

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Retd), O.M.M., C.D.

This Autumn, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada, will host the 6th Annual Graduate Student Symposium at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities. Leading edge research from young scholars in the field of security and defence studies will be showcased. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Keynote speaker is Hugh Segal, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Anyone with an interest in security and defence, national and international issues are welcome to attend. Mark the dates of 24 and 25 October in your calendar to attend a stimulating gathering of Canada's best military thinkers. For more information please read the symposium notice elsewhere in this publication.

ON TRACK readers will be pleased to know that General Paul D. Manson has been selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2003. General Manson is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career of service to Canada. The Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, has been invited to present the award on 21 November, at a mixed formal dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec.

The Conference of Defence Associations, in concert with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, is the sponsor of the Ross Munro Media Award. The award will be presented the same evening to a selected electronic or print journalist who has produced an exceptional article, series, or documentary relative to Canada's defence and security. I am gratified that the Grand Hall, for this prestigious event, is once again completely sold out.

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MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel Alain Pellerin (retraité), O.M.M., C.D.

Cet automne, l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense, en collaboration avec le Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's et le programme d'Études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada, animera le 6^e symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, au Collège militaire royal, à Kingston (Ontario). Le symposium met en valeur les travaux des étudiants en doctorat et en maîtrise des universités civiles et militaires. De jeunes universitaires y présenteront des travaux poussés dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. Le symposium a pour objectif de resserrer les liens entre les établissements d'enseignement civils et militaires. Hugh Segal, président de l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, sera conférencier d'honneur.

Est invitée à y participer toute personne qui s'intéresse aux questions de sécurité et de défense, ainsi qu'aux enjeux nationaux et internationaux. Réservez les dates du 24 et du 25 octobre et participez à une réunion enrichissante des meilleurs penseurs militaires au pays. Pour de plus amples renseignements, veuillez consulter l'annonce du symposium figurant dans la présente publication.

Les lecteurs d'*ON TRACK* seront heureux d'apprendre que le général Paul D. Manson a été sélectionné lauréat du prix Vimy 2003. Le général Manson est un Canadien éminent qui a fait preuve de normes de leadership des plus élevées tout au long de sa carrière au service du Canada. L'honorable John McCallum, ministre de la Défense nationale, a été invité à remettre le prix, lors d'un dîner officiel mixte qui aura lieu le 21 novembre, à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations à Gatineau (Québec).

La Conférence des associations de la défense, en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, parraine le Prix Média Ross Munro. Ce prix sera remis au cours de la même soirée, à un journaliste des médias électroniques ou imprimés qui a publié un article ou une série d'articles ou encore qui a réalisé un documentaire de qualité exceptionnelle sur la défense et la sécurité canadiennes. J'ai le plaisir de vous informer qu'une fois de plus, toutes les

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While many members of the defence community have examined the current state of the Canadian Forces and have considered the factors that have contributed to their present state, one of Canada's best known military historians, Dr. Jack

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive **ON TRACK** and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des assoc se est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront **ON TRACK** et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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places ont été vendues pour cette manifestation prestigieuse qui aura lieu à la Grande Galerie.

Bien des membres de la collectivité de la défense se sont penchés sur la situation actuelle des Forces canadiennes et ont examiné les facteurs qui sont responsables de cette situation; or, l'un des historiens militaires les plus connus au Canada, le docteur Jack Granatstein, offre à nos lecteurs un extrait de la conclusion de son ouvrage, intitulé *Who Killed the Canadian Military ?* Cette publication devrait être lancée lors du 20^e séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD, qui aura lieu le 26 février 2004, au Fairmont Château Laurier, à Ottawa. Marquez cette date sur vos calendriers pour ne pas manquer cette manifestation importante.

Le commandement de la zone d'opérations de Kaboul-Ouest a été transféré, le 21 août, du bataillon 152 des grenadiers de l'armée allemande au 3^e groupe-bataillon du Royal Canadian Regiment. On a déployé des patrouilles canadiennes dans les rues encombrées et

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Granatstein, provides our readers with an extract from the conclusion of his book, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* We anticipate that *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* will be launched at the CDA Institute's 20th Annual Seminar, 26 February, 2004, at the Fairmont Château Laurier, in Ottawa. Please keep this date in mind to attend this important event.

Command of the Kabul West area of operations was transferred to the Third Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion Group from Panzergrenadier Battalion 152 of the German Army on 21 August. Canadian patrols deployed into the bustling, dusty streets to ensure a seamless transition between the contingents. We are privileged to print, here, for our readers a patrol report that details the activities of a patrol under the command of Master Corporal Jeff Donaldson, of 'N' Company, 3 RCR, that starts out from Kabul at 0730 hrs. The membership of CDA and of the CDA Institute wish the members 3 RCR Battalion Group, and all of the CF personnel on duty in Operation Athena, well in the performance of their mission and a safe return to their families.

Security sector reform aims to ensure that those forces and jurisdictions that have responsibility for a country's security are run transparently, accountably, and successfully on behalf of those they are meant to serve. David Law, in *Security Sector Reform Comes to Canada*, analyses the concept of sector security reform, its history, and what it means since 9/11. Has Canada taken sufficient measures to address this requirement?

As Canada's participation in Operation Apollo winds down, and attention turns to the deepening commitment in Afghanistan, it is timely to reflect upon the navy's accomplishments in the national interest over the past two years in the War Against Terrorism. Our long-time contributor, Dr. Richard Gimblett, outlines for us the success that our Navy has achieved in the tasks that our sailors have undertaken in the War Against Terrorism, and their value to Canada, in *The Canadian navy in Operation Apollo - Some Reflections*.

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poussiéreuses de la ville pour assurer une transition sans accroc entre les deux contingents. Nous avons le privilège d'imprimer dans les présentes pages et à l'intention de nos lecteurs, un rapport de patrouille qui détaille les activités d'une patrouille commandée par le caporal-chef Jeff Donaldson, de la compagnie « N » du 3^e RCR, qui commencent à Kaboul à 7 h 30. Les membres de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD offrent leurs meilleurs vœux de succès dans leur mission aux membres du 3^e groupe-bataillon du RCR, et à tout le personnel en fonction de l'opération Athena, et leur souhaitent de revenir sains et saufs au sein de leur famille.

La réforme de la sécurité sectorielle vise à ce que les forces et compétences chargées de la sécurité d'un pays soient gérées de manière transparente, responsable et avec succès au nom de ceux et de celles qu'elles servent. Dans un article intitulé *Security Sector Reform Comes to Canada*, David Law analyse la notion de réforme de la sécurité sectorielle, son histoire et ce qu'elle signifie depuis les attaques du 11 septembre 2001. Le Canada a-t-il adopté suffisamment de mesures visant à combler ce besoin ?

La participation canadienne à l'opération Apollo tire à sa fin et l'attention se tourne maintenant vers les besoins sans cesse grandissants en Afghanistan; il sied donc de passer en revue les réalisations de la marine dans le domaine des intérêts nationaux au cours des deux dernières années, dans la cadre de la guerre contre le terrorisme. Notre collaborateur de longue date, le docteur Richard Gimblett, nous relate les exploits de la marine dans les tâches menées à bien dans la guerre contre le terrorisme, et leur valeur pour le Canada, dans son article intitulé *The Canadian navy in Operation Apollo - Some Reflections*.

Dans un monde idéal, le besoin de réexaminer les politiques de défense canadienne n'existerait pas. On a déjà écrit suffisamment de textes sur plusieurs secteurs à problème, de la situation du recrutement et du maintien des effectifs à l'état critique des pièces de rechange et de l'entretien des véhicules militaires. Christopher Ankersen explique pourquoi une évaluation de la situation de la défense au Canada est plus

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In an ideal world, there would be no need for another examination of Canadian defence policy. Enough words have already been written on several problem areas, from the state of recruiting and retention, to the critical nature of spare parts and maintenance of military vehicles. Christopher Ankersen writes why an appraisal of the state of Canadian defence is stronger now than ever before. In *Big Steps: The crisis is now* Christopher reviews the pressures that bear on the requirement for Canada to recognise that many countries of the world have been profoundly affected by the events of 9/11.

Our friend, Fred Fowlow, reminds us that the Right Honourable Lester Pearson discovered that influence only comes when supported and backed up by a viable military. He writes in *Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy An Appalling Display of Neglect* a critical review of the Government's management of national defence issues. Fred is the Director Maritime Affairs, Calgary Branch, the Naval Officers Association of Canada.

We believe that Canadians should write Members of Parliament and tell them their concerns for good governance for this country. On the matter of issues of national defence Colonel Gary Rice (Retd) has provided us with a thoughtful open letter to the Honourable Paul Martin. Gary's letter encourages Mr. Martin to take a closer interest in matters of national defence and the Canadian Forces in the event that he becomes the next Prime Minister.

Through the generosity of Mr. David Scott, CDA Vice-Chairman, we embarked on a new venture - that of reaching out to the public at an important venue to promote CDA and the CDA Institute. David donated to CDA his space in the Air Industries Association of British Columbia's kiosk at the Aerospace Congress and Exhibition (ACE) 2003, that was held in Montréal's Congress Centre, 9-11 September.

Over 300 exhibitors from around the world put up displays and demonstrations at the exhibition. The exhibition attracted thousands of visitors. Our Public Affairs Officer, Peter Forsberg, handed out *ON TRACK*, the CDA brochure, and a flyer promoting the Institute's 20th Annual Seminar, next February, to dozens of interested exhibitors and visitors to the exhibition. Considerable interest was shown in attending the forthcoming annual seminar. Leads will be followed up to determine the likelihood of corporate sponsorship of the Institute's activities. We hope to take advantage of venues, such as ACE, to inform a wider public of the importance of the work of CDA and of the Institute and of the importance of corporate as well as individual support of the Association.

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importante que jamais. Dans son article intitulé *Big Steps : The crisis is now*, M. Ankersen passe en revue les facteurs qui exigent que le Canada reconnaisse que bien des pays dans le monde ont été profondément touchés par les événements du 11 septembre.

Notre ami, Fred Fowlow, nous rappelle que le très honorable Lester Pearson avait réalisé que l'influence d'un pays ne se fait sentir que lorsqu'elle est appuyée par des forces militaires viables. Dans un article intitulé *Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy An Appalling Display of Neglect*, il présente un exposé critique de la gestion gouvernementale des enjeux de défense nationale. M. Fowlow est directeur des Affaires maritimes à la succursale de Calgary de l'Association des officiers de la marine du Canada.

Nous sommes d'avis que les Canadiens devraient envoyer à leur député fédéral une lettre dans laquelle ils expriment leurs inquiétudes au sujet de la bonne gouverne du pays. Sur le sujet de la défense nationale, le colonel Gary Rice (retraité) nous fournit une lettre ouverte bien pensée adressée à l'honorable Paul Martin. Advenant la situation où M. Martin deviendrait le prochain premier ministre fédéral, il encourage ce dernier à porter un intérêt particulier aux questions de défense nationale et des Forces canadiennes.

Grâce à la générosité de David Scott, vice-président de la CAD, nous avons entrepris un nouveau projet – la promotion de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD auprès du grand public lors d'une manifestation importante. M. Scott a fait don à la CAD de sa place au comptoir de l'association des industries aérospatiales de la Colombie-Britannique, dans le cadre du congrès et du salon de l'aérospatiale 2003 (ACE 2003), qui a eu lieu au Centre des congrès de Montréal, du 9 au 11 septembre.

Plus de 300 exposants venus des quatre coins du monde possédaient des stands et ont fait des démonstrations dans le cadre de ce salon qui a attiré des milliers de visiteurs. Notre agent des affaires publiques, Peter Forsberg, a distribué *ON*

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In closing I wish to thank our members for their financial support for the work of CDA and the CDA Institute. When we tell a donor that CDAI needs money, this is not asking, but saying that the military community has demonstrated a need for support for their families or that Canadian society wants and needs a safe and secure country; that providing it is one of the tasks of the military; that the donor can help accomplish that peace and security with financial support.

Over the past year it is gratifying to note that our supporters have increased their donations to the Institute. You can see who they are by reading their names in the door recognition boxes on the front pages of *ON TRACK*. To our donors: **THANK-YOU**. We still have a way to go, however, to weave the **Voice of Defence** into the Canadian conscience and to encourage more Canadians to express their concern for the risk to the security of this nation to which government inaction has exposed our country.

TRACK, le dépliant de la CAD, et des prospectus annonçant le 20^e séminaire annuel de l'Institut, qui aura lieu en février prochain, à des douzaines d'exposants et de visiteurs du salon. Bien des personnes se sont dites intéressées à participer au prochain séminaire annuel. On fera le suivi des contacts qui ont été faits pour établir la possibilité de faire commanditer des activités de l'Institut par des entreprises. Nous espérons tirer profit de manifestations, telles que celles d'ACE 2003, pour renseigner le grand public sur l'importance des travaux de la CAD et de l'Institut, et sur celle de l'appui commercial et individuel des activités de la CAD.

En conclusion, je tiens à remercier nos membres de leur appui financier des travaux de la CAD et de l'ICAD. Lorsque nous expliquons à un donateur que l'ICAD a besoin d'argent, nous ne demandons pas; nous expliquons que la collectivité militaire a exprimé le besoin que l'on appuie leurs familles ou bien que la société canadienne a besoin de vivre dans un pays sûr; cette tâche incombe aux forces armées et le donateur, grâce à son appui financier, contribuera à la paix et à la sécurité.

Au cours des 12 derniers mois, nous avons eu le plaisir de constater que nos sympathisants ont accru leurs dons à l'Institut. Vous lirez leurs noms dans les fenêtres de reconnaissance aux premières pages du magazine. À nos donateurs, un grand MERCI. Cependant, nous avons encore bien du chemin à faire pour intégrer la **Voix de la défense** à la conscience canadienne et pour encourager davantage de Canadiens à exprimer leurs inquiétudes à l'égard des risques que l'inaction gouvernementale fait courir à la sécurité de la nation.

WHO KILLED THE CANADIAN MILITARY?

Dr. J.L. Granatstein, Military Historian, Canadian Author

Who killed the Canadian military? Our politicians must take the lion's share of the credit for dismantling Canada's armed forces over the last forty years. In truth, it made little difference who was in power. The Liberals and Conservatives never cared much for the armed forces, although at times they pretended interest, and the New Democrats were always unredeemably hostile to military spending. Neither did it make much difference whether the Prime Minister was French- or English-speaking or from Quebec, Ontario, or Alberta. The military was low on the priority list for all.

Some of our generals and admirals also did their part in killing the CF through bad judgement. Some were incompetent, venal trimmers who rose through low cunning more than high military skills. They were not the great majority of our senior commanders, however. Nor were junior officers and non-

commissioned members of the CF all as brutal or corrupt as the media sometimes painted them. Ninety-nine of every hundred were in the CF because they loved the comradeship and believed they were serving their country. Some of the killers of the CF wore uniforms, to be sure, but even they do not deserve the all the blame that has sometimes been placed on them by the press and their political masters. The politicians were far more important in destroying the Canadian Forces, and they had very effective allies.

At root, the real killers of the Canadian Forces were you, the Canadian people. The military scarcely interested us, and we ordinarily paid it no attention. We assumed that we were safe, our territory inviolable, and we believed ultimately that the

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Americans would protect us. So you and I elected our dreary politicians, and in opinion polls we told them that we wanted health care, culture, better pensions, and a thousand other programmes from the government. These were and are all good things, and we need them. But Canada is a rich country and we could have had a strong military **and** the social services we want. Who killed the Canadian military? We, the Canadian people, did.

By our disinterest in the Canadian Forces, by our unwillingness to demand that troops despatched overseas have everything they need to protect themselves and to operate effectively, Canadians colluded with their leaders and governments that sought cheap popularity by being a chore boy for the United Nations and refusing to cooperate fully with our friends. The media focussed on petty military scandals rather than on the gross disgrace of governments failing to equip and train our service personnel properly. As a result, we Canadians failed to demand that our soldiers, sailors and airmen get the modern equipment they need—to fight and win, to train realistically,

to be able to operate effectively on their own and in cooperation with our friends and allies.

A military exists to fight wars and ultimately to protect the national interests. Instead, Canadians somehow came to think of the CF as the embodiment of their values, as social workers abroad. By letting our governments put women into combat units and lowering training standards to accommodate them, by accepting the idea that there could be quotas for visible minorities in the military, Canadians let their values run far ahead of their reason. The kinder, gentler killing machine—the “not Americans”—that was our Canadian Forces. Canadians and their successive governments, Liberal and Conservative, turned the CF into a bad joke that will take a decade and tens of billions of dollars to set right. Who killed the Canadian military? We did.

(This is an extract from the conclusion of J.L. Granatstein’s *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* to be published in late February 2004 by Harper Collins Publishers of Toronto.)

PATROLLING WEST KABUL

Master Corporal Jeff Donaldson, ‘N’ Company, Third Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment

It is only 7:30 a.m. in Kabul, but the sun is already beating down on the small patrol of 3 RCR soldiers preparing for the day’s mission. Troops are scurrying around their Iltis vehicles, some conducting radio checks, others filling water bottles – all while the drivers perform their last checks under the hood.

“Everyone on me for orders,” barks Master Corporal Jeff Donaldson, the patrol commander.

“Today we’re gonna link up with the police in this district,” he says, jabbing at a map of West Kabul with his finger. “We’ve got reports that small groups of Taliban or al-Qaida may be moving towards Kabul along several routes in the area.”

He goes on to give precise instructions on the route, along with actions the patrol will take in the event of an ambush.

“Once we’re done checking out the area and looking for some possible observation posts we’ll pay a visit to the police back in town,” says Master Corporal Donaldson. “That should get us back here around lunch.”

The troops scramble into their vehicles and head towards the main gate of Camp Julien. Master Corporal Donaldson signs out the patrol and picks up the interpreter while the remainder load their weapons. After a few minutes, the patrol is leaving the sanctity of their fortress-like camp for the wild streets of Kabul.

The activity on the main route leading through the southwest side of the city is frenzied. Cars weave through the crowds of people, horns blaring. Equally brazen, an armada of cyclists fearlessly forces their way through the chaotic traffic.

Even after almost three weeks in theatre, the Canadian troops still gawk in amazement at the sights as they make their way through the market area. Just inches off either side of the road, hundreds of vendors flog their rudimentary goods from shanty-like structures. Some display local fruits, vegetables or tin pots, while others hock pirated DVDs and rusty auto parts. Animal carcasses hang from wooden tripods in semi-enclosed shacks; shielded from the sun – but not the heat and flies.

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The thousands of Afghans that have flooded the area seem to relish the buzz of activity, oblivious to the stench of raw sewage running down the street. Many citizens give the Canadians the ‘thumbs-up’ sign as they speed by. Children run excitedly alongside the Iltis vehicles yelling “howareyou, howareyou?” Members of the patrol are constantly scanning the crowd and surrounding buildings for signs of danger, but still have time for the occasional wave and friendly smile.

The need for vigilance while outside the main gate has been drilled into every member of the contingent. “We watch the high ground, windows, roofs, and check alley ways,” explains

across the wastelands of Afghanistan, searching for vegetation and water in a dry, barren land. Landmines in the area are well hidden, but the soldiers know they are present due to the inordinate number of wandering goats and children that are missing limbs. The Iltis drivers are very careful to keep their vehicles moving along the same tracks that have been made by others in the recent past.

“The town coming up we refer to as *Tusken-Raiderville*,” says Corporal Marc Belanger, pointing to some sandy ruins in the distance. “It looks exactly like where the Sand People from Star Wars live.”



On Patrol in West Kabul

Private Bradley Carson. “Anything that seems out of the ordinary.”

Soon the sights, sounds and smells of Kabul are left behind and the patrol is headed west towards their intended destination. The few trees and gardens that dot the city landscape have been replaced by jagged rocks, bleak mountains and endless powder-like sand. The sole signs of civilization are the few tents that dot the desolate landscape. These belong to nomadic Afghans whose lifestyle has not changed significantly in the last 500 years. They follow their herds

Virtually every structure in the primordial village is constructed of mud-bricks made from the limitless supply of powdery sand. The driving winds and scalding sun have eroded the many walls and structures of the community giving it a prehistoric feeling, even though many of the buildings are only a few years old.

The patrol stops at a group of buildings about a kilometre outside of town. A group of armed men quickly appear from

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a small cluster of buildings. “This is the sub-unit police headquarters,” explains Master Corporal Donaldson. “Three of us will go in and talk to them, the rest of you keep your eyes open out here.”

The master corporal grabs his patrol second-in-command and interpreter and follows the police down a stinking alley and into a small courtyard. The courtyard is tidy, even upscale in comparison to the putrid alley the soldiers have just traveled. The group is ushered into a lavish office that looks as if it is only used for important guests. The desk is empty except for a pen set and a vase of plastic roses encased in a plastic bag. Every available seat is taken in the small room – the police chief has brought in five of his closest underlings.

Tea and fruit are ordered, and the meeting begins – with 15 minutes of small talk, smoking, and frequent cell-phone interruptions. Master Corporal Donaldson keeps his cool through the delays, and ever so slowly begins to probe for information. Using the interpreter, but never taking his eyes off the chief, he asks several casual yet pointed questions. After another ten minutes, he drops the one big question on his mind.

“Have you seen any unusual activity in your district lately?” asks the patrol commander, his voice calm and collected. “Anything at all that concerns you at all?”

The chief takes a long drag on his cigarette, staring at one of the tacky portraits hanging crooked on the wall.

“Taliban are moving in from the West,” he says after a long pause. “They organize small gatherings – only a few people are involved. We don’t know who they are... we can’t punish everyone,” he says, his tone somewhat resigned and embarrassed.

Master Corporal Donaldson quickly reassures the men that they have handled the situation well and that the International Security Assistance Force is here to assist them. Tea arrives on a tarnished silver tray, and large bowls filled with a strange white melon are quietly brought into the room.

The discussion continues, and the Canadians complement their hosts on the sweet taste of the fruit. Privately they all wonder what effect it will have on their digestive tracts. More details are gleaned regarding the suspected Taliban incursions, and the police agree to accompany the Canadians on a patrol of the nearby town.

As the three soldiers and police head back to the rest of the section, they notice that the vehicles are surrounded by about

30 children. The kids are excitedly gawking at the vehicles and the strange uniformed Westerners who travel in them. Most stay a few feet away from the strangers, but the bravest of the bunch come in for a closer look. Most soldiers politely smile and then ignore the kids, knowing that staying alert is critical. When a young girl opens her backpack to show her drawings from school however, one patrol member can’t help but kneel down and take a quick look.

Soon the patrol is mounted up and following the police vehicle ~~into~~ *Tusken-Raider-ville*. More children line the mud-brick walls and wave as the Iltis jeeps weave their way up the narrow path leading into the centre of town. Tattered green banners flap softly in the breeze marking the burial grounds of martyrs from battles gone by. The patrol pulls into the centre of town and parks in a loose-box formation.

Master Corporal Donaldson selects a team of soldiers to patrol the western outskirts of the town on foot. The remainder secure the vehicles and maintain radio connections with the main camp. The patrol commander allows the local police to lead the way up the dusty track leading out of town, a prudent thing to do in one of the most heavily mined countries in the world.

*...the patrol members remain sharp, scanning
their arcs-of-fire...*

The soldiers march in the 45°C heat carrying weapons, ammunition, and flack vests fitted with heavy ballistic plates. Despite the temperature and 30 kilogram load, the patrol members remain sharp, scanning their arcs-of-fire as they plot steadily uphill. After a few kilometres the patrol reaches a vantage point that offers a fantastic view westward, right up to the mountains.

The patrol members and police converse and quickly conclude that the spot would make an excellent observation post from which to observe infiltrators attempting to move into town. The position is marked using a GPS, and the patrol starts back towards their comrades in town.

Before returning to Camp Julian, the section will conduct a further two hours of operations. They will patrol through another nearby suburb of Kabul, visit a school, and link up with additional police officials.

After half a day in the searing Kabul sun, the troops finally head for home. They’ve missed lunch, but have gained valuable information that will contribute to the 3 RCR Battalion Group’s mission: to assist in maintaining security and stability in the Afghan capital.

Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court addresses Canadian Intelligence and Security Association

Earlier this year, the Honourable Barry Strayer, Q.C., spoke at a Canadian Intelligence and Security Association-sponsored meeting in Ottawa. The meeting was attended by 27 members of CISA, the Judge Advocate General's Branch, and the Civil Liberties Association of the National Capital Region.

The Honourable Mr. Strayer spoke on the Court Martial Appeal Board. The Board was established in 1950 to hear appeals from military courts martial. In 1959, that Board was replaced by the Court Martial Appeal Court, which further civilianised the appeal process. It was then composed of federal or provincial superior court judges. In 1991 amendments to the National Defence Act altered the jurisdiction of the Court, and made it more analogous to civilian criminal appeal courts. Either a service person or the Minister of National Defence may appeal the legality of a finding or of any sentence. The Minister or another individual has the right

to appeal the Court's ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada on questions of law if one of the three judges hearing the case dissented on the decision or if the decision was unanimous and the Court Martial Appeal Court gives leave to appeal.

The Honourable Barry Strayer graduated from the University of Saskatchewan in 1959. After four years in the Saskatchewan Department of Justice, he became a professor of law at the University of Saskatchewan, serving there until 1968, when he moved to Ottawa as Director of the Constitutional Law Division of the Privy Council Office. He was appointed as Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice in 1974, and became its leading representative in the patriation of the Canadian Constitution. The Honourable Mr. Strayer was instrumental in drafting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He was appointed a Justice of the Federal Court and a member of the Court Martial Appeal Court in 1983. He became Chief Justice of the latter Court in 1994.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM COMES TO CANADA

David M. Law

Security sector reform aims to ensure that those forces and jurisdictions that have responsibility for a country's security are run transparently, accountably and successfully on behalf of those they are meant to serve. In meeting this challenge, a

country's security sector actors face four overarching challenges. First, they must be adequately resourced and efficiently run. Second, they have to be able to work in synergy with other jurisdictions within the national theatre. Third, they should be able to interface effectively with similar organizations within the burgeoning array of security issue areas necessitating regional and international cooperation. And fourth, they need to be monitored and overseen by governmental and civil society institutions that are themselves both viable and engaged.

The concept has grown out of the realization that the security sector is of crucial importance for a country's overall development and prosperity. An over-consumptive security sector can divert resources from areas that are essential for national development; an under-resourced security sector can invite subjugation by foreign powers; a security sector that is not subject to democratic oversight and control can drag a country into military adventurism. Examples of such security pathologies abound. The Soviet Union had a security sector problem as does its Russian successor state; the Congo clearly has one as well; so has Myanmar as does Iraq – just to name a few among the very many.

(continued p. 10)

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Historically, interest in security sector reform originated with western concerns about the growth and stability prospects of developing countries, in particular as the post-Cold War world took shape in the early 1990s. Later the same decade, this interest was extended to the situation in post-communist transition countries, where it had become clear that security sector dysfunctionality threatened to delay or even derail the process of reform, and that the hitherto prevailing focus on civil-military relations and defence reform lacked the necessary comprehensiveness. This was a problem of particular concern in those countries whose first post-communist decade was marred by ethnic strife and national conflict. The next progression came with the events of 11 September 2001.

9/11 has made clear that the developed democracies have to move beyond the often piecemeal adjustments that they made to their security sectors in the 1990s

The terrorist attacks on the United States have affected countries world over, even as perceptions of vulnerability to the triple threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, outlaw states and strategic terrorism have varied greatly. But whatever its impact on individual countries, 9/11 has made clear that the developed democracies have to move beyond the often piecemeal adjustments that they made to their security sectors in the 1990s and carry out much more fundamental changes.

Security sector reform is therefore an extremely broad concept. It encompasses developing countries, transition states and consolidated democracies - each group with its own specificities and challenges. It extends to countries whose security circumstances have been additionally complicated by the experience of inter- and intra-conflict or their new or re-constitution as national states – oftentimes, groupings that have tragically overlapped.

As a concept, the security sector and its reform are relatively new to Canada, notwithstanding the fact that the country has long been involved in activities in this area. Prior to 9/11, the bulk of Canada's security sector reform efforts were directed outwards, at other countries' problems or at issues that were felt to have only an indirect impact on Canada. Not a superpower, not identified with American policies towards the Middle East, not a frontline target of Al-Queda, Canada has not felt itself to be directly under threat.

Still, in view of its enormous economic interdependence with the United States, its common border (until 9/11, for the most part unprotected) and its reliance on the United States in security matters, it is difficult to understate the overall impact of 9/11 on Canada.

9/11 has turned several core assumptions long entertained by Canada on their head. North America has been shown to no longer be a fire-proof house, a seeming sanctuary from direct attack from abroad. With the United States on a war footing, security concerns have displaced economic interdependence as the principal vector of bilateral relations, and US patience with what it sees to be the sometimes idiosyncratic foreign policies of allies like Canada has considerably waned.

The new doctrine of preventive defence embraced by the United States is an uncomfortable one for Canada in view of its traditional approach to international law and the UN Charter. In the wake of 9/11, the United States has set about the largest reorganization of its security infrastructure since 1947; Canada needs to readjust accordingly. The US campaign against terrorism has furthermore confronted Canada with difficult deployment choices that have highlighted its military weakness to an unprecedented degree.

Non-participation in the campaign against Al-Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan would have constituted a politically intolerable lack of solidarity, while participation threatens to stretch the already overextended Canadian Forces to the breaking point. The enormous American military build-up that has followed 9/11 has drawn further attention to Canada's military shortcomings. Finally, the crisis of multilateralism that ensued after America took its case before the UN Security Council and NATO has significantly weakened a fundamental pillar of Canadian foreign policy.

Against this background, Canada has adopted several initiatives designed to bolster its security preparedness and to enhance its credibility south of the border. New resources have been made available for intelligence and public safety initiatives of various kinds. The long-starved Canadian Forces have also received funding increases after decades of cuts.

On the organizational front, Canada has made a high-profile Minister responsible for coordination with the US Homeland Security Czar and appointed him chair of a Ad Hoc Committee on Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism, the closest thing that Canada has to the United States' Department for Homeland Security. With the US, a bilateral planning group has been created to address crisis scenarios in North America. A "Smart Border Initiative" has been launched to ensure the unimpeded flow of goods, services and people across the Can-Am border.

A Public Safety Act has been passed that should improve security measures in the air and at air- and seaports, as has an Anti-Terrorism Law that enhances the government's ability to deal with the activities of terrorist groups on Canadian soil.

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In addition, there is a new Immigration Bill, designed to counteract abuses of Canada's visa and asylum regimes by criminal and terrorist elements. Alongside these changes in domestic law, Canada has been involved in a bewildering array of anti-terrorist initiatives on the part of the international institutions to which it belongs. In addition to its support, albeit selective, for the US military campaign against terror, Ottawa has also announced that it is prepared to begin talks with Washington about Canadian participation in Ballistic Missile Defence, thus abandoning its reluctance of long date.

It is too soon to attempt a full assessment of these initiatives. Almost two years post-9/11, however, the impression one has is that Canada's response has been sorely insufficient, more motivated by appearing to do enough to placate American concerns about Canada's reliability as an ally and a source of potential security problems for the US, than by doing what is necessary to protect Canada from the very real direct and indirect threats that could come its way.

the Canadian security sector still faces serious resources shortfalls.

Despite new funding, the Canadian security sector still faces serious resources shortfalls. With resources only restored to the pre-cut levels of a decade ago, the situation facing the Canadian Forces is particularly alarming. Moreover, Canada lacks a unified conceptual framework for orienting its security policy. The Department of National Defence has its White Paper; the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has its Foreign Policy Review; the Solicitor General (roughly Canada's Department of Home Affairs) has its Anti-Terrorism Plan. Yet there is no overall concept and much of what does exist is mired in the strategic realities of the early post-Cold War period. It is difficult not to conclude that Canada needs a National Security Doctrine of its own.

Similarly, responsibility for Canadian security remains splintered among several actors. The Privy Council Office plays its traditional coordinating role among the various ministries of the government; the Solicitor General's office holds prime responsibility for dealing with emergencies on Canadian soil; the Department of National Defence oversees the newly (but pre-9/11) created Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Planning; the Finance Minister is the key interlocutor of US Homeland Security Czar Tom Ridge but is also responsible for bringing down the budget, acts as the governing Liberal Party's chief minister for Ontario (Canada's most populous province) and on top of that has been a candidate in the Liberal leadership race through most of 2003.

Who calls the shots if a dirty bomb hits a Canadian city, or if US interests on Canadian soil come under terrorist attack, an increasingly likely prospect in view of the ongoing US effort to reinforce its homeland defences? All this suggests that the country needs a National Security Council with a mandate not only to react to contingencies but also to anticipate and prepare for them.

This is important since most of what Canada has done to address post-9/11 concerns has been in the realm of preventing possible contingencies as opposed to addressing in a timely and effective manner, those that might actually occur. Canada has elaborate schemes for responding to natural and manmade catastrophes that foresee enlisting the support of the Canadian military if and when the civil authority can no longer cope. These procedures are ill suited, however, to contingencies that arise and peak rapidly, such as those of the 9/11 variety.

A further difficulty stems from the fact that new legislation passed since 9/11 has led to an increase in the government's right to collect information on its citizens and an expansion of its mandate to take action against groups that it considers to be aiding and abetting terrorism, a trend witnessed in many other countries. However necessary, such practices need to be flanked by measures designed to reassure the public that the government will not abuse its powers. Similarly, there has been a considerable expansion of bureaucratic interface between the American and Canadian civil services, without any concomitant effort to ensure the necessary parliamentary oversight and direction – already a serious problem prior to 9/11.

There is a pressing need for a bi-national commission of parliamentarians and congressmen with enough teeth to focus attention on the common challenges at hand. The issues are too important to be left to the Prime Minister, the Ottawa bureaucracy and the Washington Embassy. The Canadian parliament and public need to become much more engaged.

Notwithstanding foot-dragging in Ottawa, post 9/11 Canada has no choice but to make fundamental changes in the way it perceives its security, organizes the appropriate resources, works with security jurisdictions beyond its borders, and ensures democratic oversight. Canada's unique relationship with the United States may make this task somewhat more urgent than is the case elsewhere, but no less important for national well being and prosperity.

THE VIMY AWARD WINNER

The Vimy Award is presented annually to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values. The Vimy Award Selection Committee has selected General Paul D. Manson, O.C., C.M.M., C.D., as this year's recipient of the award.



The Vimy Award/La Distinction honorifique Vimy

General Manson is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career of service to Canada. The Vimy Award will be presented at a formal reception and dinner to be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec, on Friday, 21 November, 2003, beginning at 6:00 PM.

LE RÉCIPiendaIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

La Distinction honorifique Vimy est présentée chaque année à un canadien ou à une canadienne ayant fait une contribution exceptionnelle à la sécurité du Canada et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le comité de sélection du Récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy a, cette année, choisi le général Paul D. Manson, O.C., C.M.M., C.D., comme récipiendaire de la distinction Vimy.

Le général Manson est un canadien distingué qui a démontré les standards les plus élevés de leadership au cours d'une carrière consacrée au service du Canada. La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera remise vendredi le 21 novembre 2003, lors d'un dîner gala mixte dans la Grande Galerie, au Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau, Québec, débutant à 18h00.

THE CANADIAN NAVY IN OPERATION APOLLO - SOME REFLECTIONS

Dr. Richard Gimblett, C.D. PhD

As Canada's participation in Operation Apollo winds down, and attention turns to the deepening commitment in Afghanistan, it is timely to reflect upon the Navy's accomplishments in the national interest over the past two years in the War Against Terrorism.

Attention to date has focused upon the practical achievements of our Navy. With a contribution typically constituting less than twenty percent of Coalition naval resources, Canadian sailors have accomplished some fifty percent of the measurable achievement: on the second anniversary of the September 11th attacks, it stood at exactly 565 of 1300 Coalition boardings, an average of nearly two a day for the duration of the operation. Sustainment of this effort has required the deployment of practically the entire major surface fleet: fifteen of seventeen destroyers and frigates, and both supply ships; and nearly every one of the 4200 sailors of all ranks and trades in sea-going billets. The Canadian Navy effectively has been operating at wartime mobilization for the last two years.

But the real success has been Canadian command of a significant element of the multinational Coalition Against Terrorism. When the US turned to the problem of Iraq and recognized the need for a clear distinction between the two efforts – that is, the War Against Terrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom), and the War Against Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) – the commander of NAVCENT was quite specific in his desire that Enduring Freedom continue to be led by the Canadians he could rely upon to “guard the back door”. Command of Task Force 151 remains the only operational-level command exercised by a senior Canadian officer in an active theatre since the Second World War. It is a singular national achievement that we have lost sight of in the false debate over participation in the war against Iraq.

How that command came about holds important lessons for consideration in the eventual transformation of the Canadian Forces. When defence planners in NDHQ searched for a Canadian military response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, they quickly appreciated that the only force immediately capable of taking the fight to the enemy was the Navy. The Air Force's CF-18s were completely committed to supporting NORAD's Operation Noble Eagle flying Combat Air Patrols against further attacks, and the Army was preoccupied with the similar homeland defence requirements of critical infrastructure protection. The potential for emerging maritime terrorist threats was considered low, while the extent of Canada's offshore estate demands our possession of a Navy with oceanic reach: the fleet was available and appropriate to tasking in far distant waters. On Thanksgiving Sunday, 2001,

Prime Minister Chretien gave the Navy the nod.

A short ten days later, a complete task group, comprising the destroyer *Iroquois*, the frigate *Charlottetown*, and the tanker *Protecteur*, each with an embarked Sea King helicopter, sailed from Halifax harbour. This was a remarkable feat, considering the CF standard for deploying a Main Contingency Force is three months. The Vanguard standard is 21 days – and the navy accomplished that within 24 hours of the Prime Minister's order, with the re-tasking of HMCS *Halifax* from duties with NATO's Standing Naval Force.

Proving the adaptability of modern naval forces, she proceeded directly from a port visit in Spain, without needing to return to Halifax for re-configuring. She ‘chopped’ to NAVCENT control on 24 October 2001, becoming the first CF unit to participate in the War Against Terrorism. *Halifax* operated with US Navy forces already in-theatre until more Canadian warships could arrive, performing a variety of fleetwork tasks, ranging from close escort of High Value Units through the Strait of Hormuz, to working to establish the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) throughout the region. This included not only the search for Al-Qaeda, but also significant observations on Indo-Pakistani air and submarine movements.

Although the faraway Arabian Sea region should not be a natural operating area for the Canadian Navy, it has been for most of the past decade. Since the last Gulf War of 1991, a single frigate regularly has been integrated with a USN carrier battle group to enforce UN sanctions against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Navy's decision to despatch an entire task group for Op Apollo was remarkably prescient in breaking that pattern.

While by definition the precise composition of any task group is dependant upon the mission, the Canadian Naval Task Group ideally is constituted of a trinity of critical elements (corresponding roughly to ship-class capabilities as follows): command and control (as presently epitomized in the DDG-280 class of destroyers); operational depth (frigates, submarines and attached aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing); and integral sustainment (an operational support ship). Brought together, the result is greater than the sum of their individual parts: it is the ability to deploy a visibly Canadian force capable of independent and militarily useful operations.

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The payoff for the effort to despatch a full task group this time came almost immediately. Only a day after arrival in the Arabian Sea off Pakistan, in mid-November the commodore commanding the Canadian Task Group was appointed to the role of ‘Amphibious Support Force Defence Commander’ – assigned responsibility for protection of the US Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) gathering for operations against Afghanistan.

When it is considered that the task was assumed having just completed a month-long, independent 8000-mile passage, without any ‘acclimatizing’ period, it is an impressive testament to the readiness and adaptability of Canadian naval forces. And they had arrived at just the right moment, with just the right forces, as the Marines began to move ashore. The Canadian Task Group maintained this vital protection role for the next three months, with all of the ships spending most of that time continuously at sea. The mission ended only with the departure of the ARGs when the Marines turned over to the US Army (and coincidentally as the Canadian Army arrived to assist in Kandahar).

Iroquois coordinated the actions of a French warship and two Americans to intercept a flotilla of seventeen small boats smuggling several hundred people

Through that time, other Coalition forces were attached to Canadian command as their anti-terror role evolved and expanded. The first major Leadership Interdiction Operation (LIO) to search suspicious vessels for escaping Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists was conducted on 24-25 November, when *Iroquois* coordinated the actions of a French warship and two Americans to intercept a flotilla of seventeen small boats smuggling several hundred people from Iran to Oman. They were assessed to be economic refugees, but the simple establishment of ‘presence’ and making local mariners aware of the scope of the Coalition effort was immensely important. Within a matter of months, NAVCENT was able to determine that strict maintenance of this rigorous inspection regime had for all practical purposes closed the at-sea escape route.

Canadian naval participation was essential to the success of the leadership interdiction operation on several levels. To begin, there was the simple volume of activity (described earlier as some fifty percent of the effort). More important was the fact that Canadian command of the Coalition force was critical to its success.

No other navy could have performed this role as effectively, for several reasons. First, the US Navy was rather limited in its own operational depth at the level of frigates to perform the myriad fleetwork tasks of the War Against Terrorism – facing its own ‘peace dividend’ cutbacks in the early 1990s,

the USN had concentrated on the ‘sharp-end’ capabilities of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and a new generation of *Aegis* air defence destroyers. In this way, the integration of Canadian frigates into deployed American carrier battle groups through the latter 1990s worked to the Americans’ advantage as well as Canada’s. Second, there was the basic issue of communications interoperability, which existed at a closer level for the Canadians than any other allied navy, primarily because the US Congress has placed severe ‘NOFORN’ (no foreign) limitations on the releasability of classified information, equipment and codes – limitations that are relaxed in the case of Canada for the common defence of North America.

Finally, there was the simple matter of *realpolitik* that few of the Coalition partners – which at various times included French, British, Dutch, Italian, Greek, Australian, Japanese and New Zealand forces (the list comprised 21 nations in total) – could have worked comfortably under the direct command of any of the others. Canada, however, could take the lead, being a member of an array of multinational organizations including virtually all of these other nations, and having never really been in a competitive power relationship with any other country.

To be sure, some other navy could have exercised command of the Arabian Sea multinational task group, and would have had to, if Canada had responded to the events of September 11 with just another frigate deployment. But any other navy would not have been as effective, for all the reasons given above. Indeed, another multinational task group has been operating in the Horn of Africa area under the rotating command of Western European Union (WEU) navies. That area, however, does not demand the close airspace and waterspace coordination with several American carrier battle groups, and for a variety of reasons that group has not been as effective in closing off the traffic of escaping Al-Qaeda leadership (mostly because their Rules of Engagement are less robust than Canada’s). Still, the point must be emphasized that the integration of Canadian frigates into carrier battle groups had reached a level of marginal utility.

An invaluable tool for the fleetwork of the UN MIO against Iraq, without an area air defence weapon and with a minimal submarine threat, the frigates were of little use to a CVBG. Nor are they truly effective flagships. What gave the Canadian task group commander an operational edge upon arrival in the theatre of operations in the fall of 2001 was the trinity of capabilities described earlier: command and control, operational depth for area defence and fleetwork, and integral sustainment.

(continued p. 15)

For the Navy, Operation Apollo has been a substantial achievement. It has confirmed the transformation of the ‘rust bucket fleet’ of the late 1980s into the world class navy of today – one that has been able to sustain the deployment of a task group to foreign waters for nearly two years, the largest operational commitment since the Korean war, culminating in Canadian command of an allied naval task force.

For the Canadian Forces, it has produced an unanticipated success. The political controversy surrounding the Army’s off-again on-again role in Afghanistan has distracted attention from the fact that the CF has assisted materially in putting the squeeze on Al-Qaeda: if the Kabul battle group is facing a resurgent Al-Qaeda, it is in part because the Canadian Navy sealed off the terrorists’ escape route at sea. This demonstrates the immense utility of a multi-pronged strategy. For a military concerned with demonstrations of ‘jointness’, too bad this wasn’t planned. It’s still not too late to recognize it.

Finally, for the nation, it also has been a success, even if similarly qualified. It truly is a pity that our government has failed to take better diplomatic advantage of this hard-earned

military capital. The naval effort in Operation Apollo epitomizes those typically Canadian values of internationalism and coalition building – what other ‘helpful-fixer’ could have kept the original ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in the War Against Terrorism together as a broadly-based and effective consortium, allowing USN and French Navy ships to work together in the same formation throughout the Iraq crisis?

As a change of government leadership looms, and with it hopefully the long-promised defence policy review, it is important to bear in mind the lessons of Operation Apollo. Modern combat capable naval forces with global reach provide the Canadian government with a nearly-immediately deployable option in a crisis management situation. That they are interoperable with USN forces gives us unique access to operational-level decision-making. But ensuring Canadian command – and hence independent Canadian say over employment – can best be achieved through continued adherence to the task group concept in all three of its constituent elements: command and control, operational depth, and integral sustainment. If ever any proof was required, it has been provided by the Navy’s contribution to Operation Apollo.

A Question of Honour

Recently the National Office staff attended the screening of the first episode of the Gemini-nominated series, *A Question of Honour*. The screening was hosted by Robert Roy, Head of Research and Producer of *A Question of Honour*, and Roy Rempel, author of “The Chatterbox”.

A Question of Honour is a five-part documentary series recently nominated for two Gemini Awards. The documentary examines the state of our national defence and the role of Parliament as part of the *underground royal commission* report. *A Question of Honour* examines the external relations of Canada through its foreign and defence policies.

The first episode that was screened introduced the frontline stories of Canadian soldiers deployed on “peacekeeping duty” in the Balkans in the 1990’s. A question and comment period, chaired by Roy Rempel, followed the screening. This is a very compelling cinematic work that portrays the conditions under which Canadian Forces members served, as told by the soldiers themselves. For many citizens, this series will be a shocker. If you have an opportunity to watch this documentary, please do so. If you have seen *A Question of Honour*, do not hesitate to recommend it to others to view.

The underground royal commission (theurc.com) is an ongoing inquiry into the nature of our country’s governing institutions and the relationship we, as citizens, have with those institutions.

BIG STEPS: THE CRISIS IS NOW

Christopher Ankersen

“From knowledge to competence is a big step; from ignorance to competence, a bigger one still.” von Seeckt

In an ideal world, there would be no need for another examination of Canadian defence policy. Enough words have already been written highlighting the urgent plight of the Canadian Forces. The Auditor General has written on several problem areas, from the state of recruiting and retention, to the critical nature of spare parts and maintenance of military vehicles. The House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has repeatedly commented on the dire state of the quality of life within the CF and the negative effect that a frenetic pace of operational tasks can cause. Senior military commanders, such as the chiefs of the Navy and the Army, as well as the Chief of Defence Staff, have issued plaintive calls for help. Most recently, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* has warned about the “irreversible damage” done to the CF, through years of “placing future capabilities at risk to meet current commitments”.

Think tanks and other interested parties have added their voices to the growing cacophony. The Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century report “To Secure A Nation”, a series of articles from Institute for Research in Public Policy, several reports from the Conference of Defence Associations, all demonstrate the pressing requirement to fix what is broken within the Canadian Forces. Hundreds of thousands of words on thousands of pages, making a stack of over 50 centimetres, weighing in at over 10 kilograms. However you measure it, there should be sufficient evidence out there to forestall the writing of any more ‘serious examinations’ of the state of Canadian defence.

the need for appraisal and recommendation is stronger now than ever before.

Sadly, despite this evidence, the need for appraisal and recommendation is stronger now than ever before. Why?

- ***The previous calls for help have gone unheeded.*** Help has come, but it is not enough to offset the years of neglect, or to address the increased demand for deployments. The so-called ‘capability-commitment gap’ has not been closed, despite declarations to the contrary. As a result, Canada faces the real possibility of having no credible defence capability; we will

either need to withdraw our forces from the world so that they can recover from the punishing treatment they have endured over the past decade, or they will literally fall apart. Either way, we will have no way to contribute to the many situations that cry out for our attention. The detail behind the extent of the capability shortfall is evident in the decrepitude of capital investment, the shambles of human resource management, and the chaos of command, control and intelligence.

- ***The world remains a dangerous place.*** The nature of the international security environment, made visible not only by the events of September 11th, 2001, but reinforced in Bali, in Casablanca, in Kabul, in Monrovia, and in Baghdad, requires that Canada have the ability to contribute to global stability, for a whole host of reasons, including national self-interest. Calls for Canada to lead the way in the world require investment in the means required to provide that leadership. In the current policy climate, Canadian foreign policy is founded on harmonised base made up of diplomacy, development, and defence. The ‘real world’ out there, as messy as it is, needs Canada to deliver more of all three of these ingredients.
- ***A moment of change is upon us.*** There is a glimmer of hope that a window of opportunity might be opening that will allow the combined effect of all the good work that has gone on over the last few years to come to fruition. A subtle but perceptible desire on the part of the Canadian public, coupled with an impending change in government, might just be enough to see through the scores of changes that need to be made.

Pressure to Change: All is not right in the world

That the Cold War is over should come as no surprise to anyone. Neither should the fact that the Brave New World that was meant to follow it failed to materialise. Recent events should remind us of two fundamental aspects of Canadian international relations: 1) we do not live in a fireproof house and 2) there is no peace dividend to reap and there never was. If these concepts seemed abstract in the 1990s, then the horror of September 11th, 2001 should have transformed them into undeniable concrete.

(continued p.17)

The United States was the country most profoundly affected by the events of 9/11. The Bush Administration was forced to do a comprehensive ‘re-think’ of the way it was conducting its security, both at home and abroad. The National Security Strategy of the United States, published by the White House early in 2002 is an indication of the seriousness with which the American government takes defence. Equally, it is a clear and frank appraisal of how the United States views the world and intends to function within it.

While Washington may have been the first to recognise the need for reflection, other countries have undergone similar exercises. Following on from its thorough Strategic Defence Review in 1998, the British government updated its defence policy by adding a ‘New Chapter’ in 2002. In it, the UK Ministry of Defence revealed how it would modify its defence capabilities, in keeping with how it assessed the new security environment in the wake of Al-Qaeda’s attacks. Australia, too, reconsidered its defence posture. Consequently, it added significant capabilities to its counter-terrorist and special operations forces.

All of these countries recognised that September 11th was a signal event. A state’s responsibility to protect its citizens and their interests was underlined that day. That responsibility cannot be ignored and required both stocktaking of a nation’s abilities and a renewed emphasis on defence and security.

Pressure to Change: Freeloaders beware

It seems as if Canada is not aware of the gravity of the situation. No serious defence review has taken place since September 11th, let alone any changes in capabilities or clarifications of intentions. The few improvements that have been made have been fleeting, ad hoc, and done with resentment. The Cabinet committee on national security, convened under John Manley as Deputy Prime Minister, folded after only a few months. Canada is still without a comprehensive national security strategy. Federal funding on security has been minimal and has not been accompanied by any indication of an overall objective.

This lack of significant change, coupled with the amount of concern in other countries, has led to international pressure of another sort. If Al-Qaeda were not enough of a worry to precipitate Canadian action, then perhaps the censure of the US, in the form of speeches by the American ambassador to Ottawa and in strategic omissions from White House announcements, would be. Previously, the Secretary-General of NATO, too, warned Canada to pull up its socks and create the capacity to make meaningful contributions to collective defence.

Perhaps most sadly, the foreign minister from tiny Slovenia added his dislike of Canada’s ineffectual defence policy, labelling it “immoral”.

Opportunity for Change: A widening and deepening of support

All is not gloom. Some have understood the gravity of the situation and public support is growing. Some Canadians—perhaps the largest proportion of the population for some 40 years—are concerned about this country’s capability to defend itself, its citizens, and its interests. While defence still ranks well behind concerns over health care, education, and childcare, it is firmly on the agenda. This appreciation of the situation has taken shape in several grassroots organisations’ calls for changes. Public involvement in the flawed defence and foreign affairs consultation processes has been impressive.

At the level of formal political parties, there is also wide support for an increased emphasis on defence. All parties understand that regardless of what purpose a military may serve, the current level of decay with the CF prevents it from realising its potential. This limits political options and significantly reduces the scope for action on the international scene.

While political parties may not agree on what the military should do, they all see it having a role. And any one of these roles requires additional capability to be built into the Canadian Forces. A military so tired that it needs to rest for 18 months is of little use to anyone, regardless of political stripe. A military desperately short of personnel, unable to transport its people or maintain its aging equipment, can neither fight wars nor keep the peace.

Opportunity for Change: A new government

The final reason for spilling more ink on Canadian defence matters lies in the sizeable potential of the upcoming change of government. Mr Martin has indicated on several occasions that he wants Canada to take its rightful place in the world.

A full defence review and a re-articulation of Canadian security, defence, and foreign policies would be a necessary part of such a move. Such a review would form one brick in the necessary edifice that will need to be constructed if Canada is to assert itself internationally. The critical failures that lie at the very heart of Canadian defence need to be understood and immediate actions taken to repair them. Otherwise, any proposed political foreign policy aspirations will not be worth the paper they are written on.



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CANADIAN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY AN APPALLING DISPLAY OF NEGLECT

Fred R. Fowlow, Director Maritime Affairs, Calgary Branch, Naval officers Associations of Canada

“Canada’s defence policy must reflect the world as it is, rather than the world as we would like it to be.”

1994 Defence White Paper

Another frustrating period for the Canadian Forces has appeared in the form of humiliation resulting from the government’s mismanagement of the Iraq/Afghanistan file.¹ A situation which no doubt prompted members of the armed forces and Canadians to wonder what is going on in Ottawa.

The Prime Minister’s “on the fly” foreign policy decisions during the Iraq War debate at the UN obviously accounted for a change in Canadian public attitude toward the armed forces. Simply put, his no-UN sanction, no-Canadian involvement decision confused Canadians, ultimately prompting them to question the combat-capability of the CF. Described as the “Chrétien Doctrine” by Allan Gotlieb, former Canadian Ambassador to the US, we learn that, “Aside from its lack of moral basis, it is difficult to believe that such a foreign policy serves our national interest.”²

A country’s foreign policy sets the agenda for national defence and hence, the requirements of the armed forces.³ Clearly, development of new Canadian foreign policy is an absolute must, as is fostering greater cooperation with the US. Mr. Gotlieb goes on to say that, “If Canada genuinely wants to contribute to peace and international security, if it wants to affect outcomes in the world, then it must be able to influence the US.”⁴

History tells us that the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson discovered during his tenure that influence only comes when supported and backed up by a viable military, which is what Canada had in his time. Not so today. It appears that Canada is losing the status that showed we could be depended upon to conduct ourselves honourably when a friend and ally asked for help in a just cause.⁵

In a *Citizens Centre Report* article entitled “Rebuilding Respect,” Kevin Steel reminds Canadians that if they believe our armed forces should be resuscitated, the government (and I say especially those in the PM’s office) must recognize and deal with three realities: (a) Canada has no independent military role; (b) Canada cannot acquire authority over this continent’s strategic decisions; and, (c) Canada’s influence has declined drastically because our armed forces have been woefully underfunded, under-equipped and undermanned for almost half a century.⁶

Unacceptable conditions confronting the CF are many, the Sea King replacement heading the list. Sadly, the forty year old helicopters deployed to our ships patrolling the Persian Gulf lack night-time surveillance and are considered to be less capable today than during Gulf War One. In other words, our ships are a potential liability at night. Concomitantly, the

future for the award of a replacement contract looks dim, especially in light of recent information suggesting the military helicopter fiasco is shaping up to be the sorriest scandal of Jean Chrétien’s government.⁷

It appears that material written by a Colonel who had a direct connection with the Sea King replacement project states that, “political ‘interference’ could compromise safety of [the] replacement fleet.” Picking up on the academic paper which was written by the aforementioned officer, a globeandmail.com article states: “there has been so much interference in Ottawa’s bid to buy new naval helicopters that the winning aircraft could end up offering less performance than the 40-year old Sea Kings.”⁸

the feds say they should accept the two-engine chopper that will go into a ‘soft crash’ if one engine fails.

Adding to the confusion surrounding the helicopter replacement issue, *Toronto Sun* writers allege that military officials were pressured to change the specifications of their helicopter requests to allow greater competition from helicopter manufacturers other than Westland which builds the Cormorant. “The suggested changes are mind boggling: The military wants a three-engine chopper that won’t crash if one engine fails; the feds say they should accept the two-engine chopper that will go into a ‘soft crash’ if one engine fails.”⁹

While Defence Minister McCallum may have tried his best to keep the helicopter tendering process on an even keel, it is understood the alleged “shanghaiing” of the tendering process will delay delivery of the first Sea King replacement until at least 2009.

McCallum expressed a strange reaction to another important defence issue, namely the air- and sea-lift problem. We read, “McCallum’s theory is that as long as soldiers are being paid, they won’t care if their equipment is ancient and they cannot deploy overseas.”¹⁰ Conclusion: the air- and sea-lift proposals are not going anywhere since the MND has a strong preference for renting both air- and sea-lift capacity when the need arises. And who might be the sea-lift contractor should the need arise to move military equipment? Does he have a hot-line to the Ukraine?

(continued p. 20)

Time and again it has been said that the future state of the navy depends on the investments we make today. The problem is that the defence budget barely covers today's maritime needs. Moreover, the lack of vision by the PM and his PMO "squishy thinkers" means that many important long-term requirements will go unfulfilled.

From the maritime point of view, there is a guideline for the navy's future in the form of the Chief of Maritime Staff's *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*.

Among many requirements that have been identified over the decade, there is one which has received but passing attention. That is the stated need for the replacement for the air defence and command and control capability provided by the Iroquois-class destroyers. In response to this need, *Leadmark* states the navy is developing a Command and Control Area Air Defence Replacement (CADRE) project.¹¹ It is believed the replacement of the Iroquois-class destroyers warrants a priority right next to the Sea King shipborne helicopter replacement programme.

While the number of personnel required to operate our ships might show signs of decreasing in future, the CF continues to have severe personnel shortages. As Dr. J. L. Granatstein has written, "the government pretends everything is fine and that nothing needs to be done even though experienced officers and technicians are leaving the military in a steady stream."¹²

In an article entitled "Yesterday's Army," Douglas Fisher describes the problem confronting the government should it accept the concept of transformation and agree to provide funds to support the building of the CF to the prevailing fighting paradigm. Military transformation loosely translates into an effort to reshape the military into an agile, highly interconnected force, and purports to implement and capitalize on vast advances in information technology to engage and fight new kinds of wars in future.¹³ A wonderful concept, but is our government prepared to recognize and provide the funding to implement the concept?

Transformation of the CF will cost billions. Illustrating but a small segment of the cost, Fisher provides his readers with an equipment shopping list costing a total of over \$6 billion. His \$6 billion figure ignores costing one of the forces' most desperate needs: more troops. Nor does it include items such as remotely piloted vehicles, night vision equipment, satellite uplinks, heavy-lift helicopters, and battlefield computers, which the Americans recently used to such good effect in Iraq.¹⁴

In the process of attempting to deal with the transformation issue and acquiring urgently required modern military equipment, the government has lost sight of the importance of ensuring the security of Canada's Arctic territories. It is a sad commentary that Denmark's Standard Flex 3000 Offshore Patrol Vessel, which is capable of patrolling under arctic conditions, has been operating in our northern waters. Our navy does not have a single ship capable of doing the same (sailing our MCDVs to Resolution Island hardly qualifies them as Arctic-capable ships). Global warming patterns suggest that potential territorial jurisdiction problems will confront our government when the Northwest Passage becomes navigable on a year-round basis. Unless the navy acquires ice-strengthened ships, it will not be capable of sailing into ice-

covered waters in the Arctic.

The next important maritime issue concerns Canada's plan for operation in littoral waters. The worldwide trend towards littoral warfare comes at a time when our own *Leadmark* calls for the CF "to provide our country with modern, task-tailored and globally deployable combat-capable forces which can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad."¹⁵ Preparation and funding for littoral warfare might well run in conflict with the CF mandate for global-deployable forces. It certainly introduces another costly, tough decision to be made in future. In the meantime the US, and for that matter other allies, are at the stage where the contracting process for the construction of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) is well under way.

if advisors to a future Prime Minister continue to speak and act with obvious ignorance on defence matters, is anything likely to change?

Recognizing the complexity of providing for the security of our country, Fisher makes an important point saying that if advisors to a future Prime Minister continue to speak and act with obvious ignorance on defence matters, is anything likely to change?¹⁶

Douglas Bland suggests there is every possibility that should our government find that it is called upon to ask the military to use force in the furtherance of government policy, they will likely discover that the armed forces have all gone home. Adding that perhaps the government should take note of what Douglas Bland has written, Canada, he suggests, should "accept the inevitable and simply make a financial contribution to the Pentagon and allow the United States to defend us."¹⁷

A May 26, cover story in *Time* magazine entitled "Where Has Canada Gone?", sums it up well. The subtitle reads: "The world's second largest country is being swallowed up by its own irrelevance." Invest in a copy, read it, then write your MP and the Prime Minister advocating the government reclaim the lost sense of direction in a new foreign and defence policy.

Fred Fowlow is Dir. Maritime Affairs, Calgary Br.

FOOTNOTES

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³ Mike Trickey, "Canada Becoming Irrelevant," Ottawa Citizen, January 7, 2003.

⁴ Gotlieb.

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⁶ Kevin Steel, "Rebuilding Respect," Citizens Centre Report, April 14, 2003.

⁷ Editorial, "Helicopter Scandal is a Real Legacy," Toronto Sun, May 11, 2003.

(continued p. 21)

8 Daniel LeBlanc, "Copter Project Abject Failure," globeandmail.com, May 10, 2003.

9 Editorial, "Helicopter Scandal is a Real Legacy," Toronto Sun, May 11, 2003.

10 Scott Taylor, "Defence Under Fire Again for Mismanaging Books," Halifax Herald, October 14, 2002.

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13 Gopal Ratnam, "Industry Considers Transformation Needs," Defense News, November 11-17, 2002.

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Dear Mr. Martin,

For quite a long time now most of the journalists and 'talking heads' who write for our local newspapers and television stations have been telling us ordinary folks that you're going to be our next Prime Minister. Most of them make no bones about saying that you've been working flat out for the best part of ten years to make sure you get the job.

So, I guess there's no question in anyone's mind that you very much want to be our First Minister. And though me and some of my neighbours are still not entirely clear as to what it is you're going to do for us after you unpack your bags on Sussex Drive, we're pretty sure that a former big ship owner like yourself must surely have spent an awful lot of his spare time figuring out the direction in which he's going to point the Canadian ship of state when he finally gets his hand on its tiller. In fact, one of our brighter lads even went as far as to say that he thought it was more than likely that an acknowledged captain of industry like yourself would have already seen the striking similarities between steering a prosperous and growing shipping company through some recent and very rough and dangerous financial waters, and a bold and visionary Prime Minister who has been blessed by God with the innate ability to prevent his Nation from foundering on the treacherous shoals of international rivalries and from going aground on the uncharted internecine reefs that so often tear nations apart, as he adroitly pilots his country towards its destiny as a preeminent middle power.

Your decade-long pursuit of the singular goal to become Prime Minister leaves no doubt in the minds of many of your fellow Canadians that you are indeed a very focused and dedicated man who cannot be easily sidetracked once his mind is made up. And just as your ability to successfully tackle Canada's financial woes in years past demonstrated to one and all that you possess the necessary business smarts to lead a great trading nation like ours, so too did the organizational talents that enabled you to leave all of your potential rivals in the dust confirm your ability to understand the everyday concerns of working men and women. But you will need all of these attributes, and more, if you are to truly fulfill your own, and your father's, dream.

Most of the folks around where I come from are farmers. They've been on their land for a long time, and they and their wives and children work very hard year round to put bread on the table. They don't ask for government handouts, and they don't want it to interfere or interrupt their daily lives. But since before Confederation they have never failed to respond to our Nation's call to come forward and do what is necessary to defend its vital interest and to preserve their way of life. Shortly after the Great War our grandfathers built a small stone cairn to record the names of their comrades who didn't come back from France. The old people themselves could not forget, and they did not want their children, or their children's children, to ever forget. They and their neighbouring comrades in arms paid a very steep price in blood to keep Canada free, and this sacrifice was something worth remembering - forever.

So, today, those of us around here continue to gather together every year at our unremarkable little cenotaph. Only now there are a few more of us to stand and stare at the several other bronze plaques on it that are inscribed with the words: World War Two, Korea, The Cold War, NATO, Peacekeeping - and more names of more local lads - to remember.

(continued p. 22)

To the working people of my community, helping to preserve our way of life and maintaining Canada's ever expanding global interests is what being our Prime Minister is really all about, Mr. Martin. When everything is all boiled down, we reckon that unless all Canadians provide the ways and means to assure their personal and territorial security, and to defend and advance the freedoms that are now so well recognized throughout the world as Canada's hallmark, that little else of what remains may really matter - including our long cherished health care system and our enlightened social programmes.

So, Mr. Martin, when you take your new front row seat in the House of Commons, me and my neighbours hope our thoughts are uppermost in your mind. We know that you are going to have a very big job on your hands. And you must know that Canadians expect much from you.

Four or five years in office will probably not be enough time to allow the accomplishment of all of the many goals you will soon be setting for you and your new government. But, unless you resolve now, as a matter of first priority, to take the necessary steps to set your course on a new tack that more adequately provides for Canada's continued security, and to take the time to inform all Canadians of your intentions when you make your maiden speech as Prime Minister, it is feared that as your government's tenure runs out, and as other intervening domestic and international crises overtake your administration's energies, Canada's defences will have been weakened beyond repair, and the dream of becoming one of Canada's great Prime Ministers will remain unfulfilled. At least, that's how me and my neighbours see it.

Sincerely,

Gary H. Rice,
Mississippi Mills, Ontario
Citizen

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