events in the future that could impact, in the future, on the direction of the current transformation of the Canadian Forces.

While it has been suggested that Canada could lease an amphibious warship to project a military force abroad, there is no assurance that the needed sea-lift would be available to the Canadian Forces in a timely manner. On the other hand, the addition of an amphibious warship capability to Canada's Navy would address the Forces' requirement for dedicated sea-lift capability that would enable it to swiftly project a credible military force abroad in support of the government's 3-D policy initiative. What is the likelihood of the Canadian Forces actually acquiring an amphibious landing transport dock ship, of the San Antonio Class? Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice, examines the challenges that the CF faces in acquiring such a capability, in *One Ship Too Many?*

We are pleased to salute the opening of the new Canadian War Museum, and the people that gave so much of their time and energy that grew a dream into a stunning addition to the nation's capital. General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, who headed the fundraising campaign to complete the new Museum, has provided our readers with an inside look at what visitors can look forward to experiencing on their next visit to the Canadian War Museum, in *The New Canadian War Museum: Quaint Historical Relic or Augury for Better Security?* He examines the question of what impact might the new Canadian War Museum have on the voters' views of current security issues. General Manson, the new President of the CDA Institute, likens the decline of the armed forces to that of a downward spiral, a theme he enunciated very clearly following his acceptance of the Vimy Award, November 2003, observing " , When I was in

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cibler son attention sur d'autres régions, maintenant que ses troupes ont rétabli une sécurité relative à Kaboul. L'armée canadienne est une des raisons qui a contribué à faire de l'opération à Kaboul un succès.

Les dangers auxquels les troupes canadiennes sont exposées s'accroîtront considérablement en août, lorsque Ottawa va déployer une équipe provinciale de reconstruction (EPR) à Kandahar. Nos lecteurs réalisent sans doute que toute affectation en Afghanistan près de la frontière pakistanaise est dangereuse. Celle-ci sera particulièrement périlleuse car Kandahar abrite de nombreux Afghans qui restent fidèles à leur chef taliban, le mollah Omar et au tristement célèbre Osama bin Laden.

L'EPR canadienne regroupe quelque 250 membres des FC, dont des ingénieurs, des fantassins et du personnel infirmier, ainsi que quelques membres de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, des diplomates et des spécialistes de l'aide; elle aura pour mission de rétablir l'ordre à Kandahar. Une force d'infanterie bien plus importante viendra grossir ses rangs à Kandahar au début de l'année prochaine.

Les Canadiens qui suivent les affaires étrangères et de défense étaient ravis de la publication tant attendue de l'Énoncé de politique internationale du gouvernement, conjointement avec l'Énoncé de la politique de défense (EPD 2005). Le colonel (ret.) Howie Marsh, analyste principal de l'Institut en matière de défense, se penche sur la pertinence de l'EPD 2005, dans le contexte actuel, dans son texte intitulé *Defence Policy Statement 2005 : A Defence Policy for the 1990s ?* Le colonel Marsh nous offre une réflexion sur l'éventualité d'événements internationaux qui pourraient avoir des répercussions, dans l'avenir, sur la voie qu'adopte la transformation actuelle des Forces canadiennes.

Bien qu'il ait été suggéré que le Canada puisse prendre à bail un navire d'assaut amphibie pour une force militaire à l'étranger, il n'y a aucune garantie que le transport maritime nécessaire serait mis à la disposition des Forces canadiennes à temps. D'autre part, l'ajout d'un navire d'assaut amphibie à la Marine canadienne répondrait au besoin des Forces d'une capacité de transport maritime dédiée qui leur permettrait d'organiser une force militaire crédible à l'étranger, à l'appui de l'initiative de politique gouvernementale des 3D. Quelles sont les probabilités que les Forces canadiennes puissent se procurer un transport amphibie de chalands de débarquement et de personnel de la classe San Antonio ? Le colonel (ret.) Gary Rice se

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business I learned the term 'death spiral', which describes a company that is in such trouble that nothing can be done to pull it out. I fear that the Canadian Forces are nearing such a state, and that is an alarming prospect."

Armies evolve over time. Any number of factors contribute to this fact of life; however, the demands of war and operations must remain the most powerful drivers. As described by Colonel John Eggenberger in the Spring 05 issue of *ON TRACK* (www.cda-cdai.ca), the regimental System is instrumental in developing the soldiers, leaders and teams that have made Canada's Army one of the best small armies in the world. In this edition, we are pleased to extend the discussion of the Regimental System with Colonel Mike Capstick's *Strong and Cohesive - The Canadian Army Ethos and Culture*. Colonel Capstick outlines for us important details of the report, *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*. *Canada's Soldiers* is the follow-up of two major surveys that were completed by the Army.

Fred Fowlow wrote a commentary on Defence Policy Statement 2005 (DPS 05) in the Spring 2005 edition of *The Bowline Journal*, the quarterly publication of the Calgary Branch of the Naval Officers Association of Canada, under the heading of *Please Play "Heart of Oak"*. Fred noted that Stephen Thorne, in *canoenetwork Cnews*, pointed out that "The DPS is long on ideals and objectives but short on facts and strategies of how to reach them given the Forces' weakened state." Fred writes that it is important that something be done to promote a better and more informed understanding of what is happening to the CF during each phase of its transformation and rebuilding process. We are pleased to reprint Fred's article, here, as *Commentary - Defence Policy Statement*.

Canada is not alone in experiencing difficulty in meeting the enrolment objectives of its armed forces, and the impact that the difficulties are having on to-day's military. Matthew Fisher reported in the *National Post*, recently, upon the fatigue that the U.S. Forces are experiencing in Iraq. And, earlier this month, *The New York Times* headlined a story with "The Army's inability to recruit enough new soldiers to sustain its worldwide commitments is already serious, is becoming alarming and poses a real threat to the future of America's all-volunteer military." The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are sapping the strength of the U.S. military. Can the American all-volunteer force sustain a long counterinsurgency? Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association (of the United States) and a good friend of CDA, reports in *ON TRACK* on the challenges facing U.S. efforts to fill the ranks of their

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penche sur les défis qui se posent aux Forces canadiennes en matière d'acquisition d'une telle capacité maritime, dans son article intitulé *One Ship Too Many ?*

Nous avons le plaisir de saluer l'inauguration du nouveau Musée canadien de la guerre, et les personnes qui ont consacré leur temps et leur énergie à cette vision qui est maintenant un fleuron de la capitale nationale. Le général (ret.) Paul Manson, qui avait dirigé la campagne de financement des travaux du nouveau musée, donne aux lecteurs une idée de ce que les visiteurs pourront voir lors de leur prochaine visite du Musée canadien de la guerre, dans son texte intitulé *The New Canadian War Museum : Quaint Historical Relic or Augury for Better Security ?* Il se penche sur les répercussions que pourrait avoir le nouveau Musée canadien de la guerre sur l'opinion qu'ont les électeurs des enjeux liés à la défense. Le général Manson, nouveau président de l'Institut de la CAD, compare le déclin des forces armées à une spirale descendante, un thème qu'il a clairement énoncé lorsqu'on lui a remis le prix Vimy en novembre 2003; il a fait cette remarque : « Lorsque j'étais en affaires, j'ai appris le terme 'spirale de la mort', qui décrit une entreprise qui éprouvent des difficultés telles que rien ne pourra la sortir de son marasme . Je crains que les Forces canadiennes ne soient bien proches d'un tel état, et c'est une situation bien alarmante. »

Les armées évoluent avec le temps. Toutes sortes de facteurs contribuent à ce fait concret; cependant, les principaux catalyseurs doivent demeurer les exigences de la guerre et des opérations. Comme le décrit le colonel John Eggenberger dans le numéro de printemps 2005 de *ON TRACK* (voir site web à : www.cda-cdai.ca) le système régimentaire est déterminant dans la formation des soldats, leaders et équipes qui ont fait de l'armée canadienne l'une des meilleures armées au monde. Dans le présent numéro, nous sommes heureux d'élargir la discussion du système régimentaire avec le texte du colonel Mike Capstick, *Strong and Cohesive - The Canadian Army Ethos and Culture*. Le colonel Capstick donne les grandes lignes du rapport intitulé *Canada's Soldiers : Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*. Il s'agit du suivi de deux sondages d'importance menés par l'armée.

Dans le numéro de printemps 2005 du *Bowline Journal*, une publication trimestrielle de la branche de Calgary de l'Association des officiers de la marine du Canada, Fred Fowlow a rédigé un commentaire sur l'Énoncé de la politique de défense 2005 (EPD 05), ayant pour titre *Please Play ?Heart of Oak?*. M. Fowlow a remarqué que Stephen Thorne, dans *canoenetwork Cnews*, soulignait que « l'EPD fait une large place aux idéaux et aux objectifs, mais ne

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armed forces. He notes that if another major military intervention were to be needed, one has to wonder how the (U.S.) Army could put enough forces in the field. Jayson offers one interesting course of action that even Canada's recruiters could examine.

On the subject of the transformation of the Forces, Major Eric Dion, R22eR, discerns two antagonistic Defence entities, in *e-Capabilities: Canadian Military transformation in the face of 21st Century Challenges*. He argues in this edition of *ON TRACK* that the primary focus of military services has mostly been concerned with military operational effectiveness, while the primary focus of DND has been national and political interests, and civilian oversight of the military. The expanded version of Major Dion's article is posted on the CDA website (www.cda-cdai.ca), under "current topics".

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with the large number of submissions that were received for the consideration of the Vimy Award Selection Committee, and culminating with the presentation of the Award to Dr. David Bercuson by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place, 18 November at, a gala reception and dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2004 was the Canadian correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Sharon Hobson. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of the defence and security issues affecting Canada. An added feature, this year, is that the Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears in this issue.

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donne pas beaucoup de détails sur les faits et stratégies qui permettront de les réaliser, compte tenu de l'état affaibli des Forces ». Selon lui, il importe de promouvoir une compréhension améliorée et plus éclairée de ce qui arrive aux FC à chaque étape de son processus de transformation et de remaniement. Nous avons le plaisir de reprendre ici son article, sous la rubrique *Commentary - Defence Policy Statement*.

Le Canada n'est pas le seul pays à éprouver des difficultés à répondre aux objectifs de recrutement de ses forces armées, et à ressentir les difficultés que cela crée pour les militaires d'aujourd'hui. Matthew Fisher a récemment fait un reportage, publié dans le *National Post*, sur la fatigue que ressentent les Forces américaines en Iraq. Et avant cela, le *New York Times* a mis en manchette un article comme suit : « L'incapacité de l'armée à recruter suffisamment de nouveaux soldats pour maintenir ses engagements à travers le monde est déjà grave, devient alarmante et constitue une véritable menace à l'avenir pour l'armée américaine, entièrement composée de volontaires ». Les conflits en Iraq et en Afghanistan minent la puissance de l'armée américaine. Cette force entièrement constituée de volontaires pourra-t-elle assumer une contre-insurrection de longue durée ? Jayson Spiegel, ancien directeur exécutif de la Reserve Officers Association (des États-Unis) et un ami de la CAD, rend compte dans *ON TRACK* des défis qui se posent aux tentatives américaines de remplir les rangs de leurs forces armées. Il souligne que si une autre intervention militaire importante était nécessaire, on pourrait se demander comment l'armée américaine serait en mesure d'envoyer suffisamment de forces sur le terrain. M. Jayson propose un plan d'action intéressant que même les recruteurs canadiens pourraient envisager.

Concernant la transformation des Forces, le major Éric Dion, R22eR, distingue deux entités antagonistes de la défense, dans un article intitulé *e-Capabilities : Canadian Military transformation in the face of 21st Century Challenges*. Il soutient que la préoccupation centrale des services militaires a principalement été l'efficacité militaire opérationnelle, tandis que la préoccupation maîtresse du MDN a porté sur les intérêts nationaux et politiques, et l'oubli des militaires par les civils. Une version développée de l'article du major Dion est affichée au site Web de la CAD (www.cda-cdai.ca) sous la rubrique « Sujets actuels ».

L'une des principales activités figurant au calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la remise annuelle du prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable aux enjeux de défense et de

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Both programmes, last year, were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals, this year, is very encouraging.

This Autumn, on 28-29 October 2005, the CDAI, in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada, will host the 8th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities internationally. Leading edge research from young scholars will be showcased and the D Scott GD Canada \$2,000 first-prize will be awarded for the best paper presented. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Please note the call for papers which appears elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose mandate is to provide research support to the CDA and promote informed public debate on national security and defence issues. It is no secret that our mandate is not yet over and that the CF are more than ever deserving of the nation's support for their rejuvenation and they undertake more hazardous missions.

In closing I wish to thank our donors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute. Their support is reaping dividends through increased awareness by Canadians, including the media, of the need for a credible military. We add to the debate on issues of defence and national security. Your financial support of the work of the CDA Institute that is carried out on your behalf is critical, now, more than ever. With your continued support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military

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sécurité du pays, et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un succès sans précédent, compte de la quantité importante de soumissions envoyées au Comité de sélection du prix Vimy, et a été couronné par la remise du prix à M. David Bercuson par l'honorable Bill Graham, ministre de la Défense nationale.

Cette année, la remise du prix Vimy aura lieu le 18 novembre, lors d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui se tiendront à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau (Québec). Pour donner tout son sens au prix, l'Institut invite les mises en candidature pour le lauréat de cette année. Les associations membres de la CAD, ainsi que les membres eux-mêmes, sont invités à soumettre des mises en candidatures. Veuillez consulter l'avis d'appel de mises en candidature qui est publié dans le présent numéro.

Le dîner du prix Vimy donne également lieu à la remise du Prix Média Ross Munro. En 2004, c'est la correspondante canadienne du magazine *Jane's Defence Weekly*, M^{me} Sharon Dobson, qui a été lauréate du prix. Lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, ce prix prestigieux est remis à un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions de défense et de sécurité canadiennes. Cette année, le prix sera amélioré de la remise d'un montant de 2 500 \$. L'avis d'appel de mises en candidature est publié également dans le présent numéro.

L'an dernier, les deux programmes ont connu un vif succès. Je suis heureux d'annoncer que l'appui que contribuent cette année le secteur industriel et les particuliers au pays est des plus encourageants.

Cet automne, soit les 28 et 29 octobre 2005, l'ICAD tiendra le 8^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques (IRPP), le Centre des relations internationales de l'Université Queen's et le Programme des Études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada. Le symposium mettra en valeur les travaux des étudiants de doctorat et de maîtrise des universités civiles et militaires du Canada et d'ailleurs. Le symposium permettra aux jeunes universitaires de mettre en évidence de la recherche de pointe; la meilleure soumission recevra le premier prix, D Scott GD Canada, assorti d'un montant de 2 000 \$. Le symposium a pour objectif de renforcer les liens entre les établis

(voir p. 8)

affairs. As you may be aware, convincing Government of the importance of the CF in our society is challenging, but attainable.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal. If you are already a donor, please consider an increase in your valued support. Your financial support as a donor to the Institute is needed as a valued element for the continuing success of your CDAl.

sements d'enseignement civils et militaires. Veuillez prendre note que l'appel de soumissions de documents est publié dans le présent numéro de ON TRACK.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense est un organisme caritatif et non partisan qui a pour mandat d'offrir un soutien de recherche à la CAD et de promouvoir un débat public éclairé sur les enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationales. Ce n'est un secret pour personne que notre mandat n'est pas encore achevé, car les FC méritent plus que jamais l'appui de la nation pour leur renouvellement, alors qu'elles entreprennent des missions plus dangereuses.

En conclusion, je voudrais remercier nos donateurs, et particulièrement nos mécènes, compagnons et officiers pour leur appui financier des travaux de l'Institut de la CAD. Leur soutien porte ses fruits en sensibilisant davantage les Canadiens, y compris les médias, à la nécessité d'une force militaire crédible. Nous enrichissons le débat sur les enjeux de la défense et de la sécurité nationale. Votre appui financier du travail que fait en votre nom l'Institut de la CAD est plus essentiel que jamais. Grâce à votre appui continu, nous sommes en mesure promouvoir l'étude des affaires militaires canadiennes et la sensibilisation à celles-ci. Comme vous le savez sans doute, convaincre le gouvernement de l'importance des FC au sein de notre société est une tâche difficile, mais pas impossible.

Si vous ne contribuez pas déjà à l'Institut de la CAD à titre de donateur, je vous exhorte à le faire. Vous trouverez à la dernière page de la présente revue un formulaire de donateur. Si vous êtes déjà un donateur, envisagez donc d'accroître votre précieux appui. Pour que l'ICAD puisse poursuivre ses réalisations, il a besoin de votre appui financier à titre de donateur.

Ever vigilant

Private Michael Freeman, "Duke of Edinburgh" Company, First battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment

CAMP JULIEN - The Islamic call to prayer lilts softly on the evening breeze as a section of soldiers from the Task Force Kabul (TFK) Force Protection Company (FP Coy) prepares to head out on patrol. Equipment is checked and rechecked, weapons are loaded, night vision devices are adjusted, and once orders are issued the section heads out the gate.

The protection and security (TFK) is a responsibility that is taken very seriously by these soldiers, and they are all only too aware of the trust that is placed in them by their colleagues and friends in Camp Julien.

The mission on this particular night is relatively simple. The section is to conduct a foot patrol in the neighbourhoods immediately surrounding the camp. It is a good way to interact with the local population and make them aware of our presence. By talking to local Afghans, the section can find out how things are going in the city, and also gather information that can be used to assess threats against the various International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contingents.

(continued p. 9)



Corporal Jason Tucker from Task Force Kabul Force Protection Company looks on as the remainder of his section walks past during a foot patrol of a local Afghan neighbourhood. Photo: Corporal Dan Shouinard

The streets are usually quiet at night, with only the occasional Kabul City Police patrol or passer-by to break the silence.

Dogs bark in the distance, and once in a while a starved, mangy looking mutt slinks across the road and into the night, hardly sparing us a curious glance.

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These patrols are a typical duty for members of the FP Coy. Other tasks for these soldiers include gate security, perimeter security, as well as manning the camp's Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

The soldiers of the FP Coy are members of the "Duke of Edinburgh" Company from CFB Petawawa. They are well trained, well motivated, and ever vigilant against the threats that the ISAF forces face in this distant and potentially dangerous land.

These soldiers are proud of their professionalism and strive to be worthy of the confidence and trust that all Canadians place in the members of the Canadian Forces deployed on *Operation ATHENA* in Afghanistan.

Defence Policy Statement 2005: A Defence Policy for the 1990s?

Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh, Senior Defence Analyst CDA

Summer months provide time for reflection. The initial demands of analysis that accompanied the spring release of the Defence Policy Statement (DPS 2005) have passed. A reflection on whether Canada has the right policy for the approaching geopolitical season might now be in order.

I have already written on the impediments to achieving DPS 2005, in particular on the existing approach to the administration of defence policy in Canada (see www.cda-cdai.ca under "current topics" for an analysis of the IPS and of the DPS). The fragile state of Canadian political leadership also works against achieving the defence objectives, and the pernicious mechanisms of the public administration of defence, if left uncorrected, will stymie transformation plans. Now I would like to reflect on whether Canada has the correct defence policy.

DPS 2005 is founded, in large part, on Canadian military operational experience of the last ten years, moral persuasion from communities committed to **"The Responsibility to Protect"** agenda and reflects academic analysis provided by Dr. Thomas Barnett's 'gap and connected core thesis' (www.thomaspmbarnett.com). However, a defence policy based on the past and current state of affairs is likely to be found wanting as time passes.

Thus DPS 2005 has inherent risk in that it may initiate a transformation shaped by the military and geo-political demands of the last ten years, but which is unlikely to be realized in the next ten to fifteen years because of the impediments mentioned above, particularly the very long gestation period of equipment acquisition, and possible other obstacles. In 2020, Canada could find itself with a transformed military force suitable for 1995 scenarios, but inappropriate for the third decade of the 21st century.

In reality, foreign and defence policy is driven by the 'tools' at the government's disposal. Unfortunately Canada's toolbox is relatively empty. Some key essentials, such as the means to deploy and support military force, are near non-existent. Personnel levels and requisite skills are low. Promissory notes, furthermore, are not tools. For a long season, Canadians and their allies will have to wait and see if there is any currency behind the recent budgetary promises. Until the tool chest is replenished, Canada will be severely limited in its ability to play a more meaningful role internationally.

The Government's recently announced intention to do something of substance in Darfur, Sudan, illustrates Canada's dilemma. The promised deployment probably fell apart, not because of African sovereignty sensitivities, but due to the Canadian Forces' (CF) inability to support an overseas military contingent. There is no strategic airlift, no medium lift helicopters and no mobile forward support. The nation's lack of effective tools has defined a foreign policy stance of non-involvement. Canada can only go where others are willing to transport, protect and support the Canadian military.

Not having the relevant military tools is a condition that will likely debilitate Canadian governments for the remainder of this decade and possibly well into the next. Defence policy statements need to be accompanied by skilled people and effective equipment before words become tangible assets. Professional development and equipment acquisition have long gestation periods. A special operations corporal is not an entry-level product, but is rather the result of a ten-year mentoring. The sad truth about acquisition of major military equipment is that, on average, our governments have preferred a slow, 15-year approach, and the timeline is becoming alarmingly longer. By the time Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of key transformational items is achieved, fifteen or twenty years from now, there can be no assurance that they will be the best equipment for the challenges of the day.

This is the gamble of the 2005 Defence Policy Statement; it is built, for the most part, on the continuance of asymmetric warfare in which Dr Barnett's 'core' countries remain connected and the 'gap' countries remain unconnected. Dr. Barnett's thesis, in which he argues that the lack of global connectedness is the primary cause of armed conflict, is one of the pillars of Canada's foreign and defence policy.

China, India, Russia, Europe, America, Australia and others are connected. These 'core' nations enjoy the stability and prosperity that comes from being connected diplomatically, economically, and commercially. For the most part the people of these nations are connected to the Internet, banking services, water and sewer, electrical, transport grids, etc.

(continued p. 11)

The 'gap' nations, for the most part, lack connections. These nations dwell in a three thousand kilometre wide swath that runs from the Caribbean Sea to the Ivory Coast, across sub-Saharan Africa, through the Middle East to Kabul and on to East Timor. The peoples and nations inhabiting this swath of the globe are the least connected to the Information Age. As well as lacking modern communications they have the dubious distinction of possessing the largest concentration of failed and failing states. The highest level of misery, piracy and displacements of peoples reside in this swath. It is here that most of Canada's military, diplomatic and development assets are destined to be sent in the coming years.

However, should the connected 'core' of nations assert themselves then the military needs to prepare for the more lethal warfare of major power struggles.

However, will there continue to be a disconnected swath of nations in ten years, or will the gap become absorbed by globalization? Is it more likely that the connected nations become more strident and attempt to redefine regional power blocks? If the disconnected 'gap' continues then transforming the CF to a medium weight force makes sense. However, should the connected 'core' of nations assert themselves then the military needs to prepare for the more lethal warfare of major power struggles.

It may well be that this global condition of 'core' and 'gap' will persist, but a quick review of history, especially Canadian defence policy, alerts us to the unpleasant reality that our policy is more often than not inappropriate for its season. Canada has a very poor track record of being militarily prepared for the next geo-political season.

In the 1930s Canada's leadership agreed with the Imperial assessment that there would be no major power conflict in the next ten years, and Canada continued to disarm because the Paris Pact of 1928 had declared war illegal. That disastrous foreign and defence policy resulted in Canada going to World War II unprepared. Canadian Army casualty rates in the European theatre were 235% higher per manoeuvre division than those of the better prepared and equipped American divisions. Likewise, Canada's navy suffered much from the military poverty of the 1930s. During the same decade the Royal Canadian Air Force had become little more than a small civilian flying agency. That Canada responded so well to the challenges of the Second World War is nothing short of miraculous.

Immediately after WW II the then Minister of Defence, Brooke Claxton, envisioned that a 30,000 man military

was adequate for Canada. Within five years the Korean War proved that approach inappropriate. Canada's military expanded to some 125,000 personnel by the late fifties. For a while, Canada's military had a short season of the right policy for the Cold War.

The 1964 Pearsonian foreign and defence policy shrank Canada's homeland military. While European-based forces were reaffirmed, Canada-based units were run down. This had the unusual consequence, for example, of some Canadian NATO forces in Europe being placed on standby to reinforce domestic units deployed to Quebec during the 1970 October Crisis. That defence policy focused on multilateralism while the subsequent demand was domestic.

The Trudeau era of foreign and defence policy, 1968-1983, reduced the CF. Prime Minister Trudeau, however, realizing that he had erred, reversed his earlier stance by increasing defence expenditures toward the end of his mandate.

The 1987 White Paper emphasized NATO and attempted to rebuild force strength, acquire nuclear-powered submarines and replace main battle tanks. The economy of Canada and the events of 1989 made that defence policy ineffective in less than two years.

The 1994 White Paper on defence envisioned a post-Cold War era of world order characterised by peace. The 1994 *Defence Economic Review* placed the military on a steep slope toward disarmament. Few in this country and elsewhere were prepared for the disorder that occurred once nations were no longer restrained by the Warsaw Pact, and when militant Islamism introduced a new form of conflict to the world.

In summary, recent Canadian governments have produced inappropriate defence policies in six out of seven attempts. A fifteen percent success rate in the last seventy years does not bode well for DPS 2005. The system, it seems, tends to get it wrong. This historical trend suggests that the current transformation policy has not much chance of being appropriate.

So what can be done?

I believe that now is the time to prepare for wars amongst 'core' nations; it is not the time to transform for 'gap' conflict. The transformation that is currently underway may have been right for the 1980s, in that it would eventually have given our armed forces the wherewithal to deal reasonably well with the exigencies of the last ten years. Given the long time lag between policy articulation and

(continued p. 12)

implementation, now is the time to plan and build robust tactical units that are ready for the return of major power conflict.

I perceive that the world is currently in a benign state of geo-political intercourse. Asymmetric warfare may be unpredictable, but it is much less deadly than the symmetrical version of major power warfare. Reflect on the casualty rates of the World Wars in comparison to the asymmetric conflicts of recent years. Tens of thousands have died in the War on Terrorism; tens of millions died in the Second World War.

If I have persuaded you that the world is most likely passing through the relatively benign nadir of asymmetric warfare and that the more virulent symmetrical war fighting is going to return, then you can better appreciate this concern.

Effective military capability requires well-trained and well-lead servicepersons, with relevant equipment and support. This is not achieved quickly, not even in a decade. It takes a lot of time to build effective military capability. Military planners and the Auditor General of Canada know that replacing existing obsolete systems takes about 15 years, and that timeline is increasing. Introducing substantially new capabilities and force structure is a 20-year endeavour.

The announced and funded elements of the Canadian Forces *Strategic Capabilities Investment Plan (SCIP)* should achieve initial operational capability by 2020. But elements that are not yet funded are unlikely to be realized by then. It is significant that the majority of these unfunded strategic capabilities are symmetrical warfare equipments such as jet fighters, ships, guns and tanks.

Restoring heavier capabilities such as these would take another twenty years, i.e. to 2040. Canada's leadership is betting that an emphasis on medium weight and Special Forces will be appropriate until the middle of the next century, and that our nation will not be involved in intensive combat during that period. I think that this level of risk is too high for my great-grandchildren.

At this stage of world history Canada must maintain a balanced capability across the five services: navy, army, air, joint and special. In this the *Year of the Veteran* it would be wise to put their expensive lessons of recent decades at the forefront of defence planning, and honour our veterans by safeguarding future generations of young Canadians through the development of a military force that is ready for whatever strategic framework might arise.

ONE SHIP TOO MANY?

Colonel Gary H. Rice (Ret'd)

Because Canadians no longer live in a "fire-proof house," perhaps now might be the right occasion to pay heed to the words of Liddell Hart: "A self contained and sea-based amphibious force is the best kind of fire extinguisher because of its flexibility, reliability, logistics simplicity and relative economy."

In late May, DefenseNews.com, the web site of Defence News, the authoritative, independent, professional news source for the world's Defence decision-makers, reported that Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier, foresees a day when the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) called for in the Defence Section of Canada's recent International Policy Statement is embarked on an amphibious assault ship that the government apparently intends to purchase and station near potential trouble spots. The article also said that while Canadian military officials declined to give a detailed breakdown of costs, the government has invested 12.8-billion dollars to remodel the Canadian Forces by 2010, including the purchase of the amphibious assault ship and aircraft plus new

equipment for Joint Task Force 2 and three light infantry battalions.¹

There is little doubt that the addition of an amphibious warship to Canada's Navy will be viewed by some Defence cognoscenti as long overdue recognition of the Canadian Forces' oft stated requirement for dedicated sea-lift capability that would enable it to swiftly project a credible military force abroad in support of the government's 3-D policy initiative. On the other hand, assuming General Hillier must surely be well aware that the only government approved new ship construction programme is the one

(continued p. 13)

unveiled in Budget 2004 for the Navy's Joint Support Ship (JSS), other observers will probably wonder what he really had up his sleeve when he let the cat out of the bag about a future amphibious assault ship. These same critics are undoubtedly already speculating about how the CDS might be planning to fast-track, short-circuit or circumvent his own department's Byzantine capital acquisition process to secure the necessary additional funding he will require if he is to put such a warship ship to sea by the 2010 target date.

The three JSS which are to be built at a cost of 2.1-billion dollars will replace the Navy's remaining out-of-date supply ships. When they are in service, their job will be to provide underway fleet and task group support, surge sea lift and afloat support for forces which may be deployed ashore. And to dispel the speculation in some quarters that the JSS might in fact be the amphibious assault ship referred to by the CDS, one has only to be aware that these ships were not functionally designed to permanently embark a serious complement of seaborne soldiers, they possess no troop landing craft and have space for operating only two medium/heavy lift helicopters. The minimal space that is set aside for other than the ship's crew is intended to accommodate only up to 210 personnel who might be involved in the staffing of an afloat Joint Force HQ, or engaged in handling cargo, or for the rest and recreation of troops who may be working ashore, or comprising the staff and patients of an ad hoc 60-bed sick bay.

With the capacity of all three ships combined being only 7,500 lane metres, little room would be left over to embark and support even a token SCTF while simultaneously carrying out their primary fleet support functions. More important, the funds budgeted for the JSS programme do not include all of the equipment the vessels might theoretically be able to carry, i.e., troop landing craft, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) fighter aircraft and additional medium/heavy-lift helicopters, a modular 60-bed hospital designed to be temporarily set up on the vehicle deck, and the advanced communications equipment required to keep an afloat Task Group headquarters in touch with its ships and any troops deployed ashore.²

...an amphibious assault ship is a special-purpose warship designed primarily to transport army seaborne units to an area of operations and support them from the sea.

Unlike the omnifarious JSS an amphibious assault ship is a special-purpose warship designed primarily to transport army seaborne units to an area of operations and support them from the sea. The capability of these ship(s) is

described in terms of their capability to lift an army seaborne unit or formation of a given size. This is expressed in five categories, or "fingerprints of lift;" i.e., 1) The number of troops the ship(s) can carry; 2) Its vehicle storage area, measured in thousands of square feet (or vehicle square); 3) Its cargo storage area, measured in thousands of cubic feet (or cargo cube); 4) The number of "SPOTS" available for parking vertical takeoff aircraft and landing aircraft (expressed as CH-46 helicopter equivalents); and 5) The number of available "SPOTS" for embarking air-cushion landing craft (hovercraft known as LCACs).³

We have yet to be informed by the CDS of the intended strength of the SCTF, but it would appear that anything less than a light infantry battalion of 700-800 would have little international credibility and even less military utility once it is on the ground. Accordingly, it is estimated that a future Canadian amphibious assault ship embarking one austere light infantry battalion SCTF would minimally require the following lift capability: 1) The number of troops the ship must be able to carry - 800; 2) The vehicle square - 20; 3) The cargo cube - 44; 4) The required number of SPOTS for parking vertical takeoff aircraft and landing aircraft - 6; and 5) The required number of SPOTS for LCACs - 2.⁴

However, one amphibious assault ship possessing the previously stated lift capability would not be sufficient to fulfill the government's policy intentions. It goes without saying that a single ship with an embarked SCTF cannot be maintained constantly on station at sea. Therefore, to fulfill the government's wishes and realize the CDS's vision the Navy would appear to minimally require three ships of this class: one home-ported on the Atlantic Coast, say at strategically located CFB Shearwater with its existing deep water port and superb long runway, and one home-ported on the Pacific Coast, say at CFB Esquimalt, with a third ship undergoing routine maintenance, refitting and essential pre-deployment training and work-ups.

Theoretically, when the three-ship JSS programme is complete, and were there also three amphibious assault ships then in service, it would be possible in time of crisis for the Navy to simultaneously embark, deploy and subsequently support ashore a balanced but austere all-arms light infantry brigade group with accompanying VTOL and attack helicopter close air support.

At this time only the US Navy's San Antonio Class (LPD-17) amphibious landing transport dock ship approximates what is seen to be the required fingerprints of lift for a future light infantry battalion size SCTF and hence it would appear to be a reasonable option for a future Canadian amphibious assault ship that jibes with the CDS perceived requirements.⁵ *(continued p. 15)*

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2005 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include: General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Honourable Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Honourable John Fraser, General Paul Manson, and Dr. David Bercuson.

Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2005, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTE
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 18 November 2005, at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



The Vimy Award/La Distinction honorifique Vimy

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2005.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui s'est distingué par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité ou à la défense de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, Major-général Roméo

Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'honorable John Fraser, le General Paul Manson, et M. David Bercuson.

Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2005, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION
HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIA-
TIONS DE LA DÉENSE
359 RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présenté vendredi, le 18 novembre 2005, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner gala, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone: (613) 236 9903.

Designed from the outset to accommodate women, and with a projected fifty-year life span, the LPD-17 class is an air-capable, wet-well ship, designed with substantial improvements over the US Navy's existing LPD ships in terms of lift capacity, accommodations for personnel, electronics, and self-defence capabilities. Its side ports enable the embarkation and debarkation of troops and rolling equipment, while a floodable well deck permits operation of two LCAC, or advanced amphibious assault vehicles, or four LCM-8 (Landing Craft Mechanised Type 8), or nine LCM-6, or 20 LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked). The ships's storage and offload capabilities provide for all classes of supplies, including fuel, ammunition, and food for army seaborne forces ashore.

The vessel's spaces are configured for amphibious craft logistic support and aviation maintenance and refuelling/rearming servicing on its flight deck. There are six spots for helicopters of up to CH-53 (Sea Stallion) size. Three AH-1W (Super Cobra) or two CH-46 (Sea Knight) or one CH-53 or MV-22 (Osprey) may be accommodated in the hangar. It will also be able to support the future F-35 Joint Strike Fighter/VTOL, AV-8B (Harrier) aircraft and AH-1W attack helicopters. Its extensive command and control spaces and 'flagship-like' connectivity enable this fully interoperable ship to support independent operations or to serve as an integral part of a national or international Joint Task Force.

Unlike the JSS the LPD-17 incorporates the latest quality of life standards necessary for seaborne troops embarked for extended periods, including sit-up berthing, a ship services mall, a fitness centre and a learning resource centre/electronic classroom with the flexibility to accommodate mixed gender troops. Its on-board medical facilities comprised of 124 beds and two operating rooms enable the ship to respond to a natural disaster occurring in Canada's littoral zone and elsewhere in the world, as well as support domestic aid to the civil power, humanitarian, peace support or war fighting operations.

So far (through fiscal year 2004), the US Navy has confirmed orders for six LPD-17 and its first ship, the USS San Antonio, will be commissioned in August of this year. Its

original plans were to buy six more between 2005 and 2010, at a rate of one per year but this has now been reduced to three. Were Canada to decide to enter into an agreement with the US Government and Northrop Grumman Corporation to lease or purchase one, or all three, of the ships cut from the US Navy's original 12-ship construction programme the estimated cost would be approximately 1.48-billion dollars per ship.

Canada currently possesses no such warships, and there is no government funding yet set aside for them. Were the funds to somehow become available there would not be sufficient time to acquire and put to sea even one such vessel by 2010, what General Hillier is seen to need if he is to ultimately acquire an amphibious warship capability and also realize the totality of his challenging vision to transform the Canadian Forces. It would be a longer time-line that extends his planning horizon to 2015, and a government guaranteed annual increase in the Defence budget to move it within ten years from its current 1.2 per cent of GDP to about 2.2 per cent. However, without more time, and lacking the necessary additional hard cash to "make it so," it is most unlikely that the CDS's reported intention to see a Canadian amphibious assault ship with an embarked SCTF on station somewhere in the world's oceans by 2010 will become a reality, and his inspired vision, as laudable and as professionally well-grounded as it is, may turn out to be just one ship too many?

ENDNOTES:

¹.David Pugliese, Ottawa. *Canada Plans To Improve Light Infantry Units*. DefenseNews.Com, The Americas. Posted 05/23/05 10:23

².<http://www.sfu.ca/casr/101-navalsc.htm>.

³.Congressional Budget Office. *The Future of the Navy's Amphibious and Maritime Propositioning Forces*. (Washington, DC. Subcommittee on Sea power of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, November 2004).

⁴.Ibid.

⁵.LPD-17 *Lift capability expressed* as "Fingerprints of Lift:" 1) Troop accommodation - 699 with a surge capacity to 800; 2) Vehicle square - 25,000 square feet; 3) Cargo cube - 36,000 cubic feet; 4) Helicopter Spots - 6; 5) LCAC Spots - 2.

THE NEW CANADIAN WAR MUSEUM: Quaint Historical Relic or Augury for Better Security?

General Paul Manson, President CDAI



*CF-101 Voodoo Interceptor in the Le Breton Gallery,
Canadian War Museum*

With its grand opening on May 8th, 2005, the 60th anniversary of VE Day, the new Canadian War Museum in Ottawa is a stunning new addition to the cultural scene in this country, all the more so because it deals with our nation's military, a subject which in recent years has almost disappeared from the public radar scope.

It is enigmatic, therefore, that the new museum has proved to be such a resounding success. In its first three weeks of operation, more than 100,000 visitors had passed through its portals, a truly remarkable number considering that the total *annual* attendance at the old facility on Sussex Drive in Ottawa was only slightly above that figure. Something good has happened, and it raises an intriguing question. Is this interest an indication that Canadians are at last taking their military legacy to heart? More specifically, is the new museum the touchstone for a national will to rebuild the Canadian Forces?

Without a doubt the building's remarkable architecture and the carefully researched displays will stimulate an awareness that was simply not possible in the old facility, which closed its doors in September of 2004. Located on Sussex Drive next door to the National Gallery, the century-old structure was never intended to be a museum (it was built as the Dominion Archives). Much too small to tell the story of Canada's military history, plagued with utterly inadequate environmental controls, asbestos insulation, and a host of

other woes, this was not a museum to engender great pride in the accomplishments of those who served, nor of the pivotal role that military history has played in the development of the Canadian nation.

It took a controversial plan to build an extension to the old museum to draw public attention to its inadequacy. In particular, the inclusion of a holocaust gallery in that plan led to strong opposition from veterans' groups and a public airing of the whole sad state of the War Museum before a Senate Subcommittee hearing in early 1998.

Emerging from the furor was a growing understanding that the only satisfactory solution was to build an entirely new facility. It was a nice thought, but making it happen was not going to be easy. The cost of a decent new museum would exceed \$100 million. A good site would have to be found. An architect had to be selected, and a worthy design chosen. Then a constructor would have to take the design and turn it into a real building. Meanwhile (and perhaps most important of all), the story of Canada's rich military history had to be presented in the new museum's exhibitions and displays in such a way as to be comprehensive, balanced, accurate and interesting to a very wide-ranging audience. All of this would be an enormously ambitious undertaking, at a time when public interest in things military was apparently not particularly strong.

And yet it happened, and in an amazingly short time. How it all came about is a complex story, not to be recounted here in detail, but full credit must be given to the many people who were involved in one way or another. The Hon. Barney Danson was instrumental in obtaining federal government funds and the personal support of then-Prime Minister Jean Chretien, without which the project could not have succeeded. Eminent Canadian historian Jack Granatstein, both during his two-year tenure as director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum and in the preceding and succeeding periods, consistently stated with great eloquence and forcefulness the urgent need to do things better in a new facility. Some 2500 donors contributed more than \$16 million towards the cost. The Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, of which the War Museum is a part, gave truly outstanding support

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throughout the project in so many ways. (Without a doubt, the project would not have succeeded without that support.) Veterans' groups, notably the Royal Canadian Legion, were involved in planning from the beginning. And the whole business was managed with consummate skill by Joe Geurts, the current Director and CEO of the Museum, who ensured that the project was completed on time and within budget. It was a remarkable team effort from start to finish. Participants were driven by a sense that a successful outcome was vitally important, not only to our understanding of the past, but to the future of defence and national security in this country. We owed it to our veterans to do it right.

By all accounts, it has been a resounding success. Raymond Moriyama's brilliant design has received rave reviews at home and abroad. The LeBreton Flats site, which initially met with some reservation, has turned out to be ideal, both in its proximity to the heart of Ottawa and its quiet setting on the banks of the Ottawa River. The chronological displays, ranging from prehistoric times to current operations in Afghanistan, reflect a great amount of research and thought by the museum's historians and the international design team. A particularly appealing aspect is the presentation, on walls throughout the building, of hundreds of works from the museum's Beaverbrook Collection of War Art, paintings and drawings previously stored in a vault, unseen by the public.

In the first few weeks of operation it is clear that visitors like what they see, as attested by the huge numbers in attendance every day.

As might be expected, there have been a few criticisms. The display of two paintings related to the murder of a young Somalian has drawn some flak, mainly from a couple of individuals who have not in fact taken the time to visit the museum. Others who were initially distressed by the paintings changed their minds when they saw the context in which they were presented.

This episode makes an important point. The Canadian War Museum adamantly defends its right – even duty – to tell the whole story of our military history. If at this critical juncture it was to give in to self-appointed censors, then the whole undertaking of creating a new museum of military history would be a failure. Warfare so often brings out the best in people, and the museum's storyline is full of superb examples from Canada's military history. But occasionally the stress of conflict brings out the worst, and this part of the story cannot be whitewashed, as some would wish.

A telling measure of the new museum's appeal is the remarkable fact that 42,000 schoolchildren have been booked into the facility during the first seven weeks of operation. Given that young Canadians' knowledge of our military past has been abysmally low (no fault of their own), this new-found interest is significant in that it promises a well-informed future generation in matters of security and national defence.

But what about today's voters? What impact might the new Canadian War Museum have on their views of current security issues?

There is a simple syllogism which goes something like this:

- Successive Canadian governments have been inclined to react strongly to perceived public attitudes in the formulation of policy.
- Public interest in defence and the Canadian Forces has been exceedingly low.
- National defence has been given very low priority in policy terms.
- Funding for defence has been neglected.
- The armed forces have therefore gone into serious decline.

One way to break out of this downward spiral is to increase public interest in our national security, and this is where the Canadian War Museum has a role to play. The astounding initial attendance figures seem to indicate that there is a nascent interest that is only now emerging. Canadians are indeed proud of their military past and, by extension, of today's serving men and women. Something is happening, as Canadians saw in the media coverage of the VE-Day 60th anniversary celebrations in Holland. Perhaps there was a little element of shame in learning that the Dutch people know and care about our own veterans more than we do ourselves. Whatever the reasons, there is a genuine resurgence of interest in and understanding of Canada's military heritage. What must be done now is to parlay this into a greater public involvement in today's strategic situation and the role of the Canadian Forces in meeting some difficult challenges, known and unknown.

It will take more than a new Canadian War Museum to accomplish this, but the wonderful new facility clearly has the potential for becoming a focal point in the process.

In the final analysis, Canadians themselves must choose to understand the lessons of the past, and apply them to secure a better future for their nation.

THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2005 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.


The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, and Sharon Hobson.

Any Canadian may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of reasons for the nomination. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2005, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 18 November 2005, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236 9903.



*The Ross Munro Media Award/
Prix Média Ross Munro*

PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2005

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2 500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, et Sharon Hobson.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro.

Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivent votre nomination et d'une biographie du candidat. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2005, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359 RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 18 novembre 2005, au dîner gala Vimy qui aura lieu dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus informations, incluent la demande de billets pour le dîner gala, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée, ou télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

STRONG AND COHESIVE – THE CANADIAN ARMY ETHOS AND CULTURE

Colonel Mike Capstick, Director Land Personnel Strategy, National Defence Headquarters

Military Ethos and Army Culture

Armies, like societies at large, evolve over time. Any number of factors contribute to this fact of life – social change, technology, societal expectations, demographics and politics are among the most the most important. For armies, however, the demands of war and operations must remain the most powerful driver. It is a truism to state that navies and air forces “man the equipment” while armies “equip the soldier.” That said, too many strategic thinkers limit their discussion of this to actual equipment (or *materiel*) and they ignore the intangible elements of fighting power – training, leadership, morale and cohesion. It is precisely these intangibles that Canada’s Army recognizes as fundamental to our success in operations. As described by Colonel John Eggenberger in the Spring 05 issue of *On Track*, the Regimental System is instrumental in developing the soldiers, leaders and teams that have made Canada’s Army one of the best small armies in the world.

As strong as it can be, the Regimental System is not an immutable or totally coherent concept. Like every other institution it has its strengths and weaknesses and must be shaped to respond to the demands of contemporary warfare. In fact, anyone who has studied the Army over the past four decades will realize that in addition to its positive contribution to fighting power, misguided application and understanding of the system has resulted in a degree of parochialism and tribalism. Many have argued that this has, in reality, detracted from the Army’s cohesion and effectiveness.

In recognition of this dynamic, building on the strengths of the Regimental System and, by extension, minimizing its weaknesses, is a central theme in the document *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy* (2002). The aim is simple: ensuring that our organizational culture (“how we do things around here”) is closely aligned with our ethos (“how things should be”) as described in *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Since most soldiers live, train and are developed within Regiments, it is clear that

the Regimental System is a crucial part of the organizational culture of Canada’s Army.

To accomplish the objective of aligning the culture with the ethos it is imperative that the profession has a clear understanding of both. *Duty With Honour* has provided a Canadian Forces view of the ethos that is precise but still accommodates the “...unique-to-Environment expressions of ethos (that) derive from and reflect the distinct military functions associated with sea, land and air operations.” Expressing these unique Army facets of the ethos will be theme of the next version of *Canada’s Army*, which will be revised over the next two years. This is where the Regimental System will be described and where the Army leadership will provide the direction necessary to meet the strategic objective of building on its strengths. To do this we need to reach a collective understanding of what the Army wants the Regiments to do and how they should do it.

The Regimental System Study

Many *On Track* readers will be aware that LGen Jeffery, as CLS, initiated a project to study the Army’s organizational culture. A large part of this is an in-depth, multi-disciplinary review of the Regimental System. This includes theoretical work (some of which appeared in the Summer 2004 issue of the *Canadian Army Journal*), a historical review and an anthropological/sociological study that encompasses a review of the literature, focus groups and actual field observations by an eminent social anthropologist (Dr. Donna Winslow). All of these activities are still works in progress but should be completed within a year. The very act of initiating these studies generated understandable, but misplaced, concern and controversy. Although many jumped to the conclusion that this study is a threat to the Regimental System, the *Army Strategy* is clear that the aim is to “build on its strengths.” In addition, no one has been ignored in this study. For example, the lead researcher on the historical portion is a serving officer in The Royal Canadian Regiment with regular and reserve service.

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Dr. Winslow, the lead researcher on the social science side, has interviewed hundreds of retired and serving members of Regiments, including most Colonels-Commandant. In addition she has participated in the entire range of Regimental activities including two developmental sessions for new officers and NCOs as well as a wide variety of historical, traditional and social events. Most importantly, she has lived with and spoken to soldiers in training and on deployed operations to determine their views on the Regiments. Finally, the Army's senior leadership will stringently review the findings and recommendations.

Military Ethos and Canadian Values

An equally important aspect of aligning our ethos and culture is determining the values, attitudes and beliefs of serving soldiers. To that end, the Army has recently completed two major surveys and issued a report, *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*. The report and the details of the research can be found on the Army website at: http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/5_10_7.asp. This report is intended for the widest possible audience and does not dwell on methodological issues and is not overly technical. Despite this, its major findings have been misinterpreted in some media with headlines like "Army Survey a Worrying Read" (Ottawa Sun, 5 April) and "Army Attracts Violent Louts" (Canadian Press 9 April). This kind of reporting has resulted in understandable concern among many who care about the CF and the Army and who have dedicated (and continue to dedicate) a great deal of effort to making it a better institution. If you are reading *On Track*, you are probably one of these people and, therefore, deserve a better explanation than the media has presented.

The finding that the "army attracts violent louts" is from a question that is asked annually by CROP in their survey of Canadian values. This national survey asks respondents (15-39 years old) about their interest in a career in the CF. Those that answer affirmatively are clustered in an area of the "Canadian values map" that indicates that they are conformists who are motivated by success. This group tends to seek social status, lack life goals and see a need for national assertiveness. In addition, they often seek "fun" in transgressing social norms and in violence. In short - not the best of Canadian youth! This finding is not the whole story. Instead it was just the beginning. Experienced soldiers and leaders intuitively know that this is not the picture of the Canadian soldier that we serve with. As a result, the Army commissioned an internal administration of the same survey to determine where we fit on the Canadian "values map."

This survey (full results are described in *Canada's Soldiers*) found that "...soldiers' values are closely aligned with those of Canadian society." It also found that in areas where the groups' attitudes differed from those of Canadians at large, it was both to be expected and appropriate for the military. For example, the survey found that we are slightly more conservative and that we value the idea of duty much more than the general population. Excellent values for soldiers! It is also important to note that CROP found that members of the Army are almost four times more adaptive to the complexities of life than the average Canadian. This reinforces our experience on operations where soldiers and leaders consistently demonstrate that they can adapt to the demands of a complex environment where you simply cannot develop enough rules or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to deal with the "snakes" (as General Hillier calls the contemporary threat).

...Canada's soldiers are still very much soldiers with a strong adherence to the military ethos.

Canada's Soldiers also describes "The Army Culture and Climate Survey" that was developed by The Royal Military College (Department of Military Psychology and Leadership). This survey measured numerous dimensions of organizational culture and climate as well as specific items designed to gauge adherence to the military ethos. Again, the highlights can be found in the report itself. However, it is worth noting that we replicated the benchmark 1979 "Cotton Study" on military ethos. Many readers will recall that the study provoked considerable controversy when it was found that 14% of respondents (almost 30% among junior support troops) would try to avoid combat. In the 2004 replication, only 6.8% answered the same way and the number of junior support soldiers who would "avoid" dropped to 8.8%.

Although this portion of the survey indicates that not all soldiers subscribe to the essential concept of "unlimited liability," it does illustrate the fact that more do today than in 1979. More importantly, the responses in this category reinforce the experience in the field and reinforce the point that even in this era of human and individual rights, Canada's soldiers are still very much soldiers with a strong adherence to the military ethos.

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Strong Ethos – Strong Culture

Both ethos and culture are complex concepts guaranteed to stir up strong emotions. The Regimental System, at the heart of “how we do things” in Canada’s Army, is even more emotional. Most of us have grown up in one Regiment or another and we feel its value. However, Regiments – like any other social institution – must evolve or die.

Canadians, Canadian society, the “enemy” and the operational reality have all changed in radical ways in recent decades.

The Army must be able to prevail in these new conditions and the strategic objective is to establish the conditions for success. That is why we are studying the Regimental System

with a view to making it even more relevant in 21st Century warfare. At the same time, *Canada’s Soldiers* demonstrates that today’s soldiers and leaders hold very similar values to the Canadian population at large and that the differences are, for the most part, appropriate for those who have voluntarily selected to become members of the profession of arms. It also demonstrates that we have a very strong adherence to the military ethos and are willing to fight in defence of Canadian interests and values. Of course there are challenges and issues, but there always have been. The *Army Strategy* ensures that the institution has a coherent approach to dealing with these. In turn, the Regimental System Study and the wider Army Culture Project are addressing the essential human aspects of our military capability in a coherent fashion to ensure that Canada’s soldiers (individually and in teams) continue to be among the best in the world.

Commentary

Defence Policy Statement 2005

Fred R. Fowlow, Director Maritime Affairs, Calgary Branch

When asked to comment on the federal government’s international policy statement, which was expected to provide a foundation for the development of a defence policy statement, Allan Gotlieb got it right when he replied, “There’s a good deal of high flying rhetoric, statements about how great we are.”¹

Examining both policy statements one agrees with Gotlieb, when one observes, as did the Conference of Defence Associations, “The policy (Defence Policy Statement [DPS]) is long on ideals and objectives but short on facts and strategies of how to reach them given the Force’s weakened state.”² We read in the same article, “The objectives stated in the defence paper are encouraging [but] omissions cause concern, and the fact sheets create suspicion.”³ But there are good features in the report which must not be overlooked. So good readers, come on aboard as we set sail using the charts made in “Fort Fumble.”

The rhetoric in both policy statements explains how effective, well equipped, organized and efficient the forces will be in the future, and that an interesting decade of change, transformation and rebuilding awaits our Canadian Forces (CF). Dare one ask ... are we about to see the 21st century vision end up with the same results that followed the tabling of the 1994 Defence White Paper; a lot of talk... no action? The DPS offers an outlook for the CF which on first reading, seems to be no more than a modified presentation of the same old statements we have been hearing for decades.

In the past the communications pattern to which the Canadian public was subjected usually offered a collection of cliché phrases emphasizing that Canada will continue to maintain modern, combat-capable maritime, land air and special forces. Not much

change in the new defence policy statement. There appears a slightly newer version similar to the one we received in the past. Today we are assured that our armed forces will perform their traditional roles: protecting Canada, defending North America in cooperation with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security.

One slight variation to the obvious mission assignments for the forces appears in the statement that the government believes a greater emphasis must be placed on the defence of Canada and North America, an objective which will comprise the armed forces first priority.

With the goal that the forces will now view Canada as a single operational area where the best available resources from the navy, army air

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force and special operations forces can be brought to bear on a contingency wherever it occurs, one can understand why a single operational command headquarters (Canada Command) must be established in order to quickly respond to any form of domestic crisis. All of these decisions announce a shift in policy direction which brings to the maritime and air forces, greater emphasis on protecting Canada when deploying navy and air force personnel and assets.

Greater recognition of the need to protect the sovereignty and security of our territory in the North receives resounding support, because the government finally recognizes that armed forces capabilities in Canada's north must be enhanced. Considering the amount of international air traffic that now flies over the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and our other Arctic territory, the proposed basing of search-and-rescue aircraft in the region is a long overdue undertaking.

So lets give the drafters of the DPS a good grade for their effort with an underlined note that we are pleased to observe that Ottawa has finally recognized in a more positive way, the pressing need to increase the efforts of the armed forces to ensure the sovereignty and security of all our territory, air space and maritime approaches, by moving closer to building response teams to support civilian and other government agencies when responding to a major incident in Canada.

Thankfully the policy statement recognizes the world's international situation requires attention, concluding that something must be done to fulfil the long-ignored needs of the CF if Canada hopes to regain respect on the international scene.

The DPS' description of the outlook for the future offers a collection of important issues that the government plans to resolve. The list of future

undertakings will obviously be used when drafting what we will call a "game plan" that offers an introduction to, and implementation of, a new vision for the Canadian Forces.

The policy statements ramp up the focus on that heretofore elusive term "transformation," a term that has been bandied about Canada's National Defence Headquarters and the Pentagon for more than just a few years. Briefly, both countries are independently working on a game plan which will respond to the international game called the "Revolution in Military Affairs" which coincidentally, includes the special play called transformation of the military.

Transformation of the CF is described in the federal government's document, "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," where we find under the heading "Canada's Defence Policy is at a Defining Moment," that the key to implementation of the great vision for the CF is the transformation process on which they are now embarked, including the adoption of a fully integrated and unified approach to all military operations through transforming the command structure. It also mentions establishing fully integrated units capable of a timely, focused and effective response to foreign or domestic threats to Canadian security. The defence statement contains a list of proposed undertakings which are too lengthy and detailed to discuss here.

...the small amounts of funding promised in the defence budget for 2005 and 2006, barely cover the minimum funding required...

Notwithstanding the encouraging news contained in the DPS, one commentator suggests that among several worrying signs emerging is

"the continuing disconnect between major capital investment demanded by the DPS, and the very modest short-term funding increases shown in the recent defence budget."⁴

Several defence analysts outside DND have told us the small amounts of funding promised in the defence budget for 2005 and 2006, barely cover the minimum funding required to sustain the current level of CF operations. In response to this claim, DND spin-masters rationalized the low amounts allocated in the budget as adequate with the claim that the department does not have enough people to generate the paperwork required to spend an appreciable amount of money.

The assessments completed by the Chiefs of the Navy, Army and Air Force project a cumulative shortfall in their operating accounts of some \$1 billion this year alone.⁵

Canadians understand that our armed forces experience difficulty in sustaining overseas deployed forces for a period beyond six months. Defence planners must therefore take great care when they develop the plans for the future operations of the CF, a task that will demand taking the PMO's office out of the loop and undertaking more careful reconciliation of capabilities with demands.

There must be determination to avoid the ever present "can-do" attitude which inadvertently places undue emphasis on readiness to move forces quickly, only to find that for want of our own reliable sea-lift support ships, our deployed forces could be confronted with the ever present sustainability problem.

Thankfully the DPS shows an intention to correct this shortcoming by documenting an intention to move ahead with the acquisition of ships that will be able, among other things, to deploy and support the troops and their equipment, as well as to provide a sea-based national or multinational command capability.⁶

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Even though it lacks a certain amount of conceptual framework with respect to the overall structure of the CF, which will hopefully be clarified in due course,⁷ it is expected that the DPS proposed joint multi-command concept will receive full support by leaders of the navy, army and air force.

Viewing the situation as it appears to be developing, one ventures to suggest that pleased as one is to read of General Hillier's success in bringing some logical common sense thinking and a vision back into the defence planning process, one is hard pressed to generate optimism that the promises to transform and build a better-equipped, more efficient and more effective military will be attained within the promised five year time frame.

We must remember that the General has been given the task to pursue and implement a new approach to the resolution of hundreds of military problems which accumulated as a consequence of government neglect over the past 15 to 20 years. Not an easy problem to resolve in a short five year period.

Hillier's enthusiasm for resolving the CF problems as we move through the 21st century, and his vision, is commendable. It no doubt prompted the long overdue change in the mind set of those who worked on the Defence Policy Statement.

It should be noted that detailed plans recognizing that the level of CF responsiveness, and the fact that the mission capabilities of our armed forces must be improved, have yet to be written by the CDS' staff.

As we check off the list shown in the DPS, one cannot overlook the length of time it will take to recruit 8,000 troops, prepare statements of requirements for new equipment, get project management staff in place to identify and arrange contracts for

new equipment, and, inspect and coordinate deliveries following equipment trials and acceptance.

Finally, anyone who has been involved with such a cycle will confirm that getting new equipment into the system from conception to delivery, generally takes ten or more years. The time required to train people to use the new equipment before it is assigned to operational units, must also be added to this.

There is another important undertaking that must be considered as part of the rebuilding process. Before all the work required to get new equipment into the military system is finalized, it is important that something be done to promote a better and more informed understanding of what is happening to the CF during each phase of the transformation and rebuilding process. Briefly, a communications dialogue must take place between the military, parliamentarians, and yes, even the Canadian public.

None of the aforementioned will be easy to accomplish should the political climate in Ottawa continue to grovel around in a turmoil of distrust and name-calling, while the armed forces, and in this case the navy, struggles with a rapidly decaying infrastructure, a depreciating asset base, increasing personnel issues, and a fleet that faces an intimidating number of sustainment issues. Which is to say, 'the Navy will not be able to deliver the full mandated level of maritime defence readiness and capability delineated in the Defence Plan.'⁸

Canadians must not be misled by TV clips showing the Naden Band of Maritime Forces Pacific pounding out a moving rendition of "Heart of Oak" as another frigate deploys for a six-month tour in the far east theatre. It is this kind of activity that leaves the impression the navy is in a position to cover a wide spectrum of maritime

operations such as a small but irregular increase in the number of coastal patrols and overseas deployments, when in actual fact there is shallow depth to sustain simultaneous operations. All this gives cause for concern as we move along into the 21st century.

Notwithstanding the "can-do" attitude of navy leaders, the navy's level of preparedness could become even more shaky as our twelve year old frigates move to the point in their life cycle where they are wanting for equipment and system upgrades as they queue up for extensive refits.

Past events confirm that our navy always moved forward as the vanguard force in the security and defence of this great country. Undoubtedly there is the making of a situation which falls short of these times when our maritime forces could be depended upon to be ready to deploy ships to the scene of a disaster or crisis on short notice.

One is reminded that within thirty minutes of the decision being made to participate in the War on Terrorism, our first ship was en route to the Persian Gulf, followed by a complete task force some ten days later.⁹ What would happen should the same situation confront us today?

The political climate which plagues the minority government creates a situation that could, following a snap election, result in a blow-back of the plans for rebuilding or transforming our armed forces.

As a "buyer beware" comment, we must not lose sight of the fact that despite the plans for returning the forces to their former strength, and at the same time preparing them for the 21st century, there are still those in the back rooms of bureaucratic Ottawa who might be inclined to continue to question the need for

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increased funding for the forces, and champion the unacceptable status quo.

The Canadian Forces has reached the point where failure, or even a delay to implement General Hillier's plan as quickly as possible, is not an option. Establishing fully integrated units capable of a timely, focused and effective response to foreign or domestic threats to Canadian security as described in the Defence Statement, is an absolute must.¹⁰

Time waits for no one. Our National association and local branches must actively support quick implementation of the federal government's Defence Policy Statement, aptly named: "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World."

ENDNOTES

1 John Geddes, "Foreign Policy Reviews Should Not Be Conducted," Maclean's Magazine, May 2, 2005.

2 Stephen Thorne, "Military Objectives Ignore \$1.1 Billion Shortfall," canoenetwork CNews, May 2, 2005.

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4 Nic Boisvert, "The Defence Policy Statement – Worth the Wait."

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6 Defence Summary - Canada's International Policy Statement: "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World"

7 Syndicate 2 Report, "Jointness, the Canadian Navy and the New Security Agenda," p.39.

8 Stephen Thorne, "Budget unlikely to assuage under funded, overstretched military," documents Canoe Network

News, April 24, 2005.

9 *ibid.* 7, Syndicate 2 Report.

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Fred Fowlow's columns appear regularly in "The Bowline Journal" and in NOAC's national publication, "Starshell."

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U.S. EFFORTS TO FILL THE RANKS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES - A Challenge

Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director, the Reserve Officers Association (of the United States)

The U.S. Army is in the midst of a desperate manpower crisis. Plunging recruiting numbers mean that the Army may soon be unable to fill its ranks. For four straight months, from February through May 2005, the Army missed its recruiting goals, missing its target by an increasing amount each month.

Major General Michael Rochelle, head of the Army Recruiting Command, has described the recruiting challenge as "one of historic proportions" that poses the greatest challenge since the All Volunteer Force was established in 1973. Although nobody is seriously contemplating a return to conscription, it is questionable whether the Army could field enough forces if another major commitment were required in the future.

Although the Army was supposed to bring in 6,700 recruits in May, it fell 1,661 individuals short. The Army would have missed its target by a whopping 37% if it had not earlier lowered its May goal. For 2005, the Army must recruit 80,000 new soldiers; as of May 31, it was 8,321 recruits short of its 2005 goal, which equates to more than a month's worth of recruits. With only four months to go in the fiscal year, the Army must double the number of recruits it has brought in to reach its annual goal. The

Army National Guard and Army Reserve missed their May recruitment goals by 29% and 18%, respectively.

The causes of the manpower crisis are fairly straightforward. The U.S. economy is doing fairly well, with relatively low unemployment. Accordingly, young men and women who are not entering college after high school have other attractive options.

More importantly, the war in Iraq has put a significant damper on recruitment. Any soldier enlisting today is committing to at least one year, if not two years, of duty in Iraq. As a result, the "propensity to enlist," the percentage of young Americans willing to consider Army service, has dropped from 11% last year to about 7% this year.

A major problem for the U.S. Army is that so-called "influencers," parents, coaches, teachers, etc., are not recommending military service. According to a Department of Defense survey, only 25% of parents in November 2004 recommended military service to their children, down from 42% in August 2003. Shortly after the September 11 attacks, 22% of all "influencers" recommended the military

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as a career option. Earlier this year, that figure dropped to 14%. In an effort to appeal to these influencers, the Army is launching a series of patriotic television ads urging parents to encourage their children to enlist to fight the war on terrorism. It remains to be seen if this program will make a difference.

...a sense is emerging that military service is for somebody else's child...

Significantly, the media is replete with stories that few leading American policy makers have children who serve in the military. While a handful of Members of Congress have children who are officers, only Democratic Senator Tim Johnson of South Dakota has a child who currently serves as an enlisted soldier. As leading military sociologist Charles Moskos points out, the propensity to enlist would rise dramatically if Jenna Bush were to enlist. As a result, it may be fair to say that a sense is emerging that military service is for somebody else's child, particularly during a war that has never been popular.

I would cite another factor contributing to declining enlistment. In every prior American war, the government appealed to its citizens to sacrifice for the common good. For some Americans sacrifice meant military service. For all Americans sacrifice meant a rise in taxes to pay for the war effort. For the first time in history, however, the U.S. government not only did not raise taxes during a war, but actually cut taxes. As a result, virtually all Americans, particularly those at the upper end of the economic spectrum, have been insulated from any sacrifice for the common good of the war on terrorism. As a result, U.S. policymakers have inadvertently created an environment where most families do not feel the urge to make a commitment by urging their children to enlist.

Telling Americans that the war is not important enough to pay for makes it unlikely that Americans would find the war important enough to fight for.

The Army's problem is not lack of access to potential recruits. The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act requires schools to give military recruiters the same campus access offered to other recruiters. Schools are required to provide the military with students' home phone numbers and addresses, unless parents opt out. Failure to comply can result in the withdrawal of federal funds. Nevertheless, recruiters face an uphill battle.

General Rochelle of Recruiting Command said earlier this year that parental resistance could jeopardize the survival of All Volunteer Force. When parents and other influential

adults dissuade young people from enlisting, "it begs the question of what our national staying power might be for what certainly appears to be a long fight." While nobody believes a draft is imminent, if another major military intervention were to be needed (Iran, China, North Korea), one has to wonder how the Army could put enough forces in the field.

Since the Army cannot do anything about the policy in Iraq, it is trying to make military service more attractive financially to compete in the marketplace. The Army has doubled enlistment bonuses from \$20,000 to \$40,000 and will now provide help with initial mortgages, in addition to the traditional college funds. In addition, the Army has raised the age limit for service from 35 to 40, taken more recruits who lack high school diplomas and will accept recruits who are overweight, hoping that basic training will mold them into fighting shape. Remarkably, the Army is now spending \$56,000 for each recruit it brings into the force, reflecting recruiter salaries, bonuses, nearly \$200 million in annual advertising costs, etc.

The Army is also offering a 15 month active duty enlistment in the hopes of luring those willing to serve on active duty but not defer college or civilian plans for four to six years. While it remains to be seen if this option will draw more recruits, it has been heavily criticized in the media. As commentators correctly point out, those who enlist for 15 months are subject to "stop loss," the program by which any soldier can have his/her tour of duty extended involuntarily for as long as the government wants to keep the soldier. Many thousands of soldiers have been prevented from leaving the service over the past few years because of stop loss. Furthermore, soldiers who enlist for 15 months will incur a Reserve obligation after completion of active duty.

Because so many reservists are being mobilized to support ongoing operations, a soldier with a 15 month service obligation could be mobilized from reserve status. Adding stop loss and reserve mobilization could convert a 15 month active duty obligation into 36 to 48 months of active duty with two tours in Iraq.

Stop loss also has a negative force management effect. The Army currently has the highest officer to enlisted ratio in its history – there are 15,000 excess field grade officers and the percentage growth of field grade officers exceeds the percentage growth of the enlisted force. The enlisted growth derives from stop loss imposed on E4 and E5's, not recruiting. In fact, the number of E1-E3 has shrunk by 13%. This means the Army is not bringing in the future leaders but retaining mid-grade enlisted structure and officers who really should be eased out.

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Remarkably, the Army can expect an even worse recruiting year in 2006. Each year the Army enlists people it expects to send to basic training the following year. For example, a rising high school senior may commit to the Army in the fall with the expectation of shipping out in the summer after graduation. The putative soldier is considered to be in the Delayed Entry Pool or "DEP" between signing the enlistment contract and reporting to basic training. The Army hopes to start each fiscal year with up to one third of its required recruits for the next year already in the DEP. However, in order to make its numbers for 2005, the Army has raided the DEP and is now trying to sign up a recruit and ship him/her to basic training within 30 days of enlistment. Without recruits bankrolled in the DEP, any further erosion in the propensity to serve suggests that 2006 will leave the Army well short.

The Army is also having some trouble with soldiers it does recruit. A recent report indicated that over 36% of all soldiers fail to complete their first term enlistment. Many fail basic training due to poor conditioning or other physical or mental problems. Others fail to adapt to military service and are processed out under military justice actions. In an effort to stem the exodus of first-term soldiers, the decision to discharge a soldier for drug abuse, poor conduct or for failure to meet fitness standards now rests with brigade, as opposed to battalion, commanders.

As if all this bad news were not enough, reports of recruiters trying to enlist unqualified applicants forced the Army to suspend recruiting for one day earlier this year so that recruiters could receive refresher training. The unethical behavior cited included helping a recruits fake diplomas or pass drug tests. Notwithstanding the loss of one recruiting day, the Army did not alter the monthly requirement that recruiters sign up two recruits per month that some recruiters argue was the catalyst for abuse and unethical behavior. Recruiters interviewed by the media indicated that they currently work 80-hour weeks, which they claimed caused depression, broken marriages and the temptation to cut corners.

...units returning from combat have very high retention rates because members feel pride in what they have accomplished...

Thus far, retention has been adequate. It has been well-documented that units returning from combat have very high retention rates because members feel pride in what they have accomplished together. However, soldiers now face deployment to Iraq every other year and the Pentagon is bracing for an exodus of young company grade officers. Unfortunately, those are the very officers whose counterinsurgency experience will be critical in the future

both in Iraq and next year. The Defense Department hopes that a purported significant troop reduction in Iraq in 2006 will allow the Army to slow the pace of troop deployments, giving soldiers two years at home for every year in battle. Given the continued pace of the insurgency, however, the hope for a massive troop reduction in 2006 may prove elusive.

...what can U.S. policymakers do to man its fighting forces?

Given the present environment, what can U.S. policymakers do to man its fighting forces? Noting that the pace of deployments and mobilization of the Reserve Components cannot be sustained, some in Congress have called for an increase in the size of the Army from its current size of 480,000. Although DOD has used emergency war powers to increase troop levels temporarily by 30,000, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld opposes permanent increases. As he notes, the total American military consists of 2.6 million active, Guard and Reserve personnel of all services. That ought to be enough to maintain 150,000 troops in Iraq, particularly if the military is transformed into more agile, smaller, independent forces that can be moved about with duties redistributed so that active-duty soldiers are not filling garrison positions or trained in a Cold War-related skill. Although transformation takes time, it will be a critical component to ensuring sufficient capability where it is needed.

Although it remains to be seen if additional monetary incentives will increase recruiting in the face of concern about the war in Iraq, it should be noted that contractors have no trouble finding volunteers to go to Iraq for the right price. While appealing to mercenary impulses may at times seem unseemly, if American youth are attracted to job opportunities other than the Army, then the Army must provide what the target demographic is seeking. At some point, enough financial incentives could overcome concern about the war. However, the more the Army provides to its recruits as financial incentives, the more it must provide its NCO corps to ensure that recruits don't make more than those who lead them.

The Army is also launching a major initiative to attract foreigners to its ranks with the promise of citizenship in exchange for service. While this program might fill the ranks in the short term, what does it say about the health of American society if its citizens choose outsource the fundamental duty of citizenship – military service – to those who dream of American citizenship?

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In fact, the very structure of military service may make it unattractive to most middle income families. The current divisional structure, with an officer corps leading an enlisted corps, is something with which Caesar, Henry V or Napoleon would be familiar. In their day, the officer corps would be drawn from nobles, while lower classes filled the soldier ranks. Today, the officer corps is drawn from those with merit who self select themselves for education and training. As a class, the officer corps by virtue of its college education, responsibility and training, is separate from the enlisted ranks.

The American middle class dream is to send children to college so they can then pursue a "white collar" profession, such as officership. Serving as an enlisted "blue collar" soldier is inconsistent with, or at least defers, pursuit of the middle class dream. Accordingly, enlisting may be seen as a step back for middle class American families striving to get ahead. It may not, therefore, be surprising that the Army has not had a problem filling its officer ranks. American

youth may be more willing to go to college and then serve in the military rather than serve in the military as a vehicle to pay for college.

Of course, not everybody can be an officer and the military must remain a command operation where superior officers are empowered to order subordinates into life-threatening situations. However, part of DOD's transformation agenda involves creating smaller more independent forces that would operate like today's Special Forces, most of whom are college-educated. Restructuring organizations and the personnel who serve in them may not only yield a more effective fighting force but also create opportunities more attractive to middle class families.

There certainly are no easy answers. However, the downward spiral for recruiting is not sustainable. If the war continues to drag on, and recruiting suffers, the U.S. may have no choice but to limit its future commitments to Iraq, sending a potentially dangerous signal to future adversaries.

e-Capabilities; Canadian Military Transformation in the face of 21st Century Challenges

Major Eric Dion, R22°R

Strategic Integration

This executive article will circumvent the lack of integration within Canada's National Defence Institution. This is strategic in that faced with limited resources and new challenges, DND and the CF cannot persist to sustain two antagonistic Defence entities. In June 2000 DND and the CF adopted capability-based planning (CBP) with a primary focus on Force Development¹. Based on the premises of the 1994 White Paper, CBP was to provide more focus to Defence planning and serve as a change catalyst for the DND/CF integration. Indeed, integrating planning to produce capability is the main objective of CBP but this is very challenging.

National Defence

Historically, the Canadian Institution of Defence has been composed of three military services, namely: the Navy, Army and Air Force, and of civilian oversight embodied in the Ministry or Department of Defence. The primary focus of military services has mostly been concerned with military

operational effectiveness, while primary focus of DND has been national and political interests, and civilian oversight of the military.

History reveals the Canadian Institution of Defence has been plagued ever since with conflicting agendas. "Operational effectiveness & Strategy are essential to superior performance, but work very differently²". Strategically, the 1994 White Paper mission stated that the CF would maintain core capabilities to protect Canada and further national objectives³; it did not specifically set out a mission for the Department itself. This has literally institutionalised two antagonistic defence perspectives: That of DND and that of the CF.

So far as no real or new security challenges to Canada emerged, these antagonistic entities could survive. However, the fundamental changes in the Security Environment now exacerbate this strategic disconnect. Thus, in light of the emergence of a National Security Portfolio, DND now faces a serious relevancy issue.

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Defence Stakeholders

Canadians are not really interested in Security and Defence issues⁴. However, they relate to their military when they think of Defence, whether at home assisting civil authorities or abroad serving as Peacekeepers. Canadians intuitively understand the key role of military capabilities in preserving their Peace & Freedom. The Government also understands the high political leverage an effective and efficient military provides⁵. For the Government of Canada (GoC), political leverage comes through the complex workings of DND. And the Department acts as its intermediary in order to maintain civilian oversight of the Military or CF.

Indeed, faced with other budgetary pressures, such as Health, Education and even the Economy, the GoC must ensure the efficiency or best value for Defence money, while our Military focuses on effectiveness. International Allies, as a third order stakeholder, are also primarily concerned with military effectiveness. As such, “the credibility-capability gap⁶” is very reflective of the strategic challenge the GoC is faced with when trying to address both the efficiency of the Defence Portfolio and effectiveness of Military Services.

“For Canada, it is time to awake, and seize the day⁷. Indeed; Hope is not a method³⁰”

Defence Disconnectness

Considering the CF would maintain core capabilities to protect Canada and further our national objectives⁸ and in light of the challenges emerging from the security environment, it is quite obvious that there exists a strategic disconnect between the DND and the CF perspectives in their respective entities and also agendas. Faced with faster, leaner and meaner security challenges, finding refuge in the opportunities offered by new phenomena like the emergence of new economic powers, cyber and information warfare, trans-national narco-criminality, international terrorism and social disruption, Canada’s Defence clearly lacks integration. Traditionally, Defence was not concerned with these second order threats, but clearly since September 11, our military has to take a more holistic & proactive approach to managing Defence & Security challenges. Clearly, our Defence is not ready to face these strategic challenges arising from the Security environment.

Defence Posture

Internally, the Defence Institution is not well aligned with its own stated mission, that to protect Canada. Bringing Defence policy intentions and administration into harmony is

the next great Defence challenge⁹. Structurally, National Defence headquarters (NDHQ) is known as the one biggest bureaucracy in town. Its stove piped, generally disintegrated approach to Defence management often serves to justify its own ends.

The Military on the other hand, is still structured to fight a known enemy coming in the March formation, with its Regiments, Battalions & Companies, Napoleonic formations, more appropriate today for museums. Culturally, the internal environment operates like an immune system to isolate and expel hostile individuals who challenge current directions or established thinking¹⁰; this applies as well to DND as it does to the CF.

Systematically, stovepipes are the construct of the Defence Institution, reinforced by the military hierarchy. Horizontal activities like Infrastructure and Environment, Human Resources, Information Management and Material Procurement, have only limited functional authorities and do not transcend organisational barriers.

In essence, inappropriate structure, based on an inadequate culture and inefficient systems, are weaknesses. But on the other hand, Military leadership has consistently demonstrated its great strength in times of crisis. Military professionalism and can do attitude, have been the fundamental keys to Peacekeeping’s successes, and military esprit de corps, based on a firm military ethos, have been the moral foundation of our military. Thanks to this combination of Leadership, Professionalism, Esprit de corps and Ethos, the CF has excelled. However this is not to say that it couldn’t have done better; more Effectively, Efficiently and Responsively. “Like humans, corporations must choose to master their fate, or doom themselves to be mastered by it¹¹”.

Strategic Architecture

At this point in our analysis it is now obvious that the crux of the issue is the lack of DND/CF integration: Defence “is not well positioned, from a management perspective, to meet its strategic-level challenges¹²”. Faced with emerging security challenges, such as threats arising from opportunities and vice versa; faced with significant internal weaknesses, culturally, structurally and systematically; thankful for its strengths of leadership, professionalism, esprit de corps & ethos, an integrated perspective of Defence is quintessential.

Indeed, beyond Defence all by itself, the new Security Paradigm calls for more interagency co-operation¹³. As well,

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
ongoing reforms in International Organisations, UN and NATO, also call for more co-operation¹⁴. Therefore, the formulation of strategy enforces that DND/CF must now consider a strategic architecture¹⁵. In order to develop a CF integrative strategic architecture, capabilities constitute the basic building block: Capabilities must be viewed as integrated solutions considering structure, culture and systems holistically.

Integrated Capabilities

As a strategic approach to managing change, Capability-based planning proposed conceptual models¹⁶, often based on ill-conceived or outdated assumptions, such as those in the 1994 Defence White Paper. Indeed, the so-called CF Transformation has focused primarily on Force Development in recent years. However, it is necessary to revisit the fundamental assumptions under which today's posture was based.

Emerging technological concepts such as Network-enabled operations¹⁷, Effects-based approach¹⁸, have generated great expectations that digitisation could break down the stovepipe information structures that have characterised armies throughout the ages¹⁹. This is partly based on intuitive knowledge of change. "Strategic reorientation's really are cultural revolutions²⁰". Culture is the fundamental strategic leverage. "To effect transformation, make fundamental change, it is necessary to change those critical processes²¹".

Culturally also, integration is the key, realising the interdependence of Defence, the Military & Security. In order for the Defence people to personify integration, a change in structural paradigms becomes key. "Organisations don't make progress, people do; and the organisation is just a vehicle for co-operation²²". Structurally then, the power of new technology and their enabling concepts and capabilities, can only be leveraged with integrated organisational structures and systems, much like a spider web of capabilities:



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2X e-Strategy²³

But before adopting change and adapting to new circumstances, it is imperative to define a new Strategy. Indeed, many visions have been articulated and interpreted in recent years identifying where we want to be. Although quite interesting, Strategy 2020 namely, doesn't explicit how we will get to where we want to be.

The latest Defence policy statement²⁴ also does not further articulate how to implement its very own vision. Thus, integrating DND and the CF becomes key, streamlining the Defence political management overhead. Making choices²⁵ and selecting key capabilities for their adaptability to both Domestic and Expeditionary challenges is necessary. Striking a balance of Forces and being able to leverage capacities of Agencies and Allies is also crucial.

If the new defence policy is to succeed, the Government must review not only policy objectives but also every major aspect of Defence organisation and administrative processes and methods as an essential first step²⁶. We do have to earn our way back in the world but ours will never be the biggest force, so it must be smart, strategic, focused²⁷. Clearly, Canada's National Security interests reside with our Forces' Military Capabilities, not with the Institution, and our Military's allegiance should be to Canadians.

Fundamentally, this really entails a DND/CF cultural revolution, as a needed transformational catalyst, and changing culture is a question of leadership. This has been a key strength to ensure the DND/CF survival.

Success in warfare depends on morale, which in turn depends on good leadership, and it doesn't cost much. However, the current DND/CF leadership is not geared towards change as it has emerged from its stability. CF human resources policies are essentially the pegs that hold the entire Institution firmly rooted in place²⁸.

Because all military capabilities are fundamentally human-centric, this is where transformation focus lacks. Capabilities are based on capacities of course, but the assumption is that people will engage their abilities.

Implementation Articulated

"Like humans, corporations must choose to master their fate, or doom themselves to be mastered by it²⁹". Therefore, redesigning the military is necessary, from culture as catalyst, to structure and all system types, the intent being to design with outputs/operations in mind and with people as key transformation enablers.

A single integrated (perhaps unified) CF chain of Command is required, Domestically and Expeditionary; thus reinstating a CF Headquarters (CFHQ) with primary focus on military operations, our *raison d'être*³⁰. Streamlining the Defence management framework by integrating into the Program Activity Architecture, which identifies the strategic outcomes, describes the supporting activities and organisational structure³¹, is necessary. Strategic planning must also be integrated and become strategic management and thinking³².

An integrated management readiness framework should engage all CF capabilities into one focused effort. Integrating the many disparate DND/CF Enterprise Resource Planning and information management systems is also fundamental. Financially, efficient and responsible planning of any sort requires a stable predictable flow of funding³³. Furthermore, zero-based budgeting should be adopted within the CF, on a 3-year cycle, tied to postings.

The Joint Capability Requirement Board would be the strategic oversight of Program Management Board. Accelerating the material world, procurement process and capital equipment acquisition is also necessary; integrating various disconnected processes in a strategic level (national) equipping capability, leveraging Canada's National Industrial Base, accelerating procurement and opting for more off the shelf are all key.

Infrastructure rationalisation is also essential, in the constant search for efficiencies and value for money. Indeed, refocusing efforts into more modern infrastructure, better aligned with the requirement, will help alleviate the critical sustaining issue that is exponentially consuming the overall National Defence budget. There is no point forming task forces if synergies can't be found, clustering them in fewer strategic bases.


And integrating all training capacities & abilities into a strategic level joint training capability is required: "Of all forms of personal development, none is more effective than learning on the job under a mentor³⁴".

Finally, an integrated strategic level capability to generate people must transcend organisational barriers. The HR system must evolve from fatherhood to adulthood; CF members competing for CF opportunities. Exploiting technological benefits of synthetic training environments or online HR management is cultural.

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Operationally, task forces would comprise of command, sense, act, shield, sustain & special capabilities³⁵. What is the point having goalies in one place, defence in another, offence and the coach somewhere else? If task forces are to be the construct of the CF, then from the moment of generation on, a task force fuses: In other words, is generated, managed, equipped, trained, based, commanded as a single entity task force.

Standing Task Forces would be domestically interagency responsible and have expeditionary focus areas. In essence, redesigning the CF, with outputs in mind and around people, is key to leveraging capabilities:



Strategic Conclusion

Warfare remains Human-centric. Defence as history shows, is the extension of politics in military affairs. Weaknesses from the current defence posture are cultural, structural and systemic, primarily in their lack of integration. But the institution has clearly excelled thanks to its core military competencies of leadership, professionalism, esprit de corps & ethos. A strategic architecture is required to better align the Defence posture with the realities of the Security environment, building on capabilities as the basic building block.

Indeed, capabilities are more than just assets or platforms; they are about the effect that can be achieved³⁶.

But capabilities only provide a vehicle by which to integrate the breadth of DND/CF capacities & abilities. Fundamentally however, this is based on the one assumption that people will engage their best of abilities.

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For the first time in the history of management, it is the human mind that is the primary creator of value³⁷. Paradoxically then, we should not employ a Network-enabled metaphor but a Human-enabled one. This is especially true if we consider that strategic victory in modern warfare is synonymous to Moral victory. If it is the ball of snakes we are facing, in the operational context of a three-block-war³⁸, then integration is key.

Strategically, the crux of the issue is: "Old business models prove insufficient to deal with new realities³⁹". There is no more need for two antagonistic Defence entities; CF military capabilities must become central.

Over consumption of Defence resources not for military capabilities, has led to structural disarmament⁴⁰. Amidst all the transformational talk, fundamental integration is the one strategic leverage to our success. Real transformation is one that takes root within the minds of those participating in the change process⁴¹.

Thus, redesigning National Defence with outputs in mind and people at heart really is the key to success. "To effect transformation (make fundamental change) it is necessary to change those critical processes³¹".

Leadership has always made the day: It is now more important than ever that CF leaders make choices⁴². And by establishing a new integrated strategic architecture, capabilities would truly leverage our people.

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Note: This document is an executive summary of e-Capabilities, which can be found on the CDAI Website. It contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and DND.

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