



ON TRACK

SUMMER / ÉTÉ 2009

VOLUME 14, NUMBER 2

Afghanistan: The Next Phase

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Rationale for War

The Dragon in the Hindu Kush: China's Security Interests in Afghanistan

The Military Training Assistance Programme

CANSOFCOM

Offshore Anarchy: Building Stability at Sea and Ashore

North Korea: What is the Succession when Kim Jong-il Dies?



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COVER PHOTO: The Naval Boarding Party returns to Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) Winnipeg after they launched a rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) in the Gulf of Aden. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: L'équipe navale d'arraisonnement regagne le Navire canadien de Sa Majesté (NCSM) Winnipeg. Elle avait quitté le navire, à bord d'une embarcation à coque rigide (RHIB), dans le golfe d'Aden.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

This summer edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of, among others, preparing Canadian troops for deployments, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, the Military Training Assistance Programme, CF personnel challenges, Afghanistan, Korea, China's security interests, pirates, a financial outlook, a follow-up to the Graduate Student Symposium, and a book review.



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

Colonel Ian Hope's article, "Afghanistan: The Next Phase," identifies a paradigm shift occurring under the Obama administration, one which will achieve greater US unity of command in the coming months. Prior to 2011, in fact probably by the end of 2009 or early 2010, Canada needs to consider its options as NATO/ISAF is displaced by US Central Command. The shift is informed by the US administration's acceptance of two main factors: Pakistan as the insurgency's centre of gravity, and NATO's failure to recognize the true parameters of the insurgency in the Southern and Eastern provinces.

Louis Delvoie reviews the policy rationales that advanced the engagement by NATO allies in military operations in Afghanistan. He then outlines two 'nightmare' scenarios for the political future of Pakistan and argues that neither of the scenarios is entirely improbable. Monsieur Delvoie is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.

Colonel (Ret'd) Sean Henry has written, in *'Afghanistan and the Myth of Peacekeeping'*, that peacekeeping has always been overrated by Canadians, arguing that it was never a central tenet of defence policy. Colonel (Ret'd) Henry is a former Senior Defence Analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), and is a defence analyst living in Ottawa.

In June 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Good-neighbourly Relations and, at a recent meeting at The Hague, China pledged US\$ 75 million of aid over the next five years to Afghanistan. In the article, *'The Dragon in the Hindu Kush: China's Security Interests in Afghanistan'*, Arnav Manchanda and Thomas Adams outline the motivating factors regarding

Ce numéro d'été de *ON TRACK* présente des articles d'actualité intéressants dans des domaines comme la préparation des troupes canadiennes pour les déploiements, le Commandement – Forces d'opération spéciales du Canada, le Programme d'aide à l'instruction militaire, les défis du personnel des FC, l'Afghanistan, la Corée, les intérêts de la Chine en matière de sécurité, les pirates, un aperçu financier, un suivi du symposium des étudiants diplômés et des comptes rendus de

lecture.

L'article du Colonel Ian Hope, «Afghanistan: The Next Phase», identifie un changement de paradigme qui est en train de se produire sous l'administration Obama, et qui réalisera une plus grande unité de commandement américain dans les prochains mois. Avant 2011, en fait, probablement dès la fin de 2009 ou au début de 2010, le Canada doit considérer ses options au moment où l'OTAN/FIAS sera déplacé par le US Central Command. Le changement est façonné par le fait que l'administration américaine accepte deux facteurs principaux : le Pakistan comme le centre de gravité de la sédition et l'incapacité de l'OTAN de reconnaître les vrais paramètres de la sédition dans les provinces du Sud et de l'Est.

Louis Delvoie examine les assises, en termes de politiques, qui ont avancé l'engagement par les alliés de l'OTAN dans les opérations militaires en Afghanistan. Il décrit ensuite deux scénarios "cauchemards" pour l'avenir politique du Pakistan et fait valoir qu'aucun des deux n'est entièrement improbable. M. Delvoie est Senior Fellow au Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's.

Le Colonel (retraité) Sean Henry écrit, dans *«Afghanistan and the Myth of Peacekeeping»*, que le maintien de la paix a toujours été surapprécié par les Canadiens, en faisant valoir que telle n'a jamais été une doctrine de la politique de défense. Le Colonel (retraité) Henry est un ancien analyste principal de la défense auprès de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), et analyste de la défense qui vit à Ottawa.

En juin 2006, la Chine et l'Afghanistan ont signé un Traité d'amitié, de coopération et de bonnes relations de voisinage et, lors d'une réunion récente tenue à La Haye, la Chine s'est engagée à verser à l'Afghanistan une aide de 75 millions de dollars américains sur les cinq prochaines années. Dans l'article *«The Dragon in the Hindu Kush: China's Security Interests in Afghanistan»*, Arnav Manchanda et Thomas

China's increasing involvement in Afghanistan and provide us with some preliminary conclusions as to its possible implications. Mr. Manchanda is a Defence Policy Analyst with the CDA. Mr. Adams is the Strategic Studies Staff Officer with the Canadian International Council, Toronto.

The Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) is a strategic instrument of defence and foreign policy with key partner countries within the developing world. Andrew Rasiulis and Sara Fortin write, in *'Military Training Assistance Programme'*, how MTAP accomplishes its mission. Mr. Rasiulis is the Director, MTAP, and Ms. Fortin is Policy Officer, MTAP.

The Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), in Canadian Forces Base Wainwright, is a world-leading institution that uses live simulation to prepare Canadian Forces land-based elements, and other Whole of Government partners, to conduct full spectrum operations in their assigned theatre of operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel MacIsaac outlines, in *'Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre: A World-Leading Training Facility'*, the impetus to form CMTC and delineates the six components considered when designing and delivering exercises. Lieutenant-Colonel MacIsaac is Chief of Plans at the CMTC. He is taking command of 5e Régiment du Génie de Combat this month.

The topic of Special Operating Forces rarely fails to illicit a response; normally an emotional one that is either on one extreme end of the spectrum or the other. Colonel Bernd Horn, Deputy Commander Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), provides a background for the formation of CANSOFCOM and its roles, in *'Coming to Grips with the Invisible Hand: Understanding Special Operations Forces'*.

The waters off the Horn of Africa have become the most dangerous in the world, illustrating how a vacuum in the rule of law in Somalia extends into the sea. In *'Offshore Anarchy: Building Stability at Sea & Ashore'*, Captain Brian Wilson, U.S. Navy, and Commander James Kraska, U.S. Navy, write that the international community can take additional steps to bring more order and security to the world's wildest ungoverned maritime space. Captain Wilson heads a Navy region legal office in Washington, D.C., and Commander Kraska is a member of the International Law Department at the (U.S.) Naval War College.

Adams décrivent les facteurs de motivation concernant l'implication croissante de la Chine en Afghanistan et nous donnent quelques conclusions préliminaires sur ce que représente cette implication. M. Manchanda est analyste des politiques de défense à la CAD. M. Adams est officier d'état-major en études stratégiques au Conseil international du Canada, à Toronto.

Le Programme d'aide à l'instruction militaire (PAIM) est un instrument stratégique de défense et de politique étrangère qui rassemble des pays partenaires clés du monde en voie de développement. Andrew Rasiulis et Sara Fortin nous disent, dans « *Military Training Assistance Programme* », comment le PAIM accomplit sa mission. M. Rasiulis est le directeur du PAIM et Mme Fortin en est l'agente chargée des politiques.

Le Centre canadien d'entraînement aux manoeuvres (CEEM), de la base des Forces canadiennes Wainwright, est une institution de premier plan dans le monde qui utilise de la simulation réelle pour préparer les éléments terrestres des Forces canadiennes, et autres partenaires pangouvernementaux, à mener des opérations de terrain complètes dans le théâtre d'opération qui leur a été assigné. Dans « *Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre: A World-Leading Training Facility* », le Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel MacIsaac décrit l'impulsion qui a mené à la formation du CEEM et délimite les six composantes considérées lors de la conception et de la mise en oeuvre des exercices. Le Lieutenant-Colonel MacIsaac est chef des plans au CEEM. Il prendra ce mois-ci le commandement du 5e Régiment du Génie de Combat.

Le sujet des Forces d'opération spéciales manque rarement de susciter une réaction, normalement une réaction émotive qui se situe à une extrémité du spectre ou à l'autre. Le Colonel Bernd Horn, commandant adjoint du Commandement – Forces d'opération spéciales du Canada (COMFOSCAN), nous offre un tableau d'ensemble de la formation du COMFOSCAN et de ses rôles ; c'est l'objet de « *Coming to Grips with the Invisible Hand: Understanding Special Operations Forces* ».

Les eaux situées au large de la Corne de l'Afrique sont devenues les plus dangereuses au monde, ce qui illustre comment un vide dans la primauté du droit en Somalie s'étend jusque dans la mer. Dans « *Offshore Anarchy: Building Stability at Sea & Ashore* », le Captain Brian Wilson, U.S. Navy, et le Commander James Kraska, U.S. Navy, écrivent que la communauté internationale peut prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour apporter plus d'ordre et de sécurité à l'espace maritime ingouverné le plus sauvage du monde. Le Captain Wilson est à la tête d'un bureau juridique régional de la marine, à Washington D.C. et le Commander Kraska est membre du International Law Department du (U.S.) Naval

Four years ago our readers were alerted to the economic adjustment that the world is currently navigating, in *'Long-Wave Theories and the Canadian Forces'*. Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh writes, in *'The Great Adjustment'*, it would be prudent to examine our current economic condition, now that the global economy appears to have entered the economic contraction phase of Fischer's long-wave theory. Colonel (Ret'd) Marsh is a former Senior Defence Analyst of the Conference of Defence Associations and a former advisor to the Minister of National Defence.

Kim Jong-il, the current leader of North Korea, has yet to officially designate any successor. Vernie Liebl outlines for us the likelihood of any of Kim's three sons succeeding him as leader of that poverty stricken country, in *'North Korea: What is the Succession when Kim Jong-il Dies?'*. Mr. Liebl served in the United States Marine Corps, retiring as a Major.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 60th Anniversary Summit was held in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany from 1 to 4 April 2009. As a co-sponsor of the 11th Graduate Student Symposium NATO awarded an expense-paid attendance at the Summit for the top five presenters at the symposium. Major Eric Dion was one of the five recipients of the tour. He presents the issues surrounding NATO that were raised during the Summit, in *'NATO AT 60: Securing Our Future?'* Major Dion is a staff officer with the Land Force Québec Area Headquarters.

Ms. Bonnie Butlin reviews *'A History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Police and Security Services'* by Colonel (Ret'd) Ronald J. Donovan and Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) David V. McElrea. The book and accompanying CD is a comprehensive record – written and visual – of the Air Force Police and Security Services from 1924 until unification in 1968.

We are pleased to note and congratulate the President of the CDA Institute and former Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada, Dr. John Scott Cowan, on the occasion of his receiving a degree of Doctor of Military Science (Honoris Causa) during the College's convocation, 14 May, in Kingston. Dr. Cowan remarked during his convocation address to the graduating class of 2009 that the degree that was conferred upon him is the greatest honour that he has ever received. It is our understanding that it is the first time that a former Principal of the College has been invited to deliver the convocation address...Well done, John!

War College.

Il y a quatre ans, dans un article intitulé « *Long-Wave Theories and the Canadian Forces* », nos lecteurs étaient alertés à l'ajustement économique que le monde traverse présentement. Le Colonel (retraité) Howard Marsh écrit, dans « *The Great Adjustment* », qu'il serait prudent d'examiner notre condition économique actuelle, maintenant que l'économie mondiale semble être entrée dans la phase de contraction de la théorie des ondes longues de Fischer. Le Colonel (retraité) Marsh est un ancien analyste principal de la défense de la Conférence des associations de la défense et ancien conseiller du ministre de la Défense nationale.

Kim Jong-il, l'actuel dirigeant de la Corée du Nord, ne s'est pas encore désigné de successeur. Dans « *North Korea: What is the Succession when Kim Jong-il Dies?* », Vernie Liebl nous décrit la probabilité qu'un des trois fils de Kim lui succède comme chef de ce pays frappé par la pauvreté. Mr. Liebl a servi dans le United States Marine Corps, d'où il prend sa retraite comme major.

Le Sommet du 60e anniversaire de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) s'est tenu à Strasbourg (France) et à Kehl (Allemagne) du 1er au 4 avril 2009. Comme co-commanditaire du 11e Symposium des étudiants diplômés l'OTAN a offert aux présentateurs qui s'étaient mérités les cinq premières places de pouvoir assister à ses frais au Sommet. Le Major Éric Dion était l'un des cinq récipiendaires de la visite. Dans son article intitulé « *NATO AT 60: Securing Our Future?* », il présente les enjeux entourant l'OTAN, qui furent présentés au Sommet. Le Major Dion est officier d'état-major au Quartier général du Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre.

Mme Bonnie Butlin donne un compte rendu du livre « *A History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Police and Security Services* » par le Colonel (retraité) Ronald J. Donovan et le Lieutenant-Colonel (retraité) David V. McElrea. Le livre et le CD qui l'accompagne est un dossier très vaste – écrit et visuel – des services de police et de sécurité de la Force aérienne de 1924 jusqu'à l'unification de 1968.

Nous sommes heureux de féliciter le président de l'Institut de la CAD et ancien directeur du Collège militaire royal du Canada, M. John Scott Cowan (PhD), à l'occasion de sa réception d'un diplôme de Doctorat ès Sciences militaires (Honoris Causa) lors de la collation des grades du Collège, le 14 mai, à Kingston, et de noter ici l'événement. Dans son allocution à la classe de diplômés de 2009, M. Cowan noté que le diplôme qui lui avait été remis était le plus grand honneur qu'il ait jamais reçu. Nous croyons comprendre que c'était la première fois qu'un ancien directeur du Collège ait été invité à prononcer l'allocution de collation des grades...

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff, by the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, before some 630 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 20 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go on line at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/the-vimy-awards>.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2008 was Alex Castonguay, journalist for the newspaper *Le Devoir* and magazine *L'actualité*. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), will be presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda/ross-munro-media-award>.

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is very encouraging.

This autumn, on 30 and 31 October, the CDA Institute, in collaboration with the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada, the CDFAI, Queen's University's Defence Management Studies Programme, and Mr. David Scott, will host the 12th Graduate Student Symposium. The keynote speakers for the two-day event will

Bien fait, John!

Une des principales activités du calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un succès retentissant, avec un nombre record d'excellentes soumissions qui ont été étudiées par le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a eu son point culminant avec la présentation du prix au Général (retraité) Rick Hillier, ancien Chef de l'état-major de la Défense, par la très honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, devant quelque 630 invités lors d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

La présentation de cette année du Prix Vimy aura lieu le 20 novembre, lors d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala, une fois encore au Musée canadien de la guerre. Pour faire de ce prix un événement réellement significatif, l'Institut a besoin des mises en candidatures que vous nous ferez parvenir pour le récipiendaire de cette année. Même si nous avons déjà reçu un certain nombre de candidatures, les associations membres de la CAD, ainsi que les individus, sont encouragés de soumettre les noms de leurs candidats. Reportez-vous à l'avis d'appel de candidatures qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro et allez en ligne à l'adresse <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/the-vimy-awards>.

Le Ross Munro Media Award sera également présenté au dîner du Prix Vimy. Le récipiendaire de 2008 était Alec Castonguay, journaliste au journal *Le Devoir* et au *L'actualité*. Ce prestigieux prix, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), sera présenté à un journaliste canadien ou une journaliste canadienne qui a fait une contribution importante à la compréhension par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité qui touchent le Canada. Le prix est accompagné d'un prix en argent de 2 500 dollars. L'avis de l'appel de candidatures paraît aussi ailleurs dans ce numéro et sur notre site Web à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda/ross-munro-media-award>.

L'an dernier, les deux programmes ont connu un succès retentissant. Il me fait plaisir de rapporter que l'appui des programmes de la part de l'industrie et d'individus canadiens est très encourageant.

Cet automne, les 30 et 31 octobre, l'Institut de la CAD, en collaboration avec le programme d'Études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada, le CDFAI, les programmes d'Études sur la gestion de la défense de l'Université Queen's et M. David Scott, sera l'hôte du 12^e symposium des étudiants diplômés. Les conférenciers invités pour l'activité de deux

be Elissa Golberg (confirmed) and Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard, Commander CEFCOM (invited). The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally. Cutting edge research from young scholars will be showcased and cash prizes, totaling \$6,000, will be awarded for the three best papers presented. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Please note the call for papers which appears elsewhere in *ON TRACK* and on our website at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available on line at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>.

Thank you. ©

jours seront Elissa Goldberg (confirmée) et le Lieutenant-Général Marc Lessard, Commandant du COMFOSCAN (invité). Le symposium soulignera le travail d'étudiants au doctorat et à la maîtrise d'universités civiles et militaires de tous les coins du Canada et du globe. Des recherches très pointues de jeunes chercheurs seront mises en lumière et des prix en argent, un total de 6 000 dollars, seront remis aux trois meilleures études présentées. Le but du symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires. Prière de prendre note de l'appel de présentations qui paraît ailleurs dans *ON TRACK* et sur notre site Web, à <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>.

Au cours de la dernière année, le gouvernement fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à une telle initiative, il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés sur les enjeux majeurs des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et des pénuries continues dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins à long terme de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Mais l'Institut de la CAD va continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, ce qui nous permet de réaliser notre mission. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous inviterais à le devenir et à recruter un/e ami/e. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut aussi se les procurer en ligne à l'adresse <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>.

Merci. ©

Afghanistan: the Next Phase

by Colonel Ian Hope



This article is an academic speculation about how American military involvement in Afghanistan will change in the next few months. It is based upon perceptions evident in US military circles that ISAF is failing militarily, and that the United States must act decisively within the next twelve months to arrest insurgent growth. The observations are made in order to inform strategic discussion in Canada about what might be the appropriate response to these changes. The article was prepared as part of the author's current responsibilities within the United States Army War College.

In May 2008 I had the privilege of researching and writing a monograph concerning command structures in Afghanistan, which has since been widely circulated as a United States Army War College Carlisle Paper entitled, "Unity of Command in Afghanistan: a Forsaken Principle of War." During the past year, in my capacity as instructor at the college, I have engaged in research and discussion with American colleagues regarding the same issue. What follows is a 'think piece' on what I believe will be next evolution of allied command and control structures and mandates in Afghanistan, written to inform discussion in Canadian strategic circles. It in no way represents institutional or governmental thinking in either the United States or Canada, but is simply academic speculation based upon personal research.

In 2008, I drew attention to how the command construct in Afghanistan had broken away from the proven principle of war called 'unity of command,' which advocated that a singular American combatant commander be made responsible for a specific theatre of war. I argued that the division of responsibility for Afghanistan between Commander US Central Command, Commander US European Command (through his NATO hat as Supreme Allied Commander Europe), and Commander US Special Operations Command, was creating convoluted command and control organizations and procedures detrimental to the overall mission. My recommendation was a modification to the Unified Command Plan to grant full authority for the Afghanistan joint operating area (including Pakistan) to Commander US European Command. I believed that he and his headquarters were the only ones capable of integrating

NATO fully into the fight.

Three things have emerged since the publishing of the Carlisle Paper that makes transference to US European Command an impossibility. First, it has been formally recognized – at long last – that the centre of gravity for the Afghan insurgency is entirely in Pakistan and that the Pakistani-Afghan border cannot be a barrier to the planning and conduct of full-spectrum operations aimed at defeating the insurgency. This region falls within US Central Command's boundaries, as laid down in the Unified Command Plan, and cannot be easily parceled out to US European Command.

Secondly, Americans have come to realize that even if US European Command were leading in Afghanistan, NATO is militarily incapable and politically unwilling to see the true dimensions of the insurgency (especially in its regional dimensions) and therefore cannot be expected to plan, resource and operate the full-spectrum operations required.

Third, it has become apparent that regardless of NATO tactical contributions, theatre enablers – namely theatre intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, medical aviation, close air support and theatre air coordination, theatre special operations, counter-narcotics and regional engagement – can only be guaranteed by the United States and cannot be effectively commanded by NATO/ISAF. Central control of these enablers is already being exercised by US Central Command and there is no appetite to transfer such control to US European Command or to NATO. Despite the plethora of NATO generals in ISAF, and the expanse of the ISAF headquarters, the acquisition and control of theatre enablers lies beyond their abilities.

Realization of these three things by the new administration in Washington has produced significant changes in American thinking. The results of this paradigm shift are becoming manifest.

The first change is the consolidation of authorities for Afghanistan under General David Petraeus, Commander US Central Command, despite NATO overtures about shared authority. From an American standpoint, Petraeus alone has

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the requisite capacity to effectively command and control the theatre enablers, to work within Pakistan, and to represent Afghanistan to the executive and legislative branches of the US government. Consequently, formulation of military strategy for Afghanistan has been placed squarely in the hands of US Central Command, where NATO input is minimal. Political and diplomatic strategies rest with American Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and his team, and are independent of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The dismissal of General David McKiernan, the NATO-friendly ISAF commander, by the US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates without consultation with NATO is indicative of the extent to which the executive branch in Washington has turned away from NATO and is consolidating full authority for Afghanistan under Petraeus.

That there have been no responsive statements from NATO is very curious. The designation of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, a general with no NATO experience, as the new American ISAF commander is also telling, his primary skill being the prosecution of special forces direct action operations.

The surge of American forces into Afghanistan without input from NATO/ISAF also speaks volumes. Very critical of the NATO tendency to reduce tour lengths to six months or less, American military personnel are being prepared for lengthy tours of duty in Afghanistan; some individuals will stay three to five years in the region. Commanders and units who have been successful can expect to return frequently to carry on the counter-insurgency fight there. In addition, a sizeable American civilian volunteer corps and diplomatic contingent are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan to surge development and institutional capacity-building, both within and outside of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

The United States has also started deliberate efforts to reassure Afghans and Pakistanis of their commitment to the region. To reinforce this, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has declared to Congress that the military main effort of the United States armed services has formally shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan. This is not semantics – declared main efforts receive tremendous amounts of resources.

All these measures clearly indicate a perception that NATO is failing militarily. While they will be careful not to state this out loud, the Americans, quite frankly, believe that NATO has not taken the insurgency in Afghanistan seriously enough. They perceive NATO general officers to be largely self-serving and not operationally focused, and NATO command and control to be irretrievably locked in bureaucratic process. European politicians are seen to range between complacent to obstructionist. Of particular concern

is lack of demonstrable will to win. Therefore, America is now set to re-assert the military lead in Afghanistan outside of NATO constraints. Based upon this observation, I make the following projections about what Canada should expect to see regarding American plans for Afghanistan. These are offered to invoke discussion about what our responses will be. These projections are not based upon any insider knowledge, but rather upon comprehensive knowledge about how Americans organize theatres of war, and a deep understanding of American strategic culture.

Even though Americans believe that NATO is failing militarily in Afghanistan, they will be very cautious not to state this. Indeed, it could be argued that politically NATO is successful in Afghanistan and will remain successful so long as it stays in Afghanistan. The United States needs NATO commitment there, but must reorganize the mission in such a way as to placate NATO sensitivity and keep it in play, while at the same time prevent NATO from disrupting new American-led efforts to win the counter-insurgency in the region. Therefore, I believe that we will see the establishment of an American subordinate unified command headquarters in Kabul (probably formed from a US Army Corps headquarters), mandated as a theatre strategic headquarters that will work with the US Embassy, the Afghan Government, UNAMA and other agencies.

This will see the re-emergence of the American principle of war called 'unity of command'.

There will be a great reduction in ISAF headquarters as American participation is diminished, with functions migrating to the newly resurrected American headquarters. This combined headquarters will report directly to US Central Command and will be responsible for all operational level planning, control of all theatre enablers, Army service component functions, and the conduct of full-spectrum operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Concurrently, the United States will permanently operate two American divisional headquarters in Afghanistan, one in Regional Command East and the other in Regional Command South. These will work exclusively for the American headquarters in Kabul, probably under an Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mandate. With this reorganization,

America will ask NATO to retract from the east and south and limit NATO operations to Regional Commands North and West. ISAF headquarters will be encouraged to take on a divisional headquarters function, commensurate

with the size of NATO forces once they have consolidated into this smaller area of operations. ISAF will be focused upon constabulary and stability operations functions.

There are several options for the command relationship between ISAF and the new American headquarters in Kabul, and while it is possible that none will exist for some time, as this was the case between ISAF and Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan from 2003 to 2007, a formal relationship will be required to allow ISAF forces access to theatre enablers.

With this reorganization, full-spectrum counter-insurgency operations under US lead will be prosecuted throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan and throughout Pakistan as one large area of operations under one commander, reporting to Commander of US Central Command in Tampa, Florida, and independent of NATO.

This will see the re-emergence of the American principle of war called 'unity of command' over, at least, the most contested areas of Afghanistan. It will be much more efficient than the current top-heavy but largely impotent ISAF construct. The role of JFC Brunssum and indeed even Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the NAC will be reduced.

I predict that these changes will start to occur in the next few months. The Americans sense that they must stop the growth of the Taliban within the next twelve months or face the prospect of an irreversible momentum in the insurgency. This imperative trumps any ideas about revamping NATO efforts to lead in Afghanistan.

When the changes happen, Canada will need to decide how it will respond to the retrenchment of NATO in Kandahar prior to 2011. Canada will have strategic choices.

We worked extremely well under OEF in 2006 and could do so again, comforted by the fact that until our combat forces depart in 2011, Americans will support Canadian soldiers during difficult operations to degrees that NATO

could, or chose, not to do. But this would mean acceptance of the OEF mandate and its regional dimension, something that might prove unsavoury to Canadian domestic politics. Canada could use the retrenchment of NATO as an excuse to leave Kandahar early, but this would aggravate all parties and forsake all that we have done there so far. Canada might also surge militarily (and with other capabilities) until 2011 to ensure that Canada's good work in Kandahar grows deeper roots. Alternatively, or in conjunction with the last option, Canada could facilitate a symbolic slower transition from NATO to OEF in Regional Command South until 2011, in order to lessen the stigma of NATO failure.

Canadians should debate our best course of action vis-à-vis mandate and organizational changes in Afghanistan before they occur.

Whichever course Canada chooses, we should not feel, nor allow any ally to make us feel, that we have contributed to NATO military failure. Canada sustained its conviction through hard-fought times.

The American assumption of full control of Kandahar opens the door for Canada to cease combat operations and depart with pride, largely because this will be allowed and enabled by the intervention of our closest ally and friend.

Despite media speculation that America will pressure Canada to remain in combat in Afghanistan, the fact is that our combat contribution will not be critical to American efforts, and we will not feel the coercion that is now suggested.

Regardless of political feelings toward American reassertion of lead in Afghanistan, Canadians must be reminded that America has never failed to come to our assistance, even if it is on their own terms. We cannot say that much for the rest of NATO, and we should seriously reconsider all of our personnel and troop contribution promises to the alliance – not leaving it, but never again allowing ourselves to bear so disproportional a burden of fighting with so little alliance support. ©

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Rationale for War

by Louis Delvoie

Canada and a host of NATO allies are now engaged in military operations in Afghanistan. The policy rationales advanced in support of this engagement usually fall into two categories.

The first is that NATO forces are in Afghanistan to help the long-suffering Afghan people achieve a degree of security and stability, and to reconstruct a society and country torn apart by thirty years of warfare. This is a perfectly valid rationale given the Western world's long-standing commitment to humanitarianism and humanitarian assistance in the face of human suffering. It is insufficient, however, to explain NATO's military involvement in Afghanistan. If this were the sole or principal rationale in play, NATO forces would also be present in Somalia, Sudan and Congo, which are also the scenes of humanitarian disasters, perhaps on a broader scale than Afghanistan.

The second rationale is directly related to international peace and security, and more particularly to the security of Western nations. The stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are essential if that country is to avoid reverting to Taliban rule or failed state status and once again becoming a sanctuary for Islamist terrorists who pose a threat to Western countries and their interests. This rationale is solidly founded in reality and history. After all, it was from Afghan soil that Al Qaeda's most spectacular and destructive attacks on Western targets were plotted and planned. And it is above all for this reason that NATO countries have been prepared to sacrifice lives and treasure in efforts to defeat the Taliban insurgency and to stabilize Afghanistan.

The question may, however, be posed as to whether this second policy rationale remains as important and as relevant as it once was, given developments in neighbouring Pakistan. Put simply, what is the use of ensuring that Islamist terrorists do not re-establish bases in Afghanistan if they can do so with a fair degree of freedom in Pakistan? As things now stand, the leadership of Al Qaeda enjoys a relatively secure existence in the Tribal Areas of northern Pakistan, but must be on its guard against occasional incursions by NATO

forces in Afghanistan and by the Pakistani army. Its security and room for manoeuvre could, however, be considerably enhanced if the political situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate.

There are at least two 'nightmare' scenarios for the political future of Pakistan which would make NATO military efforts in Afghanistan largely irrelevant. The first is for Pakistan to make the transition from fragile state to full blown failed state. The second is for the seizure of power in Pakistan by an Islamist military junta. Unfortunately, neither of these scenarios is entirely improbable.

The fault lines which run through Pakistani society, and which make the country a fragile state, are numerous and diverse. They can be briefly outlined under the following six headings.

Ethnic divisions

Each of Pakistan's four provinces is home to a different dominant ethnic group. Over the six decades of the country's existence, these ethnic identities and identifications have never been overcome to give rise to any real sense of Pakistani nationhood among the population at large. Quite the contrary. In the province of Balochistan there has long been an active separatist movement which is now engaged in an armed insurgency against the central government, requiring the deployment there of tens of thousands of Pakistani troops. In the province of Sindh, native Sindhis are fighting a rearguard separatist action to avoid losing their position of dominance to Pashtun immigrants from the north and to the descendants of immigrants from India, known as Mohajirs. As for the Pashtun majority population of the North West Frontier Province, it has always felt far more affinity to the Pashtuns of Afghanistan than to the other ethnic groups in Pakistan. All of this hardly makes for national unity.

Religious divisions

Pakistan is a primarily Muslim country, with a large Sunni majority and a much smaller Shia minority. Relations between the two sects are anything but harmonious. Sunni discrimination against Shiites is a daily fact of life. Drive-by shootings and the mutual bombing of mosques are

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regrettably frequent occurrences, and usually reach a peak of violence during the Shia holy month of Moharam. But this is not the only sectarian divide in Pakistan. Discrimination and occasional acts of violence against Hindu, Christian and Parsee minorities are also part of the religious landscape.

Politico-religious schisms

The vast majority of Pakistanis are what are usually referred to as moderate Muslims; they practice their faith, but believe in an essentially secular political order. Islamists, or advocates of an Islamic political order, are a distinct minority; their political parties have never secured more than 15 per cent of the vote in any general election. That said, the Islamists have always exercised an influence out of all proportion to their numbers by virtue of their fervour, their organizational capabilities and their effectiveness in mounting demonstrations and riots. Most recently Islamist extremists have engineered a long succession of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, in most of Pakistan's major cities. These have resulted not only in the death of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, but also in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. They have engendered a climate of fear and insecurity in most urban centres.

Political animosities

The leaderships of Pakistan's two main political parties, the People's Party and the Muslim League (N), loathe each other with passion. When in government they seek to intimidate the opposition and to make use of the courts and the security services to persecute and prosecute their adversaries. When in opposition they seek to destabilize the government through the use of a variety of extra-parliamentary tactics, including strikes, marches and demonstrations. Neither is prepared to recognize the other's legitimacy in an endless struggle for power and for the spoils of office. This, along with corruption and incompetence, has undermined the credibility of every civilian government which Pakistan has known in the last thirty years.

Civil-military relations

In a memoir published nearly twenty years ago, a former British high commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Morrice James, wrote: "Pakistan does not have an army, the army has Pakistan." As the country's only truly solid public institution, the army has played a dominant role in Pakistani politics for decades. Generals have ruled the country directly and overtly

through half of its relatively brief sixty year history; during the rest of the time they have operated behind the scenes to ensure that civilian governments toed the line on matters to which they attached a high importance, such as relations with India or the nuclear weapons programme. And a succession of Chiefs of Staff of the Army have seen it as their sacred duty to intervene when corrupt and incompetent civilian governments were presiding over states of civil disorder and economic calamity. As a result, all too often civilian politicians tend to view the military with suspicion and fear, while the generals view prime ministers and ministers with dismay and contempt.

"Pakistan does not have an army, the army has Pakistan."

Centre and periphery

The Pakistani government inherited from the British Empire what can only be termed a very loose system of government for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of north-western Pakistan. The government is represented in each of the areas by a senior official or political agent, whose principal function seems to be to funnel financial resources from the central government to the regions for socio-economic and infrastructure development. He also serves as a lightning rod for tribal complaints against the government. He does not, however, exercise any of the normal functions of regional or local government. These are entirely in the hands of the tribes, which jealously guard their autonomy and their ancestral traditions. Furthermore the tribes have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to use armed force if necessary to resist what they regard as unwarranted interference in their affairs by the central government.

These various fissures which run through the Pakistani body politic make for a very fragile state, especially when combined with the popular discontent engendered by a serious deterioration in the country's economic situation. Political chaos and the escalating threat of Islamist violence could fairly easily lead Pakistan to making the transition from fragile state to failed state. This would not only lead to regional instability on a dangerous scale (e.g. there are irredentist elites in India which would see this as an ideal opportunity to regain some of the territory lost at the time of partition), but would also provide Al Qaeda and its affiliates with a thoroughly secure safe haven in northern Pakistan.

The second 'nightmare' scenario is that the government of Pakistan might be taken over by a cabal of Islamist military officers. For those who have known the Pakistani army in decades past, this may seem like a reasonably remote prospect. It is unfortunately no longer quite so remote.

During the first three decades of the country's existence, most members of the Pakistani army's officer corps displayed a strong attachment to British traditions. They were often said to be more Sandhurst than Sandhurst itself. This was reflected in their professionalism, discipline and regimental loyalties. British ranks and insignia, Sam Brown belts, swagger sticks and neatly trimmed moustaches were the order of the day. Many took on distinctly English-sounding nicknames and acquired a taste for Scotch whiskey; much of this is still in evidence today.

However, a notable change in the make-up of the army officer corps began to emerge in the 1980s. The then military dictator, General Zia ul Haq, had repeatedly promised to hold elections and to return the country to civilian government. When he failed to do so, in order to stay in power, he sought to give some legitimacy to his government by proclaiming that he had a special mission to transform Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Among the initiatives which he took to fulfil this mission was to encourage Islamists to join the army, which they did in significant numbers. The training of the army began to take on certain religious colourations. Thus the curricula at the Military Academy in Kakul and at the Command and Staff College in Quetta, which had until then been purely secular, came to include daily prayers and readings from the Koran.

The effects of these changes were already evident

in the early 1990s as more and more fully bearded officers began to make an appearance in barracks and on parade squares across Pakistan. (When I presented my letters of appointment as high commissioner in 1991, the guard of honour at the presidential palace was commanded by such an officer.) By now many of these officers have risen to senior ranks and appointments in the Pakistani army, including in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization. What is important to remember is that these Islamist military officers, almost by definition, have a political agenda, which is to transform Pakistan into a full blown Islamic state. In the face of the mismanagement which Pakistan has known under both civilian governments and traditional military governments, it would be passing strange if some of these officers had not given some thought to the possibility of an Islamist military coup.

Were such a coup ever to occur, the consequences would be dramatic. Regionally, it would bring to office a government viscerally hostile to India and equipped with an arsenal of nuclear weapons. Internationally, it would mean an end to virtually all cooperation with the West, and a policy of support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. While such a regime might not necessarily approve of the methods used by Al Qaeda, it would certainly sympathize with its aims and objectives, and be prepared to grant it and similar movements sanctuary in northern Pakistan.

In short, even if NATO countries were successful in achieving their principal objective in Afghanistan, their efforts could be rendered largely meaningless by political developments in Pakistan. Trying to pursue the same objective in Pakistan itself would seem to fall into the category of mission impossible, given that its population is eight times larger than that of Afghanistan, to say nothing of the fact that it has nuclear weapons. ©

Afghanistan and the Myth of Peacekeeping

by Colonel (Ret'd) A. Sean Henry

Comments made earlier this year by Prime Minister Stephen Harper regarding the war in Afghanistan were not focused, to say the least. First, he stated that, "we are never going to defeat the insurgency," and then expressed satisfaction with the renewed commitment of US troops to the fight. He further indicated that the main issue in Canada was suc-

cess of the mission, and not whether Canadian troops remain there beyond 2011. He also stated that the future of the NATO alliance would be in doubt if the mission did not succeed.

It is suggested that Mr. Harper is influenced by the perception that a majority of Canadians object strongly to combat roles for the Canadian Forces (CF). Much of this mindset has been generated by disinformation embodied in the myth of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has always been overrated by Canadians. It was never a central tenet of defence policy and

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a number of experts, including Edward Luttwak and George Koch, have produced studies that debunk its value and utility. Nonetheless they have had little success in removing the myth from the Canadian psyche, thereby encouraging New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton and others to claim that combat operations are "not the Canadian way."

Mr. Harper now seems to be indirectly supporting that view. It is also gaining public credence through the

efforts of some academics of the left. When Canadian troops arbitrarily leave the battlefield in Afghanistan in 2011, these actors and others will lobby hard to make peacekeeping the principal role of the CF in the future. The fact that NATO states that the mission of ISAF in Afghanistan is "peacekeeping," and that the main implementation tool is Provincial Reconstruction Teams, is certainly not helpful in this situation.

Peacekeeping unravelled during United Nations

operations in the Balkans in the early 1990s, and was replaced by what could be termed ‘international security operations.’ During the transition, Canadian troops engaged in combat and took casualties while inflicting the same on assorted opponents. The Chretien government, by then having placed all of its bets on peacekeeping, was horrified and chose to suppress the details. The origins of the reluctance to focus clearly on the aims and means for operations in Afghanistan may be traced to these events.

There now seems to be a desire in government to turn to ‘peacekeeping by other means’ – by stressing the ‘3Ds’ of diplomacy, development and defence in foreign policy, and the ‘three block war’ in military operations. These are valid concepts, but many politicians, officials and interest groups want the military components to fade from the equation and have attention directed mainly to humanitarian aid, diplomacy and similar ‘soft’ initiatives. The problem is that if the military does not first succeed in providing a secure framework (through counter-insurgency operations in the case of Afghanistan), none of the objectives linked to stability and reconstruction will be achieved.

There is another problem, and that is a failure to understand the special nature of Islamist insurgency. Michael Scheuer, a former analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, argues convincingly in his book *Imperial Hubris* that this insurgency is atypical and that there is little hope for negotiated settlements. Instead, the leadership at all levels must be hunted down and eliminated. This view is reinforced by Hassina Sherjan, an Afghan businesswoman writing in the *New York Times* in May 2009: “We know that there is not, and will never be, any ‘moderate Taliban.’ Extremists and ideologues do not compromise.”¹ Al Qaeda aims to re-establish Afghanistan as a prototypical Islamic theocratic

state, run by the Taliban, as a base for the conduct of terrorist operations worldwide. Canada needs to understand Osama bin Laden’s strategic plan before taking hasty decisions to end combat operations there.

Finally, there is misunderstanding of what constitutes Canadian national interests and why they are at stake in Afghanistan. In 2000, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute published an assessment of this topic, *The Benefits of Investment in Defence*. It noted that, because of its small domestic market, Canada’s high standard of living is closely tied to success in international trade. The latter requires stable international conditions if it is to provide maximum returns. The effects of the current global economic crisis underline this point. Sending troops to Afghanistan to reduce instability in international relations serves Canada’s interests well.

Canada’s armed forces are not employed to impose Canadian values on others. Instead they fight to preserve these values at home and to promote our interests globally. Often, as is the case in Afghanistan, their combat operations also assist others to move forward to a better life – but to one of their own choosing. The government needs to craft the simple message that classical peacekeeping is dead and that in order to guard and advance our national interests, conventional military operations will continue to be a priority commitment of the CF.

Endnote

1 Hassina Sherjan, “Talked to Death,” *The New York Times*, 7 May 2009. Available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/opinion/08sherjan.html>

©

The Dragon in the Hindu Kush: China’s Security Interests in Afghanistan¹

by Thomas Adams and Arnav Manchanda

“You ask me what kind of natural resources China is looking for in Afghanistan. I can tell you: peace, stability and development are the most important natural resources in Afghanistan for China.” - China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Qin Gang, March 31, 2009²

Introduction

This article outlines the motivating factors behind China’s increasing involvement in Afghanistan and sketches

some preliminary conclusions as to its possible implications. The contemporary history of Afghanistan-China relations

is not the stuff of excitement, but it is a relationship marked by an increasing potency. It is clear from China's recent actions that, due to economic, domestic and regional interests, it is forging closer economic, business and infrastructural ties with Afghanistan, along with the concurrent cultural and social exchanges involved in any bilateral relationship. Afghanistan undoubtedly also maintains a great interest in Chinese investment as it seeks to diversify its international relationships away from the West, with the recognition that Western interest in Afghanistan will not last forever. Chinese involvement also brings a no-strings-attached set of investments and opportunities to generate employment and prosperity, a possible long-term solution to the Taliban insurgency. However, this no-strings-attached approach, along with other aspects of China's greater interest in Afghanistan, creates its own set of implications within Afghanistan, China and the region as a whole.



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Contemporary Afghan-Chinese relations

The People's Republic of China withdrew its diplomatic staff from Kabul in February 1993 during the Afghan civil war, suspending all official contact. In December 2001 China sent a working team to Afghanistan following the ousting of the Taliban. In January 2002 Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited China, a visit which preceded the reopening of the Chinese Embassy in February; he was promised aid and assistance.³ In June 2006 both countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations. It contained pledges to fight separatism, extremism, terrorism and transnational crime, with Afghanistan agreeing to follow the 'One China' policy by not recognizing Taiwan.⁴ At a recent meeting at The Hague, China pledged US\$75 million of aid over the next five years to Afghanistan.⁵

Three reasons stand-out as explanations for China's increasing interest in Afghanistan and its rationale for further involvement in the post-Taliban era.

First, China requires natural resources to help fuel its continued economic rise. As China's domestic supplies are inadequate to sustain its economic growth rates, it has been driven by necessity to seek external resources. Afghanistan possesses an interesting set of natural resources and China has been making inroads into their acquisition. Most notably,

China won a significant victory in the acquisition of one of Afghanistan's most important strategic commodities: copper. In 2008, China's Jianxi Copper Corporation and China Metallurgical Group Corporation jointly invested approximately US\$3.5 billion to acquire 100 percent mining rights to Afghanistan's Aynak copper field, the world's largest unexploited copper field. China is the world's largest copper consumer and this important

resource is used in China primarily for power generation and manufacturing. The mine is located in Logar province, just south of the capital Kabul. While this area of Afghanistan is relatively more stable when compared to the more insecure South, there is concern among both the Chinese and Afghan governments that the Aynak mine, its workers and related infrastructure are vulnerable to attack from the Taliban.⁶ Indeed, decades of war in Afghanistan is the principle reason for which the mine has remained unexploited. A stable and secure Afghanistan, therefore, provides China with a safe environment in which to invest and exploit resources. As discussed below, the security dimension will undoubtedly become more important for Beijing should China wish to invest further in Afghanistan's unexploited oil, natural gas and iron-ore reserves.

Second, Beijing has an interest in combating the "three evils" which threaten both Afghanistan and China: extremism, terrorism and separatism.⁷ For Beijing, these "three evils" are located primarily in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which shares a seventy-six kilometre border with Afghanistan and is populated by Muslim Uyghurs. China's leaders have become increasingly concerned with Muslim extremist, terrorist and separatist movements in Xinjiang, in particular the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). According to official Chinese government sources, members of ETIM have been going into Afghanistan from Xinjiang since the late 1990s to receive training and support from the Taliban and al Qaeda, thereafter re-entering China and conducting terrorist acts in Xinjiang province in an effort to gain independence and form a pan-Turkic Islamic state.⁸ Any support that China's Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang Province receive from extremists in Afghanistan might embolden them and provide them with greater means to seek autonomy. Such an outcome is entirely unacceptable to the Chinese Communist Party, whose legitimacy rests partially

on its ability to keep China unified. The loss of Xinjiang might further embolden Tibet to seek greater autonomy, if not outright separation, and might also encourage Taiwan to declare official independence. Moreover, terrorists might begin targeting the critical transportation networks and energy pipelines in this region. Thus, fighting the “three evils” in this border region is essential if Beijing wishes to preclude such disastrous outcomes, and cooperation with the government of Afghanistan is essential to achieving this objective. As a result, Beijing has increasingly recognized the short border it shares with Afghanistan as a source of insecurity and has beefed up its border security.⁹

And third, a stable Afghanistan can help with the attainment of China’s broader regional economic and strategic interests. In this context, it is important to see the insecurity in Afghanistan as inextricably linked with Pakistan, an important ally of China. Bringing security and stability to Afghanistan will by necessity require bringing an end to the material, moral and territorial support provided by Pakistani militants in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. This, in turn, might help ensure the survival of a regime in Pakistan that is friendly to China. Moreover, instability caused by these militant extremists can compromise China’s economic and strategic interests in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. For instance, China has invested heavily in the deep sea port of Gwadar in Balochistan province, which borders the unstable Southeast region of Afghanistan. This port is of tremendous strategic importance as it lies on the Pakistani coast, some 400 kilometres east of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 40 percent of global oil shipments travel, including 60 percent of China’s oil imports. Gwadar port provides China with a forward operating port from which to better project its naval power so as to ensure the safe passage of its seaborne energy shipments. Moreover, a new rail-line linking the Aynak copper mine with Gwadar is being considered, as is another rail-line linking Gwadar with China’s western rail-line in Xinjiang province. Finally, some analysts contend that China’s interest in a secure and stable Afghanistan (and Pakistan) is that it can provide the Middle Kingdom with greater “strategic depth,” in what these analysts believe to be an effort on the part of the Chinese to encircle and contain a rising India.¹⁰ Whether China is consciously attempting to encircle India is difficult to definitively ascertain, though the possibility is surely in the minds of India’s leaders.

Chinese military involvement in Afghanistan?

At a lecture at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on November 14, 2008, in response to a question regarding the possibility of Chinese military involvement in Afghanistan, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown remarked, “we’ve got to look at that as a possibility for the future ... not just NATO countries, obviously, countries from all over the world, I think people do see this as the front line against the return of at least a country that is totally taken over by a terrorist group.”¹¹ The Chinese response was to state that China did not send troops abroad without a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mandate.¹²

Indeed, it is unlikely that China would commit troops to a NATO- or US-led mission in Afghanistan. But it might do so under a separate UN mandate. Indeed, China has become increasingly involved in such missions. In April 2009 it was ranked fifteenth in the list of UN military and police contributors, with a total of 2,150 personnel on duty.¹³ However it seems unlikely that the UN would authorize an additional chapter six or seven mandated mission in Afghanistan under UN control, given that it already authorizes the NATO-led counterinsurgency and reconstruction mission.¹⁴ This latter option, as before, is a non-starter for China.

For now it seems as if China is willing to entrust the security of its Afghan interests to the United States, NATO and the Afghan government, free riding on their efforts. For instance, the Aynak copper mine will be guarded by some 1,500 Afghan soldiers. There is also a substantial Western presence in Eastern Afghanistan, with some 25,000 NATO (and increasing) troops in Regional Command (East), based out of Bagram, and a Provincial Reconstruction Team run by the Czech Republic in Logar province. Deliberately or not, the US military is providing security for the area around the mine.¹⁵

There is precedent for Chinese military involvement in Afghanistan. During the war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s the Chinese provided weaponry and other assistance to anti-Soviet fighters. With Russia becoming a prominent player in Afghanistan once again through the provision of supply routes into that country, China may fear that its regional rival may gain undue influence in a country where China itself has increasing economic interests. Thus, China may view some sort of military involvement as a good way to ensure a counterbalance against its historical rival.

Implications for Afghan security

Having another player in the contemporary Afghan 'great game' is both a cause for hope and concern. Having another stakeholder invested in the stability of Afghanistan for economic and security reasons dovetails with similar Western goals of a secure region. This is especially true given the new Obama administration's pursuit of stability 'at any price' in Afghanistan, jettisoning much of the rhetoric of democracy and human rights of the previous Bush administration. China's influence over Pakistan may also convince the latter to soften its schizophrenic influence in Afghanistan.

However, the pursuit of stability 'at any price' also entails a malevolent effect on the democracy and human rights situation in Afghanistan. China's involvement abroad is purportedly based on letting nations develop socially, politically and economically at their own pace and method; this, however, has often led to some highly unsavoury relationships, such as with the governments in Sudan and Zimbabwe. Greater Chinese involvement could further retard Afghanistan's social and political development. Furthermore, given China's close alliance with Pakistan and their mutual rivalries with India and unease over India's greater involvement in Afghanistan, China's involvement may not be seen by all players as a positive force. India could view greater Chinese involvement as another move in its encirclement, and the United States could see it as another step by China into Central Asia.

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Conclusion

It is clear that China has developed a keen interest in Afghanistan, one that is likely to grow beyond purely economic manifestations to more security-related ones. In the short term, however, it seems as if China will continue to support the NATO ISAF mission and free ride on NATO's provision of security. This may change in the future into more direct intervention if China feels its interests cannot be secured, especially given that foreign interest in Afghanistan is likely to become more widespread. For now, it seems prepared to bide its time and position.¹⁶

Does any of this have relevance to Canadian policy as it relates to Afghanistan and broader foreign and defence policy? When the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan released its final report in January 2008 it recommended that Canada undertake "[f]orceful representations with Afghanistan's neighbours, in particular with Pakistan, to reduce the risks posed to regional stability and security by recent developments in that country." However, there is no specific or spelled-out regional strategy *per se*, apart from working with Pakistan to achieve control over the border with Afghanistan.¹⁷ Given Canada's specific and time-limited commitment to Afghanistan in Kandahar province, engaging with China on a strategic level vis-à-vis Afghanistan is unlikely in the medium term. Canada's relationship with China is currently adrift and lacks direction and strength,¹⁸ making it unlikely that a Canadian Afghanistan-China policy will develop any time soon.

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CMTC: A World Leading Training Facility

by Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel A. MacIsaac

The Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) is a world-leading institution that uses live simulation to prepare Canadian Forces (CF) land-based elements and other Whole of Government (WoG) partners to conduct full spectrum operations (FSOs) in their assigned theatre of operations. Starting from the cutting edge of Army transformation, CMTC has enabled the Army to improve high readiness collective training and confirmation. This article will describe the impetus to form CMTC, then delineate the six components considered when designing and delivering exercises, which currently focus on preparing 2,600-soldier Task Forces (TFs) for employment in the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) Regional Command (South) (RC(S)).

The Army Impetus to Form CMTC

In May 2000, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery inherited an Army that he thought needed to change. He assessed it as, "performing very well, but ... unsustainable,"¹ too big for its budget and too small for its tasks. It faced manning shortfalls, a high personnel tempo, and an unhealthy Reserve component. The Army needed to transform by

building relevant capabilities and focus collective training within a central institution that could enable unity, improve standards, and change the way the Army trained and generated forces. Further, the Army needed to evaluate collective training against a thinking enemy so that soldiers could learn how to adapt.

Lieutenant-General Jeffery conceived that the Army could improve training effectiveness by the introduction of a force-on-force weapons effects simulation system and the establishment of CMTC. Therefore, he directed that CMTC would be the main effort for implementing the Interim Army strategy until it delivered the first instrumented Battle Group (BG) exercise.

CMTC's initial mission was, "to provide a realistic environment in a national training centre for the learning, through practice and confirmation, of up to formation-level battle task standards in all operations of war. The CMTC will [was to] also provide the means to confirm readiness for those task forces conducting theatre mission specific training in preparation for operational deployments."²

Since training is a function of command, CMTC was to design and deliver exercises to assist brigade group and area commanders to confirm their units' and formations' effectiveness through four BG exercises per year to support the Army's generation of four 1,300-soldier BGs every twelve months. The Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) did not mandate CMTC to deliver live-fire training above the combat team level

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because the confirmation tool for Army collective training was to be force-on-force live simulation. CMTC was also to deliver exercises to train 300 Reserve soldiers in platoon and company operations each summer.

Lastly, CMTC was to support Force Development through experimentation. Therefore, CMTC was entitled to the vehicles and equipment needed to equip a mechanized BG and a combat team in the role of an Opposition Force.

The CLS' end-state was that by April 2006 CMTC would support a high level of BG training, including comprehensive After Action Reviews (AAR) linked to the lessons learned process to enable revisions to tactical doctrine and to individual and collective Tactics Techniques and Procedures.

CMTC's Six Components

Since achieving its initial operating capabilities in April 2006, CMTC has focused on preparing TFs for employment in RC(S). Its mission has changed, "to design and deliver collective training exercises for CF land based elements in FSO in a replicated Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) in order to produce competent and confident TFs."³ This section will delineate the six components CMTC considers when designing and delivering exercises, i.e., mission characteristics, replication of the COE, COE Forces (COEFOR), Observer Controller Trainers (OCTs), Canadian Weapons Effects System (CWES), and combined arms force-on-force training.

CMTC designs exercises that replicate the characteristics of a TF's operational mission. CMTC develops relevant exercises after analyzing Canadian policy, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) Force Preparation orders, Army Force Generation orders, Army Training Authority's Direction and Guidance for the TF's training, Army Lessons Learned Centre's reports, results from previous exercises, the theatre of operation's physical and human environments, and visiting the theatre of operations. The resulting exercises enable the TFs to practice battle-winning activities and the equally important campaign-winning activities such as information operations, psychological operations, civil-military cooperation, the Provincial Reconstruction and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams' capacity building, and the art of operating in a Joint International Multi-agency Public (JIMP) environment.

CMTC also integrates WoG players into the exercise design and delivery processes. This builds cohesion amongst the contributing departments and agencies, assists them to build training capacity, prepares personnel to deploy, and

builds the exercise scenarios required to practice TFs in the FSOs necessary to conduct counter-insurgency warfare and improve security so governance and development flourish. Upcoming CMTC exercises are being designed to replicate missions that may result from the American forces' increasing employment in RC(S), and potential post-2011 changes to Canada's mission.

The second component considered to deliver relevant exercises is replication of the COE, which currently involves counter-insurgency land operations in Kandahar province. Therefore, CMTC uses CFB Wainwright's built up area to represent Kandahar City and has upgraded its Airfield 21 to replicate Kandahar Airfield so that the JTF Headquarters, TF, Role 3 Health Services Company, aviation battalion, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) detachment, tactical airlift flights, Mission Support Squadron, Aerodrome Radar Squadrons and others can practice their operations.

CMTC has also configured the training area to replicate five of Kandahar's districts, several of its key villages, ISAF and Afghan installations, and an area of Pakistan to allow insurgents to conduct trans-border operations. CMTC will overcome some of Wainwright's size, terrain and climate limitations by designing and delivering the force-on-force portion of TF 1-10's Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN 1001 in Fort Irwin, California in January 2010.

CMTC's COEFOR, the third component, provides live, thinking forces that replicate elements TFs encounter once deployed. Since current exercises support TF generation and confirmation in conducting counter-insurgency operations, COEFOR's 500 soldiers and civilians replicate the insurgents, host-nation security forces and civilians the TF must influence in theatre, to provide "the manoeuvre space for those other agencies and elements of power,"⁴ to attempt to resolve "the root causes of the political and socioeconomic grievances that enabled its occurrence [i.e. the insurgency] in the first instance."⁵ Therefore, COEFOR's insurgents replicate irregular militias, terrorist, insurgent and criminal networks, including improvised explosive device (IED) attack networks.

Its host-nation security forces element replicates Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces. It also contracts ninety-five Afghan-Canadians to replicate Afghan provincial, district and local officials and leaders; international organisations; non-governmental organisations; and non-role playing civilians in the battle space to populate villages. Finally, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Correction Services Canada provide staff so the TF can

practice interacting with their WoG partners.

The fourth component CMTC considers to design and deliver exercises is the Observer Controller Trainers (OCTs). The OCT Group are vital to CMTC's ability to improve the Army's high readiness collective training and confirmation. They achieve their role to enable learning and confirmation by coordinating CMTC's activities on the ground, observing events, coaching tactics techniques and procedures, teaching doctrine and mentoring behaviour. The OCT Group employs commanders and senior non-commissioned members who have recently returned from operations to work credibly with the TF. These senior OCTs guide the sub-unit and unit commanders through hasty and deliberate AARs. The Chief OCT improves confirmation through daily progress briefs to the Commander CMTC and confirmation authorities. Lastly, after each exercise the OCT Group provides the TF with a Take Home Package that informs them of the strengths and shortfalls observed during their exercise.

CWES is a key tool that Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie believes enables CMTC to be "the most digitally advanced simulated training centre in the world..."

The fifth component of CMTC exercises is CWES. This advanced combat training system provides realism, fidelity and accuracy for force-on-force exercises. It enables soldiers to train as they fight and provides immediate feedback to objectively measure performance and readiness. CWES's player instrumentation includes laser transmitters and detectors attached to the trainees' and COEFOR soldiers' weapons, helmets, load bearing vests, vehicles and key installations. The global positioning system tracks the exercise participants and vehicles while the system's communications network provides real-time feedback to the participants and exercise control (EXCON) on weapons engagements. Specifically, CWES simulates direct fire from individual weapons and vehicles, and indirect weapons effects from artillery, mortars, mines, IEDs and nuclear, biological and chemical events. Soldiers use their normal weapons, gunnery drills and blank ammunition to activate eye-safe laser engagements, audio/visual effects and casualty outcomes such as kill, hit or near miss.

The EXCON facility tracks, monitors and records the movements and actions over 2,400 people, 515 vehicles, their weapons' effects and records twenty-six combat net radio networks. Analysts within EXCON use this data to support the OCTs to prepare AARs, which in turn assists the TFs to learn.

CWES is a key tool that Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie believes enables CMTC to be "the most digitally advanced simulated training centre in the world. It is further advanced than Fort Irwin; it is further advanced than Suffield or the comparable facilities in Germany."⁶

The last and vital component of exercise design and delivery is combined arms force-on-force training. While following the Army Training Authority's Direction and Guidance, CMTC's Plans Group designs the combined arms force-on-force training to meet the Lead Mounting Area Commander's training objectives and force generation obligations. CMTC exercises are intended to be the TF's culminating collective training event and an essential integration point for the TF's approximately twelve mission elements, JTF HQ and supporting campaign-winning, CF, and WoG enablers. The exercises are intended to create the conditions for the TF to practice the application of non-kinetic and kinetic effects at sub-unit and unit levels during effects based, intelligence-led, sustained and focused operations – both military and JIMP-enabled – under a formation command and control structure provided by a JTF HQ that is preparing to deploy.

The exercises begin with the TF practicing Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) into CMTC's replication of Kandahar Airfield. Under control of the JTF HQ, the TF then conducts a relief in place with the in place force, replicated by CMTC's OCT Group. These operations set the conditions for fourteen days of replicated force-on-force JIMP operations that subject the command and control of the TF's Level 5 and 6 mission elements to both personal interaction and weapons effects simulation. During this period, the TF's elements must set the conditions for effects that will disrupt and defeat adversaries or opponents in accordance with overall campaign objectives, in addition to permitting developmental effects for allies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, other government departments, multi-national actors, WoG partners and nascent Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan governing bodies.

In addition to the COEFOR and JTF HQ roles previously defined, CMTC's EXCON provides the operational (RC(S) HQ) and national (CEFCOM) higher command and control structures for the exercise. CMTC also provides orders and supporting products to the HICON, when required, to initiate Level 5 and 6 events within the overall exercise scenario.

Each exercise's main effort is on preparing the Level 5 and 6 command and control capabilities to conduct JIMP operations in a force-on-force context. Further, the exercises' end state is "to produce competent, confident, and

cohesive TFs, physically, morally, and mentally prepared to conduct operations within a high-threat COIN environment, as a member of the Multi-National force, in accordance with designated campaign plans and Government of Canada objectives; integrated with CEFCOM-led battle procedure and well trained on its journey to deployment.”⁷

Conclusion

Lieutenant-General Jeffery’s 2003 vision that as, “Canada look[s] to grapple with the complexities of modern war fighting, while managing the heightened operational tempo, there remains no closer facsimile [than a force-on-force training centre] for comparison and contrast,”⁸ has

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quickly generated CMTC. Lieutenant-General Leslie has affirmed that, “[t]he Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Wainwright is the most advance facility in the world.”⁹ As the CF’s facility for land-based warfare collective training, CMTC provides excellent, live simulated force-on-force training utilizing the CWES instrumentation, a highly qualified COEFOR and a cadre of experienced, professional OCTs to enable the Army to improve high readiness collective training and confirmation. Uniquely, CMTC allows CF, WoG players and allies who operate in the land environment to become true learning organizations by providing a JIMP environment and an institution capable of delivering to a formation with realistic field training. CMTC’s officers, soldiers and civilians believe in their formation’s mission, and diligently and professionally focus on TFs for employment in ISAF’s RC(S).

Coming to Grips with the Invisible Hand: Understanding Canadian Special Operations Forces

by Colonel Bernd Horn

A more detailed version of this article is available online at the CDA Institute website, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/> – ed.

The topic of Special Operation Forces (SOF) rarely

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fails to illicit a response, normally an emotional one that is either on one extreme end of the spectrum or the other. More often than not, attitudes and feelings toward SOF are based on misperceptions, myths and misunderstanding. Part of the blame for this ignorance lies at the feet of SOF itself, since its at times overly secret culture makes it difficult for others to comprehend the values, ethos, composition and contribution of SOF to national defence and security. Although to know SOF might not be to love SOF, it certainly provides insight into

the vital role SOF plays in the current security environment as an 'invisible hand' that operates in the shadows to shape the battle space to enable conventional forces to conduct operations in an international expeditionary context and to enhance national security in a domestic framework.

...the tragic events of September 11, 2001 changed the perception of SOF as the attacks in the United States altered the international security landscape.

Although mainstream military commanders have historically viewed SOF as unwanted roguish interlopers into a profession of arms that viewed convention, protocol, standardization, uniformity and an adherence to a Western doctrinal approach to warfare as sacrosanct, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 changed the perception of SOF as the attacks in the United States altered the international security landscape.

Gone was the comfort of the known and predictable threat and symmetrical adversary of the Cold War. Even the more unsettling, unpredictable and unconventional threat of the stability campaigns of the 1990s, with failed and failing states and their diverse array of hybrid military and para-military forces and regional warlords, became moot compared to the post 9/11 era, with the exponentially increased ambiguity, complexity and volatility of conflict. The threat was no longer state-based; it was now transnational and networked. Canada and its allies were now faced with adversaries intent on destabilizing the world. These forces were, and continue to be, well-financed, networked and technologically savvy. Moreover, they employ asymmetric and ever-changing tactics at home and abroad.

We now find ourselves in a war of conflicting ideas, ideology and social values against an enemy that is capable of hiding in and utilizing the rights, freedoms and protections of the very societies that they seek to destroy. Conventional military responses alone are insufficient to bring resolution and rapid effects. Furthermore kinetic solutions are exponentially less effective and important than non-kinetic methodologies focused on influence, deterrence, information management and exploitation, as well as intelligence.

As such, in this post 9/11 world, governments and senior military commanders quickly realized that SOF are often better suited to operate and achieve the necessary effects in this ambiguous, complex, politically sensitive and volatile environment. SOF provide governments the necessary enhanced options to allow for tailored, timely responses that

can deter, pre-empt, disrupt or defeat adversary threats. After all, SOF organizations contain specially selected personnel that are organized, equipped and trained to conduct high-risk, high-value operations to achieve military, political, economic or informational objectives. They utilize special and unique operational methodologies in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas to achieve desired tactical, operational and strategic effects in times of peace, conflict or war.¹

The key factor to SOF success is the people that are selected and screened into the organization. SOF equip the operator rather than man the equipment. SOF organizations seek individuals who are risk accepting, creative, agile thinkers, adaptive, self-reliant, oriented to pursue excellence, relentless in their pursuit of mission success, and culturally attuned.

Armed with exceptional individuals, as well as cutting-edge technology and equipment, SOF endow governments with a wide range of kinetic and non-kinetic options to pre-empt, disrupt, react or shape strategic or operational effects domestically or abroad.² Key to the effective employment of the full spectrum of SOF options is the early engagement of SOF to advise, plan and deploy in a timely manner.

There are a number of factors that must be considered for the successful employment of these forces. The factors are: clear national and theatre strategic objectives; compartmentalized knowledge of SOF tasking, planning and mission execution; effective command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) support; full integration into the theatre commander's and joint task force commander's overall campaign plan; missions and tasks of operational or strategic significance; decisive early and timely engagement of SOF into emerging situations as a force multiplier for decision makers; and the comprehension that SOF logistic support is often austere in nature and geared toward the requirements of fielding and supporting rapidly deployable and agile forces.

SOF theory, however, is of little importance unless it can be applied. On February 1, 2006 Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) was created.³ The purpose of the Command is to force develop, generate and, where required, employ and sustain Special Operations Task Forces (SOTF) capable of achieving tactical, operational and strategic effects required by the Government.

CANSOFCOM is also responsible for providing expert advice on special operations and providing the Government and the CF with a conduit to allied special operations and counter-terrorism expertise, technology, research and development.

CANSOFCOM

CANSOFCOM is an operational command, as well as the fourth service, analogous to the Navy, Army and Air Force. CANSOFCOM creates, trains and validates the force packages that it deploys on assigned missions.

CANSOFCOM contributes to the defence of Canada through its integral support to the six core *Canada First Defence Strategy* missions: conducting daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD; supporting a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics; responding to a major terrorist attack; supporting civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada; and conducting international operations for varying periods of time.

Domestically, CANSOFCOM is capable of delivering the following operational effects:

- maintaining Arctic security;
- conduct and improving surveillance; and
- deterring and denying the inappropriate use of Canadian territory.

Strategically, its efforts are meant to defend Canada, deter and defeat terrorist threats at home, provide crisis

(Endnotes)

1 This is the official Canadian Special Operations Forces Command doctrinal definition. Special operations differ from conventional operations in the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence.

2 “Non-Kinetic” options refer to a wide range of skills and task sets that include provision of strategic advisory teams, security force assistance, information operations, psychological operations, and support to other military, paramilitary or law enforcement agencies.

3 CANSOFCOM is composed of a headquarters that is broken up into four functional areas (i.e. the Command Group, Chief of Staff (COS) Operations, COS Support and COS Force Development); Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2), the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (427 SOAS), and the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CJIRU – CBRN). All of the subordinate units are responsible for enabling the Force Generation and Force Employment of Special Operations Task Forces.

response for weapons of mass effect incidents, assist in the shaping of the national security architecture and general crisis response, and assist other government departments in select counter-terrorism areas.

CANSOFCOM also contributes to the overall defence of Canadian national interests by conducting operations abroad in support of CF conventional forces and on discrete operations. SOTFs are capable of projecting a wide range of skills and surgical precision kinetic and non-kinetic effects in denied, hostile or politically sensitive areas to achieve high value missions. The reality is that Canadian SOF is often requested to exercise kinetic or non-kinetic tasks for which there are simply no other options available to the government.

CANSOFCOM will continue to provide the CF with the benefits of its efforts, whether they be the removal of enemy leadership, command and control nodes or military capacity; the sharing of technologies (e.g., night-vision goggles, communications), equipment (e.g., tactical vests, sniper rifles), or enhanced tactics, techniques and procedures (e.g. close quarter battle).

As the global security environment continues to grow in ambiguity, complexity, chaos and uncertainty, so too will CANSOFCOM adapt and evolve to provide the government and the people of Canada with dedicated, highly trained and skilled SOF.

Offshore Anarchy: Building Stability at Sea and Ashore

by Captain Brian Wilson and Commander James Kraska

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

The waters off the Horn of Africa – the Red Sea, the

Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean – have become the most dangerous in the world, illustrating how a vacuum in the rule of law in Somalia extends into the sea. Approaching a condition of offshore anarchy, the lawlessness has affected global commerce. In 2008, 850 seafarers and more than forty vessels were seized and held

for ransom by pirates operating from Puntland, Somalia. The data for 2009 indicates this year could be worse. Even ships that manage to avoid attack are affected by tremendously increased insurance premiums, cargo “surcharges,” and additional time and costs to take the alternative route bypassing the Suez Canal and using the Cape of Good Hope. In response, the international community has embarked on a course of naval diplomacy to quell the dangerous waters. These efforts will prove ineffective unless the new approaches are matched by comprehensive maritime security capacity-building and coordination and leadership in the region, particularly in Somalia.

Achieving a permanent resolution to the problem of Somali piracy requires political stability ashore. Sustainable change in Somalia will require a political solution to conflict that is developed and implemented by Somalis and not imposed by outsiders. So far, the United Nations (UN)-led Djibouti Peace Process is the most promising effort, and it provides a mechanism for Somalis to make political and security decisions. The Peace Process has led to the establishment of a new unity government with a respected leader as President, Sheik Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. The new leadership must foster deeper credibility by restoring the delivery of services and governmental functions, first in Mogadishu and then in surrounding regions and the offshore areas. This process will take time.

In the meantime, however, the international community can take additional steps to bring more order and security to the world’s wildest ungoverned maritime space. Despite the armada of ships, piracy attacks have actually in-



090513-N-0743B-084 GULF OF ADEN (May 13, 2009) Members of a visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team from the guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64) and U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team South Detachment 409 capture suspected pirates after responding to a merchant vessel distress signal while operating in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of responsibility as part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric L. Beauregard/Released)

creased this year (but successful attacks have declined), and distant states will be hard pressed to maintain naval deployments on a permanent basis. First, international merchant shipping has to become less skittish about deploying armed security on board high risk vessels transiting the area. In the handful of cases in which pirates have attacked a vessel with organic security, the pirates have been unsuccessful every single time. The shipping industry should work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop widely accepted standards and safeguards for armed private security contractors or armed crew. Private security contractor Xe, formerly known as Blackwater, has made available to commercial shippers the services of a security escort ship in the Gulf of Aden that includes a helicopter. These efforts will not provide the long-term reductions in the incidence of piracy unless they are followed up with greater integration, collaboration and regional commitments.

Second, regional capabilities must be developed so that the countries of East Africa can assume the role of maritime cop in the neighborhood. To date, forces from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, China, Denmark, Japan, Republic of Korea, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and Yemen have conducted counter-piracy operations. While this global effort is impressive, military forces

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alone cannot eradicate maritime piracy.

A sustained, long-term reduction in maritime piracy is possible only if shipping states, regional partners and major maritime powers commit, and deliver, on significantly enhanced collaboration. Persistence, adaptability and incentives will be necessary components of altering the landscape so that neighboring states with a capacity and capability become more engaged. Any action will be meaningless if it does not develop nascent regional maritime security infrastructure in East Africa.

Over the past five years, maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa has been steadily growing. In 2006, the British Parliament concluded that the growth in piracy over the past decade represents an “appalling amount of violence against the maritime community.” After rising in 2007, the incidence of piracy doubled in 2008 from the previous year. Last year Somalia’s maritime bandits set their sights on larger and more lucrative prey, raising alarm in the worldwide shipping community about the costs and dangers of transiting through the Gulf of Aden at the southern end of the Suez Canal and the narrow Bab el Mandeb strait, and this occurred just as the global economic slump was causing a precipitous drop in cargo rates. In November 2008 Somali pirates hijacked the 1,000-foot supertanker *Sirius Star* nearly 500 miles east of Kenya. The Liberian-flagged Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), which is owned by Aramco in Saudi Arabia, was carrying two million barrels of oil valued at \$100 million. After three months of demanding a payment of \$25 million to release the ship and its twenty-five crewmembers, the Somali pirates eventually accepted \$3 million, which was dropped by parachute near the vessel.

The daring attack on the *Sirius Star* so far from shore suggests the pirates were using the shipping industry’s open-access automatic identification system (AIS) to intercept merchant ships. Similarly, after holding the *M/V Faina* for more than four months Somali pirates were paid \$3.2 million to release the Belize-flagged vessel, which was owned by a Ukrainian company. The ship was transporting thirty-three Russian armored tanks and ammunition to Kenya, with end user certificates to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, an authorized regional security force that has helped to maintain

a fragile peace in the country. Evidence suggests the attack on the *Faina* was aided by AIS as well.

The first few months of 2009 demonstrate that large numbers of foreign warships can have a positive effect with a reduction in successful attacks, but piracy continues to threaten the critical sea line of communication connecting the Suez Canal to the Arabian Sea. Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, Commander of the US Fifth Fleet, testified before Congress in March 2009 that pirate capacity has been impacted by the seizure or destruction of twenty-eight pirate vessels, and the confiscation of 133 small arms, twenty-eight Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), fifty-one RPG projectiles, and twenty-one ladders and grappling hooks. Ships are especially vulnerable if they fail to operate within the recommended transit areas or follow preventative guidance. Of fifteen pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008, ten involved ships that were operating outside the IMO’s recom-



060128-N-4374S-003 Indian Ocean (Jan. 28, 2006) - Members of Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) team, assigned to the dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), perform gear checks as they prepare to conduct a master consent boarding aboard an Indian cargo dhow. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Michael Sandberg (RELEASED)

mended traffic corridor or did not employ suggested self-protection measures.

Ninety percent of world trade travels by sea, and commercial shipping is both regulated and protected by a global network of rules based on flag state jurisdiction, port state control and coastal state responsibilities. The Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the western Indian Ocean encompass a critical node in the global supply chain. More than 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden

adjacent to the Indian Ocean each year, transporting cargo that includes 12 percent of the world's daily oil supply. Significantly reducing criminal acts at sea in an area that stretches the distance from San Diego to Seattle, however, poses significant logistical, operational, and political challenges. To counter the threat, nations have for the first time begun to employ maritime power in the Horn of Africa. A multinational coalition of naval forces associated with the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain operates in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Western Indian Ocean. Under Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), Combined Task Force (CTF)-150 conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO) to deter maritime terrorism and promote the rule of law at sea in the Horn of Africa.



090513-N-0743B-144 GULF OF ADEN (May 13, 2009) Members of a visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team from the guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64) and U.S. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric L. Beauregard/Released)

Some navies in CTF-150 did not have the authority to conduct counter-piracy missions, however, so on January 8, 2009 CMF created CTF-151 as a new counter-piracy naval force that could grow to include warships from more than twenty nations. The goal of CTF-151 is to deter, disrupt and facilitate the criminal prosecution of those involved in piracy. CTF-151 joins a pantheon of warships from the European Union, NATO and numerous countries, but the patrols are costly and many states cannot – and should not – have to maintain a large presence in perpetuity.

Unmanned surface vessels, essentially self-propelled robotic patrol craft, now exist and could be outfitted with weapons and sensors to provide protection for high value merchant ships. One firm has even developed a high-powered millimeter-wave ray that shoots a six-foot wide beam creating a burning sensation on the surface of the skin. Another has developed a 9,000 volt electric fence, and yet another is working on ‘holographic radar’ with a round-the-ship capability that could complement other on-board radars.

A Contact Group on Somali Piracy, developed at the UN, has shown promising signs of collaboration and

commitment. Going forward, with multiple local, regional, and international initiatives being developed and proposed, a single, well-funded piracy centre in the region could be necessary to link the states together into an effective network. Piracy, much like stability in Somalia, will continue to be a challenge, but meeting the challenge requires not only greater integration, collaboration, and regional partnering, but also must include serious efforts at regional capacity building.

In sum, the shipping industry will have to do more. Reliance on naval forces to ensure security is a false hope because warships cannot possibly cover a coastline that stretches from Miami to Maine. The IMO should develop standards for the provision of armed security on board certain types of vessels on international voyages. Second, the international community should begin to develop local maritime security capacity in the Horn of Africa – forces that would gradually displace the large warships from distant states. Third, the long-term solution is the ephemeral resolution of the chaos in Somalia and the re-establishment of the rule of law. ©

The Great Adjustment

by Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh

The king [Solomon] made silver as common as stones in Jerusalem.

- 2 Chronicles 9:27

Four years ago readers of *On Track* were alerted to the economic adjustment that the world is currently navigating. In that article, the cyclical indicators of economic long-waves were examined and it was offered that the global economy was entering the “price-crisis” phase, characterized by a shift from price inflation to price deflation.¹ Now that the global economy appears to have entered the economic contraction phase of David Hackett Fischer’s long-wave theory,² it would be prudent to examine our current economic condition through his analytical lens.

History records that the period of “price-crisis” – adjustment from inflation-based economics to deflation-based economics – is followed by 70-100 years of price equilibrium. The spectre of economic contraction followed by a century of near-zero growth is not readily embraced by those who have planned on an inflationary economic future, where today’s liabilities were planned to shrink as the economy inflates. However, early acceptance that contraction and price equilibrium are the approaching norm produces a more favourable outcome than prolonged denial. The French experience during the last great economic adjustment (1789-1815) demonstrated the cost of not quickly adjusting to this cyclical behaviour of economies.³

It is not good for nations to resist the great adjustment to deflation or for leadership to plan for a return to inflationary economics. Right now it is essential that national leadership plan for the most likely economic future: one of declining revenues and prices. The sooner that deflation is accepted as the new normal, the sooner the perils of planning for inflation can be mitigated. Deflation denied tends to rearrange global power. The US approach to its economic crisis is likely to lead to it being eclipsed in the next decade.

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It would be good to revisit Fischer’s analysis and Donald Kraybill’s understanding, and reflect on that which most shapes futures: finances, resources, information, innovation, and energy.⁴

Finances

The global financial system is dominated by Western indebtedness. The United States is the most forthcoming in providing details of its indebtedness, but it is not the most indebted. Several European countries carry greater debt loads as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP), but it is easier to access US data and discuss that situation.

Total US public and private debt held by citizens, financial institutions, governments and corporations is calculated at US\$53 trillion.⁵ Servicing this debt load, even at today’s low interest rates, consumes over 10 percent of that country’s annual economic output and will continue to hobble that economy for decades. To date, the cost and effects of this condition have been masked, for the most part, through currency inflation. The deleterious outcome of this practice has been an annual loss of purchasing power of 4.4 percent for the last four decades.⁶

Since 1971 the actual buying power of the US dollar has shrunk 81 percent. The Chinese are now able to buy six times the same military capability with their currency than the equivalent in American dollars. The American dollar may inflate but the economy’s purchasing power is rapidly decreasing. This downward trend is likely to accelerate, not only due to indebtedness, but because of a new economic factor – the Internet.

Throughout history the common medium of economic exchange has been money in its various forms, but now currency has competition – shared experience. Forty years ago a Canadian provided the measures of communication effectiveness and described the relationship of communication to wealth generation.⁷ It has taken forty years to build the communication system to prove his thesis. We now have the Internet and the means to freely exchange things of great value – shared experience. The shared experience economy is rapidly growing and is subtracting from the measurable market economy.

The value of the shared experience exchange is difficult to calculate in monetary terms, as it has yet to be measured. However Internet traffic patterns reveal that much is being exchanged. Some sectors in the economy can no longer compete with shared experience exchange. The value of shared experience exchange is probably already 10 percent of our current economy and could be as high as 30 percent in some sectors. The shared experience exchange economy includes both the exchange of valuable goods and knowledge. Most are familiar with the concept of sharing with neighbours and getting wisdom from elders, but the Internet permits sharing within a much larger community and finding exactly the item or knowledge sought. In one shared experience exchange a Canadian avoided a \$2,000 charge for medical services by applying a \$3 African missionary's experience. In another case, an expensive reference was exchanged for \$1 through iTunes. As people become accustomed to using search and computation engines to acquire goods and services at little to no cost, the monetary based economy will have more competition and prices will drop further.

The emerging displacement of the monetary economy by the shared experience economy indicates that those who rely on monetary exchange – governments, institutions and corporations – would suffer losses while those who benefit from shared experience exchange should enjoy prosperity.

Resources

An abundance of natural resources often leads to lower prices. A shortage of consumers (human resources) and a surplus of employees would also contribute to lower demand, lower prices and deflation. The Club of Rome and others⁸ have been predicting shortages of basic commodities since the early 1970s, but none have materialized even though the world's population has more than doubled in the last forty years. Why do predicted shortfalls vanish like a mirage as the day of reckoning approaches?

It is offered that we live on a truly abundant planet whose explored volume is infinitesimal in comparison to that which can be explored. Little of the Earth's crust and ocean floors have been mined. In addition, the things that people need most – food, fuel and shelter – are derived from three families of molecules – carbohydrates, hydrocarbons and cellulose – that are predominantly the products of three common and abundant elements: oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. Future scarcity would need to be engineered through malice and stupidity. An abundance of natural resources deflate prices.

Demographics and economics present a mixed picture. On the one hand, one-fifth of the world's population who consume most of the resources is declining in number;

on the other, Asian populations are producing large quantities of highly-educated and skilled persons who should consume more but, thus far, consume less than their Western counterparts. Lower consumerism may be due to lower Asian remuneration and cultural tendencies to thrift. However, the trend to more competition for high-end employment is more assured. The increasing supply of skilled Asians would lower salaries in the coming decades while declining or stagnant consumerism would further contribute to deflation.

Information

Information is a two-edged sword. It empowers and creates new wealth while it makes redundant that which is inefficient. Information allows engineers to build more efficient processes and machines that increase the longevity of goods and enhance efficiencies that, in turn, displace workers. The forty year march towards increasing automobile reliability and flexible automation has brought that industry to reduced production, lower prices for better products, and now lower incomes and fewer automobile workers.

A similar scenario is occurring in most manufacturing processes and many segments of the service industry. Pulp and paper mills, media, print journalism, publishers, music and film industries are all adjusting due to advances in the accessibility of information. Information introduces new forms of competition and lower prices.

Innovation

Innovation has been growing exponentially since the dawn of the Information Age. In measurable terms applied innovation has significantly decreased the quantity of resources and energy per unit of product; for example, the amount of water to produce one dollar of GDP has decreased five-fold in the past thirty years.⁹ The performance of a \$1,000 desktop computer in 2008 exceeds the performance of a \$10 million 'super computer' in 1970. Innovation produces abundance at lower prices and there is every indication that this trend will accelerate as nano-engineering and bio-technology merge to replicate common goods, even meat.

Energy

Contrary to recent experience and the dire warnings of some, energy is not in short supply.¹⁰ A North America deprived of energy and subject to cartel-induced vagaries should soon become a memory. Technical advances in oil and gas extraction, abundant shale gas, clean coal, alternate energy, micro-nuclear energy and bio-tech energy (not bio-

energy) are poised to keep the energy equivalent of a barrel of oil in the \$50 range for a long time. Bio-tech energy – pure fuels formed from carbon dioxide and water courtesy of sunlight and algae – is rapidly moving to full-scale production in southern latitudes.¹¹ The potential of sunny, desert regions, in close proximity to brackish water and coal-fired furnaces, producing millions of barrels of pure fuels by 2025, would deflate some economies.

The Great Adjustment

The adjustment from a century of economic expansion to decades of contraction, followed by a century of revenue and price equilibrium, will require different government policies. This adjustment will show no mercy to those overly indebted, causing some to lose significant power and authority. The Western economies, especially those of the United States and Great Britain, whose banks hold much of the global debt, are likely to contract significantly. The

Western decline would greatly weaken global democratic influence and embolden autocratic regimes (China, Iran, Russia, etc). A less wealthy Anglo-Saxon axis is unlikely to sustain its generosity and stability to its global commitments (UN, NATO, NORAD, OAS, etc).

Empowered and emboldened autocratic regimes concomitant with shrinking democratic influence would require minor democratic nations to shoulder a great portion of regional defence and security. Western nations who have enjoyed decades of national security at super expense are about to discover the real cost of national defence and security. Some, especially the heavily indebted European nations with elderly populations and negligible investments in defence and security, may not survive the great adjustment. About fifteen years from now, Canada could be forced to enhance its defence and security investments at a time when its economy is smaller. Now would be a good time to plan for this most likely of scenarios, before the great adjustment forces Canada to rediscover the fundamentals of nationhood.

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North Korea: What is the Succession When Kim Jong-il Dies?

by Vernie Liebl

Kim Jong-il, the current leader of North Korea, an apparently very ill 67 year old man, has yet to officially

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designate any successor. His absence at the sixtieth anniversary of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) founding added weight to ongoing speculation that Kim Jong-il’s health may be deteriorating after having possibly suffered a stroke sometime in August 2008. Yet, leading DPRK observers have expressed doubts about Kim Jong-il’s alleged new health problem. This very confusion about Kim Jong-il incites curiosity as to a possible successor.



Kim Jong-il

Whoever that successor may be will inherit a poverty stricken country with a large but obsolescent military that consumes the majority of North Korea's resources. Additionally, that successor will also run one of the world's largest exporters of missile technology (usually to the highest bidder), oversee an extensive stock of chemical munitions and a modest biological weapons suite, and, most critically, control a numerically minute yet strategically huge nuclear weapons stockpile.

Kim Jong-il has three sons and it is currently assumed that he will choose one of them to succeed him, most likely the first or second son. There is a half-brother, a full sister and two-half sisters to Kim; however, they have all been barred from succession. Although there is no sure way to know exactly who will succeed until Kim actually dies, examination of the mothers of his sons and how they are remembered may be the surest way to indicate who may succeed. If Kim Jong-il selects a son to succeed him, the family-dominated and Confucian observant communist leadership will likely ease that succession.

Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung, selected his son as his successor when he was 62. His heir proved to be the world's first communist dynastic successor and had twenty years as the heir before his father died. Kim Jong-il will celebrate his 68th birthday in February 2010 and has yet to name an official successor.

Kim is reportedly diabetic, has heart disease, high blood pressure and possible liver problems. He has 'reduced' his smoking and agreed to some dietary restrictions. He does go to China for health care and reportedly will go to Russia if his health takes a turn for the worse.

In an article in *North Korea Today*, Japanese researcher Keiji Abe, quoting unnamed Chinese intelligence sources, states that Kim Jong-nam, Kim's eldest son, is likely to be named as his successor. Confucian tradition, historically favoured in Korea, also favours succession by the eldest son.

Kim Jong-nam, 38, currently holds a high-level post inside the Ministry of Public Security, North Korea's internal security apparatus, and is the chairman of the DPRK Computer Committee, placing him in charge of the Korean Computing Center (KCC), which is North Korea's high-tech research centre. These positions are seen as necessary to solidify his heir-apparent status within North Korea as well as legitimizing Kim Jong-il's own dynastic right to rule by emphasizing 'family' continuity. Kim Jong-nam has studied

at an international school in Switzerland, has traveled widely and was reportedly residing in Macau in 2007 until called back to North Korea. It is still not certain that he now permanently resides in North Korea, as rumours persist that he now lives in Beijing with continued trips back to Macau (possibly to continue his gambling habit).

Kim Jong-nam does have some significant negatives, completely aside from his heavy gambling while in Macau. It is believed that he was out of favour with his father until called home in 2007, because of an embarrassing 2001 incident in which he was briefly detained by Japanese authorities at Tokyo airport for trying to enter Japan on a forged passport (it stated he was from the Dominican Republic, using the Chinese name of Pang Xiong, which means 'Fat Bear'). The reason he gave authorities for the visit was that he was trying to visit Tokyo Disneyland. He was deported to China and his father, out of embarrassment, then cancelled a trip to China.

Prior to 2001 Kim Jong-nam had visited Japan several times, always staying at an exclusive men's club in Tokyo's Yoshiwara district, which also happens to be a red light district. One \$350-an-hour hostess recalled that he had a tattoo on his back, a taboo in any Confucian society as it is considered a desecration of the body. He has traveled and lived extensively overseas without bodyguards or any official status, both key indicators that during that time (2001-2007) he was not in contention for the succession. He was last known to be in Europe in November 2007, when he traveled to France and Austria after having visited Moscow.

The second son, Kim Jong-chol, was assumed to be the heir-apparent in the absence of the eldest son, although he is ten years younger than Kim Jong-nam. Kim Jong-chol has also spent extensive periods abroad, having studied in Switzerland (at the International School, Berne), and been seen at a rock concert (Eric Clapton) and at a soccer match, both in Germany. He currently has a leadership position in the Korean Workers Party (KWP) propaganda department, which not only seems to place him in good standing for any succession but also allowed him to invite Eric Clapton and his band to play in North Korea sometime in 2009 (the band refused the offer).

Although only 28, Kim Jong-chol appeared to have the inside track to succession until Japanese chef Kenji Fujikoto (a pseudonym for a man who worked for Kim Jong-il for thirteen years), in his bestselling memoir, *I Was Kim Jong Il's Cook*, stated that Kim Jong-il believed Jong-chol was unsuitable as he is, "no good because he is like a little girl." There has been no confirmation or otherwise of that statement by the North Korean government.

(continued p. 34)

THE VIMY AWARD

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For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2009.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'Honorable John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault et le Général Rick Hillier.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2009, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION
 HONORIFIQUE VIMY
 L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE
 LA DÉFENSE
 222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B
 OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 20 novembre 2009, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans le Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or téléphone (613) 236 9903.

The third son, Kim Jong-woong, is known least of all. Now 25, he is also believed to have been educated abroad. He is said to resemble his father in every way, including physically, and has been considered more qualified than Kim Jong-chol, despite being younger. His mother reportedly ordered those around her to refer to him as “Morning Star King,” something not countermanded by Kim Jong-il, who apparently doted on him.

Thus, examination of the sons is uncertain, so referral to the status of the mothers is required. All three of the sons are by mistresses, none by an ‘official’ wife. Kim Jong-il was forced by his father to marry Kim Young-suk in 1974, from which resulted a daughter, Kim Sul-song, in the same year. Kim Jong-il had already been living with his first mistress, Song Hae-rym, since 1969 and had had his first son by her in 1971. She was forced to leave North Korea by Kim Il-sung in 1974, initially moving to Switzerland before eventually ending up in Moscow, where she died in 2002.

Kim Jong-il took his second mistress sometime in the mid-1970s, soon after the departure of Song Hae-rym. He was already estranged from his ‘official’ wife by this time. Kim Jong-il then had two sons by Koh Young-hee, the first in 1981 and the second in 1984. She eventually died of cancer in a Paris hospital in 2004.

Song Hae-rym is referred to in North Korea as “Esteemed Mother” and “Most Loyal Companion” to Kim Jong-il. Koh Young-hee is referred to as “Revered Mother” and “Great Mother.” In this cultural context it has been assumed by South Koreans that Kim Jong-nam is the heir, although in 2003 an “idolizing” campaign was begun concerning Koh, thus casting the succession in doubt, at least according to the South Korean cultural experts.

Although it is possible that Kim Jong-il could turn the government over to a non-family designate, it is considered unlikely. On February 1, 2005 North Korea’s state radio quoted Kim as saying, “I will uphold Father President’s instructions ... that if he falls short of completing the revolution, it will be continued by his son and grandson.”

Kim Jong-il does have siblings but all were classified by Kim Il-sung as “side branches” and to be treated as “outsiders” and not allowed in “the centre of political circles.” His half-brother, Kim Pyong-il, has been sent abroad as an ambassador since 1979 (currently in Poland) and his two half-sisters live abroad as well. The exception is his only full sister, Kim Kyung-hee, who the older Kim Jong-il keeps close to him in North Korea. She is head of the KWP’s Economic Policy Audit department and has unfettered access to her brother. Although a power in her own right, she is excluded from the succession and her closeness to Kim Jong-il has not

prevented her husband, Chang Song-taek, from being purged in 2004 (sent away for ‘re-education’ in 2004 and then re-admitted to the circle of power in 2007, but to a less powerful position in charge of public labour work).

Despite the personality cults of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, ruling North Korea is not a one man show. The extended “first family” of Kim Jong-il is only the most visible example of a highly nepotistic regime bound together by vested interests. Many of the current political and military leaders are sons of the anti-Japanese leadership generation or have siblings in high positions. These dense family networks will likely ease the succession and allow it to proceed without visible problems once Kim Jong-il identifies which son will succeed him. Still, if one of the two younger sons, especially Kim Jong-woong, is selected as successor, this would be a major and potentially destabilizing departure from the Confucian ethos that North Korea still follows.

There is precedent in North Korea to rehabilitate and reinstate disgraced figures after a period of atonement. Therefore, the rehabilitation and eventual succession of Kim Jong-nam cannot be ruled out. However, until Kim Jong-il either specifically denotes a successor or dies suddenly without clarification of succession, it is unknown who will inherit the mantle of leadership. The best bet remains the eldest son, as this would maintain family continuity and remain firmly within the Confucian ethos that the North Korean communists observe.

Author’s post-script, June 3, 2009:

If, as was recently reported by two South Korean newspapers, Kim Jong-il has settled the succession question by naming his youngest son, Kim Jong-woong, as his successor, then one of the most intensely debated international security questions may have been answered.

However, until the Korean Central News Agency, the sole news organization of North Korea, cites an official statement from the National Defence Commission, the highest state body where ultimate executive power (including responsibility for the armed forces) currently resides with its chairman, Kim Jong-il, it cannot be considered as confirmed. The news must be considered seriously if the reports of North Korea’s ministries and overseas diplomatic missions having been issued orders to take loyalty oaths to Kim Jong-woong, reportedly shortly after the May 25, 2009 nuclear test, are true.

(continued p. 36)

THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2009 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, and Alec Castonguay.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda/ross-munro-media-award>. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2009, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 20 November 2009, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the LeBreton Galley of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, has been invited to attend as the guest of honour.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.

PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2008.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, et Alec Castonguay.

Toute personne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par

deux lettres du soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des écrits du journaliste. Pour les détails voir <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda/ross-munro-media-award>. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2009, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222 SOMERSET STREET, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 20 novembre 2009, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans la galerie LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, a été invitée.

Pour de plus informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

What makes the situation uncertain are the numerous succession rumours – frequently from South Korean or Japanese news agencies and citing “unconfirmed intelligence officials” – that have been a staple news item over the last several years (the last were in January 2009 concerning the possible naming of the second son as heir apparent). Reportedly, Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in early 2008 and a relapse in late 2008, which, combined with reports of an unusual procession of Chinese military doctors and possibly a French neurosurgeon to Pyongyang in 2008, give credence to reports of a potentially serious medical condition for the Dear Leader. There have also been reports that Chang Song-taek, husband to Kim Jong-il’s only full sister, was elevated to membership on the National Defence Commission in April 2009, signalling his placement as the nominal second-in-command of North Korea. Additionally, there are rumours that Kim Jong-woong has also been elevated to the National Defence Commission. If true, this would likely indicate that the succession reports are true and that Chang Song-taek would be the “steady hand” providing guidance to the youth-

ful Kim Jong-woong, which would be immensely comforting to the very traditional leadership elite of North Korea.

Alternatively, the possible naming of Kim Jong-woong and Chang Song-taek to the National Defence Commission potentially places family power interests in direct competition with the leadership elites likely favouring the older and more mature Chang Song-taek over the immature Kim Jong-woong. The positions of Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-chol, the first and second sons respectively, have become uncertain, and any factions that have aligned themselves with either may be unpredictable. The Confucian tradition of the eldest son being the successor would be a powerful factor in that unpredictability for a peaceful succession to Kim Jong-woong.

Regardless, if the rumour is true, then Kim Jong-il may be indicating that he is close to death, as he has resolutely refrained from naming a successor for years, despite the increasing potential for destabilization in the advent of his sudden death. He certainly is fulfilling the Chinese curse, “may you live in interesting times.” ©

NATO at 60: Securing our Future?

by Major Eric Dion

This article represents the personal views and assessments of the author. A longer version is available online at the CDA Institute website at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/> – ed.

Following the CDA Institute graduate student symposium in October 2008, the top five presenters were invited by NATO to attend key events at NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit held in Strasbourg (France) and Kehl (Germany), April 1-4, 2009. Amongst public diplomacy events and discussions with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and NATO Policy Director Jamie Shea, the CDA Institute delegation also attended US President Barack Obama’s first presidential speech in Europe.

NATO faces a number of challenges early in the twenty-first century, not least of which are: soul searching, alliance branding, external relationships, the Afghanistan litmus test, geographic expansion, functional transformation, consensual decision-making, and fundamental strategic management.

Major Dion is a staff officer with the Land Force Québec Area Headquarters.

Soul Searching

NATO’s sixtieth anniversary was celebrated in Strasbourg-Kehl, in the heart of Europe. It began with a symbolic crossing of the Bridge of Europe. The reintegration of France in NATO’s military structure was followed by the welcoming of the two newest members: Croatia and Albania.

Demonstrators were present, campaigning for NATO disbandment with the end of the Cold War. Although most disagreed with their ways, the demonstrators were making an important point: as a philosopher put it at the summit, if NATO is the answer, then what is the question?

This set the tone for a profound reflection amongst the delegates and leaders as to the soul of an alliance formed in a very different context sixty years ago. More implicitly, fundamental questions were being asked: What is NATO? What is it to become in 2020? How will NATO secure our future? Is Afghanistan a bridge too far? Where do military capabilities fit in a comprehensive approach that is not within its core?

Alliance branding

Throughout the summit, it was obvious that NATO's branding was different, certainly more proactive: securing our future. As such, NATO's military brand was being reshaped into an emerging security brand, with more far-reaching and greater fundamental implications for the alliance than first thought. Indeed, as a NATO scientist put it, 'security' includes non-military threats arising from incompetent governance, corruption and organized crime, insecure borders, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, even the shortage of natural resources and, of course, terrorism. Not exactly NATO's traditional core businesses, and not ones in which the alliance's leaders recognised their militaries' particular expertises.

External relationships

NATO's external relationships were also important considerations for discussion, namely those with Russia in light of its conflict with Georgia in August 2008, and Ukraine's desire to become a member of the alliance.

German dependence on Russian natural gas transiting through Ukraine is clearly a key concern for the alliance as much as Russian influence in closing the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, an air base that was supporting alliance operations in Afghanistan, is.

In a traditional geopolitical way, NATO still finds itself in the middle of great power competition, set within the American sphere of influence in the heart of a missile-defended Europe. For the European Union, NATO serves as counterweight to American or Russian hegemony.

NATO's reluctance to pursue full membership for both Georgia and Ukraine at the summit signalled to Russia that mutual respect and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme were still on the agenda. However, from a geopolitical perspective, Iran, China and North Korea indirectly present interesting challenges coming from the Pacific region in terms of the alliance's mutual defence agreement. Therefore NATO is clearly interested in looking east, towards Australia, Japan and South Korea. Pakistan was also a major part of the discussions, for obvious reasons.

The Afghanistan litmus test

The essence of summit discussions, however, revolved around what many called NATO's litmus test, a bridge too far beyond the Rhine called Afghanistan, where the strategic aim has become one of simply not losing face

(rarely a winning strategy in a counter-insurgency).

However, the insurgency has not quite yet entered the minds of NATO diplomats, even with Afghanistan as NATO's main engagement since its creation. Throughout the sessions there was talk of military capabilities, force generation scenarios and national policy issues, with little or no references to the contemporary operating environment we have become acquainted with: improvised explosive devices, insurgents, narco-criminals. Diplomats were simply more concerned about the home front than the actual war front.

NATO's public diplomacy efforts at the summit shifted, from making Afghanistan a flagship of democracy in the heart South West Asia to better managing expectations and redefining the mandate of the mission: Afghan self-security, self-governance, and self-development.

NATO's ability to forge a coherent strategy, allocate burdens among its members, and shore up domestic support for the mission are vital to the alliance's ability to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan, a goal that serves as a litmus test of NATO's effectiveness. Falling short of saying that Canada would be the first of a series of dominos (in reference to Canada's planned pullout of troops in 2011), NATO Policy Director Jamie Shea said, "[w]e hope that Canada will contribute in other very significant ways beyond 2011."

Geographic expansion

As such, NATO should by all means forge new strategic partnerships with countries and regional groupings willing to contribute to the common cause. The assistance of non-members in Afghanistan is more than welcome. However, making NATO the institution of choice for dealing with conflicts around the world is a bridge too far. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO's secretary-general, was keen to reinforce many times that "NATO is not, will not and should not be the Gendarme of the World."

So, where does NATO expansion end then?

Functional transformation

NATO no longer perceives large-scale conventional military threats to alliance territory. The secretary-general reinforced this perspective when he stated that contemporary threats include terrorism, proliferation, narcotics, cyberattacks, piracy, energy, environment and water crises, disasters, and even corruption.

(continued p.40)

CALL FOR PAPERS



Conference of Defence Associations Institute 12th Annual Graduate Student Symposium “Canada’s Security Interests”

Currie Hall, Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario
Friday & Saturday, October 30-31, 2009

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute will be hosting its 12th annual Graduate Student Symposium, on “Canada’s Security Interests,” on 30-31 October 2009 at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Kingston. The symposium is conducted in collaboration with the War Studies Programme at RMC, the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Queen’s University’s Defence Management Studies Programme, and the Department of National Defence’s Security and Defence Forum.

Individuals are invited to submit a **one-page (maximum)** proposal to the CDA Institute Project Officer via projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca no later than **Thursday, September 24, 2009**. Please include the title of your presentation, a brief summary/abstract, and your full name, institutional affiliation, program of study, and full contact information (telephone number, email address, and mailing address).

The acceptable range of presentation topics include contemporary and historical analyses of: national security and defence; insurgency and counter-insurgency; conventional warfare; campaign planning; Canadian military campaigns and operations; security and defence alliances, peace enforcement, and peace support operations; conflict resolution; security and defence related economics; intra-state conflict issues; and terrorism and other non-traditional threats to security.

Cash prizes will be awarded to the top three papers. The winning paper will be awarded **\$3,000**, and the second and third place prizes are valued at **\$2,000** and **\$1,000** respectively.

Funding for student presenters may be made available, upon request, to assist with travel costs.

(Please note that Canadian Forces members who receive a full-time salary are not eligible to receive a cash prize. Their work will, however, be recognized, and a non-cash prize will be awarded in lieu.)

Proceedings from previous years’ symposia can be found at the link below:
<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia>

For more information, please contact the CDA Institute Project Officer at projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca / (613) 236-9903.

APPEL DE COMMUNICATIONS



12^{ème} symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés de l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense « Les intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité »

*Salle Currie, Collège militaire royal du Canada
Kingston, Ontario
Vendredi et samedi, le 30 et 31 octobre 2009*

Le 12^{ème} symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, « Les intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité », qui est parrainé par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD) en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, l'Université Queen's, le programme sur la conduite de la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada (CMR), et avec l'appui du programme FSD du MDN, aura lieu au CMR de Kingston, le 30 et 31 octobre 2009.

Les personnes intéressées sont invitées à soumettre leurs projets de communication (**une page au maximum**) à l'ICAD au moyen de projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca **au plus tard le 24 septembre, 2009**. N'oubliez pas d'inclure le titre de la présentation, votre nom complet, l'université et diplôme en cours, et vos coordonnées (numéro de téléphone, adresse courriel, et adresse postal, s.v.p.)

Les exposés acceptables peuvent porter sur les thèmes (dimensions contemporaines et historiques) suivants: la sécurité et la défense nationales; les alliances de sécurité et de défense; les opérations d'imposition de la paix et de maintien de la paix; la résolution des conflits; l'économie liée à la sécurité et la défense; les enjeux des conflits intra-états; et le terrorisme et autres menaces non-traditionnelles constituant une menace à la sécurité.

Les prix seront offerts aux meilleures trois présentations. Un prix de **\$3,000** sera offert à la meilleure présentation. Des prix de **\$2,000** et de **\$1,000** seront offerts aux deuxième et troisième meilleures présentations.

Des fonds pourraient aussi être disponibles pour les frais de déplacements.

(N.B. Les membres plein-temps des FC n'ont pas droit aux prix en argent. Néanmoins, leurs présentations seront reconnus dans l'ordre de mérite.)

Les présentations de l'an dernier sont sur le site web de l'ICAD:
<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia>

Pour plus d'information, s.v.p. contacter : projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca / (613) 236-9903

Thus, the functional transformation of the alliance, from a firefighting and manoeuvring military posture to a fire-preventing and mediating security posture, was an important item, with visions of shaping the alliance into a smarter and more agile and versatile one, something we have heard before. But with no additional commitments from cash-strapped nations, and no appetite for a more robust or comprehensive stance, visions can quickly become daydreams. By its very nature, security is a different and much more complex business than conventional armed conflict.

Consensual decision-making

Managing a consensual decision-making process within an alliance that has outgrown its own organisational processes, and with an expanded membership of twenty-eight (where Albania now has the same voice as the United States), has become an issue. Exacerbated by other organizational issues, such as geographic expansion and functional transformation, challenged by Afghanistan and Russia and indirectly by others, branding itself away from its core defensive business and its military competencies, the alliance is not only soul-searching – it is literally spreading itself too thin.

Fundamental strategic management

It is clear that NATO faces a number of important challenges early in this century. Most significantly, the alliance's efforts in Afghanistan probably constitute a bridge too far, and the campaign's strategy has obviously shifted to managing security expectations. More fundamentally, the fact that NATO's strategy is largely derived from Washington

is a major issue for a consensual alliance of twenty-eight members.

The challenge therefore remains to find a better overall balance between geographic expansion and functional transformation. Fundamental strategic management would indicate that expansion or transformation risk alienating the alliance from its core membership and competencies, which have served to distinguish NATO from the European Union and the UN.

A more appropriate strategy would seek to leverage essential partnerships with non-member allies, such as through the PfP and with key states such as Australia and Japan. It would also leverage the capabilities of entities such as the OSCE, UN and nongovernmental organizations.

Conclusion

The more fundamental strategic management point is that NATO must not become the gendarme of the world, as the secretary-general put it. This is not NATO's core business. Furthermore, NATO must adapt its consensual decision-making process to the realities of the contemporary operating environment. This has made consensus more difficult, thereby risking the alliance's cooperative nature, credibility and cohesion.

NATO should strive to retain its core membership and core competencies, which have made NATO successful and appealing as a brand and organization to new members. Perhaps NATO should return the Afghanistan file to where it started (and belongs), the UN Security Council, which under article 7 of the NATO charter has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. For, as the secretary-general mentioned, Afghanistan's lasting solution will not be military. ©

Military Training Assistance Programme

by Andrew Rasiulis and Sara Fortin

MTAP: Defence Diplomacy in Action

The Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) is a strategic instrument of defence and foreign policy diplomacy. This program enables the Government of Canada, through the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND/CF), to provide military training and education programs to developing, non-NATO member coun-

tries.

The aim of MTAP is to build cooperative partnerships with the armed forces of like minded countries. MTAP designated countries have been identified as having the greatest potential to work with Canada and the CF in promoting international peace and stability; whether in Afghanistan serv-

ing shoulder to shoulder with the CF, or in lieu of the CF in hot spots such as Darfur, Congo or Haiti. MTAP accomplishes this mission by means of training and education, broadly based on the three pillars of language (English/French), staff and peace support training. Exception niche training projects¹ are also very much in evidence with certain countries.

A Key Player in Foreign and Defence Diplomacy

Defence diplomacy interactions fostered by MTAP allow for the creation of bilateral and multilat-

eral relations. MTAP is often the first or only formal contact that DND has in many developing regions around the world. In so doing, MTAP facilitates the projection of Canadian defence capabilities and values into these developing regions in a cost effective manner that also contributes to the security of Canadians and their current and emerging allies.

By promoting democracy, MTAP training increases the degree of democratic governance in the international system, thereby lowering the incidence of fragile and failed states that are havens for terrorists, a beneficial outcome for Canada and the international community. MTAP training achieves a strategic effect in that it allows Canada and its partners to promote shared values, protect shared interests, and preserve international security and stability.

Over the past year, more than 1,000 officers from 63 member countries around the world have participated in MTAP training. MTAP has provided: language training to facilitate communication and interoperability among international forces; professional development and staff courses to improve the professionalism of foreign armed forces; and peace support operations training to improve military and civilian participants' capacity to undertake multi-lateral peace support operations. Such training provides candidates with the skills and knowledge to work in a multi-national peace-keeping headquarters and foster participants' self-sufficiency in mounting peacekeeping operations.

Besides its three pillars of training, the Directorate of MTAP (DMTAP) also manages supplemental projects that are funded by partners either within DND or from other government departments. These projects, which are developed on an opportunity basis, allow the Programme to react to



Andrew Rasiulis is the Director, Military Training Assistance Programme, Department of National Defence. Sara Fortin, in September 2005, joined the Policy Group at the Department of National Defence where she is currently working for the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP). She graduated with a Master's degree in political sciences from the Université de Montréal.

strategically urgent training requests. For example, through supplemental projects, training is currently provided to the Afghan National Army, the Jamaican Defence Force, as well as to military officers bound for the African mission in Sudan.

Our Contribution to Enhance Security in Afghanistan

In support of the Government of Canada's commitment in Afghanistan, MTAP staffs have worked very hard to establish a Staff and Language Training Centre in

Kabul, Afghanistan. This initiative delivers on one of the six key priorities for Canada's current mission in Afghanistan by providing training to the Afghan National Army (ANA). This training centre will contribute to the long-term development of the ANA through junior staff officer training and English language instructor training. This initiative definitely reinforces the Canadian commitment and leadership within the NATO-ISAF effort to build capacity in the ANA, enabling them to meet their training requirements through the use of Canadian-trained Afghan mentors and instructors.

MTAP: A Policy Instrument for the Canada's Americas Strategy

The Caribbean has long been an area of strategic interest to Canada, and MTAP activities in the region date back to the Programme's inception in the early 1960s. Particularly, Canada enjoys a positive and long-standing defence relationship with Jamaica that is based upon extensive bilateral engagement with the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF).

The training that the JDF has received in Canada through the MTAP and the capacity-building programs currently being developed in Jamaica place them in a very strong position as a key regional partner and trainer for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Regional initiatives include the repatriation of the Jamaica Military Aviation School to Jamaica, the establishment of the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course and the construction of the Caribbean Counter Terrorism Training Centre. This was all being conducted under the Tropical Hammer series

of exercises, which were designed to prepare CF construction engineers for deployments abroad and build military capacity in Jamaica.

The methodical approach taken by DND and MTAP to develop the capacity-building capabilities of the JDF in areas that directly affect regional security and military professional development sends a strong message about Canada's support to the region. In return, Canadian strategic interests for stability in the Caribbean are enhanced. Over the last twelve months Counter-Terrorism Operations Group (CTOG) personnel have received training by the CF through the MTAP managed Counter Terrorism Capacity Building program which is funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. To Canada's credit, DMTAP capacity-building training played a key role in the successful resolution of the hijacking of CanJet 918 that happened in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 19-20 April 2009. Indeed, members of the Jamaica Defence Force CTOG stormed CanJet Flight 918 after close to eight hours of negotiations between the gunman and family members broke down.

Africa: The Lost Continent?

The African continent is an area of priority for Canada; and is currently the largest recipient of MTAP training funds. MTAP has trained more than 2,400 students from Africa since the mid-1960s.

MTAP's important contribution to Government of Canada efforts to end violence in Darfur and build peace in Sudan was reinforced in 2004. Since then, African military personnel bound for the United Nations/Africa Union mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) have received military observer training delivered through collaboration between MTAP and the Canadian Forces' Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). To date, the training has been offered in Canada, Mali, Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia. Building on its successful military observer training initiative, MTAP developed a Tactical Operations Staff Course (TOSC) to enhance AMIS capabilities further. Designed for officers from African Union countries, the TOSC offers candidates ranging in rank from lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel, the staff skills required to work effectively in a mid- to high-intensity operations room or command post. It has proven to be a useful tool in supporting the peace support efforts of the UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMIS), the capability building in Africa and the Canadian defence diplomacy objectives.



Fall 2007 — Students conducting a Recce for the Area defence phase during the Junior Command and Staff Course. L to R: Lt Koho (Burkina Faso), Capt Reza (Bangladesh), Maj Singh (Nepal)

Another major MTAP initiative is the permanent posting of four military officers to Africa. For the first time since the 1970s, in August 2006, a CF officer was posted at the *École de maintien de la paix* in Mali. As Director of Training of the school, the Canadian officer has been in a position to influence the development of the school and contribute to the enhancement of peace support operations capacity-building in Africa. During the summer of 2007, DMTAP posted another Canadian infantry officer to the same school in Mali, and two more (a curriculum developer and a logistics officer) at the Karen Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya.

An increasing role for MTAP in the future

Canada is a world leader in the development of leadership training and CF pedagogical materials and instructors are synonymous with the highest standards of excellence. By drawing upon its experience in applying coherent expertise to foreign military training, DMTAP has *de facto* become the Department's key instrument for foreign military training assistance. Accordingly, MTAP has the essential tools to make an even greater impact on the manner in which military training assistance is delivered in Afghanistan, in the Americas, in Africa and around the world.

Each year, DMTAP receives many demands for training assistance from developing states and this is expected to increase. Similarly, the requirements for peacekeeping forces, including those of Canada, will certainly

also increase as international instability shows no sign of abating. Consequently, MTAP will remain a key player as a force multiplier in assisting friendly developing countries to train additional peacekeeping forces to meet the demands of the international community. In so doing, closer defence relationships will be built with partner countries around the

world, working with the CF to share the common burden of maintaining international peace and security.

For more information about the MTAP, please consult the MTAP website at the following link: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/mtap-eng.html>.

Footnote:

1 During fiscal year 2008-2009, MTAP special training projects included: the Staff and Language Training Centre in Afghanistan, Exercise Tropical Hammer in Jamaica, courses run through the Jamaican Military Aviation School, DFAIT's Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building projects in the Caribbean, and the Tactical Operations Staff Course specifically designed to support the United Nations/African Union mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). ©

Book Review

A History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Police and Security Services

by Colonel (Ret'd) Ronald J. Donovan and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret'd) David V. McElrea

Reviewed by Bonnie Butlin



Colonel (Ret'd) Ronald J. Donovan and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret'd) David V. McElrea. *A History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Police and Security Services*. General Store Publishing House. \$40.00 Cdn

The book and accompanying CD are a comprehensive record of the Air Force Police and Security Services from 1924 until unification in 1968. For those who served in the Air Force Police and Security Services and their families, this stylishly attractive book is a nostalgic souvenir volume. This effort preserves the experience of the Services, detailing uniforms, weapons, training syllabi and course loadings, rank structures, duty records and identification cards, among many other elements. Important events and exercises, such as security infiltration exercises, are preserved along with interesting anecdotes. For the broader audience, historical detail is complemented by substantive analysis, providing the reader with a contextualized understanding of the time period and environment within which the Services carried out their duties.

The book analyzes the structural and functional metamorphosis of the Police and Security Services as they adapted to the dramatically changing security environment during the 1924-68 period. As the geopolitical environment

changed, so too did the threats facing Canada and Canadians abroad. This necessitated adaptations including rapid mobilizations, quick demobilizations and the generation of new capabilities to fill functional gaps, such as the protection of nuclear weapons and prevention of sabotage, infiltration and espionage. The book clearly explains how the Air Force balanced these challenges within legal, political, cultural and budgetary parameters without compromising effect, and outlines the rationale for the decisions taken.

The book pays tribute to the loyalty and dedication of the Canadians who served with the Police and Security Services. While the Police and Security Services trade was not the preferred trade for most Air Force recruits, it was recognized as being necessary to protect and enhance the operational missions of the Air Force. The men and women of the Police and Security Services rose to meet the challenges on both operational and strategic levels, with several factors being key - adaptability, relevance, attention to perceptions, caring for the front-line, and taking a collaborative approach.

On an operational level, the Services' core mission of protecting Canadians frequently encountered functional

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gaps, which required adaptability, and often function creep. Security spilled over into military justice, as with the investigation of war crimes against Canadian soldiers and the implementation of sentences. The protection of nuclear weapons and the advent of a foreign intelligence role also exemplified expansions in function. This adaptability was also related to maintaining the relevance of the Services in a changing environment, which became critical given expanding Canadian commitments through NATO and NORAD, for example with the need to protect remote microwave stations and aircraft undergoing cold weather testing. Augmented and newly-adapted roles required developing new orientations and training, and these became a significant part of the Services' duties.

The Services also fulfilled a strategic role, both in averting problems and building relationships. They strategically averted public relations problems and the formation of negative perceptions of the Air Force among the public and international community through image awareness and discipline. The culture within the Police and Security Services emphasized caring for Canadian service personnel and the civilians accompanying them. This awareness of the front-line and its care was evidenced by the Service's moniker, "the Airmen's friend."

Also of strategic value was the collaborative approach employed by the Services. Featuring tact and diplomacy and deliberate efforts to work with the civil authorities, it was more than an early prototype of community policing on Canadian bases. The Services recognized the mutually beneficial nature of synchronizing with the Army, Navy, government departments and civilian agencies as well

as other states. Collaboration with civilian police forces was cost-effective and augmented capabilities in times of underfunding or transition while building capabilities, and provided mutual assistance. The Air Force experience may be considered a prototype for current Whole-of-Effort approaches, such as that employed in Canada's mission in Afghanistan. The overall effort for the Services was Canadian-interest focused, despite cultural and operational differences between the military and police agencies, as exemplified by the RCMP's resistance to guarding nuclear weapons and managing related protest activities.

Beyond inter-agency and inter-state collaborative efforts, the Air Force Security and Police Services may also serve as a useful model for the management of other challenges facing Canada today. It may be instructive in how to address threats in the grey area between war and criminal terrorism. Many of the threats in the current, post-9/11 operating environment can be categorized as existing in this grey zone. The Services' experience dealing with formidable threats such as Nazi-fascism and Communist infiltration is also valuable in the current high-security environment where disruption, pre-emption, and infrastructure and weapons protection are key. The Services may also be a model for agile, dispersed operations functioning in tandem with rigorous control and discipline, even where high security and tight control of information are required. Control and discipline were maintained despite limited force numbers and dispersion across broad geographic areas, internationally, and while in transition. As such, Air Force lessons might be extrapolated to counterinsurgency solutions today. This is a potential that the careful detail and analysis of the book illuminates. ©



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