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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Retd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

A topic that is gaining the attention of Canadians these days is that of Forces capability. Articles are appearing regularly in the media; the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) is hearing briefs from the Chief of Defence Staff and the environmental chiefs, as well as from the Chairman CDA; and questions are being asked in Parliament. During this process, questions have arisen over the emerging perception that the Canadian Forces are in fact able to meet their 1994 White Paper commitments. This issue of *ON TRACK* features articles of varying opinions from our contributors and other sources on this important subject.

In *The Canadian Forces - More Capable in an Unpredictable World*, the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, presents for our readers a thought-provoking article with a forward-looking view of the factors that lie behind forces' capabilities. In his view, the Canadian Forces have moved beyond the attrition concept of the 1970s and the 1980s to a 'smarter' model of both equipment and people that is relevant for to-day and the future.

Peter Kasurak, as Principal Auditor responsible for auditing the Department of National Defence at the Office of the Auditor- General of Canada, writes on armed forces' capabilities from a different perspective in *Sorting Out the Essentials of readiness: A Look at the Canadian Forces*. His article outlines his views of what readiness is and how it fits into military management. Peter reviews what the Office of the Auditor- General has discovered about the readiness of the Canadian Forces over the last five years.

We are also pleased to include an extract of the CDA presentation to SCONDVA that was delivered recently by our Chairman, Lieutenant-General (Retd) Charles H. Belzile.

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LE MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

La capacité des Forces est un sujet qui retient de plus en plus l'attention des Canadiennes et des Canadiens ces jours-ci. En effet, des articles à cet égard paraissent régulièrement dans les médias; le Chef d'état-major de la Défense et les chefs d'état-major des armées, ainsi que le président de la CAD, présentent des communications au Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants (CPDNA); de plus, des questions sont posées au Parlement. Au fil de ce processus, des questions ont aussi été soulevées en raison de la perception nouvelle que les Forces canadiennes peuvent en fait respecter les engagements énoncés dans le Livre blanc de 1994. Le présent numéro de *ON TRACK* offre des articles de nos collaborateurs et d'autres sources où l'on trouve des opinions variées sur cet important sujet.

Dans *The Canadian Forces - More Capable in an Unpredictable World*, le Vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense, vice-amiral Gary Garnett, présente à nos lecteurs un article inspirant qui dépeint de façon prospective les facteurs inhérents à la capacité des forces. Selon lui, les Forces canadiennes se sont affranchies du concept d'attrition des années 70 et 80 et ont adopté, pour l'équipement et les effectifs, un modèle plus « intelligent » qui correspond à la réalité actuelle et future.

Peter Kasurak, à titre de vérificateur principal responsable du ministère de la Défense nationale au Bureau du vérificateur général du Canada, écrit sur la capacité des forces armées d'une perspective différente dans *Sorting Out the Essentials of readiness: A Look at the Canadian Forces*. Dans son article, il formule son opinion sur ce qu'est la disponibilité opérationnelle et comment elle s'intègre à la gestion militaire. Peter passe en

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General Belzile pointed out to the Standing Committee that, while recent approval of additional funds for DND has been welcome, the sum is insufficient to halt the decline of the Canadian Forces and to set the foundation for rehabilitation. He reminded SCNDVA that money spent on defence is well spent since it enhances peace and security which, in turn, support international trade - the lifeblood of Canada's prosperity and well-being. For the full text of Lieutenant-General Belzile's address please visit CDA's website at www.cda-cdai.ca; go to current topics.

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute, a self-supporting entity within CDA, is dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

Les questions de défense sont portées à l'attention du public par le truchement d'analyse et de discussions informées parrainées par l'Institut de la CAD. L'Institut, un organisme autonome, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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revue ce que le Bureau du vérificateur général a découvert sur la disponibilité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes au cours des cinq dernières années.

Nous sommes également heureux d'inclure un extrait de la présentation de la CAD faite récemment devant le CPDVA par notre président, le lieutenant-général (ret) Charles H. Belzile. Le général Belzile a fait remarquer au Comité permanent que, même si l'approbation récente de fonds additionnels pour le MDN a été accueillie très favorablement, la somme en question est insuffisante pour arrêter le déclin des Forces canadiennes et jeter les assises de la réorganisation. Il a rappelé au CPDVA qu'un investissement dans la défense était judicieux puisqu'il permet de rehausser la paix et la sécurité, ce qui par ricochet appuie le commerce international - le moteur de la prospérité et du mieux-être de la population du Canada. Pour consulter le texte intégral du discours du lieutenant-général Belzile, veuillez visiter le site Web de la CAD à www.cda-cdai.ca; choisissez la rubrique « Sujets actuels ».

C'est aussi avec plaisir que nous incluons un texte de la main de Brian S. MacDonald intitulé *The Capital/Capabilities Gap: The Final Rustout Decade of the Canadian Forces?* Brian est un commentateur très connu traitant de la défense nationale et des questions de sécurité. À son avis, au lieu de s'intéresser uniquement au présent par rapport au passé, il faudrait procéder à une analyse adéquate qui porterait principalement sur le présent en comparaison avec l'avenir.

J. Robert Nicholson a laissé courir sa plume pour écrire *Post-Soviet Era Defence Assumptions Revisited* qui examine les facteurs régissant la structure du Livre blanc de 1994 sur la défense. Robert présente un examen approfondi des (voir p.3)

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Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) Allan L. Hepburn, CD, MD, FRCS

From Brian S. MacDonald we are pleased to include here *The Capital/Capabilities Gap: The Final Rustout Decade of the Canadian Forces?* Brian is a well-known commentator on national defence and security issues. In his view, instead of focusing entirely on the present in comparison to the past, a correct analysis should focus on the present in comparison to the future.

J. Robert Nicholson has given us *Post-Soviet Era Defence Assumptions Revisited*, in which he examines the factors that governed the structure of the 1994 White Paper on defence. Robert presents a thoughtful examination of the critical assumptions that underlie the White Paper. *Legion Magazine* writer Ray Dick, in his article *The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost*, takes a look at current capabilities of the Canadian Forces, compared with the forces that are called for in the 1994 White Paper. He concludes that a lack of funding is a root, if not the root, of all the problems in the Canadian Forces. We are grateful to *Legion Magazine* for this article.

From *The Bowline Journal* we are pleased to include *Who Should Be responsible For Preparing Our Military For an Uncertain and Possible Dangerous Future?* In his article Fred Fowlow examines some of the challenges facing the Canadian Forces in their goal of modernization, and believes that government must take the initiative to take a look at what we spend on defence in a different light. Finally, in his appearance before SCNDVA, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, Chief of Land Staff, advised that the army is more capable but fragile. With thanks to *Maple Leaf* we include an article outlining Lieutenant-General Jeffery's report to SCNDVA.

With this issue of *ON TRACK* we are pleased to introduce to our members Roberta Abbott, MA, who has joined the Institute, as Programme Coordinator, under the auspices of the Security and Defence Forum (MA scholarship program) sponsored by the Department of National Defence. Roberta spends some time *In The Company of Warriors* and takes an up-close-and-personal look at the lifestyle and work of troops at a nearby CF base.

We are pleased to conclude this issue with an extract of the recommendations of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs that were tabled in the House of Commons on 12 June, 2001.

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hypothèses importantes qui sous-tendent le Livre blanc. Dans son article *The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost*, l'auteur Ray Dick du *Legion Magazine* se penche sur la capacité actuelle des Forces canadiennes par rapport à celle des forces réclamées dans le Livre blanc de 1994. En conclusion, il affirme que le manque de fonds est une cause, sinon la cause même, de tous les problèmes affligeant les Forces canadiennes. Nous remercions *Legion Magazine* pour cet article.

Nous joignons aussi l'article *Who Should Be responsible For Preparing Our Military For an Uncertain and Possible Dangerous Future?* tiré du *Bowline Journal*. L'auteur Fred Fowlow y examine certains des défis que doivent relever les Forces canadiennes pour atteindre leur objectif de modernisation, et estime que le gouvernement se doit de considérer les dépenses pour la défense sous un angle différent. Enfin, lors de sa comparution devant le CPDNA, le lieutenant-général Mike Jeffery, Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre, a souligné que l'armée est dotée d'une plus grande capacité mais est aussi plus fragile. Tous nos remerciements à *La Feuille d'érable* grâce à laquelle nous pouvons ajouter l'article donnant les grandes lignes du rapport du lieutenant-général Jeffery au CPDNA.

Nous profitons de la parution du présent numéro de *ON TRACK* pour présenter à nos membres M^{me} Roberta Abbott, M.A.; elle œuvre au sein de l'Institut à titre de coordonnatrice de programme dans le cadre du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense (bourse de maîtrise) qui est parrainé par le ministère de la Défense nationale. Roberta côtoie à l'occasion la Compagnie des guerriers et est donc témoin du mode de vie et des tâches des troupes dans une base des FC à proximité.

Enfin, nous terminons ce numéro par un extrait des recommandations du Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants, qui ont été déposées à la Chambre des communes le 12 juin 2001.

Un des principaux événements inscrits au calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la remise annuelle de la distinction honorifique Vimy à un Canadien qui a contribué de façon notable et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécu

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One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, and I am pleased to report that support for the programme this year, to date, from Canadian industry and others is very encouraging. This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place 16 November at a gala dinner that will be held at the Fairmont Château Laurier, in Ottawa.

We are pleased that some nominations for this year's award have been received. However, I wish to remind CDA member associations, as well as individuals, that your nominations to the CDA Institute by 1 August are needed to make the Vimy Award truly meaningful. Do not delay! Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue.

In closing I wish to thank our members for their financial support in the work of CDA and the CDA Institute. Their support is reaping dividends through increased awareness by Canadians of the need for a credible military. We add to the debate on issues of defence and national security. With the continued support of you, our readers, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs.

If you are not already a member of the CDA Institute, I would urge you to join us. Registration forms are printed on the last page of this newsletter. **Your financial support as a member of the Institute is needed as a valued element for the continuing success of your CDA.**

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rité de notre pays ainsi qu'au maintien de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'année dernière a connu un franc succès, et je suis enchanté de vous informer que l'appui offert jusqu'à présent par l'industrie canadienne et d'autres intervenants pour le programme de cette année augure très bien. Cette année, la remise de la distinction honorifique Vimy aura lieu le 16 novembre lors d'un dîner de gala organisé au Fairmont Château Laurier, à Ottawa.

Nous sommes très contents d'avoir reçu des mises en candidature pour le prix de cette année. Toutefois, je souhaite rappeler aux associations membres de la CAD, ainsi qu'aux individus, que leurs mises en candidature doivent parvenir à l'Institut de la CAD d'ici le 1^{er} août pour que la distinction Vimy prenne toute sa signification. Donc, ne tardez pas! Consultez l'avis traitant de l'appel de candidatures qui figure dans le présent bulletin.

Pour terminer, je remercie nos membres de leur appui financier pour les travaux de la CAD et de l'Institut. Leur assistance porte fruit, car elle permet de générer une plus grande sensibilisation chez la population canadienne quant au besoin d'une administration militaire crédible. Nous alimentons le débat sur les questions de défense et de sécurité nationale. Avec le soutien continu de nos lecteurs, nous pouvons favoriser l'étude des affaires militaires au pays et la sensibilisation aux questions connexes.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà membre de l'Institut de la CAD, je vous encourage fortement à le devenir. Vous trouverez un formulaire d'inscription à la dernière page de ce bulletin. **L'aide financière que vous nous accordez en devenant membre de l'Institut est un élément précieux du succès de la CAD.**

THE CANADIAN FORCES MORE CAPABLE IN AN UNPREDICTABLE WORLD

Vice-Admiral G.L. Garnett, CMM, CD, Vice-Chief of Defence Staff

INTRODUCTION

We live in changing times. Very little in today's complex and violent world is constant. Further, change is pervasive – in industry, in society, as well as in military affairs. The nature of conflict and the concomitant application of military force are undergoing radical change and at an unprecedented rate.

The world has become more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous – indeed, the entire context under which military force is and will potentially be applied bears little resemblance to that of only a decade ago. Certainly, it has shifted from the

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so-called Cold War era where nuclear deterrence, large standing forces, and now dated technology characterized a relatively static bipolar strategic environment. Just as no leader in the commercial world can afford the luxury of looking back, neither can any progressive military - events are simply changing too quickly. All of our available resources and force development horsepower needs to be firmly focussed on the future. The Canadian Forces need to change at a pace not previously encountered or even imagined. Its leadership is firmly committed to facing these challenges head on – and to ensuring that the Canadian Forces becomes increasingly capable in a world that is increasingly unpredictable.

THE REALITY OF THE LAST DECADE

The last ten years have been extremely demanding for the Canadian Forces, both in terms of the operational tempo as well as the breadth of operations that we have asked our military to undertake. There has been a significant variety of missions accomplished in virtually every possible area of the world - from Kosovo to East Timor and from the Arctic to Equatorial Africa. Despite these pressures the Canadian Forces have:

- ? Performed to consistently high standards in all circumstances - and fared very well in comparison to the performance of forces from similarly sized nations;
- ? Executed more operations in the last decade than in the previous thirty-five years; and
- ? Completed these missions with very few operational casualties.

COMBAT CAPABILITY AND READINESS

There is an ongoing intellectual debate, both internal and external to the Department, on how best to balance our future force structure needs with policy demands and current commitments. As our forces evolve and adopt modern, high-tech equipment, as well as new doctrine and operational concepts they are becoming much more combat capable. Individual units and elements are better able to conduct the combat missions of today than the forces of a decade ago. Modern militaries must be tailored to need, needs that are very different than those for which our legacy forces prepared. Our forces are more lethal and are much better equipped – the impact of Coyote and LAV-III in the Army, the full effects of the modern and capable Halifax-class frigates, and the ongoing upgrades to the CF-18 fleet are examples of these exponential platform improvements. Our force structure and doctrine are also evolving to better utilize new concepts and equipment and to become more interoperable and capable of conducting missions that are relevant, practical and necessary today and within the future planning environment. Light and lethal, technologically enabled and rapidly deployable forces are the requirements of today's world - and we are doing our best to deliver these important capabilities for the people of Canada.

There has also been much discussion over the “readiness” of our military. Broadly defined, readiness is simply the temporal state of preparedness of a military force. It is to a large extent the simplest component of the force development equation; ie, having decided on what ‘shape’ the force will take, one must simply decide how quickly it needs to be available to conduct potential operations. To a large degree, it is a function of the security environment and the threats that it presents. Today, there is no clear military threat to Canada - or broadly speaking to NATO, for that matter. As a result, defence spending has generally declined across the Alliance. That being said, it is noteworthy that Canada is one of the very few NATO member states to increase its military spending in each of the last three years. This can be attributed to our improved coherence in spending these dollars wisely as reported by the Auditor General in October 2000.

Current analysis also points to the fact that the requirement to quickly deploy or forward-position large, heavy mechanized formations has dramatically diminished. Our NATO allies share this view and their forces - and their armies in particular - are collectively moving away from forward-deployed, Cold War legacy structures. Heavy formations, once the mainstay of Western armies, are on their way to specialized roles and armoured/mechanized formations are being replaced by lighter and more deployable digitized forces of the future. Military capability is no longer a simple function of the number of personnel in uniform. The multiplying effect of technological enablers has led to modern forces that are smaller, yet many times more lethal. DND/CF strategic planners are thinking along these lines vice planning towards a 21st century Maginot Line. They have left the past firmly behind and are focussed on developing combat capabilities that are and will remain relevant in the ambiguous and uncertain future strategic environment.

DEALING WITH PERVASIVE CHANGE

What is the CF plan to deal with pervasive change? How do we ensure that we achieve balance between the policy-mandated and crucially important tasks of today and the incredible challenges we know tomorrow will bring? The cornerstone of our force development methodology is our institutional strategy – Defence Strategy 2020. This living and relevant plan provides strategic level guidance and direction to the Canadian Forces. Rooted firmly in the 1994 Defence White Paper, and embracing both the letter and spirit of our proud Canadian military ethos, it clearly directs that modern force development methodologies be used to shape our future military. Specifically, a robust set

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of policy-based force planning scenarios, coupled with defined capability goals, are being used to develop Canada's future military forces.

We have also promulgated a Concept of Employment for the Canadian Forces which is based upon the following clear principles:

- ? Multi-purpose combat capable forces;
- ? Expeditionary operational level results achieved in co-operation with coalition partners;
- ? Task-tailored self-sufficient tactical units/formations; and most importantly
- ? Effective and relevant Forces (to both Canadians and our allies)

The recent creation of the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group, with its Joint Headquarters and Joint Signals Regiment is yet another example of a significant enhancement in capability. These newly created operational units provide a rapidly deployable, modern and robust Command and Control capability.

Additionally, we have created the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, where dedicated and specialized staffs will examine leading edge future trends and developments. They will exploit developments in the Revolution in Military Affairs and the latest thinking in doctrine, technology and conflict resolution to assist the Canadian Forces in developing a cogent and focussed set of concepts for long-term force development.

TRANSLATING STRATEGY AND CONCEPTS INTO ACTION

Carefully choosing and then embarking on a co-ordinated path of change is essential to developing and delivering a more effective, relevant and coherent force. In a resource-constrained environment, it is essential that we carefully consider our options and make well-balanced decisions. In particular, we must be careful to invest in those capability areas that provide maximum return and growth potential. The relatively new capability-based planning framework is the ideal tool to accomplish these different, but related objectives. Growth potential is a recent but significant phenomenon in military force development. It recognizes the technological reality that change is so rapid that one does not now purchase a complete technological solution, but in essence commits to continued investment in a capability that will continue to evolve over time.

Capability-based planning provides the Canadian Forces with the ability to identify potential solutions and to make informed decisions to both acquire and retire capabilities. It is these 'trade-off' decisions that are at the heart of an informed and vigorous debate – not simple decisions on the individual

readiness of units. Our procurement processes continue to mature and dovetail with these new methodologies as we embrace complementary Revolution in Business Affairs concepts such as Simulation Based Acquisition.

Capability-based planning not only provides a coherent methodology with which to examine long-term capitalization, it also provides the framework for dealing with the horizontal issues that cut across Service boundaries – and, in so doing, helps break down the "stovepipes" so characteristic of past practice within the Canadian Forces.

MORE CAPABLE – MORE RELEVANT – MORE LETHAL

Militaries, like the private sector, are evolving. A mature perspective of the strategic environment consistently leads to increased demands for quality – not quantity. This is the reality of force development today. Unlike the Cold War, in today's environment more is not necessarily better, because fewer technologically enabled and digitized forces can defeat larger but less technologically advanced forces. Human capital requirements are also changing, and all militaries are moving towards small but highly trained teams of professional technical and tactical experts. We have moved beyond the attrition mentality of the 1970s and 1980s to a "smarter" (and often asymmetric) model of both equipment and people that is relevant for today and for the future. Canada is embracing these changes and is clearly focussed on quality. Specifically, a recent series of coherent technology investments has given the Canadian Forces a quantum leap forward in command and control structures and systems. This new and more responsive capability, created in response to fundamental changes in both the nature of military operations and in the technologies that support them, will be the backbone upon which we can grow new, joint Canadian Forces capabilities.

One example of a new, relevant and proven capability is our Disaster Assistance Response Team. Already successfully deployed on several occasions, the DART is typical of the rapidly deployable, agile and flexible task-tailored forces that will characterize future missions. All Canadians are proud of the relevant, international humanitarian aid contribution that this capability brings to those in need around the world.

We are however more than simply a humanitarian force and have taken steps to improve our warfighting capabilities. The relatively new Halifax class of frigates provides an excellent example in this regard. These modern warships, conceived and equipped for today's naval operations, are fitted with leading edge weapons and sensor packages. Based on informed decisions and commitments to technology, we are able to maintain the highest possible level of interoperability

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with the United States, our principal ally and the most probable leader of future coalitions of like minded nations. In fact, our frigates are the only foreign naval vessels in the world to be fully integrated into United States Navy Carrier Battle Groups - a mission we have recently conducted on numerous occasions.

Likewise our air forces remain technologically engaged and relevant. The Government recently signed an important contract to modernize about eighty of our CF-18 aircraft, to provide these critical assets with the systems required to operate effectively with our key allies, particularly the United States, anywhere in the world. In the case of the CP-140 Aurora fleet, we have a similar modernization program underway to update sensor and communication systems and to ensure the effectiveness and relevance of this important strategic reconnaissance platform well into the future.

Mobility will be a key factor for the Canadian Forces of the future and so we are taking steps to improve our capability in this area. Our fleet of Hercules aircraft recently underwent an extensive avionics upgrade to dramatically improve navigation and other cockpit systems. We will shortly be taking delivery of fifteen new CH-149 Cormorant helicopters to replace the ageing CH-113 Labrador in the vital search and rescue role.

Our army, which arguably has and will continue to undergo the greatest degree of change, is now reaping the benefits of the acquisition of the Coyote and LAV-III vehicle fleets. More than just the simple battle-taxis of the past, these armoured fighting vehicles provide superior firepower, protection and mobility. They form the cornerstone of modern, task-tailored and globally deployable land forces that can quickly and effectively respond to the new reality of peacekeeping as well as to peace enforcement missions that challenge us on a day to day basis. Canada's high quality and very relevant contribution to operations in Ethiopia/Eritrea is precisely the kind of task for which the Army needs to be prepared.

Finally, Canada's commitment to the future continues to manifest itself in a Canadian Forces comprising extremely high-quality personnel. Massive changes in technology and operational complexity continue to push the demands on the human elements of the military force – Canadian Forces members and leaders continue to meet this challenge. Indeed, we have seen a number of Canadian senior officers selected

to command significant Allied and Coalition operations around the world in recent years. In fact at this moment, Major-General Hillier is commanding Multi-National Division Southwest in Bosnia, Major-General Meating is commanding the Multi-National Force and Observers in the Sinai and Major-General Holmes is commanding NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land).

CONCLUSION

Although much has been done, there is considerable work ahead for those charged with the leadership of today's Canadian Forces. Clearly, it will be an ongoing challenge to keep pace with these profound changes while carrying out a broad spectrum of institutional reforms. That being said, a conscious decision has been taken to embrace innovation in doctrine, organization and technology in order to ensure the Canadian Forces remain an effective and relevant element of national power well into the future. Our progressive, future-oriented men and women are committed and focussed on the way ahead – on what is relevant and important to both the Canadian Forces and to our nation as we move together into the 21st century.

The Canadian Forces “will not squander the very real opportunity to create a truly modern, combat capable and joint Canadian Forces.”¹ The magnitude and complexity of our challenge is however best defined by Admiral Bill Owens who recently observed that:

completing the [so-called] revolution in military affairs will involve the controversial and difficult effort of integrating innovative military technological applications, and organizing new ways of conducting warfare, into a realigned structure. Identifying specific organizational reforms will be hard and difficult work, because every change will challenge and threaten a host of entrenched military traditions and bureaucratic interests...²

The leadership and all ranks of the Canadian Forces are firmly committed to meeting this challenge – this is the future, and (as Yogi Berra might observe), ‘it ain't what it used to be’.

¹ Garnett, p.9

² Owens, p.226

SORTING OUT THE ESSENTIALS OF READINESS: A LOOK AT THE CANADIAN FORCES

Peter Kasurak, Principal responsible for the Department of National Defence at the Office of the Auditor General of Canada

(Ed note: the views expressed by the author are not necessarily those of the Office of the Auditor General)

What is all this ‘readiness’ stuff anyway?

In his testimony to the Somalia Commission, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie said that “funny enough [readiness is] not a term we use . . . within the Army; historically, it is a commander’s responsibility to evaluate [readiness] according to his own standards.”¹ The quote encapsulates a central problem in managing readiness in the Canadian Forces – the concept has not been well-developed, nor have adequate systems been built to manage it.

Nevertheless, readiness *is* important. It is one of the essential concepts behind the management framework of all military organizations. This paper will outline what readiness is and how it fits into military management. It will describe a basic structure for managing readiness and will review what the Office of the Auditor General has discovered about the readiness of the Canadian Forces over the last five years. Finally, a few suggestions will be made as to what the Department of National Defence could do to improve its management systems.

WHY MANAGING READINESS IS IMPORTANT

According to the standard definition, operational readiness is “the state of preparedness of a unit to perform the missions for which it is organized or designed. It is closely associated with operational effectiveness – that is the degree to which forces are capable of performing their assigned missions in relation to known enemy capabilities or specific mission requirements.”² Readiness is therefore about whether military units are capable of performing to their design limits.

Readiness, however, needs careful management. States need to ensure that they have enough potential military capability to meet their security needs. They must also ensure that this capability will be available when it is required.

If a state creates too little capability or is not ready enough, its forces will not fare well when fielded. They may lack mass or firepower if not capable enough. If not ready enough they may not get there in time or may take extra casualties when they do, as poorly maintained equipment fails and badly trained troops make mistakes.

On the other hand, being too ready carries penalties as well. It is not necessary (or even desirable) for every military unit to be at its designed performance limit all the time. Keeping forces at a very high state of readiness consumes fuel and spare parts for training and uses up money that could be spent on modernizing forces or maintaining larger forces. In addition, the people in a unit cannot run at their peak level continuously. They need to be brought to peak when needed and then allowed to rest. At a broader level of national security, a state that keeps its forces in a state of high readiness is communicating that it believes conflict is imminent. This is a message that most states wish to avoid sending.

It is therefore obvious that managing readiness involves making choices about where resources should be spent in the defence establishment. The United States Army identifies five components or pillars of military capability:

- ? infrastructure and overhead such as fixed bases, facilities and headquarters;
- ? force structure which includes military units with their equipment and personnel;
- ? modernization and investment consisting of the capital equipment program and R&D;
- ? sustainability – the stocks of consumables, replacement parts and reserves of personnel; and,
- ? readiness.³

Defence ministries must therefore trade-off these components against each other to achieve the best mix. They must also have some way of knowing how much better off they would be by diverting money from, say, readiness to modernization or force structure (i.e. size) to readiness.

HOW SHOULD READINESS BE MANAGED?

READY FOR WHAT?

One of the key elements of the standard definition of readiness is ‘the mission.’ A stated mission is needed as a standard against which to assess a unit’s state of preparation. In other words, you need to be able to answer the question, “Ready for what?”

The Office of the Auditor General has challenged whether the Department has answered this question on a number of occasions dating back to 1994. At that time we reported that senior military planners told us they did not have sufficient

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THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2001 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.



The Vimy Award

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, General John deChastelain, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-Général Charles H. Belzile, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Dr. Jack Granatstein, and the Honourable Barnett Danson.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing and be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for your nomination. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2001, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTE
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 16 November 2001, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa.

For more information, including ticket orders for the award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or Fax (613) 236 8191; E-mail cdai@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2001.

La distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, le Canadien ou la Canadienne ayant apporté une contribution extraordinaire à la sécurité ou à la défense de notre nation et à la préservation de notre démocratie.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Général John deChastelain, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Dr. Jack Granatstein, et l'Honorable Barnett Danson.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen/citoyenne pour la distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et accompagnées d'un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une courte biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2001, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION
HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSO-
CIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359 RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 16 novembre 2001, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu au Fairmont Château Laurier à Ottawa.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le banquet, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée, ou Télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel cdai@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

guidance on the types of conflict the Canadian Forces should be prepared for.⁴ The White Paper published later that year did provide some information about the size of force the government intended the Department to be able to deploy and the amount of warning time it was planning for, but provided little in the way of

detail regarding the 'what.' The White Paper merely said that the Canadian Forces should be capable of fighting "alongside the best, against the best" and should not be a "constabulary force."⁵

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Our Office has recommended that planning scenarios be adopted in order to clarify what the Canadian Forces are being designed to do. The model we have had in mind is the scenarios used in the United States Bottom-up Review of 1993 and later in its Quadrennial Defense Reviews. The United States has stated that its forces have been designed to cope with two “Major Regional Conflicts” defined as fighting a remilitarized Iraq in the Persian Gulf and aggression by North Korea against the South.⁶ This scenario is concrete enough to allow planning – and political debate – to take place.

A frequent comment is that any scenario chosen for planning is bound to be the wrong one. Real world conflicts emerge unexpectedly. While this is undoubtedly true, the alternative is worse. Scenarios are chosen to set force structure and readiness standards because they are representative of either a probable event, or the worst case that political authorities believe prudent to prepare for. Forces developed can obviously be employed for other emerging contingencies as well. Having no scenarios means that there is no standard, and one level of performance can be argued to be as good as any other. As a consequence, decision making tends to take a random, shotgun quality providing highly capable forces sometimes and low quality at others.

The Canadian Forces took about five years after our recommendation to develop force employment scenarios. These have been employed to screen capital projects and requirements and to make force structure decisions.⁷ The Department now needs to build on this by explaining its force employment scenarios in public documents and ensuring that readiness systems are linked to them as well as force structure decisions.

MEASURING READINESS

To manage readiness you need to measure and report on it. While readiness reporting systems vary in detail, they all fundamentally measure the same things:

- ? People: do units have their people in place and do their people have appropriate qualifications?
- ? Equipment: is equipment on hand and is it serviceable?
- ? Training: has required collective training been carried out?
- ? Enablers: are key leaders on board, are intangibles like doctrine and intelligence current?

Over the years, the Office of the Auditor General has also developed views as to what a good readiness measurement system would look like. The current expectations of the Office include the following:

- ? Comprehensive: A good readiness reporting system should include all the military units in the Canadian Forces,

not just a few high-readiness ones. Without a comprehensive view it is possible that a few units may continue to meet standards while the majority continue to decline. Overall trends become impossible to figure out.

- ? Based on military units: Readiness systems should be based on organizational pieces that individuals can be held accountable for – units and formations. If readiness is reported on an abstract conceptual basis (for example, defence program goals or outcomes) measurements become almost impossible to verify and no one is left responsible for them.
- ? Positive reporting: Every unit should report on every readiness factor in every time period. Exception-based reporting should not be used as it is vulnerable to the optimism of those reporting and masks trends that may not immediately trigger a report.
- ? Objective measures: Objective measures should be used wherever possible. The countable should be counted.
- ? Commander’s assessment: A commander’s assessment will always be necessary to interpret the meaning of objective measures.
- ? Auditable: All management data should be auditable. It should be collected on a uniform basis and stored for a set period of time.
- ? Validated: Readiness measurement systems are subject to distortion and must be continually validated to determine whether measurements accurately portray the state of the units reported upon. One way to validate what is reported by readiness systems is to compare the results to assessments from free-play exercises, especially when these take place on an instrumented training range such as the National Training Centers in the United States.

Our audits have repeatedly shown that the Canadian Forces do not have readiness reporting and management systems that can meet these criteria.⁸ Since 1984 the Department has developed and discarded at least five separate readiness reporting systems.⁹ These systems have generally not reported on individual units and have often used negative exception reporting. The current system applies only to Vanguard units, less than 10 percent of the Canadian Forces.

In addition, audits consistently find that subordinate service-level readiness systems are not in place or fully functioning. A 1994 audit and a 1996 follow-up found that while the Navy and the Air Force had readiness assessment systems, they had not been fully implemented. For example, the Air Force conducted only about one-third of the operational evaluations its policies called for.¹⁰ The Army had no system at all.¹¹

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Even worse, the services have not always followed up on field and operational exercises. In 1994 we reported that 24 percent of field exercises did not file a report documenting the results and the lessons learned.¹² There is reason to believe that the problem is a continuing one.

Capacity for validation of readiness assessments, through exercising on instrumented ranges, varies. The Air Force has an instrumented range and frequently flies on foreign ranges. The situation is similar for the Navy. The Army, however, lacks an instrumented range and will not have one before 2006 when its Weapons Effects Simulation Project is completed.

Overall, the Canadian Forces have significant gaps in the systems they need to manage readiness. This is an area that needs attention if resources are to be applied to the most benefit.

READINESS GAPS

Auditor General reports do not provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of readiness of the Canadian Forces. Readiness has been considered as part of a number of studies over the last 10 years, but only a fragmentary picture emerges. Nevertheless, some of the findings are important in themselves.

The audit report that addressed readiness most directly was the 1996 Peacekeeping audit. The principal gaps reported were in Army training. The 1995 field training exercise, VENOM STRIKE, conducted to allow troops to practice support for a withdrawal of Canadian troops from the former Republic of Yugoslavia under adverse conditions, concluded with a staff assessment that, "The most optimistic interpretation of readiness, on the last day of VENOM STRIKE, was that the land component was still 14 days away from being ready." This in spite of the fact that the exercise was the single highest priority event of the year for the Army.¹³

The same audit noted that individuals and contingents had sometimes been deployed for peacekeeping operations even though they had not been fully or consistently trained, requiring remedial training in the theatre of operations.¹⁴ In addition, 20 percent of Militia selected for peacekeeping operations were unable to pass selection training and evaluation at the lowest level for individual skills. As well, medical support did not meet goals for the number of beds required for the level of casualties that were anticipated in mid-intensity operations.¹⁵

Revisiting this subject in 1998, we found the Army could not tell us whether Reserve qualification levels had

improved over the previous two years. We noted continuing occurrence of this problem in post-operation reports. We also found that about 300 troops had been deployed to Central Africa for OPERATION ASSURANCE before being declared operationally ready.¹⁶

ADDRESSING READINESS PROBLEMS

The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has moved readiness to the forefront by holding hearings on the subject. From the above, it is apparent that there is more to solving readiness problems than supplying additional resources. Several key things need to be done to address how readiness is managed.

First, National Defence needs to provide a clearer description of what it aims at being ready for. Scenarios describing the 'what' is the approach this Office has recommended, but there may be others. Without a clear description of the 'what' there will be no yardstick to gauge current readiness and the debate will sink into a swamp of conflicting, but perhaps unstated, assumptions.

Secondly, a readiness measurement system needs to be put in place that meets the basic criteria this paper has set out. Without measurement, allocating resources becomes dependent on 'small p' politics inside the Defence establishment. Audits of capital acquisitions have shown that adversarial decision-making and allocation of resources by 'gut feel' have not produced good results. Allocating resources to improve readiness by the same techniques will not work any better.

Third, if additional resources are allocated for readiness – either by redistribution within the Defence budget or by increasing the budget – they should be tied to observable performance improvements. Commanders receiving additional readiness funding should be held accountable for achieving a measurable result.

And finally, Parliament needed to know about readiness targets and the degree of success in meeting them. Without transparency and engagement of Canadians outside the Defence establishment, debating readiness will remain an arcane pursuit with little effect on defence policy or management.

¹ quoted in Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Vol. 2, p. 697.

² Department of National Defence, *Canada's Army*, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, 01 April 1998, p. 90.

³ United States Army, *How the Army Runs, 1997-98*, p. 8-3.

⁴ Office of the Auditor General, 1994, 24.36.

⁵ Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper*, pp. 13-14.

⁶ United States, Department of Defense, *Report of the Bottom-up Review*, p.14.

*(continued p. 12)*⁷ Office of the Auditor General, 2000, 16.118.⁸ Office of the Auditor General, 1984, 12.40.⁹ They include: CMORS, ORRS, ORES, RECAP and the Operational Status Display.¹⁰ Office of the Auditor General, 1996, 35.30, 35.32.¹¹ Office of the Auditor General, 1996, 35.31.¹² Office of the Auditor General, 1994, 24.92.¹³ Office of the Auditor General, 1996, 7.96-110.¹⁴ Office of the Auditor General, 1996, 7.102.¹⁵ Office of the Auditor General, 1996, 7.68.¹⁶ Office of the Auditor General, 1998, 28.126, 140.

**CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS
TO**

**THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE
AND VETERANS' AFFAIRS**

APRIL 26, 2001

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

**ALLOCUTION DU PRÉSIDENT
AU**

**COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS
COMBATTANTS**

LE 26 AVRIL 2001

LA CAPACITÉ OPÉRATIONNELLE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

L'attention que vous accordez à la capacité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes est à la fois importante et opportune. Nous espérons que cet intérêt sera un catalyseur aussi efficace que votre travail en matière de qualité de vie voilà deux ans. L'approbation subséquente par le gouvernement de fonds additionnels pour le MDN a été bien reçue, mais les montants accordés sont insuffisants pour arrêter le déclin des Forces canadiennes et ont jeté les bases d'une remise en état.

Your focus on operational readiness of the Canadian Forces is both important and timely. We hope that it will prove to be as effective a catalyst as was your work on quality of life two years ago. Subsequent government approval of additional funds for DND has been welcome, but the sum is insufficient to halt the decline of the Canadian Forces, and set the foundation for rehabilitation.

À la CAD, nous avons poursuivi nos efforts visant à sensibiliser le public à la crise que continue de vivre la notre étude, *STABILITÉ ET PROSPÉRITÉ*, publiée en septembre 2000. Nous vous avons fait parvenir des copies de cette étude,

et je vous incite à la lire, en portant une attention particulière aux parties consacrées au processus budgétaire et à l'analyse du budget 2000 au MDN. Le thème du document, c'est que les fonds alloués à la défense sont des fonds bien investis, puisqu'ils améliorent la paix et la sécurité, lesquelles favorisent le commerce international, vital pour la prospérité et le bien-être du Canada. L'étude conclut que les récentes augmentations du budget de la défense étaient d'environ 50 pour 100 inférieures à ce qui serait nécessaire pour assurer une stabilité et une assise pour le rétablissement des Forces canadiennes. Autrement dit, il y a toujours une insuffisance budgétaire d'environ 2 milliards de dollars, principalement dans le budget de fonctionnement du MDN.

We at CDA have continued our effort to focus public attention on the continuing crisis in defence. An important tool in this campaign is our study, *STABILITY AND PROSPERITY*, published in September 2000. Copies have been distributed to you, and I urge you to read it, giving special attention to sections

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on budget process, and analysis of DND Budget 2000. The theme of the document is that money spent on defence is well spent since it enhances peace and security which, in turn, support international trade: the lifeblood of Canada's prosperity and well-being. The study concludes that recent additions to the defence budget were roughly 50%. Short of what would be required to provide stability and a basis for recovery of the Canadian Forces: that is, there is still a shortfall of some \$2 billion, mainly in the DND operating budget.

Cela ne comprend pas les 5 ou 6 milliards de dollars supplémentaires nécessaires, selon le Vérificateur général, pour le remplacement d'équipement au cours des cinq à dix prochaines années. Notre étude a suscité beaucoup d'intérêt et a été jugée crédible par le MDN, le Vérificateur général, ainsi que par des représentants d'organismes centraux et des universitaires.

This does not include the additional \$5-6 billion identified by the Auditor-General for equipment replacement over the next 5 to 10 years. Our study has generated wide-spread interest and it has been judged credible by DND, the Auditor-General, and by people in the central agencies and academia.

It was always our intention to publish a supplement which would identify specific shortfalls which comprise the critical \$2 billion needed in the short term. However, recently we have become concerned over the perception that the Canadian Forces are able to meet all of their commitments, and are more combat capable than they were ten years ago. In our view these statements are open to question, and we now intend to expand the scope of our supplementary study to assess them in light of the costed shortfalls. The subject of the study will therefore be the state of operational readiness of the Canadian Forces, and whether they are able to meet the commitments stated in the 1994 White Paper.

You will, thus, understand why we are pleased to see that you, too, will study Canadian Forces operational readiness. It is indeed useful synergism. Our study will not be published until September 2001, with a view to influencing the Standing Committee on Finance and Federal Budget 2001. My Remarks today will comprise an outline of how we intend to proceed, and this may assist you in your endeavours as well. We also hope that we shall have the opportunity to testify before you once again, after the study has been published.

I shall start by reminding you that, from the CDA perspective, the serious problems of DND and the CF, which have really been developing over the past thirty years, proceed from two seminal sources: underfunding and demilitarization. The underfunding was most pronounced during the program review cuts in the period 1994 to 1996. However, the

demilitarization process dates from the early 1970s, and may in the end have had a very great negative impact on the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces.

More recently, the Auditor-General has stated in his 2000 report, and in testimony before this Committee, that the operational readiness situation of the Canadian Forces is not satisfactory in terms of both defining it, and measuring it. The problem here is partly related to our British military heritage. The British have always placed great stock in the personal responsibility of commanders at each level to decide the state of readiness of the troops under their command.

That in itself is valid, but there has been a reluctance to submit commanders and their units to measurable tests of their readiness. The complexity of modern military operations renders this approach questionable. The Americans have recognized this for some time, and now formally test their military units at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin California for the army, and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada for the air force. Operational readiness testing is not totally absent in Canada, especially in the navy and air force, but it needs much work to reach a satisfactory level across the Canadian Forces.

In Canada there is a yet more basic problem, and that is the lack of understanding on the part of government and the public as to how and why the armed forces are organized the way they are, and how they operate.

A useful analogy would be to compare armed forces to a symphony orchestra, whereby diverse elements are brought together to produce harmonious results - a complex process, even for musicians. To be successful, an orchestra needs a rational organization, trained individuals, a musical score, instruments, and time to rehearse before the curtain goes up. For armed forces the analogous elements are much the same, but with a few additions reflecting the unique nature of military forces. For our study of operational readiness, we intend to use the following factors or criteria:

- *force structure*
- *doctrine*
- *human resources*
- *equipment*
- *training*
- *logistics*
- *stability*
- *military ethos*

Although some would argue over points of detail, these factors

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fall generally within the definitions of operational readiness found in NATO, allied nations, and in the Canadian Forces.

Our assessment of operational readiness will be conducted by examining each of the above-listed factors as they apply today in the Canadian Forces. The results will then be measured against each of the tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces in the 1994 White Paper: for that is the bottom line. On that basis, a rating as to operational effectiveness and ability to meet commitments will be derived. The common standard against which each task shall be measured is stated in the White Paper as follows: *Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent: that*

is, able to fight “alongside the best, against the best.” I would be tempted to add “and win.”

I would like to conclude this intervention by quoting from Michael Ignatieff’s book *Virtual War*. A quote which, I believe, goes to the heart of the matter before us. “*Those (and I include myself) who believe in using force as a last resort in defending or protecting human rights need to understand military power much better than we usually do. If we will the ends, we had better will the right means. For the means we select may betray our ends.*”

I look forward to reporting the results of our study to you in due course. I would now be pleased to take questions.

THE CAPITAL/CAPABILITIES GAP: THE FINAL RUSTOUT DECADE OF THE CANADIAN FORCES?

Brian S. MacDonald, President The Atlantic Council of Canada

THE PROBLEM OF EQUIPMENT DEPRECIATION

Strong claims have been made recently that the Canadian Forces capabilities now are much greater than they were ten years ago—and in many cases those claims are correct. To compare the Canadian Patrol Frigates, even without their helicopters, to the clapped out survivors of the DELEX life extension programme is no contest.

Such claims are also misleading since they are based upon a snapshot approach to analysis, which focuses entirely on the present in comparison to the past—whereas a correct analysis should focus on the present in comparison to the *future*. When we shift from the rear-view mirror to the way ahead the picture changes alarmingly.

From the moment a new platform is received from the builder it immediately becomes subject to two processes which start immediately to wear away its performance and capabilities.

The first is simply the wear and tear that comes from daily operations—a process which can be easily addressed with proper maintenance when the platform, like the family car, is relatively new, but which becomes increasingly more expensive as the equipment ages, requiring increasing time in the shop before it can be put back in service. In military parlance the ‘sortie’ rate drops, and the platform’s capabilities decrease simply on the basis of increasing unavailability when it is required to do its job.

The second process stems, not from wear and tear, but from the ever-shortening technology innovation cycle, driven particularly by the information technology cycle of the civilian sector—especially that in the United States, which accounts for over 50% of global research and development in civilian information technology, and over 66% of military global research and development. Unless the technological component of major fighting platforms is regularly upgraded, its capabilities erode—not in absolute terms—but in relative terms, as the military technological capabilities of allies and adversaries continues to advance and leaves stranded technology increasingly out of date and dangerous to its crew’s survival in battle.

Technological revolution now comes, not measured by the 46 years between the launches of *HMS Warrior* and *HMS Dreadnaught*—both of which rendered immediately obsolete every other line-of-battleship in the world at the moment of their launch, but in cycles less than a decade in length.

THE 65% FINANCIAL SHORTFALL FOR EQUIPMENT RENEWAL

The defence community in Canada tends to do time series defence budget analysis using numbers on a year by year basis, a process which is misleading since, unless an adjustment is made for inflation and GDP effects, one is not really dealing with the same things at various points in the time series. A

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better way is to recast defence spending in terms of percentage of GDP, which allows for far better time-series analysis, as well as cross country analysis.

The Canadian defence budget, according to the NATO definition, was 2.0% of GDP in 1990. In 2000 it was 1.2% of GDP. Since GDP is larger today than in 1990, if the 1990 share of GDP had held constant the 2000 defence budget would have been approximately \$21.2 billion dollars. Thus in GDP terms the real defence budget underwent a 40% reduction—or 8.5 billion dollars—by 2000. This was the real ‘peace dividend’ which balanced the Canadian federal budget.

However, the real equipment budget shrank even more. By the NATO definition, the 1990 Canadian equipment budget accounted for 0.34% of GDP, whereas for 2000 it was estimated to be only 0.12% of GDP—a reduction of some 65%. Put in dollar terms, the drop in equipment capital availability was from about \$3.5 billion to about \$1.3 billion. If we still had the missing \$2.3 billion, we could afford to replace our major platforms as they come up to their ‘pull-by’ date, instead of wasting money on the futile maintenance of obsolete and worn-out platforms, such as the ancient Sea-King helicopters.

The total DND reported capital budget is larger than that cited in the NATO figures, but that includes what the NATO definition refers to as infrastructure spending, on such ‘bricks and mortar’ items as the renewal (finally) of the sub-standard housing which has been such a centre-piece of the ‘quality of life’ issues in the CF.

THE MASS EXTINCTION SCENARIO OF 2010-2015

The 1994 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada’s Defence Policy identified service life and rust-out points for major equipments as follows:

Submarine	1965 to 2004	
Destroyers	1972 to 2010	extension to 2020
AOR	1969 to 2010	extension to 2020
Sea King Helicopters	1963 to 1995	extension to 2000
CF18	1982 to 2003	extension to 2010
Aurora LRPA	1980 to 2001	extension to 2010
C-130 Hercules	1963 to 2010	
Tactical Helicopters	1971 to 1997	rplcmt in process
Self-Propelled Howitzer	1971 to 2000	
APC	1965 to 2005	
Tank	1978 to 2005	extension to 2015
Land Comm. System	1955 to 2000	rplcmt in process

Their analysis was presumably based upon a set of standard life expectancy modelling assumptions such as

Ship Hulls/propulsion	40 years
Airframes	30 years
Armoured Vehicles	30 years
Soft-skinned Vehicles	20 years

which would presume a mid-life refit at half-life point in order to upgrade capabilities with current technology, and perhaps to deal with the non-availability of commercial electronics components such as obsolete CPU chips and the like. We tend to delay the refit to about the 2/3 point. Using that approach, and including other platforms, we might modify the Special Joint Committee’s table to calculate the following expiry dates, which collectively suggest a mass Canadian Forces extinction date of around 2010-2015.

Army	MBT		2015 expire
	M109	Now expired	
	M113	Now refit	2010 expire
	MLVW		2010 expire
	HLVW		2015 expire
Navy	LSVW		2020 expire
	Hels	Now expired	
	AOR		2005 expire
	280		2005 expire
	CPF		2010 refit
Air Force	C130	2000 refit	2010 expire
	LRPA	2000 refit	2010 expire
	CF18	2000 refit	2010 expire
	A310		2015 expire
	C-17 equivalent		2005 acquire

EARLY HARBINGERS OF THE COMING MASSEXTINCTION

We can see the erosion in such announcements as the mid-life refit of the CF-18 fleet. Primarily focused upon bring the avionics to contemporary standards at a programme cost of about \$10 million per airplane, it ran headlong into the equipment renewal budget wall, with the result that only two thirds of the fleet could be modernized—an immediate 33% cut in our FGA capabilities.

Equally revealing is that whereas the Joint Committee projected a life extension to 2010, based on a thirty year airframe life, the announcement of the CF-18 refit now talks of a life extension to 2017. It will be interesting to see if the CF-18 fleet follows the Sea-King life expectancy model of ruinous maintenance costs and shrunken sortie rate availability as the airframes come toward the end of their extended service lives.

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And then there is the interesting question of how many JSFs the shrunken equipment budget will be able to afford when the last CF-18 makes its final touchdown on the tarmac—one and a half squadrons, perhaps?

Then there is the story circulating that bidders for the Sea-King replacement are being privately warned that the total buy will be reduced because there is no plan to replace the four Tribals when they hit their ‘pull-by’ date in 2005, and therefore the eight helicopters that they would be carrying will no longer be required. With that 25% cut in our naval capability goes our capacity for task group command and control, and area air defence capability. Is this the real reason, perhaps, that we are now practicing the provision of single frigates to American carrier battle groups, rather than a complete task group, as the 1994 Defence White Paper says we must?

And then there is the sad case of the wheels falling off the MLVW fleet—leading to the thought that the estimate of 2010 for their rustout is another case of futile optimism.

Writing the New Defence White Paper

The classic approach to Defence White Paper writing is from a strategic estimate, to a force structure required to meet the

needs identified in the estimate, to the required capital, personnel, and operations and maintenance budgets needed as an outcome of the strategic planning process.

Then there is the real way White Paper writing is carried out in Canada—start with a steadily shrinking real defence budget as the single input variable, slice out rising O&M and infrastructure costs (up to 47.8% of the defence budget for 2000, as opposed to 33.1% in 1990). Try to hold personnel costs constant (down from 50% of the defence budget in 1990 to 41.9% of a much smaller real budget in 2000), and then select the major platforms and capabilities we are not going to replace.

Oh, and by the way, try to include some desirable new capabilities like strategic sealift and strategic airlift—and then try to figure out which additional platforms and capabilities will have to be dropped to accommodate them.

POST-SOVIET ERA DEFENCE ASSUMPTIONS REVISITED

John Robert Nicholson, MA, Canadian International Demining Corps

With the end of the Cold War, Canadian security policy was thrown into a state of flux. The premises that had guided the formulation and implementation of our security policy were shattered by the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The old bipolar world order which had its own inherent stability was replaced by a multipolar one. Thus, foreign policy would undergo a dramatic reorientation in the mid 1990s as traditional balance of power considerations were supplanted by new paradigms known as *human security* and *soft power*. These paradigms resulted from two tacit assumptions about the emerging global order. An analysis of the the 1994 Defence White Paper also reveals that these assumptions have had a deleterious effect on post-Soviet Canadian military policy.

The Canadian defence community was extremely apprehensive in the early 1990s. What new strategic framework would be developed to guide our armed forces? In 1994, the Liberal government undertook a major defence review. Two separate schools of thought shaped this review. The first sought to remodel our armed forces on the basis of

a glorified constabulary that would be responsible for internal security and low-intensity peacekeeping missions. Such thinking was in line with the human security agenda in the Department of Foreign Affairs. A second school of thought championed a military that maintained strong combat capabilities. The 1994 Defence White Paper was primarily shaped by the second school, but the first school also left its lasting impression.

The White Paper acknowledged that Canada still faced challenges to its security and there was a requirement to commit combat forces to multilateral organizations. To this end, Canada designated an infantry brigade for such missions. At the same time, it downgraded the risk of major regional war. Implicitly, it concluded that Canada and its allies faced no *systemic* threat. This critical premise resulted from the thinking that underpinned the human security agenda.

At the time that the White Paper was drafted, there was a
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widespread belief that the causes of general war had been eradicated with the implosion of the Soviet Union and its legitimizing ideology. Over the past six decades, Western liberal democracy had defeated the systemic challenges posed first by Nazism and then Communism. These rival ideologies had sought to replace our economic and social model with their own. In 1989, our leaders and Canadians as a whole concluded that we no longer faced a true threat with the end of Communism. Such a belief was the driving force behind the sweeping defence retrenchment that took place in the mid 1990s.

This utopian hope derived from two critical assumptions. The first assumption was summarized in a short article, *The End of History*, by Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama argued that there was no longer any alternative to capitalist democracy. All societies in the world would eventually conform to the Western political-economic model. Once countries had adopted liberal capitalism, there would be a new era of peace and prosperity in the world as democracies would not fight one another. There could not be a Third World War as counter-ideologies were absent.

Such an argument has been extremely influential in Western capitals. In Canada, this influence manifested itself in Lloyd Axworthy's human security and soft power agendas. Mr. Axworthy's anti-military initiatives were in line with the thinking of Canadians as well. Opinion polls have shown that nearly 80% of Canadians consistently oppose increases in defence spending. People do not believe that we face any threat comparable to that of the Second World War or the Cold War. Yet, are the central assumptions of these arguments valid? If they are not valid, what does this mean for defence policy?

The 'end of history' argument certainly seems to be plausible on the surface. Most countries in the world practice some form of liberal economics. Yet, different countries take different approaches to achieving the same end. Japan and the United States are both capitalist democracies, but their systems are quite different. The development towards a capitalist democracy is not some linear process. Rather, unforeseen circumstances can result in violent ruptures. The history of post-1918 Germany provides chilling evidence of this fact. Prior to 1914, Germany was considered to be as stable as any country on the face of the earth. In under four years, the country would be destabilized by forces from 18th century central Europe: Nazism and Communism. History could repeat itself with the reemergence of a legitimizing counter-ideology.

Even if one accepts the argument that there is no alternative to Western liberal democracy, does this necessarily guarantee peace and stability? The 'end of history' treatise postulates that the source of conflict is primarily ideological. Without

ideological rivalry, there can be no conflict. During the Cold War, most conflicts were indeed ideological. In the new multipolar world, conflicts are being defined along sectarian and communal lines. Liberal internationalists have countered that the new democratic consensus can ultimately defuse any nationalist conflicts. They hold to the belief that liberal political institutions can channel nationalist aspirations. In addition, they argue that globalization will foster economic interdependence to such a degree that wars will be impossible.

The arguments which are being presented by liberal internationalists are not new. Eerily, similar claims were made in the early 1900s. Advances in transportation and communications had increased economic interdependence to a level at least comparable with today's. The countries of Europe were slowly democratizing to the point where people believed that the only possible types of political systems were liberal republics (France) and constitutional monarchies (Britain, Italy and slowly, Russia and Germany). Various observers, most notably Thomas Angell, believed that these forces precluded another general European war. Peace and prosperity in Europe would ensure the same for the world. There was one dissenting voice, that of the Polish industrialist Ivan Bloch. Bloch argued that these same forces, when combined with nationalism, would lead to industrial war.

The parallels between 1914 and today are disturbing, especially in north-east Asia. Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington has written that the world is slowly evolving into new power blocs that are loosely based on culture. Each of the power blocs has a core nation that provides leadership. These blocs include the Atlantic, Muslim, Hindu, Slavic and Confucian communities, as well as Japan. Such communities may never develop internal cohesion, but the non-Atlantic blocs all share one common trait: hostility to the American hegemony. For better or worse, the current world system is equated with American power. Every hegemonic power throughout history has been challenged by rising powers. Already, American hegemony in East Asia is being threatened by the emergence of China. At this time, the challenge is strictly regional. The question is whether a global challenge will ever emerge. History indicates that it must.

A new balance of power and nationalism have the potential to undermine what can only be called the *Pax Americana*. Can a liberal capitalist consensus prevent relapse into conflict? Similar arguments did not prevent the youths of France, Britain, and Germany from marching off to war in 1914. Nonetheless, Canada seems to believe that the causes of general war have somehow been eradicated. These beliefs are the main reasons that Canadians and their government remain opposed to large increases in defence spending. Such assumptions may very well be specious.

THE CHICKENS HAVE COME HOME TO ROOST

Ray Dick, Legion Magazine

(This article is re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor Legion Magazine, May/June 2001 - Ed.)

Hit by a triple whammy of bad press, declining enlistments and more than a decade of shrinking budgets, the Canadian Forces is soldiering on and making do at home and increasingly abroad despite reports of threadbare and patched uniforms, shaky infrastructure and outdated and rusty equipment. "Right now there is just not enough resources to maintain the infrastructure, maintain the kind of programs, retain the reserve structure, maintain the status quo and invest in the future," says Colonel Howard Marsh, a key adviser to the head of the army.

That view is shared by many others, both inside and outside the military structure, who agree that the Canadian military is in dire straits and needs, among other things, an immediate infusion of cash to maintain its effectiveness and its credibility. Morale is suffering from past scandals, many forces members are leaving and few are seeking enlistment, the air force is considering cutting its fleet by almost half, the navy has ships tied up at docks because they lack the crews to go to sea, and the army has cut back its training and the purchase of spare parts and equipment. Adding to the financial woes of the army, considered to be the worst off of the three services, is a rust-out problem with everything from wheels on its thousands of trucks to deteriorating infrastructure maintenance of buildings, roads and water systems at its bases across the country.

A recent reminder of the perilous state of Canadian troops in the field came from Legion Dominion Vice-President Ron Scriven who visited troops in Bosnia and Croatia last November. He reported that the Canadians are "bored, poorly equipped and tired" and that their combat uniforms were "threadbare, stained and patched" compared to troops from other countries in the theatre. His report made national news earlier this year when Conservative MP Elsie Wayne brought it up in the House of Commons. She called the report "shocking" and said the reported state of the Canadian soldiers is "a disgrace" for the country.

The Canadian Forces, for its part, has been scrimping by cutting costs, contracting out and making do with budget cuts that have reduced its annual allocation from \$12 billion in 1993 to just over \$10 billion in 2000. But when it comes to looking to the future, suggestions for survival are varied and sometimes controversial, including the politically hot potato of clos-

ing bases, changing the focus of the military to include smaller but better-equipped units, selling off aircraft and other defence property, more contracting out of military support services to private industry and the always controversial possibility of the necessity to merge the Canadian Forces with those of the United States. One suggestion, from Liberal MP for Nepean-Carleton David Pratt, would have Canada and the U.S. form an elite fighting unit modelled after the legendary Devil's Brigade or First Special Service Force of WW II. The unit would be sent to trouble spots around the world.

Putting talk of mergers and special forces aside for the moment, the common refrain heard inside and outside of military circles is that Canada's military is seriously underfunded. "The bottom line is that it is desperately short of cash," says analyst Martin Shadwick of York University in Toronto. The question that must be asked, he adds, is whether Canadians want a military. "If they do, then they are going to have to pay for it."

Funding has dropped steadily since the early years of Pierre Trudeau's government when NATO commitments, especially in Europe, were scaled back. It was a time in the mid-70s described by Shadwick as "a procurement wasteland for all three services." A slimmed down military in 1994 readjusted its sights in recognition of declining enrolment and shrinking budgets, and a government white paper called for smaller, combat-ready units that could be sent to any world trouble spot in a hurry and be adequately supported in the field. But after years of neglect, especially in maintenance of infrastructure and new procurement, the chickens have come home to roost. In the army, thousands of trucks have been pulled out of service because of rusted wheel rims, and the once front-line Leopard tank is being modernized for a secondary role. The air fleet is being modernized and cut almost by half. The navy, with some of its ships tied up at dockside because of lack of crew, wants its aging destroyers and supply ships replaced.

When Marsh, the Land Force Command inspector, looks to the future of the Canadian military he does so with pessimism as senior military leaders work on a variety of options on how to deal with the forces financial problems. "Overall I am pessimistic," says Marsh. "The army is well led, with capable officers, but they just can't square the circle." He sees shutting down bases, wiser shopping for new equipment without

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the requirements for buying more expensive Canadian products to support local industry, shared facilities and expenses with private industry and a further cutting of troops from an already sports stadium-sized complement of approximately 56,000.

The problem with acting on such proposals is that they “touch on the domain of the political,” says Marsh, and the government would be reluctant to close bases, such as CFB Petawawa, or to allow the forces to further decrease manpower that many analysts believe is at a critical level. The army has bases in Ottawa, Petawawa, Kingston, Ont., Valcartier, Que., Gagetown, NB and Edmonton, AB. It could save millions of dollars a year by cutting the number of expensive bases down to two one in Gagetown and one in Edmonton and fielding smaller, but better-equipped units.

In an essay on future challenges facing the military, Marsh says rising government costs, a national debt in the trillions and public pressure to save money over the next two decades will cause widespread changes not only in the military but in public health services, health care and social and pension plan systems. That is why some people are looking at a scenario that would merge Canadian and U.S. militaries. “With the realization that training, possibly doctrine, and command support are no longer germane to the (Canadian Forces) and that most of the country’s military capability is interoperable with the U.S.A., public discussion on amalgamating the two nations’ armed forces is initiated,” writes Marsh. “That, of course, surrenders an element of sovereignty,” he added in an interview, at a time when Arctic patrolling will become even more important with global warming on the horizon.

In the more immediate future, the deteriorating condition of the military infrastructure is a major concern for Rem Westland, director general of realty planning and policies for DND, who says the department may have to dispose of some of its prime realty holdings because it doesn’t get enough funding for upkeep and repairs. The holdings in realties are massive, old and outdated and would cost an estimated \$12 billion to replace. More than half of all buildings and more than 70 per cent of other infrastructure from sewers to roads are more than 30 years old. The problem is that sufficient funding, an estimated \$226 million a year, is not being provided to maintain the facilities, about 30 per cent less than what private industry would spend to maintain a similar infrastructure.

“So what do you do?” asks Westland “add more money, use inventive ways to attract other users such as in multi-use and sharing, or do we dispose of some assets.” The key was in using all three strategies at once. The government already has a 2005 target date to reduce its infrastructure by 10 per cent. He expects large savings could come from combining army, navy and air elements on a single base and by sharing

facilities with rent-paying users, such as training facilities with police forces.

Shadwick says what the forces needs is more capital, and that a money-saving proposal such as closing bases is the short answer: “You can’t base the navy on one coast, and you can’t put all the air force in one base. And you must have a presence in the Arctic. Somebody is going to have to pump some more money in there.” He was commenting on reports that DND, blaming budget cuts, plans to cut the air fleet by about half by next year from 505 planes and helicopters to 280. The plans call for the grounding of a third of the country’s CF-18 fighter jets, from 125 jets to 80. It also recommends that the fleet of Aurora long-range patrol aircraft be cut to 16 from 21 and that the number of hours in the air for the Auroras be reduced to 8,000 next year from the present 19,000. The 80 remaining CF-18s would be upgraded, while 40 would be scrapped or sold. The 16 Auroras will also be upgraded. Two others, along with three less capable Arcturus versions, would be retired.

Reaction to those reports has been swift, especially from opposition politicians and environmental groups who say the patrols are essential for monitoring such things as pollution, overfishing, sovereignty in the Arctic, illegal immigrants and environmental hazards.

Although Defence Minister Art Eggleton has not confirmed the plane-reduction numbers, he has said the cuts will provide the country with a leaner and better air force and will not jeopardize national security. He denied charges that the cuts are reckless, saying “in fact what we are doing is investing in modernizing and upgrading our air force.” The defence minister had a bit of good financial news for the long-suffering forces. He says more money is being made available for equipment and human resources over and above the \$2.3 billion infusion of cash over a four- year period that was announced in the 2000 spring budget.

The new money would be spent on improving quality of life, including pay increases, and infrastructure such as rapid deployment equipment. He also responded to Legion Vice-President Scriven’s report on the “threadbare, stained and patched” uniforms of Canadian peacekeepers in the Balkans and how it was affecting the morale of the troops. “I do know that in the next rotation (of 1,800 troops) there will be the new clothe-the-soldier program uniforms that will be available to them,” he says. “I am concerned about anything that would be called a disgrace, because our troops are certainly not that and they shouldn’t wear anything that indicates that.” The clothe-the-soldier program will replace the army’s old fatigues with mod-

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ern battledress similar to the camouflage kit of other NATO

soldiers. It includes state-of-the-art armoured vests and plates to protect soldiers from shrapnel and bullets.

The report from Scriven was passed on to Eggleton by Dominion President Bill Barclay, and to Lieutenant-General R.R. Henault, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, by Legion Defence Committee Chairman Lou Cuppens. Both stressed that the report was not intended as a criticism of the forces operation but rather as the perspective of a “concerned family member.”

Cuppens, a retired lieutenant-general, has his own deep concerns about the financial state of the Canadian Forces. “There is a big, dark cloud over the military. I am really pessimistic about the future if more government money is not forthcoming.” If the government didn’t take corrective action, the military would lose services that would never be regained. “The military cannot shave the ice cube any more without trimming off its capabilities.” One example of the sad state of military equipment, he said, was that the military had to rent a low-bed (truck) to drag four guns to Parliament Hill for the opening of Parliament early this year because military trucks normally used for this function had been taken off the road because of rusty wheel rims: “The military couldn’t tow its own guns.”

Cuppens was less than enthusiastic about the possible merger of the U.S. and Canadian Forces down the road, using an old Winston Churchill phrase: “If you don’t have your own army, you are certain to get someone else’s.”

Military analyst Sean Henry of the Conference of Defence Associations is also pessimistic, saying the condition of Canadian defence has been scandalous for many years and the government has done little to address the problem. Funding cuts and failure to support the essence of the military culture has created terrible damage, with personnel strength, equipment and training all falling below what is needed to maintain an effective and credible organization. “This leaves only the desperation options we see today, such as tying up ships, selling planes and closing bases. Increases in the defence budget in the last two years provided only emergency aid, amounting to some 50 per cent of what is needed to stabilize the decline.”

“The additional funds are welcome,” Henry says in a CDA report on the benefits of investment in defence, “but another \$2 billion needs to be added over the next few years to halt the serious decline of the Canadian Forces.” The auditor general has also emerged on the side of those clamouring for more funds for the military, identifying a need for an additional \$1 billion per year over the next five to six years to start the rebuilding process. Canada contributed about six per cent

of government spending, or 1.1 per cent of its gross domestic product, to defence, one of the lowest rates in the world and second lowest in NATO where the average is 2.1 per cent. Partly because of its recent military shortfalls, Canada had become less influential in international affairs which has had a negative impact on Canadian diplomacy and trade, the “lifeblood of the nation.”

“Canadian military contributions to overseas military operations have multiple value,” says Henry. “They maintain and reinforce international peace and stability, thus assuring Canada’s vital trade relations. As well, they enhance Canada’s reputation as a useful ally, willing to assume its proper share on international responsibilities, including those relating to humanitarian and human security objectives.”

But lack of money may not be the root of all evil in the forces, according to a paper produced by the military affairs and defence committee of the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, a private group that includes retired military officers and business and industrial leaders. Stating that “the fate of this vital national institution is in grave danger,” the committee under chairman Matthew Gaasenbeek argues that “present, albeit inadequate, budgets are badly allocated and that a more efficient, realistic allocation of funds could materially enhance and restructure the combat capability of our forces.” The paper argues that some defence department purchases have not always been timely, were not always what the services needed or requested and in some cases gaps in the inventory have been ignored.

The paper draws comparisons between Canada and the similar-sized military services of Australia and the Netherlands, countries that have all-arms services and which seem to have been able to restructure and acquire new equipment to produce relatively small, but combat-ready forces to face the realities of a post-Cold War world. It points out innovative acquisition programs such as Spain and the Netherlands working together to design their amphibious ships. Australia had reorganized its personnel and had built an effective, mobile combat force for service at home or abroad. “Canada’s forces, in contrast, lack direction and muddle along with inferior equipment, poor manpower utilization and a deteriorating reserve force. These ills have deterred promising people from joining the forces and have driven many of the brightest and the best from the services,” the paper states; “the effects of this loss of talent are self-evident.”

What is also self-evident to those planners inside the military and to those outside analysts is that the Canadian military is in trouble and that lack of adequate funding is a root, if not *the* root, of all the problems in the Canadian Forces. And, as analyst Sean Henry says, “blue berets and peace doves on \$10 bills just don’t cut it.”

WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING OUR MILITARY FOR AN UNCERTAIN AND POSSIBLY DANGEROUS FUTURE?

Fred R. Fowlow, Director Maritime Affairs, The BOWLINE Journal

It should come as no surprise that most Canadians do not understand what is happening with the Canadian Armed Forces. And that's just the way the government wants the situation to remain. The situation however leaves the service chiefs in an untenable position. They are victims of a system which forces them to take budget cuts, decommission ships, ground military vehicles, discontinue maritime air surveillance patrols, and the list goes on.

The armed forces have been lucky so far in that they have not been confronted with an impossible task or more seriously experienced a serious set back which might be attributed to poor training, obsolete equipment or what ever. The fact is should our peacekeepers be on the receiving end of a situation that turns sour, could the armed forces swallow the reaction of the politicians who would run for cover. Their parting comment might well be that the generals and admirals didn't tell them the problem was that serious.

Most of us know that the defence budget has been and still is inadequate. In his 1998-1999 annual report Chief of the Defence Staff told us that, in terms of ability to pay, Canada is one of the smallest spenders on defence among the OECD and NATO countries. Our spending on defence is at the lowest level in Canadian history. And while there has been some restored funding, intended to help quality of life issues, very little has been accomplished in the way of dealing with the serious equipment problems which confront the services. While the forces wait for positive signs that the government is going to do something about the crisis situation, the Canadian public continues to receive good news, lots of bad news and no news as to when and how the crisis will be smothered.

Lets take a quick look at the game the government is playing with the service chiefs. First comes confirmation that the 1994 Defence White Paper comprises the master plan for the future of the Canadian Armed Forces. With a collection of wonderful goals and objectives committed to print the generals and admirals are clearly silenced. Meanwhile Ministerial announcements and press releases by the score assure us that helicopters will be purchased, the CF 18s will go through an upgrading programme, and a list showing the priority for a number of upcoming projects. After allowing a few weeks for the news to sink in, the diversionary tactic is recognized. No assurance that funding will be provided for the outstanding projects. The next round appears in the form of the chief of maritime staff, and chief of the air staff making announcements that ships will be laid up, maritime patrols reduced, and a host

of other so called minor adjustments are about to take place. The charade, has been taking place ever since Jean Chretien canceled the EH 101 contract.

The question is how and why has the situation been allowed to develop and more seriously remain uncorrected. Must we accept the comment made by Cedric Jennings in a recent edition of the Defence Policy Review when he wrote "An overwhelming majority of Canadians simply don't care about national defence, and don't support it"? So, bluntly, there's no voice in it. Or catch his next condemning observation. "Next comes the blundering arrogance and incompetence of most of Canada's generals, in and out of uniform. These seem to make for lurid news headlines at least once a month"¹. Strong language and clearly serious business because it comprises an attack on the foundation on which our armed forces must function. Issues such as poor retention and recruiting rates, inadequate training, obsolete equipment, quality of life problems all cry for attention, at a time when NDHQ launches itself on a million dollar advertising problem intended to encourage more females to join the forces. Some one has their priorities mixed up.

It is accepted that the generals and admirals will always have serious political issues that must be respected. They are related to social experimentation, the politicization of the senior military, social engineering, and political correctness which is often taken to the extreme. Assuming that the military readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces is at risk, the cabinet, and especially those ministers responsible for foreign and defence policy must discard their attitude of indifference to things military. They must stop the misleading approach they have taken every time a military problem hits the headlines. The solution is obvious in the changing world of today; our military leaders must be given the opportunity to publicly offer open and transparent, advice without the fear of reprisal

The time has arrived when the military and the government examine what, why, when and how Canada spends on defence in a new and different light. Surely they can agree that the Canadian Armed Forces have a job of ensuring our security, as well as making a meaningful contribution on the international stage. And that our forces must be equipped and trained to fight and win wars as well as performing as peacekeepers. The terms of reference for such an undertaking could carry a preface quote made by Major General Lewis MacKenzie who

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recently commented that the Canadian Army cannot fight and the Canadian Forces as a whole are less capable of combat than 10 years ago. Serving generals and admirals, speaking from their sheltered position and following the agreed party line would no doubt tell us otherwise? Who is correct?

Canada cannot claim to have a clearly defined foreign or defence strategy. If it does it is well hidden. We have however been told that we have a good policy in the form of the 1994 Defence White Paper. Is this an accurate statement? And if it is, are the senior military satisfied with an arrangement which must make their position difficult, even under ideal circumstances? Especially when our forces seem to be busier than ever before. And the wear and tear on equipment is significant. Years of neglect have resulted in near disaster at a time when a finite resource situation makes the intended modernization of the forces difficult if not impossible to achieve.

What appears to be happening, is that there is no sense of alarm coming from the generals and admirals, who in all fairness have their hands tied to tradition which does not condone them moving into the political realm. The best the military leaders can accomplish, with the budget they have been given is supporting near-term readiness at the expense of future readiness and modernization. Not an easy task. Especially after hearing Foreign Minister John Manley put the source of the crisis in the right perspective when he said

that defence is not a top government priority. Surely this attitude must be changed. The indifferent cabinet must be prepared to give proper attention and funding to the armed forces. While they wrestle with this current problem, the least they can do is set to work on developing a new foreign and defence strategy for the country. A move, which must allow the military planners to produce some meaningful plans but only AFTER the strategic policy, has been put to paper.

Briefly, Canada must stop building a force structure that's constrained by the budget and has no relationship whatsoever with a strategic or foreign policy plan. We must have an armed force that exists to fight and be part of an international alliance that wins wars. Politicians can talk all they want to about global interests, responsibilities and obligations Canada has as a nation. But rhetoric must be backed up with action.

Action boils down to a simple statement; the government must take the initiative to look at what we spend on defence in a different light. First start with the proposition that our forces must be well trained, with modern equipment. Good effective planning for the future of the armed forces will come to fruition when our senior military are given a greater say in preparing the plans. Finally Canadians must be better informed of the impact an unprepared armed force can have on our security, sovereignty and economic prosperity of the country. Those who think and believe otherwise are very much in error.

Army more capable but fragile: (Army) Commander

Paul Mooney, MAPLELEAF

(This article is re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor Maple Leaf – Ed.)

The Army can meet current operational commitments but is “fragile” and “stressed,” Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery recently told the Standing Committee on national Defence and Veterans Affairs on 17 May.

Because of the quality of its soldiers, new equipment and operational cohesion, the Army is more capable now than at the end of the Cold War, the CLS told MPs during his two-hour appearance on Parliament Hill. But he warned that the Army does not have the resources to sustain the requirements of the current structure. “While that may result in personnel reductions, fewer soldiers can mean enhanced capability if the issue is managed well,” he said.

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Une Armée de terre compétente mais fragile, selon le CEMAT

Paul Mooney, FEUILLE D'ERABLE

(Cet article est réprimé avec la permission de l'Editeur de la FEUILLE D'ERABLE)

L'Armée de terre est capable de remplir ses engagements opérationnels, mais elle est « fragile » et « stressée », a déclaré le 17 mai le chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre (CEMAT), le Igén Mike Jeffery, devant le Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants.

Grâce à la qualité de son personnel, à ses nouveaux équipements et à sa cohésion opérationnelle, l'Armée de terre est plus compétente aujourd'hui qu'à la fin de la guerre froide, a expliqué le Igén Jeffery aux membres du comité, pendant sa présentation de deux heures au **Parlement**.

(voir p. 23)

The Commander said that although the Army has weathered a period of resource and personnel reductions, an increased op tempo, a fundamental change in the nature of operations and significant organizational and cultural change, it has come through the period well.

“However, that experience and the continual expectation to live beyond our means has resulted in an institution that is fragile,” he warned.

The issue of Army readiness had arisen earlier during the Committee’s hearings as retired senior officers testified that the Land Force is no longer as capable as it was in the past, largely due to smaller budgets and personnel reductions. LGen Jeffery told MPs and Senators however, that the Canadian Army is better prepared to fight the new kinds of conflict likely to arise in the new century than many other armies. “Are we more capable in absolute terms than we were ten years ago?” he asked. “Yes. While not without our weaknesses, overall the Army, with its good and improving equipment, its quality soldiers and the level of cohesion based on operational experience, is superior.”

He stressed, however, that such levels of capability are difficult to maintain. “In particular, the maintenance of a collective warfighting capability, primarily through good collective training is suffering . . . Today I can only afford to train four of my 12 Battle Groups to the level required for current operations each year and have not been able to train and validate brigade readiness since 1992.” He warned that unless the decline in collective warfighting training is halted, cohesion will also decline.

LGen Jeffery described the Army’s current force structure as ‘outdated’ and said he is most concerned about sustainability. Demands on soldiers continue to exceed personnel capacity, he told MPs. The result is “is a an increased operational tempo, as soldiers are assigned an ever increasing number of tasks. This imbalance in resources and personnel is my principal focus.”

Modernization is a priority for the CF, the Commander noted. While change requires resources, the CLS stressed, modernization can result in improved efficiency “as we produce smaller but more capable fighting organizations.”

“Readiness can and must be improved,” he added. “The development of a readiness reporting system which accurately assesses the state of all units will help,” the CLS said. He said the Army is also introducing a managed readiness system, whereby units will be cycled through ramp-up all-arms training, high readiness and then lower readiness reconstitution.

Mais il a indiqué que l’Armée de terre n’a pas les ressources financières requises pour maintenir la structure actuelle. Bien que cela puisse entraîner des réductions de personnel, le l’général Jeffery estime qu’il est possible d’accroître la capacité de l’Armée de terre tout en réduisant le nombre de soldats, à condition de bien gérer la situation.

Le l’général Jeffery a rappelé que l’Armée de terre vient de traverser une période de réduction des ressources et du personnel, d’accroissement du rythme opérationnel, de transformation fondamentale de la nature des opérations et de profond changement organisationnel et culturel, et qu’elle s’en est bien tirée.

« Cependant, cette expérience et la crainte permanente de vivre au-dessus de ses moyens l’ont fragilisée », a-t-il admis.

La question de la disponibilité opérationnelle de l’Armée de terre a été soulevée antérieurement, pendant les audiences du Comité, lorsque des officiers supérieurs à la retraite sont venus dire que la Force terrestre n’avait plus la même capacité que par le passé, surtout à cause des réductions budgétaires et des compressions de personnel. Cependant, devant les députés, le l’général Jeffery a affirmé que l’Armée de terre canadienne est mieux préparée que bien d’autres à affronter les types de conflits susceptibles de survenir dans le courant du nouveau siècle.

« Sommes-nous plus capables, en termes absolus, que nous l’étions il y a dix ans? a-t-il demandé. La réponse est oui. Malgré ses faiblesses, l’Armée de terre d’aujourd’hui, avec ses équipements améliorés, son personnel de qualité et sa cohésion due à son expérience opérationnelle, est supérieure à celle d’hier. »

Il a souligné, cependant, que ce niveau de capacité est difficile à maintenir. « Je constate que le maintien d’une capacité collective de mener la guerre, grâce surtout à une instruction collective adéquate, est déficient. Je ne peux, présentement, me permettre d’entraîner, chaque année, que quatre de mes douze groupements tactiques au niveau que requièrent les opérations courantes, et je n’ai pas été en mesure d’instruire une brigade à la disponibilité opérationnelle depuis 1992. » Il a signalé qu’à moins que le déclin de l’instruction collective ne soit stoppé, la cohésion déclinera elle aussi.

Le l’général Jeffery a qualifié de « désuète » l’actuelle structure des forces de l’Armée de terre, et il a déclaré que la soutenabilité était sa principale préoccupation. La demande est trop forte pour le niveau actuel de nos effectifs, a-t-il déclaré au Comité. Il en résulte « un accroissement du rythme

(voir p. 24)

opérationnel qui constitue un fardeau pour nos militaires, car ils se voient attribuer des tâches de plus en plus nombreuses. Cette pénurie de ressources et de main-d'œuvre doit être corrigée, et c'est ma principale préoccupation. »

La modernisation est une priorité pour les FC, a signalé le lgén Jeffery. Pour changer les choses, il faut des ressources, a-t-il souligné, mais la modernisation peut améliorer l'efficacité en mettant en place « une organisation de taille réduite, mais dotée d'une capacité de combat supérieure ».

Le niveau de disponibilité opérationnelle peut et doit être

amélioré, a-t-il ajouté. Le développement d'un système d'établissement de rapports sur la disponibilité opérationnelle qui donnera une évaluation précise de l'état de préparation de toutes les unités sera très utile, a déclaré le lgén Jeffery. Mais l'Armée de terre a également décidé de mettre en oeuvre un système de gestion de la disponibilité opérationnelle qui soumettra toutes les unités à un cycle en trois étapes : entraînement intensif toutes armes, haut niveau de disponibilité opérationnelle, puis reconstitution à un niveau réduit de disponibilité opérationnelle.

Credit bilingual: Sgt Vince Striemer

IN THE COMPANY OF WARRIORS

Roberta Abbott, CDAI Programme Co-ordinator

As a grateful recipient of DND's Security and Defence Forum Internship, I have recently joined the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) and am excited about the prospect of working with the CDAI's extremely knowledgeable and experienced group of experts. My research interests in the field of international relations specifically pertain to conflict analysis, civil-military relations and combat psychology. The latter interest is central to the MA thesis that I will be working on over the next six months and to the short tale that follows of an encounter between students and soldiers.

The theme of this issue of *ON TRACK* and of the CDA's upcoming annual seminar is the state of the CF's combat readiness. As a relative newcomer to security and defence studies, judging the readiness of a military is not something I would presume to attempt. However, from my particular perspective as a conflict analysis student, I am relatively convinced (thus far) that the nature of the international system is changing and that the response of Western governments to conflicts within that system has undergone radical, though not necessarily efficacious change. Therefore, when I think of readiness and the future of the CF, I do not think first of human and material resources, rather I find myself asking: "Ready for what?" I was pleased to note in the SCONDVA report excerpted in this newsletter that the question of what specifically our military must be prepared to do is being more earnestly asked within that committee and other political and policy circles. The need to determine with clarity and purpose what civilian policy makers expect of our volunteer military is a profound responsibility. The trust/responsibility relationship became more apparent to me following a recent visit to CFB Petawawa.

During the 2001 winter session at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn taught a Civil-Military Relations class to a small but enthusiastic

group of conflict analysis and political science students. Dr. Mychajlyszyn believes in providing a diverse learning environment to her students, in which the learning is not confined to the traditional classroom environment and activities. In that spirit, she arranged for our civ-mil class to take a fieldtrip to CFB Petawawa: bringing potential future policy-makers into contact with members of the military, whose work and lives we discuss, but whom we rarely encounter face-to-face.

Upon our arrival at Petawawa, we were provided with a comprehensive briefing regarding the organizational structure of the base and some of the many activities undertaken by the regiments who make their home there. Thus we were given a glimpse into what is meant by 'a life in the military'. We were toured through the relatively small but very diverse and artfully displayed collection of regimental memorabilia that is housed in the base museum. Then, following lunch at the mess, we were given a second briefing with more direct reference to some of the recent missions employing CF troops in domestic and overseas locations, with specific reference to training and deployment for such operations as SFOR, KFOR and UNMEE (Eritrea). The morning's briefing sessions were carefully planned, thoughtfully delivered and informative; the presenters were frank and forthcoming to the extent that they could be. We asked many questions regarding the nature of operations, which were, understandably given our backgrounds, more political than military in nature and were, therefore, difficult for our hosts to answer to our satisfaction. Our questions were sometimes answered with a charming smile and reference to the 'multi-purpose' capability of the CF.

Up to this point in the day's activities, we were comfortably ensconced in conference rooms and given power-point

(continued p. 25)

presentations; we were firmly within the comfort zone of academics: the presentation/Q&A realm of analysis and critique. Then the atmosphere of our visit changed and we were led into what is unfamiliar territory for a group of civilian graduate students. We were taken to meet members of the Reconnaissance and Anti-Armour platoons of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) and to be shown some of the equipment they use in the course of their work. We were given a 'hands-on' demonstration of reconnaissance and anti-armour vehicles. We climbed into and onto the new Coyote with its very impressive thermal imaging system, and also the TOW Under Armour (TUA) vehicle. From inside the TUA, I took a turn at attempting to track an unsuspecting pedestrian or two crossing the adjacent parking lot through the thermal imaging scope. The pedestrians strolling by were more frequently out of than in my sites. I tried not to think of what could happen to the TUA's crew if they had to rely on my skills to keep them from being fired upon, but it is this 'small' fact, which pertains directly to the 'what' question, that was most salient for me as I talked with and listened to the Anti-Armour and Recce soldiers, recently returned from Kosovo.

My interest in the psychology of the military profession, the motivation of soldiers, and their behaviour in the field led me to ask a group of junior NCOs a series of rather personal questions and caused my 'subjects' a degree of discomfort initially, but they graciously endured. I asked about (completely unscientifically and informally) such things as their reasons for joining the CF, their feelings regarding the political purpose of the missions they are sent overseas to accomplish, their psychological reactions to that job while engaged in it, and their overall job satisfaction. The recent DND study (The Debrief the Leaders Project), which addresses *inter alia* some of these issues, suggests that CF officers are questioning the necessity of recent missions from the point of view of Canada's national interest. They have been criticized in the newspapers for expressing these opinions and I understand the concern expressed by scholars and politicians when military leaders question the decisions of civilian government. That the military must be entirely subordinate to civilian decision making is the central premise of effective civil-military relations. However, since a military coup in Canada is a highly unlikely event, I am less concerned than philosophically heartened that CF officers are questioning the validity of decisions that might expose troops to risks beyond the scope of their perceived commitment to protect the lives and interests of their nation and state. Their concern is not only valid, but also necessary, because the young soldiers I spoke with seemed not to consider it their affair to deliberate whether the missions they were being sent on were politically or economically necessary. This is a course of deliberation they leave to their senior officers and their government. Rather they wish to believe that the

Canadian public at large supports and approves of their profession and its actions and beyond that they wish only to carry out, when required, the tasks they had trained for. I was not prepared for such a mix of idealism of purpose and banal acceptance of the risks inherent to the profession of arms. During a conversation with one enthusiastic young corporal, he told me that he loves his job! He is part of a high-skilled, exciting profession and is relatively well paid, in spite of lacking a post-secondary education. Trying to shake his complacency regarding the uniquely dangerous job he had chosen I stated, "Yes, but people shoot at you!" "Sure," he answered, smiling, "but not every day."

The word accountability is being robbed of significance with recent overuse, in spite of the fact that there does not seem to be a greater level of accountability apparent in many areas of society. I wonder if we ought not to be striving for accountability, but for responsibility. One can be accountable without feeling the weight of responsibility on one's conscience. A volunteer military accepts the collective responsibility of defending the nation and state, and the government is obliged to respond in turn with well considered policies and decisions regarding how it will ask them to conduct that defence. I am reminded of Colin Powell's 1992 statement in response to criticism that the US government was too slow to commit troops to Bosnia, that the government has the responsibility to ensure that the lives of military personnel are not squandered on an unclear purpose.¹ When we ask whether the CF is capable and ready, as was pointed out by Peter Kasurak, it is just *as vital* to ask 'what' (in the present context of the risks they are being asked to assume) do we wish them to be capable of, as how capable they are of undertaking the tasks they are fundamentally charged with.

Some of my NPSIA colleagues and I may be fortunate to achieve positions in DFAIT and DND and I hope we will carry with us the sense of responsibility we felt that day as 'future decision-makers' or even, simply, as members of the "alert political public."² Those of us who made that trip still speak of it and the impact it had on our studies and our opinions of the CF. John Keegan wrote that, for the sake of their craft, "military historians should spend as much time as they can with soldiers."³ For students of international affairs, particularly those for whom the analysis of conflict is the primary professional aim, it is also good advice to spend time in the company of warriors. For that opportunity we are grateful to our hosts for their professional courtesy, their thoughtful engagement with our questions and their gracious hospitality.

We especially thank Corporal Andrew Dunning, Captain Ron Carson, Lieutenant Gerry Byrne, Major Bernie Derible, and museum curator Mike Wheatley. Last, but by no means least, a special thank you to the guys in Recce and Anti-Armour for

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letting us get 'up-close-and-personal' with a TUA and a Coyote and for candidly answering our many questions.

¹ Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *The New York Times* Thursday, October 8, 1992, Op-Ed.

² Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (London: The Free Press, 1960).

³ John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1976).



NPSIA Civil-Military Relations Class at CFB Petawawa

Left to right:
Genevieve LeDuc,
Marie Palacios-Hardy,
Roberta Abbott,
Jennifer Kleniewski,
Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn,
Renee Martyna,
Patrick Young,
Captain Ron Carson,
Christian Fournier,
Corporal Andrew Dunning.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS TABLES REPORT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

MP David Pratt, Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), tabled the committee's report on Plans and Priorities in the House of Commons, 12 June. ON TRACK is pleased to include excerpts from the report, hereunder.

"Our current project entails a thorough examination of the 'operational readiness' of the Canadian Forces. The third leg of our triad was undertaken to ensure that the CF are prepared and equipped to do what is asked of them. Military personnel must be confident that they and their families are cared for, that they receive necessary equipment in a timely fashion, and that they are trained and properly equipped to perform the tasks they are asked to do. We cannot afford to downplay the importance of any of these three elements.

If there is one thing upon which we can all agree it is that our personnel deserve the best equipment available. The risks involved in flying old shipborne helicopters in the North Atlantic or in the Pacific Ocean are well known and require no illustration here. As well, the operational capabilities of our frigates remain limited in the absence of a modern helicopter. In keeping with Recommendation 38 in our Procurement Study for the immediate tendering of a contract for the replacement of the Sea King helicopters, we recommend:

1. That the government proceeds as quickly as possible with the Maritime Helicopter Project to ensure that the delivery of the replacements for the Sea King helicopters begins in 2005.

And furthermore:

2. That the government explain why the current milestones for the Maritime Helicopter Project are now many months later than those indicated in the 2001-2002 Estimates tabled in Parliament.

If the Canadian Forces are to be properly equipped, there must be stability in the procurement budget. We therefore recommend:

3. That expenditures on capital expenditures be set as quickly

as possible at a minimum of 23% of the departmental budget, but that this goal should not be achieved at the expense of other programs such as quality of life or by downsizing personnel levels.

4. That in fiscal year 2002-2003, the Department be prepared to come before SCONDVA with a clear timeline for the achievement of this objective.

While adequate capital budgets are an essential aspect of defence planning and effectiveness, personnel are indispensable. Recent trends suggest that there is a serious recruitment and retention problem in the Canadian Forces. We have not yet studied this in detail, but our collective experience convinces us that a complement of 60,000 personnel is the minimum required for the CF to remain an effective force. Despite the rhetoric about technology and the probability that RMA will increase our combat effectiveness, we need to remember that peacekeeping is done by individuals on the ground. Since the onus of peacekeeping falls disproportionately on the army, it is imperative that their levels remain at full complement. We therefore recommend:

5. That the Department make every effort to ensure that the total number of Regular Force personnel be restored to 60,000 by the end of fiscal year 2003-2004.
6. That a special effort be made to avoid any decline in the number of Regular Force personnel in the Land Forces.

Finally, the CF has always prided itself on having an expeditionary capability. In fact, we have never gone to war except in the company of allies and on the basis of shared values and goals. However, today, when rapid deployment is an essential aspect of combat readiness, Canada does not have enough strategic airlift. Nor do we have dedicated transport ships of the kind needed to move equipment overseas. Here, we find ourselves in the hapless situation of either renting or relying on Allies. This situation will be further aggravated when our replenishment ships (AORs) will reach the end of their service life later this decade. When the lack of a strategic air-to-air refueling capability is added, one has a rather grim picture of our ability to 'rapidly deploy'. We

therefore recommend:

7. That the government accord a high priority to providing the Canadian Forces with the strategic sealift, airlift, and air-to-air refueling capabilities they require to fulfil the commitments outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper.

Providing the Forces with the capabilities they need to meet their commitments will require significant expenditures. Meanwhile, the importance of improving the quality of life of military personnel, of ensuring adequate funding for the equipment necessary to keep pace with the revolution in military affairs, and of providing all the required training are also making heavy demands on a defence budget still suffering the effects of the cuts made over the last decade. Yet, we notice that the 2001-2002 Estimates indicate that the planned spending for 2002-2003 is actually lower than the budget allocated for this fiscal

year. The Estimates do indicate that the planned spending for 2003-2004 is higher than for the two previous fiscal years. However, this increase may not be enough given all the demands being put upon the defence budget. We therefore recommend:

8. That the government re-examine its spending plans for the next two fiscal years with a view of increasing the budget for the Department of National Defence.

The ability to deploy on short notice and to sustain units for as long as necessary is an essential aspect of the 'early in - early out principle'. We need to be able to deploy rapidly if we are to maintain our role as one of the world's leading peacekeepers. The latter is not a self-ascribed title and it is not to boast. It is a compliment the men and women of the Canadian Forces have earned, and one granted them by peacekeepers of other countries who participated in the same operations."

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