



ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

Autumn / Automne 2007

Volume 12, Number 2



CF photo by / Photo FC par Master Corporal / Caporal chef Kevin Paul

- Afghanistan - Looking Beyond February 2009
- Le soldat capteur - l'arme secrète de la rotation canadienne 0703 en Afghanistan
- Le Québec, l'opinion publique canadienne et la mission en Afghanistan
- The Arctic Factor in Russia-Canada Relations

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) provides public information services on national security and defence issues by conducting studies, seminars and symposia, and publishing their results in print. CDAI is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose ability to prosecute its mandate depends on private donations.



L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense (ICAD) fournit les services d'information publiques au sujet des questions de la sécurité et de la défense. Il remplit cette tâche par des études, des séminaires, et des symposia et en publiant les résultats. L'ICAD est un organisme caritatif et non partisan dont la capacité à s'acquitter de son mandat dépend de dons privés.

The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDAI.

Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'ICAD.

Officers / Officiers

President/Président.....General Paul D. Manson (Ret'd), OC, CMM, CD
Vice-President / Vice-Président.....Dr. John Scott Cowan, BSc, MSc, PhD
Executive Director/Directeur exécutif.....Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD
Secretary-Treasurer/Secrétaire-trésorier.....Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord D. Metcalfe, CD

CDAI Board of Directors

Mr. Keith Ambachtsheer
Dr. David Anido
Lgén (Ret) Charles H. Belzile
Mrs. Kathleen Birchall
Mr. Thomas Caldwell
LGen (Ret'd) Bill Carr
Gen (Ret'd) John de Chastelain
The Hon Barnett Danson
RAdm (Ret'd) Gordon Edwards
Mr. Pete Fisher
RAdm (Ret'd) Roger Girouard
Dr. Frederic Jackman
MGen (Ret'd) Reg Lewis
LGen (Ret'd) Donald (Pablo) Mackenzie
The Hon Roy Maclaren
Lgén (Ret) Michel Maisonneuve
Mr. John Noble
The Hon Hugh Segal, Senator
RAdm (Ret'd) Ken Summers
Mr. John Watts

Adm (Ret'd) John Anderson
Gén (Ret) Maurice J.M. Baril
Dr. David Bercuson
Dr. Douglas Bland
Mr. Mel Cappe
Dr. Jim Carruthers
Dr. John Scott Cowan
Mr. Dan Donovan
Lgén (Ret) Richard J. Evraire
Col, the Hon John Fraser
Dr. Jack Granatstein
Mgén (Ret) Claude Lafrance
Col (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald
MGen (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie
BGen (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara
Gen (Ret'd) Paul Manson (Chairman)
The Hon David Pratt
Col (Ret'd) Ben Shapiro
LGen (Ret'd) Jack Vance
Gen (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers

Cover Photo: *An Afghan National Army soldier (foreground) and Canadian Forces Warrant Officer Stefan Meinert of the Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) scan opposite sides of the road on a patrol near the Canadian Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Ma'sum Ghar, Afghanistan.*

Photo de la page couverture : *Un soldat de l'armée nationale afghane (avant-plan) et l'adjudant des Forces canadiennes, Stefan Meinart, de l'équipe de liaison et de mentorat opérationnel (ELMO) examinent chaque côté de la route lors d'une patrouille près de la base d'opérations avancée canadienne (BOA) de Ma'sum Ghar (Afghanistan).*



Donor Patrons of CDAI

Mr. Keith P. Ambachtsheer

Mr. Thomas S. Caldwell

Dr. John S. Cowan

Defence Associations National Network

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara

Senator Hugh D. Segal

Companions of CDAI

Colonel (Ret'd) J.H.C. Clarry

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) James S. Cox

Mr. Peter A. Fisher

Major-général (Ret) J.P. Robert LaRose

Colonel (Ret'd) Ben Shapiro

Mr. Robert G. Tucker

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) J. Roy Weir

Officer Level Donors to CDAI

Admiral (Ret'd) John A. Anderson

Captain Herbert G. Brookhouse

Honourary Colonel James W. Burns

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) James I. Hanson

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Garth R.S. Husk

Colonel (Ret'd), the Honourable R.A. Jacobson

Major-General (Ret'd) Reginald W. Lewis

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Donald C. (Pablo) MacKenzie

Lieutenant-Colonel Markus C. Martin

Colonel (Ret'd) D. Bruce McGibbon

Captain (N) (Ret'd) Charles M. Nicholson

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) T.H.M. Silva

Major (Ret'd) Mirosław K. Szulc

Donateurs Patrons de l'ICAD

Mrs. Kathleen Birchall

Colonel (Ret'd) John Catto

Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard J. Evraire

Jackman Foundation (1964)

Mr. David E. Scott

Colonel (Ret'd) J.H. Turnbull

Compagnons de l'ICAD

Mr. M.G. Corbett

Mr. John A. Eckersley

Colonel the Honourable John A. Fraser

M. Bruce Poulin

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Ernest Skutezky

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Jack Vance

Donateurs de l'ICAD - niveau d'officier

Lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile

Mr. Paul J. Brunelle

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Bill Carr

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Ralph Hennessy

Mr. I.D. Isbester

Mr. Albert Kranenburg

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian S. MacDonald

General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson

Colonel (Ret'd) W.J. McCullough

Colonel (Ret'd) Conrad A. Namiesniowski

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) André Richard

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) David L. Stinson

Mr. W.H. Young

From the Executive Director/ Le Mot du Directeur Exécutif

Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin.....1

Afghanistan - Looking Beyond February 2009

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson.....6

Le soldat capteur - l'arme secrète de la rotation canadienne 0703 en Afghanistan

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret) Rémi Landry.....7

Reflections on Canada's First 18 months in Kandahar and Prospects for the Future

Dr. Lee Windsor.....10

Le Québec, l'opinion publique canadienne, et la mission en Afghanistan

Monsieur Stéphane Roussel.....14

Vimy Paper 2, Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic, in Review

Dr. William (Bill) A. Adams.....17

Canadian Government Policy on Northern Sovereignty - Where is the White Paper?

Colonel (Ret'd) Murray Lee.....19

The Arctic Factor in Russia-Canada Relations

Mr. Nikolay G. Babich.....21

Canadian Military Strategy in Distress

Commodore (Ret'd) Ian Parker.....24

Lessons Learned at the Western Front

Ms. Elizabeth Sneyd.....28

***Book Review: A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of
General H.D.G. Crerar***

J.L. Granatstein.....30

FROM THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin



In the previous edition of *ON TRACK*, the President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, asked for feedback on the appearance and content of the journal. The responses have been universally positive. While some of the replies that we received suggested that the stature of *ON TRACK* has grown to the extent that the inclusion of advertising in the journal would be financially rewarding, the majority of the others did not make such a recommendation. While we remain open to suggestions for improvement in the appearance of the journal and in the quality of its content, we will continue to exclude advertising from *ON TRACK*.

We are pleased to feature in this edition of *ON TRACK* articles that are reflective of global events that are challenging Canada and the Canadian Forces, and that can have an influence on federal government policy.

While Canadian society, including the media, is debating the merits of Canada's involvement in bringing peace and security to Afghanistan, the federal government is refocusing the elements of its '3D' mission that encompasses diplomacy, development and defence. The recalibration of Canada's mission to training and mentoring the nascent Afghan National Army to shoulder more of the burden of bringing peace and security to Afghanistan will produce long-term, if not immediate, benefits to that country. General (Ret'd) Manson has written that there are other ways that Canadians might contribute, post-2009, to the rebuilding of Afghanistan, in 'Afghanistan – Looking Beyond February 2009'.

'Le soldat capteur – l'arme secrète de la rotation canadienne 0703 en Afghanistan' is written by our friend, associate, and fellow officer of the Royal 22e Régiment, Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Rémi Landry. His article is a review of the main training themes that dominated the preparation of the fourth Canadian rotation in Kandahar. The article stresses the ability and the rapidity of the present system to incorporate into training the lessons learned by the previous rotation. The author also introduces one of the pillars that accompany the new philosophy on the 3 Block War environment in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-Colonel

MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR
EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin

Dans le dernier numéro de *ON TRACK*, le président de l'Institut de la conférence des associations de défense, le Général (ret.) Paul Manson avait demandé aux lecteurs de nous faire part de leurs commentaires sur l'apparence et le contenu du journal. Les réponses ont été universellement positives. La qualité des articles qui paraissent dans *ON TRACK* a été exceptionnelle, et l'honneur rejaillit sur nos collaborateurs. Si certaines des réponses que nous avons reçues suggèrent que la stature de *ON TRACK* a pris une telle ampleur que la publication d'annonces dans le journal serait financièrement bénéfique, la majorité des autres s'est abstenue de faire une telle recommandation. Nous restons ouverts aux suggestions concernant l'amélioration de l'apparence du journal et de la qualité de son contenu. Nous restons également ouverts aux contributions de nos lecteurs.

Nous sommes heureux de présenter, dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*, des articles qui reflètent les événements mondiaux qui représentent des défis pour le Canada et les Forces canadiennes et qui peuvent avoir une influence sur la politique du gouvernement fédéral.

Pendant que la société canadienne, médias y compris, est en train de débattre des mérites de l'implication du Canada dans l'apport de la paix et de la sécurité en Afghanistan, le gouvernement fédéral refocalise les éléments de sa mission « 3D », qui porte sur la diplomatie, le développement et la défense. La recalibration de la mission du Canada des opérations de combat sur la formation et le mentorat de l'armée nationale afghane naissante va produire des bénéfices à long terme, sinon immédiats, pour ce pays. Dans son article « Afghanistan – Looking Beyond February 2009 », le Général (ret.) Manson a écrit qu'il y a d'autres façons possibles de contribuer pour les Canadiens, après 2009, à la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan.

« Le soldat capteur – l'arme secrète de la rotation canadienne 0703 en Afghanistan » est dû à la plume de notre ami et associé, et collègue officier du Royal 22e Régiment, le Lieutenant-colonel (ret.) Rémi Landry. Son article est un examen des principaux thèmes d'entraînement qui ont dominé la préparation de la quatrième rotation canadienne à Kandahar. L'article souligne la capacité et la rapidité du système actuel d'intégrer à la formation les leçons apprises par la rotation précédente. L'auteur présente également un des piliers qui accompagnent la nouvelle philosophie « environnement de guerre à 3 blocs » en Afghanistan. Le

(Ret'd) Landry is an Associate Researcher at the Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale, Université de Montréal.

The CDA Institute, over the years, has provided DND-funded Security and Defence Forum (SDF) interns the opportunity to further their scholarship, knowledge and careers in the fields of defence and security. We are very pleased to include a significant report on Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan, written by Dr. Lee Windsor, a former CDA Institute intern, is the Deputy Director of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick.

Monsieur Stéphane Roussel has written a paper that presents a view of the public perceptions of the Québécois on issues of national defence. He presents a discussion of what he sees as indications that tend to show that Québécois attitudes toward defence and security issues have changed over the past decades. Although we do not necessarily agree with Monsieur Roussel's conclusion that the current Afghan mission should end in February 2009, we, however, believe that readers should have an opportunity to be aware of a broad range of opinions on the issue.

Prime Minister Harper's commitment to the Arctic has raised the profile of the Arctic nationally and made it an element in the on-going debate over national priorities. We are pleased that Dr. Bill Adams, Chair, Defence Science Advisory Board, has provided us with a timely review of Vimy Paper 2, 'Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic', which the CDA Institute released in February. We believe that Arctic concerns will remain a topic of interest for Canadians and our circumpolar neighbours for the foreseeable future.

While Colonel (Ret'd) Murray Lee notes that the federal government has announced initiatives to support this country's sovereignty in the high Arctic, he writes that there is a requirement for a White Paper on Northern Sovereignty in 'Canadian Government Policy on Northern Sovereignty – Where is the White Paper?' Colonel Lee is President of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

It is worthwhile for us to be aware of other nations' perspectives on the development of the Arctic region, and in this light we are pleased to include the article, 'The Arctic Factor in Russia-Canada Relations', written by Mr. Nikolay G. Babich, Deputy Director Icebreaking Fleet Department, Ice Operations, of the Murmansk Shipping Company. Our readers might be interested to learn of the

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.) Landry est associé de recherche auprès du Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale de l'Université de Montréal.

Au cours des années, l'Institut de la CAD a offert aux stagiaires du « Forum sur la sécurité et la défense (FSD) » financé par le MDN la possibilité de poursuivre leurs études, d'approfondir leurs connaissances et de mousser leurs carrières dans des questions de défense et de sécurité. Nous sommes très heureux d'inclure un important rapport sur les opérations des Forces canadiennes en Afghanistan, rédigé par M. Lee Windsor, directeur adjoint du « Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society », de l'Université du Nouveau-Brunswick, et ancien stagiaire à l'Institut de la CAD.

Monsieur Stéphane Roussel est l'auteur d'un article qui présente un aperçu des perceptions du public québécois sur les questions de défense nationale. Il présente une discussion de ce qu'il voit comme des indications qui ont tendance à montrer que les attitudes des Québécois envers les questions de défense et de sécurité ont changé ces dernières décennies. Même si nous ne sommes pas nécessairement d'accord avec la conclusion de Stéphane à l'effet que la mission actuelle en Afghanistan devrait prendre fin en février 2009, nous croyons cependant que les lecteurs devraient avoir l'occasion d'être sensibilisés à une large gamme d'opinions.

L'engagement du Premier ministre Harper envers l'Arctique a relevé le profil de cet océan dans l'ensemble du pays et en a fait un élément du présent débat sur les priorités nationales. Nous sommes heureux de ce que M. Bill Adams, président du Conseil consultatif sur les sciences appliquées à la Défense, nous ait offert une critique à propos du Cahier Vimy 2 intitulé « Les besoins en matière de défense dans l'Arctique canadien », publié par l'Institut de la CDA en février. Nous croyons que les préoccupations concernant l'Arctique vont demeurer un sujet d'intérêt pour les Canadiens et nos voisins circumpolaires pour un avenir prévisible.

Alors que le Colonel (ret.) Murray Lee note que le gouvernement fédéral a annoncé des initiatives visant à soutenir la souveraineté du pays dans l'Extrême-Arctique, il écrit, dans « Canadian Government Policy on Northern Sovereignty – Where is the White Paper? », qu'il faut un livre blanc sur la souveraineté. Le Colonel Lee est président du « Royal United Services Institute », de la Nouvelle-Écosse.

Il nous est utile de nous sensibiliser aux points de vue d'autres nations sur le développement de la région de l'Arctique et, sous cet angle, nous sommes heureux d'inclure l'article « The Arctic Factor in Russia-Canada Relations », de M. Nicolai G. Babich, directeur adjoint du service de la flotte de brise-glace, opérations de la glace, de la Murmansk Shipping Company. Nos lecteurs seront



Warrant Officer Lori Coady, a member of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) speaks with local youth during a patrol by KPRT Military Police Company, Civil-Military Cooperation, Civilian Police, and Engineer teams into the outlying areas of the City of Kandahar to check on KPRT-sponsored projects.

The KPRT is an integral part of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan, which is Canada's military contribution to Afghanistan. DND photo by Sergeant Craig Fiander

L'adjudant Lori Coady, membre de l'équipe de coopération civilo-militaire de l'Équipe provinciale de reconstruction de Kandahar (l'ÉPRK), s'entretient avec des jeunes Afghans pendant une patrouille effectuée par des équipes de la compagnie de police militaire de l'ÉPRK, de coopération civilo-militaire, de police civile, et du Génie dans les zones voisines de la ville de Kandahar visant à contrôler les progrès des projets parrainés par l'ÉPRK.

L'ÉPRK fait partie intégrante de la Force opérationnelle interarmées en Afghanistan, qui constitue la contribution militaire canadienne aux efforts déployés en Afghanistan. Photo DDN par Sergent Craig Fiander

Russians' view of the climate change phenomenon.

Commodore (Ret'd) Ian Parker posits in 'Canadian Military Strategy in Distress' that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces are failing to develop a broader strategy for the transformation of the CF. He views the current defence policy as land-centric, limiting the Forces' capability to provide for an adequate defence and security of Canada. Commodore (Ret'd) Parker proposes, instead, a defence policy based on our national interests that will lead to a defence plan which would explain how the defence policy was achieved.

On Easter Monday, 90 years ago, Canada's soldiers fought in the Battle of Vimy Ridge and dislodged the German troops. The Canadians' victory and its cost

peut-être intéressés à apprendre comment les Russes voient le phénomène du changement climatique.

Le Commodore (ret.) Ian Parker pose le postulat, dans « Canadian Military Strategy in Distress », que le Ministère de la Défense nationale et les Forces canadiennes négligent d'élaborer une stratégie plus large pour la transformation des FC. Il voit la politique de défense actuelle comme centré sur l'armée de terre, ce qui limite la capacité des Forces à offrir une défense et une sécurité adéquates du Canada. Le Commodore (ret.) Parker propose, à la place, une politique de défense basée sur nos intérêts nationaux, qui va mener à un plan de défense qui expliquerait comment la politique de défense a été réalisée.

Le lundi de Pâques, il y a 90 ans, les soldats du Canada ont fait la bataille de la Crête de Vimy et ont délogé les troupes allemandes. La victoire canadienne,

ON TRACK

of lives lost brought our young nation much acclaim. The CDA Institute's former Project Officer and SDF intern, Ms. Elizabeth Sneyd, made the pilgrimage to Vimy for the re-dedication of the Canadian National Vimy Memorial. In 'Lessons Learned at the Western Front' Elizabeth relates for us the experience of her pilgrimage.

We are, again, pleased to include as an important feature for *ON TRACK* a book review provided by Jack Granatstein. To Canadians today, all those who know nothing of the Second World War, Harry Crerar is one figure totally absent from our history. Dr. Granatstein reviews Paul Dickson's biography, *A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.G.D. Crerar*, noting that Dickson's work aims to address this gross imbalance. Dr. Granatstein's review provides us with an incentive to read about the life of one of the best generals that served Canada during the Second World War.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA-CAI has been and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence interests:

- As a strong supporter in the work of the members of the Canadian Forces, we appreciate the sacrifices that members' families face when spouses and parents are away from home on duty. On 29 June, the CDA was pleased to co-sponsor a fundraiser BBQ in support of the Military Families Fund, recently established by the Chief of the Defence Staff. The BBQ was hosted by Ottawa radio station 'The Jewel'. The event was well attended and raised some \$12,000. Photographs taken at the event can be viewed at <http://www.985thejewel.com/RecruittheNationFundraiserBBQ/index.html>.

- The CDAI will be hosting its 10th annual graduate student symposium on 26-27 October at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, in partnership with Queen's University, the War Studies Program at RMC, and the DND-funded SDF programme. The symposium will highlight the work of graduate students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally, and cash prizes will be awarded for the top three papers presented. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen links between civilian and military educational institutions. Keynote speakers will be Dr. J.L. Granatstein, eminent Canadian military historian, and Major-General

avec le coût des pertes de vies, a apporté beaucoup d'acclamations à notre jeune nation. L'ancienne agente de projets et stagiaire FSD de l'Institut de la CAD, Mme Elizabeth Sneyd, a fait le pèlerinage de Vimy pour la re-dédicace du Monument commémoratif du Canada à Vimy. Dans son article « Lessons Learned at the Western Front », Elizabeth nous relate l'expérience de son pèlerinage.

Il nous fait à nouveau plaisir d'inclure comme un des éléments importants de *ONTRACK* une critique de livre due à Jack Granatstein. Pour les Canadiens d'aujourd'hui, tous ceux qui ne savent rien de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Harry Crerar est un personnage totalement absent de notre histoire. M. Granatstein présente la biographie de Paul Dickson, « *A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.G.D. Crerar* », en notant que le travail de M. Dickson vise à redresser ce grand déséquilibre. La critique de M. Granatstein nous incite à lire la biographie de l'un des meilleurs généraux qui ont servi le Canada pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Mis à part *ON TRACK*, la CAD-ICAD a été impliquée et le sera dans de nombreuses initiatives participant à la promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité et de défense :

- Comme supporter indéfectible du travail des membres de Forces canadiennes, nous apprécions les sacrifices que les familles des membres font quand des conjoints et des parents sont éloignés de la maison en service. Le 29 juin, la CDA a eu le plaisir de co-commanditer un BBQ de levée de fonds qui voulait soutenir le « Fonds des familles des militaires » récemment créé par le Chef de l'État-major de la Défense. Le BBQ était sous les auspices du poste de radio « The Jewel », d'Ottawa. L'activité a connu un beau succès et a pu recueillir quelque 12 000 \$. On peut même voir les photographies prises à cette occasion à l'adresse <http://www.985thejewel.com/RecruittheNationFundraiserBBQ/index.html>.

- L'ICAD sera l'hôte du 10^e symposium des étudiants diplômés, les 26 et 27 octobre, au Collège militaire royal du Canada, de Kingston, en association avec l'Université Queen's, le programme Études sur la conduite de la guerre du CMR et du programme FSD financé par le MDN. Le symposium mettra en lumière le travail des étudiants diplômés des universités civiles et militaires du Canada et du niveau international, et des prix en argent vont être remis pour couronner les trois meilleures études présentées. Le but du symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires. Les conférenciers invités seront M.

Daniel Gosselin, Commandant of the Canadian Defence Academy. Anyone with an interest in defence, national and international issues is welcome to attend.

Readers will be pleased to learn that General Raymond R. Henault has been selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2007. General Henault is an honourable Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career in the Canadian Forces and on the international stage as Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, has graciously agreed to present the award on 16 November, at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum.

I wish to take this opportunity to welcome our new DND-sponsored SDF Intern, Mr. Arnav Manchanda. Before joining the CDA Institute, Arnav, earlier this year, undertook an internship with the Department of Political Affairs at United Nations Headquarters, in New York, and completed his Master's degree in Political Science from McGill University.

There still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the CF, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available on line at <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>.

Thank you.

J.L. Granatstein, éminent historien militaire canadien, et le Major-Général Daniel Gosselin, commandant de l'Académie canadienne de la Défense. Toutes les personnes qui s'intéressent à la défense, et aux questions nationales et internationales, sont bienvenues.

Les lecteurs seront heureux de savoir que le Général Raymond R. Henault a été choisi comme récipiendaire du Prix Vimy 2007. Le Général Henault est un Canadien honorable qui a fait preuve des standards les plus élevés de leadership tout au long de sa carrière dans les Forces canadiennes et sur la scène internationale comme président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN. Son Excellence la Très Honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure-générale du Canada, a gracieusement accepté de présenter le prix, le 16 novembre, lors d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Je désire saisir cette occasion pour souhaiter la bienvenue à notre nouveau stagiaire FSD commandité par le MDN, M. Arnav Manchanda. Avant de se joindre à l'Institut de la CAD, plus tôt cette année, Arnav a entrepris un stage au Département des affaires politiques du Quartier général des Nations Unies, à New-York, et a complété sa maîtrise en sciences politiques à l'Université McGill.

Au cours de l'année écoulée, le gouvernement fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à cette initiative, il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés des grands enjeux des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et du déficit continu dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins de longue date de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD va cependant continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs de niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur de l'Institut, je vous demanderais de le devenir et de recruter un ami. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut se les procurer en ligne à l'adresse <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>.

Merci.

Afghanistan – Looking Beyond February 2009

by General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson



Stephen Harper's Conservative government is feeling boxed in these days by the unprecedented deadline imposed by parliament on Canada's Afghanistan mission. With casualties dominating the news and public support wavering, the government must balance its minority position against the need to do the right thing in Afghanistan beyond the February '09 deadline.

Recent statements by the Prime Minister indicate that a political compromise is being sought. Suggesting that he would seek parliamentary support for a revised mission, the PM has opened the door for what could be a major change in direction.

With an extension of the current mandate now unlikely, the government has several available options, ranging from a complete withdrawal at one extreme to a modestly reduced presence on both the military and diplomatic fronts at the other.

A total pullout, however, can be set aside at the outset. The consequences of handing the Taliban a huge victory both in military and political terms, of abandoning the Afghan people, of making our country look like the bad boy of the International Security Assistance Force (however unjustly), would be so severe that a decision along these lines seems quite unlikely. The only possible justification for a complete pullout in 2009 would be an assurance that one or more ISAF nations would fill in the vacuum left in Kandahar by Canada's departure.

Kandahar, after all, is the key strategic area in the struggle for Afghanistan, and its loss to the Taliban would have the most serious consequences. Unfortunately, the prospect of a NATO or ISAF backfill is slight.

So what are the practical possibilities?

It has been suggested that Canadian troops might be given a welcome respite from their heavy security duties by moving them to the relatively peaceful north, but that again begs the question about who would take over Canada's role in Kandahar.

Both Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor and Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier, correctly recognizing that increased security must be established in the Kandahar region if development initiatives are

to make substantial headway, have recently indicated that the defence staff is looking at a plan that would involve a continued but reduced military presence, while contributing to the build-up of security in the region.

Most observers agree that the long term solution to the problem of the Taliban lies in the development of the fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) into an effective security force. General Hillier suggests that a reduced Canadian military contingent could exercise great leverage by training and mentoring the ANA in Kandahar Province. This builds on Canadian mentoring successes to date. Our soldiers are good at helping their ANA allies, and their efforts have already shown impressive results. The Afghan soldiers are quick to learn.

Increasingly, the Afghan army would move to the "front", so to speak, in the war against the insurgents, and the Canadians would ease back accordingly. By the end of the summer there will be three battalions of ANA troops in Kandahar Province and two more by year-end, bringing them up to a strength of 5000, out of a total ANA complement of 30,000 across Afghanistan.

The net impact on the Canadian mission would be a reduced military presence, less direct contact with the Taliban, fewer casualties, reduced cost, yet good value for the investment. Perhaps, also, if the plan is effective, it could be a model for the rest of the ISAF.

This plan is not a panacea. There would remain an urgent need for more NATO troops in Kandahar, and the Canadian government must not give up its urgent call for increased operational participation by allied nations. Beyond "boots on the ground", there is a particular requirement for medium lift helicopter support, currently available in several NATO nations, yet not deployed to Afghanistan in sufficient numbers.

There are other ways that Canadians might contribute, post-2009, to the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Development aid can be increased and more efficiently applied at the local level. The Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul, until recently quite unheralded, has been remarkably successful in helping the Karzai administration build the machinery of government at the federal level. The SAT concept could be exploited to good effect in Kandahar Province, making use of Canadian civil servants as much as possible. (Until now, the SAT has been made up of military officers.) Training of the Afghan National Police by Canadians could also be greatly expanded.

The Whole of Government approach to Afghanistan, given a real boost by the Prime Minister's

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff. He is currently President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute

appointment of David Mulroney as the interdepartmental coordinator for Afghanistan, is the way to go as the government searches for a new mission structure beyond the current mandate. Communicating the Afghanistan story effectively to the Canadian public must be a high priority in the months and years ahead.

There is an urgent need for an early decision on the new mandate. Military planning alone needs to get underway months in advance. The political process will be complicated, given the call for a parliamentary consensus. All of this suggests that a parliamentary debate should take place when the House reconvenes this autumn. Once

a decision is made, Canada must then quickly inform NATO of its intentions post-2009, so that corresponding adjustments can be made to the Alliance's grand strategy for Afghanistan.

The importance of the coming decision should not be lost on Canadians. Maintaining some form of effective presence in the struggle to prevent the return of a brutal Taliban regime is very much in the Canadian national interest. Now is not the time to write off Canada's large and painful human and material investment, undoing all of the substantial progress that has been made to date.

Saving Afghanistan is a long term undertaking, and Canada needs to remain a part of it.

Le soldat capteur – l'arme secrète de la rotation canadienne 0703 en Afghanistan

par Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Rémi Landry, OMM, CD

En août 2006, alors invité pour une parade de changement de commandement au 5^e Groupe brigade mécanisé à la BFC de Valcartier, j'en profitais pour me renseigner sur les composantes de la montée en puissance de la rotation 0703 d'août 2007. Étant appelé à commenter les activités militaires auprès des médias québécois, je tenais à me familiariser avec le processus de planification qui devait garantir l'optimisation des ressources disponibles, tout en offrant au personnel l'encadrement requis afin de garantir leur sécurité et le succès de l'opération.

Les rencontres furent des plus révélatrices, constatant avec étonnement que les calendriers d'entraînement étaient déjà complétés, les stratégies de regroupement publiées et le processus de sélection du personnel miliciens en marche. Je réalisais alors l'ampleur de la complexité que l'environnement opérationnel afghan imposait aux divers états majors; un effort de coordination hors du commun qui devait continuellement être refait, au fur et à mesure que les détails se précisaient. Quant aux troupes désignées, leurs préparations individuelles étaient déjà en marche sous la gouverne de leur unité d'appartenance.

Je constatais aussi que l'effort requis, pour la montée en puissance d'une telle force, nécessitait la mise en commun des ressources de toutes les composantes des

Forces terrestres et de l'appuie des autres éléments des Forces canadiennes. L'ensemble des ressources du Secteur du Québec allait être mobilisées sur près de deux ans afin de préparer des effectifs de plus de 2300 militaires et de supporter leur déploiement de juillet à février 2008.

Avant de poursuivre, je tiens à préciser mon intention. Certes, je pourrais chercher à décrire les moindres détails de cette montée en puissance. Mais ce n'est pas mon désir. D'ailleurs, je ne me sens pas à la hauteur d'une telle tâche étant assuré que les membres de la Rotation 0703 seront le faire avec plus de précision et sans doute avec un vocabulaire beaucoup plus adapté à leur réalité. Mon objectif est plutôt de partager ma réflexion sur les raisons que j'ai de croire que cette rotation a su pleinement bénéficier des rotations précédentes et innover dans la préparation de ses troupes. J'ai de plus constaté qu'elle possède la cohésion requise pour ce type d'opération. Ceci malgré la gymnastique, devenue traditionnelle, qui est de constituer les composantes opérationnelles à partir d'un regroupement temporaire d'effectifs en provenance de diverses unités.

Exercice Réflexe Rapide- Fort Bliss Texas – 23 janvier au 3 mars 2007

Le lieu et la nature de cet exercice mettent bien en perspective la dynamique de changement qui a accompagné la préparation des troupes du Secteur du Québec. En effet, lors de ma visite en août on prévoyait un déploiement au

Le Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.) Rémi Landry est associé de recherche auprès du Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale de l'Université de Montréal

Fort Carson au Kansas, sans la contribution d'un escadron de chars du Lord Strathcona's Horse et sans la présence d'une densité accrue à Kandahar des Forces nationales afghanes. Les annonces du gouvernement d'augmenter la capacité opérationnelle de la mission allaient changer l'orientation de l'entraînement, tout en affectant l'élément de support national et l'ensemble de la structure de commandement.

qui se sont dégagées de cette période de prédéploiement et qui contribuent à maintenir un niveau de professionnalisme des plus élevés au sein des troupes déployées. Préparé des soldats, dans le présent contexte international et national de l'Afghanistan, doit avoir comme objectif de faire de chacun d'eux un élément de transformation dans un environnement où l'ordre et la sécurité ne sont qu'embryonnaires.



On peut voir sur cette photo une section démontée utilisant la protection et le tir direct d'un char afin de couvrir leur avance.

En août 2006, le besoin de s'entraîner sur une base américaine, se voulait de familiariser les troupes à un climat et une géographie similaires à ceux de l'Afghanistan en période estivale, alors que le Québec serait sous la neige. Fort Carson devait aussi offrir un milieu naturel propice à la simulation des conditions qu'exigent la conduite des nombreux protocoles opérationnels à l'intérieur de la FIAS. Il fallait aussi disposer d'un habitat qui présentait les mêmes conditions de vie austère des camps opérationnels avancés (les fameux *FOB*), à partir desquels les troupes du groupement tactique allaient opérer en théâtre. De plus, on cherchait des installations d'entraînement qui représentaient bien l'environnement rural et urbain afghans.

J'aimerais maintenant commenter les thématiques

Les thématiques qui ont dominé la philosophie de l'entraînement préparatoire

À la fin de juin 2007, j'ai eu de nouveau l'occasion de rencontrer les responsables du cycle d'entraînement. De nos discussions, j'ai retenu trois thèmes qui sont indicateurs de la qualité du personnel, de leur degré de préparation, et des ressources disponibles afin de combattre les spécificités de l'environnement opérationnel de Kandahar.

Un soldat capteur

De nos jours, les expressions militaires, tel que la guerre à trois volets, se retrouvent dans les propos des analystes militaires. En effet, il a bien fallu construire un nouveau vocabulaire afin d'illustrer les exigences des nouveaux types de conflits armés, que l'on rencontre principalement à l'intérieur des États, dit en faillites. Cette terminologie cherche avant tout à décrire la complexité de la nature du nouvel environnement que doivent affronter les stratèges et les états-majors militaires. Sans doute la contrepartie de cette nouvelle réalité opérationnelle repose sur les épaules des troupes. Car si l'emploi de protocoles variés d'intervention donne la flexibilité aux autorités de conduire des opérations de nature différentes à l'intérieur d'un même quadrilatère, qu'en est-il de la préparation de leurs exécutants? Le concept mis de l'avant par le Secteur du Québec afin de répondre à cette conjoncture est le *Soldat Capteur*.

Le programme d'entraînement a eu comme objectif, en plus de préparer le soldat à opérer à l'intérieur d'une gamme diversifiée de scénarios, de le doter d'une sensibilité additionnelle à son environnement. En plus de lui prodiguer un entraînement de type conventionnel, on a outillé le soldat de réflexes appropriés, pour qu'il soit lui en mesure de passer d'un mode d'aide à celui de combat, selon sa perception de la situation tactique en temps réel.

Le concept n'est pas nouveau, le soldat est toujours de loin la ressource la plus efficace qu'un général possède sur un champ de bataille. Par contre, afin de le transformer en soldat capteur, c'est-à-dire de le faire passer d'un mode de réaction à une condition proactive, il faut le doter d'une compréhension holistique de son environnement de combat. Ce qui est supérieur à celle qu'il doit posséder habituellement pour y opérer conventionnellement.

Le soldat capteur doit posséder, entre autres, un bagage culturel additionnel de l'environnement où il opère. En effet il doit pouvoir distinguer les diverses pratiques et coutumes des populations indigènes avec qui il interagit, lui permettant d'analyser le moindre changement nécessitant une réaction de sa part. De plus, il doit disposer d'une connaissance approfondie des règles d'engagement, afin qu'elles l'assistent et le protègent dans l'exécution de ses tâches, plutôt que de le restreindre dans sa capacité à intervenir. Le soldat capteur doit, plus que jamais développer un esprit de cohésion avec ses coéquipiers, car à chaque sortie opérationnelle la sécurité de la mission repose sur les épaules et la performance individuelle de chaque membre de l'équipe. Dorénavant, le succès de la mission est l'affaire de tous et de toutes, la compréhension des ordres n'est plus l'apanage que des chefs. Même l'exécution de la tâche la plus simple doit optimiser la valeur ajoutée, que chaque membre de

l'équipe apporte à sa réalisation. Il importe donc pour ce type d'environnement de fournir un développement professionnel additionnel à l'ensemble de la troupe. Lequel revêt diverses formes dont, entre autres, des mises en situation répétitives suivies de discussions, où tous sont appelés à contribuer sur le comportement à optimiser.

Le soldat capteur n'est pas pour autant un super héros, mais l'ajout de sa contribution proactive augmente la survie de tous les membres de l'équipe et surtout permet d'optimiser le succès de la mission.

La numérisation du champ de bataille

J'apprenais aussi que les troupes de Valcartier ont su compléter leur préparation par des activités de simulation virtuelle. Où, entre autres, les soldats, seuls ou en sous-groupe, étaient confrontés à diverses situations et devaient décider de leurs actions, lesquelles étaient suivies de discussion de groupe avec moniteur, afin d'optimiser l'apprentissage des protocoles étudiés.

De plus, la rotation 0703 sera celle qui introduira la numérisation des quartiers généraux du contingent canadien. En plus de faciliter le suivi de l'évolution des troupes au sol, via un système de positionnement par satellite, elle simplifiera la diffusion instantanée de données à l'intérieur des nombreux états-majors canadiens et alliés. Le tout aura comme conséquence d'accélérer la dissémination de l'information, tout en limitant l'usage des modes traditionnels de communication verbale. Le système permettra une économie de ressource et de temps, entre autres, au sein des postes de commandement pour ce qui est de la préparation et de l'illustration des déploiements des troupes et des divers scénarios envisagés. Le commandant pourra ainsi visualiser plus rapidement la situation opérationnelle dans son secteur d'activités, facilitant son processus décisionnel.

Il sera intéressant de constater l'impact de l'introduction de cette numérisation sur la conduite des opérations à Kandahar.

Les services de soutien aux militaires

À l'intérieur de ce calendrier d'entraînement je ne fus pas surpris de constater que l'on accordait la même priorité à la préparation psychologique du militaire, que celle attribuée aux aspects opérationnels. Les services de santé, en plus du programme de prévention pour les symptômes associés au syndrome post-traumatique, ont innové en incluant une section pour la résilience, afin de mieux préparer les militaires à la réalité des décès au combat. Il faut aussi prendre note que cette préparation psychologique offrait un programme adapté aux besoins des proches des militaires.

ON TRACK

À ce programme, s'ajoutent les services rehaussés du Centre de soutien à la famille de Valcartier, qui est déjà des plus actifs auprès de la communauté militaire. Il opère, entre autres, en étroite collaboration avec l'arrière-garde et les autorités du 5GBMC, afin de garantir un service de 24 heures par jour, 7 jours par semaine aux familles des militaires. Le Centre de soutien fut aussi en mesure de rejoindre les familles des militaires avant leur départ afin de leur présenter les services offerts. De plus, ce dernier et celui de Montréal ont étendu leurs services afin de rejoindre les familles des trois cents miliciens qui sont intégrés à la rotation 07-03, en établissant divers protocoles de collaboration avec divers organismes communautaires régionaux.

Conclusion

Il est évident que la préparation de la rotation 0703 a su bénéficier des leçons apprises des précédentes et que les ressources appropriées furent dégagées afin de garantir l'optimisation de leur montée en puissance. Je crois aussi que les autorités en place malgré les éternels regroupements de personnel ont su en minimiser les impacts, et créer la cohésion requise au sein des divers éléments de l'opération Athéna.

Les dernières modifications à la structure de commandement de la force opérationnelle furent faites quelques semaines avant la première envolée des troupes. En effet, une rencontre des hauts gradés directement concernés par l'opération eut lieu à Kandahar, afin de réviser la situation opérationnelle et de s'assurer que la structure de la nouvelle rotation répondait à ses exigences.

Le concept de soldat capteur est sans doute une approche des plus novatrice. Il met en évidence le



Un des objectifs de l'entraînement à Fort Bliss était de familiariser les membres du groupement tactique aux conditions austères que l'on retrouve dans les Camps opérationnels avancés à Kandahar

rôle et le développement professionnel de plus en plus indispensables que le soldat joue à l'intérieur du nouvel environnement opérationnel. Cette réalité retrouvée est aussi indicatrice des attributs élevés qui sont dorénavant requis de nos soldats afin de relever ce défi.

En écrivant ces lignes, j'apprenais avec tristesse et empathie que la rotation 0703 venait de subir sa première perte de vie humaine. Le soldat Simon Longtin qui à bord d'un LAV III décédait dès suite de ses blessures, occasionnées par la déflagration d'un engin explosif improvisé le 19 août 2007. Un dur rappel à la réalité afghane...

Mes pensées accompagnent les proches du soldat Longtin, ainsi que ceux des 67 autres canadiens qui ont donné leur vie au service de la démocratie en Afghanistan. En priant pour que l'on ne les oublie pas et que leurs décès n'aient pas été en vain.

Reflections on Canada's first 18 Months in Kandahar and Prospects for the Future

by Dr. Lee Windsor

In September 2006, the University of New Brunswick's Centre for Conflict Studies and Military and Strategic Program merged into the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society. The new Gregg Centre builds on thirty years of research and teaching at UNB about war as a phenomenon. It also marks the launch of a new

research program on Canada's Army, in cooperation with the Combat Training Centre in CFB Gagetown. The program cements a long history of ties between UNB and CFB Gagetown that includes student tours to base facilities, observation of field training, joint conferences, and lecture exchanges. All are intended to promote learning interaction between soldiers, scholars and students.

In light of Canada's ongoing commitment to building a viable Afghanistan, the Gregg Centre waded into its new program with a major study of the Kandahar

Dr. Lee Windsor is Deputy Director, Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, University of New Brunswick

DONATIONS

Conference of Defence Associations
Institute

A gift provided under your will means a great deal to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. It perpetuates a commitment in support the mission of the Institute.

Making an outright or planned gift to a non-profit organization such as the CDA Institute is a private decision, and should fulfill philanthropic wishes while maximizing tax and other financial and personal benefits. Planned gifts are commonly referred to as deferred gifts, such as bequests, life insurance, charitable remainder trusts and similar undertakings, whereby the commitment is made now, but the funds do not become available to the Institute until a set time in the future.

Including a bequest to the CDA Institute in your will is one of the most popular and simplest ways to make a planned gift. It allows you to make thoughtful decisions regarding your family, other loved ones, and also organizations and charities you have supported throughout your lifetime.

By including the CDA Institute in your estate planning you will ensure a long-lasting legacy for the Institute.

For further information or to advise the CDA Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903 or treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.

LES DONNS

L'institut de la conférence des associations de la
défense

Un don inscrit à votre testament revêt une grande importance pour l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense (l'ICAD). Il perpétue votre engagement envers l'Institut et assure le soutien continu à sa mission.

Faire un don immédiat, ou un don planifié à un organisme comme l'Institut de la CAD est une décision privée qui doit répondre aux désirs philanthropiques, tout en maximisant les avantages fiscaux, financiers et personnels. Les dons planifiés sont communément appelés dons différés. Ils incluent les legs, l'assurance-vie, les fiducies résiduelles de bienfaisance et toute entente similaire. La personne s'engage dès maintenant, mais les fonds ne sont versés à l'organisme qu'à une période déterminée dans le futur.

Un legs à l'Institut de la CAD est une des façons les plus simples de faire un don planifié. Il vous permet de prendre des décisions réfléchies concernant votre famille, vos êtres chers et des organismes que vous avez appuyés tout au long de votre vie.

En incluant l'Institut de la CAD dans vos plans de succession, vous assurerez un héritage durable pour l'Institut.

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour aviser l'Institut de la CAD de vos intentions, veuillez communiquer avec le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe en composant le 613 236-9903 ou courriel treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. Toute demande d'information sera traitée de manière personnelle et strictement confidentielle.

mission to address questions raised in the often bitter debate about its merits. These include tough questions about whether or not success is possible, whether Kandaharis want NATO help, whether force is being applied effectively, and if the effort in Afghanistan justifies the blood price Canada has paid so far and will probably continue to pay.

Our faculty team is approaching the subject with

a case-study of the recently returned Task Force 1-07 based on 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment from Gagetown. We aim to produce a short history of how one operational tour to Afghanistan works: pre-deployment training and education, the handover from previous rotations, six months of operations in 'Canadabar,' and the return home.

The goal is to explain how the various components

of Canada's mission function and interact, including the Battlegroup, the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team attached to Afghan National Army units. The study also illuminates the relationship between Canadian and Allied soldiers, civilian police trainers, diplomats, and especially the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which remains the least understood yet most vital Canadian government agency involved in the Kandahar mission.

The project team includes David Charters, Brent Wilson and myself. The book will include introductory chapters on events that led to UN and NATO commitment to Afghanistan, as well as recent Canadian Forces missions abroad to demonstrate where the Kandahar experience fits into the history of increasingly difficult post-Cold War CF operations in failed states.

Properly addressing questions about the mission necessitated that we see soldiers' preparations and their operations for ourselves. In the summer and fall of 2006, I followed the Task Force through all types of training, from live-fire exercises, IED defence and Afghan culture and negotiation methods, to the massive mission dress rehearsal at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in CFB Wainwright.

Most importantly, my research involved a three-week stay in Kandahar in April 2007 to experience the challenges Canadian soldiers face on the ground. There I spoke to Canadian soldiers and government officials, NATO partners, leaders from the aid agency community, and Afghans. I also had the unfortunate opportunity to witness the daily threats and strain endured by our soldiers when one convoy I hitched a ride with was ambushed and another struck by a suicide car bomb that killed eight Afghan civilians.

One of the most obvious preliminary findings is that public discussion over the mission is based on little hard and timely information about what is happening on the ground, especially because the situation is both complex and rapidly evolving. Debate in Canada is based on a perception of life in Kandahar that is out of date. What is needed is a historical timeline of the past 18 months and of what has been accomplished to date.

The story begins with the Canadian decision to participate in the United Nations-mandated NATO International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003 and then to assume responsibility for security and reconstruction in Kandahar in 2005-06. The mythology and conjecture surrounding these two decisions is rampant but also based on small truths. The most enduring myths surround how Prime Minister Jean Chrétien chose ISAF to avoid Canadian involvement in Iraq in 2003. The other is that delays by Prime Minister

Paul Martin's cabinet in 2005 regarding where Canada should establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team left only the most difficult Kandahar option available when a choice was finally made. Public comments by former cabinet ministers suggest that both myths contain grains of truth. However, they overshadow how both choices were taken within a context of a long tradition of Canadian foreign, defence and development policy rooted in collective action. The Kandahar decision was also shaped by the relative military capabilities of NATO members and stability-building experience in the former Yugoslavia.

On the matter of expanding ISAF throughout Afghanistan, evidence suggests that NATO nations decided together that the best combination of forces for the difficult Kandahar job was the old Dutch-British-Canadian team that worked so well as Multi-National Division South West in Bosnia. Having the most modern and robust vehicle fleet and being highly interoperable with US forces, Canada was a natural choice to deploy first.

The story of the first Canadian rotation into Kandahar is one of managing a demanding handover from American forces as Operation Enduring Freedom ramped down, paving the way for Dutch and British contingents to flow into Helmund and Uruzgan Provinces. The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team started in Kandahar City in 2005, taking steps to replicate the nation-building effort that worked in northern Afghanistan.

According to former National Public Radio correspondent-turned aid worker Sarah Chayes, the people of the south were waiting for this kind of assistance ever since the US-led invasion of 2001. Unfortunately for them, the American PRT in Kandahar could offer only minimal assistance. When aid and reconstruction *did* appear on the horizon on a large scale in 2006, it posed a massive threat to the dominance of the Taliban in their heartland. It offered people hopes of stability and thus threatened absentee landlords and drug gangs who controlled them; these power brokers thrived in the lawless south and provided the Taliban with most of their operations budget. Reconstruction, especially of the road network and water management system, provided an end to a dependence on poppy growing by tenant farmers and threatened the power of feudal drug lords over their serfs, thereby threatening Taliban funding. As a result, it appears the reconstruction effort was directly targeted by militants.

After the much revered Foreign Service Officer Glyn Berry was killed in those early attacks, CIDA and Foreign Affairs pulled out of the city. The PRT ceased to function for a few months in early 2006 as the non-uniformed Canadian departments scrambled to reassess their prospects. By summer 2006 the Canadian Battlegroup

returned to the Kandahar city area to restore security; CIDA returned, a new and highly capable Foreign Service officer was assigned, and the PRT was poised to restart operations. Before it did, and much to everyone's surprise, a new and greater threat appeared.

A large Taliban force massed west of the city, apparently preparing for a major offensive and testing international resolve. The goal, it seemed, was to prove to Kandaharis that Canada and NATO was unwilling to fight to protect them and that the only future possible was

have ended permanently.

The defeat of the main Taliban force at Pashmul altered the political and social landscape in Kandahar by dramatically improving the credibility of the international community among locals. As a result Canada's third rotation to Kandahar that arrived in February 2007 could finally proceed as planned, with all mission components carrying out their assigned tasks. This fundamental timeline is apparently not understood in Canada, where impatience is rife at the perceived slow progress of the mission.

Only in the past six months was the Battlegroup, based on 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment, able to push presence and security patrols outward into the most important agricultural and population areas around the river-centered ancient irrigation system. In effect, they have created a security bubble outside Kandahar City. Currently, the latest Battlegroup, based on 3rd Battalion of the Royal 22^e Régiment, continues to protect and expand that bubble.

This security bubble was greatly enhanced in the past months with the arrival of soldiers and aid workers from a number of NATO and UN members in all provinces in the south. Growing international presence and improved professionalism and capability among the Afghan National Army is driving the Taliban into increasingly remote areas. In their absence aid and reconstruction work has increased.

The other significant development from the winter of 2006-07 was ample rainfall. When combined with improved security this means that fields are being fully irrigated and cultivated for first time in decades. This will help significantly in breaking the hold of feudal drug lords and Taliban over the rural population.

Small numbers of hardcore Taliban and foreign fighters still try to disrupt NATO efforts. However, for the most part, calm and prosperity is returning inside the Kandahar Afghan Development Zone. So too are the aid agencies. In addition to Canadian, American and British government aid agencies, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, the Red Cross, a variety of UN elements, the World Food Program, and even Sarah Chayes' Arghand Cooperative are all delivering short-term aid and long-term development projects throughout the area.

The National Solidarity Program, so successful in other parts of Afghanistan at restoring local governance and community capacity in north and western Afghanistan,



WO Lori Coady of the Kandahar PRT, Captain Alan Best from the 2RCR Battlegroup and author Dr. Lee Windsor, returning to Camp Nathan Smith following a reconstruction monitoring patrol in Kandahar City

under Taliban rule. The result was Operation Medusa, the systematic effort to defeat the Taliban force in Zhari and Panjwai Districts and prevent it from interfering with the restoration of civil society and reconstruction.

No one anticipated that Canada's reconstruction effort would require a conventional battle to launch it. 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment delivered an assault river-crossing and deliberate attack on a dug-in and well-armed enemy force around the fortified village of Pashmul. Operation *Medusa* and the subsequent clean-up and return of civilians to their homes known as Operation *Baaz Tzuka* were the dominant episodes for Canada's second rotation to Kandahar. These efforts also consumed most of the resources and time of the PRT. Canada's reconstruction for the province as it was originally conceived had to be put on hold. However, had the 1RCR *not* defeated the Taliban in Pashmul, reconstruction efforts under the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan would

is being expanded to the south. Large scale development projects undertaken by CIDA, USAID and the British Department for International Development are focused on water and drought management to help break dependence on the opium harvest. Improved roads are restoring market access for farmers as well. Even the banking system has been restored and modernized, helping undo decades of survivalist corruption by paying soldiers, policemen and other public servants by direct deposit.

Many challenges remain, especially due to the chronic shortage in the south of Afghans with skills and education. Agricultural processing and marketing infrastructure are also badly needed to ensure farmers can sell alternative crops at fair prices. However, the window of opportunity is open. Progress has been tangible in the streets of Kandahar in the past six months, and momentum is building. Commerce is returning and the highway traffic between continents that was an historic mainstay of the Afghan economy has been resuscitated. On my last day outside the wire I saw children happily flying kites in a field free of mines.

To put a fine point on this status report from Kandahar, the attached photograph says a thousand words. On the left is Warrant Officer Lori Coody from the PRT. In the middle is the Battlegroup's Information Officer, Captain Alan Best. Warrant Officer Coody and I had just returned from a standard PRT patrol in Kandahar

City. This was not a combat patrol to hunt Taliban. Our activities consisted of a follow-through visit to a job site where a contractor built concrete stairs down a canal bank to improve water access. We then checked up on a newly reactivated elementary school before heading to a police substation for a mentoring meeting with the station commander. Throughout the drive, patrol members conducted ongoing city services mapping. The patrol was a typical one for the Canadian PRT, and the very type of activity that will decide the fate of Afghanistan. It is also the type of patrol only possible with regularity in the past six months. It was made possible by the sacrifice of Afghan, Canadian and other Allied soldiers killed in the fight to create security and stability.

The operational concept behind the Canadian security and reconstruction mission achieved traction in February 2007. Since then, NATO and the UN have made monumental strides forward as additional forces and development resources pour into the south, multiplying security and assistance capacity threefold from where it was but a year ago.

The debate over whether Canada should continue its role in Afghanistan is critical to the functioning of our democracy. The picture painted by the popular press and many critics, of a high blood price paid for minimal signs of progress, is misleading. Those weighing the merits of the mission must do so with a clear understanding that the sacrifices to date have borne significant fruit.

Le Québec, l'opinion publique canadienne et la mission en Afghanistan

par M. Stéphane Roussel

Le déploiement du Royal 22^e Régiment en Afghanistan soulève bien des craintes parmi les commentateurs et la classe politique. La mission est, en effet, très peu populaire au Québec. Si le R 22^e R devait encaisser un taux de perte aussi élevé que les unités qui l'ont précédé, craind-on à Ottawa et parmi les commentateurs, la grogne des Québécois pourrait se muer en colère, plaçant le gouvernement dans une situation intenable et mettant même la mission en péril. Et si un tel scénario se produisait, il y a fort à parier que certains y verront une nouvelle manifestation de l'attitude timorée des Québécois face aux questions de défense et de l'influence disproportionnée du Québec sur la politique étrangère canadienne.

S'il est encore prématuré de mesurer les effets du déploiement du R22eR, il importe tout de même de mieux comprendre les fondements de cette opposition et de voir ce qu'elle peut masquer. Le discours sur l'attitude des Québécois face aux questions de défense et de sécurité est en effet truffé de clichés qui se substituent à l'analyse, mais qui ne résistent pas à un examen approfondi.

Le mythe du Québec pacifiste

L'arrivée du R22eR en Afghanistan, et l'opposition clairement exprimée par les Québécois face à cette mission, réveille de vieux démons de la politique de défense canadienne. Ceux-ci, hérités des crises de la conscription de 1917-1918 et de 1942-1944, font renaître la crainte de voir les deux communautés linguistiques profondément divisées par des engagements militaires

Stéphane Roussel, titulaire de la recherche du Canada en politique étrangère et de défense canadienne Université du Québec à Montréal

internationaux. Cette crainte repose en grande partie sur le postulat, très bien ancré mais pourtant discutable, selon lequel les Québécois francophones entretiendraient une attitude différente des autres Canadiens face aux questions de défense et de sécurité. Pour bon nombre de commentateurs, l'attitude de la société québécoise serait marquée par une forte sympathie à l'égard des idées pacifistes, antimilitaristes ou isolationnistes.

L'opinion publique québécoise tend, il est vrai, à manifester sa désapprobation de façon plus marquée face à certaines initiatives internationales impliquant le recours à la force armée. Toutefois, l'imaginaire collectif tend à exagérer la différence qui sépare les francophones des anglophones, comme si la situation qui prévalait lors du plébiscite de 1942 (alors que 80% des francophones rejetaient les mesures de conscription tandis que 75% des anglophones les approuvaient) existait encore. Depuis les années 1990, plusieurs signes indiquent que la situation a changé.

En premier lieu, l'examen des sondages que Jean-Christophe Boucher (Université Laval) et moi avons mené tend à démontrer que l'écart entre les positions exprimées par les deux communautés linguistiques face aux engagements militaires internationaux ne dépasse que rarement 10%. Dans la grande majorité des cas, les francophones sont un peu moins favorables aux opérations outre-mer, même si la courbe peut occasionnellement se renverser. Les différences pouvant aller jusqu'à 20%, que l'on a observé à propos de la mission en Afghanistan, sont en fait exceptionnelles par rapport aux tendances lourdes qui se dégagent depuis 1990. La donnée la plus significative tient cependant au fait que les deux communautés tendent à réagir aux mêmes stimulus; lorsque la position des anglophones tend à changer, on observe généralement un phénomène d'une ampleur comparable chez les francophones – et vice-versa. Bref, l'image inspirée du plébiscite de 1942 ne tient plus la route.

En second lieu, le discours tenu par les dirigeants politiques francophones semble beaucoup plus conforme à celui de Lester Pearson qu'à celui des représentants du Nouveau Parti démocratique. L'exemple le plus frappant est celui des politiciens souverainistes. Si l'on se fie aux programmes du Parti québécois et du Bloc québécois, la politique de défense d'un Québec souverain présenterait de grande similarité avec celle du Canada : forces armées de taille modérée, participation aux institutions internationales et opérations multilatérales, etc. Si ces programmes sont représentatifs des idées ayant cours dans la classe politique et la société, les Québécois sont plus internationalistes que pacifistes.

En troisième lieu, la population québécoise peut accepter le recours à la force en certaines circonstances. L'appui indiscutable des francophones aux opérations

de l'Alliance atlantique au Kosovo en 1999 en témoigne en effet clairement – ceci même si l'écart de 10% avec l'opinion publique anglophone se vérifie aussi dans ce cas.

Il convient, bien entendu, d'expliquer la persistance de cet écart. Ce phénomène d'abord peut trouver sa source dans une expérience historique différente, alors que les francophones disposent de peu d'exemple où le recours à la force a effectivement donné des résultats positifs. Au contraire, la guerre est souvent associée à la défaite (la Conquête de 1759, la révolte métisse) ou à la participation forcée (les deux crises de la conscription). Il peut aussi découler des influences différentes auxquelles sont soumises les deux communautés, les anglophones étant plus exposés aux informations en provenance des États-Unis, tandis que les francophones sont plus sujets à recevoir celles d'Europe continentale. Enfin, l'écart exprime peut-être une plus grande méfiance des francophones face aux initiatives qui ne semblent pas servir les intérêts immédiats du Canada, mais plutôt ceux d'une grande puissance face à laquelle leurs affinités sont plus limitées que celle de leurs concitoyens anglophones.

Le fondement de l'opposition

Quelle qu'en soit la cause, la distance qui sépare les Québécois francophones des Canadiens anglophones est loin d'être aussi importante que ce que l'image populaire laisse croire. Or, en cherchant désespérément la clef de son « problème québécois », le gouvernement et les commentateurs risquent de s'égarer et d'oublier un aspect essentiel de la question: il existe, au Canada anglais, un mouvement d'opposition tout aussi préoccupant pour le gouvernement. Les Québécois expriment peut-être plus clairement ou plus massivement leur désapprobation, mais ils ne représentent pas une voix isolée. Et si la tendance des deux communautés à réagir au même stimulus se maintient, toute hausse de l'opposition au Québec pourrait bien préfigurer une croissance semblable ailleurs au Canada.

À chercher les causes de l'opposition de la société québécoise dans ses particularités culturelles ou historiques, on peut facilement oublier qu'il y a d'autres motivations à cette attitude, et d'autres clivages qui sont passés sous silence. La ligne de partage la plus importante que révèlent les sondages n'est pas la langue ou le lieu d'origine des répondants, mais plutôt le genre. En effet, les femmes semblent beaucoup plus critiques à l'égard de la mission que ne le sont les hommes.

La pente est lourde à remonter pour le gouvernement, qui tend à réduire ce scepticisme de la population à un simple « problème de communication ». Si l'on explique clairement la nature ou la raison d'être de cette



The Conference of Defence
Associations Institute's
10th ANNUAL GRADUATE
STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

10^{ième} SYMPOSIUM ANNUEL DES
ÉTUDIANTS DIPLÔMÉS
de l'Institut de la conférence des
associations de la défense

Canada's Security Interests –
The Lessons of History

Les intérêts canadiens en matière de
sécurité: Les leçons de l'histoire

26-27 October, 2007
Currie Hall, Royal Military College of Canada,
Kingston, Ontario

Les 26 et 27 octobre 2007
Salle Currie, Collège militaire royal du Canada,
Kingston, (Ontario)

Keynote Speakers:
Dr. J.L. Granatstein,
eminent Canadian Military Historian
and
Major-General Daniel Gosselin,
Commandant Canadian Defence Academy

Conférenciers Principaux:
Monsieur J.L. Granatstein,
grand spécialiste de l'histoire militaire canadienne
et
Le major-général Daniel Gosselin,
Commandant Académie canadienne de la défense

in collaboration with / en collaboration avec



Canadian Defence
& Foreign Affairs
Institute

DE SCOTT
&
K TIEMAN



National
Defence

Défense
nationale

GENERAL DYNAMICS

Participants are required to register
by 17 October 2007 at:
www.cda-cdai.ca

Les participants et les participantes doivent
s'enregistrer au plus tard le 17 octobre 2007 par:
www.cda-cdai.ca

For more information: projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca
or telephone: (613) 236 9903

Renseignements: projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca
ou téléphoner: (613) 236 9903

mission aux Canadiens, croit-on à Ottawa, alors ceux-ci changeront d'attitude. Pourtant, il y a déjà plus de cinq ans que des soldats canadiens se battent en Afghanistan et, si la mission se poursuit jusqu'en 2009, cette guerre sera la plus longue de toutes celles auxquelles le Canada aura participé. Au bout de tout ce temps, il est étonnant que les Canadiens n'aient « pas encore compris ». Au contraire, le fait que l'appui s'est effrité depuis 2002 est un signe inquiétant. L'attitude critique à l'égard du conflit a eu maintenant le temps de se cristalliser. Certes, on peut accuser les médias de se concentrer sur les aspects négatifs ou dramatiques de la mission et de négliger les progrès sur le terrain. Mais l'ampleur et la persistance du malaise des Canadiens témoignent sans doute d'un problème beaucoup plus profond.

Il est difficile d'identifier la cause de ce malaise collectif. Le fait qu'il s'agisse d'une guerre lointaine, que le Canada n'ait pas été directement la cible d'un acte terroriste, ou encore les critiques face à la présence militaire américaine en Irak éclaboussent la mission afghane, sont peut-être des facteurs importants. Mais il n'en demeure pas moins que bien peu de Canadiens entretiennent une sympathie à l'égard des talibans ou de la cause qu'ils défendent. Ceux-ci sont clairement perçus comme présentant une menace pour le Canada. Rares sont ceux qui ne voient pas dans cette mission une « cause juste » entendue au sens restreint du terme. Pourtant, quelque chose cloche. Les véritables raisons

de l'opposition, comme l'ont souligné bon nombre de commentateurs, résident sans doute dans l'impression qu'il s'agit d'une guerre menée d'abord et avant tout pour assurer la sécurité des États-Unis, et que l'espérance de succès, même à long terme, est faible. Cette vision des choses est loin d'être limitée aux Québécois.

Il est improbable que le gouvernement parviennent à renverser la tendance dans l'opinion publique, sauf peut-être s'il trouve des arguments pour contrer cette impression. Il peut, au mieux, tenter de limiter les dégâts et espérer que cette opposition demeure plus passive qu'active. Ce n'est, en effet, que lorsque des sondeurs ou des journalistes posent la question que les citoyens expriment leur mécontentement. Mais ils ne vont pas – du moins pas encore – jusqu'à descendre dans la rue pour manifester ou à changer leurs intentions de vote de manière significative. Sur ce plan, le meilleur atout du gouvernement réside encore dans l'annonce du retrait en février 2009, car cette décision convainc probablement plusieurs opposants de « serrer les dents » jusque-là plutôt que d'éprouver la nécessité d'agir pour forcer la main des dirigeants politiques.

Le scénario d'une transformation de l'opposition à la guerre en un mouvement actif est probablement le pire que l'on puisse imaginer, car elle saperait bien plus que la mission elle-même. C'est l'ensemble de l'effort de redressement des Forces canadiennes qui serait affecté. Pour le meilleur et pour le pire, l'échéance de 2009 ne doit pas être repoussée.

Review

“Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic”

ed. Brian MacDonald

by William (Bill) A. Adams, PhD

This short (132 page) book entitled the 2nd Vimy Paper is a set of eight reports by a group of specialists in both the Canadian Arctic and in aspects of defence policy followed by a summary chapter with recommendations. It represents an excellent and very timely effort by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) to raise many issues related to Canada's Arctic regions. It should be required reading at a time when the present government seems intent on making new and perhaps significant investments in Arctic defence and security as a part of an effort ensuring the security of our overall

continental defence system. The 1st Vimy Paper dealt with the process of analyzing future Canadian defence needs and the lengthy process leading to the equipping of the Canadian Forces. In the 2nd Vimy Paper we see an attempt to create future scenarios for the Canadian Arctic and suggest how the CF could be prepared and equipped for their role in that region.

In this review only a few of the contributors have been singled out for mention. The topic of Arctic defence and security is one of such complexity that in a short review it is not possible to adequately cover the contributions of all participants. The first chapter by Rob Huebert, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies,

William (Bill) A. Adam is Chairman of the Defence Science Advisory Board

University of Calgary, is well researched and fully documented with extensive footnotes as are most of the chapters. Huebert outlines the historical background of Canada's defence and security involvement in the Arctic from the perspective of a political scientist. He brings the most recent Canadian political statements by the Federal Conservatives under Stephen Harper into the discussion. Harper's commitment to the Arctic has raised the profile of the Arctic nationally and made it an element in the ongoing debate on national priorities. The second chapter by Andrea Charron, a Canadian academic with government policy experience, suggests an alternative approach in which Canada pursues a bilateral approach to the Arctic with the United States to ensure continental security.

In a fascinating chapter by senior American government policy advisor, James Kraska, the history and future of the Northwest Passage is reviewed and Canada's claims to the Arctic explored. A brief chapter on the situation in Iceland points out the huge impact that the decision to pull out US/NATO forces from this island has had on Iceland and the view that the Arctic and energy security are closely linked. The defence infrastructure associated with the Cold War has had similar impacts on Canada's north. Much more could be written about energy security and the Arctic since circumpolar Arctic nations are all looking closely at the changes in Arctic ice cover and permafrost and considering the impact that these changes will have on oil and gas developments.

The Paper includes several chapters based on possible Canadian military responses to scenarios requiring Canada to take action in the Arctic, but not involving an outright attack on Canada. These provide a mechanism for planners to determine what responses might be required by the CF and the Paper provides chapters on land, sea, and air requirements. There was no chapter on space based surveillance which, in light of the vast area to be defended, would seem to make sense.

It is interesting that the CDAI chose this topic for the Second Vimy Paper rather than one related to the role that the CF is playing in its external missions, such as that with NATO in Afghanistan where Canada has been investing significant resources and may be involved for many years. Could it be that the defence of the Canadian homeland is beginning to attract more widespread public and institutional support including the realization that our shores include a third ocean that soon may be navigable for several months per year? Having had experience working in the high Arctic in the 1970s as a research scientist with the Federal government studying the potential impact of the oil and gas industry on Arctic ecosystems and on climate, I am particularly pleased to see this renewed interest.

I do believe, however, that there are some significant

omissions in this Paper. The importance of dealing with widespread social problems and new challenges as self-government is implemented by the aboriginal peoples who make up the majority of the citizens in the Arctic should have been covered. Suggestions on how an expanded presence by the CF and DND in the Arctic could impact aboriginal lives and the Ranger program would have been interesting. It is also surprising that there was no chapter on the role of other Federal Departments and Agencies, the Territorial Governments, and the private sector since clearly DND must work with the many players in this part of Canada.

Recent CF exercises in the Arctic such as Exercise Narwhal II in 2004 of which I was privileged to be an observer, certainly have provided evidence that interdepartmental/agency and private sector cooperation is essential for CF operations in the Arctic as well as showing how the local Inuit population must be involved in any defence activities in the North. Finally, also neglected in this volume which includes a review of the need for specialized capabilities for operating in the Arctic on land, sea/ice, space, and air, is that Canada will certainly require investments in Arctic science and engineering and specialized training facilities which must be considered as a long term investment.

Fortunately some signs of renewed public concern, media coverage, and Canadian government interest and funding are beginning to appear in 2007, the International Polar Year.

I would like to conclude this review by quoting from the excellent summary chapter provided by Paul Manson, an eminent Canadian military man with deep interest in defence issues and in Canadian culture and current President of the CDAI. He states that four themes can be identified in the previous chapters:

1. Environmental change related to global warming
2. The emergence of terrorism as a serious physical threat to North American security
3. Past indifference to the need for Canadian forces activity in our Arctic regions, and
4. Concerns about challenges to Canadian sovereign ownership and control of our Arctic spaces – maritime, territorial, and air.

He identifies two areas of immediate concern.. One is the prospect of "a sudden and severe energy shortage in the western world.." and second "...the prospect of terrorist infiltration through the North". Either of these eventualities could lead to a rapid increase in Arctic activities and Canada must be prepared to make early investments to meet these potential but very possible threats.

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON NORTHERN SOVEREIGNTY- WHERE IS THE WHITE PAPER?

Colonel (Ret'd) Murray Lee

This year, the media have been flooded with news reports of the government of Canada announcing initiatives to support this country's sovereignty in the high Arctic. These reports and announcements have ranged from building a northern port, the construction of ice breakers, a military presence in the north to a navy capable of patrolling in Arctic waters with state of the art Corvettes. However, this piecemeal approach to a recurring national problem is not addressing the issue.

In February, the CDA Institute published the Vimy Paper 2 entitled "Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic" which was well received by numerous institutes across the country and indeed supported by a number of government ministers, senators and members of Parliament. It is suggested that although the Vimy Paper is military-centric in content, it does not go far enough in challenging the government to produce a firm policy on the entire issue. Although General Manson in his summary correctly identifies the requirements in this debate, challenging the government to implement a cohesive Arctic policy is missing. In other words, the requirement for a White Paper on Northern Sovereignty.

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia feels the government, although repeatedly stating a commitment to Northern Sovereignty, has missed the mark. What has not developed in recent years is a cohesive policy that, no matter which political party is in power, is a *de facto* blueprint to follow for years to come. RUSI Nova Scotia has written to many influential parliamentarians and they all support the notion of Northern Sovereignty. What is missing is a central department responsible for the development of a Northern Sovereignty policy. Who has the lead? There are standing committees; Canada participates in the Arctic Council established by Canada in 1996; and under subsection 23(1) of the Oceans Act, the Department of Foreign Affairs is the lead federal department on issues of national sovereignty with respect to bodies of water. So what? Who has the lead? Should it be the Department of Transport, Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Industry Trade and Commerce, Indian and Northern Affairs, the Department of the Environment? On initial examination, we would strongly suggest that a single department be designated by Cabinet as the agency

responsible for Northern Sovereignty and that it be tasked with the introduction of a White Paper for passage in Parliament.

What should this paper address? There are a myriad of issues that have been identified in detail in the Vimy paper. However, a start point should be a commitment by the Government of Canada to the following areas of development:

- (1) *Designation/construction of two northern deep water ports.* An eastern gateway to the Northwest Passage (the future Panama canal) and a western gateway. Studies suggest a potential western portal at Gray Bay or Bathurst Inlet. Priority may rest in establishing the eastern gateway first at either Iqaluit or other port capable of deep water off-loading operations. An over-the-beach option should not be considered.
- (2) *Designation of national and regional air hubs.* Northern airfields are essential for Arctic resupply, passenger services and military requirements. *National* air hubs should be located at Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet and Iqaluit. *Regional* hubs should be identified and could include Inuvik, Cambridge Bay and Resolute. All these air hubs are capable of supporting C-17, C-130 and B737 type aircraft.
- (3) *Development of a northern military training centre.* The Canadian Forces will require a northern training centre for the conduct of Arctic operations. Such a facility should be identified in the white paper.
- (4) *Cooperation with surrounding Arctic Countries.* Working agreements on the ecology, pollution control, resource management and navigation in Arctic waters need to be agreed upon. The five Arctic nations involved need to be consulted and work together with Canada to make this policy a reality.
- (5) *Control of northern waterways.* Methods of navigation, pollution control, reporting and tracking of commercial and military sealift traffic must be identified. A coherent policy encapsulating these issues should be identified

Colonel (Ret'd) Murray Lee is the President of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

early so that Canada is prepared to implement these controls once global warming permits year-round operations in Arctic waterways.

- (6) *Environmental protection for northern communities.* Included in this category is the welfare of the indigenous peoples of the north, protection from pollution of waterways and other activity associated with northern development (mining, minerals and other natural resources).

I have touched on several major issues involved in the development of the White Paper. There are many more issues and major categories of work that would have

to be addressed. Suffice it to say, the blueprint for the paper has been identified in many forums and it should not be difficult for the designated department to examine and study the work that has been done over the past 10 years. What is needed now is to energize the government to move forward on this tremendously important issue.

As in any new initiative, the subject of funding is of prime consideration. The cost of a White Paper is not the issue. Funding for the identified requirements laid out in the paper is. However, the paper need not set out specific timelines for the introduction and acquisition of infrastructure, equipment and people. What is needed is the identification of such resources and as successive budgets are introduced, spending to support the policy can



Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie "Supports the Troops"
at Mosport before hundreds of fans

"Had the weekend of my life at Mosport (ON) – ended up 3rd in feature event, half a second behind an ex-non points F1 driver and ahead of a number of F1-experienced drivers. Walter Wolf came over from Austria to see the race. I had the "Support the Troops" decals on my helmet, of which hundreds of photos were taken by spectators."

– Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie

be incrementally introduced. Each department responsible for its sphere of influence can identify parts of the White Paper or plan in their annual budget requirements so that overall, the policy will eventually be implemented.

Who has the lead? This is the third time in this article that I have asked the question. The answer, once again, is Cabinet should designate one department and assign it the responsibility for Northern Sovereignty. If a single department is *not feasible*, then a joint effort should be undertaken.

So who has the lead? The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia recommends this White Paper be undertaken by a *joint DFAIT/DND* team as both departments have tremendous influence over its outcome: the Department of Foreign Affairs for issues concerning the sovereignty over the waterways and agreements with

the other Arctic nations; and the Department of National Defence for the defence of the region. Other departments would of course cooperate in their fields of expertise in providing the coordination and input required to make the proposed policy work. What we are asking for is a commitment, a policy that Canadians can share and support and indeed make the true north “strong and free”.

Of the many issues discussed in this short article, the majority of them rest within these two departments. As already suggested, the other departments responsible for the environment, transportation and other areas of discussion would of course be collaborators in the development of the White Paper. It is the *political will* that is required for success. Does the Government of Canada have the will to ensure our Northern Sovereignty for future generations?

Left to right Brigadier General Christine Whitecross Joint Task Force North, Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Tyler, Master Warrant Officer Harrison, Brian Leblanc of the Canadian Coast Guard, Captain Derek Sheridan Ontario Regiment.

Operation NANOOK 07 is a Canada Command sovereignty operation taking place in the Baffin Island Coastal and the Hudson Strait areas



DND photo by Corporal Evan Kuelz

The Arctic Factor in Russia-Canada Relations

by Mr. Nikolay G. Babich

If we compare Russia and Canada it would be obvious that both countries have more similarities than differences. Our climate is very similar. If we compare Canada’s arctic route – North-West passage with the Russian – Northern Sea Route (according to the Western countries’ terminology – North-Eastern passage) we will also note the similarity of ice, hydrometeorological and other conditions. Correspondingly, the possibilities of the economic activity in the Russian and Canadian Arctic, including the maritime transport component, are almost identical. The similarity of navigation conditions in the Arctic Ocean entails the identification of social and economic requirements pertaining to the arctic ice-breaker and transport fleets of both countries. The problems navigation security and preservation of environment are

Mr. Nikolay G. Babich is the Deputy Director of the Department of the Icebreaking Fleet and Head of Ice Operations for the Murmansk Shipping Company

similar, as the fragile nature of the Arctic makes high demands on those who are using its resources.

The abovementioned circumstances create good prerequisites for full cooperation between Russia and Canada in the area of sea navigation. We should agree to unify our approaches in all of the interconnected areas. It means common language (apparently – English), joint creation of navigation manuals and the development of a joint system of hydrometeorological security of arctic navigation. These objectives are often articulated at the international level of cooperation of various countries in the Arctic. A necessity to create a World Ice Center for coordination and cooperation which, in turn, could elaborate an Arctic Code of Navigation, is often stressed. The joining-up of efforts of our two Arctic countries could become a first step on the way of achieving the mentioned objectives. They could solve more effectively their internal problems and they could make an invaluable contribution

to the development of the missing international rules on Arctic regional activity and to the establishment of standards of cooperation.

If we view in detail the possible areas of cooperation we should start this analysis from the issue of defending similar interests. Canada and Russia have established their jurisdiction over Arctic water area, following a sectoral principle of division. This integral right is defined by article 234 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982. The essence of this article is that: the state, whose territorial or internal sea is covered by ice for more than six months, has a right to adopt in these water areas national rules of navigation with an aim of unconditional observance of environmental protection rules, as a violation of ecological balance may lead to irreversible consequences.

Canada gained this right in the confrontation with its southern neighbour. We are well aware of what it coast to win a process against the USA in the international court – initiated by Canada in response to unauthorized navigation of American vessels in the waters of the Canadian Arctic. The court acknowledged that Canada has the right to set national rules of navigation intended for the adherence to ecological standards and requirements. This rule was secured by the UN Convention of 1982. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the US abandoned their claims to their neighbour's state and today challenge Canada's sovereign rights.

Something similar is happening to Russia, in that many other countries have appealed for a ban on Russia's exclusive rights within their national sector of the Arctic. The costs of improving the Northern Sea Route operating conditions and the efforts that were put into practice by the Soviet Union were unprecedented. Take for example, the activities of the Northern Sea Route Directorate prior to and following the Second World War. Thanks to this organization, development of a vast territory of the Far North, Siberia and the Far East became possible. A powerful fleet of ice-breakers and ice-strengthened merchant vessels was created, northern ports were built or modernized, and a navigation and weather surveillance system was established throughout the entire route. Some 200 billion dollars were invested.

Today the main argument for free navigation in the Arctic and a ban on exclusive rights of some countries to regulate seafaring in their respective sectors is that global warming allegedly nullifies those rights because of a rapid icecap shrinking in the Polar seas. The thesis of the irreversibility of the global warming is doubtful. Past natural processes and phenomena studies provide evidence that all of them fluctuate and are notable for a cyclic variation of cold and warm periods, and never being of a one-way trend. Our forecast is that in 2012-

2013 a colder period will follow the current period of global warming. The scientific world is polarized, one part of it sustaining a hypothesis of an inevitable global warming, while the other is supporting a future view of global freezing. It is necessary for Russian and Canadian specialists, involved in a long-term monitoring in their respective Arctic sectors, to start a systematic information and scientific prognosis exchange that would provide a good-reasoned demonstration to the world community that ignoring nature can be very dangerous.

In the latter decades of the 20th Century the extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons from the Arctic region assumed prime importance. Canadians have succeeded in extracting oil and now are actively prospecting the rest of the reserves. But the transportation problems remain unsolved. Beginning from the 1980-s Canadian companies began to transport non-ferrous metals and oil during six summertime months, with the shipping season being closed for the rest of the year and accumulating raw materials in coastal storage facilities. The economic effect of such a transportation scheme is far from optimal. The Russian experience, and mostly the Murmansk Shipping Company 30-year experience of a year-round navigation on the western part of the Northern Sea Route, could be very useful for Canada. The continuous operating cycle has been achieved because of the building and successful exploitation of powerful second generation "Arctica" type ice-breakers. The aim of the year-round navigation can be attained only by using a fleet of nuclear ice-breakers and ice-strengthened merchant vessels.

Let us mention the advantages that a joint effort would provide. The Central Institute of the Russian Merchant Navy substantiated the methodological approaches to lengthen the navigation season. The Institute has calculated the operational speed of ice-breaking navigation for the Canadian Arctic and made a report on the topic in Canada. The objective of year-round navigation in the Canadian Arctic can be accomplished with the assistance of Russian ice-breakers.

The (Central) Institute (of the Russian Merchant Navy) can provide Canada with information on the dimension-type line, installed power, design, architecture type, ice-breaking capabilities and other parameters of ships and tankers suitable for the Arctic navigation. Some time ago the Institute made such technical and performance assessments for the series of ships which now are being used by Murmansk Shipping Company. These are ships of the following types: "Michail Strelalovsky", "Dmitry Donskoy", "SA-15", tankers "Samotlor". The Institute in cooperation with the Maritime operations headquarters of the Murmansk Shipping Company developed a transport-technological chart for the Northern Sea Route from an economic efficiency perspective and these documents

will be useful and relevant during the development of a similar chart for the North-West Passage. The capability and advantage of the Russian practice of year-round navigation is made possible with the support of the nuclear ice-breakers.

The virtually unlimited endurance of voyage in combination with the power of the engines of more than 50-60 Megawatts and more are the advantage of a nuclear powered ice-breaking fleet. To reach such operational factors on diesel-electrical ice-breakers they must be equipped with engines consuming more than 300 tons of regular fuel a day. If we take into consideration the minimal duration of a self-sufficient voyage of two months we would require 15000 tons of fuel. In practice it would mean the construction of an ice-breaker with the fuel tanks of its own size just for self-sufficiency. Such a vessel with a draft fluctuation of 3-4 meters depending on the amount of fuel aboard cannot provide proper ice-breaking capabilities. Taking into account shallow waters typical for Arctic the threat of grounding for such a vessel increases. Imagine the damage to the fragile Arctic environment in case of an accident with such an ice-breaker involving an oil spill.

The problem of the ecological security of the icebreaking fleet is urgent even without taking a potential accident into account. The emission of nitrogen and carbon compounds into the Arctic area caused by the use

of diesel installations on the vessels operating near the USA and Canadian coasts are rated at over a hundredfold. The conclusion is obvious: the diesel-operated fleet would endanger the air quality of the Arctic Region. From an ecological perspective only a completely harmless atomic fleet would be able to meet the technical challenge.

Some questions may arise among the public concerning the possible ecological consequences of a wide use of a fleet of atomic icebreakers but here the facts speak for themselves: in the 50-year history of the development of the Russian atomic fleet have been there no nuclear-radiological incidents, which could lead to a serious accident. The passage of time has confirmed the appropriateness of the line chosen by Russia to develop marine atomic energy.

Problems in Russian-Canadian cooperation will arise. International legal issues need to be solved. Today, a single pass of a new icebreaker from Saint-Petersburg to its Murmansk home port requires a large number of adjustment formalities with the countries which border the water area. It will be necessary to add amendments to the Canadian Northwest Passage rules at sea, to create the relevant traffic control system. Cooperation could start with joint experimental passages to expand the navigation period in the Canadian Arctic sector. It is difficult to say whether it will be the construction of the Canadian atomic fleet under Russian know-how, Russian ice-breaker lease,

Chief of the Defence Staff

Families First – A Night to Remember

*A Gala Evening
In honour of
The Military Families Fund*

*Your Hosts: General Rick Hillier and
Mrs Joyce Hillier*

*Saturday 3 November 2007
Doors Open 1730 hours*

*Canadian War Museum -
1 Vimy Place Ottawa*

*For tickets please contact
1-877-445-6444 ~ \$125*

*Dress: Mess Kit/Black Tie/Formal Gown
www.militaryfamiliesfund.ca*



Chef d'état-major de la Défense

Les familles d'abord – Une soirée inoubliable

*Soirée gala
en l'honneur du
Fonds pour les familles des militaires*

*Vos hôtes : le Général Rick Hillier et
M^{me} Joyce Hillier*

*Samedi 3 novembre 2007
17 h 30*

*Musée canadien de la guerre –
1, place Vimy, Ottawa*

*Pour vous procurer des billets, veuillez
téléphoner au 1-877-445-6444 ~ 125 \$*

*Tenue : tenue de mess/cravate noire/robe du soir
www.fondsfamillesmilitaires.ca*

for example time charter, or any other form of cooperation. What is required is a political will as well as a research and logistics activity.

In the late 1960s after the visit of the Soviet Prime-Minister Alexey Kosygin to Canada when he concluded the trade relations development treaty with Prime-Minister Pierre Eliot Trudeau, the Murmansk Shipping Company provided for a long time regular cargo traffic on the “Arctic line” between Europe and Canada and was

solving the same kind of problems which exist today. “The Russians are challenging the ice and are going to make first steps to confirm that Montreal could be open for a winter navigation” according to Montreal Daily Star then. This problem was solved. The ice-breaker “Vladimir Ignatjuk” which was bought in Canada worked in the Canadian Arctic during three navigation seasons.

We have a history of past and present fruitful relations; it is a good basis for our cooperation in the future.

Canadian Military Strategy in Distress

by Commodore (Ret'd) Ian Parker

In September of 2002 the CDA published *A Nation at Risk – The Decline of the Canadian Forces*. The Navy summary stated:

“The forced abandonment of the Naval Task Group concept is imminent. In consequence, Canada no longer will have the capability for an independent national presence in multinational operations at sea. Within 3-5 years, the state of the Canadian Navy stands to be reduced from a Rank 3 World-Class force, to a Rank 6 “Offshore Territorial Defence Navy”. That would be incompatible with Canada’s self-ascribed status as a medium power with global interests.

“The negative implications for Canadian sovereignty are enormous. Much of Canada’s standing in the international community is due to the activities of the Canadian Forces – an important component of which is the Navy. With no capability for more than token foreign deployments, the Canadian Navy will have no alternative but to concentrate on Homeland Defence, and even that will have to be conducted under the direction of the United States Navy. Canadian warships will not be able to operate effectively in multinational groups, nor will Canadian naval commanders have any claim or credibility to lead such groups. Any military or diplomatic leverage enjoyed at present will be lost.”

This article gives voice to concern that the above prophesy by the CDA is being implemented by default. While the focus is on the Navy, the reader must keep in mind that a similar situation applies also to the Air Force.

Various media articles have alluded to an ongoing conflict between Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Gordon O’Connor, and Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, between a Canada First Defence Strategy and a strategy that is focused on foreign intervention. The former, though perhaps insufficiently comprehensive, at least addresses some of Canada’s National Interests. The latter focuses narrowly on a concept of intervention in failed and failing states. It is evident, notwithstanding ministerial direction, that the plan that is now evolving is the plan of General Hillier, who outlined his intentions in a letter that he signed in June 2003 when he was Chief of the Land Staff. He stated:

“The reality of the emerging security environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in “blue skies or blue waters” and the overall value to our country of equipping to do so would be minimal compared to the impact of providing precision land effects”

In essence the intent is to invest in the Army while investment in the Air Force and the Navy will only occur if it is in the best interests of the Army. But only a flawed understanding of sea and air power could fail to appreciate that the size of Canada’s offshore areas of maritime responsibility and the vast distances of our airspace and sea approaches make a blue water navy and a blue sky air force fundamental to our security and sovereignty as a nation, in reality, a National Interest.

Commodore (Ret'd) Ian Parker has extensive experience in strategic planning analysis and force development and is a keen observer of Canada’s defense and security environment

Indeed, it appears that nothing has changed since General Hillier's statement of his philosophy in 2003. A review of the DND 2007/2008 Report on Plans and Priorities and as elaborated upon in a CANWEST Global article by David Pugliese, of 31 January 2007, on the DND Defence Capabilities Plan/Canada First Strategy, reinforces the sense that an army dominant vision is indeed the goal. The result is a "chicken-vs-egg" situation, where the so-called DND/CF transformation agenda amounts to the vast majority of CF resources being focused on operations of today, of which a significant proportion are focused specifically on the operations in Afghanistan.

This predilection for foreign adventures has led to our expanding engagement in Afghanistan, an operation that deploys only seven percent of the Army and is equivalent to just three percent of the entire CF, to the detriment of all other national security tasks. A case in point is the furor over cancellation of a Navy fisheries patrol that was due to a lack of centrally-controlled funding. Such patrols touch on the national interest of sovereignty, and it did not take the Government long to react and provide the necessary funding. This example is but a symptom of the failure of DND/CF to develop a broader strategy, and how the focus on the conflict in Afghanistan is blinkering the senior leadership of the DND/CF. That so little effort is focused on addressing other threats to Canadian security should raise alarm bells for those who are concerned about Canada's security now and in the future.

It is recognized that the government has signalled significant investment in the Air Force. However, this investment is restricted entirely to capabilities for tactical and strategic lift, the sole purpose of which is to deliver and logistically support the Army following the principles laid out by General Hillier in June 2003. As CDS he stated specifically that the new airplanes are needed to support the mission in Afghanistan. But, it should be noted that these new aircraft will come too late for the current mandate thus there should be no need to rush these particular procurements at the expense of so many other air and naval capabilities critical to the immediate defence of Canada.

What is needed is a Government Defence Policy based on our National Interests that will lead to a Defence Plan which would explain why and how the Defence Policy will be achieved. Lacking a firm policy foundation based on Canadian National Interests, interests that impact on the very foundations of the country, such as sovereignty and our ability to trade, we seem to have a series of short term decisions based on the belief that only tactical level land engagements – "boots on the ground" – can contribute to Canada's security and curry favour

with Allies. But history and reality teach us that nations have interests while nations also tend not to have long memories, unless perhaps the memory is a lingering hurt. Canada's "boots on the ground" in both World Wars had little effect on our post war international standing. The endless draining rotations of battle groups through the Balkans in the 1990s failed to get Canada a seat at the table crafting the Dayton Accord; neither have our more recent efforts in Afghanistan realized any resolution of the significant cross-border trade or other issues vital to Canada's interests.

The false premise that only "boots on the ground" count is leading furthermore to a wilful ignorance of real and potential threats to Canada's National Interests. If one believes that only "boots on the ground" count, one can ignore reports that China has some one thousand spies operating in Canada, that its officials have threatened Los Angeles with an ICBM attack if the U.S. joins in the defence of Taiwan, that they operate a huge Arctic research ship in the Canadian Western Arctic Basin, and that it has had naval battles with Vietnam and the Philippines over oceanic resource claims. One would also be able to dismiss the President of Russia's veiled threat of an attack on Poland or the Czech Republic if they join the emerging NATO/U.S. missile defence pact. Essentially the "boots on the ground" focus allows one to ignore the reality of the threats facing this country. Thus one can also ignore the fundamental importance of the Navy and the Air Force both for the security of Canada and for how Canada chooses to contribute to a secure global environment. But one cannot suggest that a defence plan based on this premise and a total focus on failed and failing states addresses the most significant threats to Canadian National Interests.

Canada has the longest coastline of any country. The offshore Exclusive Economic Zone through which our (and a considerable percentage of U.S.) seaborne trade passes is equivalent in size to the combined area of Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. Forty percent of our exports move by sea. Twenty-five percent of our known oil reserves are offshore. Canada is surrounded by oceans on, over and under which an adequate navy and air force can operate to keep us secure from threats that can only approach us through those routes. The unfettered control of Canada's ocean areas and the unfettered use of the world's oceans – including our ability to deny unfettered use to our enemies – is a vital National Interest to Canada.

The Pugliese article of 31 January 2007 demonstrates that, to implement the emerging plan, the Navy and the Air Force will be significantly cut to pay for an enlarged and enhanced Army. This plan essentially

disposes of the Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft, at least one if not all of the remaining destroyers, and the Navy's two remaining replenishment ships, with the dubious promise of future investment (one destroyer and a replenishment ship already were disposed of in the 1990s, supposedly to reduce operating costs in order to save for future capital investment, not yet undertaken). These cuts will cripple the ability of Canada to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction in her ocean approaches as well as to deploy internationally should the Government direct. Mr Pugliese's warning is supported by the strong land-focused wording in the governments RPP for 2006/2007, which states:

"Defence will benefit from the Land Force operational experiences, both positive and negative, that enable adaptation to the challenges of today's ever-evolving operating environment".

This planned reduction in Canada's defence capability is playing out without either a national debate or, it would seem, an understanding within government of the strategic impact of cutting the Navy by over twenty percent and our manned maritime air surveillance capability by one hundred percent. Reductions such as these, even over a short period of time, will diminish Canada's ability to defend and assert her sovereignty and security in her ocean approaches or internationally. These cuts also hazard our economic well-being as without unfettered use of the seas our ability to trade and exploit offshore resources will be in jeopardy as will our ability to contribute to the security of North America. Foreign policy options will be reduced and become more restrictive as will our collective security contributions. Moreover, it could well cede sovereignty to other nations.

Government and DND/CF leadership need to recognize that navies, air forces and armies fulfill differing functions, even today. Navies take a long time to develop and to build, but provide government with a longer lasting and wider range of independent national options, spanning the spectrum from diplomatic to combat. They directly affect the defence, security and sovereignty of Canada while permitting the independent projection of power worldwide, without the need for over-flight clearances or basing and landing rights. Air forces also directly affect the defence, security and sovereignty of Canada. Admittedly neither the Navy (without a marine corps) nor the Air Force can occupy foreign land – only the Army can. But the Army can neither affect the defence, security and the sovereignty of Canada, nor can it operate internationally without the agreement of other nations, nor can it deploy without air and sea support.

Given the strategic importance of air forces and navies, the apparent intent to sacrifice them for an expanded army is perplexing and short sighted. One must ask, what was the basis of this plan? What "future strategic" environment is envisaged that Canada no longer is required to defend herself, has no national maritime interests, or that future governments will not require their most flexible military tool (the Navy)? The importance of the Navy and its inherent military and political value to the nation was recognized by the government in its response to *The Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs – Facing Our Responsibilities*, which stated:

"The Government recognizes the importance of maintaining a command and control and air defence capability for its naval task groups. These capabilities have proven to be of tremendous value to the nation in times of crisis such as the Gulf War and Operation APOLLO. In both cases the capabilities of the Iroquois class destroyers have resulted in Canadian officers being assigned major command functions, including control of the forces of other nations".

The constant strategic reality throughout our history is that Canada has relied on the sea both to move her trade, to defend herself and to go to war. Strategically, the most important aspect of our security has been and will continue to be the ability to use the world's oceans. Protected in the decades after Confederation first by Great Britain and then by the United States, Canada emerged during the Second World War as a full partner, ensuring that both the Atlantic and the Pacific formed an effective moat, securing the homeland. The importance of being able to operate anywhere in the world's oceans to ensure that national or vital interests are met was pointed out succinctly by the noted British Historian Niall Ferguson when recently observing on the general decline of Western sea power, with particular reference to Canada:

"Without Canadian pilots the Battle of Britain might well have been lost. Without Canadian sailors, the Battle of the Atlantic surely would have been."

He is correct; a lost Atlantic campaign would have led directly to the capitulation of Great Britain and the loss of the war.

Another noted British historian, Paul Kennedy, similarly compelled to observe on the dire present situation, stated that it was the Allied navies that were the

constant and unchallengeable wall that stood against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Canada's small but effective navy was part of that wall, ensuring both that a seaborne threat to our country would be stopped, and that the war-winning capacity of a thriving North American economy could therefore be deployed. This strategic reality has allowed Canada to contribute to the security of the NATO area and to move forces in support of Europe, in addition to providing for the maritime defence of North America. Essentially, North America, though not immune from attack, was then and is now immune from a seaborne invasion.

Paradoxically, that provision of security from seaborne invasion includes also the ability to deploy that capability independently world wide, increasing the government's options. Even if a land operation fails, with a capable Navy and Air Force Canada will remain territorially secure with the ability to project power, to secure our trade and to operate anywhere in the world's oceans. But without maritime and air power the country remains open to attack from the sea and no land deployment could ever counter this vulnerability.


It is recognized that Canada has both limited resources and regrettably limited political capital to spend on the security of the nation. Essentially, governments tend to find more voter-friendly issues to focus limited tax dollars on than national defence and security. As a result, any defence plan needs to ensure, first the strategic

security and well-being of the nation, and second how best to contribute to overall global security. In both cases, balance is always a sound strategic footing to ensure strategic surprises can be countered. Balance between the operational forces of the CF and within each operational force would ensure there remains resident in the CF the range of capabilities needed to secure our sovereignty as well as provide government the expeditionary tools that it may desire. But in formulating such a plan there is the need for a sound foreign policy foundation and a ready willingness for the CF to truly transform to meet the nation's needs free from service bias. As Paul Kennedy has further correctly pointed out:

“One of the dangers of wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan is that they soak up resources and intellectual bandwidth. It is said that generals always fight the last war. Another way of stating that is to say they believe the war they are fighting now will go on forever in some form. That belief leads to neglect of capabilities that appear superfluous for the current conflict. That is the true hollowing-out that extended warfare creates. It is an intellectual hollowing-out.”

To avoid falling victim to just such an intellectual hollowing-out, the leadership of the DND/CF must focus neither on a single operation, nor especially on a single service. Our leaders need to take a strategic approach to ensure that Canada has balanced capabilities. They need moreover to present the case to government, based on logical strategic analysis, of the panoply of actual and emerging threats to Canada. Only then will the government adequately resource the CF and not resort, as Senator Kenny has characterized it, to “defence on the cheap”. Finally, our Parliamentary leaders would be wise to take the sage counsel of Woodrow Wilson:

“A powerful Navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural means of defense; and it has always been of defense that we have thought, never of aggression or of conquest. But who shall tell us now what sort of Navy to build? We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas, in the future as in the past; and there will be no thought of offense or provocation in that. Our ships are our natural bulwarks.”



General (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers (L), President of Defence Associations National Network (DANN), presents a donation, following the cessation of the activities of DANN, to General (Ret'd) Paul Manson (R), President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), toward the continuation of the Institute's activities. Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Lessons learned at the Western Front

by Elizabeth Sneyd



The Western Front is a behemoth that cannot truly be understood and appreciated unless you are able to visit in person. Once you do visit, it is all too easy to become lost in the dates and statistics that pepper each battlefield site. And it is all too easy for the sites to overlap and blur, unless you find something, be

it a picture, a story, or a relic that will give you a point that you can directly relate to. Then suddenly everything falls into focus.

I was fortunate that I was able to experience such moments of clarity throughout our recent trip to France and Belgium, because it gave me a great deal of insight into the First World War. My fiancé, Steve, and I were part of a large group from Kingston on a tour that visited nearly all of the battlefields on which the 21st Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force fought. Our group included serving and retired members of the Princess of Wales' Own Regiment and other units of the Canadian Forces, family members, individuals who had ties to the members of the 21st Battalion, and our excellent guides Clive and David from Battle Honours Limited.

My first epiphany, if you like, came on the first day of our trip, after only a few hours of touring. Our first visit that day had been to the German cemetery at Neuville-St. Vaast. Being used to Commonwealth cemeteries, I found the dark metal crosses grim. It was quite eerie, despite the warm sunshine, to see Christians and Jews buried alongside each other, with no distinction other than the symbols of their faith, and I thought of Otto Frank and others like him who had served in the German Army during the First World War, only to have his family destroyed in the Second.

Our next stop was Notre Dame de Lorette, with its famous lighthouse, housing the remains of unknown soldiers from the First World War onwards, and guarded by French veterans. Again, the crosses, this time of white stone, stretched row on row as far as the eye could see. Within the base of the lighthouse were the coffins of some of France's Unknown Soldiers, guarded by elderly *hommes en béret*. It was at Notre Dame de Lorette that

I really began to grasp the enormity of the First World War, and I was overwhelmed. It wasn't until we reached Vimy Memorial Park shortly afterwards that I was able to process what I had seen.

We had the opportunity to wander around the trenches at Vimy for a bit. I was struck by the terrain of the trench area – the craters of war were everywhere, but



Canada Mourning Her Lost, the Canadian National Vimy Memorial. Photo by Lieutenant Steven Dieter

they were covered in brilliant spring grass and shadowed by Canadian-born pine trees. After we followed the paths for a bit, Steve asked “Do you want to go to the memorial or the cemetery?” Since we were going to the rededication the next day anyway, I said “Let’s go to the cemetery instead”, little realizing the impact that this visit would have.

The stone was slightly mottled by years of exposure, but gleamed white in the Easter sunshine. It sat at the end of a row that contained a number of members of the 75th Battalion. It had a simple inscription on a tombstone that read “LIEUTENANT C.D. HEWSON,

Ms. Elizabeth Sneyd was the 2006-07 Project officer, and remains on contract with the CDA Institute as Special Events Co-ordinator

75TH BN, CANADIAN INF, 9TH APRIL 1917, AGE 20". Charles Hewson was my great-grandmother's cousin, and the only member of my known family to have died in the First World War. He was killed within the first few hours of the assault on Vimy Ridge, just over a year after enlisting.

I knew that Charles was buried in the area but didn't know where exactly. As a surprise, Steve found the exact location over the Internet and led me straight there. To me, seeing Charles' grave after visiting countless rows of strangers was like being struck by lightning. He was a distant relation and buried in a distant land, one of millions, but he was kin nonetheless, and I now had a personal perspective on the War that I had never had before. We stood by his grave for a while, the first of the family (we figured) to visit him in ninety years, and talked about what we knew about him and what he may have been like. All too soon, though, we had to return to our tour bus and our tour group, but we promised that we would return to see Charlie's grave again.

There were a number of twinges of insight at the Vimy Memorial rededication ceremony held the next day. There was an undercurrent of solemnity to the day, in part because the news that six Canadian soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan the day before, but for the most part, the crowd seemed to be in a celebratory, patriotic mood. The air on that Easter Monday was full of familiar sounds: the roar of the guns, the screams of the Mirages as they flew by, the drone of the pipes, the blare of the trumpets. Even the speeches were familiar, but familiarity certainly does not breed contempt in these matters.

It was a new sound that made me pause and again think of the First World War in a different way. After the lone piper had played atop the ramparts of Vimy, a young Métis fiddler stepped forward and began to play. It struck me that here was the one musical instrument that soldiers on both sides of the battle would have identified with, no matter what their heritage. For me, then it became a lament for the Lost Generation, no matter what side they were on.

Although we saw many memorials over the subsequent days – Beaumont Hamel, Thiepval, the Menin Gate, the Brooding Soldier, even the Arc de Triomphe – Vimy was a unique experience in many respects. I came to see the Vimy Memorial as a symbol of Canada's coming-of-age by fire. Just as the pylons at Vimy emerge from the names of the Missing, Canada emerged from its losses in the First World War a more mature nation. It is a stark contrast with the Menin Gate and to the memorial at Thiepval where I got the impression of the old British Empire, bowed down with grief, holding her lost children close to her, like a *pietà*.

The town of Ieper (more commonly known by the spelling "Ypres") caused a great deal of reflection on my part. It was a marvel of what humanity can accomplish in response to war. Nearly completely destroyed by German shelling during the First World War, the town was resurrected by its own people, and rebuilt in its old form. This, to me, was and is somewhat unusual. Generally, after a city is destroyed by war or by natural disaster, civic leaders seize the opportunity to rebuild the city according to their own vision. It has happened in London, in Paris, in Kobe. To be sure, the rebuilding process sometimes takes on a greater meaning. In Nagasaki, in Dresden, in Coventry, and countless other cities, the scars of war have been incorporated into post-war architecture, to serve as a reminder of the city's history. This is not quite the case in Ieper. While the reconstructed buildings incorporate relics of Ieper's war experience as details, a good number of the buildings themselves are reproductions of what were destroyed during the War. Walk from the Menin Gate to the Cloth Hall, and you feel as if you have stepped back in time. It must have brought great satisfaction to the town's survivors that they were able to triumph over those who had destroyed their home by rebuilding it the way it was before. Indeed, the spirit of overcoming the adversities of war can be felt all along the Western Front.

Until I went to France and Belgium, the First World War felt almost as distant as the War of 1812, and I am sure that this would be the case for most Canadians my age and younger. Once I visited the Western Front and saw the battlefields and memorials for myself, I realized how little I actually knew. Thankfully, I had excellent guides. Steve, as a military historian, was always willing to answer questions that I had. Clive and David passed on a great deal of information and enlivened our tour with innumerable stories of individuals, putting a human face on what we saw. Much as my visits to Hiroshima and to Nagasaki brought home to me the realities of nuclear



*Ieper: the Cloth Hall and main square.
Photo by Lieutenant Steven Dieter*

war, our trip to the battlefields has given me a better understanding of the traumas experienced and endured on the frontlines themselves, and a better understanding of how peoples can survive death and destruction and

rebuild. While the soldiers who died along the Western Front would no doubt be disappointed that world peace is as elusive now as ever, they may rest easy knowing that their mission was accomplished. All is quiet on the Western Front.

Book Review

A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar

Paul Dickson

Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein



Harry Crerar was never very well known. As General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of First Canadian Army, he was a grey figure to the soldiers under his command. To Canadians today, all those who know nothing of the Second

World War, he is simply not on the radar, a figure totally absent from our history. Paul Dickson's able biography, the first of this important player in our military history, aims to address this gross imbalance and does so successfully.

Born in Hamilton in comfortable circumstances, Crerar went to Upper Canada College and then the Royal Military College from which he graduated in 1909. He joined the militia artillery and in 1914 went overseas with the First Contingent as a captain. He had a good war, seeing heavy fighting, and rising from battery captain to Staff Officer, Royal Artillery at Canadian Corps headquarters, and then, as a lieutenant-colonel, to Counter-Battery Staff Officer in late 1918. Along the way, he came to the favourable attention of Andy McNaughton, the Corps' chief artillery theorist and practitioner, and of Major Alan Brooke, one of the many British staff officers who made the Corps function so well. Both would have huge influence on Crerar's subsequent career.

Crerar left the army in 1919 but, his mother having left him some money and his wife, the beautiful "Verse" Cronyn, supportive, he joined the Permanent Force the next year as a temporary lieutenant colonel. Over the

course of the next two decades, he had a not-untypical career of training, schooling in the United Kingdom, and staff positions. Crerar was an intelligent man, and in his Ottawa stints he became friends with some of the rising bureaucrats in External Affairs like Lester Pearson and, as a member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, with some of the leading businessmen in the country. He was an imperialist but also a nationalist and he believed in preparedness, all such views leading him into verbal battles with isolationists and the many true believers in the League of Nations as a global panacea. When the Second World War began in September 1939, Crerar was a brigadier and the Commandant of RMC. But at the same time, he had been shuttling back and forth to Ottawa to draft the nation's mobilization plans.

At once, Crerar was sent overseas to fill the role that eventually became the key position at Canadian Military Headquarters in London. Quickly, he made himself one of the key advisors to McNaughton (who was at that time GOC of First Canadian Division), to the War Office where friends he had served with in the Great War or at the Imperial Defence College were in crucial positions. He also served as an advisor with the High Commission, where Mike Pearson ran the show while nominally under Vincent Massey, and with the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa. It was a politico-military role of the kind Crerar had trained all his military life to fill. And all the time, Crerar politicked on his own behalf—for promotion to major-general so he could hold his own at the War Office; for command of Second Canadian Division which went for blatantly political reasons to Victor Odlum of British Columbia; and for higher pay for himself. He knew Defence minister Norman Rogers well—Rogers was M.P. for Kingston and Crerar, as RMC commandant, dealt frequently with him—and he lobbied him shamelessly on his own behalf and, it must be said, for the changes the army needed to become a good fighting force.

Historian J.L. Granatstein is the author of Whose War Is It? He was Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century and Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum. He is also a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute

Soon Crerar was Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa. To him fell the task of implementing home defence conscription, of raising men for new divisions, and of persuading the Mackenzie King government, worried about Quebec opinion, that Canada could do more in the war without imposing conscription for overseas service. It was Crerar who twisted arms to get the government to agree to establish First Canadian Army. It was also Crerar who wanted troops to be sent to Hong Kong and, although careers were destroyed by the debacle there, no one laid a glove on Harry who, by the time the Royal Commission did its analysis, was back in England commanding a corps. Then, while McNaughton was in Canada on leave, Crerar pressed for Canadians to be given the lion's share of the Dieppe raid, largely on the grounds that the troops were bored after their years in England and public opinion at home needed a boost. He was right, but not even the disaster at Dieppe could do anything to slow his inexorable rise.

And all the time Crerar was in London, he worked to undercut McNaughton. Andy was a flawed figure, a dabbler at military command who was not interested in training and apparently incapable of commanding troops in the field. But Crerar talked behind his back to High Commissioner Massey, a man well-connected to British politicians. He met frequently with his friend Brooke, now Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and he made sure that when the Canadian and British authorities combined to force McNaughton from command, he was the only logical successor.

So it would be Crerar who would lead First Canadian Army into battle. First he had a few months seasoning in Italy, commanding I Canadian Corps, a sojourn most notable for his hissy fit against Guy Simonds, the one Canadian field commander who had made a mark.

The correspondence between the two is a study in military psychopathology, but to me it looks like nothing so much as Harry trying to cut the much younger Guy down to size. Their relationship for the rest of the war was fragile, a relationship worsened by General Bernard Montgomery's contempt for Crerar and admiration for Simonds.

Monty kept Crerar's Army headquarters away from the Normandy battle until August 1944, and even then Crerar's role, like that of all army commanders, was one of coordinating the corps under his command, rather than directing the battles. Crerar also was Canada's national army commander, responsible to Ottawa as much or more than he was to Monty's 21 Army Group. This led to some terrible fights and to Monty at one point trying to sack Crerar only to realize that he couldn't—only Ottawa could do that. In fact, Crerar did his job at First Canadian Army with skill, keeping the national interest foremost while simultaneously making sure that the troops had what they needed. Even the conscription crisis of late 1944 did him no damage.

Thus Harry Crerar. He was a political general, a master of memoranda, a shrewd maker of policy, a soldier unlike the other field commanders. His role in a sense was more akin to Eisenhower's, though he lacked Ike's charm and ability to get balky horses to pull together in harness. Crerar was not a great man, however, because his own interests, his own status, perks and pay, mattered too much to him. But he was genuinely the indispensable man in the Canadian Army, the very best we had. Paul Dickson has done a fine job in telling Crerar's story, warts and all, and given his subject's central role, he has in fact presented us with a history of the army from 1914 to 1945.

Paul Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. PP. 569, \$55.00



Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, Air Marshal A.M. Coningham, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, and Air Chief Marshal Sir T.L. Leigh-Mallory meet at First Canadian Army Headquarters, 4 Aug 1944. Ken Bell photo, PAC 129122.

NATIONAL OFFICE STAFF/L'EXÉCUTIF NATIONAL

Executive Director/Directeur exécutif: Colonel (Ret) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD, (613) 236-1252; **Executive Secretary and Treasurer/Secrétaire exécutif et Secrétaire-trésorier:** Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) G.D. Metcalfe, CD, (613) 236-9903/1252; **Project Officer/Officier des projets:** Mr. Arnav Manchanda, MA, (613) 236-9903; **Archivist/Archiviste:** Major (Ret'd) G.V. Clark, CD, (613) 828-6124; **Honourary Counsel/Avocat-conseil honoraire:** Mr. Gavin Freitag, Esq.; **Public Affairs Officer/Officier de relations publiques:** Captain (Ret'd) P.W. Forsberg, CD, (613) 236-9903

ON TRACK is published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Submissions on past and present defence issues, news of CDA member associations and of associate members, and letters to the editor are encouraged. Forward to the attention of the editor at the address below.

ON TRACK est publié par l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la Défense. Nous encourageons les soumissions d'articles sur des questions de défense, les faits nouveaux ayant trait aux membres et associations de la CAD et également les lettres à éditeur. Veuillez faire parvenir vos soumissions à l'adresse indiquée ci-dessous.

ATTENTION NEWSPAPER EDITORS/ATTENTION AUX ÉDITEURS DE JOURNAUX

Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from *ON TRACK*. A credit line is desired. For inquiries contact the Public Affairs Officer, Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg, CD at: (tel) (613) 236 -9903; (fax) (613) 236-8191; (e-mail) pao@cda-cdai.ca.

Vous est permit de reproduire, intégralement ou en partie, les articles du *ON TRACK*, en donnant le crédit à la publication. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez vous adresser à l'officier des relations publiques, le Capitaine (ret) Peter Forsberg, CD au numéro de téléphone (613) 236-9903; télécopieur (613) 236-8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca.

L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense

Donateur - formulaire d'adhésion

222 rue Somerset Ouest, Pièce 400B, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2G3

Tél: (613) 236-9903 Fax: (613) 236-8191 Courriel: treasurer@cda-cdai.ca URL: cda-cdai.ca

Chèque/mandat poste
 Patron (\$ 1,000+) Master Card
 Compagnon (\$ 500) VISA Numéro _____
 Date d'expiration: _____ Signature: _____
 Officier (\$ 300) Nom: _____
 Associé (\$ 150) Adresse: _____
 Supporter (\$ 75) Ville: _____ Prov: ____ Code postal: _____ Tél: (____) ____-_____

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Donor Application Form

222 Somerset Street West, Ste 400B, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2G3

Tel: (613) 236-9903 Fax: 236-8191 E-mail: treasurer@cda-cdai.ca URL: cda-cdai.ca

Cheque/Money Order
 Patron (\$ 1,000+) Master Card
 Companion (\$ 500) VISA Number _____
 Expiry Date: _____ Signature: _____
 Officer (\$ 300) Name: _____
 Associate (\$ 150) Address: _____
 Supporter (\$ 75) City: _____ Prov: ____ Postal Code: _____ Tel: (____) ____-_____