



# ON TRACK

SPRING / PRINTEMPS 2009

VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1

**Canada-US Defence Relations After the Obama Visit**

**It Didn't Have to Be This Way**

**Canadian Forces in Afghanistan - Then, Now and Beyond**

**The Impact of Missile Defence on China's "Minimum Deterrence" Nuclear Posture**

**Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan**



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**COVER PHOTO:** A CH-147 Chinook helicopter prepares to sling bridge segments during a combat engineering exercise at Camp Wainwright AB. **PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE:** Un hélicoptère Chinook ch-147 se prépare à élinguer des segments de pont pendant un exercice d'ingénierie de combat au Camp Wainwright AB.

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## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

## MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

We are pleased to begin the 14<sup>th</sup> year of publication of the CDA Institute's ON TRACK. The quarterly journal is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes significant value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada, with the presentation of excellent articles by experts in those fields.



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

We feature in this edition of ON TRACK articles of current significance in the areas of, among others, national defence and security, Canada-U.S. relations, Afghanistan, Islamism, the Chinese concept of minimum defence, artillery ammunition, and U.S. employer support.

It is noteworthy that Ottawa was the first foreign capital to be visited by the U.S. President soon following his election. Paul Chapin writes, in *'Canada-US Defence Relations After the Obama Visit'*, that President Obama's visit to Ottawa was a policy triumph for Canada. He provides an analysis of the importance of Canada's relations with the United States. Mr. Chapin is a research associate with Defence Management Studies at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University, and is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Colonel George Petrolekas notes that in Afghanistan ill-considered decisions long ago have come back to haunt us. In *'It didn't Have to be this way'* Colonel Petrolekas details the policy decisions and their outcome. He concludes that the time for blame is past now; it is how we apply our lessons going forward that is of import now.

The Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan demands a far greater level of coordination and cohesion among stakeholder agencies of Government than ever before. Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier provides an overview of the extent of the CF's presence in the Afghan theatre from early 2002 to today, and notes, in *'Canadian Forces in Afghanistan – Then, Now, and Beyond'*, the influences that will bear on the CF's military emphasis. Lieutenant-General Gauthier is the Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command.

C'est avec plaisir que nous commençons la 14<sup>ème</sup> année de publication de ON TRACK, la publication de l'Institut de la CAD. Cette revue trimestrielle est un important véhicule grâce auquel l'Institut apporte une valeur significative à la discussion des questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la présentation d'excellents articles rédigés par des experts de ces domaines.

Dans la présente édition de ON TRACK nous présentons des articles de grande actualité, notamment dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, des relations Canada-U.S., de l'Afghanistan, du concept chinois de défense minimum, des munitions d'artillerie et du soutien aux employeurs des États-Unis.

Il est remarquable qu'Ottawa ait été la première capitale étrangère à être visitée par le président des États-Unis, tôt après son élection. Paul Chapin écrit, dans *« Canada-US Defence Relations After the Obama Visit »*, que la visite du Président Obama à Ottawa fut un triomphe politique d'Ottawa. Il donne une analyse de l'importance des relations du Canada avec les États-Unis. M. Chapin est associé de recherche aux Defence Management Studies de la School of Policy Studies de l'Université Queen's et un des directeurs de l'Institut de la CAD.

Le Colonel George Petrolekas note que, en Afghanistan, des décisions mal mûries prises il y a longtemps sont revenues nous hanter. Dans *« It didn't Have to be this way »*, le Colonel Petrolekas examine en détail les décisions en matière de politiques et ce à quoi elles ont abouti. Il conclut que le moment est maintenant passé de distribuer les reproches et que, ce qui importe maintenant, c'est la façon dont nous appliquons les leçons que nous avons apprises, au moment où il faut aller de l'avant.

La mission des Forces canadiennes en Afghanistan exige un niveau de coordination et de cohésion beaucoup plus élevé qu'auparavant entre les organismes gouvernementaux qui y ont partie prenante. Le Lieutenant-Général Michel Gauthier présente un aperçu d'ensemble de l'étendue de la présence des FC dans le théâtre afghan, depuis le début de 2002 à aujourd'hui, et il note, dans *« Canadian Forces in Afghanistan – Then, Now, and Beyond »*, les influences qui auront un effet sur l'emphase militaire accordée par les FC. Le Lieutenant-Général Gauthier est commandant du Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada.

One Canadian initiative of which we should be proud was the creation by the Canadian Forces (CF) of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A). While there has been debate in some quarters regarding the appropriateness of the SAT-A operating under the leadership of the CF which resulted in its closure, Roy Thomas provides a historical overview of the circumstances which led to the creation of the SAT-A in ‘*Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan*’.

Last January and February, some 3,000 soldiers, mostly from Canadian Forces Base Valcartier who form the current operational task force in Afghanistan, underwent training in Fort Bliss, Texas, in conditions similar to those they will face in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Gilles Paradis reports on his visit to observe the troops in training, in ‘*Un dernier tour de piste à Fort Bliss*’.

We wonder to what extent is the Islamists’ radical view of the world representative of the thinking of mainstream Islam. General (Ret’d) Paul Manson provides us with some thought on this challenging issue, in ‘*Dealing with Islamism*’. General (Ret’d) Manson is a former President of the CDA Institute and is a Member of the Institute’s Board of Directors.

Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, outlines the challenges that both reservists and business are facing in the United States, in ‘*Employer Support*’. While Mr. Spiegel’s provides us with an informed analysis of those challenges that are extensive in the United States, a not dissimilar situation has slowly begun to occur in Canada.

We are reminded that “there are no atheists in a foxhole” in Anne Frances Cation’s article, ‘*Onward Christian Soldiers?*’ Anne outlines the mission of the military’s chaplaincy and provides an overview of the work of our chaplains. Ms. Cation is an Associate at the Canadian International Council.

We have seen the published Agence France Presse photo of a number of white phosphorous pads from an M875 A1 round falling into a United Nations school in Beit Lahia, Gaza. Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald provides us with a review of the development and use of smoke ammunition in, ‘*White Phosphorous in Gaza – New Accusations of War Crimes*’. Colonel (Ret’d) MacDonald is CDA Senior Defence Analyst and Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Thomas Adams writes, in ‘*The Impact of Missile Defence on China’s “Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear Posture*’,

Une initiative canadienne dont nous devrions être fiers, ce fut la création, par les Forces canadiennes, de l’Équipe consultative stratégique - Afghanistan (ECS-A). Malgré qu’il y ait eu dans certains lieux un débat concernant l’à-propos du fonctionnement de l’ECS-A sous le leadership des FC, qui a abouti à sa fermeture, Roy Thomas nous donne, dans son article « *Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan* », un aperçu historique des circonstances qui ont mené à la création de l’ECS-A.

En janvier et février, quelque 3 000 soldats, la plupart de la Base des Forces canadiennes Valcartier, qui forment la force opérationnelle présente en Afghanistan, ont fait de l’entraînement au Fort Bliss (Texas), dans des conditions semblables à celles auxquelles ils vont faire face en Afghanistan. Dans « *Un dernier tour de piste à Fort Bliss* », le Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gilles Paradis fait rapport de sa visite d’observation des troupes à l’entraînement.

Nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure le point de vue des islamistes sur le monde est représentatif de la pensée de l’Islam de tout le monde. Le Général (ret.) Paul Manson nous livre quelques réflexions sur ce problème difficile dans son article « *Dealing with Islamism* ». Le Général (ret.) Manson est un ancien président de l’Institut de la CAD et un des directeurs de l’Institut de la CAD.

Dans son article « *Employer Support* », Jayson Spiegel, ancien directeur général de la Reserve Officers Association of the United States, décrit les défis que les réservistes aussi bien que les entreprises doivent affronter aux États-Unis. Même si M. Spiegel nous donne une analyse informée de défis qui sont répandus aux États-Unis, il commence à se produire au Canada une situation qui n’est pas sans ressembler à la situation américaine.

« Il n’y a pas d’athées dans un trou de tirailleur », nous rappelle-t-on dans l’article d’Anne Frances Cation intitulé « *Onward Christian Soldiers ?* » Anne décrit la mission de l’aumônier militaire et donne un aperçu du travail de nos aumôniers. Mlle Cation est « associée » au Conseil international du Canada.

Nous avons vu la photo publiée par l’Agence France Presse, d’un certain nombre de plaquettes blanches phosphoreuses provenant d’une ronde de M875 A1 tombant dans une école des Nations Unies à Beit Lahia (Gaza). Le Colonel (Ret) Brian MacDonald nous donne une revue du développement et de l’utilisation des munitions fumigènes dans « *White Phosphorous in Gaza – New Accusations of War Crimes* ». Le Colonel (Ret) MacDonald est l’analyste principal de la défense de la CAD et un des directeurs de l’Institut de la CAD.

Thomas Adams écrit, dans « *The Impact of Missile Defence on China’s “Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear*

that some analysts have suggested that ballistic missile defence will lead to a shift in China's nuclear doctrine of "minimum deterrence" with corresponding increases in its strategic nuclear forces. He challenges this analysis. Thomas is the Strategic Studies Officer at the Canadian International Council.

In 'R2P as a doctrine' Eric Morse writes that two of the sustaining myths of Canada's perception of itself in the world are our history and role as peacekeepers and our adherence to 'soft power' in conflict prevention and resolution. To this is now added the new concept of Responsibility to Protect. Eric provides a critical analysis of the concept. Eric is the Director of Communications of the Royal Canadian Military Institute and is a former officer of the Canadian Foreign Service.

Arnav Manchanda reviews Sally Armstrong's book, *'Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan's Women'*, which outlines the progress made in women's rights in post-Taliban Afghanistan and the threats posed to that progress by retrograde elements in society and by insecurity. Arnav Manchanda is the new CDA Defence Policy Analyst.

Ms Bonnie Butlin reviews Dr. David Bercuson's book, *'The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan'*. Bonnie notes that Bercuson's book introduces three important lines of discussion in Canada which she outlines in her review. Ms. Butlin is a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum (SDF) Intern, employed as the Project Officer with the CDA Institute.

Dr. David Anido has provided a review of the book, *'The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11'*, written by Lawrence Wright. David writes that the "road" in the book's title refers to the five-decade span of detailed and broad analysis as to how Osama Bin-Laden became a cave-dwelling terrorist. Dr. Anido is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDAI.

Our 25<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar was held on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February. Its theme, Canada-U.S. Relations – the Security Dimension, was a timely one, given the recent changes of Government in Canada and the United States. The Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar was held, was filled to capacity. The luncheon address was given by Senator Hugh Segal. We heard presentations given by the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs; General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault, former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO; Dr. Mark Katz, George Mason University, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Michael Hart, Simon Riesman Professor of Trade Policy, Carleton University; Dr. Joseph Jockel,

*Posture'*, que certains analystes ont suggéré que la défense antimissile balistique va mener à un déplacement de la doctrine nucléaire de « dissuasion minimum » de la Chine avec une augmentation correspondante dans ses forces nucléaires stratégiques. Il conteste cette analyse. Thomas est agent d'études stratégiques au Conseil international du Canada.

Dans « R2P as a doctrine ». Eric Morse écrit que deux des mythes soutenant la perception que le Canada a de lui-même dans le monde sont notre histoire et notre rôle comme soldats du maintien de la paix et notre adhésion au « soft power » dans la prévention et la résolution de conflits. À cela s'ajoute maintenant le nouveau concept de la « responsabilité de protéger ». Eric donne une analyse critique du concept. Il est directeur des communications du Royal Canadian Military Institute et est un ancien fonctionnaire au Ministère des affaires extérieures.

Arnav Manchanda nous donne un compte rendu du livre de Sally Armstrong, « *Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan's Women* », qui décrit le progrès fait dans les droits des femmes dans l'Afghanistan d'après les Talibans et les menaces que posent à ce progrès les éléments rétrogrades de la société et l'insécurité. Arnav Manchanda est le nouvel analyste des politiques de défense de la CAD.

Mme Bonnie Butlin a lu le livre de David Bercuson, « *The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan* ». Bonnie note que le livre de M. Bercuson introduit trois nouveaux volets de discussion importants au Canada, qu'elle décrit dans son compte rendu.

M. David Anido nous donne un compte rendu du livre « *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* », de Lawrence Wright. David écrit que « the Road », dans le titre du livre, c'est la période de cinq ans d'analyse détaillée et large de la façon dont Osama Bin-Laden est devenu un terroriste qui se terre dans une caverne. M. Anido est un des directeurs de l'Institut de la CAD.

Notre 25<sup>ème</sup> séminaire annuel s'est tenu le 26 février. Son thème, *Les Relations Canada-États-Unis – la dimension de la sécurité*, ne pouvait mieux tomber, étant donné les récents changements de gouvernements au Canada et aux États-Unis. La Salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, où s'est tenu le séminaire, était remplie à capacité. La conférence du déjeuner a été donnée par le Sénateur Hugh Segal. Nous avons entendu des présentations de l'Honorable Lawrence Cannon, ministre des Affaires étrangères, du Général (ret.) Raymond Henault, ancien président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN, de M. Mark Katz, de George Mason University, Washington (D.C.), de M. Michael Hart, Simon Riesman

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Professor and Director, Canadian Studies Programme, St. Lawrence University; Colonel John Blaxland, Defence Attaché, Australian Embassy, Thailand; Dr. Jim Boutilier, Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor, Maritime Forces Pacific; Dr. Norman Friedman; Commander James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College; and Mr. Rafal Rohozinski, the Sec-Dev Group.

There was significant media interest in the seminar, at which simultaneous interpretation was provided. I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received.

The seminar was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, Ambassadors, Senators and MPs, military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College of Canada and from Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, and members of the Canadian public. The day was filled with speakers from across Canada, Australia, and the United States.

Electronic copies of the addresses that were delivered at the seminar are available at <http://www.cdai-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm>.

The conference, continuing on 27 February, was held in conjunction with the 72<sup>nd</sup> annual general meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA). Addresses included those of the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence; General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff; General James Mattis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation; General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., Commander NORAD/US NORTHCOM; Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff; Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff; and Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, Chief of the Air Staff.

Both the annual seminar and the AGM were truly successful, reflecting the general public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and national defence. Our Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, presents a summary of the proceedings in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

The presence of so many speakers from around the world was made possible through the financial assistance of General Dynamics Canada, General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada, Pratt & Whitney Canada, ATCO Frontec, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ADGA Group Consultants, Boeing, the Security and Defence Forum programme of the Department of National Defence, Bombardier, and Defence Management Studies department of the School of Policy Studies at Queen's

Professor of Trade Policy de l'Université Carleton, de M. Joseph Jockel, professeur et directeur du Canadian Studies Programme, St. Lawrence University, du Colonel John Blaxland, attaché de défense, Ambassade de l'Australie, Thaïlande, de M. Jim Boutilier, conseiller en matière de politiques pour l'Asie-Pacifique, Forces maritimes du Pacifique, de M. Norman Friedman, du Commander James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College, et de M. Rafal Rohozinski, du Sec-Dev Group.

Le séminaire, doté d'un service d'interprétation simultanée, a soulevé un grand intérêt chez les médias. J'ai le plaisir de noter les commentaires très positifs que nous avons reçus.

Assistaient au séminaire des membres des Forces canadiennes, des ambassadeurs, des sénateurs et des députés, des attachés militaires, des cadets-officiers du Royal Military College of Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean et des membres du public canadien. La journée a été remplie de conférenciers du Canada, de l'Australie et des États-Unis.

Des copies électroniques des conférences prononcées lors du séminaire sont disponibles à l'adresse <http://www.cdai-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm>.

Le séminaire a enchaîné, le 27 février, sur la 72<sup>ème</sup> assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la Défense (CAD). Des allocutions furent prononcées par l'Honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, le Général Walter Natynczyk, chef d'état-major de la Défense, le Général James Mattis, commandant suprême des Forces alliées de l'OTAN, Transformation, le Général Victor E. Renuart, Jr., commandant de NORAD/US NORTHCOM, le Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre, le Vice-Amiral Drew Robertson, chef d'état-major de la Force maritime, et le Lieutenant-Général Angus Watt, chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne.

Le séminaire annuel et l'AGA ont tous deux été une vraie réussite, qui a été le reflet de l'intérêt accru du public envers le rôle que joue le Canada dans les domaines de la sécurité internationale et de la défense nationale. Notre analyste principal de la défense, le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald, présente un sommaire des délibérations dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*.

La présence de si nombreux conférenciers de tous les points du globe a été rendue possible grâce à l'aide financière de General Dynamics Canada, de General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada, de Pratt & Whitney Canada, d'ATCO Frontec, de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, de ADGA Group Consultants, de Boeing, du programme Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du ministère de la Défense nationale, de Bombardier, ainsi que du département des Defence Management Studies de

University. Coffee for the seminar was generously provided by CSMG of Ottawa. Following the conclusion of the seminar General Dynamics Canada graciously hosted a reception for the attendees.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff, by the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, before some 630 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 20 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go on line at [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy\\_Award/2008%20Award/vimycall09.htm](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/2008%20Award/vimycall09.htm).

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2008 was Monsieur Alec Castonguay, of *Le Devoir* and of *L'Actualité*. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), will be presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website at [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro\\_%20Award/munro\\_media\\_award\\_main.htm](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/munro_media_award_main.htm).

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is very encouraging.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within

la the School of Policy Studies de l'Université Queen's. Le café pour le séminaire a été généreusement fourni par CSMG d'Ottawa. Suite à la conclusion du séminaire, General Dynamics Canada a gracieusement offert une réception à l'intention des personnes présentes.

Une des activités majeures du calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an passé a connu un succès retentissant, avec un nombre record d'excellentes candidatures qui ont été considérées par le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a eu son point culminant avec la remise du prix au Général (ret.) Rick Hillier, ancien chef d'état-major de la Défense, par la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, Juge en chef du Canada, devant les 630 invités d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Cette année, la présentation du Prix Vimy aura lieu le 20 novembre au cours d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui se tiendront à nouveau au Musée canadien de la guerre. Pour que le prix ait vraiment une signification, l'Institut a besoin de vos candidatures pour désigner le récipiendaire de cette année. Même si nous avons déjà reçu un certain nombre de mises en candidature, les associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les individus sont encouragés à nous faire parvenir les dossiers de leurs candidats. Reportez-vous à l'avis d'appel de candidatures qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro et allez en ligne à l'adresse [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy\\_Award/2008%20Award/vimycall09.htm](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Award/2008%20Award/vimycall09.htm).

Ce prix prestigieux, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), sera remis à un ou une journaliste canadien qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité qui touchent le Canada. Le prix s'accompagne d'un prix en argent de 2 500 \$. L'avis d'appel de candidatures paraît aussi dans ce numéro et sur notre site Web, à [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro\\_%20Award/munro\\_media\\_award\\_main.htm](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Munro_%20Award/munro_media_award_main.htm).

Les deux programmes ont connu un succès retentissant l'an dernier. J'ai le plaisir de dire que l'appui accordé à ces programmes par l'industrie canadienne et les particuliers est très encourageant.

Au cours de la dernière année, le gouvernement fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à une telle initiative,



## ON TRACK

Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available on line at <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>.

Thank you. ©

il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés sur les enjeux majeurs des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et des pénuries continues dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins à long terme de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Mais l'Institut de la CAD va continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, ce qui nous permet de réaliser notre mission. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous inviterais à le devenir et à recruter un/e ami/e. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut aussi se les procurer en ligne à l'adresse <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>.

Merci. ©

Warrant Officer Stéphane Grenier, R22eR, was recently decorated with the Medal of Military Valour (MMV), for his valiant conduct when his Section was ambushed in Afghanistan and received heavy fire from insurgents. He exposed himself to great peril when he engaged the enemy to rescue and evacuate two wounded soldiers. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, recognized and thanked Warrant Officer Grenier and other Members of the Canadian Forces for their service to Canada, during the annual general meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations.



L'Adjudant Stéphane Grenier, R22eR, a récemment été décoré de la Médaille de la vaillance militaire (MVM) pour sa vaillante conduite quand sa section a été prise en embuscade en Afghanistan et s'est retrouvée sous un tir nourri des troupes de l'insurrection. Il s'est exposé à un grand péril quand il a engagé l'ennemi pour rescaper et évacuer les soldats blessés. À l'occasion de l'assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense, le Chef d'état-major de la Défense, le Général Walter Natynczyk, a reconnu et remercié l'Adjudant Grenier et d'autres membres des Forces canadiennes pour les services qu'ils ont rendus au Canada.

*Photo by / Photo par Gord Metcalfe*

## Summary of CDA Institute 25<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar and 72<sup>nd</sup> CDA AGM

26-27 February 2009, Ottawa

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald



### **Day 1: Canada-US Relations – The Security Dimension**

#### **Keynote Address**

The Hon Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, began with a quick review of the discussions between President Obama and Prime Minister Harper in which President Obama informed the Prime Minister of the ways in which he saw US foreign policy would change in order to emphasize a new multilateralism, a new approach to Afghanistan, and an emphasis upon “smart power.” He then spoke of the priorities of Canadian foreign policy with particular emphasis on the Canada/US continental bi-lateral, which would see US/Canada cooperation along the defence, security, and economic dimensions and the need to maintain an “open border,” one open to trade but closed to crime and terrorism.

A second priority was that of the Canadian Arctic, and mentioned meetings with the Arctic Council which saw Canada as an Arctic power with special interests in Arctic resources, climate change, security, and sovereignty and the purchase of new Arctic Patrol Ships and a heavy ice-breaker as important facets of that policy.

Other priority areas included cooperation with the US in the G8 discussions and actions against terrorism and the existence of international crime, as well as shared security interests including the protection of North America. Canada would continue cooperation with NATO with a particular emphasis on burden-sharing.

In Afghanistan Canada would continue to focus on security, the training of Afghan National Army elements, and development and governance, all of which would see a stronger Canadian civilian presence than before. In addition Canada would remain engaged in hemispheric matters including the 5<sup>th</sup> Summit of the Americas this fall, as well as contributions to non-proliferation, arms control

and disarmament including the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review.

#### **Special Address: “NATO at 60 from a Military Perspective”**

General (Ret'd) Ray Henault, former Chair of the NATO Military Committee, dealt with three themes: NATO's expanding operations, the process of improving capabilities, and the development of partnership opportunities.

He spoke of the increases and number of taskings in “out of area” roles and contingency operations and the practical problems of coordinating the activities of 26 (soon to be 28) nations, particularly while having to deal with the modernization of forces and development of multi-national forces, especially when the NATO operational tempo conflicted with NATO Transformation's agenda in the competition for limited national resources.

The European members of NATO have found the shift from operations in Europe to “out of area” operations problematic especially with respect to the availability of strategic airlift, and NATO has responded through the development of a force of shared C-17s. He mentioned partnership activities which have included the Partnership for Peace (including four states in Asia), the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as NATO/UN and NATO/EU relations, and the Canadian interest in helping Ukraine.

#### **Panel I – Canada-US Relations Under New Administrations**

##### **Cross Border Economic Relations**

Professor Michael Hart, Carleton University, observed that the visit of President Obama had laid the foundation for progress in the Canada/US relationship. However, Professor Hart noted, there were still obstacles to overcome.

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*Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald is Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations, and Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute*

The global economic situation has no clear solutions to inspire confidence since the problem has been building over the last 10 years. While Canada is the best positioned of all of the OECD states the situation in the US will affect us given that cross-border trade amounts to \$2 billion every day.

Canada/US trade has been in trouble for the last eight years. While the NAFTA impact had been completed by 2000, the events of 2001 created a critical security issue for the US and the border has become “thick” due to the loss of American confidence in Canada as a security partner. This is particularly problematic since our pre-NAFTA “trading relationship” has been replaced by an integrated dual economy.

The auto industry is a key example of cross border parts and assembly integration, with the average auto “crossing the border” six times in its construction. The “thickened border” is more costly for Canada than for the US and the border is increasingly dysfunctional with the number of new rules increasing. We need, therefore, to rethink the border and its regulations to determine whether they are really needed, to reform the border decision processes, and to reduce the 240 informal networks that have appeared.

### Continental Defence

Professor Joseph Jockel, St. Lawrence University, is a long time analyst of US/Canada relations, and is no stranger to the CDA. His remarks followed his previous pattern of trenchant realism. His fundamental thesis was that we have, with the new administration in the US, a fleeting opening to save and restore NORAD, an institution which is now in decline.

NORAD’s original role was the defence of North America from an attack by Soviet bombers and evolved to one of aerospace warning and defence as the USSR shifted to ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile defence was intended but the technology of the time was inadequate to the task and the role was abandoned. Later, with advances in technology, BMD became feasible and the US deployed a limited system. Canada, under then-Prime Minister Martin, declined to participate and since Canadian locations were not required for BMD interceptor basing, the US transferred the tasking from NORAD to USNORTHCOM. Since the two have overlapping roles USNORTHCOM can handle the US air defence role without the participation of NORAD and Canada, with the result that there is a danger that USNORTHCOM and NORAD will be split and NORAD allowed to disappear.

With the election of President Obama the anti-Bush feeling in Canada is gone and there is a narrow window to rethink Canadian participation in North

American BMD. Without such a decision the future of NORAD is obsolescence and termination, neither of which is in Canada’s national security interest.



*The Hon. Lawrence Cannon,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Photo by Gord Metcalfe

### Luncheon Speech: “Keeping Recession Angst from Turning into War: the Civilian-Military Challenge”

Senator Hugh Segal reminded the conference of the lesson of the 1930s when the post-1929 cycle of mid-Depression Europe led irrevocably to reducing military capacity as governments re-allocated spending priorities and let military preparedness fall by the wayside, with the result that a war which could have been stopped with little risk in 1938 led to 50 million dead. His key question for the present was very clear – how do we prevent global recession from turning into global depression, and depression from once again turning to war.

He warned that “this is not the time to let recession dilute the rebuilding of our forces – as some would love to let happen in Treasury Board, PCO, and Finance Canada,” and bluntly rebuked “those who would see a weakened Canada, militarily unable to deploy, politically internalized and parochial, able only follow the lead of others and unable to pay its own way or contribute to the defence of its own interests. Some in the civil service have and are using ‘process uber alles’ to dilute the pursuit of our national objectives. Others simply prefer a quiescent Canada which stands for little, defends less, and has no core principles or strategic goals.”

His closing line, “This is not what we believe in this hall,” got the standing ovation from the audience which it so richly deserved.

## Panel II – Asia-Pacific and Canadian Defence and Security

### Looking West, Not East, to Afghanistan

Colonel John Blaxland, Defence Attaché, Australian Embassy, Thailand, began with a review of Australia’s international deployments, which amount to 3,000 troops world-wide, including 1,100 in Afghanistan, making Australia the largest non-NATO contributor to that mission. He noted that Australia’s geo-strategic interests



*The Hon. Hugh Segal,  
The Senate of Canada*

Photo by Gord Metcalfe

are served by its participation in that mission since Australia is located in Asia-Pacific, in a particularly volatile part of the world, and cited the cases of the terrorist bombings in Bali and of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, as well as the cases of incidents and insurrections in Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga, as well as the need to deal with the effects of the tsunami in Indonesia.

In such a context Australia’s strategic policy pillars include the alliance with the US and a readiness to be engaged in the Asia-Pacific region which relies on the presence of US forces, and the continuing American ability and commitment to the management of the US/China bi-lateral, as well as a willingness for engagement in UN-mandated operations in the area.

## Trade and Security

Dr. Jim Boutilier, Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, noted that all Asia-Pacific nations had been impacted by the global economic crisis, as well their fears of its possible impact driving a radicalized working class. China’s exports, for example, were down 17% and imports down 53%, a measure of the inter-relationship between the Chinese and American economies as well as that between China and other Asian states.

China and India have turned from a strategic focus on their interior space to one focusing on the sea. There are concerns about an emerging India/China maritime rivalry. China is reliant upon the Indian Ocean energy transport routes and has moved naval and military assets into the area to Myanmar and Pakistan which has been worrying the Indians.

The Chinese navy is experiencing rapid growth with the launch of destroyers, frigates, submarines, and support ships. China is preparing the aircraft carrier Varyag, which it acquired from Ukraine, to go to sea and is planning the construction of three additional carriers in the 50,000 tonne class by 2020, of which one will be nuclear-powered.

India has been pursuing the purchase of a former Russian carrier, though the escalating cost of its refurbishment has led to some delay. India has also planned the acquisition of modern submarines. Other states in the area are acquiring submarines as well, including Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. The US has moved an increasing number of its naval assets into the Pacific.

## Regional Balance of Power

Dr. Norman Friedman, defence analyst, New York City, posed a series of strategic questions to ask when looking at regional balance of power issues in the broader Asia-Pacific region: whether deterrence (and self-deterrence) was still operative, what were the war-fighting capabilities of states (and their perception by other states), and the probability of conflict actually taking place. Other factors were the effects of nationalism, internal stability and the Islamic Revolution.

He noted that China was sitting on a volcano, with its regime using nationalism as a means of retaining popular support.

He observed that the immediate effect of the Christian Reformation was the launch of a 30 year war and posed the question as to whether that might be a correct analogy for understanding the current situation in Islam. The Islamic Revolution seems to be characterized

by a rising religious fervour, lethal factionalism, a demand for purity on an impossible scale, and gross xenophobia. Under such circumstances we may be in for a 50 year problem as we try to ride out the storm.

He argued that past experience points to bleak outcomes since bad economic times frequently result in a toxic nationalism in which borders are never just, though nationalism by itself does not finance conquest. He questioned whether an “Asian way to solve disputes” would follow a similar path and suggested that we remember the fate of the League of Nations when depending on ASEAN to be a panacea.

Turning to the Maritime environment he suggested that strategic success rested on the ability to sustain power projection (a function of aircraft carriers) and expeditionary operations (a function of naval logistics). Other key factors are ocean surveillance and a unified command and control system.

He suggested a Chinese operational concept based upon the early neutralization of the Taiwanese air force by missile fire to achieve air dominance, while simultaneously eliminating the Taiwanese navy at the outset, to be followed by an amphibious invasion. He noted that the Chinese have developed a shore bombardment capability and is developing amphibious lift.

**Panel III – Contemporary Security Concerns**

**Arctic Security**

Commander James Kraska, US Naval War College, drew our attention to the fact that US president George W Bush had issued a National Security Policy Directive/ Homeland Security Policy Directive (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) on January 9, 2009 to deal with US Security policy with respect to the Arctic. The Presidential Directive includes objectives for the enhancement of Arctic governance through organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and the eight member Arctic Council, and encourages the US Senate to confirm the US accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, suggesting that the US has sufficient interests that it should proceed to accession to the Treaty.

He cited a CIA study which sees open water in summer by 2025 in both the North East Passage and the North West Passage, which will provide much reduced travel distances, particularly for Asian states, as well as access to new resources. This will result in new players at the Arctic table which will have significant implications for US Homeland Defence (and by extension for Canada).

He noted that the US had vital interests in the Arctic for strategic defence and conventional deterrence. It also had clear national interests in freedom of navigation.



*Panel II - Asia-Pacific and Canadian Defence and Security - l-r: Panelists Dr. Norman Friedman, Dr. Jim Boutlier, and Colonel John Blaxland; with Moderator Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers*

Photo by Gord Metcalfe

The maintenance of strategic access to the Arctic is a key national interest of the US, as is the need for increased US surveillance over the maritime Arctic. The US requires a greater icebreaker capacity than it has at the moment. He also noted that the US and Russia control access to the Western Arctic.

### Strategic Significance of Cyberspace

Rafal Rohozinski, The SecDev Group, challenged the audience to begin to understand that in cyberspace the centre of gravity is not driven by geography but rather by the population. He noted a crucial difference between populations in the developing world and the developed, in that the former are using cyberspace for empowerment rather than for security; the fact that cyberspace has fewer controls than is the case with normal media enhances this empowerment.

He noted that many of today's governing elites are "digital immigrants" who have been introduced to cyberspace through having to cope with it in their workspace, but remain limited in their approaches to using it. Opposed to the "digital immigrants" are the "digital natives," who have grown up with access to cyberspace throughout their entire lives.

He noted that some terrorist organizations are beginning to make the transition from "old Media" to the "New Media." Hezbollah, for example, has moved from Old Media channels such as television, radio, and combat camera to transitional media such as streaming videos on the internet and to New Media such as internet games with a strong ideological/propaganda content.

He also noted the Russian use of "denial of service" attacks on Georgian government websites during the Russo-Georgian war as an example of something which we must plan for in the future. And he expressed some scepticism about the possibility of establishing any sort of deterrence in cyberspace since the domain is so inherently anarchic.

### The Russian Challenge

Professor Mark Katz, George Mason University, noted that the Obama administration inherited some of the Bush administration's views, which has left Russia with deep concerns about the US and its policy with respect to Russia. These concerns include perceived American interference in internal Russian affairs, an unwillingness to accept Russia as a major gas supplier to Europe or to accept that the former Soviet republics in Asia are within a Russian zone of interest, and NATO expansion into the former Soviet strategic space. Russia also has difficulty in accepting that it is not the principal focus of American

policy, since the US is central to Russian foreign policy.

Russia's policies are equally confusing to the West. Russia has taken steps to improve its relations with Iran and together with China has eased UN pressures on Iran. Iran, however, has been less than cooperative and accordingly Russia has been reluctant to sell advanced weaponry such as the S-300 missiles to Iran. Russia fears a US/Iran rapprochement and a parallel sale of US nuclear technology to Iran. It also fears the construction of alternative pipelines through the Caspian/Iran corridor as another development which would make Russia less influential in US policy.



*The Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence*

Photo by Gord Metcalfe

While Russia fears the growth of American influence in Central Asia it also fears the growth of Islamic influence in the area, as well as among its own Muslim population. One consequence has been that Russia's relations with Israel are closer than before.

Going forward Russia will continue to seek US concessions through its leverage obtained by allowing the passage of non-military supplies through its transportation network north of Afghanistan and thereby reducing pressure on the NATO/US supply line through Pakistan. Russia and the US have overlapping concerns over the growth of radical Islamic influence and this may lead to greater cooperation between the two states.

### ***Day 2: "Changing Times, An Evolving Canadian Forces, a New Defence Strategy"***

#### **Introductory Address**

The Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National

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Defence, reminded the audience that the fundamental aim of the Canada First Defence Strategy was to rebuild the Canadian Forces over the period of the next twenty years by addressing the critical gaps in current capabilities and the need to invest in their closure. He noted that the Defence Budget would rise from the current \$18 billion to over \$30 billion by the end of that period.

The government planned to increase the strength of the CF to 100,000, of which 70,000 would be regulars

and 30,000 reserves, though he acknowledged that the current effects of early retirements and increased attrition rates would be challenging.

He observed that the re-equipment process was successfully launched, with the purchase of C-17s and CH-47s, and movement was underway on a variety of other programmes. He acknowledged that there was a deep need to vastly improve the defence procurement system.

He noted that the recent meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Harper, as well as a series of other meetings, represented an era of increased US/Canada cooperation in defence and security matters. He noted that an expansion of the scope of NORAD to include maritime warning, as well as the development of closer working arrangements between USNORTHCOM and Canada Command, were aspects of this cooperation.

He drew the audience's attention to the planned end to the current Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan in 2011, but pointed out that this would not mean an end to Canadian activity there. He remarked that there was still a fundamental need for security if the other activities are to be able to be carried out and suggested that Canadian efforts in reconstruction and development are paralleled by efforts to train the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army, noting that Canada is currently mentoring five battalions of the ANA with success.

### Special Address

It was particularly satisfying to see General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, continue an innovation of his immediate predecessor, General Rick Hillier, in his annual address to the CDA, that of recognizing the contributions made by individual members of the Canadian Forces. This recognition of the contributions of individual members of the Forces by the CDS provides a particularly powerful means of connecting Canadians with the CF, and of connecting the members of the CF with the citizens they have committed to defend and protect.

General Natynczyk began his address with a sweeping overview of the extent of the operational deployment of the CF, noting that we were treating operations within Canada, under Canada Command, as those within a Theatre of Operations, mentioning that the CF Search and Rescue operations were now handling SAR incidents at the rate of about three per day on a 24/7/52 basis.

He flagged the increasing importance of Canada's Arctic as a part of the Canadian Theatre of Operations which relies heavily on the CF's infrastructure and operations, including the patrolling activities of the Canadian Rangers as a means of demonstrating Canadian sovereignty over the area.

Canada Command has become the Headquarters which deals with Canada/US cooperation in such structures as NORAD and USNORTHCOM to jointly manage the continental defence of North America, which may include elements of cross-border support in such non-military areas as natural disaster operations.



General Walter Natynczyk,  
Chief of the Defence Staff

Photo by Gord Metcalfe

The CF is involved in many other missions abroad in addition to those in Afghanistan. Traditional “blue helmet” peacekeeping operations are still a feature of Canada’s contribution to international security, as are those involved with Canadian contributions to the international naval forces dealing with piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

Afghanistan remains the most prominent and most difficult of Canada’s operations abroad. While it will end in 2011, that will not necessarily end all Canadian military commitments to that country. Civilian contributions to reconstruction and development and the improved governance of that country depend on there being a secure environment for those activities.

The CDS looked to the future of the CF, observing that while we cannot predict where we are going to be going next, we still have to be ready to do so. He praised the government’s decisions to improve our equipment capabilities, many of which are already in place and providing us with the “global legs” to respond to contingencies as they may arise. He was pragmatic about the difficulties that remain since it is difficult to reverse rust-out overnight, but was confident that the government commitment to the 20 year financial commitment of the Canada First Defence Strategy was a move in the right direction.

Lastly, he turned to “the people” dimension, admitting that the challenge of “growing” the human resources of the Department of National Defence remains a key priority, since the “demographic bubble” which came from the decisions in the 1990s to effectively stop recruiting has created a difficult experience distribution,



which is being exacerbated by opportunities for individuals to retire after 20, 30 or 35 years of experience. He noted that the operational tempo impact upon families was another contributing factor in the higher attrition rates described a number of measures being taken to reduce the impact upon families. Part of this required attention to the way in which injured and wounded CF members are looked after.

It was a vigorous, optimistic, but realistic address, one which left the audience secure that the CF remains in capable hands and that its future remains bright.

## Special Address

General James Mattis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, expressed a deep respect for the CF and the success of its transformation back to the force which it used to be, and cited Canada as a role model for much of the rest of NATO in this regard.

He then turned to NATO's Multiple Futures Project, which seeks to establish what can be agreed about future threats. While NATO stands supreme in air, naval, and heavy mechanized operations, it is not supreme in irregular warfare, which will become the norm in future "wars among the people," especially when the operational centre of gravity remains the "will of the people."

He concluded his address by noting that the challenge for NATO will be the maintenance of a balance between military and non-military means, but that there will always remain a need for strategic expeditionary forces which can disaggregate into smaller balanced forces to deal with specific tasks and missions, led by commanders marked by imagination and creativity.

## Special Address

General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM, spoke of a future in which the ability to integrate soft and hard power on the battlefield will be a critical force multiplier and will increasingly force a capability to anticipate events as never before.

He noted that NORAD's missions had been changed and now included both space warning and maritime warning. The addition of the task of maritime warning has led to the challenge of looking into the maritime domain to understand how surveillance, identification, and warning of maritime threats might be undertaken. To complicate this is the need to understand and anticipate what acts of war might be in the cyber domain, which affects both the

space and maritime dimensions, and which is increasingly vulnerable to "denial of service" attacks, as we saw in the Russo-Georgia campaign.

He noted that NORAD sees about 13 million ship-borne containers passing through its maritime domain each year. Consequently there is a profound need for the recapitalization of NORAD and other military and naval forces to achieve the development of capable, interoperable forces, even in difficult economic times.

## Panel I – Environmental Update: Land, Maritime, and Air

**Chief of the Land Staff**, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, painted a picture of an excellent small army which was being pushed to its limit by an extremely high tempo of operations. With an Army of 20,831 full time soldiers, 19,327 part-time reserve soldiers, and 5,355 civilians the Army has to man 15,918 positions in support of our international and expeditionary operations – and relies on the Reserves to provide about 22% of the strength of each rotation.

While recruiting has been going well it has been counter-balanced by an increasing attrition rate approaching 10% annually, much of which is structural as members of the Army hit the 20 year, 30 year, 35 year points at which members may leave the Forces to take advantage of pensionable service retirement points.

Equipment is becoming a problem – while its quality is good there simply is not enough of it available to sustain operations at current tempos. With Afghanistan the priority the vehicle fleet in Canada has suffered. Of the 600 vehicles in the LAV fleet about 30-40% are VOR (vehicle off road for necessary repairs and maintenance). The MTVs (the rebuilt M113 APCs) are suffering an 80% VOR rate in Canada. The Coyote fleet is effectively at the end of its useful life with a 70% VOR rate in Canada.

The Army is planning for the future, which the Army sees as involving both littoral and urban warfare which will be impacted by such factors as climate change, mass migration and urbanization, rapid technological change, and multidimensional terrorism. These factors will drive organizational change in the Army as it evolves from the "Army of Today" (2009-2016), which can be described as a "Balanced Medium Weight Army," into "the Army of Tomorrow" (2021), which will be a LAV-based Army, and finally into the Future Army (2040), which will include some heavy assault vehicles.

**Chief of the Maritime Staff**, Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, struck a sombre note as he compared the developments in the global maritime strategic space with the reduced fleet capacity that Canada will experience over the next ten years, and led the audience to the obvious conclusion that the re-capitalization of the Canadian Navy is central and critical.

He noted that the global strategic maritime space is seeing a growth in importance of the Asia-Pacific region and that ocean politics is growing, especially with the rise in global oil production and its transportation by sea, developments which may threaten energy supplies. Moreover, while the focus on the implications of Arctic warming and loss of ice cover has implications for Arctic shipping, there may well be future concerns about the security of Arctic oil and gas deposits.

Canada's Navy remains a forward deployed navy with such current deployments as those in support of counter-narcotics operations, those involved in anti-piracy and convoy escort operations in the Indian Ocean, and those involved in humanitarian operations in delivering supplies to coastal villages in Haiti.

Current critical projects needed to support the "Future Navy" include the Joint Support Ship, the Canadian Surface Combatant, the Arctic Operations

Patrol Ships (which will eventually replace the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels), the Submarine mid-life refit, and the new Multi-Mission Aircraft which will replace the Auroras.

**Chief of the Air Staff**, Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, in his address was both upbeat and worried. On the one hand real progress has been and is continuing to be made in terms of fleet recapitalization. The success of the C-17 project has been followed with real progress in the acquisition of C-170Js and CH-47s, as well as the establishment of an air expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan. While the average age of aircraft in the fleet is very high at about 25 years, the acquisition of the new aircraft has meant that average has begun, at last, to decrease. On the other hand there are serious concerns about the increasingly dysfunctional pattern of the demographics of the Air Force as we continue to experience personnel attrition and the attendant drop in experience levels.

Finally, there is the problem of the Air Force's infrastructure, 50% of which is over 50 years old. The Air Force estimates that the bill for replacement of its infrastructure is currently around \$6 billion and that the current allocations for maintenance amount to about 1.6% annually, whereas the allocation for recapitalization/replacement is only about 1.9% annually. ©

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## Canada-US Defence Relations after the Obama Visit

by Paul H. Chapin

### *A policy triumph*

**B**arack Obama's visit to Ottawa was a public relations success for the United States, but it was a policy triumph for Canada. The media, ever shallow, missed it. Not so the senior officials who travelled back to Washington with the President. In a briefing on Air Force One, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg described the tone of the discussions as "really excellent." It was

their content, however, that most impressed. "It was a very strategic discussion," Steinberg said, "heavily focused on the economy and then next on Afghanistan and Pakistan." There had not been the "narrow focus on little issue . . . the kind of smaller-level bilateral kinds of problems" typical of previous meetings between presidents and prime ministers.

Clearly, Prime Minister Stephen Harper had not heeded the public advice of many experts on Canada-US relations to be friendly but keep a safe distance, to push for hassle-free trade at the border and cooperation on climate change, and to do something "distinctive" to demonstrate Canada's "independence," including not succumbing to US pressure to extend Canada's military mission in Afghanistan beyond 2011. Instead, there was high-level discussion of the high-level economic and security issues

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testing both countries and agreement to work together on the global agenda. The outcome, rare in the annals of Canada-US relations, was US recognition that Canada today is an international player with a performance record to be envied, views worth listening to, and influence to be taken account of in the lead-up to the G20 meeting in London on April 2, the NATO summit in Strasbourg on April 3-4, and the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain on April 17-19.

## *Learning from the past*

There is scant evidence that a strategy of keeping your distance has ever served Canada well, whatever its political attractions. The reason is that there is nothing in it for the United States and no benefits for American politicians in spending scarce political capital on 'Canadian' issues. It is an iron law of international politics that every state's interests come first, and a successful relationship between states requires both sides seeing the relationship as serving their interests. The corollary is that once it is no longer obvious to one side or the other that there is a gain to be made or a loss to be avoided, the relationship will quickly atrophy, and then sour if one side continues to press. If the win/win is not evident, it is not going to happen.

Adopting such an attitude this time could have proved disastrous for Canada. With the enormous problems they have to deal with, the new leaders in Washington have little reason to take the slightest interest in anyone or anything not helping to lighten their burden.

Some history can be instructive. April 2004 was a bad month for the President of the United States. US casualties in Iraq had suddenly spiked to their highest monthly level since the war began; the media was carrying photos of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; George W. Bush's job approval rating had dropped below 50%; and the polls showed him in an unexpectedly tight race for the presidency in November. That was when the new Prime Minister of Canada came to Washington to discuss softwood lumber, mad cow disease, and Devil's Lake. A year later, touring Bush's ranch, Paul Martin "really went after him" on how drilling for oil in the Arctic might imperil migrating caribou. When the President of the United States needed a friend and counsellor on great affairs of state, he got a provincial satrap with grievances. Why anyone in the Prime Minister's Office thought Bush would respond positively to Canadian concerns remains a mystery. He did not, of course, and Canadian interests suffered – and so eventually did Paul Martin.

## *The emerging defence agenda*

The Harper government came to office three years ago determined to restore Canada's international credentials, to better protect and promote Canadian interests. Eschewing the grandiose policy reviews typical of new governments, it moved directly to address the most pressing foreign and defence policy issues of the times – not least the nature and extent of Canada's strategy in Afghanistan and the political, economic and military means required to pursue such a strategy successfully. Other matters it put aside for more propitious times, including the systemic issues undermining NATO's ability to conduct "out-of-area" operations such as in Afghanistan, and the institutional architecture required for the future defence of North America.

With the advent of a new administration in Washington and with Europeans more confused than ever about how to address the security challenges confronting democratic states, the time is right for Canada to assume a leadership role on allied defence issues.

## *Afghanistan*

There is a new Afghanistan strategy coming. During his visit to Ottawa, Obama confirmed that the administration had commenced a strategic review of US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan whose findings are to be ready within 60 days, in other words by the time of the NATO summit. The US would be seeking input from its allies, the President said, so that the result could be "a comprehensive strategy for which we all take responsibility."

The objectives of the new strategy will not differ markedly from those pursued to date: protect populated areas, reduce the flow of insurgents from Pakistan, train Afghan military and police, secure major highways, improve governance, and accelerate economic growth. But management and tactics are likely to evolve to incorporate more of the counterinsurgency lessons learned in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke, the new US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, outlined some of the management challenges to be overcome at a conference in Munich in early February: better coordination within the US government, better coordination within NATO, "attainable objectives with adequate resources instead of the reverse," and a regional approach that engages all the neighbours, especially Pakistan.

Canada needs to be an author of the new strategy, not just a consumer. Canada is among NATO's half-dozen most experienced participants in the Afghanistan campaign and must not lose the opportunity to share the knowledge it has acquired in designing the new tactics.

The Canadian Forces (CF) have earned Canada the right to be listened to on how to win the war in Afghanistan, and Canadian diplomats, development assistance officers and police officers on how to win the peace.

Obama also confirmed that the administration intends to send 17,000 additional troops to the region within the next few months, with another substantial complement likely to follow. The net effect would be to double the number of US troops to around 60,000 and increase the number of US combat brigades from two to six. With NATO and other coalition members contributing a further 30,000 troops, this would make some 90,000 foreign troops available to support the new strategy. Afghan security forces would also be available, of course. This is an encouraging increase in military resources for an enterprise only recently being written off as a lost cause, but the total remains modest compared to the commitment made to Iraq. As Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution has noted, 90,000 foreign troops is only two-thirds of what the US alone deployed in Iraq before the surge; and Afghanistan's 150,000 military and police forces, only a third of whom can be considered combat ready, pale in comparison to the 400,000 Iraqi forces that supported the surge in 2007 and 2008.

A conclusion easily drawn is that Canada will indeed face pressure to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2011. For the time being, however, Washington appears little interested in making an issue of it. On the contrary: as Jim Steinberg observed, "[in] relative terms, the commitment up to 2011 is a much longer-term commitment than anyone else has given. Many other allies have existing commitments for six months to a year."

But as planners begin to think about Canada's engagement after 2011, a continued military component cannot be ruled out. First, the Government motion of March 14, 2008 spoke of ending Canada's military presence in Kandahar, not in all of Afghanistan. Second, there are indications that the new Liberal leadership may be rather more open to the idea of a future role for the CF even in Kandahar, perhaps to provide ongoing protection for the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team and to continue training and mentoring the Afghan National Army. As Defence Minister Peter MacKay recently told this year's annual meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, "We can reconfigure the mission . . . but with the full support of Parliament." Finally, July 2011 is still two years away, and two years can be a long time in international politics. ©

## It Didn't Have to be This Way

by Colonel George Petrolekas

In Afghanistan, as with the global financial crisis, ill-considered decisions long ago have come back to haunt us, and now require a sustained effort to correct them. So we must run to keep up, when we should be walking to get ahead. Richard Holbrooke, the new US envoy to the region, told a conference in Munich: "I have never seen anything like the mess we have inherited." Problem is that it's a mess of our making.

In 2003, NATO began its mission centered in Kabul whilst the US was responsible for the rest of the country. At the time, there was a real sense of optimism: a constitution was crafted, the international community was committing development funds, elections were to be held, and the country as a whole was relatively safe. Certainly,

there were daunting challenges: opium production was growing, the infrastructure was in serious disrepair, and warlords held considerable sway.

However, the fates intervened on many planes and the great chance was lost. The principal ill fate was Iraq. American forces and political attention were diverted as the military victory turned bad, and Afghanistan became a casualty.

America pressed NATO into taking responsibility for Afghanistan. This turnover was supposed to be 'conditions based' (meaning that only when there were sufficient resources available would NATO assume responsibility). The minimum levels for troop strength, equipment (such as helicopters) and robust Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that NATO set as conditions prior to assuming control were never met. This resulted in wide swaths of territory having minimal or no NATO presence. Furthermore, throughout this turnover, NATO never fully grasped that military presence and action had to be linked to development activity.

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Shortly after assuming leadership of the Afghan Transitional Authority, Hamid Karzai clearly identified the obstacles before it. First, the physical threat presented by a dormant Taliban in its sanctuaries; second, the lack of human capital (literate and trained people) which thwarted improvements in governance and security; and lastly, the absence of unified action by the multitude of governments and organizations which diluted development efforts and, correspondingly, potential effects.

Ironically, some of the very same people who now argue in favour of limited but achievable goals, tighter integration of the international effort, more troops, a regional approach and more effective governance and development were the cause of the problem a mere five years ago.

Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Secretary of Defense, frequently painted the Taliban as a spent force numbering no more than 600 to 1,000 adherents. These pronouncements demonstrated that it was a movement whose dynamics and roots we little understood. Not clearly knowing why the Taliban did things confounded our ability to defeat it.

It is entirely possible that senior American and NATO officials publicly underplayed the threat to ease and facilitate NATO's involvement so that America could turn its attention elsewhere. But that strategy led to an under-resourced NATO mission, which recent 'surge' talk now seeks to remedy. Denial of the threat also extended to the US Embassy in Kabul, which equally underplayed the menace, and, in both military and non-military endeavours, constrained the potential authority of Commander International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.

This was manifest in command arrangements which made integration and coordination difficult. On the diplomatic front, different G8 nations retained lead roles which were never made subordinate to a senior alliance civilian authority. On the military front, two separate missions continued to operate, though some steps were grudgingly taken to achieve a semblance of unity in command. Without unity in command on the diplomatic, development or military fronts, it is difficult to imagine how unity of purpose could ever be achieved.

The warning signs were certainly present. After eliminating many hundreds of Taliban with no effect and only superficially understanding tribal relationships, the US and NATO were hard pressed to explain the lingering insurgency. Where was this magical fount of Taliban? Of course, it was Pakistan and disaffected Afghans. Many US intelligence officers on the ground knew that the refugee camps and sanctuary provided in Pakistan's frontier provinces were fertile ground for recruitment and regrouping.

Furthermore, the failure of development to penetrate the countryside created the 'accidental insurgent' and poppy continued to grow. The Pakistan problem had existed for decades – we just refused to acknowledge it in higher circles. In not doing so, we failed to confront it until recently. It has become impossible to ignore, leading to the conclusion that a military solution is no longer possible. Only now, with the production of opium firmly linked to the financing of the insurgency, is concerted action being envisioned against those who protect, move and profit from it.

*But it did not have to be this way.*

In 2004, Canada's Rick Hillier became Commander ISAF. En route to taking command, his first stop was Pakistan, in recognition that there was a regional conflict at play. In Kabul, building on lessons from Bosnia, a roadmap was prepared which sought to unify development, governance and military action (now euphemistically termed 'whole of government'). Hillier's ISAF V planners sought to harmonize efforts on a strategic level within a structure called the Investment Management Framework, synchronizing separate and sometimes divergent mandates into one common vision for the country designed to move from a position of recovery to that of sustainable development. From a financial standpoint, this meant moving towards programme financing inexorably tied to national development planning, as opposed to shotgun style project financing on which national signature projects and NGO efforts, to this day, are based.

This first approach to integration was rebuffed by not only NATO but also by Hillier's own national authorities, for whom the 'whole of government' approach had not moved much beyond a marketing slogan. "No General, NATO's remit is simply to provide security. The rest is for development specialists, diplomats and politicians, not for the military to do." This was heard whilst demands for support from other government departments lay unanswered or unfilled.

In 2006, Britain's General Sir David Richards, in his turn as ISAF commander, also tried to demolish the walls which prevented the international community from achieving synchronized effort, only to be similarly rebuffed. However, he did succeed in instituting a Policy Action Group (PAG) which at least put all the major actors in Kabul around a table on a regular basis.

But during Richards' term, the Taliban began to make its presence felt in more substantial ways, particularly in the South, leading Richards to plead publically for a few thousand more troops, (less than a quarter than is being asked for in the upcoming surge) so

that he might nip the insurgency in the bud. But even the existence of a PAG in Kabul could not answer his pleas for more troops, freedom of action or strategic adjustment if his NATO superiors were not listening.

Without reinforcement, Richards developed an ‘inkspot’ strategy which sought to provide security and development in key populated areas, not everywhere. It was eerily similar to what is now being considered as the way forward. But, again, it was a strategy borne of too few resources; without sufficient military and development resources, NATO could not benefit from even a momentary advantage.

When NATO defeated the Taliban in Kandahar in 2006, Brigadier-General David Fraser, NATO’s southern regional commander, said, “we’ve won this battle and I’ve bought you time, but you have to fill the vacuum I’ve created.” No one heard the message.

As an Assistant Secretary General of NATO told me when we travelled back and forth from Kabul, “I see no evidence of a unified plan, the NATO commander has little power, PRTs answer to their own national governments and priorities, intelligence sharing is pathetic and the security timidity of various national PRTs and contingents imperils all the gains that have been made to date.”

At this critical juncture, the hollowness of the overall mission was revealed. It lacked the dexterity in development programs to fill the vacuum that had been created by military success and lacked sufficient military resources to consolidate hard fought gains.

Though America shares much blame, NATO also bears responsibility for the current state of affairs. Clearly, NATO’s leadership – and by extension the leaders of its constituent nations – knew that the state of affairs was precariously balanced between success and failure. Yet, troop contributions never materialized in a substantial way and caveats remained. NATO could not even agree on an omnibus detention policy, leaving it to nations to negotiate bilateral agreements though it was fully aware that NATO expansion and probable combat would lead to detainees becoming an issue. NATO also failed to extract a substantial US commitment, which led to a condition where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “In Afghanistan we do what we can.” Without American leadership and involvement, “what we can” was not good enough.

“Almost everything wrong on the military side here can be traced to decisions made in Rumsfeld’s office and that NATO submitted to,” stated a senior advisor to the Afghan government, adding that, “the same holds true on the development side where successive US Ambassadors have effectively neutered [the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan].” Coupled with the UN’s

congenital impotence and preoccupation with process instead of effect, the results were entirely predictable.

The time for blame is past now, and everyone shares a portion: the US, the UN, NATO, the member states in Afghanistan, the International Community and its NGOs, even the Afghan Government itself. Of import now is how we apply our lessons going forward, especially for those who exerted influence five years ago and who now pepper the Obama administration.

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*Afghanistan needs the ‘Marshall Plan’ that President Bush promised in 2002.*

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The tone of recent commentary seems to focus on the limited goals of security and governance and how difficult they are to achieve, laying the blame on corruption within the Afghan government (amongst other factors) and neglecting the lack of unity. At the same time, this commentary ignores the economy, where since 2004 the unemployment rate has not budged from its current 40% level. Corruption exists precisely because of high unemployment and because we did not adequately assist the Afghan government in ridding itself of warlords who offered jobs in exchange for personal gain.

Every single senior Canadian officer who has served in Afghanistan understands the simple fact that jobs are a far better anti-corruption and counter-insurgency tool than anything else. Afghanistan needs a massive job creation effort to dry up the pool of unemployed young men who will pick up an AK out of desperation. In short, Afghanistan needs the ‘Marshall Plan’ that President Bush promised in 2002. Unfortunately, the collective will has weakened to the point that we will be satisfied with a solution that falls somewhat short of that vision.

To illustrate the failure of the economic dimension in the simplest terms: after eight years into an international presence, 60,000 plus foreigners in Afghanistan drink water that is bottled outside the country. In effect, a self-sustaining \$40 million a year business which could provide employment has never been incubated.

At this point it would be simple to lay down prescriptive solutions. These themes were articulated by General Hillier in Einsiedlerhof, Germany on the day he first met the international staff that would comprise his headquarters. Six years on, they retain their validity. One, lead from behind: we are not there to tell Afghans how to do things, but rather to demonstrate and assist them; where credit is due, it is to be theirs alone. Two, put an Afghan face in all we do: we are not occupiers, this is not our country. Whenever occasion permits, Afghans –

their government, their institutions, their ministries, their security forces – must be in front of all we do. Third, this is all about Afghanistan, not just us: the true measure of our effect must be ‘how does this improve the lot of the Afghan people.’ If it is measured only in terms of our own agendas, then we will never succeed.

Of all we have learned these past eight years, it can be distilled into the need to follow four principles for the future.

The first is **consensus**. For some nations, participation in the Afghan mission marked their ‘coming of age,’ as the Chief of the Defence Staff of a newer NATO member state told me. For others, participation garners points with Brussels or Washington, as for many, al-Qaeda and the spectre of a Taliban-provided sanctuary is America’s security problem, not theirs. On that basis alone, many allied countries committed troops for reasons other than denying Afghanistan to al-Qaeda and its allies, and are now reluctant to admit circumstances have changed and that we now face an insurgency. As the international reach of al-Qaeda has shown, it is a problem for us all.

But without representative government, security and an improved economy in Afghanistan, that aspect of the threat will never disappear. If we cannot agree on why we’re in Afghanistan, we’ll never be able to agree or focus on an outcome.

As Fredrick Kagan notes, “We should accept whatever contributions they are willing and able to make, but avoid allowing tensions over those contributions to distort the overall understanding of the fight.” In some nations, participation comes at great domestic political cost; governments will stand or fall on the issue. We must be cognisant of that fact.

The second principle is **understanding**. To solve the problems in Afghanistan we must have a holistic understanding of local dynamics in the national context. The term ‘Afghanistan’ implies a unitary whole which does not completely exist, while solutions are applied using Kandahar, Helmand and the Eastern provinces as a metaphor and models for the whole. This will have to be reconciled. In some areas, this will mean that internationals will have to live among the people; in other areas, too much living among the people will only increase resentment. The very nature of the country, its geographic and political divisions as well as its religious, ethnic, linguistic makeup, defies the broad application of *prêt à porter* solutions without some thought to asymmetric execution.

The third principle is **planning**. Afghanistan needs more troops and a civilian surge, but it needs them under one umbrella. It needs a unified roadmap, with

buy-in from the Afghan Government, our allies, and the civilian organizations that will help execute it. Without one, we will only repeat past errors of disjointed action. Developing, resourcing, synchronizing and monitoring such a plan should be the immediate focus of the alliance. We have failed in this regard not because we have not known that we must, but because the *quid pro quo* trade-offs and sacrifices necessary to achieve this have sapped the will to do it.

Therefore, we need an overarching body that can coordinate international efforts and mesh them with military planning. The PAG, augmented with a robust secretariat, could serve that function. Without such an overarching body, or a group of principals, the best laid plans will be of no avail. This overarching body must have at its head an individual in whom all international authority is vested. Whilst consensus must continually be sought, it must not become an impediment to advancement.

Once it has a plan and a coordinating authority, the alliance must then appropriately apply its plan. The alliance cannot turn away from the central government and seek solutions only at the local level at the expense of the central government. A lack of a strong connection to the central government invites ethnic strife and instability. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development serves as an example: bottom-up definition of needs, top-down financing, coordination and assistance. There are benefits that can only be provided by central governments, infrastructure and regulatory environments, but that does not necessarily mean centralized governance. Equally, strong central leadership does not imply a central strongman.

The final principle is **commitment**. Everyone has heard the now-famous insurgent quote, “you may have the watches but we have the time.” Until it is widely believed that NATO will remain in Afghanistan until the insurgency is defeated (or marginalized or brought into government) and an Afghan government can stand on its own two legs, doubts about our commitment will continue to fuel the insurgency. In turn, the competing dichotomy of time-based commitment and conditions-based exit must be clearly resolved.

The tragedy in all this is that Afghans may have to settle for something far less than the vision of the Afghan Compact, but at least that something is far better than the course we’re presently on. Karl Marx, building on Santayana’s dictum that “those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it,” said that “the first time history is repeated, it is a tragedy, the second time it is repeated it is a farce.” The tragedy is that it did not need to be this way at all; whether it turns out to be a farce, only time will tell.

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## Canadian Forces in Afghanistan

### – Then, Now and the Road Ahead

by Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier

The Canadian Forces (CF) mission in Afghanistan represents a significant chapter in our military history. It is the first time since the Korean War where we have faced a declared adversary in combat. It is the only instance in modern times where our operations have been centred on counterinsurgency. It demands an unprecedented level of coordination and cohesion among engaged Government agencies. Canada has ambitiously staked out uniquely national objectives, consistent with international community aims, in a militantly opposed nation-building effort of epic proportions.

Canadian ground forces first arrived in Afghanistan in early 2002 as part of a coalition response to the 9/11 tragedy. At the onset, a Battle Group deployed to Kandahar Province with US forces to provide airfield security. They also participated in combat operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Paktia Province, and in the Tora Bora, as well as establishing a coalition presence to operate with Afghan forces in Zabul Province. Our forces departed Afghanistan in July of that year but returned the following year to play a leading role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) authorized under the United Nations Security Council. Initially based in Kabul, this contingent at its peak numbered 1,900 and contributed to security in the capital and the surrounding areas.

Canada's prominence in the southern province of Kandahar is reflective of a determination to play a greater leadership role in international operations as well as the nation's commitment to peace and security. In 2005 our forces first established a Provincial Reconstruction Team and the following year assumed responsibility for security efforts throughout the Province. Our troops were confronted by an increasingly violent insurgency bent on usurping the legitimately elected Government of Afghanistan and challenging the presence of our forces in the region.

Not long after our arrival in the South our forces were fiercely opposed by concentrated insurgent groups who hoped to test NATO's resolve. Under Canadian leadership, OPERATION MEDUSA – the most significant operation in NATO's history – demonstrated

to our adversaries the futility of directly challenging well-equipped and trained Alliance forces. It broke their emerging stranglehold and allowed many thousands of internally displaced persons to return to their homes and livelihoods.

Post MEDUSA, ISAF operational tactics shifted to consolidating and expanding the security footprint by the creation of 'Afghan Development Zones'. Given the limited forces available, the concept was to establish concentrations of coalition and eventually Afghan security forces, in areas strategically linked to development, which could provide the security environment needed for growth of economic and reconstruction efforts. It was predicated on the expectation of steady growth in the capacity of Afghan security forces to augment and eventually succeed coalition forces as the stability footprint expanded, with progressively greater reconstruction efforts strengthening public confidence and associated security and stability.

Through 2007 and into 2008, our forces twice successfully undertook to significantly expand the security influence in Zhari and Panjwayi Districts, on the strategically important eastern approach to Kandahar City. Unfortunately, in both instances it became apparent that the role we had hoped Afghan security forces might play in supporting the expansion of the Kandahar City Afghan Development Zone was not achievable.

Much progress was made in the professionalization of the Afghan National Army, but similar results with the police proved much more elusive. At the same time the Taliban re-oriented their approach, choosing to concentrate on the more vulnerable Afghan security forces while increasingly using asymmetric tactics of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices to limit ISAF freedom of movement, all of this aimed to thwart any perception among the population of improving security and stability. This was and is also a reality in neighbouring provinces of the south and to a lesser extent in other parts of the country.

Canadian hopes for a shifting balance of effort from security to governance and development in Afghanistan have been frustrated by these multiple challenges. It was during this timeframe that the Manley Panel conducted its very thorough deliberations, and provided comprehensive recommendations regarding burden-sharing among the coalition, capability enhancements for our forces, re-

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oriented ‘Whole of Government’ emphasis, and the need for greater transparency of effort to the Canadian public. Government’s response to the Panel’s report led to the formulation of six areas of mission priority and associated benchmarks derived to measure progress. These were to be communicated to Canadians through quarterly reports, the third of which has just been released. Government direction also resulted in the introduction of medium lift helicopters and more capable unpiloted aerial vehicles, another allied battalion in Kandahar, and a much more robust Canadian civilian presence.

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*...the model we have developed has attracted much praise and positive interest from our coalition partners in the South.*

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By these and other metrics, progress on many fronts is clear. The competence and professionalism of Afghan Army units trained and mentored by our forces has been impressive and a source of considerable pride. They are regarded by many as the best of any throughout the country and are steadily assuming greater responsibility for security operations. Police reform is also taking hold, particularly in Kandahar City, though their reach and effectiveness in rural areas remains a vulnerability.

In areas of healthcare, education, infrastructure and numerous others, there have also been many positive developments, largely attributable to steadily increasing Canadian civilian presence in the mission. Together our Joint Task Force Commander and the civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (the RoCK) have developed a Kandahar Action Plan which closely integrates objectives and activities of the numerous Federal Government Departments involved in the mission. This level of integration in planning and implementation is unprecedented in our history.

There remain many challenges to be overcome, but the model we have developed has attracted much praise and positive interest from our coalition partners in the South.

Nevertheless, the situation throughout Afghanistan in early 2009 is widely portrayed as disappointing in relation to the initial objectives of both Afghans and the international community. Reports cite increased levels of violence through 2008, higher civilian and military casualties, and greater Taliban influence in areas where

coalition force levels are insufficient. The people of Kandahar have increasing concerns for their security. Many are harassed and intimidated by Taliban and are frustrated by inadequate support or entrenched corruption of their own government officials. Without sufficient faith in the eventual outcome, they are reluctant to take sides in the struggle with the insurgency. This is a matter of significant concern and overshadows the effects of our very substantial achievements.

Looking forward, there is a growing international consensus on the impediments to progress in Afghanistan and what must be done to eliminate them. Various envoys



*Kandahar Province, Afghanistan; 8 October 2008 — Warrant Officer Tom Jones of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team works with Afghan soldiers during Operation ARAY. Conducted by ISAF Regional Command (South) in partnership with the Afghan National Army, Op ARAY disrupted insurgent command and control networks in Panjwayi District and prevented the insurgents from infiltrating into Kandahar City.*

DND photo by: Master Corporal Karl McKay

are being appointed and the Obama administration is nearing completion of a comprehensive review of its strategy in the region.

In a pure military context, it is widely accepted that there are insufficient forces, either ISAF or Afghan, to win public confidence and reverse the insurgency. The US has already announced its intention to dramatically increase troop commitments in the South, and we know this will have a substantial effect on the ISAF presence in Kandahar province. Likewise, ISAF’s strategy has also evolved as lessons have been learned or re-affirmed. Chief among these are a progression from the Afghan Development Zone concept of the early days to the “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer Security lead” model that has

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achieved some success in various provinces and districts, and a clear recognition of the need for a more “bottom up” approach to effects while continuing to extend the capacity and legitimacy of the central government.

The CF has been working closely with US military planners, other Regional Command South partners, and the ISAF chain of command to set the conditions for continuing progress by our forces in 2009 in ways that are fully consistent with both the evolving ISAF strategy and our own strengthened Whole of Government foundation. More coalition troops in Kandahar will allow the CF to concentrate its effort more sharply where the majority of the population lives: on Kandahar City and the key villages making up the populated approaches to the city. We will work alongside Afghans to protect the population where they live and sleep, and build Afghan confidence of improved and enduring security at the village or community level. All this should allow us to build irreversible momentum that sets the conditions for sustained progress, leading to more enduring holding and building effects where it matters most in the province.

It has been understood all along that insurgencies are won politically, not militarily. This reinforces our approach to harness all elements of available power and ability, including local, tribal, business, Afghan governance, Afghan security forces, CF, Whole of Government, International and Non-Governmental Organizations, down to city and village level so it is clear to Kandahar citizens that life improves when we work together. This will result in the weaving of the social, economic and political fabrics of Afghan communities.

Canada will make a difference for Afghans. We will incorporate Whole of Government power and influence aimed at empowering Afghans to provide an enduring framework for their people. This struggle will



*Kandahar City, Afghanistan — Early morning in a typical street market.*

DND photograph

ultimately be won by Afghan leadership applying Afghan solutions that are meaningful and visible, and engender popular support and commitment.

With the noblest of intentions, Canada has made an enormous commitment to the people of Afghanistan and endured tremendous sacrifice in doing so. Military personnel and increasing numbers of Canadian civilians are experiencing hardship, danger, and professional challenges of a scope and complexity unlike any we have experienced in several generations. The pace of progress, while disappointing to many, is consistent with the dimensions of the international challenge. The Canadian response has been resilient and adaptive and will continue to be so to ensure we leave an enduring legacy of achievement that Afghans will remember and appreciate and for which all Canadians can take enormous pride. ©

## Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan

by Roy Thomas

In the pre-election days of August 2008, the termination of Operation ARGUS garnered little media attention. This was the label given to the Canadian Forces

*Roy Thomas is a retired Armour officer with United Nations service in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Afghanistan, Macedonia, Sarajevo and Haiti. He was hi-jacked in South Lebanon and taken hostage in Bosnia. Mr. Thomas is a graduate of the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College, Quetta, Baluchistan.*

(CF) Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A), initiated in September 2005, consisting of 15-18 military planners and one or more civilians led by a Colonel.<sup>1</sup>

Ignoring the ending of this short-lived initiative shortly after the departure of General Rick Hillier as Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff in July 2008 should come as no surprise. After General Hillier departed as Commander International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2004, the ISAF Strategic Advisory Team that he had provided was also withdrawn. Indeed the very

origins of direct military planning assistance to Afghan government departments seem to be unknown, especially among the critics<sup>2</sup> of the CF's SAT-A.

This short paper will outline the origins of Canada's SAT-A, which in fact can be found in 2004 – before its start date of September 2005 – and may very well have roots that reach back to the continued unresolved political situation in Bosnia.

In the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia, “the military and security objectives of the Dayton Accord were solidified fairly early in NATO’s deployment but other objectives of governance and development were not.”<sup>3</sup> Thus it has been suggested that the provision of the first planners to the Afghan government from NATO staff in 2004 was the result of experiences in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>4</sup> These first planners provided to Afghan authorities in Kabul came from NATO’s ISAF headquarters during the tenure of General Hillier as commander,<sup>5</sup> not from Canada.

At a meeting preceding General Hillier’s assumption of command of ISAF in early 2004, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had noted that “the absence of unified action by the multitude of governments and organizations in Afghanistan had resulted in a dissipation of development efforts, and correspondingly, the potential effects”<sup>6</sup> as the most pressing of his four major concerns. The urgent requirement for a unifying framework is best understood by looking at the strategic situation confronting ISAF in February 2004.



*The author (centre) with some companions outside the Frontier Scout fort at Ashewat near Qumruddin Karez on the so-called Pakistan / Afghanistan border, 1989.*


institutions accepted by the Taliban regime on Afghan soil. Canadians contributed to this campaign under aegis of Operation ARCHER and until October 2003 under Operation APOLLO. The need for coordination between these two campaigns – not to mention the armed elements of the ATA – necessitated an American creation, the Office of Military Co-operation for Afghanistan.

*Literally thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operated in Afghanistan...*

Governance and development were part of a basically uncoordinated international effort to provide resources to reconstruct Afghanistan and hopefully to reconcile Afghans of various sects, tribes, language groups and political persuasion. Nominal lead for relief, recovery, reconstruction and ultimately development of Afghanistan as a sovereign state was the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Notably missing in Afghanistan was any UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs presence, which was often found in other missions. This coordination function was added to the burdens of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan. The extent of UN involvement is illustrated by the fact that the UNAMA website had links to 27 other UN agencies with interests, indeed most with a footprint, in Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup>

Literally thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operated in Afghanistan, ranging from major multinational agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to small NGOs. The need for coordination was evident in the creation by the NGOs themselves of several coordinating bodies. One such example is the Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau, which at end of 2003 listed over 200 members.<sup>9</sup> Another example is the Agency Coordinating Body Afghan Relief,<sup>10</sup> which listed even more members at the start of 2004.

In early 2004, in the short term, Karzai’s ATA regime had to organize an election. For the longer term



There were two major military campaigns underway in Afghanistan at that time. First, there was the ISAF military effort itself, dedicated to securing the capital of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and its hoped-for elected successor in 2005. Canadians contributed to ISAF under the aegis of Operation ATHENA. Second, there was the American-led campaign, labeled Operation Enduring Freedom,<sup>7</sup> to uproot the terrorist al-Qaeda

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goal of sustaining some form of central governance, his transitional regime had to try to coordinate the well-meaning attempts to develop Afghanistan into a sovereign state.

It is at this point that General Hillier stepped in to provide the initial team of ISAF planners, assigned from NATO resources under his command, to assist in developing a strategic framework. This ISAF SAT produced a proposal which was initially known as the *Structured Process for the Harmonized Development of Afghanistan*. Subsequently it was called the *Investment Management Framework*.<sup>11</sup> This framework was developed through a review of the mandates of all the major organizations in Afghanistan and then compiling a list of these. ISAF staff on the SAT then assisted the ATA with incorporating this information into *National Priority Programmes* (NPPs). The unifying function of these NPPs was to be that donor aid would be channeled

through an Afghan budget process. The NPPs represented a shift from recovery and reconstruction to sustainable development.<sup>12</sup>

Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani was given help with planners for strategic analysis. Two additional CF officers were deployed from Canada to help translate the work done so far into a strategic vision for Afghanistan, to include all the themes necessary for the creation of a sustainable sovereign state. The product of this small team and the ISAF planners was the paper *Creating a National Economy: The Path to Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, which provided the strategic coordinating concept needed for the ATA to take the lead in re-establishing Afghanistan as a functioning state.<sup>13</sup> This paper served as the precursor to the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy*.

The planning assistance provided under the aegis of NATO through ISAF was apparently appreciated.

Finance Minister Ghani, at an International Development Research Centre conference in Ottawa in March 2005, before the creation of Canada's SAT-A, is reported to have complimented the ISAF planners and, in particular, the Canadians assigned to the ISAF SAT for their unfettered assistance.<sup>14</sup>

Although the Afghans appeared pleased with the assistance provided by the ISAF planners, General Hillier's successor as Commander ISAF withdrew these personnel after he assumed command. This provided an opportunity for civilians, whether from governments or agencies or NGOs, to step in and provide the planning assistance requested by the central Afghan authorities. None stepped up!

In 2005, "when [Hillier] visited troops in Afghanistan as the Chief of Defence Staff, President


Karzai asked *if he would be willing to provide those guys again*. The CDS agreed."<sup>15</sup> The CF SAT-A deployed on Operation ARGUS starting in September 2005. When asked in an interview about this decision, General Hillier was quoted as saying, "We did it because no one else did, but our intention was to shift it to a civilian focused capability."<sup>16</sup>

The history of Operation ARGUS remains to be told.<sup>17</sup> However, it is clear that its origins are to be found in the help provided by ISAF planners during General Hillier's tour as Commander ISAF in 2004. The usefulness of that assistance led to President Karzai's request in 2005 for uniquely Canadian assistance as, in the intervening year, no civilian agency or agencies had stepped up to provide similar help.

We should be proud of that Canadian leadership and initiative.

## The Plan for Afghanistan

Taken from Howard Coombs and General Rick Hillier, "Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-Conflict Afghanistan" in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 3 Autumn, 2005, p. 8



(Endnotes)

1 Mike Capstick, "Operation ARGUS," [http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/Operation\\_ARGUS.pdf](http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/Operation_ARGUS.pdf), and Nipa Banerjee, "Capacity Building – A Myth in Afghanistan?" *On Track*, Summer, 2008, Vol. 13, No. 2.

(continued p. 32)

**THE VIMY AWARD**

**LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY**

Nominations are invited for the 2009 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include: General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Honourable Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Honourable John Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Mr. G. Hamilton Southam, Brigadier-General David Fraser, General Raymond R. Henault, and General Rick Hillier.

Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2009, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE  
 CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE  
 222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B  
 OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, November 20 2009, at a gala dinner that will be held in the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca); or telephone (613) 236 9903.



Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2009.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'Honorable John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault et le Général Rick Hillier.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2009, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION  
 HONORIFIQUE VIMY  
 L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE  
 LA DÉFENSE  
 222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B  
 OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 20 novembre 2009, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans le Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca); or téléphone (613) 236 9903.

2 Paul LaRose Edwards, “NATO and Militaries as Trusted Partners in Civil-Military Interaction”, *The Pearson Papers*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, Spring 2008, p.22 – cites the CF SAT-A as an example of the military undertaking what civilians should do. Other critics note that the CF SAT-A has been associated with a government linked with corruption, a somewhat ironic criticism in view of the fact that the Gomery Inquiry was ongoing over part of the life of the Canadian SAT team’s existence.

3 Colonel Mike Capstick, “A Military Solution to Fostering Civil Service Capability,” *Vanguard*, May/June 2007, p.12. Colonel Capstick was the first commander of the CF SAT-A.

4 General Hillier, in an essay co-authored with Howard Coombs, also suggests the provision of military planners was the result of Canadian experiences in the former Yugoslavia. Their contribution was titled “Command and Control during Peace Support Operations: Creating Common Intent in Afghanistan”, in Allan English, editor, *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Leadership and Command*, Kingston, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006, p. 178. General Hillier was the Commander of ISAF when ISAF provided military planners in the original SAT-A and Howard Coombs was a Canadian officer brought from Canada to augment this 2004 ISAF team.

5 General Hillier commanded ISAF from February 9 to August 12, 2004.

6 Coombs and Hillier, in English, *op cit*; p. 177

7 Operation Enduring Freedom also had theatres of operations in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa, with all three reporting to Central Command headquarters in Florida.

8 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, [www.unama-afg.org](http://www.unama-afg.org)

9 Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau, [www.ancb.org](http://www.ancb.org)

10 Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, [www.acbar.org](http://www.acbar.org)

11 Howard G. Coombs and General Rick Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-Conflict Afghanistan”, *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn, 2005, Vol. 6, p. 8.

12 Coombs and Hillier, *Ibid*; p. 9

13 Coombs and Hillier, *Ibid* p. 10, 11

14 Scott Gilmore and Janan Mosazai, “Defence, Development and Diplomacy,” in Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods, editors, *Exporting Good Governance*, Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007, p. 158

15 Colonel Capstick, *op cit*; p. 13

16 Interview, General Hillier with Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher as reported in “Transforming Force”, *Vanguard*, March/April, 2008, p18.

17 Colonel Capstick, “A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan,” *On Track*, Autumn, 2006, Vol. 11, No. 3, p13, 14 – provides a good start point for the history of Operation ARGUS. ©

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## Un Dernier Tour de Piste à Fort Bliss

par le lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gilles Paradis, en collaboration avec le lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Raymond Taillefer

En janvier et février dernier, environ 3,000 militaires, la majorité d’entre eux provenant du Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre (SQFT), ont complété leur entraînement préparatoire au déploiement en Afghanistan de la Force opérationnelle 1-09 (FO 1-09). Au moment où vous lirez ces lignes, la plupart d’entre eux seront déjà arrivés dans leur secteur de mission ou seront en route vers la province de Kandahar afin de relever les militaires du Secteur du Centre de la Force terrestre de la FO 3-08.

Cet entraînement, avec la série d’exercices

tenus à Wainwright à l’automne 2008, aura été le point culminant d’un cycle qui aura duré près d’un an pour la vaste majorité de ces militaires. Comme les aires d’entraînement situées au Canada ne peuvent offrir en hiver des conditions se rapprochant de celles avec lesquelles les soldats canadiens seront appelés à vivre en Afghanistan, cette phase d’acclimatation dans le désert du Texas et du Nouveau-Mexique devient essentielle afin d’optimiser la préparation et faciliter l’adaptation en théâtre opérationnel. Une préparation dans des conditions quasi-identiques de topographie, de climat, de variations de température, de poussière, de types de missions et ce au sein des mêmes équipages et équipes qui oeuvreront en Afghanistan permet de diminuer les risques inhérents à cette mission.

Suite à une invitation du Conseil national de

(voir p. 34)

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*Le lieutenant-colonel Gilles Paradis ainsi que le lieutenant-colonel Raymond Taillefer ont fait carrière avec le Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment. Le lieutenant-colonel Paradis est depuis 1999 analyste militaire avec la Société Radio-Canada (SRC) et avec le Réseau de l’Information (RDI) de la SRC à Montréal. Le lieutenant-colonel Taillefer effectue des fonctions similaires avec Le Canal Nouvelles (LCN) à partir de Québec.*



## THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2009 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, and Alec Castonguay.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca), click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2009, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE  
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS  
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B  
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 14 November 2008, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the LeBreton Galley of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, has been invited to attend as the guest of honour.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca), or telephone (613) 236-9903.

## PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2008.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, et Alec Castonguay.

Toute personne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux lettres du soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des écrits du journaliste. Pour les détails voir [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca), click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2009, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO  
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE  
222 SOMERSET STREET, SUITE 400B  
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 14 novembre 2008, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans la galerie LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, a été invitée.

Pour de plus informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca), ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.





*Entraînement aux manœuvres d'approche et de prise de contrôle d'un hameau où la présence d'insurgés a été confirmée.*

### **le besoin de continuellement s'adapter aux conditions toujours changeantes des opérations en Afghanistan.**

Tous les principaux groupes constitués qui opéreront en Afghanistan au cours de la prochaine rotation se sont entraînés en conditions de tir réel en vue de leurs futures missions. Le groupement tactique du 2<sup>e</sup> Bataillon, Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment (GT 2<sup>e</sup> R22eR) commandé par le lieutenant-colonel Jocelyn Paul, a mis l'accent sur les opérations prolongées, pouvant aller jusqu'à quelques semaines en campagne, des équipes de combat (sécurisation de zones et de hameaux, défense de points d'appui, bivouacs en *leagers*, manœuvres pour parer aux embuscades, etc.) avec une coordination interarmes bien rodée. L'élément de sécurité de l'équipe de reconstruction provinciale (ERP Kandahar) ainsi que les équipes de liaison et de mentorat opérationnel (ELMO) ont appris à mieux maîtriser les différentes facettes de leurs tâches. La batterie d'artillerie, équipée des canons M777, a impressionné les observateurs autant par la capacité d'atteindre avec grande précision des cibles situées à une distance très supérieure à la portée des autres obusiers que par la cadence de tir

liaison des forces canadiennes (CNLF) et du bureau des affaires publiques du SQFT, quelques officiers retraités agissant comme analystes militaires auprès des médias du Québec ont pu passer quelques jours en compagnie des soldats à Fort Bliss. Ils tiennent par le biais de cet article à présenter quelques-unes de leurs observations qui peuvent être partagées avec les lecteurs de la revue *ON TRACK*. Bon nombre d'informations sur les tactiques, la capacité des armes et des équipements ne peuvent toutefois être divulguées pour des considérations de sécurité.

### *Un entraînement de plus en plus adapté à la réalité afghane*

L'entraînement tenu à Fort Bliss est très polyvalent. Il intègre aux manœuvres d'une guerre conventionnelle les opérations de contre-insurrection, d'assistance aux projets de développement et de bonne gouvernance, illustrant ainsi la transition qui a cours dans la doctrine et les méthodes d'entraînement de la Force terrestre. Lors de discussions tenues avec le Lieutenant général Andrew Leslie (Chef d'état-major de la Force terrestre) et le Major général Marquis Hainse (Commandant du Système de la doctrine et de l'instruction de la Force terrestre), tous deux de passage à Fort Bliss en visite aux troupes, on retient que ce qui est devenu primordial est la capacité d'analyser rapidement les leçons apprises en Afghanistan et d'adapter conséquemment la préparation des contingents suivants. Le processus est ainsi grandement accéléré et les soldats n'ont plus à attendre la publication des manuels de doctrine officiels afin de mettre en pratique les modifications exigées par

qu'une section de servants bien entraînée peut soutenir pendant une action intense. Les sections d'ingénieurs, dont dépend la lourde responsabilité d'améliorer la sécurité des déplacements contre la présence d'engins explosifs improvisés (EEI), ont également profité d'un entraînement parallèle tout aussi intensif. Quant au bataillon d'aviation, unité récemment formée suite à la mise en service en Afghanistan d'hélicoptères CH-146 Griffon et CH-147D Chinook, les pilotes et membres d'équipage ont tiré profit de la topographie et de la poussière de Fort Bliss pour pratiquer leurs manœuvres en appui aux troupes de combat terrestres ou au soutien logistique.

Le déploiement à Fort Bliss aura également permis aux militaires constituant l'élément de soutien national (ESN) d'adapter leur travail aux conditions exigeantes des régions désertiques. Le personnel d'entretien des véhicules et de l'équipement doit contrecarrer les effets nocifs de la poussière dans les mécanismes et dans les systèmes électroniques sensibles. Les membres des services médicaux ont été particulièrement en mode préventif avec une campagne énergique visant à prévenir les troupes gastriques, les morsures de serpents, les piqûres d'insectes, les effets néfastes de la déshydratation et de multiples autres menaces contre la santé du soldat, et donc contre leur capacité opérationnelle, avec lesquels ils sont beaucoup moins familiers au Canada.

Le commandant du 5 Groupe brigade mécanisé du Canada (5<sup>e</sup> GBMC), le Colonel (bientôt promu au grade intérimaire de brigadier général pour la durée de l'affectation) Daniel Ménard, a également exploité l'occasion pour débiter l'entraînement du futur



*Les membres des équipes de liaison et de mentorat opérationnel (ELMO) s'entraînent à accompagner les soldats de l'armée nationale afghane (ANA) lors de patrouilles à pied.*

quartier général de la Force opérationnelle interarmées (Afghanistan) qui prendra la relève du quartier général présentement sous le commandement du brigadier général Jonathan Vance.

L'effort logistique exigé par le déploiement à Fort Bliss aura été colossal et les logisticiens qui l'ont réalisé peuvent en être fiers. Transporter par groupes successifs plus de 3,000 militaires et observateurs ainsi que les véhicules et l'équipement requis pour soutenir l'entraînement aura nécessité une vingtaine d'aéronefs des Forces canadiennes, 232 wagons de train, 55 conteneurs maritimes et bien d'autres statistiques impressionnantes dont nous vous faisons grâce.

L'entraînement ne remplace jamais réellement l'expérience acquise dans la dure réalité des opérations de combat. Le contingent profitera toutefois amplement de l'expérience de 20% à 25% de ses membres qui en seront à leur deuxième tour et d'une cinquantaine d'autres dont ce sera la troisième mission en Afghanistan. Enfin, soulignons l'apport indispensable des réservistes qui constitueront environ 15% du contingent.

Des critiques furent occasionnellement à propos de la qualité de l'équipement militaire canadien. Bien qu'il y ait toujours des lacunes et de nouvelles technologies à intégrer dans l'inventaire militaire, les soldats rencontrés sont dans la vaste majorité très satisfaits de leur matériel. Les plus anciens aiment souligner les changements importants survenus au cours de la dernière décennie

dans les domaines de l'habillement et de l'équipement individuel ainsi que les améliorations continues apportées aux véhicules blindés, à l'armement, aux technologies de l'information et, tout aussi important, aux mesures de soutien aux soldats et à leur famille.

### *Le Conseil de liaison des Forces canadiennes*

Un mot sur la participation du Conseil de liaison des Forces canadiennes (CLFC). Le bureau du Québec du CLFC a été l'instigateur de la présence pendant quelques jours de gens influents du milieu des affaires du Québec parmi les soldats à l'entraînement à Fort Bliss. Cet organisme récemment créé a comme objectif global de promouvoir les relations entre les institutions militaires et les milieux d'affaires du Canada. Un aspect qui lui est important est la sensibilisation des dirigeants d'entreprise aux bénéfices de la présence de réservistes dans leur organisation et au gain qu'ils peuvent retirer de leur participation à une mission en termes de sens de l'initiative, de responsabilisation individuelle et de la capacité à travailler en équipe. Le groupe des dirigeants d'entreprises invités s'est intégré aux soldats en n'hésitant pas à porter le casque d'acier et la veste anti-fragmentation. Ces personnes ont été unanimes à exprimer comment elles étaient impressionnées par le réalisme de l'entraînement, la qualité du soldat canadien et l'efficacité de l'organisation militaire dans l'ensemble.



*Troupe d'artilleurs avec le canon M777 en mission de tir dans un paysage qui rappelle la province de Kandahar.*

## Conclusion

Concluons en soulignant que cet entraînement dans un environnement aussi similaire qu'il se peut au théâtre opérationnel permettra sans doute de réduire significativement les risques auxquels sont confrontés les soldats servant dans la province de Kandahar et épargner possiblement la ressource la plus précieuse des Forces canadiennes: la vie de ses soldats. L'effort logistique et financier requis pour ce déploiement aura été un investissement à grande valeur ajoutée non seulement pour les Forces canadiennes en regard de son actuelle implica-

tion sur le théâtre afghan mais également pour la société canadienne qui y gagne des soldats qui continueront tout au long de leur vie à servir comme citoyens aptes à faire face avec succès à des situations exigeant une capacité d'analyse et de décision ainsi qu'un sens aigu des responsabilités dans un cadre de travail d'équipe. Au retour de ce voyage d'observation tous avaient à l'esprit l'image de ces hommes et femmes dédiés à leur profession, unis par un esprit d'équipe unique à la vie militaire face au danger qui se pointe et confiants devant les nombreux défis qui les attendent dans la région de Kandahar. ©

## Dealing with Islamism

by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson



Commenting in a useful way on Islamism is a daunting task. For one thing, the threat posed to our Western world by this militant and often violent form of Islam is bewildering. Imperfect as our society may be, it surely represents the best that mankind

has produced, with its freedoms, respect for human rights, and opportunities for collective and individual advancement. To borrow a well-known line from the TV sitcom, *Seinfeld*, "How could anybody not like us?" Yet we face today a force which, in the name of a major religion, threatens to change our society in the most radical way, in effect setting it back many centuries while potentially killing millions along the way.

A measure of our bewilderment is the proliferation of names which are variously assigned to this threat and its purveyors. Beyond *Islamism*, one hears and reads about *Jihad*, *Radical Islam*, *Militant Islam*, *Islamic Extremism*, *Islamic Terrorism*, *Islamofascism* and other such names which attempt to distinguish this abhorrent form of Islam from its more benign mainstream.

Whatever it may be called, the phenomenon is very real, and it must be understood if it is to be thwarted.

But therein lies a problem. By what rules of logic and rationality can it be analyzed, and judgments made? When in the 20<sup>th</sup> century we confronted Hitler's Nazis and Mussolini's Fascists (and to a lesser extent Japanese Imperialism) we pretty well understood what

we were up against, because their political philosophies, as repugnant as they were, were clearly understood. Likewise, Communism was more or less an open book. In these cases we were able to judge the opposing systems in the context of a familiar analytical frame of reference, the product of centuries of evolving western thought.

Not so in the case of Islamism, partly because its proponents, practitioners and apologists think in radically different ways, according to a mindset that is based on a rigid and harsh interpretation of the Qur'an and an evolved body of religious doctrine called the *hadith*. Thus, the extremists see Islam as the only true religion, while rejecting and condemning all who do not subscribe to it. They believe it is the will of Allah that the world become a universal *ummah*, or Islamic community, and that all non-believers be converted, subjugated or eliminated within the political confines of a global Caliphate, returning to the 7<sup>th</sup> century Islamic ideal.

Regrettably, our failure to analyze, understand and speak frankly about Islamism is also due in no small way to an atmosphere of political correctness and self-censorship, producing a doctrinal blindness that was not present in the cases of National Socialism, Italian Fascism and Marxism-Leninism.

The radical search for a new Caliphate lay dormant for centuries, as Muslim expansion into Europe and Asia was reversed, and as social progress was inhibited through factional strife, corruption and ineffective leadership. It was awakened in the 1920s with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but this was largely ignored by the free world. Our attention was caught in 1979 with the expulsion of the Shah of Iran and occupation of the American embassy in Teheran, but little heed was paid by the West until the horror of 9/11. Since then, Islamist

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fervour has been growing exponentially throughout the Middle East and beyond, with new outrages in London, Madrid, Bali, Mumbai and Lahore, to say nothing of pre-empted strikes elsewhere.

In the eyes of those who subscribe to this extreme brand of Islam, such murderous activity is justified by their tendentious interpretation of religious doctrine. The West is seen as an infidel, decadent society given to excesses that are offensive to Islam; it can only be saved by being brought into the Islamic fold. In executing this religious imperative, the extremists feel none of the behavioural constraints, legal or moral, that qualify our own activity. Suicide attacks in the name of Allah are glorified and encouraged with promises of Qur'anic paradise. Beheadings are justified through an interpretation of the Prophet Muhammed's entreaty that "When you meet the unbelievers, strike off their heads."<sup>1</sup> International humanitarian law is utterly disregarded in their conduct of military operations. Non-combatants are legitimate targets. Even the killing of innocent Muslims – a frequent outcome – is excused.<sup>2</sup>

Such radical thinking is not a recent development. In the words of a 14<sup>th</sup> century historian and philosopher, Abdel Rahman ibn Khaldun, "In the Muslim community, the jihad is a religious duty because of the universalism of the Islamic mission and the obligation (to convert) everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force."<sup>3</sup>

It might be argued that this is not very different from the 15<sup>th</sup> century Spanish Inquisition, but that was centuries ago, and the comparison with today's Islamist zealotry is hardly valid. Such excesses in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the gleeful beheading of "infidels" and the execution of apostates set Islamists apart. It is important to understand, in trying to make sense of their heinous behaviour, that they have their own logic and reference frame, a grossly distorting window through which they in fact see us as the aberrant society, justifying their actions.

A very important question, in all of this, is the extent to which their radical world view is representative of thinking in the mainstream of Islam. Moderate Muslim leaders tell us that, on the contrary, theirs is a peaceful, non-violent religion; this is certainly the general impression that prevailed before 9/11. In the wake of that event it is fair to say that there has emerged a notion in our society that all of the world's one and a half billion Muslims fall

into either one or the other of two categories, namely the mainstream, moderate and peaceful version on the one hand, or the extremist version on the other.

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*How serious, then, is the real threat from Islamism today?*

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There is considerable evidence that this is an oversimplification. In the UK following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some 35% of Muslims declared in a poll that Al Qaeda's attack was justified. In that country and in Europe in general, there is growing concern that the expanding Muslim population is a threat to traditional values and institutions, a sentiment that is reflected in pointed terms like "Eurabia" and "Londonistan."

And then there was the violent and incomprehensible reaction to the Danish cartoons throughout the Muslim world.

Here in Canada the Muslim community has been damaged by less-than-categorical statements from certain Islamic associations and their leaders, purporting to represent the attitudes of the community at large. The World Trade Center episode was condemned, but all too often with an added "however." Demands for the superimposition of Sharia law on Canadian Muslims have raised serious concerns, and the appearance on our streets of women dressed in head-to-toe burkas suggests that there are echoes here of the Taliban's dreadful subjugation of women in Afghanistan. There have been calls for the creation of special prayer spaces, meal provisions and reserved times in recreational facilities for Muslim university students. Some of our universities have become hotbeds of anti-Israel sentiment and thinly disguised anti-Semitism.

Nevertheless, Canadians recognize that the vast majority of Muslims in this country detest the extremism of Al Qaeda and its worldwide affiliates, including the Taliban. Many Muslim immigrants – perhaps most – came to Canada to escape the conflict and oppression that militant Islam had brought to their countries of origin.

How serious, then, is the real threat from Islamism today?

It must be taken seriously, for a number of reasons. There is no denying the spread of extremism into the democratic world, as evidenced by the uncovering of numerous terrorist cells, some of them home grown, but usually having some sort of connection with professional jihadists based in the Middle East. A particular concern is the proliferation of Madrassa religious schools, chiefly

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1 Qur'an, Sura 47:4.

2 For a fascinating first-hand account, see [The Development of A Jihadist's Mind](#), by Tawfiq Hamid, Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, 6 April 2007

3 Quoted by Efraim Karsh in the Wall Street Journal, 4 April 2006

in Pakistan, where impressionable young Muslim boys are indoctrinated (some would say brainwashed) into a culture of hatred and total dedication to the destruction of Western society. Al Qaeda is known to have active branches ranging from West Africa to Indonesia, and it is penetrating northward into the Balkans. Increasingly, Al Qaeda is becoming adept at the use of global communications to spread its word. As laughable as these are, the occasional video proclamations by Bin Laden and his deputy, al Zawahiri, are taken seriously by countless Muslims.

These are reasons enough for us to pay heed to the Islamist phenomenon, but one additional aspect demands our full attention: the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The discredited WMD link with the invasion of Iraq has numbed our society in regard to these weapons to the point of scepticism, but their potential use by terrorists raises the spectre of devastating attacks on our cities and people, attacks that would make 9/11 look like child's play. As we have seen, there is no moral inhibition on their part to the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the West. The only obstacle, in the eyes of the Islamists, is the practical matter of difficulty of access and delivery.

Meanwhile, the extremists carry on their insurgent campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other areas. They continue to work towards the elimination of Israel and other democratic nations. Terrorist attacks continue around the world. Infiltration of the "infidel" West continues, and the radicals increasingly present themselves as the voice of Islam.

All of this sounds alarming, but at best it is a modest estimate of what is happening in what has been called "The Long War," a global conflict in which Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza are mere skirmishes.

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*How then should we respond?*

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"More seriously" is one answer. NATO and its international allies have to stop the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan, but until now they have not done a good job of it. We need to show the Muslim world that the West is not the "Great Satan" that it is made out to be by the jihadists. We can do this, for example, by increasingly sharing our wealth with poorer parts of the world through overseas development assistance. We need to show relentlessly that the free and democratic way of life we enjoy is infinitely better than the virulent, misogynist society which Islamism brings to its subjects.

At home, we must demonstrate clearly that we will not allow our hard-won democracy to be eroded by proponents of religious extremism. We must also show that we are utterly determined to protect our cherished way of life, and that we are able to do so without violating the sacred freedom which is the hallmark of our liberal democratic society.

In the final analysis, however, it is from within Islam itself that the principal solution must be found. Moderate adherents of this religion have to remove the destructive cancer that is growing within it. In effect, the jihadists are attempting to hijack Islam, and they are succeeding largely because of the passive stance of many Muslims in what has been called the struggle for the soul of Islam.

Islamism has to be seen for what it really is: a political rather than a religious phenomenon.

Failure to stop it, both from within and without Islam, will only encourage a continuation of its assault on enlightened society, reversing centuries of human progress, and at huge cost. ©

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## Employer Support for US National Guard and Reserve

by Jayson L. Spiegel

The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed enormous strain on the members of the United States National Guard, Reserve and their civilian employers. Unlike their active duty counterparts, members of the Guard and Reserve must simultaneously maintain both a civilian and military career. Despite the

unprecedented level of Guard/Reserve mobilization, most employers have fulfilled their legal obligation to their employees who are called up. Some employers do more than the minimum required by federal law and continue to provide pay and benefits to their employees while they are on active duty. However, recent developments suggest that there may be cracks in continued employer support. Without such support, the Pentagon's ability to rely on the Reserve Components in the future will become problematic.

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*Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States*

Since September 11, 2001, the National Guard and Reserve have evolved from a strategic reserve to an operational force that provides forces for deployment on a rotational basis. As of January 2009, over 126,600 Guardsmen and Reservists were on active duty in support of ongoing operations. In addition to their overseas responsibilities, 50,000 National Guard soldiers served in Hurricane Katrina relief operations and thousands more participated in border security operations. Since 2001, over 350,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers have deployed for duty in Iraq, Afghanistan or homeland-defence missions.

Many observers have questioned whether the Guard and Reserve can remain a viable operational force. In its March 2007 report to the US Congress, the Commission on National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) stated:

*The current posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an 'operational reserve' is not sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the reserve component's ability to serve our nation will diminish.*

The CNGR noted that “the long-term viability for recruiting and retention remains highly problematic” for the Guard and Reserve. Over the last decade, the number of prior active duty personnel enlisting in the Guard and Reserve has steadily decreased. The percentage of parents, teachers and other ‘influencers’ willing to recommend military service to their children or other young people has continually decreased. The total youth propensity to enlist declined from 15% of the population to only 10% from 2005 to 2006.

Of greater concern is the potential for declining support for the Guard and Reserve among civilian employers. Without continued robust employer support, the Pentagon may have to rethink its future use of the Reserve Components.

In a very real sense, private industry subsidizes national defence. The National Guard and Reserve are an attractive manpower pool because they are only called upon and paid when needed. Since they are not paid full-time, they cost less than their active duty counterparts who are paid full-time. Reliance on the National Guard and Reserve, therefore, makes fiscal sense. However, when members of the National Guard and Reserve are needed for duty, any economic consequences their employers might suffer because of their absence are not considered by the Pentagon. Employers must allow their employees to report for mobilization or military training,

regardless of the circumstance. The employer must allow the employee to go even if the employee volunteered for duty, the absence is at a crucial time for the employer, and the absence of the employee would be economically devastating.

Federal law as embodied in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) generally requires employers to return members of the Guard and Reserve to their former jobs upon their return from duty.<sup>1</sup> Because the employee’s job is protected under federal law, employers are limited in how they can replace the employee.

If an employer hires a temporary replacement, it incurs hiring and training costs and suffers a loss of productivity until the temporary employee becomes proficient. When the reservist-employee completes military duty, he/she must be reinstated, even if the temporary replacement is a superior employee. Accordingly, employers are subsidizing national security because their employees can be called away for extended and multiple deployments, sometimes with little or no notice, regardless of the economic cost to the employer. Employers bear the risk of economic loss if their employee is mobilized as federal law provides no compensation if the employer suffers as a result of mobilization.

Significantly, most employers only have one reservist on the payroll – more than 80% of all employers that employ at least one reservist only employ one reservist. Despite the fact that there are over one million members of the Guard and Reserve, only five businesses employ more than 700 reservists. According to the Department of Defense the leading employers are Wal-Mart (2,611 reservists), United Parcel Service (1,145), Home Depot (1,010), FedEx Corp. (974), and Lockheed Martin (738).

The absence of one employee from a Fortune 500 company due to mobilization should not pose a problem. However, the absence of that one employee from a small business could be devastating, especially if the reservist is a key employee. The fact that most businesses only employ one reservist may also lead to a corporate culture that is less understanding of Guard or Reserve duty. In the absence of a critical mass of reservists, employers may be less informed about USERRA and feel less interested in providing support other than the minimum required by law.

Six percent of reservists are self-employed, many of them doctors, lawyers, dentists, construction workers or tradesmen. Obviously, a self-employed reservist risks severe economic loss upon mobilization as his/her business may be shuttered during mobilization. Customers may gravitate to other businesses during mobilization while business debts remain due. A variety of programmes including Small Business Administration disaster loans are

available to assist self-employed reservists in rebuilding their business after mobilization. Loss of goodwill or a customer base cannot, however, be easily recovered.

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*Today, members of the Guard and Reserve can expect to serve at least one year out of every five on active duty with many months of additional training leading up to the year of mobilization.*

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The CNGR noted that over 50% of employers stated in a 2007 survey that they would not hire a reservist because their employee could be mobilized, despite federal law prohibiting such discrimination. Significantly, the CNGR stated that the trend of employers to question hiring reservists is directly correlated to when the Pentagon began referring to the Guard and Reserve as an “operational reserve” as opposed to a “strategic reserve.” As the report explained, if the Guard and Reserve are “operational,” then they are not really a force held in reserve. Accordingly, employers are less willing to hire prospective employees more likely to face frequent extended absences due to deployments. Despite USERRA’s prohibition on discrimination in employment, the poll suggests that discrimination occurs.

Further cracks in employer support are also apparent. A November 2007 hearing of the US Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee demonstrated that reservists find that mobilization has put their jobs, healthcare and benefits at risk: nearly 11,000 reservists were denied reemployment; more than 22,000 lost seniority, pay and benefits; nearly 20,000 had their pensions cut; nearly 11,000 failed to get their health insurance back; and 23% of reservists surveyed in 2006 who could not find a job after deployment attributed their unemployment to the failure of their employer to comply with USERRA.

Such findings may not be surprising in light of the extent of the ongoing mobilization. Employment support laws like USERRA were not originally designed for a Guard and Reserve that serves as an operational rotational force similar to active duty forces. At the time USERRA was enacted, the Guard and Reserve were a strategic reserve intended to support domestic operations such as natural disasters or fight in World War III. The former operations might occur frequently but would be of only a few weeks duration. The latter might last for years but would only occur once in a generation, if ever.

Today, members of the Guard and Reserve can expect to serve at least one year out of every five on active duty with many months of additional training leading up

to the year of mobilization.

Although USERRA is generally understood as requiring that members of the Guard and Reserve return to their civilian jobs when they are released from active duty, there are exceptions to the law. First, the law does not actually guarantee a job upon demobilization. USERRA only obligates the employer to return the reservist to the employment status he/she would have had in the absence of mobilization. If the employee would have been promoted had he/she not been mobilized, then he/she must be promoted upon return. If the employee would have been laid off had he/she not been mobilized, they will be laid off upon demobilization.

When USERRA was passed, the United States was still a largely industrial economy with many Guard/ Reserve personnel working in the manufacturing sector. Barring a recession, employment was steady. An employee leaving for a year’s mobilization could anticipate that the factory’s workload would not significantly change during that year, thereby limiting the likelihood of layoffs. In today’s service-based economy, employment may depend on shorter-term contracts and entrepreneurial skills. When an employee completes one contract, he/she moves to another contract or opportunity. Many reservists find today that the contracts they work on expire while they are mobilized or shortly thereafter. When this happens, the employer can properly claim that the employee would have been laid off if he/she had not been mobilized and USERRA does not apply. Recent Senate hearings suggest that this USERRA exception is being cited as a basis for denying re-employment rights.

Moreover, many lawyers argue that a reservist is not entitled to reemployment if doing so presents a hardship to the employer, is unreasonable or impractical. Although lower federal courts have not as yet accepted that argument, it will continue to be raised. It may be only a matter of time before a court rules that the reemployment right is limited, particularly because the reemployment statutes were not designed for the current environment.

Many employers now require that their employees sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment, effectively allowing arbitrators to determine the scope and extent of employee rights under USERRA. Although various bills have been introduced to prohibit arbitration of USERRA claims, it is unclear whether any bill will be passed in the next session of Congress.

Despite the ongoing pace of mobilization, some employers go beyond the minimum required by USERRA and provide extensive benefits to their mobilized employees. These include paying the difference between military and civilian pay if military pay is lower and continuing health insurance. Such employers are to be



commended for their support of their employees. However, most employers, particularly small businesses, lack the resources or revenue to continue to pay employees who are not contributing to the bottom line.

It would be possible to allow market forces to address the reservist-employer relationship. As the current mobilization continues, reservists may leave employers who are less supportive and gravitate toward employers whose policies are more supportive. Those whose civilian employment and economic situation so dictate will leave the military. Reservists who continue to serve may accept that service limits their civilian career advancement.<sup>2</sup> If these trends prove correct, then employers and reservist/employees on their own will achieve an equilibrium in which reservists are available to deploy and then return to the civilian economy.

Such a state of affairs would not, however, be acceptable. Our nation has come to rely upon members of the Guard and Reserve as a critical component of national defence. The Guard and Reserve represent hometown America, and when citizen-warriors deploy, America deploys with them. As the Canadian Forces so aptly describe it, citizen-warriors are the “footprint” of the military in the community.

More importantly, members of the Guard and Reserve possess critical capabilities developed in the civilian economy that are a valuable asset to the military. Civil affairs is one area where reservists excel because skills like agriculture science, municipal or school system management can only be developed in the civilian economy. Similarly, civilian policemen, truck drivers, doctors, lawyers, dentists and engineers often serve in comparable military occupations and apply civilian knowledge and skills to military operations. If, however, service in the Guard and Reserve limits maintaining a robust civilian career, then such highly skilled individuals may not join or remain in the Guard and Reserve.

Traditionally, the reservist-employer relationship has been a one-sided affair. Other than non-monetary award programmes, the government provides little recognition of the employer’s sacrifice. Despite the fact that private employers subsidize national security, the government provides no financial compensation for economic losses associated with mobilization, no matter how catastrophic the losses may be. While expressions of gratitude are important, they do not contribute to the bottom line.

One way to address this challenge is to recognize the financial loss that employers, particularly small businesses, suffer when an employee is mobilized. Congress has frequently considered bills providing tax credits to small businesses whose employees are mobilized. Congress recently passed a bill that provides credits for employers who pay the difference between

military and civilian salaries where military salaries are lower.<sup>3</sup> This bill is a good first step because it incentivizes business to support their employees who are mobilized. Such credits, however, do not help the many businesses whose economic dislocation during mobilization is such that they cannot afford to pay a salary differential. Moreover, the credits do not address the losses suffered by all businesses upon mobilization and the costs incurred addressing staffing shortfalls.

The current economic slowdown may cause employers to question the fairness of the current system which imposes costs and obligations on employers of Guardsmen and Reservists. Addressing the employer-reservist relationship, therefore, requires a dialog among business, labour and the Pentagon. As the Army Reserve has described it, reservists represent a “shared workforce” that is employed by both the private sector and military. In order for a “shared workforce” to function in everybody’s best interests, employer support programmes must move beyond the traditional one-sided emphasis on the employer’s legal obligations and award programmes.

By virtue of serving in the Guard and Reserve, reservists provide intangible value to their employers. They are necessarily physically fit, free of medical problems that drive up insurance rates, drug free, do not have criminal records, capable of operating under stress and trained in leadership. Good soldiers make good employees and private businesses should want to employ them. However, reservists are subject to periodic deployment. Employers looking for prospective employees with the traits derived from military service could simply hire veterans with no Guard or Reserve commitment and thereby reap the benefits of employees with military experience.

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*...most military medical, police, transportation, and engineering personnel are in the National Guard and Reserve.*

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To ensure robust employer support in the future, creative programmes should be considered that provide economic value to the employer in exchange for sharing its workforce with the Pentagon. ‘Sharing’ is most obvious where reservists are employed in the same field in both their military and civilian capacities. For example, most military medical, police, transportation, and engineering personnel are in the National Guard and Reserve. Many of those personnel are employed in substantially similar occupations in the civilian sector. This presents government and industry with collaborative opportunities that create economic benefit for both and

provide some partial offset for the loss employers suffer when employees are mobilized.

The US Army Reserve has taken the lead in this effort, establishing an employer partnership initiative that formalizes a relationship between the Army Reserve and the private sector. As the Army Reserve describes it:

*The Army Reserve Employer Partnership is a joint public-private venture designed to give business leaders tangible benefits for employing and sharing Soldiers-Employees. Since the Army Reserve and Employers share a valuable resource, the Army Reserve can recruit a Soldier for the Army Reserve and for a civilian business. The Army Reserve can also share training by aligning military and civilian credentialing and licensing, providing highly skilled and capable Soldiers who can meet the demands of the civilian workplace.<sup>4</sup>*

This important initiative attempts to demonstrate the tangible value to the private sector of service in the Guard and Reserve. By harmonizing training, professional certification and licensing requirements for like specialties in the military and civilian sector, industry would realize cost savings from hiring Guardsmen and Reservists. The Army Reserve initiative ensures that trained military policeman, truck drivers, construction tradesmen, engineers and health care professionals could move easily between the military and civilian workforce. The government should also pay for state licenses, bar

and other professional dues that benefit reservists in both their civilian and military careers.

The government and private sector can also collaborate on recruitment. The Army Reserve website allows Army Reserve Soldiers to search for civilian jobs with Army Reserve partners.

In addition, the Guard or Reserve could strategically locate new military police units in communities that have a shortage of law enforcement officers. As military policemen are assigned to the unit, local law enforcement agencies would have access to a pool of trained candidates for employment. Similarly, transportation units could be located in communities which have a shortage of truck drivers. The government and private employer can engage in joint recruiting and credentialing programmes that provide a trained workforce for both. Such collaboration also ensures that the private sector and military understand their mutual obligations and requirements upon alert for duty and mobilization.

As members of the Guard and Reserve continue to deploy at regular intervals, continued employer support will be tested. Ensuring that the civilian and military sectors can share the workforce will require more than a legislative regime that provides reemployment rights. Ultimately, the Pentagon will have to make the case to the civilian sector that there is economic value in a system where employees can be called away every few years. If service in the Guard and Reserve is viewed only as a burden on the civilian sector, then business support for the Guard and Reserve will decline. Collaborative programmes such as the Army Reserve Employer Partnership initiative can mutually benefit both the civilian and military sectors and ensure that citizen-warriors continue their extraordinary contributions to national security. ©

### (Endnotes)

1 USERRA provides that the re-employment right does not apply if the employee serves more than five years of active duty or is discharged under other than honourable circumstances.

2 Of course, the psychic and monetary value of military service would compensate those individuals for any loss in civilian income or progression.

3 According to the General Accounting Office, 41% of reservists earn less in military pay upon mobilization than they earned in their civilian jobs. Reservists whose income decreases after mobilization are less likely to remain in the force. There is a real pay gap that must be addressed. Employers who provide continued compensation or benefits upon mobilization are a valuable part of the solution.

4 The website for the programme can be found at: [http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/arweb/news/word/Employer\\_Partnership.htm](http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/arweb/news/word/Employer_Partnership.htm)

## Onward Christian Soldiers? Religion in the Canadian Forces

by Anne Frances Cation



Any association between Church and State makes many Canadians deeply uncomfortable. Nevertheless, Canada, like the United States and Britain, has traditionally embedded organized religion in its agent of power, the Canadian Forces (CF). Serving first in the Boer War and later

established formally in 1945, members of the CF Chaplain Branch currently serve in Afghanistan, and have worked with Canadian troops in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Rwanda.

Despite the controversial Church-State connection inherent in the military chaplain role, it provides psychological support for Canadian soldiers and further reflects Canada's principals of multiculturalism.

The military chaplaincy considers itself to symbolize higher principles of hope and faith. Beyond performing religious ceremonies, chaplains counsel soldiers and their families and help staff the five CF Operational Trauma and Stress Support Centres. The chaplains are accessible to the soldiers, having a continual presence both on base and during operations.

Whereas health care professionals agree that the stigma associated with mental health issues impedes treatment, there is no stigma associated with talking to a chaplain, unlike other mental health options available to a soldier during duty. In addition, because chaplains are visible and present in the theatre of operations and on base, they can develop relationships and trust with the soldiers which is not frequently available to other health professionals.

While having decidedly Christian roots, over the last several years the CF Chaplain Branch has become more reflective of Canada's cultural mosaic. In 2007, there were 192 chaplains in the Regular Force, representing a variety of faiths and denominations, including: Anglican, Roman Catholic, United Church, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Salvation Army, Judaism and Islam. The Chaplain Branch's insignia reflect this diversity. Christian

chaplains wear a badge with the Maltese cross. For Jewish chaplains, this cross is replaced with the Star of David and two tablets, which is again changed for Muslim chaplains, whose insignia bears a crescent.

These badges underscore the CF's wider efforts at multiculturalism. The Diversity in Recruiting campaign has publicized CF opportunities for visible minorities, Aboriginal people and women. The Muslim community, which, as of 2006, represented less than one percent of the Forces, has received a specific recruitment drive: recruitment officers have presented at mosques and former Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier attended a service at a mosque. In particular, the CF has demonstrated accommodation towards Lieutenant Wafa Dabbagh's religious requirement since she joined the Canadian Navy over a decade ago. Lt. Dabbagh is permitted to wear a head covering and loose clothing and is able to follow her dietary restrictions.

As chaplains do not carry weapons, the Chaplain Branch is a positive alternative for religious people who want to represent Canada abroad but who do not want to engage in combat. The chaplaincy can be most helpful for some religious adherents, including Muslims, who maintain the principle of never killing someone else from the same faith.

This inclusion of other religions and cultures in the CF adds an important grey area to the mission in Afghanistan, a critical shade in the black and white world of terrorism. Canada considers itself tolerant and multicultural, and by having the CF reflect these characteristics, it will facilitate other countries and their citizens to consider Canadians as such.

The Army Chaplain Manual writes that "there are no atheists in a foxhole." When in an extremely stressful situation, faith or spirituality provides emotional support. Even without the religious component, discussing problems with a trusted friend can alleviate stress and encourage mental health. Warfare is extremely stressful: Veterans Canada estimates that ten percent of war zone veterans, including peacekeepers, will experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It has also been noted that the 'elusive' enemy and high degree of uncertainty in Afghanistan further encourages PTSD. By spring 2009, Veterans Canada expects to double its mental health clinics, from five to ten.

Canada owes its soldiers every preventative measure possible to respond to the needs of military personnel and their families. Having a friend or religious mentor always available is an important step. ©

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## White Phosphorus in Gaza: New Accusations of War Crimes

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

Every campaign of the seemingly perpetual war between Israel and the Palestinians seems to be marked by accusations of war crimes, each side alleging that deliberate targeting of civilians by the other has taken place.

The 2009 Gaza Conflict has been no exception, except that mainstream international non-governmental organizations are now getting into the act. One of these is Amnesty International, which issued a report on February 24 accusing both Hamas and Israel of committing war crimes during the conflict and calling on the United Nations to impose an arms embargo on both sides.

Amnesty did not spare Hamas, declaring that, "Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups fired hundreds of rockets that had been smuggled in or made of components from abroad at civilian areas in Israel."

But its criticism of Israel was far more stinging. Donatella Rovera, the head of the Amnesty fact-finding mission to Gaza, declared that, "Israeli forces used white phosphorus and other weapons supplied by the United States to carry out serious violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes."

White phosphorus (WP), of course, has been used for many years as a means of screening portions of the battlefield from enemy observation and thus preventing the enemy from bringing aimed fire against armour and infantry forces moving on the battlefield. The white phosphorus contained in WP shells ignites when the shell is detonated, and causes an almost instantaneous cloud of smoke to rise above the point of impact. WP also has a lethal effect which can be particularly hideous and its use as an anti-personnel weapon is prohibited by international law, as is its use against civilians and civilian property.

A limitation to the effective tactical use of WP occurs when conditions on the battlefield are hot and windless. The intense heat released by the ignition of the WP may cause the smoke to 'pillar,' forming a narrow column of smoke which has a much reduced screening effect.

Gunners characteristically carry a second type of smoke shell called 'base ejection' (BE) smoke, carried in small containers in the shell which are ejected out the rear of the shell by a small expelling charge at a certain point in the shell's trajectory. Since the BE canisters burn more slowly than WP, the pillaring effect does not take place. A limitation to the use of BE stems from the fact that

it usually takes more time to plan and execute a screen mission using BE, though the screen itself tends to hug the ground more successfully since BE lacks the intense thermal effect of WP. BE shells also lack the lethal anti-personnel impact of WP.

The United States has recently developed a different form of WP shell (the M875 A1) in an effort to overcome the pillaring effect of WP and to produce a more effective quick screening effect.

Instead of a single solid mass of WP, the new round contains 96 small quarter circle pads of about 4-inch in diameter, which are impregnated with granular WP. The pads are ejected from the shell casing at a calculated point on the shell's trajectory and the pads, which have ignited once in contact with air, fall over an oval dispersed pattern which is about the size of a Canadian football field. The smoke emitted by the burning pads produces an area screen since the individual pads do not generate enough heat to produce pillaring. This mid-air dispersal of the burning WP pads produces the striking aerial 'pink jelly-fish' pattern which photographers have frequently captured during the course of the conflict.

The M875 A1 is an example of effective weapons development. Under normal battlefield conditions outside urban areas, the new shell produces a faster screen not subject to pillaring. When fired in urban areas, however, care must be taken to select the location and height of



*Photo - Agence France Presse*

burst of the shell to minimize the probability of the burning pads falling into civilian installations.

This, then, brings us to the allegations made by Amnesty International that Israel is guilty of war crimes through the use of M875 A1 shells in dense urban areas in Gaza.

Judged by the visual evidence of the pink jellyfish  
 PROMOUVOIR UN DÉBAT PUBLIC ÉCLAIRÉ SUR  
 LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA DÉFENSE NATIONALES

photos, as well as evidence on the ground of empty shells with their serial numbers including manufacturing sources still evident, it appears that M875 A1 shells were used in Gaza, and that, as the sole manufacturer of the shells, they were supplied to Israel by the US.

Central to the controversy is likely to be the question of the interpretation of the Agence France Presse photo of a number of WP pads from an M875 A1 round falling into a UN school in Beit Lahia, Gaza.

No doubt those attacking Israel will allege that this represented a deliberate targeting of a clearly civilian installation, whereas Israel's defenders may argue that there was a legitimate military target in close proximity to the civilian installation and that there was no intent to deliberately target the civilian site.

This will be the subject of intense international political debate, and the outcome of that debate, if any, is yet to be seen.

And, as a by-product, we can expect a call from the disarmament lobbies for such rounds to be outlawed,

regardless of their practical utility under normal battlefield conditions. Such a campaign can be expected to follow the model used in the 'Ottawa Process' to ban the use of land mines, and which is being used again in the campaign against the use of cluster munitions. ©



Photo - Agence France Presse

## The Impact of Missile Defence on China's 'Minimum Deterrence' Nuclear Posture

by Thomas Adams



In December 2002, the Bush Administration announced its intention to begin fielding ballistic missile defence (BMD) assets starting in 2004. Since then, there has been a heated discussion among world leaders, policy makers, and strategists as to the implications this would have on regional and global security. Reactions from potential peer competitors such as Russia and China have been especially negative. For the latter, this is understandable: China has always fielded the smallest nuclear force of all the established nuclear powers and does not want its nuclear capabilities degraded by the deployment of BMD. As a result, some analysts have suggested that BMD will lead to a shift in China's nuclear doctrine of 'minimum deterrence,' with corresponding increases in its strategic nuclear forces.

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The modernization of China's strategic nuclear forces predates the deployment of BMD by decades. Though the deployment of BMD worries China to the extent that it will reduce the effectiveness of its minimum deterrent, there is scant evidence to suggest that BMD is directly causing China to make quantitative, qualitative or doctrinal changes to its strategic deterrent forces. China will most likely wait and see the nature and extent of BMD deployment so as to determine how that might degrade its own deterrent and then make the necessary quantitative and qualitative adjustments to its nuclear forces in line with its doctrine of minimum deterrence.

### *What is China's concept of minimum deterrence?*

The purpose of China's nuclear forces is defensive. They are meant solely to deter foreign invasion and nullify the kinds of nuclear threats and blackmail that the country was subject to in the early 1950s. This posture has been reinforced by China's declared 'no first use' policy: its nuclear weapons would only be used to retaliate against

the initiator of a first-strike, thereby hopefully deterring such an attack in the first place.

Beijing's nuclear doctrine has long rested on the concept of minimum deterrence. Despite possessing the ability to greatly increase the size of its nuclear arsenal, China's leaders have long believed that deterrence only requires a relatively small number of its nuclear-armed missiles to survive a first-strike and be able to retaliate against an attacker's cities. An essential component of this strategy is to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces; if China's leaders feel that only a relatively small number of nuclear weapons are needed to deter a first-strike, then China must ensure that they can survive a first-strike and be capable of retaliation in the event that deterrence fails.

China's minimum deterrence posture is further exemplified by its relatively small nuclear arsenal. Though China's nuclear submarines (SSBN) were first launched in the early 1980s, they are neither substantially deployed beyond China's waters nor considered operational. Land-based delivery systems constitute the core of China's nuclear arsenal. Its land-based strategic nuclear missiles are currently composed of the 13,000 km range, three-stage, liquid-fuelled DF-5 and DF-5A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) which are capable of hitting targets as far away as the continental United States. Approximately 20 DF-5/5As are believed to be operationally deployed in silos. With a range of approximately 11,000km, its new DF-31A ICBMs are land-mobile. Approximately 10 DF-31As are believed to now be deployed.

### *Possible Impact of BMD Deployment on China's Nuclear Forces*

BMD is any weapon system that can destroy a ballistic missile and/or its warhead before it can reach its target, with differing systems designed to target the missile in each of the three phases of its trajectory – boost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase. A multilayered defence is one in which several weapon systems capable of destroying the missile and/or its warhead in each phase is deployed. Such a multilayered defence would be most useful in providing redundancy measures should the missile and/or its warhead get through one of the lines of defence. As terminal defences are currently used for tactical battlefield purposes, only the boost and midcourse phases of missile interception will be discussed.

The boost phase is the period during which the rocket is launched which carries an ICBM's warhead to the exoatmosphere. In this phase, the missile is easily traceable and highly vulnerable to interception by Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) sea-based interceptors (SBI) deployed on Aegis ships and, once made operational, the

Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system composed of interceptors mounted on trucks or airborne lasers (ABL) deployed on modified commercial Boeing 747 aircraft. The drawback of boost-phase interception is that these systems need to be already stationed close to a potential launch site to be able to intercept a missile in its early launch phase.

Through 2007, 21 SM-3 SBIs have been deployed on three Aegis cruisers and seven destroyers. China's ICBM forces are located deep inside China's interior, and SBIs would not be able to reach them on time before the ICBMs have reached the exoatmosphere. There are currently no THAAD fire units or ABLs deployed; even if and when they become deployed, they will also be unable to negotiate their way through China's air defences and travel all the way into the interior in time to destroy an ICBM while still in its boost phase. All three systems would also be largely ineffective against submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), as it would be near impossible to know in advance where an SSBN is located and to station an SBI accordingly. Interception of an SLBM will be made all the more difficult with the deployment of China's new Type 094 Jin-class SSBN carrying 12 Julang-2 8,000 km range, three-stage, solid-fuelled SLBMs. It is believed that each JL-2 will be capable of holding up to four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), though capability does not necessarily translate into intent. The People's Republic hopes to eventually deploy four to six Jin-class SSBNs by about 2010.

While these boost-phase interceptors will be largely ineffective against China's ICBMs and SLBMs, two systems of space-based interception are also currently in development – the kinetic energy interceptors (KEI) and directed energy systems/space-based laser (SBL). KEIs will be placed in low orbit; upon detection of a missile launch, an exoatmospheric hit-to-kill vehicle (HKV) would come out of orbit and smash into the missile, destroying it through force of impact. The US Missile Defense Agency estimates a constellation of three to six space-based KEIs to be operationally deployed by 2011-2012. The proposed SBL system will consist of a constellation of satellites capable of focusing a high-intensity laser on the missile until it is destroyed. Because the laser will travel at the speed of light, the system will be the most effective for boost-phase interception. Whereas sea-based assets must either be currently deployed or redeployed in close proximity to an enemy launch area for successful interception (in the latter instance, it would probably be too late), a constellation of space-based interceptors will offer a truly global capability to intercept a missile from wherever it is launched. It is perhaps for this reason that China is so vehemently opposed to the 'weaponization of space,' while paradoxically developing anti-satellite capabilities.

In the midcourse phase, the warhead has been delivered into the exoatmosphere, which in turn heads for its target through momentum and gravity. In order to intercept the warhead at this stage, a ground-based interceptor (GBI) is launched with a HKV as its payload. Once in the exoatmosphere, the HKV destroys the warhead by colliding into it.

Through 2007, 24 GBIs have been deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Fort Greely, Alaska, with the total number expected to reach 44 by 2013. This would essentially protect the North American continent from ballistic missile strikes coming from North Korea or Iran, or limited launches from Russia or China. However, those 24 GBIs will most likely not be able to successfully intercept all 30 of China's currently deployed ICBMs. Deployment of at least 100 GBIs, however, might neutralize China's 30 ICBMs. Thus, it is believed that China is developing countermeasures for its missiles, including decoys and manoeuvrable warheads. However, despite the fact that China is reported to have had the ability to tip its missiles with MIRVs for some time now, it has chosen to mate each of its missiles with

a single warhead. It is believed that China's new DF-31A ICBMs will also only be mated with one warhead each. This may change with the further development and deployment of BMD. But even if China decides to MIRV these new ICBMs as a result of BMD developments, it would do so to reinforce its minimum deterrence doctrine, not to move away from it.

### Conclusion

China has been modernizing its nuclear forces for decades, long before the Bush administration announced its intention to deploy BMD. Increases in the quality and quantity of China's deterrent forces do not necessarily imply that it is moving away from its doctrine; 'minimum' is relative to an opponent's ability to successfully destroy China's nuclear forces in a first-strike or effectively use BMD to intercept any surviving retaliatory missiles. The primary rationale for this modernization is to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces in order to reinforce its minimum deterrence doctrine, not move away from it.

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## Chasing myths: soft power in a hard world

by: Eric Morse

*"Canadians don't fight wars. We're peacekeepers!"*  
- *Woman in coffee shop, 2002 [as told by Sean Maloney]*

*"Who will bell the cat?"*  
- *Aesop, 6<sup>th</sup> century BC*

*"The Horn? Nobody wants to go **near** the Horn."*  
- *Canadian general, February 2007*

Myth is important to any nation. It is the emotional distillation of a people's collective experience, entwined with the facts of history but not identical with them, and it provides the basis for a sense of destiny, aspiration and purpose in the world.

Myth can also get nations in serious trouble when it encounters hard reality on the ground. Think: the transposition of the values of the New American Century into Iraq. But also think: the myth of peacekeeping and the

international doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect 'R2P', both of which are tenets of faith among the advocates of soft power among the Canadian foreign policy commentariat.

Eugene Lang has recently noted that Canada's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping missions holds mythical status in this country. That is the case not only with ordinary Canadians, but also with a very strong element of Canadian opinion leaders to whom we may refer to broadly as advocates of 'soft power'.

Lang comments: "Peacekeeping reminds us of an important post-war Canadian role in international affairs, symbolized by our innovative involvement in Suez in the

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1950s, and in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. Peacekeeping also helps with Canada's self-definition by setting us apart from the Americans. For many Canadians, a foreign policy anchored in peacekeeping equates with a defensive military, one that rarely if ever is engaged in violence, combat or war."

It has been argued by Professor Sean Maloney of the Royal Military College of Canada, among others, that the 'classic' non-violent peacekeeper image was only ever matched in reality by the two early missions in Suez and Cyprus. Both were put in place to separate combatants who, for reasons of their own, preferred that situation to continued conflict, and both served the interests of super-powers to whom continued conflict was inconvenient – but neither could have existed without the consent of the warring parties. Other UN 'peacekeeping' involvements through the decades have not been so tidy; some have ended in catastrophe (as with the Rwanda massacres) and very few have operated outside the shadow of continuing violence or its imminent threat.

Somalia, the Congo and Sudan all exemplify sincere attempts at 'peacekeeping' where there is no peace to keep. They also exemplify running humanitarian sores which seem to demand action by the international community while defying solution by means of any available implementation of R2P.

Given that peacekeeping and non-violent conflict resolution or prevention have been the touchstones of soft-power advocates in Canada for decades, it is an odd juxtaposition – to say the least – that R2P has now been added to the soft-power mix, insofar as its application has every chance of being very far away from non-violent.

R2P evolved in the 1990s when it became clear that in the post-Cold War era there were many ruling regimes that practiced on their own peoples what the international community generally defines as crimes against humanity. The doctrine was adopted in the 2005 World Summit outcome document, which states that: 'The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action . . .'

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*The problem is: what action can be taken that is consistent, exemplary and effective?*

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R2P has been embraced by the advocates of 'soft power' in Canada, who indeed took the lead in framing it, essentially on the basis that it is to be applied and enforced principally by 'appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and

other peaceful means', with violent intervention only as a last resort. That is a high and laudable aspiration, and consonant with a worldview which values due process as the central vehicle for conflict prevention or resolution. However, as time passes, it is becoming uncomfortably clear that the last resort may be the *only* resort in practice – and even that may not be viable.

In the worldview of 'soft power', the UN is viewed as the ultimate legitimizing authority in any type of international peacekeeping operations, and has now been charged with mandating any action under R2P. This presents some issues of the 'elephant in the room' type since it is in no way clear that all of the 192 members of the UN accord it as much legitimacy as a paramount international authority in the way that Canadian opinion does, or that the UN is in fact capable of either articulating or enforcing consistent international policy.

Leaving aside all the metaphysical but very serious issues of the limits to Westphalian national sovereignty, the universality, or lack thereof, of the UN as a legitimizing body for action, and the opportunity that the doctrine affords any state so minded to cloak aggressive intent in the doctrine of just intervention, the major problem with R2P is that in the end it must present consistent and credible sanctions if it is violated, or it will be ignored. Whatever successes may be credited to 'soft power' are laudable – but the doctrine itself stands or falls by the will and ability of its supporters to resort to the ultimate sanction, and to carry it off successfully. The track record here is nonexistent and the prognosis is, frankly, poor.

There are various reasons for this, and they are basically the stumbling blocks on which R2P collapses as a concept:

- R2P attempts to define the circumstances under which it may be invoked. But the conditions and process are both so convoluted that by the time action can be agreed on, it is most often too late – and the rules always furnish adequate pretext to defer action if such a pretext is desired.
- Although the doctrine prescribes that all peaceful means be attempted, the situations that are most in need of urgent intervention are generally perpetrated by regimes that are impervious to any sanction short of force.
- Even if the use of force is agreed on – it never has been since R2P was enacted – there is no guarantee that it will succeed, and no hint of a viable exit strategy. In any case, these things cannot be programmed.



- If force is resolved upon, from where is it to be had? *Suitable* deployable forces are in short supply anywhere.

The worst-case scenario here has already happened, in Somalia in 1993, which serves both as a poster case for an R2P intervention and as a dire warning.

Both the American and Canadian militaries in Somalia were eventually forced out by uncontrollable local chaos. The Canadian military suffered public humiliation as the result of having sent in troops that were in no way suitable for the mission, but that was not the worst that could have happened. Only by the fortunes of war were we not also treated to the spectacle of Canadian corpses dragged through the streets, as happened to the men of 'Blackhawk Down'. Since then, Somalia has chewed up and spat out yet another internationally-sanctioned intervention force, and looks like it is sliding further into chaos. If ever there was a candidate for both peace enforcement and R2P intervention, it is Somalia, but the chances of any successful intervention appear minimal.

Darfur has always been a *cause célèbre* in Canada as a humanitarian issue, and in 2005, according to Lang, then-Prime Minister Paul Martin wanted to deploy the Canadian Forces to Darfur if authorized by the UN Security Council. Lang states that Martin was advised by defence staff that such a mission could be more dangerous for Canadian troops than Kandahar. (All things being equal on the world and Canadian political stages come 2011, it would seem that Darfur is by no means off the political radar, assuming that the Canadian Forces' commitment in Kandahar ends in 2011)

In passing, the reaction of the regime in Sudan in expelling or threatening international agencies in response to Bashir's indictment before the International Criminal Court may be noted as a consequence of indicting a tyrant who still has force at his disposal. While the act may be morally satisfying, the results for the people of the region are likely to be very unfortunate.

At the most recent Munk Debate on Humanitarian Intervention, International Crisis Group's (now former) head and R2P proponent Gareth Evans claimed that several non-violent resolutions could be credited to R2P, including Kenya, but he was unable to make a convincing case for any of them. On the other hand, there are several high-profile instances (Myanmar, Darfur, Zimbabwe, North Korea) where action is wanting. The recent 'compromise' in Zimbabwe is not to be taken seriously as anything but a cynical slap in the face of humanity; it is a fig-leaf that staves off intervention. But in any case, no state wishes to be the first to call for intervention because it would then all too probably find itself fighting its way into the country.

As for R2P – General Rick Hillier, who has had more experience than most with unintended consequences, has said that he would not commit the life of a single soldier to any mission as ill-defined in means or ends as an R2P intervention is likely to be. A cooperative and humane international community is a guiding dream for humanity, and the warrants against and actual detentions of a very few war criminals are scattered lights in the darkness, but in this eighth year of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a dream is all it is. And some dreams can be nightmares.

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## Book Reviews

### Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan's Women

by Sally Armstrong

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Sally Armstrong. "Bitter Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan's Women." Penguin Group Canada, November 2008. Hardcover, 304 pages, \$32.

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*Arnav Manchanda is the CDA Defence Policy Analyst. He holds a Master's degree in political science from McGill University and has interned with the United Nations in New York.*

During a talk in Ottawa in January, a prominent Canadian journalist who covers Afghanistan reflected on whether bringing stability, democracy and development to Afghanistan was worth the price being paid in Afghan

and Western blood. Paraphrasing Kurt Vonnegut, he asked whether the prospect of the return of the Taliban was so horrendous that it was a “fate worse than death” (in the sense that it was better to fight and die than live under the Taliban).

At the time I also happened to be reading Sally Armstrong’s *Bitters Roots, Tender Shoots: The Uncertain Fate of Afghanistan’s Women*. In it, I came across a reference to hundreds of women in one year having “chosen death [by self-immolation] rather than face a forced marriage or another beating.”

Perhaps there was a fate worse than death, I thought.

In *Bitter Roots* – a sequel to her 2002 *Veiled Threat: The Hidden Power of Women in Afghanistan*, which focused on the plight of women under the Taliban – Armstrong, a Canadian journalist and human rights activist, explores the prospects of Afghan women in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

What is most striking about the book is the series of stories of individual women who struggle to make a life and advocate for their rights in the new Afghanistan. The tales chronicle such extreme hope and despair that I felt at times as if I were reading Khaled Hosseini’s *A Thousand Splendid Suns*.

There is the story of Annisa, a burn victim and survivor of the practice of trading daughters without dowries. There is an entire chapter devoted to the indefatigable Sima Samar, head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, a perch from which she tirelessly advocates for the rights of women and withstands attacks from retrograde elements within government and society. Female parliamentarians like Safia Sadiqi and the outspoken Malalai Joya are examples of greater female representation in politics. There is also that emblematic story of hope, of girls going to school and enthusiastic for a better future: “They were coming over the hills, down the valleys, in twos, in fours, as far as the eye could see along the furrowed paths and dusty byways.”

That hope and progress is now under threat from what Armstrong calls the “fundamentalist menace.” Social tension and psychological and physical trauma are combined with entrenched and systematized brutalization of women and intolerance. Girls are still jailed for ‘sex crimes’ and for running away from their marriages. Misogynistic attitudes remain pervasive within the Afghan government among the legitimized strongmen and officials. For instance, Armstrong describes a particularly bizarre encounter with Chief Justice Shinwari, an octogenarian misogynist who keeps a thick rubber strap

for ‘punishment’ on his wall and holds backward views of women’s roles in public and private life.

One unexpected revelation (at least for this reader) was the activities of various volunteer Canadian groups in the advocacy of women’s rights in Afghanistan. These snapshots showcase concrete links between cultures that would otherwise have had very little contact. There are Canadian women who have raised funds to train Afghan teachers, organizations such as Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, and gutsy 10-year olds like Alaina Podmorow who founded Little Women for Little Women in Afghanistan.


The book’s biggest strength – apart from vividly portraying the personalities and actions of its female protagonists – is that the reader’s inner cynic will be dealt a sharp blow. Armstrong is forceful without being didactic, and bases the narrative in her own experiences and hard facts. If you claim that women’s inequality is part of Afghan culture, Armstrong counters that a ‘culture’ cannot be defined without the input of half its population. If you say that change can only come from within Afghan society without outside interference, Armstrong would counter that internal progressive forces often need an outside helping hand. If you assert that the Taliban brought stability and security, Armstrong would undoubtedly assert that they were more interested in minimal government and victimizing females and minorities.

The book’s biggest weakness is its propensity to meander and lose focus on the principal subject. The chapters feel episodic instead of integrated, and interviews are often too broad and could have done with some editing. Armstrong also describes projects that have no clear link to women, such as the Turquoise Mountain Foundation in Kabul and the Kabul Medical Library Project. Nonetheless, the stories are always informative.

Since Armstrong gives us stories, I will add another to the list. In January Dexter Filkins of *The New York Times* wrote that several Kandahari girls who had acid thrown on them for daring to be educated were now returning to school.<sup>1</sup> Armstrong, I’m sure, would not be surprised: she would tell us that once an opportunity is grasped, it’s difficult to let go.

But will Afghan women and girls be able to hold on? The new American administration under President Barack Obama is surging troops into Afghanistan as part of a strategy to augment stability. However, the

1 Dexter Filkins, “Afghan Girls, Scarred by Acid, Defy Terror, Embracing School,” *The New York Times*, 13 January 2009. Online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/world/asia/14kandahar.html>



administration is simultaneously paring down its goals. Talk among Western allies nowadays tends to bypass progressive optimism and the ‘soft’ issues, for example democracy, human rights and education for girls. Furthermore, renewed negotiation with the Taliban might entail the acceptance of their cultural and social practices – witness the effects of appeasement of the Pakistani Taliban on the tribal areas.

Canada’s policymakers should take note of this book as they decide on the extent of, and justification for, Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan post-2011, and even to examine Canada’s commitment since 2002. How

do we balance addressing the ‘hard’ issues – insurgency, drugs and stability – and the ‘softer’ ones, such as human rights, democracy and women’s rights? Should – and can – we treat them as distinct phenomena? Should we, as the Canadian journalist at the University of Ottawa suggested, allow the ‘unpleasant’ mistreatment of the female half of the Afghan population to continue as the necessary price of stability and security? As Armstrong writes, “[to] a world still traumatized by 9/11, Afghanistan has become a story about terrorists, drug barons, and the Taliban insurgency. To me, it remains a chronicle about blameless women and girls who continue to pay an awful price for the opportunism of angry men.” ©

## The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan

by David J. Bercuson

Reviewed by Bonnie Butlin



David J. Bercuson. “The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan.” Harper Collins, September 2008. Hardcover, 400 pages, \$34.95.

David J. Bercuson’s book, *The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan*, describes the development of the regimental tradition in Canada from its Aboriginal and European roots to the present. To do so it covers a variety of battles and regimental milestones in the Canadian historical experience.

From a historical perspective, it is not a stand-alone history of Canadian regiments or the featured battles. The book lacks sufficient background, detail, and continuity to either clearly visualize battles or easily trace regimental histories. This may be due to the chronological ordering of the book which shifts between regiments in an ambitious attempt to cover a lot of ground over decades of conflict.

From an analytical perspective, there is very little interpretation of facts, including in the concluding chapter, which is a light five pages. The book overtly says little about the Canadian regiment-based army, in contrast to Dr. Bercuson’s 1996 book, “Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia,” which is a staple for analysis of the regimental system. Alternatives

to the regimental system such as religion and ethnic-based structures are not discussed in depth despite currently being the subject of much debate. Andrew Bacevich’s book, “The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War,” and Stephen Mansfield’s, “The Faith of the American Soldier,” are notable works on alternatives.

Due to these weaknesses, the book risks being wrongly dismissed as lacking relevance beyond being an enjoyable historical narrative. The true strength of the book is its clear understanding of *how* Canada fights wars. It is a key work on Canadian socio-military culture. It identifies the historically significant incidents and trends of regimental development and engagement that form the context of how Canada as a state and as a people fights wars. It reveals how Canadians think about and use their military forces. This includes a time-tested propensity for neglecting the regimental tradition on which the army is based, underfunding the military during times of relative peace, and going to war with the army available rather than the minimum force required.

While the narrative focuses on individual regiments and battles, it is this cyclic behaviour influenced by Canadian propensities that gives the reader a sense of

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*déjà vu*; much of the book could have been written in reference to the mission in Afghanistan. As in Afghanistan, Dr. Bercuson points out that Canadian forces in the past have fought in unfamiliar parts of the world, been thrust unexpectedly into pivotal roles, struggled with mission transformation, suffered the “steady trickle of casualties,” and experienced overstretch under international and coalition demands. Canadians at war have also previously encountered *jihad*-like warfare, unexpected opposition, unclear time horizons, no-fail missions, strategic surprise, limited funding and the threat of extinction of the regimental system itself.

The book’s contextual clarity concerning Canadian regimental history and development through war, and thereby of the Canadian socio-military culture, allows the reader to step back from the Afghanistan mission and view it through the wider lens of *how* Canada fights wars. It offers a more strategic-level understanding of Canadian engagement in Afghanistan.

The book’s real accomplishment is that it serves as a platform, leveraging contextual understanding to inspire three needed lines of discussion concerning Canadian military engagement, particularly in light of the Afghanistan mission. These lines of discussion hold the potential to turn a sense of *déjà vu* about Canadian military engagement into 20/20 hindsight and change the way Canada wields its military.

First, the regimental system has traditionally been viewed as a capability that allows soldiers to fight, a view supported by Dr. Bercuson. Interpreting the context and propensities of Canada at war as laid out in the book, the regimental system might also serve as a stabilizing catalyst on a strategic level for how Canada goes to war. By consciously and deliberately embracing the regimental tradition, Canada may leverage it to stabilize Canadian military and foreign policy efforts and avoid the highs and lows that the Canadian military has repeatedly faced in terms of size, funding, support, readiness and results. It would ensure that a military capability minimum threshold would be sustained so that when the Canadian Forces are deployed, they will “have the oxygen they need to put out the fires properly.”

Second, should Canada actively commit to the regimental tradition, the Canadian population and politicians may be guided toward a better understanding of what armies do and what kind of results they are designed to achieve. This would have a tangible effect on the expectations that are placed on the military in terms of missions, roles, results and timelines. The

civilian population and government, in understanding the entrenched regimental system and the finite role of a regimental-based military, would maximize the effectiveness of its small military force. This would reduce strategic surprise and work against the perception that insurgencies are unbeatable under modern humanitarian and legal expectations.

Third, Dr. Bercuson also introduces the difficulties related to how Canada perceives and deploys the Reserves. Canada has repeatedly relied on the Reserves to back-fill within the larger military. The Reserve has been theoretically problematic within the regimental tradition, and yet is being employed to fill the gaps in under-strength regiments. This line of discussion will be significant in the coming months and years given planned Reserve responses to new and emerging threats, and given the current move to amalgamate the Reserves to address the lack of experienced soldiers to lead units and the small size of units that prohibits training for large operations.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Bercuson recently commented that some of the proposed changes make sense.<sup>2</sup> He argues that the regimental tradition has been exceptionally resilient; how resilient it can be under these pressures remains to be seen.

Dr. Bercuson suggests that the Afghan mission has been more damaging than previous challenges to the regimental tradition, such as the Somalia Incident, numbered units and unification. The three lines of discussion inspired by the book may alternatively reveal that the Afghan mission is not the problem for the Canadian way of war, but rather symptomatic of a Canadian lack of commitment to the regimental tradition – a tradition which could stabilize Canadian efforts and add predictability and reliability to Canadian capabilities. The Afghan mission may likewise serve to reinforce regimental identification due to the rotational nature of deployments, despite back-filling by the Reserves. It could thus bring Canadian society to recognize the army as consisting of fighting units rather than a single, national-level, peacekeeping force. The mission may also alter the character of the Reserves in the Canadian military landscape.

The book is timely given current uncertainty about the prospects for success in Afghanistan and the changing nature of the War on Terror. As Dr. Bercuson indicates, there are no “supermen,” and no enemy is immune to defeat. While his book does not prescribe how to defeat enemies, it subtly reveals critical weaknesses in Canadian strategic engagement and the Canadian way of war, and serves as a platform from which Canadians can discuss and address those weaknesses. ©

#### Endnotes


1 CBC News, “Army looking to overhaul reserves through amalgamation,” 11 March 2009

2 Adrian Humphreys, *The National Post*, “Military Revamps Domestic Defence,” 05 March 2009

## The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11

by Lawrence Wright

Reviewed by Dr. David Anido



Lawrence Wright. “The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.” Knopf Publishing Group, August 2007.

*The Looming Tower* is the seminal work to date on al-Qaeda. It deservedly won the Pulitzer Prize in 2007 for its scholarship and educational excellence. *The Economist* called the book “the most comprehensive, objective, and readable guide to al-Qaeda’s emergence.”

Author Lawrence Wright demystifies much that surrounds al-Qaeda and its activities. We know the conclusion from the title: the destruction of the Twin Towers. However, the ‘road’ to that event spans nearly five decades of detailed and broad analysis as to how a rich, urbane Saudi polygamist became a cave-dwelling fanatical killer.

In the prologue the author touches on a central theme – the world, and particularly the United States, was not prepared for the most successful international terrorist system in history. He tells the story of Daniel Coleman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Counter-Terrorism Center, which was already tracking bin-Laden as a financier of Islamic fundamentalist terror. The CIA knew that bin-Laden had the intention of attacking the US, but it did not act. A major feature of the book is that “the most frightening aspect of this new threat . . . was the fact that almost no one took it seriously.” Coleman was left wondering why a group of fewer than a hundred jihadists would be a real threat, but most of his colleagues were trained for Cold War issues. He worked relentlessly on the al-Qaeda file, but, when the Towers fell, he was “to suffer permanent damage to [his] lungs because of the dust [he] inhaled that day.”

In another chapter entitled “The Martyr,” Wright traces the seeds of fundamentalist Islam to Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was assassinated in Cairo in 1949. Banna had rejected the

Western model of secular, democratic government and believed that “the nature of Islam [is] to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law (Sharia) on all nations, and to extend its power to the entire planet.”

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932, and Europeans and Americans were still involved in imperialist enterprises in Arabia. Wright notes that the Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco, was established and dominated an impoverished Saudi Arabia whose only other source of major income was from the pilgrims to the *hajj* at the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Wright notes that one of bin-Laden’s reasons for hating the Americans was their presence in the country of his birth.

Bin-Laden had a temper and an adventurous nature and “was very stubborn.” But when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, a “fear of bodily participation kept [him] well away from the battlefield in the early years of the war, a fact that later caused him great shame.” He witnessed in a mountain camp the poor state of the weaponry of the *mujahideen* and went back to Saudi Arabia and raised a fortune for the *jihad* in Afghanistan. A small group of Arabs called the Brigade of Strangers came to Peshawar. They prayed that when they crossed the Khyber Pass, “their crossing would lead to martyrdom and Paradise.” The author writes, “martyrdom promised such young men an ideal alternative to a life that was so sparing in its rewards . . . the martyr who is poor will be crowned in heaven with a jewel more valuable than the earth itself.”

While bin-Laden was in the battle zone, his role was still mainly that of financier. The Americans supplied the Stinger, a hand-held weapon deadly to Soviet aircraft. In 1986, the same year as the arrival of the Stinger, Mikhail Gorbachev offered a plan for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Bin-Laden was disappointed with the Arab Brigade, which flinched under fire while the Afghans stood firm. “I began thinking about new strategies, such as digging caves and tunnels” – the precursor to his troglodytic preference. He was now leading men into battle.

An interesting interlude in the bin-Laden saga was his sojourn in the Sudan, “which was until then a cultural

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backwater.” The idea was to create an international Muslim community, the *ummah*, which would carry the Islamist revolution around the world. The Sudanese government courted bin-Laden in 1990 and offered the entire country as a base of operations for al-Qaeda. The real motive was probably for cash, and the Sudanese became disillusioned with the lack of great sums. Bin-Laden left in 1996. The Sudanese had allowed French intelligence to kidnap Carlos the Jackal, who had sought asylum to “undergo an operation on his right testicle.” There were rumours in Khartoum that bin-Laden was “the next Carlos” and would be betrayed. Bin-Laden did not feel secure in such an environment; indeed, the Sudanese government was ready to hand him over to the Americans, who still regarded him “as a wealthy nuisance, not a mortal threat.”

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was bin-Laden’s right-hand man and was known to be a brilliant surgeon. He went to Peshawar and “had never endorsed wholesale murder.” But he became “strident, antagonistic and strangely illogical [with] a weird and malicious manner.” Wright believes he had an identity crisis and was soon to betray his Hippocratic Oath, thus preferring death over life. Wright investigates the meaning of the Quran and how bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri interpreted the scriptures. He notes that the Quran is full of references to *jihad*, and bin-Laden took literally that believers must “slay the idolaters wherever you find them.”

The mix of these two men, Wright implies, was lethal. Bin-Laden said that “the United States had always been his enemy. He dated his hatred to 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to invade Lebanon and the American Sixth Fleet helped them.” Wright notes that the CIA had not infiltrated al-Qaeda during the metamorphosis of bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri, leaving the US vulnerable. By 1998, “after the formation of the Islamic Front the CIA

started to take more interest in al-Zawahiri’s al-Jihad and bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda.” But the horse was out of the barn.

The bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen were precursors to the destruction of the Twin Towers. The climax was, in Wright’s eyes, inevitable because of the complacency and lack of coordination among American intelligence agencies. For instance, they still relied on tracking cell phones; even though the National Security Agency was able to monitor calls on satellite phones, “it refused to share the raw data with the FBI or the CIA or Dick Clarke in the White House.”

On the sunny morning of September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers were destroyed by the impact of two aircraft.

Wright’s book is a masterpiece, not only as a record for history, but also as an explanation of what happens when terrorist treachery meets Western procrastination and lax intelligence. There are copious notes, a bibliography, biographies of the major players, interviews by the author, and an index. It is essential reading for any student of terrorism.

*Postscript:* On January 22, *The Economist* published an article entitled “The growing, and mysterious, irrelevance of al-Qaeda.” The synopsis: “Osama bin Laden’s messages from the wilderness get little attention nowadays. Al-Qaeda has been unable to land a blow on Western soil since the 2005 London bombings.” There is still the danger of sleeper cells and disaffected criminals born in democratic countries, but security is much more sophisticated. The West is much better co-ordinated in intelligence terms and Allied troops are fighting terrorist killers such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the borderlands with Pakistan, where the culprits are hopefully cornered. ©



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