



ON TRACK

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- **ON TRACK Magazine at the Crossroads**
- **Objectives in Afghanistan: Perception, Assumption and Realism**
- **North American Defence Cooperation – Canada, Mexico, and the United States**
- **The Vimy Award**

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) provides public information services on national security and defence issues by conducting studies, seminars and symposia, and publishing their results in print and on this website. CDAI is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose ability to prosecute its mandate depends on private donations.



L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense (ICAD) fournit les services d'information publiques au sujet des questions de la sécurité et de la défense. Il remplit cette tâche par des études, des séminaires, et des symposia et en publiant les résultats. L'ICAD est un organisme caritatif et non partisan dont la capacité à s'acquitter de son mandat dépend de dons privés.

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Cover Photo: The Royal Navy Trafalgar-class attack submarine HMS Tireless in service near the North Pole under IceEx07 along with the USS *Alexandria* (SSN-757). Le sous-marin d'attaque de classe Trafalgar, HMS Tireless, de la Royal Navy en service près du pôle Nord sous IceEx07, accompagné du USS *Alexandria* (SSN-757).



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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin



This Spring edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current significance in the areas of, among others, Canada's Arctic and of Afghanistan. I write this coming off the most successful seminar the CDA Institute has held to date.

Our 23rd Annual Seminar was held on the 15th of February. Its theme, 'Canada's Security Interests', was a timely one, given the ongoing debate surrounding Canada's role in the international security community. The Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar was held, was filled to standing-room only. There was significant media interest in the seminar during which simultaneous translation was provided. I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received.

The highlight of the Seminar was the keynote address by the Honourable Stockwell Day, Minister of Public Safety. The seminar was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, senators, and members of Parliament, military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College, and members of the Canadian public. The day was filled with speakers from across Canada and from the United States and Europe. The seminar was held in conjunction with the 70th annual general meeting of the CDA, marking the 75th year of the Associations' existence. Addresses included those of the Honourable Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence; Dr. Michael Ignatieff, Deputy Leader of the Opposition; General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff; General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the US Army; Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair Defence Management Studies,

MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin

Cette édition du printemps de *ON TRACK* contient des articles qui ont une signification actuelle dans les domaines de l'Arctique canadien et de l'Afghanistan. J'écris ces lignes à l'issue du séminaire le plus réussi qu'ait tenu l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense jusqu'à maintenant.

Notre 23^e séminaire annuel a eu lieu le 15 février. Son thème, 'Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité', arrivait à point étant donné le débat en cours autour du rôle du Canada dans l'univers de la sécurité internationale. La salle de bal du Fairmount Château Laurier, où le séminaire avait lieu, était remplie à pleine capacité. Le séminaire, pour lequel l'interprétation simultanée était offerte, a soulevé un grand intérêt dans les médias. J'ai été agréablement surpris de noter la teneur très positive des commentaires que nous avons reçus.

Le point culminant du séminaire fut le discours-programme prononcé par l'Honorable Stockwell Day, ministre de la Sécurité publique. Assistaient au séminaire des membres des Forces canadiennes, des sénateurs et des députés, des attachés militaires, des élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal, ainsi que des membres du public canadien. La journée fut remplie d'orateurs venant du Canada, des États-Unis et de l'Europe. Le séminaire se tenait de concert avec la 70^e assemblée générale annuelle de la CAD, qui marquait le 75^e anniversaire de l'existence de l'Association. Parmi les allocutions, notons celles de l'Honorable Gordon O'Connor, ministre de la défense nationale, de M. Michael Ignatieff, leader adjoint de l'opposition, du Général Rick Hillier, Chef d'état-major de la défense, du Général Peter Schoomaker, Chef d'état-major de l'armée des États-Unis, M. Douglas Bland, président des

School of Policy Studies, Queen's University; and Dr. Jack Granatstein, Canada's eminent military historian.

The electronic copy of the addresses that were delivered at the seminar are available at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm> and http://www.cda-cdai.ca/agm_proceedings.htm. Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald presents for the readers of *ON TRACK* a summary of the seminar and of the CDA's annual general meeting which followed the seminar. Both the CDAI's 23rd annual seminar and the CDA's 70th annual general meeting were truly successful, reflecting the public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and in national defence. Our challenge is for all of us to maintain the high level of professional interest in the CDA Institute and its work.

The presence of so many eminent speakers from around the world was made possible through the generous financial support of Boeing, Bombardier, General Dynamics, Magna, the Department of National Defence, Pratt & Whitney Canada, and Queen's University. Following the conclusion of the seminar was the reception, graciously hosted by General Dynamics.

I am pleased to report that the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute held their second (annual) meeting, Thursday evening following the seminar. The meeting was productive, during which the way ahead for the Institute was discussed in detail. The Members of the Board represent a cross-section of outstanding Canadians. Please refer to the inside front cover of *ON TRACK* for a listing of the Board Members.

The 70th AGM began with a meeting of the CDA Council on Wednesday, and carried on with the general meeting on Friday, following the seminar. Of particular interest was the very informative presentation by General Peter Schoomaker. His address was preceded by ex-

études de gestion de la défense de l'École des études de politiques de l'Université Queen's et M. Jack Granatstein, éminent historien militaire du Canada.

Les copies électroniques des allocutions prononcées lors du séminaire sont disponibles à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm> et à http://www.cda-cdai.ca/agm_proceedings.htm. Le Colonel (à la retraite) Brian MacDonald présente aux lecteurs de *ON TRACK* un sommaire du séminaire et de l'assemblée générale annuelle qui a suivi le séminaire. Le 23^e séminaire annuel de l'ICAD et la 70^e assemblée générale annuelle de la CAD ont tous deux été des francs succès, reflet de l'intérêt accru du public envers le rôle du Canada en matière de sécurité internationale et de défense nationale. Le défi qui s'offre à nous tous est de maintenir le haut niveau d'intérêt professionnel envers l'Institut de la CAD et son travail.

La présence d'un si grand nombre de conférenciers éminents venant de tous les coins du globe a été rendue possible grâce au généreux soutien financier de Boeing, de Bombardier, de General Dynamics, de Magna, du Ministère de la Défense nationale, de Pratt & Whitney Canada et de l'Université Queen's. Le séminaire a été suivi d'une réception sous les gracieux auspices de General Dynamics.

J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que le conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD a tenu sa deuxième assemblée (annuelle) le jeudi soir suivant le séminaire. Au cours de cette réunion productive on a discuté en détail de la voie d'avenir qui s'ouvre devant l'Institut. Les membres du conseil représentent un échantillon de Canadiens exceptionnels qui ont un intérêt dans les questions de sécurité et de défense. Consultez l'intérieur de la couverture avant de *ON TRACK* où vous trouverez la liste des membres du conseil.

La 70^e AGA a commencé par une réunion du conseil de la CAD le mercredi, pour se poursuivre avec l'assemblée générale annuelle le vendredi, suite au séminaire. La présentation très informative du Général Peter Schoomaker a soulevé un intérêt particulier. Son allocution était précédée

cellent presentations by Minister O'Connor and General Hillier. During his address General Hillier presented members of the Canadian Forces who were recent recipients of the Cross of Valour (CV) to those present in the Fairmont Château Laurier's Ballroom.

On Friday evening the Army Officers Mess was the scene for CDA's annual mess dinner. The dinner represented the largest gathering supporters of CDA, as well as many who attended the annual seminar and AGM. It was our privilege to honour at this year's dinner the past chairmen of CDA. Past chairmen who attended the dinner included (year of chairmanship) Major-General Reg Lewis (1972), Colonel James Turnbull (1973), Colonel Don Ludlow (1977), Lieutenant-Colonel G.I. Mathieson (1986), Colonel J.C. McKenna (1988), Brigadier-General Bob Millar (1990), Brigadier-General Don Pryer (1991), Brigadier-General Jerry Silva (1998-2000), and Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile (2000-2002).

The prospect of change in Canada's Arctic, particularly the impact of global warming, demands our attention from a national defence and security perspective. The CDA Institute's Vimy Paper 2, *Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic*, examines Canada's security requirements in its Arctic territory. Our concerns for Canada's Arctic should focus on not only the future, but on the present as well. *Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic* was released on the day of the Institute's annual seminar.

Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic was edited by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, the CDA Institute's Senior Defence Analyst, and written by contributing authors Dr. Rob Huebert; Mrs. Andrea Charron; Commander James C. Kraska, US Navy; Mr. Tómas Brynjólfsson; Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice; Mr. Kyle Christensen; Mr. Peter Gizewski; Major Andrew Godefroy; and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George MacDonald.

par des excellentes présentations du Ministre O'Connor et du Général Hillier. Pendant son allocution, le Général Hillier a présenté aux personnes présentes dans la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier les membres des Forces canadiennes qui avaient récemment reçu la Croix de la vaillance (C.V.).

Le vendredi soir, le dîner annuel du mess de la CAD s'est déroulé au mess des officiers de l'Armée. Le dîner a rassemblé le plus important nombre de supporters de la CAD, ainsi que de nombreuses personnes qui ont assisté au séminaire et à l'AGA. C'est à nous qu'a incombé le privilège d'honorer, lors du dîner de cette année, les présidents passés de la CAD. Les anciens présidents qui assistaient au dîner étaient (par année de présidence) le Major-général Reg Lewis (1972), le Colonel James Turnbull (1973), le Colonel Don Ludlow (1977), le Lieutenant-colonel G.I. Mathieson (1986), le Colonel J.C. McKenna (1988), le Brigadier-général Bob Millar (1990), le Brigadier-général Don Pryer (1991), le Brigadier-général Jerry Silva (1998-2000) et le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile (2000-2002).

La perspective de changement, dans l'Arctique canadien, et particulièrement l'impact du réchauffement global, réclame notre attention, d'un point de vue défense et sécurité nationales. Le cahier Vimy 2 de l'Institut de la CAD, intitulé *Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'arctique canadien*, examine les besoins de sécurité du Canada dans son territoire arctique. Nos préoccupations concernant l'Arctique canadien devraient porter non seulement sur l'avenir, mais également sur le présent. *Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'arctique canadien* a été publié la journée même du séminaire annuel de l'Institut.

Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'arctique canadien a été placé sous la direction rédactionnelle du Colonel (à la retraite) Brian MacDonald, l'analyste principal de la défense de l'Institut de la CAD, et écrit par les auteurs collaborateurs M. Rob Huebert, Mme Andrea Charron, le Commandant James C. Kraska, de la Marine des États-Unis, M. Tómas Brynjólfsson, le Colonel (à la retraite) Gary Rice, M. Kyle Christensen, M. Peter Gizewski, le Major Andrew Godefroy et le Lieutenant-général

We have included an introduction to *Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic* in this edition of ON TRACK. The link to the full text of Vimy Paper 2 can be found at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDAI_menu.htm.

The release of Vimy Paper 2 is timely. To illustrate this point we feature on the cover of this edition of ON TRACK a Royal Navy photograph of the *Trafalgar*-class attack submarine HMS *Tireless* in the Arctic. HMS *Tireless* was in service near the North Pole under IceEx 07 along with the USS *Alexandra* (SSN-757).

We are pleased to begin the 12th year of the publication of the CDA Institute's ON TRACK. This journal is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada with the presentation of excellent articles by experts in those fields. We now wish to examine how ON TRACK can become more relevant to the defence and security dialogue amongst Canadians. We would like to know from you, our readers, what you think of ON TRACK. General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, the President of the Institute presents for us a record of ON TRACK's achievements over these years, in "ON TRACK Magazine at the Crossroads: Where Do We Go From Here?", and invites our readers to their thoughts about ON TRACK. Please let us know how you would like to see ON TRACK progress from here.

We include in this edition of ON TRACK an overview and commentary regarding Canada's defence policies provided by Terry Thompson, in 'Canada Matures as We Enter a New Era'. Mr. Thompson writes that, until now, Canada's defence policies have languished under a series of ministers, few of who understood the basic principles of defending democracy. Mr. Thompson is a retired air force officer and an observer of Canada's changing foreign and defence policies.

(à la retraite) George MacDonald.

Nous avons inclus une introduction sur *Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'arctique canadien* dans ce numéro de ON TRACK. On pourra lire le texte complet du Vimy Paper 2 à l'adresse http://www.cda-cdai.ca/ICAD_menu.htm.

La publication du cahier Vimy 2 arrive au moment opportun. Pour illustrer ce point, nous présentons sur la page couverture de cette édition de ON TRACK une photographie de la Royal Navy du sous-marin d'attaque de classe *Trafalgar*, HMS *Tireless*, dans l'Arctique. Le HMS *Tireless* était en service près du pôle Nord sous IceEx07, accompagné du USS *Alexandria* (SSN-757).

Nous sommes heureux de commencer la 12^e année de publication de ON TRACK par l'Institut de la CAD. Ce journal est un important véhicule grâce auquel l'Institut contribue son pesant d'or à la discussion des questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la présentation d'excellents articles dûs à des experts de ces domaines. Nous souhaitons maintenant examiner comment ON TRACK peut s'inscrire avec une plus grande pertinence dans le dialogue qui a cours parmi les Canadiens sur la défense et la sécurité. Nous aimerions que vous, les lecteurs, nous disiez ce que vous pensez de ON TRACK. Le Général (à la retraite) Paul Manson, président de notre Institut, nous présente un dossier des réalisations de ON TRACK au cours de ces années, dans l'article 'ON TRACK Magazine at the Crossroads: Where Do We Go From Here?', et invite nos lecteurs à nous dire ce qu'ils pensent de ON TRACK. Dites-nous comment vous aimeriez voir progresser ON TRACK à partir de maintenant.

Dans cette édition de ON TRACK nous incluons un aperçu général et un commentaire concernant les politiques de défense du Canada, offerts par Terry Thompson, dans son article 'Canada Matures as We Enter a New Era'. M. Thompson écrit que, jusqu'à maintenant, les politiques de défense du Canada ont languï sous une série de ministres, dont peu comprenaient les principes de base de la défense de la démocratie. M. Thompson est un officier de l'aviation à la retraite et un observateur des changements de politiques

Ted Itani writes that beneficiaries have been profoundly affected by the politicisation of aid and cites the Canadian policy of defence, diplomacy, and development as the one such example. In 'Politicisation of Aid' Mr. Itani explains that mixing military and civilian functions in keeping with the 3D policy adds to the complexity of a multidimensional operation. Mr. Itani is a veteran of 37 years in the CF. He retired in 1993 and has worked as a consultant as well as a humanitarian.

Canadian public opinion is focussed on two major questions around the war in Afghanistan: what are we doing there; and how do we end it? In examining these questions Eric Morse writes, in 'Objectives in Afghanistan: Perception, Assumption and Realism', that there are also three serious misconceptions around both issues that can lead us to some very wrong starting points for discussion. Mr. Morse is a consultant in communications and media relations.

Late last autumn, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers and Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara visited Afghanistan. Their report, 'A Week in Afghanistan - A Snapshot', is a must-read here. The report provides us with a clear perspective of the political-economic-military environment in which our Canadian troops excel. The authors' report includes a background that relates to the geography, the people and their history, Canada's mission, governance and a uniquely Canadian contribution - the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan, and other important issues. We were pleased, last year, to receive Colonel Mike Capstick's report, 'A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Year - Afghanistan' (see http://www.cda_cdai.ca/pdf/ontrack11n3.pdf).

We expect to see more on Canada's unique contribution of the SAT-T in the next edition of ON TRACK. Rear Admiral Summers retired following service of 37 years in the Canadian military. He is frequently featured as a

étrangères et de politiques de défense.

Ted Itani écrit que les bénéficiaires ont été profondément affectés par la politisation de l'aide et il en donne comme exemple la politique canadienne de défense, de diplomatie et de développement. Dans 'Politicisation of Aid' M. Itani explique que le mélange des fonctions militaires et civiles, dans le sens de la politique des 3D, ajoute à la complexité d'une opération multidimensionnelle. M. Itani est un vétéran qui a passé 37 ans dans les FC. Il a pris sa retraite en 1993 et a travaillé comme consultant et humanitaire.

L'opinion publique canadienne est concentrée sur deux questions majeures entourant la guerre en Afghanistan: qu'est-ce que nous faisons là et comment mettre fin à cette présence? En examinant ces questions dans son article 'Objectives in Afghanistan: Perception, Assumption and Realism', Eric Morse écrit qu'il y a également trois graves malentendus entourant les deux questions, qui peuvent nous mener à des points de départ très faux pour une discussion. M. Morse est conseiller en communications et en relations médiatiques.

Tard l'automne dernier, le Contre-amiral (à la retraite) Ken Summers et le Brigadier-général (à la retraite) Don Macnamara ont visité l'Afghanistan. Leur rapport, intitulé 'A Week in Afghanistan - A Snapshot', est ici une lecture incontournable. Le rapport nous donne un point de vue clair sur l'environnement politico-économico-militaire dans lequel nos troupes canadiennes excellent. Le rapport des auteurs comprend un contexte qui traite de la géographie, de la population et de son histoire, de la mission canadienne, de la gouvernance et de la contribution uniquement canadienne - l'Équipe consultative stratégique - Afghanistan - et d'autres questions importantes. Nous avons eu le plaisir, l'an dernier, de recevoir le rapport du Colonel Mike Capstick intitulé 'A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Year - Afghanistan' (voir <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/ontrack11n3.pdf>).

Nous nous attendons à d'autres articles sur la contribution unique du Canada, du SAT-T, dans la prochaine édition de ON TRACK. Le Contre-amiral Summers a pris sa retraite après 37 années de service dans les forces armées canadiennes. Il

military analyst with the CBC. Brigadier-General Macnamara is a former President of the CDA Institute.

Since at least 1938 Canada and the United States have seen North America as a single military theatre and have managed its defence cooperatively. Dwight Mason writes in 'North American Defence Cooperation—Canada, Mexico and the United States', that the focus of North American defence has changed. He proposes that Canada and the United States consider including Mexico and a military partner in North American defence. Mr. Mason is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

For a number of years, North Korea has been engaged in negotiations by China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States with the purpose of deterring North Korea from further development of nuclear weapons. Elizabeth Sneyd writes in 'Why Canadians should pay attention to the Six-Party Talks', that Canada has a vested interest in a positive outcome in these talks. She details why there is much at stake for Canada in these Talks.

A decade or so after the Great War writers began producing some of the great anti-war books of all time. While there was not much anti-war literature published in Canada, one volume, which appeared in 1930, was re-issued this year. Jack Granatstein reviews for this edition of *ON TRACK*, *Generals Die in Bed*, an anti-war book written by Charles Yale Harrison. In his review Dr. Granatstein cites other novels on the Great War by Canadian authors but concludes that none has the immediacy of *Generals Die in Bed*.

Earlier this year, General Manson addressed the Standing Committee on National Defence on the matter of the acquisition of goods and services for the Department of National Defence. General Manson's presentation is included in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

paraît fréquemment à la CBC comme analyste militaire. Le Brigadier-général Macnamara est un des anciens présidents de l'Institut de la CAD.

Au moins depuis 1938, le Canada et les États-Unis voient l'Amérique du Nord comme un seul théâtre militaire et gèrent sa défense de façon coopérative. Dwight Mason écrit, dans son article 'North American Defence Cooperation - Canada, Mexico and the United States', que le point focal de la défense nord-américaine a changé. Il propose que le Canada et les États-Unis considèrent inclure le Mexique comme partenaire militaire dans la défense de l'Amérique du Nord. M. Mason est Senior Associate au Center for Strategic and International Studies, à Washington.

Depuis un certain nombre d'années, la Corée du Nord a été engagée dans des négociations par la Chine, le Japon, la Corée du Sud, la Russie et les États-Unis, dans le but de la faire renoncer à développer davantage des armes nucléaires. Elizabeth Sneyd écrit, dans son article 'Why Canadians should pay attention to the Six-Party Talks', que le Canada a des intérêts acquis dans une issue positive à ces pourparlers. Elle expose en détail les raisons pour lesquelles il y a de gros enjeux pour le Canada dans ces négociations.

Une décennie ou à peu près après la Grande Guerre, les écrivains commencèrent à produire quelques-uns des livres les plus importants de tous les temps opposés à la guerre. Même s'il n'y a pas eu beaucoup de littérature anti-guerre publiée au Canada, il y a eu un volume, qui est paru en 1930 et réédité cette année. Dans la présente édition de *ON TRACK*, Jack Granatstein propose une revue de *Generals Die in Bed*, un livre contre la guerre écrit par Charles Yale Harrison. Dans sa revue, M. Granatstein cite d'autres romans d'auteurs canadiens sur la Grande Guerre, mais il conclut qu'aucun d'eux n'a l'instantanéité de *Generals Die in Bed*.

Plus tôt cette année, le Général (à la retraite) Manson s'est adressé au Comité permanent sur la Défense nationale concernant la question de l'acquisition de biens et services pour le ministère de la Défense nationale. La présentation du Général (à la retraite) Manson est incluse dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with the large number of excellent submissions that were received by the Vimy Award Selection Committee, and culminating with the presentation of the Award to Brigadier-General David Fraser by the Honourable Gordon O'Connor.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on Friday, 16 November at a gala dinner that will be held for the first time in Le Breton Gallery of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada, has graciously accepted the invitation of the CDA Institute to present the Award to this year's recipient. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nominations. CDA member associations, as well as individuals, are encouraged to submit nominations to the Vimy Award Selection Committee. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2006 was Ms. Christie Blatchford, of the *Globe & Mail*. This prestigious award, sponsored by the Conference of Defence Associations in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented to a Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the general public of Canada's defence and security issues. The Award will be accompanied by a \$2,500 cash prize. The notice of the call for nominations appears elsewhere in *ON TRACK*.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute is a charitable and nonpartisan organization whose mandate is to undertake research and promote informed public debate on national

Un des événements majeurs du calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du prix Vimy à un Canadien qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays, et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un succès retentissant, avec le grand nombre d'excellentes soumissions qui furent reçues par le Comité de sélection du prix Vimy, et il a connu son point culminant avec la présentation du prix au Brigadier-général David Fraser par l'Honorable Gordon O'Connor.

La présentation de cette année du prix Vimy aura lieu le vendredi 16 novembre au cours d'un dîner de gala qui sera tenu pour la première fois à la Galerie Le Breton du Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence, la Très Honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure-générale du Canada, a gracieusement accepté l'invitation de l'Institut de la CAD de présenter le prix au récipiendaire de cette année. Pour faire en sorte que ce prix ait vraiment un sens, l'Institut a besoin que vous communiquiez vos mises en nomination au Comité de sélection du prix Vimy. Consultez l'avis d'appel de candidatures qui apparaît quelque part d'autre dans ce numéro.

Le prix Ross Munro pour les médias sera également présenté lors du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix de 2006 fut Mme Christie Blatchford, du *Globe & Mail*. Ce prix prestigieux, commandité par la Conférence des associations de la défense en collaboration avec Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, sera présenté à un/e journaliste canadien/ne qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension des questions de défense et de sécurité par le grand public. Le prix sera accompagné d'un prix en argent de 2 500 \$. L'avis d'appel de candidatures apparaît ailleurs dans *ON TRACK*.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense est un organisme caritatif non partisan dont le mandat est d'entreprendre de la recherche et de promouvoir un débat pu-

security and defence issues. It is no secret that the Institute's mandate is not yet over. Included in the mandate of the Institute is the gathering of the nation's support for the Canadian Forces for their rejuvenation.

In closing I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer-level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute. The Institute needs the financial support of the pro-defence community of Canadians to remain effective in the debate on issues of security and national defence. With your support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military issues. Your continued financial support as donors to the Institute is vital to our continuing success. Please renew your annual donation when you are asked—and introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.

blic informé sur les questions de sécurité nationale et de défense. Ce n'est pas un secret que le mandat de l'Institut n'est pas encore fini. Il fait partie du mandat de l'Institut de recueillir l'appui du pays pour les Forces canadiennes et leur rajeunissement.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patron, compagnon et officier, pour l'appui financier qu'ils ont accordé aux travaux de l'Institut de la CAD. L'Institut a besoin du soutien financier de l'ensemble des Canadiens favorables à la Défense pour demeurer efficace dans le débat qui a cours sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale. Avec votre appui, nous pouvons promouvoir l'étude des questions militaires canadiennes et la sensibilisation à ces questions. La poursuite de votre appui financier comme donateurs de l'Institut est vitale pour la continuité de notre succès. Nous vous prions de renouveler votre don annuel quand on vous le demandera - et de faire connaître l'Institut à des concitoyennes ou concitoyens Canadiens.

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Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic

General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson



Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'Arctique canadien

Général (ret) Paul D. Manson

Vimy Paper 2

The Vimy Papers, a series of monographs, is an initiative of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI).

The prospect of change in Canada's Arctic demands our attention. The second Vimy Paper, entitled 'Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic', examines Canada's security requirements in its Arctic territory. 'Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic' was edited by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, the CDAI Institute's Senior Defence Analyst, and written by contributing authors Dr. Rob Huebert; Mrs. Andrea Charron; Commander James C Kraska, US Navy; Mr. Tómas Brynjólfsson; Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice; Mr. Kyle Christensen; Mr. Peter Gizewski; Major Andrew Godefroy; and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George MacDonald.

For the first time since the Japanese invasion scare following Pearl Harbour, Canadians and Americans concern themselves with establishing a defensive perimeter that keeps potential enemies out. While access controls become more effective at the main points of entry further south, might terrorists be tempted to enter via the relatively undefended North?

General (ret'd) Paul Manson is the President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Cahier Vimy no 2

Les Cahiers Vimy, une série de monographies, sont une initiative de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD).

La perspective du changement dans l'Arctique canadien exige toute notre attention. Le deuxième Cahier Vimy, intitulé «Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'Arctique canadien», se penche sur les exigences canadiennes en matière de sécurité dans le territoire de l'Arctique. «Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'Arctique canadien» était publié sous la direction du colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald et rédigé par les auteurs collaborateurs suivants: M. Rob Huebert, Mme Andrea Charron, le commandant James C. Kraska, Forces navales des États-Unis, M. Tómas Brynjólfsson, le colonel (ret.) Gary Rice, M. Kyle Christensen, M. Peter Gizewski, le major Andrew Godefroy et le lieutenant-général (ret.) George MacDonald.

Pour la première fois depuis la crainte d'une invasion japonaise suivant l'attaque de Pearl Harbour, les Canadiens et les Américains se soucient d'établir un périmètre de défense qui bloque l'entrée des ennemis potentiels. Maintenant que les contrôles d'accès deviennent plus efficaces aux principaux points d'entrée au sud, les terroristes seraient-ils tentés de pénétrer dans cette zone en passant par le Nord relativement sans défense?

Le général (à la retraite) Paul Manson est le président de l'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

The Paper highlights certain key factors which will influence Canada's future approach to the Arctic dimension of national security. These are:

1. environmental change, related to global warming;
2. the emergence of terrorism as a serious threat to North American security;
3. past indifference to the need for Canadian Forces activity in our Arctic regions; and
4. concerns about challenges to Canadian sovereign ownership and control of our Arctic spaces.

Beyond matters of sovereignty and defence, additional significant challenges will be brought about as a consequence of the anticipated changes in Canada's Arctic regions. Increased commercial activity, stimulating a growth in maritime traffic, in air travel, and in road travel, will impose new demands on the nation's ability to respond to disasters, both natural and man-made.

The region's changing strategic situation has garnered the attention of other Arctic nations. James Kraska and Tómas Brynjólfsson present valuable national viewpoints from the United States and Iceland respectively. Mr. Kraska's chapter presents with great clarity the American position in regard to the North West. This ties in very well with Andrea Charron's argument, in Chapter 2, for a different approach by Canada to this longstanding policy divergence between Canada and the U.S. over the North West Passage.

Le présent document souligne plusieurs facteurs clés qui influenceront sur l'approche future du Canada à l'égard de la sécurité nationale telle qu'elle s'applique dans la région de l'Arctique. Il s'agit des suivants:

1. la modification de l'environnement, tel qu'elle est liée au réchauffement planétaire,
2. l'émergence du terrorisme et la menace sérieuse qu'il pose à la sécurité en Amérique du Nord,
3. l'indifférence manifestée dans le passé aux activités des Forces canadiennes dans nos régions de l'Arctique,
4. les inquiétudes à l'égard des remises en question de la souveraineté et du contrôle du Canada sur ses espaces arctiques.

Au-delà des questions de souveraineté et de défense, d'autres défis importants se présenteront en conséquence des changements anticipés dans les régions arctiques du Canada. Une activité commerciale accrue, qui entraînera une croissance de la circulation maritime et aérienne et de la circulation routière placeront de nouvelles exigences sur la capacité du pays à réagir face aux catastrophes, tant naturelles que causées par l'homme.

La situation stratégique changeante de la région a forcé l'attention d'autres nations de l'Arctique. James Kraska et Tómas Brynjólfsson présentent des points de vue nationaux très utiles, des États-Unis et de l'Islande, respectivement. Le chapitre rédigé par M. Kraska décrit avec une grande clarté la position américaine à l'égard du passage du Nord-Ouest. Ce sujet cadre très bien avec le raisonnement présenté par Andrea Charron dans le chapitre 2, où elle propose que le Canada adopte une approche différente face à cette divergence de politiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis à l'égard du passage du Nord-Ouest.

The principle conclusions that can be drawn from Vimy Paper 2 are as follows:

- The navy's contribution to Arctic security is limited by its marginal ability to sail into northern waters.
- * There is an almost total absence of land forces north of 60 degrees.
- * Existing and planned air fleets offer a good measure of mobility for land forces in the Arctic.
- * One conclusion which stands out quite starkly is the need for a full measure of 'jointness' in Arctic operations. The concept of jointness must extend beyond the military, into a fully co-operative working arrangement with government departments, agencies, territorial and provincial governments.
- * Implicit in most of the chapters is an assumption that northern facilities will have to be built or expanded to accommodate a substantial increase in military and other government activity.
- * Caution is in order. Two threats bear careful attention because of their potential immediacy. First, there is the possibility of a sudden and severe energy shortage in the western world and, second, there is the prospect of terrorist infiltration through the North. Although neither threat may present a particularly high probability in the shorter term, Canada dare not ignore them. The more immediate threats deserve careful attention and possibly early investment in specific defensive measures.

Les principales conclusions que l'on peut tirer du Cahier Vimy no 2 sont les suivantes:

- * La contribution de la marine à la sécurité dans l'Arctique est limitée par sa capacité marginale à naviguer les eaux du Nord canadien.
- * Il existe une absence presque complète de forces terrestres au nord du 60e parallèle.
- * Les flottes aériennes, actuelles et planifiées, offrent une bonne mesure de la mobilité des forces terrestres dans l'Arctique.
- * Une conclusion qui se détache nettement des autres est le besoin de coordination des opérations dans l'Arctique. Ce concept doit s'étendre au-delà de l'armée et englober un accord de collaboration entièrement coopératif avec les ministères et organismes gouvernementaux, ainsi qu'avec les administrations territoriales et provinciales.
- * Ce qui est implicite dans la plupart des chapitres, est l'hypothèse qu'il faudra soit bâtir des installations dans le Nord canadien, soit agrandir les installations existantes, pour accueillir une hausse importante de l'activité militaire et gouvernementale.
- * La prudence est à l'ordre du jour. Deux menaces méritent notre attention, en raison de leur immédiateté éventuelle. En premier lieu, il y a possibilité d'une pénurie soudaine et grave de l'énergie dans le monde occidental et en deuxième lieu, règne la possibilité d'une infiltration terroriste par le biais du Nord canadien. Bien qu'aucune menace ne soit particulièrement probable à court terme, il n'est pas avisé pour le Canada de les ignorer. Les menaces les plus immédiates méritent notre attention et éventuellement, un in-

The principle value of this study is the message that important changes are taking place in our North which demand a national response. Scholars, analysts, planners, and government officials need to follow up constructively, and they need to start now.

We hope this Vimy Paper will help Canadians understand the challenge facing the federal Government to come to grips with developing an acquisition policy that delivers the goods that the Canadian Forces needs now.

vestissement dès que possible dans des mesures défensives précises.

La valeur première de la présente étude, est le message suivant: des changements importants se produisent maintenant dans le Nord canadien qui exigent une réponse nationale. Les universitaires, analystes, planificateurs et représentants du gouvernement doivent assurer le suivi de manière constructive et doivent s'y mettre dès maintenant.

Nous espérons que ce cahier Vimy aidera les Canadiennes et Canadiens à comprendre les défis que doit relever le gouvernement fédéral pour s'attaquer au problème, soit de mettre au point une politique d'acquisition qui dotera les Forces canadiennes des moyens dont elle a besoin dès maintenant.




Photo by: Sergeant Frank Hudec, Canadian Forces Combat Camera / Photo par: Sergent Frank Hudec, Caméra de combat des Forces canadiennes



23rd Annual CDA Seminar – Canada’s Security Interests

70th Annual CDA General Meeting: The Impact on the Canadian Forces

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

The Theme Paper

Professor Douglas Bland, from the Defence Management Centre of the Queen’s University School of Policy Studies reminded us that our instinctive preference for the 1924 Dandurand statement that Canada is “naturally secure” was rendered meaningless by 9/11 and the following events. We are now in an era of “continuous warfare,” in which “the irregular becomes the regular,” and in which war is increasingly fought “among the people,” rather than between conventional military forces. Consequently, the idea that non-combatants can be safely excluded from the effects of war is fading quickly. In such a world the very concept of an “exit strategy” no longer has meaning, for there is, literally, no “exit strategy” to be found.

Recent trends are leading to new questioning of these visions. The trend in the UN suggests that that organization is increasingly falling under the control of states which do not share our interests, and it is therefore of little long-term utility to us. The Atlantic Alliance is increasingly marked by both the Europeans and the Americans becoming more inward-looking such that “Coalitions of the Unwilling” are more common than those of the “Willing.” And there is the question of whether Canadian and European security interests are congruent any longer.

And there is a troubling within-Canada

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald is the Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

trend driven by the acceleration of immigration from non-traditional (ie non-European) states that do not necessarily share our traditional liberal-democratic principles, and the collective loyalties of these new immigrants may, in some cases, lie outside Canada.

First Panel: Canada in North America

Three speakers addressed the Canada/US bilateral. **Lieutenant-General Eric Findley, Deputy Commander of NORAD**, spoke of the practicalities of having to “filter the clutter” within the CANUS airspace, which sees 170,000 flights per day, as well as 5,000 shipping movements, and clogged international bridges. Moreover Canadian and US “critical infrastructure” is inter-connected such that “neighbourhood watch” information sharing structures have become critical elements for security in an increasingly open North American space.

Professor Moens, of Simon Fraser University, noted that while the Canada/US relationship had deteriorated in the 1990s, particularly with respect to the issue of BMD where Canadian intransigence violated traditional agreement on the defence of the territorial integrity of North America, recent political change in both countries had provided the opportunity to “fix the problem” rather than seeking only to “fix the blame.” He urged the Canadian government to work to prepare Canadian public opinion to take the Canada/US relationship to a higher level, including a growing convergence towards a truly “smart border” with the tariffs removed, a common security peri-

meter and security criteria, and bi-national border controls.

Professor **Stéphane Roussel, of the Université de Québec à Montréal**, observed that the two linguistic communities within Canada do not see the Canada/US relationship in quite the same way, resulting in a myriad of relationships at sub-national and local levels, such that a key function of the federal government is “act as the oil that lubricates the smaller relations.” Accordingly, there is a need to emphasize bi-lateral relationships in a number of security and non-security related areas.

Professor Rob Huebert, of the University of Calgary, argued that the Arctic is in a state of transformation driven by climate change, and that while DND will not be the lead department in responding to most phenomena, it will be a major supplier of resources to deal with potential incursions, including those of non-state actors. Consequently, planning, including that related to major capital equipment investments, must begin now and must be coordinated with those of other government departments.

While **the Hon. Stockwell Day, Minister of Public Safety**, was the keynote speaker, his remarks were really consistent with the direction of this panel, and could be viewed as a government response to the issues raised by the members of that panel. He noted that Canada now spends about \$1.4 billion on public security (not including defence expenditures), and has added 1,000 RCMP officers and a \$390 million electronic manifest system at the Windsor border crossing, and has armed border guards. He also stated that Al-Qaeda remained a threat to Canada, as did international terrorism, and that the government had acted to ban organizations in Canada who funded terrorism, including Hezb-I-Islami and the Tamil Tigers.

Special Address: Pacific Security

Dr. James Boutillier, Advisor to Maritime Forces Pacific, argued that the world cen-

tre of gravity in economic and security affairs has now shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and that our challenge now is to re-calibrate our strategic priorities to recognize this new reality. He noted the astonishing growth in the Chinese economy, a growth which has made Chinese issues world issues, and questioned the motivation lying behind the expansion of Chinese military capacity, particularly in terms of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. He observed that these developments seem to have caught much of the world off-guard, with the USN down to a 282-ship fleet and feeling the effects of overstretch; that the Europeans are self-absorbed in myopic introspection; that the Japanese are looking for new security relationships and weighing the elimination of the “no war” clause in its constitution; that India as well as China, seems to be shifting from a purely “continentalist” to an increasingly “maritime” strategic vision; and that there were hints of a new Washington/Dehli axis developing.

The Second Panel: Canada and the Greater Middle East.

The panel effectively began with the Luncheon Speaker, **Dr. Michael Ignatieff, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition**, who articulated a series of criticisms of Canadian government policy with respect to the Afghanistan commitment. He argued that the Canadian government has done an inadequate job of explaining why we are there in the first place, and then extended his criticism to include what he described as a failure to bring both the political and the military dimensions together—of being unable to use our leverage with the Pakistan government to influence that state to limit the use of its territory for support of the Taliban, or to convince our European allies to provide additional forces to southern Afghanistan. He stated that the government had failed to integrate the “3 Ds” of the Martin administration, particularly in the case of CIDA, which seems unable to integrate with DND. Finally, he indicated

support for the possible purchase of opium for conversion to medical opiates instead of leaving it with the drug traffickers.

Terry Colfer, former Canadian Ambassador to Iran, described the divisions within Iran, with the populace generally pro-West, while the government (and the surrounding area) is anti-West. He suggested that the population, 60% of whom are under 30, are deeply frustrated by the dismal economic situation, while the government response has been to try to whip up nationalist fervour against external enemies. He argued for a less confrontational approach, and observed that military action could have a profound impact on oil shipments from the region.

Major General Jonathan Riley, former General Officer Commanding British Forces in Iraq, summarized the underlying major factors in the Middle East as: Al Qaeda, the division between Shia and Sunni Islam, the Israel/Palestine question, the possibility of WMD proliferation, a youth demographic bulge which threatens social stability, and the potential impact of events in the region upon global energy supplies. He posed three scenarios stemming from the “surge” being implemented by the Bush administration: a tripartite fracture into Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish enclaves; an authoritarian central government; or a partially decentralized structure with a weak central government. None are particularly attractive in all respects, and a “Plan B” to follow the “Plan A” of the surge is necessary.

Brigadier-General David Fraser, former Commander of the Multi-National Brigade for Region Command South in Afghanistan, noted that the Taliban failed to achieve its goals in the 2006 campaign season and that ISAF is on the right track but will need time. He pointed out that the “new” Afghanistan is only five years old, and that in many cases what was required was “construction” rather than “re-construction.” Consequently, there is a complex shift under way from “military/civilian” operations to “civilian/military” operations. He also noted that regional

Actors—Pakistan, India, Iran, China, and Russia—remain active in pursuing their own agendas.

The De Facto Third Panel - 16 February

The four initial speakers of the second day, in effect, formed a panel devoted to the past, present, and future of the CF. In this sense it really began with the last speaker, **noted Canadian Historian Dr. Jack Granatstein**, who trenchantly traced the long decline of the strength and capabilities of the CF since its high points in WWII. He suggested that one outcome of the steady series of cutbacks was the development of a risk-averse culture more focused on administration and planning than on operations. Part of the problem came from a public indifference to the real financial needs of the CF, though proclaiming their “support” for the individual members of the CF. He called for vigorous Prime Ministerial leadership on defence and security matters, arguing that the last Prime Minister to exercise such a role was Louis St. Laurent. His recommendations, in a nutshell, were a Regular Force of 80,000, a Reserve Force of 50,000, and a Defence Budget of 2.0% of GDP.

Had Professor Granatstein’s paper been the first paper in the “Panel,” that of **Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor** might have been seen as the response of the current government to it, with first a commitment to add \$5.3 billion to the \$12 billion promised by the previous Liberal government to achieve a total increase to the defence budget of \$17 billion over five years; then a second commitment to specific capital projects including strategic lift, medium lift, medium transport helicopters, medium logistics trucks, and the Joint Support Ships; next a commitment to increase the strength of the forces; a following commitment to modernize the procurement process; and finally - a commitment to strengthen the outreach to Canadians concerning the importance of their security and defence.

In this arrangement of the panel, the address of **Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier** could be seen as the report on the current progress in implementing the government plan to redress the deficiencies identified by Professor Granatstein, and in particular those stemming from the “dollar deprivation” of the decade of the Nineties, the “decade of darkness.”

He spoke proudly of the performance of the CF in Afghanistan, and especially of the excellent leadership in action displayed by junior officers and junior Non-Commissioned Members. Nonetheless, he recognized that the human resources of the CF were in a “fragile” state and that continuing attention must be paid to recruiting and retention, and to the importance of recognizing the contributions made by military families. He continued to emphasize the importance of the restoration of the equipment of the Forces, noting that while some of it (such as the LAV-III) was of high quality, much of it was “fragile” too, and on “life-support” in some cases. He noted that the decision to reorganize the forces in order to separate “force generation” from “force employment” is proving to have been a sound one.

His message, also in a nutshell, was that the state of the CF coming out of the “decade of darkness”, was a perilous one, but that changes which have been and are continuing to be made, together with better funding from the government, are turning things around, and we are on the right track to a better future for the CF, provided that these efforts can be sustained for a long time.

General Peter Schoemaker, Chief of Staff of the US Army, provided the glimpse of the future to which the CF reforms must adapt. The former era of high intensity conventional warfare is shifting to one of asymmetric warfare against the threat of terrorism and the possibility of weapons of mass destruction, and is compounded by a parallel war of ideas and information. In such a context the Brigade Combat Team, with a flexible structure and a manning level of 2,500 to 3,000 will become the tactical

control element with additional resources assigned by support brigades providing aviation, “fires,” engineer, surveillance, and sustainment forces on a “mix and match” basis. Such forces will make increasing demands for “pentathlete” leadership structure of “multi-skilled leaders” for “multi-skilled soldiers.”

Fourth Panel: The Impact on the CF

Lieutenant-General Michel Maisonneuve, former Chief of Staff to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, began with the observation that the threat/response spectrum is now blurred, with an increasing need for military forces to work with non-state actors such as International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Other Government Departments. In this context, the appointment of a Canadian Associate Deputy Minister for Afghanistan is seen, a positive development providing a clearer coordination focus for all Canadian operations in that country, for Afghanistan remains a great test for NATO, and if unsuccessful, may endanger the future of the Alliance.

Lieutenant General Michel Gautier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, reiterated the “Vision” of CF Expeditionary Command whose principles of operational focus, command-centric, CF identity, and mission command within a “whole of government” approach, focus primarily on the need to deal with failed and failing states. “Living the vision” includes combat operations, complex peace operations, evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance operations, maritime interdiction operations, and traditional peacekeeping operations. Recent and current CF operations have led to the realization that the “Whole of Government” concept needs work, and that a variety of old operational lessons have had to be re-learned, such as combined arms operations, personnel and battle damage equipment replacement, ammunition replenishment, and casualty care. Afghanistan is, in a very real way, catapulting the CF into the future.

Lieutenant General Marc Dumais, Commander of Canada Command provided a “Work In Progress” report on the evolution of Canada Command, whose Mission Statement charges it with the defence of Canada, the assistance of other government departments, and liaison with USA NORTHCOM. CanadaCom has established Liaison Officers in other government departments since, in most cases, CanadaCom will be supporting them rather than

acting as the lead department: the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010 which will have Canada Heritage as lead department for the games, and the RCMP the lead for security. Liaison Officers are also linked at the Provincial and Territorial levels, and with USA NORTHCOM including NORAD Maritime Warning. Recommendations, in a nutshell were a regular force of 80,000, a reserve force of 50,000 and a defence budget of 2.0% of GDP.

ON TRACK Magazine at the Crossroads; Where Do We Go From Here?

by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson

The last issue of *ON TRACK* Magazine, celebrating the CDA's 75th Anniversary, was a fine example of how far the magazine has come since its creation eleven short years ago. The first edition, in May, 1996, was only two pages long, unilingual, with no colour and no photos. The only concession to imagery was a copy of the CDA logo.

By January of the following year, when the current editor, Capt (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg, took over, *ON TRACK* had changed little, although the first issue under his management was five pages in length, produced laboriously on WordPerfect.

Compare those early efforts with the most recent version of the magazine, Vol. 11, No. 4, Winter 2007. Comprising some 45 pages, it is loaded with authoritative and informative articles by distinguished luminaries in the world of defence and national security, covering a great array of subjects (many of which, in this special edition, were in the form of a retrospective on the CDA). Under Capt Forsberg's continuing editorship, the magazine has become a visually appealing publication, with eye-catching covers, a liberal sprinkling of photos and colour, and some French language content. The layout is clean and attractive.

Currently, the 1000 printed copies are

distributed gratis to our select readers, and the magazine is also offered in electronic format at <http://cda-cdai.ca/ontrack.htm>. It is a highly respected magazine, judging by the comments that come our way.

So *ON TRACK* is surely a great success story.

Like all such endeavours, however, *ON TRACK* must remain dynamic, keeping in step with these changing times. There have been recent suggestions that the time has come to institute major changes in format, scope and the very philosophy underlying our magazine.

.....one distinctive feature of ON TRACK is the total absence of advertising.

For example, one distinctive feature of *ON TRACK* is the total absence of advertising. Although we regularly recognize on the magazine's pages the sponsors of various events such as the Vimy Dinner, the Annual Seminar and the Graduate Student Symposium, there are no paid advertisements, which sets us apart from virtually all other magazines in the defence field. This represents a considerable loss of potential revenue, but until now we have consistently and deliberately avoided ads, on the grounds that this stance is a reflection of the

intellectual balance and independence that both the CDA and the Institute strive to achieve.

Because each edition is lovingly and diligently produced in our office by hand, so to speak, it is not possible to produce a glossy product of 100 pages or more, with colour photos on each page, and advertising copy. Given the physical work involved, we are currently limited to four issues a year. Furthermore, budgetary limitations preclude a print run of more than 1000 or so. We might also have to hire additional staff and expand our office space accordingly.

Content, of course, is fundamental to the success of *ON TRACK*, and here we seem to be doing the right thing, judging by the quality of articles and editorial comment seen in recent issues, as reflected in the many favourable responses we get with each new release.

The question that faces us at this crossroads is, "Can we do even better?". Shall we go for a glossy format with considerably more content? Should we accept commercial advertising, thereby adding very substantially to our revenue? Might we, for example, charge a subscription and single-issue fee? An informal proposal

along these lines has recently been made, suggesting that *ON TRACK* be produced and managed by an existing magazine. It's an interesting approach.

Related to all of this is the question of a charter for *ON TRACK*. The magazine's purpose, although generally understood, is not currently articulated in any formal way. It probably should be. But a charter would necessarily have to reflect any change in concept and presentation. These and other questions deserve careful thought. By and large, they imply a major redirection for the magazine, with obvious financial implications.

So these are not decisions that can be made lightly.

You, our readers, are invited to let us know what you think, and your opinions are most welcome. No changes will be made without a full understanding of the implications.

In the meantime the CDA Institute will continue to turn out a magazine that is topical, credible and readable, with full regard for the needs of the defence community and our own organization. *ON TRACK* will remain "on track"!

Canada Matures as We Enter a New Era

by Terry Thompson

Over the past thirty years Canada's Defence Policies have languished under a series of ministers who either had little knowledge of defence matters or who were awaiting recycling into another portfolio as determined by the PMO. Few of them understood the basic principles of defending democracy and most placed

the defence of the country near the bottom of their priority list

Gordon O'Connor, the Minister of National Defence under the Harper government, has been criticised for his previous ties to the defence industry but in a sense, the inside knowledge of how that industry operates can be used to advantage. Furthermore, with thirty-two years of service in Canada's military, he is more uniquely qualified for the job than many before him.

While lacking the slick communications skills common among those selected to spin the party message, O'Connor stoically soldiers on delivering the defence message to a heretofore

Terry Thompson is a retired air force officer and an observer of Canada's changing foreign and defence policies. He is the author of Warriors and the Battle Within, an account of his career during the turbulence of the integration of the Canadian forces during the 1960s & 70s. "Warriors" is published by Trafford.

poorly informed public. He will be even more severely challenged as the political imperative once again inserts itself into defence procurement process.

The Canadian Forces have been in need of improved strategic airlift capability for twenty-five years. The tired old C-130 Hercules, a tactical airlift aircraft, has been performing the strategic role in the absence of any other means. Politicians now alert to the imminent introduction of new strategic lift aircraft are salivating over how much development and fabrication can be shoehorned into regional make work programmes. In doing so, they threaten to jeopardise the procurement process once again placing political expedience above defence priorities. Minister O'Connor is uniquely qualified to perform the role of Dr. NO when it comes to denying whatever irresponsible political demands are made on military procurement that might impede an expeditious conclusion.

Previously, successive governments under Chretien and Martin reluctantly chose to perform a review of defence policy periodically. But they did so with little regard to even a vague notion of a long-term foreign policy. The Chretien government strode boldly into Afghanistan in order to avoid potential involvement in Iraq and now in opposition, the Liberals criticise the Harper government for fulfilling the task.

In the past fifteen years our allies have frequently been uncertain which direction Canada would take on any given foreign policy issue. Following a unilateral withdrawal of Canadian Forces from European based NATO installations, the former Liberal government turned to the US proposed missile defence of North America. The government position was blatantly ambiguous until the eleventh hour when the Liberal government finally reneged.

If it was difficult for our allies, it was impossible for our military planners to determine what Canada's policy might be with respect to any given international situation. Continuous assessment and re-assessment of the government's ever changing posture whether it in-

volved the UN, our NATO allies or any other international situation kept the military off balance. This problem was exacerbated by chronic budget cuts and shortfalls to previously approved programmes for which adequate funding had not been provided. Worse, the defence budget was constantly raided to shore up other non-defence related government programmes.

...successive governments have chosen to follow the loud voices of a clamouring anti-everything minority. The consequences have been disastrous to a once highly effective Canadian military...

The final failure imposed by the lack of a coherent national defence policy has been the imposed incomprehensibility of the defence policies on the Canadian public. Rather than lead the national reaction to international affairs, successive governments have chosen to follow the loud voices of a clamouring anti-everything minority. The consequences have been disastrous to a once highly effective Canadian military not to mention the major erosion of Canada's influence on the international scene.

Another appalling effect has been the wanton neglect of the recruitment and training infrastructure that is the lifeblood of any military institution. A few small schools and training units still exist. They are sufficiently staffed to maintain the forces at their current dangerously low personnel levels and most have fallen well behind in state-of-the-art military equipment necessary to train soldiers, sailors and airmen. A major infusion of cash is needed to improve and expand the indispensable training machinery needed to satisfy the basic needs for even a modest increase in military strength.

While it is encouraging that some steps have been taken in recent months to bolster recruiting numbers, the military training infrastructure, allowed to atrophy over years, is now in need of resuscitation and major improvements to training facilities and equipment are sorely needed.

Operational training is entirely another matter and as the need for increased and improved operational training evolves, a quiet review of Canada's foreign policy has been undertaken. We are beginning to present a new face to our friends and allies. A determination is emerging that recognises a growing need for military alliances while condemning human rights violations everywhere. It represents a new resolve that is based on the imperative to act responsibly in an ever-changing world.

The Conservative Government under Stephen Harper has been methodically taking initiatives to improve Canada's defence posture. Thirty years overdue, the re-equipment and revitalisation of the Canadian Forces have begun. The Liberals, now in opposition, are still no better equipped to deal with vital defence issues as they vacillate among themselves between soft power and the pitifully few pro-defence advocates within their ranks.

There are no easy answers to the dilemma faced by all free societies over the coming decades. Unprecedented demographic change in western democracies and the attendant discord between extreme religious and cultural values has expanded the definition of warfare to include counter-terrorist operations at home and abroad.

Since 1956 we have clung to the mantra of "Peace Keeping", little understanding that it is merely another arrow in the defence quiver of any nation. Peacekeepers are not trained. They are warriors first and foremost. Once the warrior establishes a form of order, he can then turn his capabilities to maintaining that order while the belligerents devise diplomatic solutions to their discord.

Those on the far left of the political spectrum slavishly cling to dreams of a forgiving world filled with conciliation and good will toward men. A utopia that is unattainable until men of all races and religions come to an understanding of equality for all, under one God whatever

He is named and with the supreme tolerance to accept each other as full and equal

members of a democratic international society.

Following years of introspection and neglect, there is a new crew on the bridge as we steer our course into the future and their work ahead will not be easy. Canada's foreign policies need clear definition and the military must configure the Canadian Forces to meet those policies.

We have only begun to show a new face to the world, a face of compassion and a willingness to help other members of humanity who are less fortunate. We are seeking and finding a better balance between our economic needs and our moral obligations. We are rediscovering the place in the world that we occupied at the end of WW II when over 10% of our population, represented by the nation's sons and daughters, sought a better future for their world.

Those who made the supreme sacrifice for their country will know that they did not forfeit their futures in vain. They will understand that Canada recognises the need to maintain a strong voice in international affairs.

We now face a new era in a world divided by cultural and religious ideology. Radical Muslims have infiltrated all western societies. They have taken advantage of the immigrants who have gone before them to find a peaceful haven within which to raise and educate their children. They will not be stopped by mere laws describing right from wrong for they do not recognise the laws of a free society. Instead they will take advantage of those very laws that protect all peace loving peoples and use them as a cover under which to prosecute their evil intent. An intent to subjugate all mankind to an insane ideology that promotes the bondage of women and the denial of freedom for all.

It is time for Canadians to re-establish ourselves among our friends and allies as a worthy member of the international community. As our foreign policies come into a clear focus our defence policies must be tailored to compliment them.

It will no longer be possible for smaller democracies to design their armed forces to

meet the full spectrum of military conflict. Instead, the forces of the free world must unite in the distribution of military roles and the re-equipment programmes needed to support them. Integration of operational training facilities is a means of reducing the costs for participating nations as has been proven in NATO, NORAD. These concepts should be pursued aggressively, improved and expanded upon as we move deeper into the twenty-first century.

The intent of radical Islam is clear. The terrorists will not be stopped by soft power, negotiation or persuasion. They are relentless in attempting to impose their depraved beliefs on the free world and are prepared to die in the process. The time has come for all free men to recognise how fragile freedom has become.

As the cartoon character “Pogo” said so many years ago, “We have seen the enemy and he is us”. The solution is at hand only after we have come to recognise the problem.

Politicisation of Aid

by Ted Itani

The humanitarian enterprise in general but beneficiaries in particular have been profoundly affected by the politicisation of aid. The Canadian policy of defence, diplomacy and development (3D) is one such example. It has coloured how humanitarians are viewed by belligerents and beneficiaries alike, impeding the provision of assistance, protection and post conflict development programs. As a result humanitarian space¹ has been diminished, providing some belligerents with a convenient opportunity for targeting neutral, impartial and independent expatriate and local aid workers, forcing them to reduce or suspend their operations, or withdraw altogether with telling impact on beneficiaries². Such targeting is often intended to inspire the wholesale exodus of aid agencies, to the detriment of beneficiaries, with the added

consequence, intended or otherwise, that their voice to the outside world has been silenced. Attacks also foster fear among beneficiaries and humanitarians alike, making them susceptible to manipulation at the hands of belligerents. For the sake of beneficiaries as well as for the humanitarian enterprise it is important to keep an ongoing debate, revisiting these issues from different perspectives, and perhaps discovering a way out of this dilemma.

Humanitarians are in the theatre of conflict long before there is a political-military intervention. They often remain, albeit in reduced numbers, during the conflict and are always present after conflict. Given even modest or inadequate resources, humanitarians will almost always intervene in an emergency or a humanitarian crisis; but history is replete with examples of inert body politic. Even in the face of genocide and unprecedented human suffering, dithering, to acting selectively or taking no action at all is a common occurrence. Beneficiaries, particularly those caught amidst armed conflicts do not have the luxury of time, waiting for the political process to wend its interminable way to uncertain outcomes. History is also replete with examples of neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian agencies, although encumbered by inadequate resources that have risen to the challenge to succor those in need, particularly those who are caught up in the forgotten disasters of the world³. Although the notion of

Ted Itani is a veteran of 37 years in the CF. He retired in 1993 and has worked as a consultant as well as a humanitarian, notably with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies as well as with the Canadian Red Cross. He has been a member of the external faculty of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre since 1995. The views expressed in this article are personal ones and not those of the foregoing institutions.

Good Humanitarian Donorship⁴ has been endorsed by many governments and humanitarian agencies. It has yet to be transformed into consistent and effective action on the ground, namely provision of assistance based on need. Disasters that receive inordinate media coverage inspire donations that are out of proportion to the real needs of beneficiaries, varying from 475% to 1200% coverage of the appeal. Other disasters that have not attracted the media remain woefully under-funded and the majority of humanitarian crises fall into the category of forgotten disasters.

Since the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement is the oldest and largest humanitarian network in the world today it is instructive to examine the impact of politicisation of aid on the Movement. Similar impact is felt by all agencies of the humanitarian enterprise. The Movement comprises three components: at the origin of the Movement is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a private, Swiss, humanitarian organisation that came into being 144 years ago to protect and assist victims of conflict. This venerable institution inspired the adoption of the first Geneva Convention in 1864, containing ten articles meant to protect victims of war. At the time it was solely for the protection of fallen soldiers on the battlefield.

The changing nature of conflict is reflected in the current laws of war in that now there are four Geneva Conventions and three Additional Protocols numbering over 600 articles. The Conventions and the Protocols regulate war on land, sea and air, primarily in international conflicts, but they also contain provisions for conflict not of an international nature, i.e. internal strife including civil war.

From its origin the ICRC has inspired the creation of national societies, the second component of the Movement, which numbers 185 Red Cross or Red Crescent societies and a stable of 97 million volunteers. The third component of the Movement is the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), founded in 1919 and known at that time as the League of Red Cross Societies. The

League was renamed the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1983, reflecting the changing nature of the Movement, and adopted the current title in 1991.

The mandate of the ICRC is based on the Geneva Conventions: save lives and protect human dignity. Activities under this mandate include life-saving medical intervention, provision of water, food, clothing and shelter, visits to prisoners of war and others deprived of their freedom and promoting respect for international humanitarian law. The ICRC has a unique legal personality in that 194 States Party to the Geneva Conventions have bestowed the mandate on a private, Swiss, humanitarian organisation. The number of signatories to the Geneva Conventions indicates its universal acceptance.

The mission of the IFRC is to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity.

Seven Fundamental Principles have guided the ICRC, the national societies and the IFRC:

Humanity – alleviate suffering, protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being, promote mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

Impartiality – make no adverse distinction as to nationality, race, religious or political beliefs and provide assistance based on need.

Neutrality – do not take sides in a conflict nor engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Never neutral to human suffering but neutral as to the causes of conflict and neutral in dealing with all parties to a conflict.

Independence – independent of governments, political or partisan interests.

Voluntary service – voluntary relief movement and not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity – only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country that is open to all and reaches all corners of its territory.

Universality – all National Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other worldwide. The 185

independent National Societies speak with one voice.

These principles along with a Code of Conduct adopted in 1994 are also widely practised by 393 other agents of the humanitarian enterprise. They circumscribe institutional and personal conduct and behavior. The consistent and uniform respect for the Fundamental Principles and the Code of Conduct has been a cornerstone for acceptability of the ICRC and the Movement in humanitarian intervention whether it is by host governments, host national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies, beneficiaries or belligerents.

...the ICRC is the lead component for humanitarian intervention in the field of conflict.

In the Movement the ICRC is the lead component for humanitarian intervention in the field of conflict. It coordinates and integrates the contributions of national societies into its overall operation. As the nature of conflict is changing, and a sad reflection of this change is the overwhelmingly civilian clientele that has resulted, the military continues to be an important target population for the ICRC. Although military engagement in humanitarian tasks has resulted on occasion in strained relations it is well for both institutions to remember that the ICRC was originally created for military victims who continue to be an important client.

The IFRC plays a similar role in natural or technological disasters where the situation does not encompass armed conflict. However in recent times the IFRC has been called upon to play an important complementary role, when natural disasters occur in areas that are either in dispute or are contested by belligerents engaged in armed conflict. In such cases the ICRC, as the lead agency of the Movement, takes on added importance.

Although the Fundamental Principles and the Code of Conduct have been instrumental in facilitating access to beneficiaries, it has nevertheless been adversely affected by the politici-

politicisation of humanitarian aid.

Any political-military intervention that has a humanitarian component instantly stigmatizes humanitarians and puts them in danger. The stigma remains long after the military has departed, affecting the trust and confidence with which humanitarians are perceived, literally adding years to the process of reconstruction, reconciliation and prosperity. It is the perception of neutrality, rather than the reality that is much more critical for the humanitarian actor. Some governments have recognised this and have been scrupulous in respecting the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian agencies⁵. Yet the political reality is that when sovereign nations decide to send their military into harm's way, such an undertaking gains more public support when the mission is sold to the public, based disproportionately on its humanitarian dimension. However, this raises uninformed and unrealistic expectations among the electorate, which gradually undermines the missions' longer-term support. Mixing military and civilian functions in keeping with the 3D policy adds to the complexity of a multidimensional operation, and when casualty figures begin to climb, all stakeholders lose: the beneficiaries, humanitarians as well as the military.

In implementing the 3D policy the Canadian military is often criticized for blurring the line between military and humanitarian intervention⁶. This is a classic case of shooting the messenger who is in fact the guardian of democracy, protecting the right of freedom of expression of those who criticize the military for engaging in humanitarian tasks. The criticism is unfair and off target. In a liberal democracy the military is an instrument of domestic and foreign policy, and it is the policy that needs to be debated and brought under scrutiny, rather than the military itself. The debate should be inclusive, constructive and continuous and should reveal undesirable side effects of a particular policy. The unintended consequences of a policy decision should not come as an unpleasant surprise to beneficiaries and humanitarians alike.

(continued p.26)

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In mature democracies the crafting of public policy is a collegial undertaking. Policies survive elections and are passed on to successive governments. They are rarely targeted for partisan political purposes, thereby providing continuity and transparency. The current political climate in Canada neither bodes well for fostering productive debate nor demonstrating that level of maturity.

Beneficiaries are not fooled when the military delivers humanitarian aid. Such interventions take place in an environment where there is no easy connection between humanitarian values and people carrying weapons, irrespective of whether belligerents are in recognizable uniforms or local dress. Thus a “hearts and minds” campaign has little or no residual or long term value, and it has limited value for incoming troops on rotation since “hearts and minds” is all about long term relationships. By contrast humanitarians tend to stay in the theatre for longer periods which enables them to establish mutually beneficial relationships with belligerents and beneficiaries alike. However it must be acknowledged that in the absence of humanitarians, due to a non-permissive environment, the military are remarkably versatile.

The military can act to save lives, protect civilians from danger and engage in the full spectrum of tasks undertaken by humanitarians. Moreover the sheer scale of a humanitarian crisis also means that the needs far outstrip available resources, and military capacity can be easily redirected for humanitarian purposes. Military logistics and operational capabilities are often at the forefront in the early weeks of a major humanitarian crisis. In the early hours following the earthquake in Pakistan on 08 October 2005, the Pakistan military were the first on the scene, conducting search and rescue as well as rapid assessments of threats, needs and challenges of impacted communities; and this, in collaboration with the UN, NATO, other donors and NGOs, played a key role in the rapid and unimpeded flow of vital commodities.

Quick impact projects are particularly valuable in that they cater to immediate needs and are usually in response to those needs artic-

ulated by the local population. This leads to local ownership of the project, which in turn is a key ingredient to long term viability. Local ownership of projects also inspire local ownership of security. However it would be prudent to remember that humanitarian assistance requested by a central or provincial government can often be at odds with the needs determined by the affected population. Notwithstanding that the military option is always more costly than the civilian one, in the face of compelling need, it makes little difference to the beneficiary whether the military or an NGO provides the assistance⁷.

There is no easy exit from the dilemma created when humanitarian aid has been politicised.

Past practice indicates that there is room for consultation between the military and the humanitarians on matters relating to security and the human condition. Dialogue can take place that acts to respect the humanitarians’ independence without encroaching on or compromising how they are perceived by beneficiaries and belligerents. Outright cooperation will continue to be rare and will remain on a case-by-case basis. But there is room for operational coordination as well: for example, the shared use of congested sea and air ports, main supply routes, scarce fuel and storage facilities need to be agreed to between the military, humanitarian agencies and other stakeholders. This being said, humanitarians are amenable to operational coordination when it promises to better meet the needs of beneficiaries without compromising their principles.

There is no easy exit from the dilemma created when humanitarian aid has been politicised. Nor is it facile to cater to humanitarian imperatives when the security situation does not permit neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action. As the unintended impacts of politicizing aid are felt by beneficiaries and the humanitarian enterprise, it is time to remove development, the third D of the defence, diplo-

macy and development policy, from the equation. This needs to be done without prejudicing life-saving humanitarian intervention or quick impact projects by the military. In doing so, it is vital that those who craft and implement policy have a clear understanding of why this is necessary for beneficiaries and humanitarians alike. This separation can begin by taking a policy decision to leave development to the humanitarians. It should be concomitant with public information campaigns by the military, informing people affected by conflict that relief and developmental aid will arrive by way of neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian agencies as soon as a secure and stable environment is established. In instances where the military delivers assistance, it should be made glaringly obvious that they are doing this as military so as not to be confused with civilian agencies: for example, ensuring that they do not use vehicles similar to those of humanitarians, or wearing civilian clothes to blend into the environment.

The military should act consciously to ensure that they do not blur the lines between military intervention and impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian action⁸.

A public information campaign by all stakeholders, citing instances of where the humanitarian enterprise has been able to reach its full potential due to a secure and stable environment, would, over time, highlight the stake that beneficiaries have in the outcome of political, military and humanitarian intervention. This would pave the way to long term peace and prosperity. The military and humanitarians cohabit the same work environment and in many respects, but in very different ways, share the beneficiary population but not the same objectives. De-politicising humanitarian assistance, in particular development, would be a major step forward in protecting humanitarian space, leading to the betterment of the lives of victims of conflict and complex emergencies. Our silent and voiceless beneficiaries expect no less from us.

¹Meinrad Studer, *The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations*, June 2001, “*scope for neutral and impartial humanitarian action in the midst of conflict*,” Studer confined his discussion to conflict and did not venture into peacekeeping. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2003 view humanitarian space as “*a conducive humanitarian operating environment*.”

²A beneficiary is someone who as a result of being a victim of armed conflict or a survivor of a natural disaster is entitled to and receives assistance pursuant to international humanitarian law, international disaster response laws, treaties and covenants.

³World Disasters Report 2006, International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies, 14 December 2006.

⁴Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) was created by a number of donor governments in 2003 to provide the right kind of assistance, targeted according to need, not: political affiliation, ethnicity, religion, race or unbalanced profile inspired by media coverage.

⁵Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store made this point during his presentation at the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, in Ottawa on 26 February 2007.

⁶Adoption of 3D is at odds with the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship adopted by the Canadian Government in Stockholm on 17 June 2003.

⁷Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC during a visit to Ottawa on 28 September 2006.

Official Statement by Jacques Forster, Vice-President of the ICRC at a Conference on Integrated Missions, Oslo, Norway, 30-31 May 2005.

⁸Official Statement by Jacques Forster, Vice-President of the ICRC at a Conference on Integrated Missions, Oslo, Norway, 30-31 May 2005.

Objectives in Afghanistan: Perception, Assumption and Realism

by Eric Morse

Canadian public opinion is focused on two major questions around the war in Afghanistan. They are: what are our war aims – ‘*what are we doing there?*’, and what are the conditions of victory – ‘*how do we end it?*’ There has not been enough public debate about either, though that is probably true of any war in history, but there are also about three serious misconceptions around both issues that can lead us to some very wrong starting points for such a discussion.

One misconception is that you can’t win against the insurgents; that we are already beaten. This is a mantra common among pundits. This seems to stem from a mistaken assumption that the guerrilla always has the strategic advantage, allied to a deep-rooted feeling in parts of Western society that the insurgents are always the underdog and we are always the bad guys. (Admittedly, the current US Administration’s catastrophic adventurism in Iraq has not helped change this perception at all.)

A second misconception is that we are there to revive a ‘failed state’ as we understand a state; to help the government in Kabul secure its control and project its power to its defined frontiers. The third major misconception is that wars have definitive, clear endings when everyone can go home.

Based on these assumptions we are indeed beaten before we start. But all three assumptions are wrong and they drastically skew our perception of what legitimate war aims in Afghanistan ought to be.

Assumption One: an asymmetric insurgency cannot be beaten

It cannot be if the other side plays its

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game, and conventional forces often do just that. In the parlance of asymmetric warfare it is called ‘the war of the flea’ - making a dog chase its tail by endless fleabites – but in the present case it relies on the conventional force looking through the wrong end of the telescope. A prevalent assumption in Canada and elsewhere is that the Taliban win if they can keep us from ‘stabilizing’ Kandahar and the Pashtun country. In fact, if we assume correctly that the area has never been stable as we understand stability, we win if we keep the Taliban from stabilizing *their* control.

It requires a deep cultural understanding of the situation in the area, and of the fact that although locally rooted, the (so-called) ‘Taliban’ are more alien in terms of culture and religion than they at first appear, and therefore have some claim to being regarded locally as an ‘occupying force’ themselves. This is fundamentally different from the Iraq situation, but in order to be made use of strategically, it requires smart, adaptive warfare which, as it turns out, Canadian soldiers are well-prepared for.

It requires a commitment to keeping on with reconstruction when the Taliban keep blowing things up, because only in that way will the people be persuaded that the intent is serious. That in turn requires better coordination in the sector between the armed forces (who to the end of 2006 were doing too much of the reconstruction work by themselves), Foreign Affairs, and CIDA.

It requires sensitive warfare, talking first and shooting later if at all. It requires, innovative thinking and cultural openness within our own forces: the country that brought you *Little Mosque on the Prairie* is also the first to think of sending a Muslim Padre into the mosques of Kandahar Province to find out as equal among equals what the local clergy have on their minds. The Taliban roots are part religious extremist, part tribal, part secular drug lords; the local imams are tribal but their Islam is not that

of the Taliban, and if you do not have the imams you have nothing.

It requires a strong domestic comprehension of local factors, and of what is actually going on. The Internet has weakened the authorities' ability to control information. It has also facilitated the spread of inaccurate information and of propaganda (on all sides). In these conditions the Government has a responsibility to make information more freely available and the public has a responsibility to do its homework. A propos, it is possible to speculate that a fundamental weakness of the 'strategic corporal' concept in the 'Three D's' strategy is that in order for it to work politically, the Prime Minister, Cabinet and Opposition practically need the same experiential framework as the corporal. It is a retelling of the old story that an intelligence service is only as good as the politicians who interpret the intelligence.

Panjwaii (Operation *Medusa*) in summer 2006 is an interesting case of public perception. In the context of standard asymmetric warfare theory it was insanity on the Taliban's part. Almost all we saw at home were the casualties, and pundits were saying that the whole Taliban strategy was to throw away lives to inflict one Canadian casualty on a public who would not bear it. The whole thing otherwise made no sense until it was understood that those villages had been held by the *mujihadeen* for twenty years, that they had beaten the Soviets there in stand-up conventional fighting and that the Taliban thought to draw us into the same fighting with the same result. The result this time was different. And the public bore the casualties and supported the troops, if not always the mission, whole-heartedly.

The Taliban tactics have shifted back to asymmetric warfare, to Improvised Explosive Devices and suicide bombers. One spin-off is that Canada now has tanks there, initially sent in case of another Panjwaii scenario, but, now equipped with heavy rollers or bulldozer blades, they are serving well against the new and heavier IEDs on the roads. The presence of the Leopards has led to some very negative emotional responses domestically, on the grounds

emotional responses domestically, on the grounds that they represent an escalation of involvement. However, to a soldier a tank is not the emotional symbol it is to a civilian, it is simply a very useful piece of field equipment, without prejudice to its original design function.

A final and important indicator is that – again, in circumstances where information can speedily be made public – there is no sign that the troops in the field consider the war to be unwinnable or the Taliban invincible, despite persistent and very probably accurate rumours of a major spring offensive. In a situation that is, or is perceived as, hopeless or failing, the depressive effect on morale is generally unmistakable. By all accounts, it is not perceivable among Canadian troops in the field.

Assumption Two: the 'Failed State' concept

Afghanistan could hardly fail, it was never a state to begin with. (Yugoslavia was never a state in that sense either.) Afghanistan has always been a loose patchwork of tribes and peoples which never even had the dubious advantage of a Saddam Hussein (or the somewhat less dubious advantage of a Tito) to hold it together by main force for a flickering moment in history that later gets called a Golden Age by people who do not remember the reality. The borders are lines on a map, mainly drawn by other powers, of no interest to anyone local.

It is indeed in the West's strategic interest to help the Karzai Government, which is more politically legitimate than anything seen there in the last thirty years, strengthen itself and undertake reconstruction, and bring some stability to an area that was and can again be a threat. However, the idea of creating a European-style state where there was never one before is a will-of-

the-wisp. Much in the political equation is relative and has to be viewed that way.

Assumption Three: the concept of a clean end to a war

We are conditioned to this by a European and Roman heritage of twenty centuries,

where wars were fought by organized armies and neatly concluded by armistice or surrender but always (in theory) by diplomatic arrangement. It's not the norm. In fact, World War One and World War Two did not end cleanly for anyone at all except the Western Allies. For the rest of Europe and the Middle East, the end of World War One was chaos, revolution, the hateful phrase 'ethnic cleansing', round and round without end until World War Two swamped (for us) whatever else had been going on.

World War Two, say our history books, ended with the surrender of Germany and Japan. It only ended that way for us in the West. We were lucky. There was supposed to be a last-ditch insurgency by the 'SS Werewolves' in the Bavarian Redoubt, and had it happened – it could have – the postwar story would have been greatly different. But Germans had had it with fighting by then and being sensible people decided to call it quits, as did the Japanese. That German and Japanese societies had no major internal fault lines across which further civil strife could occur helped immeasurably.

As a single example of what happened elsewhere, much of the already devastated western USSR was devastated further by truly massive Soviet campaigns against local resistance movements into the early 50's. We were very lucky, and it deceives us to this day.

In the same category as the 'clean end' concept is the 'clean beginning', usually posited as *'Is Canada now at war?'*

The question of whether Canada is in fact fighting a war has become something of a partisan issue at home, and describing what is going on in Afghanistan as a 'war' causes severe discomfort at many political levels, notably among certain other NATO allies.

The last formal declaration of war was issued by the USSR against Japan in 1945. There have been none since, and with the evolution of the international system 'on the ground' (as opposed to 'in the classroom') away from traditional European forms of conduct, there may never be another in the lifetime of this international system. Be that as it may, the grass-roots perception within Canada, whether one is for or against the Afghan involvement, and based strictly upon the 'quacks like a duck' yardstick, is that what we are doing in the south of Afghanistan is indeed a war. As a senior Canadian officer recently put it rather earthily, *'You call it 'low-intensity' –those people are trying to kill me!'*

Semantics are important in international relations, they are an indispensable smoother of relationships. Credibility is important in domestic politics, and precise perception is vital in the development of a military involvement. The need for each would seem to be in confrontation over Afghanistan.

The war aims in the South are, or should be, to deny the Taliban mastery of areas they consider their own while the Karzai Government attempts to create something recognizable as acceptance in the country in general, and to attempt to give the local people some hope that they have what it takes to resist Taliban domination. That is by no means a fantasy – in parts of Helmand Province last year, the villagers got so tired of the Taliban and the British fighting over their territory that they took matters into their own hands with a reasonable degree of success.

That would be a perfectly acceptable exit scenario. It would essentially accomplish the war aims.

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2007 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include: General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Honourable Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Honourable John Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Mr Hamilton Southam, and Brigadier-General David Fraser.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2007, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, November 16 2007, at a gala dinner that will be held in the LeBreton Gallery of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, will be the guest of honour.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2007.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui s'est distingué par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité ou à la défense de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'honorable John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. Hamilton Southam, and le Brigadier-général David Fraser.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen/citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2007, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présenté vendredi, le 16 novembre 2007, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu dans la galerie LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, sera l'invitée d'honneur.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner gala, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone: (613) 236 9903.

A Week in Afghanistan - A Snapshot

by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara and Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers



Ken Summers, a retired Rear Admiral, served 37 years in the Canadian military with much of the last half of his career in positions of Command, most notably as Commander CF Middle East during the 1990 Gulf War. Since retirement he has remained current with Canadian and NATO military issues and is frequently featured as a military analyst with the CBC. Ken is active in the Naval Officers Association of Canada serving on the National Executive as well as being President of the Vancouver Island Branch. He has made trips to Afghanistan each of the past two years and has written articles and has made numerous presentations on that conflict over the past year.

Don Macnamara, a retired air force Brigadier General and past president of CDAI, spent the last half of his 37 year military career doing and teaching strategy, strategic planning and analysis. On retirement, he joined the faculty of the Queen's School of Business as a professor of international business. Although retired, he continues as Associate Director of the Queen's Public Executive Program and teaches at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, where he is Honorary Colonel. He is also a member of the RMC Board of Governors and the Air Command Advisory Council.

Introduction

Invited by the Chief of Defence Staff, the authors visited Afghanistan 26 Oct. to 5 Nov, 2006 along with four other defence analysts including Alain Pellerin, all retired senior officers. The visit provided an opportunity to understand and appreciate the 'ground truth' concerning Canadian operations in Afghanistan. They also attended the command change of NATO/ISAF Regional Command South and the Canadian Task Force Kandahar command to BGen Tim Grant.

Stops in Kabul included the Canadian Embassy and the Afghan National Training Centre. Kandahar stops included the Task Force Kandahar HQ and various Canadian units within the US operated base at Kandahar Airport and Camp Nathan Smith, site of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar city.

In the 90th anniversary year of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, the history of Canadians mak-

ing sacrifices in the interest of world order, freedom and justice continues with a total of 52 fatal casualties in Afghanistan, including one diplomat, as of 9 April, 2007. Understanding the background and the nature of the various operations is essential to the continuing understanding of Canada's history of international military commitments – especially understanding there is both risk and cost in making such commitments.

Background

Geography - Afghanistan is a land-locked country the size of Manitoba with a population of 31 million. Mainly a rocky, mountainous desert, there are many river valleys where an agricultural economy and many villages exist. The 34 provinces variously border Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – with the Vakhn corridor of the Hindu Kush range in the northeast to China.

People - A multi-tribal, multicultural country composed of the Pashtun in the south (42%), the Tajik (27%) in the central and north, the Hazara (9%), Uzbek (9%) and lesser others. Although Dari, spoken by about half of the population, and Pashtu, about 35%, are official languages, there are over 30 minor tribal languages. The literacy rate is about 36% but disproportionately in favour of males, about 50%, while females are at 21%.

History - With a troubled history dating back to Alexander the Great, Afghanistan is an historic trading crossroads – dating from Genghis Khan and Marco Polo with various unsuccessful attempts for control by Persians, Arabs, Russians and the British. The communist coup that preceded the Soviet Union invasion of December 1979 ended a form of democratic constitutional monarchy and introduced a 27-year period of conflict, chaos and destruction. Following the ouster of the Soviet Union in 1989, a civil war ensued that ended in the rule of the ultra conservative Islamist Taliban and a haven for the Al Qaeda training camps that spawned the 9/11 attack on New York.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US,

Allied, and Northern Alliance military action (Operation Enduring Freedom) toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama Bin Laden. Then, in late 2001, an international conference in Bonn, Germany established the process for political reconstruction. On 7 Dec. 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and a National Assembly was inaugurated on 19 Dec. 2005.

Early in 2006, the London Compact reaffirmed international support and development funding (\$10 billion) for the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) aimed at governance, security and development.


Ravaged by war and conflict for almost 30 years, Afghanistan's infrastructure was virtually totally destroyed along with the few fledgling institutions. It was a failed state and now a struggling democracy with a record of two successive and successful elections – one for a President, the other for a bicameral National Assembly. Its indigenous economy is agricultural hugely distorted by the poppy / opium crop that accounts for about 40% of GDP. Although local markets are developing across the country, it is largely a service-sector base, bolstered by the donor aid supported construction activity. It is among the poorest countries in the world.

In sum, Afghanistan is a complex country with a complex history. The situations regarding governance, security and development are varied in different provinces and different regions.

Figure 1 illustrates the various levels of activity now and needed to be pursued to effect the Afghan National Development Strategy. It must be a continuous, integrated and coordinated effort – easy to say but difficult to achieve in a short time in a country with a long history of chaos and destruction.

Canadians in Afghanistan

Following 9/11, Canada committed the 3PPCLI Battle Group, Special Operations Force (SOF) and ships to Op Apollo / Op Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in



Afghanistan in early 2002.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was originally authorized by the UN on December 20, 2001 to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority. NATO took command and co-ordination of ISAF in August 2003. ISAF is NATO's first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area and operates in Afghanistan under a UN mandate. ISAF's mission was initially limited to Kabul but on 13 Oct. 2003 expanded to a wider role beyond Kabul and reaffirmed on Feb. 15, 2006.

Now, it also commands the military components of nine Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Command of ISAF Southern Region held by BGen David Fraser went to Netherlands' MGen Ton Van Loon on 01 November, 2006 and the command of Canadian Task Force Kandahar was assumed by BGen Tim Grant.

Canada's goal in Afghanistan parallels that of NATO and ISAF. Canada's approach is through three elements: a) stabilizing the country; b) strengthening government; c) reducing poverty.

The ANDS itself, similarly focuses on three essential elements – Governance, Security

and Development— all three areas involving Canadian 'whole of government' activity, which we had the opportunity to observe and discuss.

Governance

At the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, an afternoon was spent in a round-table with a unique Canadian contribution – the **Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan**, or **SAT-A**. Since September 2005 the Canadian Forces has bilaterally provided a team of strategic military planners to support the Government of Afghanistan in developing key national strategies and mechanisms for the effective implementation of those strategies.

The Strategic Advisory Team, in consultation with the Canadian Ambassador, the Head of Aid and with a senior representative of the Afghan government, provides direct planning support to government ministries and working groups in the development and governance realms. The teams are embedded in their partner Afghan Government ministries and agencies and work under Afghan leadership. The planning team members bring a very wide range of

training, education, experience, and military strategic planning skills to bear on the resolution of complex civil problems.

There are 14 military officers and two civilians (5- Army, 4- Navy, 5- Air Force, 1- Defence Scientist, and 1- CIDA rep). All have a minimum of a BA or BSc, many with MA, MSc, or MBA. Disciplines range through political science, international relations, business administration and engineering. They are gunners, tankers, Military Policemen, air navigators, aeronautical engineers, lawyers, MARS, MARE, public affairs, but all are experts and experienced at the strategic planning level.

The SAT has five 'D' objectives: direct, develop, delegate, decision-making, discipline. Military members bring a disciplined approach to advising on personal, cognitive, and doctrinal levels. SAT operates at the ministerial level in reconstruction and development, public service, interior among others. The Canadian SAT is the only one of its kind, although other nations are now seeking opportunities to emulate it.

Policy Action Group (PAG)

Canada is also involved in another 'governance' activity - the Policy Action Group. The PAG is an advisory body with which President Karzai regularly discusses the situation in the south with the most directly involved Afghan ministers, the UN, the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom commanders, and the ambassadors of the four countries with large troop contingents in the South (the UK, Canada, the US and the Netherlands). The Policy Action Group devises strategies to improve security, reconstruction and communication with the people of southern Afghanistan.

Security

The Afghan National Training Centre, near Kabul, trains both Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police recruits. Canada has a 15-member training team there: seven officers, seven NCOs and one medic – who work alongside US, UK, French and New Zealand

Instructors to develop an effective Afghan Army and Police capability.

The 16-week course for soldiers 'off the street' consists of seven weeks basic and six weeks advanced individual training conducted by US, UK and French instructors to a NATO standard syllabus, followed by two weeks 'collective' training under Canadian leadership, designed to take the soldiers to platoon and company levels. This undertaking is aimed at 'training the trainers', so CF instructors are using a mentoring approach with Afghan Army officers and NCOs who do the actual instructing. Some officers now serving as company commanders may have served as Colonels in the former Afghan Army. The CF team was held up as 'the gold standard' in terms of their effectiveness.

Task Force Kandahar

The core of Canadian operations is Task Force Kandahar, under command of BGen Tim Grant. About 2,500 CF personnel and some 200 contract civilians, including staff for Tim Horton's and other recreational facilities, are located in the US-operated base at Kandahar airport.

The Battle Group of approximately 1,000 troops currently (Spring 2007) from 2RCR Gagetown, is deployed into forward operating bases. Frequent contact with Taliban forces occurs. The addition of some 17 Leopard tanks (LdSH) is expected to improve their defensive fire support in these base areas.

There are an additional 150 R22eR personnel assigned as a protection force for the Provincial Reconstruction Team at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City.

The support elements include about 70 staff from 1 Field Ambulance and other Health Service facilities across Canada serving the Multinational Medical Unit-Role 3, now under Canadian command at Kandahar Airport. The Combat Service Support Company carries a particularly heavy load running convoys through areas of constant threat from ambushes, roadside bombs (IED) and even suicide bomb-

ers.

The convoy crews, for example, had driven up to 55 supply convoys in just two months, experienced as many as 30 ambushes. Some have experienced many ambushes as well as roadside bombs-IEDs, one crew multiple ambushes, two IEDs, and one suicide bomber.

Many are reservists and doing their jobs alongside their regular force colleagues. Men and women, regular and reserve are demonstrating the effectiveness of the total force concept – indeed a unified force. The Canadian soldiers – and supporting sailors, airmen and airwomen – are well-educated, well-trained, well-equipped and well led, committed and dedicated to their tasks – the cream of Canada’s crop. We can only describe them in superlatives – but insufficiently to make Canadians recognize what a wonderful job these men and women are doing.

Operation Medusa

Operation Medusa was the Canadian-led two-week operation in Panjwayi district commencing 2 Sep. It involved all southern region ISAF forces against substantial Taliban force – well-led and with sophisticated arms and tactics. It was NATO’s first out-of-area combat operation and was a significant Canadian / ISAF victory – at a cost of 12 Canadian fatal casualties. It is widely hailed by the ISAF Commander and new Regional Commander as ‘setting the standard’. The area remains dangerous.

Detachments continuously deployed in forward operating bases aim at pursuing the ‘inkblot’ strategy. With support from ISAF troops, the Afghan army creates safe areas where local government can exercise its authority to begin reconstruction. The strategy is to ensure rapid, visible improvements by restoring basic infrastructure, bridges, schools, mosques, drinking water facilities and health care. This model can spread like an ‘inkblot’ to more remote areas.

This approach continues in 2007 with Operation Achilles, an ISAF operation aimed at blunting any ‘spring offensive’ by the insurgent

forces.

Development

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - Camp Nathan Smith, Kandahar City.

Since August 2005, a Canadian PRT has operated in Kandahar, and expects to remain until February 2009. The PRT combines elements from the CF, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and civilian police led by the RCMP in an integrated Canadian effort reflecting the “All of Government” approach. Some 350 persons are at this PRT site at Camp Nathan Smith.

The PRT reinforces the authority of the Afghan government in Kandahar Province, assisting in stabilization and development of the region. It monitors security, promotes Afghan policies and priorities with local authorities and facilitates security sector reforms.

PRT accomplishments to 01 Nov. include 150 km of roads, 100 km irrigation canals, 1000 wells dug, 427 Community Development Councils elected at local level and they are currently directing 17 main projects, including repair of battle damage and daily engagement with Afghans to assist in capacity building.

Issues, Concerns and Conclusions

This visit was exceptionally revealing, informative and reinforced our impression that the whole story of Canada’s activities in Afghanistan in general and Kandahar Province in particular, are under-reported in Canadian media.

The magnitude of the problems reflects the history and state of a nation after nearly 30 years of war. Security remains precarious in the South, but is much better elsewhere. However, there does appear to be a lack of coordination in all efforts across all participants in all parts of the country. It is quite feasible that the insurgency will continue, even increase, as Taliban

(continued p. 38)

THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD



Nominations are invited for the 2007 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, and Christie Blatchford.

Any Canadian (or non-Canadians for that matter) may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of reasons for the nomination, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2007, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 16 November 2007, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the LeBreton Galley of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, will be the guest of honour.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.



PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2007.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, et Christie Blatchford.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et être accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivent votre nomination et d'une biographie du candidat. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2007, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222 SOMERSET STREET, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 16 novembre 2007, au dîner gala Vimy qui aura lieu dans la galerie LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, sera l'invitée d'honneur.

Pour de plus informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner gala, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

militants, drug criminals and other corrupt elements see their own futures threatened. Furthermore, corruption will continue as poverty and disparities remain as great as they are, and will only be reduced with time, development and the rule of law.

Canada must make a very long-term commitment if we mean what we say in our 'goal'. It may take 20 years or more - moving from military-assured security to military, governance

and development together, to development and governance, as Afghans are able to assume responsibility for their own security - both military and police.

All Canadians, but especially governments and bureaucracy, must understand the real nature of the undertaking and the commitment - and consequences of either failure or withdrawal for Canada, Canadians and especially the Afghan people.

North American Defense Cooperation: Canada, Mexico and the United States

by Dwight N. Mason

At least since 1938 the United States and Canada have seen North America as single military theater and have managed its defense cooperatively. Over the years starting with the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) in 1940, the two countries have expanded and deepened that cooperation until now it is as close, dense and seamless as two independent countries can hope to achieve.

After World War II, until the events of September 11, 2001, neither the United States nor Canada considered Mexico as a player in North American defense. While the agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King establishing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense directed it to "... consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere."¹ the U.S. and Canada focused on the Soviet threat which meant that our North American defense cooperation looked north, out to sea and to NATO.

No longer. Threats and focus have changed. Now, in addition to the traditional but growing economic and security problems pre-

sented by increased legal and illegal migration and refugee flows to and within North America, the region is becoming a single economic space as Mexico becomes an important economic partner to the U.S. and Canada. One result of this development is increasingly shared critical infrastructure. While that infrastructure confers great advantages, it also carries important vulnerabilities. These include the disruptive effects in all three countries of possible natural disasters, accidents and their exploitation by attack including by terrorists based beyond and within North America.²

The attacks of September 11, 2001 added focus and urgency to managing and minimizing these vulnerabilities and the dangers they present, and in particular the threat within North America arising from ease of entry and rich targets created by shared critical infrastructure. Thus the U.S. created the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command and Canada took similar steps. And both Canada and the U.S. took action to improve further their already high level of cooperation in these areas. Such action was normal given the basic U.S. - Canada relationship.

The U.S. and Canada also recognized the importance of Mexico to improved North American security and defense. For example U.S. Northern Command's responsibilities explicitly include working with Mexico as well as Canada. But improved continental security now has requirements that go well beyond defense to

Dwight N. Mason is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. From 1994 until 2002 he was the Chairman of the US Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada - United States. He was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Ottawa from 1986 until 1990.

include law enforcement, intelligence and preparation for consequence management at all levels of government within and among all three countries, hence the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.

The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America Security Agenda spelled out and responded in part to this situation on March 25, 2005. In that document, the United States, Canada and Mexico agreed to,

“Prevent and respond to threats within North America

- Develop and implement a strategy to enhance North American maritime transportation and port security.
- Develop and implement a strategy to establish equivalent approaches to aviation security for North America.
- Develop and implement a comprehensive North American strategy for combating transnational threats to the United States, Canada, and Mexico, including terrorism, organized crime, illegal drugs, migrant and contraband smuggling and trafficking.
- Enhance partnerships on intelligence related to North American security.
- Develop and implement a common approach to critical infrastructure protection, and response to cross-border terrorist incidents and, as applicable, natural disasters.”⁷³

These are important issues, and trilateral agreement to work together on them is a significant development. The agenda illustrates the agreement of Canada, Mexico and the United States that North America is a common economic space and single security theater.

Following up on this start, now would be a good time for the United States and Canada to consider moving beyond the 2005 SPP agenda to include Mexico as a military partner in North American defense. Trilateral defense coopera-

tion is clearly an important element in the improvement of overall North American security. We need to do this in ways that are both effective and acceptable to Mexico, Canada and the United States.

For the last 66 years Canada and the United States have been increasingly intimate allies, and our overall relationship has become one of enormous interdependence that has been expanding and deepening at an increasing rate. Culturally and politically, we share a rich colonial heritage.

Mexico’s relationship with the United States and Canada has been different. We do not share Mexico’s colonial heritage in an organizing political and cultural sense. We do not share the post World War II, NATO, and NORAD experience.

But we do share North America. And, as illustrated by the SPP agenda, all three countries appear to understand and accept that the world we now live in and the interdependence we now share requires a new level of trilateral cooperation and that this requirement extends into the security domain.

...judging by its most recent annual Report to Leaders, the Security and Prosperity Partnership has been active and has made considerable progress, principally in areas relating to the economy including competitiveness, border management, pandemic management, law enforcement, and screening of cargo.

However, this understanding and acceptance are not shared to the same degree in all three countries. For example, Raul Benitez Manaut recently pointed out at the U.S. National Defense University that, “Mexican nationalists distrust the United States, they do not recognize the changes in the international system of security, they do not accept the transnational character of many new threats...and they reject the participation of Mexico in the international system of security.”⁷⁴

Nevertheless, judging by its most recent

annual *Report to Leaders*⁵, the Security and Prosperity Partnership has been active and has made considerable progress, principally in areas relating to the economy including competitiveness, border management, pandemic management, law enforcement, and screening of cargo. Less attention (probably for good historical, practical and priority reasons) appears to have been devoted to North American defense matters such as maritime warning and air and space warning or more generally combating transnational threats that may require coordinated action by the Mexican, United States and Canadian defense establishments.

This latter kind of cooperation is a subject with which the United States and Canada are very familiar and with which we have a record of sustained success including experience in managing an asymmetric power relationship.

One place to begin in considering how to improve continental defense is to ask whether the United States and Canada can work with Mexico in the defense domain in a manner that will include Mexico in at least some aspects of existing United States – Canada North American defense arrangements. Can the successful United States- Canada defense partnership model be helpful in creating a trilateral partnership in at least selected areas that are acceptable and useful to all three parties?

Military to military relationships are probably a good area to focus on, and the United States military has not neglected this. In recent years there has been increasing contact between the U.S. and Mexican militaries and more so after 9/11. In fact, the two may well have created a sufficient basis for more substantive and not exclusively military contacts concerning continental defense.

A good place to build on this progress is the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada –United States. The Board is the oldest and most experienced United States - Canada defense institution. It operates at a senior political and military level – the U.S. Chairman is an appointee of the President and the Canadian Chairman is an appointee of the Prime Minister. Its members include representatives from the

military, foreign ministry and homeland security domains. But most importantly, it has a culture of informality and partnership that permits and encourages the exploration of ideas long before they take on a formal character. It is an example of how an asymmetrical power relationship can be managed to the satisfaction of both parties.

Informal and formal trilateral contact as well as institutional arrangements are now established practices. The NAFTA and its several subgroups and the SPP and its subgroups are two examples. There have been additional contacts at the state-provincial levels. The private sector has also been active. For example there is the North American Competitiveness Council. Thus for the Board to seek to establish informal trilateral contacts in its area of responsibility would not be a departure from existing norms. The Board would be well within its mandate to do so. After all, it was established to “... consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.”⁶ The Board would do well to consider informal contacts with Mexican defense, foreign ministry and military officials to stimulate thinking on possible ways forward to improved continental defense cooperation building on its experience. For example, the Board could invite Mexican observers to meet with it informally after a regular meeting. The Board could suggest that such an event focus on maritime warning.

There are several reasons for this suggested focus: first – maritime warning probably carries no freight that could be seen as challenging Mexican sovereignty -- it is about the sharing of information in both directions. Second, it would respond to the SPP agenda item on improving maritime security. Third the United States and Canada have recently agreed to expand their cooperation in this area using NORAD as the tool. Fourth, including Mexico in a trilateral North American maritime warning system (but not necessarily in NORAD but linked to it) would add value to existing maritime warning arrangements and thus improve North American security in a practical manner. Finally with a new NORAD commander in

place, this would be a good time for the Board to make some suggestions for the future direc-

tion of continental defense policy.

¹ Sean M. Maloney “Our Defended Borders: A Short History of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Military Cooperation Committee, 1940 to Present,” in *The 200th Meeting of the Canada – United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, October 1977*

² For a Canadian description of this threat, see *Threats to Canada’s Critical Infrastructure*, Office of Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Threat Analysis TA03-001, 12 March 2003.

³ *Security Agenda*, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America http://www.spp.gov/security_agenda/ (accessed November 8, 2006).


⁴ Raul Benitez Manaut, *Mexico’s Security Dilemma*, p.5. (A paper presented at a conference “Partners of Choice? A Western Hemisphere Security Conundrum,” Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, Washington, December 1, 2006.)

⁵ http://www.spp.gov/2006_report_to_leaders/index.asp?dName=2006_report_to_leaders (accessed November 8, 2006).

⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt Statement on a Joint Board for Defense of Canada and the United States. August 18th, 1940, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=15991> (accessed February 14, 2006); also Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1940.

Why Canadians should pay attention to the Six-Party talks

by Elizabeth Sneyd



On January 17, 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists declared the world to be on the brink of a second nuclear age, in part because of the nu-

clear tests conducted by North Korea in 2006.¹ For a number of years, North Korea has been engaged in negotiations by China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States with the purpose of deterring North Korea from further developing nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests of 2006 demonstrated how little progress had been made in these talks.

Nevertheless, the February 2007 round of these talks, also known as the Six-Party talks,

concluded on a promising note, with North Korea agreeing to shut down its nuclear programme. North Korea has since refused to take any action until the United States has completed a transfer of \$25 million (US) that has been frozen in a bank account in Macau. Once again, the nuclear talks have stalled, and there is no guarantee that North Korea will close down its nuclear programme anytime soon.²

The Six-Party talks are conducted behind closed doors, so there is no opportunity for Canada or any other interested nation to observe the proceedings. As a result, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs can do little more than make comments about the results of the talks. Upon the conclusion of the February 2007 round, for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay said:

“Canada welcomes news that an agreement has been reached at the Six-Party Talks. While this is only a first step in a broader effort to completely dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weap-

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ons program, we salute this attempt to bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. Today's announcement further demonstrates that the international community remains unified in its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Canada has consistently advocated the Six-Party Talks as the best means for North Korea to address its long-term economic, political and security goals."³

It is clear from the Minister's comments that Canada has a vested interest in a positive outcome in these talks even though Canada is not directly involved. And as with other international negotiations, different outcomes of the Six-Party talks will no doubt affect Canada in a number of ways.

The Six-Party talks provide a peculiar situation in which we can see no less than three historical eras coming together and overlapping in a unique way. As a result, history plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of each round of meetings. As an example, both Korea and China have demanded that Japan make appropriate reparations for the wrongs committed under Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945 in the case of the Koreans), including the "comfort women" issue.

Japan's reluctance to concede wrongdoing continues to be a sticking point, as illustrated by the collapse of bi-national talks between Japan and North Korea on March 8, 2007⁴, and by the uproar resulting from certain recent comments made by Shinzo Abe, the current Japanese Prime Minister.⁵ To be sure, not all unresolved issues from this period have an impact on the Six-Party talks – Japan and Russia are still technically at war with one another over the issue of the south Kurile islands, but they have not brought this conflict to the table.⁶

Just as the Second World War continues in East Asia, so does the Cold War. In an article for *Harvard International Review*, the new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, wrote that "resolution of the nuclear issue should be part of a broader endeavour to dismantle the Cold War's residual structure on the Korean Peninsula".⁷ Stability exists in the

Korean peninsula, thanks to Cold War-vintage strategies of deterrence and containment, but the area is still lacking permanent peace.⁸ Traditional Cold-War stances continue to cast large shadows over the present. There is continued contention between Japan and North Korea over the "abduction issue".⁹ This issue has continually threatened to interrupt rounds of the Six-Party talks, much to the chagrin of the other participants.¹⁰ The perception of a "Communist threat" appears very much alive, as the United States continues to refuse to normalize relations with North Korea, and continues to approach China with caution.

The third era that impacts on the Six-Party talks is the current "post-9/11 period" in which the world currently finds itself. In 2002, North Korea was included by U.S. President Bush as a member of the "axis of evil"¹¹, in what some have called an "ineffective attempt to link the North Korean nuclear issue to countering terrorism"¹² North Korea is the odd nation out in the "axis of evil" because of the reliance on the Six-Party talks as a means of stabilizing that nation.

One may ask what all this has to do with Canada. The fact is, Canada is inextricably tied not only to the United States, but also Russia, and the four East Asian nations involved in the Six-Party talks, as a result of history. Knowing the historical context is therefore crucial to understanding why each round of talks concludes the way it does.

Canada's ethnic and familial ties to the Asian nations involved in the Six-Party talks are growing ever stronger. The overall Asian population of Canada continues to rise, comprising 9.82 % of the nation's total population in 2001.¹³ 3.69% of the of the Asian population claims Chinese origin; the numbers are much smaller for those of Japanese and Korean origin (0.29% and 0.34% respectively).¹⁴ If we look at the make-up of the Asian populations of Canada's largest cities, we find that the proportion of Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans to the rest of the Asian population varies from 22% (in Ottawa-Hull) to as high as 60% (in Vancouver).¹⁵ These numbers do not include the thousands of

Chinese, Japanese and Korean students who come to Canada every year on study permits.

Kenny Zhang has suggested that there is also evidence of a “Canadian Diaspora” in which “many immigrants to Canada are returning to their countries of origin to pursue business and professional activities”.¹⁶ The exact number is difficult to determine, but Zhang estimated that over 644,000 Canadians live in Asia, with over 200,000 in Hong Kong alone.¹⁷ This is a sizable number – 2% of Canada’s resident population – and it is a “significant community that Canada cannot afford to ignore”.¹⁸

If a nuclear crisis were to emerge in East Asia that put the lives of Canadians or their families in danger, we could see a repeat of the evacuation operation conducted in Lebanon...

What do these numbers mean? They suggest that a growing number of Canadians at home and abroad have the potential to be directly affected by the outcome of the Six-Party talks. If a nuclear crisis were to emerge in East Asia that put the lives of Canadians or their families in danger, we could see a repeat of the evacuation operation conducted in Lebanon last year. Or there could be calls for UN intervention.

Canada’s economic ties with China, Japan, and the Koreas, also strengthen every year. If we compare export statistics from 2002 and 2006, for example, we find that Canada’s exports to Japan, China, and South Korea have all increased.¹⁹ The increase is especially notable for China and South Korea (increases by 85% and 62% respectively).²⁰ Similarly, if we look at imports from all four countries, we see increases for China and the two Koreas, although surprisingly, the most dramatic increase was from North Korea at 37.5%.²¹

Another key, although informal, economic element that must be considered is remittances from Canada back to East Asia by immigrants from these nations. While exact figures

are difficult to track, it should be noted that in 2004, China was the second-highest country in the world in terms of receipts of remittances (21.3 billion dollars US, or 19% of the world total).²²

A nuclear crisis in East Asia could have a negative impact on the Canadian economy if it disrupts trade or halts manufacturing. While China, Japan and the Koreas are not Canada’s largest trading partners, loss of these markets, even temporarily, could result in the loss of billions of dollars.

Given that North Korea is on the other side of the world, Canadians may be forgiven for thinking that distance keeps our nation safe from a North Korean nuclear attack. Yet as the northern neighbour of the United States, Canada has the potential to be impacted by any missile attack on that country. This point was raised by the United States in July 2006 after North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile that ultimately crashed into the Sea of Japan. Since this particular missile has an estimated range of 6,000 to 15,000 kilometres, it could have reached as far as Alaska or the US West Coast.²³ Two days after the missile launch, President Bush commented that North Korea:

“...could be seemingly firing a missile at the United States at, I don’t know - this is all speculation - but it could be headed toward the northwest of our country, and it wouldn’t take much for it to get off course and land somewhere he [Kim Jong Il] may not have intended.”²⁴

At the same press conference, Prime Minister Harper iterated his concern that Canada was at risk:

“I think this should concern us immensely. Missiles that are fired in the direction in [*sic*] the United States constitute a threat to Canada...I think it should be obvious, when we look at this threat, why the United States and others would want to have a modern and flexible defence system against this kind of threat.”²⁵

The discussion of missile defence is a thorny one in Canada, and will not be addressed in detail in this article. Canadians should be aware, however, that there is the potential for Canada to be affected by a nuclear attack by North Korea, either deliberately or accidentally. An erroneous nuclear explosion is as lethal as an intentional one.

Further, as demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the ties between Canada and the United States are vulnerable when one nation in the bi-lateral relationship is under attack. If a nuclear attack were to occur within the bounds of the United States, we would no doubt see a closure of the Canada-US border, which could be disastrous for trade. Similarly, if an attack were to occur in Canada, the United States would not hesitate to take steps to protect itself before rushing to Canada's

aid. Finally, since the radioactive cloud from a nuclear explosion transcends boundaries (as in the Chernobyl explosion), all of North America could possibly be affected environmentally.

If we are indeed on the brink of a second nuclear age, it is crucial that Canada remains committed to its historical stance of nuclear non-proliferation, and that it continues to express its support for the Six-Party talks. It is unfortunate that there is no opportunity for Canada to become directly involved in the negotiation process, but it is reassuring that the federal government is aware of the gravity of the situation. There is much at stake for Canada in the Six-Party talks, socially, politically, economically, and environmentally. Canadians should therefore pay close attention to the progress of these talks, so that we are not caught by surprise.

¹ The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. "Board Statement". Retrieved from <http://www.thebulletin.org/minutes-to-midnight/board-statements.html> on April 5, 2007.

² York, Geoffrey. "Pyongyang walks out of nuclear talks". *The Globe and Mail*. March 23, 2007.

³ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Statement by Minister MacKay on North Korea" (Media Release No. 25) February 14, 2007. Retrieved from http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=384847&Language=E&docnumber=25 on March 13, 2007.

⁴ Yamaguchi, Mari. "Japan-N. Korea Talks Conclude in Acrimony". *The Washington Post*, March 9, 2007, p. A16.

⁵ Loa lok-sin. "Former "comfort women" condemn Shinzo Abe's denial". *Taipei Times* March 22, 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/03/22/2003353329> on March 29, 2007. Prime Minister Abe has since back-pedalled on the issue.

⁶ Yasmann, Victor. "World War II – 60 Years After: Russia and Japan Still Searching for Closure". *Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty* Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/9261d82c-98f5-40ae-938a-eb14fa2cea14.html> on March 29, 2007.

⁷ Ki-Moon, Ban. "For permanent peace: beyond the nuclear challenge and the Cold War" *Harvard International Review* 28:2 (Summer 2006). Page unknown.

⁸ *Ibid.* No official peace pact followed the 1953 Armistice.

⁹ Yamaguchi, Mari. "Japan-N. Korea Talks Conclude in Acrimony", p. A16.

¹⁰ Kurashige, Nanae. "Abduction issue may cripple 6-way talks". *The Asahi Shimbun* March 22, 2007. <http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200703220069.html>

¹¹ United States. President George W. Bush. *State of the Union Address* January 29, 2002. C.f. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

¹² Park, John S. "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks". *The Washington Quarterly* 28:4 (Autumn 2005), p. 78. Statistics Canada. "Ethnic Origin – 2001 Census of Canada". January 21, 2003. The 2006 Census results on this issue will not be released until April 2008.

¹³ Statistics Canada. "Ethnic Origin – 2001 Census of Canada". January 21, 2003. The 2006 Census results on this issue will not be released until April 2008.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Zhang, Kenny. "Recognizing the Canadian Diaspora". *Canada Asia Commentary* 41 (March 2006). Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Retrieved from www.asiapacific.ca on March 27, 2007.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4. Zhang based his estimates on Statistics Canada emigration data.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ Exports to North Korea decreased by 19%. Based on statistics retrieved from Trade Data Online at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php on April 3, 2007.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Japan experienced a slight decrease of 0.6%. *Ibid.*

²² UN-Habitat. "Top twenty countries in terms of receipts of remittances and with respect to remittances as share of GDP: 2004 (as published in UN Secretary-General Report on international migration development. *General Assembly document A/60/871*)". *Additional Migration Statistics*. Available online at: <http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/Media/WHD%20Additional%20Statistics.pdf>

²³ Alberts, Sheldon. "Bush warns Canada could be a target of North Korean missiles". CanWest News Wire Feed. July 7, 2006. Retrieved from ProQuest on March 1, 2007.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Book Review

Generals Die in Bed

Charles Yale Harrison

Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein



A decade or so after the Great War, as the carnage and horror sank in slowly, writers began producing some of the great anti-war books of all time. All Quiet on the Western Front by Erich Maria Remarque was the German masterpiece, Robert Graves' Good-Bye to All That was one of the best of many British contributions to the genre, and in the United States volumes such as Johnny Got His Gun by Dalton Trumbo had huge sales.

There was not much anti-war literature published in Canada, however, but one volume, Charles Yale Harrison's Generals Die in Bed, which appeared in 1930, has stood the test of time. Re-issued this year in an inexpensive paperback, Harrison's book deserves to be read widely.

Born in Philadelphia in 1898, Harrison

grew up in Montreal and joined the Royal Montreal Regiment. He served in France, saw much action and suffered wounds on August 8, 1918, the beginning of the Hundred Days, and survived. After the war, he lived most of the rest of his life in New York City, making a living as a writer. His book is a novel, not autobiography, but clearly it is directly informed by his experiences.

The story he tells is stark, the prose spare and unadorned. A group of recruits, thrown together in Montreal, carouse and drink themselves into a stupor, sobering up just enough to be cheered to the echo by civilians as they march to Windsor Station. Soon they are in the trenches, abused by their officers: "Our captain, Clark, ... is an Imperial, an Englishman and glories in his authority." Not for long. In an attack soon after, Clark is shot in the back by one of the men he had tormented. If Harrison is to be believed "fragging" was not uncommon in the Canadian Corps.

So too was looting and the killing of prisoners. At Arras in April 1918, the city deserted by its inhabitants fearful of advancing German troops, the Canadians find the shops full, and go wild. Windows are smashed, food-stuffs, liquor and cigarettes are looted. "We climb through the window of a pretentious-

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looking dwelling. It is deserted. We prowl through the house. In the dining room the table is set for the next meal. There is no sign of disorder....We dump our sacks down...and begin to prepare the food....lobster salad, small French peas, bread and butter...great gulps of Sauternes.” Then the soldiers find the owner’s room. “Water is boiled and soon we are shaved and powdered with the late owner’s razor and talcum. We throw ourselves on the valanced beds and fall asleep.” Later, British Military Police come into Arras to restore order. “The police are our traditional enemies. We organize a volunteer defense corps,” and fire on them. No action, at least in Harrison’s account, is taken against the looters.

Nor is any taken against those, fired up by the German sinking of the Llandovery Castle, a hospital ship with a hundred Canadian medical officers and nurses among those on board, who slaughter surrendering enemy soldiers in the great advance on August 8, 1918. Harrison’s account is terrifying. His battalion Commanding Officer (“We like him. He has risen from the ranks.”) tells the troops that “I’m not saying for you not to take prisoners. That’s against international rules. All that I’m saying is that if you take any we’ll have to feed ‘em out of our rations....” The men draw the lesson: “We are to take no prisoners. We say this on all sides. It has become an unofficial order.”

Those unofficial orders are obeyed. The enemy try to surrender in their hundreds. “They are unarmed. They open their mouths wide as though they are shouting something of great importance. The rifle fire drowns out their words....There is a look of amazement in their faces as we shoot. We are firing point-blank now.”

Not surprisingly, the reaction to Harrison’s novel was harshly critical. General Sir Arthur Currie and General “Batty Mac” Macdonnell were outraged, and the reviews in Canada—though not elsewhere—were almost uniformly negative. Still, the book has lasted, been reprinted time and again, and it remains one of the best fictional accounts by a participant of the Canadian Corps at war.

There are many other novels on the Great War by Canadians. Any list is bound to be incomplete, but let me cite Timothy Findley’s The Wars, Frances Itani’s Deafening, Joseph Boyden’s Three Day Road, and Alan Cumyn’s Sojourners. All are first class and based on deep research. But none has the immediacy of Generals Die in Bed, a book that captures the soldiers’ language, attitudes, and possibly their actions in unsparing prose.

Generals Die in Bed by Charles Yale Harrison. Toronto: Annick Press, 2007.

**Presentation to the
STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE
By
General (Ret’d) Paul D. Manson
President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute
13 February, 2007**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Committee this morning.

Last year the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, of which I am President, published a monograph entitled “CREATING AN ACQUISITION MODEL THAT DELIVERS”. What I would like to do today is present some personal thoughts based on that work and

my other experiences over the years with the procurement of major systems for the Canadian Forces.

By way of establishing my credentials, I might mention at the outset that for the past 30 years I have been involved with defence procurement in one way or another. From 1977 to 1980 I was the Program Manager for the New Fighter Aircraft Program leading to the acquisi-

-tion of the CF-18 Hornet for the Air Force. As Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989 was of course intensely involved with numerous I was of course intensely involved with numerous capital equipment projects. Following retirement, as the CEO of a major Canadian aerospace company I saw the system in operation from the other side, so to speak, and during this period I served for a time as the Chairman of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada. And now, as the president of a think-tank on defence and national security, scarcely a day goes by without the important matter of defence procurement being raised in one way or another.

...without there being in this country an efficient and effective procurement process the system cannot do what is necessary for the military, the industry, or the government.

Let me begin this quick review by stating the obvious. Regardless of how great may be the military's requirement for new equipment and services, or how ready the industry may be to fulfill these needs, without there being in this country an efficient and effective procurement process the system cannot do what is necessary for the military, the industry, or the government. A major conclusion of our studies is that such a system simply does not exist in Canada today. This is the consequence of a gradual and barely perceptible degradation over the past several decades, to the point where it is largely dysfunctional at the present time.

Take, for example, the fact that fifteen years or more are typically required to bring a major new military system into operational service by the Canadian Forces. That is much too long, for reasons that are self-evident.

Our analysis of the causes of this inordinately long procurement cycle time has led us to conclude that multiple factors are at work here, and that they can be grouped into three main areas, namely within the Department of National Defence, in the interdepartmental bureaucracy, and at the political level. Let me say a few words about each.

First, within the Department of National Defence, over the years, and with the best of intentions, military and civilian staffs in their pursuit of perfection in defining military requirements became bogged down in an evolving internal process that churned out huge amounts of paper – in some cases literally thousands of pages of what amounted to detailed technical specifications. Your Committee is already aware of a dramatic change of philosophy in this regard, with the introduction of the concept of “performance-based requirements”. The Minister of National Defence spoke about this in his appearance before this Committee last week. It is a welcome change, not just from the industry's perspective, but also in that it greatly simplifies the staff work within DND, and it facilitates the important business of evaluating competing systems.

Another serious problem emerged within National Defence during the 1990s, the direct result of the huge manpower cuts to which that department was subjected. The number of qualified program management personnel available to staff major crown projects was severely reduced, with predictable results. Not only did the shortage of suitably skilled personnel contribute to an increase in procurement times, it also presented risks to the quality of program management, with possible adverse impacts on decision-making and program costs. The Department is still recovering from this. I understand that other government departments also suffer from a shortage of program management personnel having experience in major defence procurements.

This leads me to the second area of concern in regard to lengthy procurement times, which is the interdepartmental routine to which all major equipment programs are necessarily subjected. Gradually over the years we have seen the emergence of a complex and frustrating process within the federal bureaucracy. Many departments are involved. Typically, apart from DND, a major crown project will involve Public Works, Industry, the Treasury Board Secretariat, Finance, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Justice and perhaps other

departments. It goes without saying that consensus must be achieved before DND would dare to bring a given project before Ministers, who traditionally need little incentive to reject a big-ticket item when it is apparent that the bureaucrats “haven’t got their act together”. Reaching consensus can be excruciatingly difficult. Even getting senior officials from all of the participating departments together for a Senior Review Board meeting can take months to organize. All of this, of course, adds to the total program time.

Increasingly over the years Industrial Regional Benefits have become a critical element of major defence equipment programs, especially in cases where the Government must go outside of Canada for procurement. The mechanics of putting together a good IRB package at the bureaucratic level is difficult enough, but the real test comes when a given project moves into my third area of concern, which is the political arena. It is here that, regrettably, some of the most serious delays occur. In fact, just the prospect of running into difficulty over IRBs at the Cabinet level can force delays of months and even years.

Competing companies, eager to reap the huge influx of new business that can come from a defence contract, are not reluctant to play the IRB game. Furthermore, they know how sensitive the “Regional” element of Regional Industrial Benefits can be in this country, and they will play up this angle in the hope of inspiring support from regional ministers.

Inevitably, the Prime Minister and his colleagues around the Cabinet table have a solemn obligation to ensure that competing demands are reconciled in such a way that the men and women of the Armed Forces are provided with the right equipment, and in a timely fashion. In this regard it is my personal opinion that the greatest challenge facing the defence procurement system today is the alarming growth in IRB demands associated with the coming re-equipment of the Forces. A good example is the creation of rigid formulas such as the 100% Canadian Content Value requirement for the industrial benefit component of a given

contract. Competing companies face the almost impossible task of producing sufficient industrial work to comply with the 100% Canadian Content rule, while Canadian industry, for its part, simply doesn’t have the capacity to absorb the huge surge of tens of billions of dollars of high tech business that this rule calls for in the coming decades. To add to the burden, DND typically pays a premium of several percent to accommodate IRBs; this usually shows up as an increase in the purchase price of the equipment or service.

All of which is to say that the management of Industrial Regional Benefits has the potential to become a major barrier in the Government’s attempt to streamline the procurement process.

There is one other factor which always comes into play at the political level, and that, quite correctly, is affordability. In my experience, cabinet ministers don’t often challenge the professional judgment of the military as to which technical solution is best for the Canadian Forces. When it comes to deciding whether a proposed solution is affordable, however, the Cabinet must believe that the proposed expenditure is of a high enough priority to displace the countless other spending proposals before them, not just for the military, but also in such areas of health care, the environment and other social programs. When a decision is made to put off a given defence acquisition (and many budgetary reasons can be found for doing so), the Forces are compelled to extend the life of existing equipment, which can be very costly both in dollar and especially operational terms. Look, for example, at the sad case of the Maritime Helicopter. Twenty-seven years after the replacement program was initiated, the Sea King helicopter is still flying.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to summarize this admittedly cursory presentation by stating the obvious: that in these critical times, following decades of neglect, the re-equipment of the Canadian Forces must progress quickly and rationally, following a streamlined process that takes into account the needs of the military first and foremost, but also of a dynamic Canadian

industry, while always working in the best interests of the Canadian taxpayer.

I can say, optimistically, that there are encouraging signs that the process is getting back on track, but there is still much room for

improvement.

I sincerely hope that your own deliberations will contribute greatly to that important goal.



Her Majesty's Canadian Ship St John's conducts a diver rescue exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. Sgt Clark from the operations section is lowered from the ship's Sea King aircraft in order to recover one of the ship's divers.

Le Navire canadien de Sa Majesté St. John's tient un exercice de sauvetage des plongeurs dans la Méditerranée. Le sgt Clark, de la section des opérations, descend de l'hélicoptère Sea King du bord pour aller à la rescousse d'un des plongeurs du navire.

Photo by/par: MCpl Michel Durand, FIS Halifax

LIGNES DIRECTRICES POUR LE PRIX DU LIVRE DU 75^e ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA CAD

Énoncé général : La Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) marquera son 75^e anniversaire par un prix du livre. Le prix reconnaîtra l'auteur/e canadien/ne dont on aura jugé qu'il/elle a le plus contribué à faire mieux comprendre par le grand public les questions de politique étrangère canadienne, de sécurité nationale et de défense pendant le dernier quart de siècle.

Admissibilité :

- L'auteur doit être citoyen canadien ou avoir été canadien au moment de la publication.
- Les ouvrages doivent avoir été publiés en français ou en anglais, au Canada, ou avoir été réimprimés pour publication canadienne pendant la période d'admissibilité, du 1^{er} octobre 1982 au 30 septembre 2007.
- Les ouvrages publiés comprennent, mais sans s'y limiter : des compilations d'essais, des livres d'histoire, des biographies, des mémoires, des manuels, des études ou des thèses.

Sélection :

La décision du comité de sélection sera finale et à sa seule discrétion ;

- Les oeuvres d'auteurs conjoints peuvent être considérées.
- Le prix peut être basé sur un seul titre ou pour un ensemble d'ouvrages.
- Dans le cas de nouveaux auteurs, la signification potentielle de l'ouvrage peut être jugée sur la base de la qualité de la recherche, de l'analyse et de la présentation, plutôt que sur son impact historique (comme cela peut s'appliquer dans le cas de travaux plus anciens).

Prix :

La présentation se fera au moment de l'assemblée générale annuelle 2008 de la CAD.

L'auteur choisi recevra :

- Le prix du livre du 75^e anniversaire de la CAD.
- Un prix de 5 000,00 \$ en argent.
- Des mentions supplémentaires qui peuvent être accordées à la discrétion des juges.

Mises en candidature :

- Les mises en candidature peuvent être présentées formellement par n'importe quelle association membre de la CAD (Voir www.cda-cdai.ca pour l'information contact) et par tout autre citoyen canadien, étudiant, auteur, éditeur et autres, par l'entremise d'une des associations membres de la CAD ou directement aux bureaux nationaux de la CAD (voir l'adresse ci-dessous).
- À l'exception du/des récipiendaire(s) sélectionné(s), les auteurs de candidatures et les candidats ne seront pas informés de leur statut ou de leur classement.
- **La date limite pour les candidatures est le 15 octobre 2007.**
- Les candidatures formelles seront adressées à :

PRIX DU LIVRE DU 75^e ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA CAD

Conférence des associations de la défense

222, rue Somerset Ouest, Pièce 400B, Ottawa, ON K2P 2G3

GUIDELINES FOR THE CDA 75th ANNIVERSARY BOOK PRIZE

General Statement: The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) will mark its 75th year by an Anniversary Book Prize. The Prize will recognize the Canadian author deemed to have made the most significant positive contribution to the general public's understanding of Canadian foreign policy, national security and defence during the past quarter century.

Eligibility:

- The author must be a Canadian citizen or must have been Canadian at the time of publication.
- Works must have been published in French or English in Canada, or have been reprinted for Canadian publication during the eligibility period 1 October 1982 to 30 September 2007.
- Published works may include, but are not limited to: compilations of essays, histories, biographies, memoirs, textbooks, studies, or theses.

Selection:

The Selection Committee's decision will be final, and at their sole discretion;

- Jointly authored work(s) may be considered.
- The prize may be based on a single title or for a body of work.
- In the case of new authors, the work's potential significance may be judged based on the quality of research, analysis and presentation, rather than on its historical impact (as may apply in the case of earlier works).

Prize:

The presentation will be at the time of the 2008 CDA Annual General Meeting.

The selected author will receive:

- The CDA 75th Anniversary Book Prize.
- A cash award of \$5,000.00
- Additional honours that may be granted at the judges' discretion.

Nominations:

- Nominations may be made formally by any of the CDA Member Associations (See www.cda-cdai.ca for contact information) and by any other Canadian citizen, student, author, publisher and others through one of the CDA Member Associations or directly to CDA National Office (See address below).
- With the exception of the selected recipient(s), nominators and nominees will not be advised of their status or placement.
- **Deadline for nominations is 15 October 2007.**
- Formal nominations should be addressed to:

CDA 75th ANNIVERSARY BOOK PRIZE

Conference of Defence Associations

222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B

Ottawa, ON K2P 2G3

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