



ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

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Volume 9, Number 3



- *Canadians Keep Helping the Afghans*
- *The Challenge of Producing a Credible Defence Policy*
- *NORAD is Dead*
- *Attrition and Asymmetric Warfare*

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

On 29-30 October, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, in collaboration with the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at Royal Military College of Canada, will host the 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium at Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities. Leading edge research from young scholars in the fields of security and defence studies, and national and international issues will be showcased.

The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Keynote speakers are Major-General Lewis MacKenzie and Dr. David Bercuson. I am pleased to note that, even though Dr. Bercuson accepted our invitation to speak before he was selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2004, both keynote speakers are Vimy Award recipients.

Anyone with an interest in security and defence, national and international issues are welcome to attend. Mark the dates of 29 and 30 October in your calendar to attend a stimulating gathering of Canada's best young military thinkers. For more information please read the symposium notice elsewhere in this publication.

We note with regret the passing, in September, of Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, CM, OBE, DFC, O Ont, CD. World War II hero, Saviour of Ceylon, Air Commodore Birchall was the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2001. The members of the Conference of Defence Associations and donors of the CDA Institute express their sincere condolences to the late Air Commodore's family.

As I mentioned earlier, *ON TRACK* readers will be pleased to know that Dr. David Bercuson has been selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2004. Dr. Bercuson is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career in the fields of military and strategic studies. The Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, has been invited to present the award on 19 November, at a mixed formal dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec.

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MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Les 29 et 30 octobre, l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense et le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, en collaboration avec l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, le Centre des relations internationales de l'Université Queen's et le programme des Études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada, animeront le 7^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, au Collège militaire royal, à Kingston (Ontario). Le symposium met en valeur les travaux des étudiants en doctorat et en maîtrise des universités civiles et militaires. De jeunes universitaires y présenteront des travaux poussés dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense, et on y débattrait d'enjeux d'importance nationale et internationale.

Le symposium a pour objectif de resserrer les liens entre les établissements d'enseignement civils et militaires. Le major-général Lewis MacKenzie et M. David Bercuson seront conférenciers d'honneur. Je suis particulièrement heureux de signaler que, bien que M. Bercuson ait accepté notre invitation avant d'avoir été sélectionné lauréat du prix Vimy 2004, nos deux conférenciers d'honneur sont des lauréats du prix Vimy.

Est invitée à y participer toute personne qui s'intéresse aux questions de sécurité et de défense, ainsi qu'aux enjeux nationaux et internationaux. Réservez les dates du 29 et du 30 octobre et participez à une réunion enrichissante des meilleurs jeunes penseurs militaires au pays. Pour de plus amples renseignements, veuillez consulter l'annonce du symposium figurant dans la présente publication.

Nous sommes au regret de vous informer du décès, en septembre, du commodore de l'air Leonard Birchall, C.M., OBE, DFC, O Ont, CD. Héros de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, sauveur du Ceylan, le commodore de l'air Birchall a été lauréat du prix Vimy en 2001. Les membres de la Conférence des associations de la défense et les donateurs de l'Institut de la CAD présentent leurs condoléances les plus sincères à la famille de feu le commodore de l'air.

Comme je l'ai mentionné plus haut, les lecteurs de *ON TRACK* seront heureux d'apprendre que M. David Bercuson a été sélectionné lauréat du prix Vimy 2004. M. Bercuson est un Canadien éminent qui a fait preuve de

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We congratulate Ms Sharon Hobson who has been selected as the recipient of the Ross Munro Media Award for 2004. Ms Hobson has consistently demonstrated the finest qualities of a journalist who specializes in defence issues.

The Conference of Defence Associations, in association with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, is the sponsor of the Ross Munro Media Award. The award will be presented during the Vimy Award Dinner.

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive **ON TRACK** and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront **ON TRACK** et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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normes de leadership des plus élevées tout au long de sa carrière dans les études militaires et stratégiques. L'honorable Bill Graham, ministre de la Défense nationale, a été invité à remettre le prix, lors d'un dîner officiel mixte qui aura lieu le 19 novembre, à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations à Gatineau (Québec).

M^{me} Sharon Hobson a été sélectionnée lauréate du Prix Média Ross Munro. M^{me} Hobson a démontré à travers les années des qualités exceptionnelles comme journaliste s'étant spécialisée dans les questions de défense.

La Conférence des associations de la défense, en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, parraine le Prix Média Ross Munro. Ce prix sera remis au cours du dîner Vimy.

J'ai le plaisir de vous informer qu'une fois de plus, toutes les places ont été vendues pour cette manifestation prestigieuse qui aura lieu à la Grande Galerie.

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I am gratified that the Grand Hall, for this prestigious event, is once again fully booked.

I wish to take this opportunity to welcome our new intern, Ms Sarah Noble. Ms Noble, who recently completed an MA programme at Carleton University, came to the CDA Institute through the DND-sponsored Security and Defence Forum Internship Programme. Her internship is of one year's duration.

While the defence and foreign affairs policy reviews are underway, the CDA Institute believes that Canada's defence interests would be better served through a process that is more transparent than is the case at present. To this end we feature in this edition of *ON TRACK* articles from our contributors that are reflective of global events that can bear an influence on Canadian policy in the areas of defence and security.

During its tour of duty in Afghanistan, from which it recently returned to its home base, the Third Battalion, Royal 22^e Régiment Battalion Group played an important part in maintaining security in the Afghan capital, Kabul. Lieutenant Yan Labrecque, an officer of the Third Battalion, provides us with a review of the work that his Battalion Group carried out in Kabul, assisting in providing confidence-building measures in the Kabul community and surrounding area.

It is incumbent upon the federal government to ensure the safety of every Canadian citizen, and to make available to those responsible for executing defence policy, the appropriate level of resources. As the operational capabilities of the CF continue to decline, however, the challenge facing government will be to find ways to conduct a credible foreign policy with

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J'en profite pour souhaiter la bienvenue à notre nouvelle stagiaire, M^{me} Sarah Noble. Ayant récemment achevé ses études de maîtrise à l'Université Carleton, M^{me} Noble s'est jointe à l'Institut de la CAD par le biais du programme de stage du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense, qui est financé par le ministère de la Défense nationale. Son stage sera d'un an.

La Conférence des associations de la défense, en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, parraine le Prix Média Ross Munro. Ce prix sera remis au cours de la même soirée, à un journaliste des médias électroniques ou imprimés qui a publié un article ou une série d'articles, ou encore qui a réalisé un documentaire de qualité exceptionnelle sur la défense et la sécurité canadiennes.

Bien que les examens de la défense et des affaires étrangères soient en cours, l'Institut de la CAD estime que les intérêts de la défense au Canada seraient mieux servis par un procédé plus transparent qu'il ne l'est actuellement. Dans ce but, nous publions dans le présent numéro des articles de nos collaborateurs qui évoquent les événements mondiaux influant sur les politiques canadiennes dans les secteurs de la défense et de la sécurité.

Pendant sa période de service en Afghanistan, qu'il a récemment achevée pour rentrer à sa base principale, le Troisième bataillon du groupe-bataillon du Royal 22^e Régiment a joué un rôle des plus importants en assurant la sécurité dans la capitale afghane, Kaboul. Le lieutenant Yan Labrecque, officier du Troisième bataillon, nous fournit un examen du travail accompli par son groupe-bataillon à Kaboul, mettant en œuvre des mesures qui visaient à rétablir la confiance dans la collectivité de Kaboul et des régions avoisinantes.

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declining military capabilities and to reconstruct relations with the United States of America. With these thoughts in mind I was pleased to provide the September/October 2004 edition of *SITREP*, a publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute, with *Meeting the Challenge of Producing a Credible Defence Policy in the 21st Century*. The requirement for producing such a credible policy remains and, therefore, I share with you, our readers, my concerns for the development of a financially resourced defence policy in a reprint of the article in *SITREP*.

Our longtime friend and *ON TRACK* contributor, Colonel Gary Rice, has written for us *The Slow March to a National Military Strategy*. Colonel Rice provides us with insightful comment on the National Security Policy that was announced by the Government, last April, and details where the government should go from there.

We are very pleased to include in this edition, a pointed look at recent government announcements that will have an impact on defence policy, in *Have You Heard?*, written by Fred Fowlow. Fred's observations are sobering and provide a rationale for a transparent policy review with public and parliamentary input. Fred is the Director Maritime Affairs, Calgary Branch, the Naval Officers Association of Canada.

Joe Varner writes in *NORAD is Dead and Canada Held the Knife* a summary of changes in the operational role of NORAD and Canada's part in the changed organization. While, in August, the Government announced that Canada had amended the NORAD treaty with the United States, other changes to the mandate of NORAD that had taken place were not included in that announcement. Read on, and see what changes Mr. Varner thinks are in store for Canada. Mr. Varner is a professor of Homeland Security at American Military University.

Are wars of attrition an outdated aspect of warfare? An article written on the subject caught our eye and we have invited commentary on the matter from our Public Affairs Officer, Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg; Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, Defence Analyst; Colonel (Ret'd) Howie Marsh, the Institute's Senior Defence Analyst; and Mr. Christopher Ankersen, a doctoral student at the London School of Economics, in the UK. In this issue Captain Forsberg introduces the subject with a review of some of the thoughts on war of attrition that were put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. military intelligence officer. We also include *Attrition and Asymmetric Warfare*, provided us by Colonel MacDonald. We will follow through in the Winter edition of *ON TRACK* with articles on war of attrition by Colonel Marsh and Mr. Ankersen.

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Il incombe au gouvernement fédéral de veiller à la sécurité de tous ses citoyens et citoyennes, et de fournir à ceux et celles qui sont responsables de l'exécution de ses politiques de défense, les ressources appropriées. Cependant, les capacités opérationnelles des FC continuent à baisser et le défi que doit relever le gouvernement sera de mener une politique étrangère crédible alors que déclinent ses capacités militaires, ainsi que de renouer ses relations avec les États-Unis. Soucieux de ces problèmes, j'ai été heureux de contribuer au numéro de septembre-octobre 2004 de *SITREP*, une publication du Royal Canadian Military Institute, un article intitulé *Meeting the Challenge of Producing a Credible Defence Policy in the 21st Century*. L'exigence de produire une politique crédible existe toujours et je partage donc avec vous, nos lecteurs, mes inquiétudes concernant l'élaboration d'une politique de défense adéquatement financée en reproduisant ici l'article paru dans *SITREP*.

Notre ami de longue date et collaborateur de *ON TRACK*, le colonel Gary Rice, a rédigé un article intitulé *The Slow March to a National Military Strategy*. Il y fournit des commentaires pénétrants sur la politique de sécurité nationale qui a été annoncée par le gouvernement, en avril dernier, et des détails sur la direction que devrait adopter celui-ci.

Nous sommes très heureux d'inclure dans le présent numéro, un regard lourd de sous-entendus sur les annonces gouvernementales qui auront des répercussions sur la politique de défense, dans le cadre d'un article rédigé par Fred Fowlow et intitulé *Have You Heard?* Les remarques faites par l'auteur donnent lieu à réflexion et justifient un examen transparent des politiques, assorti d'un apport du public et des députés. M. Fowlow est directeur des Affaires maritimes, bureau de Calgary, de l'Association des officiers de la marine du Canada.

Dans un article intitulé *NORAD is Dead and Canada Held the Knife*, Joe Varner donne un résumé des modifications du rôle opérationnel du NORAD et le rôle que jouera le Canada au sein de cet organisme modifié. Alors qu'en août dernier, le gouvernement annonçait que le Canada avait modifié l'Accord du NORAD avec les États-Unis, d'autres modifications qui avaient déjà été apportées au mandat du NORAD n'étaient pas intégrées à cette annonce. Vous verrez en lisant les changements qui, selon M. Varner, auront lieu au Canada. M. Varner est professeur de la sécurité du territoire à l'American Military University.

Les guerres d'usure sont-elles un aspect dépassé de la conduite de la guerre ? Un article sur ce sujet nous a intéressés et nous avons demandé à notre agent des affaires publiques, le capitaine (ret.) Peter Forsberg, à l'analyste de la défense, le

(voir page 5)

As the third year anniversary of the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th passes, the Conference of Defence Associations believes that those involved in the current defence review should take into account issues to include:

- *the importance of Canada's role in the protection of North America;*
- *Canada's relationship with the United States;*
- *Canada's role in the world; and*
- *the increasingly dangerous nature of so-called 'peace' operations.*

The CDA believes that the Canadian Government owes it to its citizens, to the men and women who serve with loyalty and honour in the Canadian Forces, and to Canada's allies, to demonstrate that it is serious about defence. In order to do so, not only must the Government increase the defence budget, it must also articulate a strategic vision that takes into account the changes to the world order that have occurred since 1994, the year of Canada's most recent White Paper on defence. The CDA calls upon the government to conduct a formal, open and transparent defence policy review in a fashion that is the hallmark and tradition of the democratic process. The CDA believes that only a policy review can determine the investment needs and capabilities of the Canadian Forces in the 21st century. **We would suggest that you contact your Member of Parliament to express concerns you may have about this country's security and national defence issues.** For their address, see:

http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/SenatorsMembers_house.asp?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&Sect=Hoccur

You may wish to consider sending a communiqué, similar to the one below, to your Member of Parliament, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of National Defence:

“The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) regrets [or we regret] the as-yet unexplained decision not to conduct an open, comprehensive Defence Policy Review. The CDA hopes [we hope] that all concerned Canadians will continue to press their Parliamentarians for a transparent defence policy review with public and parliamentary inputs which will result in a well-funded Defence White Paper no later than 2005. “

In closing, I wish to thank our donors for their financial support for the work of CDA and the CDA Institute. When we tell a donor that the CDAI needs money, this is not asking, but saying that the military community has demonstrated a need for support for their families, and that Canadian society wants and needs a safe and secure country; that providing it is one of the

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colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald, à l'analyste principal de la défense de l'Institut, le colonel (ret.) Howie Marsh, et à Christopher Ankersen, étudiant en doctorat de la London School of Economics (Royaume-Uni), de commenter sur le sujet. Dans le présent numéro, le capitaine Forsberg présente le sujet en passant en revue certaines des opinions sur la guerre d'usure avancées par le lieutenant-colonel Ralph Peters, officier américain à la retraite du renseignement militaire aux États-Unis. Nous fournissons également un article intitulé *Attrition and Asymmetric Warfare*, que nous a fourni le colonel MacDonald. Nous poursuivrons ce sujet dans le numéro d'hiver de *ON TRACK*, grâce à des articles sur la guerre d'usure rédigés par le colonel Marsh et M. Ankersen.

Alors qu'a lieu le 3^e anniversaire des attentats terroristes dévastateurs du 11 septembre, la Conférence des associations de la défense est d'avis que ceux et celles qui participent à l'examen en cours de la défense devraient notamment tenir compte des enjeux suivants :

- *l'importance du rôle du Canada dans la protection de l'Amérique du Nord,*
- *la relation du Canada avec les États-Unis,*
- *le rôle du Canada dans le monde,*
- *la nature de plus en plus dangereuse des soi-disant « opérations de maintien de la paix ».*

La CAD est d'avis que le gouvernement canadien doit prouver à ses citoyens et citoyennes, aux hommes et aux femmes qui l'ont servi avec loyauté et honneur dans les Forces canadiennes, et à ses alliés, qu'il s'intéresse sérieusement à la défense. Pour ce faire, il doit non seulement accroître le budget de la défense, mais également articuler une vision stratégique qui tient compte des changements survenus dans l'ordre mondial depuis 1994, l'année de publication par le Canada de son dernier livre blanc sur la défense. La CAD demande au gouvernement de mener un examen formel, ouvert et transparent de ses politiques de défense d'une manière qui caractérise et reflète la tradition du processus démocratique. La CAD estime que seul un examen des politiques permettra d'établir les besoins et les capacités des Forces canadiennes au XXI^e siècle. **Nous vous suggérons de communiquer avec votre député ou députée pour lui faire part de vos inquiétudes au sujet des enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationale.** Vous trouverez son adresse au site Web suivant :

http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/SenatorsMembers_house.asp?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&Sect=Hoccur

Envisagez d'envoyer un communiqué, semblable à celui qui figure ci-dessous, à votre député fédéral, au premier ministre fédéral et au ministre de la Défense nationale :

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tasks of the military; and that the donor can help accomplish that peace and security with financial support of the work of the CDA Institute. Please consider an increased contribution to the Institute. Thank-you.

ON TRACK

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« La Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) regrette [ou nous regrettons] la décision encore inexplicquée de ne pas mener un examen des politiques de défense ouvert et détaillé. La CAD espère que tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes concernés continueront de presser leurs députés pour que soit mené un examen transparent des politiques de défense, appuyé d'une contribution publique et parlementaire qui aboutira, pas plus tard qu'en 2005, à un livre blanc sur la défense adéquatement financé. »

En terminant, je remercie nos donateurs pour leur appui financier de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD. Lorsque nous expliquons à un donateur que l'ICAD a besoin d'argent, nous ne demandons pas; nous lui expliquons que la collectivité militaire a exprimé le besoin que l'on appuie leurs familles, et que la société canadienne a besoin de et souhaite vivre dans un pays sûr; cette tâche incombe aux militaires et le donateur, grâce à son appui financier, contribuera à la paix et à la sécurité en appuyant financièrement les travaux de l'Institut de la CAD. Veuillez envisager d'augmenter votre contribution à l'Institut. Je vous en remercie d'avance.

Canadians Keep Helping the Afghans

Lieutenant Yan Labrecque, Third Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment

The acronym CIMC, a reference to Civil-Military Cooperation, has now become a part of the vocabulary for the members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment Battalion Group (3 R22ndR Bn Gp) currently deployed in Afghanistan. This organization is composed of both members of the regular force and primary reserve and is tasked with working with the local Afghan population to create a line of communication between the 3 R22ndR Bn Gp and the citizens of Kabul, allowing for increased force protection. This important channel permits the organization to obtain vital information in assisting the 3 R22ndR Bn Gp in its mission to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining a secure and stable environment in its area of responsibility.

...CIMIC has sought to identify and implement projects with a large impact in aiding the local population

The concrete actions of CIMIC have been twofold: the creation of lines of communication with the international community as well as key administrators and the implementation of small-scale, large impact projects. In terms of communications, these lines have been greatly appreciated by the local population for the regular contact provided by CIMIC teams at municipal and police meetings. Members of the donor community have also been invited to Camp Julien to participate in several meetings aimed at exchanging ideas and information for important community projects ranging from

assisting women and children in Kabul, sanitation, and road repair.

In terms of projects, CIMIC has sought to identify and implement projects with a large impact in aiding the local population. These projects have been jointly identified by the CIMIC teams, the Afghan authorities, the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community, and through Battle-Group patrols. Thus far, the projects have ranged from the construction of new classrooms and community centres, to the digging of wells, purchase of new police equipment, and renovation of a fire hall. In total, CIMIC has been able to increase the quality of life for the Afghan population thus helping to increase stability in their society.

One of the CIMIC projects was completed in the village of Qal-Eh Moheb. This village is characterized by the arrival each spring of hundreds of nomads from all over Afghanistan. This area is said to permit the nomads to benefit from the oasis of peace during the summer season. However, their arrival was not entirely welcomed by the local villagers and the CIMIC teams sought to identify the source of this conflict between the two types of residents.

The main area of friction seemed to come from the availability of water – with the arrival of the nomads, the wells in the

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village were not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the permanent residents. To help alleviate this problem, the CIMIC team, in collaboration with the local authorities, CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), and a local entrepreneur began work on digging two new wells for the village. The two new wells have allowed for the coexistence of these two distinct groups within the village and permitted further cultural

exchange among future Canadian patrols and the local population.

Because of these concrete actions assisting the Afghan population, the CIMIC element attached to the 3 R22nd R Bn Gp has significantly contributed to the force protection of Canadians deployed in Kabul.

Meeting the Challenge of Producing a Credible Defence Policy in the 21st Century

Colonel Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD (Ret), Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations

Although national defence is the responsibility of every Canadian, it is incumbent upon the federal government, through decisions and actions, to ensure the safety of every Canadian citizen.

National defence is an essential component of national security policy and a primary responsibility of government. It is therefore incumbent on government to make available, to those responsible for executing defence policy, the appropriate level of resources. The essential first step in this process is the development of a financially resourced defence policy.

The Canadian Forces (CF) share national security responsibilities with, among others, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Canadian Coast Guard, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Border Services Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Cooperation between these actors is high. Each has unique but complementary characteristics/capabilities that provide Canadians with an integrated security capability. However, the strength of this 'chain' of partnerships depends on the strength of each member.

The CF has unique characteristics/capabilities that must be maintained, the most important of which is their ability, as a last resort, to use deadly force at sea, on land and in the air. If these characteristics are not maintained, the integrity of the whole security 'chain' is put at risk.

As the principal custodians of the missions and tasks emanating from Canada's national defence policy, the leaders of the Regular and Reserve components of the CF are those to whom the government turns to ensure the viability of the increasingly interdependent fundamentals of Canadian security: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and contributions to international peace and security. Because of a serious shortfall in personnel and materiel resources, the CF is incapable of sustaining the current operational tempo. They must therefore be given the resources to rebuild the 'present'

force, a first and necessary step in the process of achieving military viability, and allow for the transformation (in terms of mission reorientation and modernization) to the 'future' force.

As a contribution to the successful prosecution of Canadian foreign policy, and more specifically to international peace and security, the CF regularly deploys overseas on a variety of missions. In more recent times, Canadian military personnel have served with distinction in such places as Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea, and Haiti. What is currently an extremely high operational tempo (the minimum time between individual and unit deployments) has, however, come at a price. The serious shortage of personnel and other resources has forced the CF to raid their capital investment funds. As a result, major equipment procurements have been delayed to the point where the CF is currently forced to operate hazardous helicopters, rely on obsolescent supply ships and deploy without readily available strategic and tactical air and sea lift capability for the support and sustainment of overseas operations. Although new money has been made available in recent years, most of it has only served to cover the cost of ongoing operations.

If the CF is to meet the challenges of the 21st century, the cycle of dysfunction – where making ends meet takes away from an ability to prepare for and ultimately survive in the future – must be broken. In other words, the days of 'robbing Peter (the future) to pay Paul (the present)' must be put behind us. The military demographic and the decisions of the 1990s have placed the CF on a steep slide that is irreversible in the medium term. Reversing the military decline will, over the next fifteen years, require approximately \$50 billion for new equipment; \$30 billion to restore intellectual capital; \$20-30 billions more to rebuild support capabilities; and \$10 billion to restore infrastructure assets.

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Canadians are becoming aware of the perilous state of the CF on active service today. Numerous studies point to the stresses and strains on members of the armed forces and their families, and on our military capabilities, resulting from policies that have demanded, for a decade, that members of the CF “do more with less.” Support for equipment and operations is disintegrating, and little can be done to stop it, in some cases because spare parts and technicians are not available and will not be available in the years to come.

When the government moves to solve these problems, it will find that the time required to rebuild and transform fundamental capabilities will exceed the life expectancy of many major assets in service today. Even if the government were to immediately and substantially increase expenditure allocations to national defence, this pending crisis could not be avoided. As the operational capabilities of the CF continues to decline in the next five to ten years, the challenge facing government will be to find ways to conduct a credible foreign policy and to reconstruct relations with the United States of America.

Three ingredients are needed to rectify this dire situation - resources (personnel, materiel, financial), political commitment, and time, without healthy doses of which the current crisis within the CF will not be resolved.

Modern armed forces can rarely be divided into discrete service packages. Although the navy, army, or air force may be prominent on certain missions, never have recent operations been completely the purview on one service alone, if only because logistics support in the CF is a function provided by a unified military system. Those who suggest that Canada might develop niche roles based on one service alone discount the negative effects such a policy would have on operational efficiency and effectiveness. The maintenance of multi-faceted core capabilities will provide governments with the best possible support. The evidence from missions the CF has undertaken over the past ten years supports this fact convincingly.

While it is encouraging that the federal government has begun to address the armed forces’ outstanding equipment requirements, a lot of work has yet to be done to address the Forces’ need for other necessary capabilities as well as personnel issues, including those of recruiting and training. The current defence policy review should address these issues and, upon its completion, the government should table a new White Paper accompanied by a long-term funding plan designed to fulfil this expectation.

The tempo of operational demands on the CF over the past ten years is most likely to continue, and what we have seen in Kabul, Bosnia, and Haiti will likely become the template of future Canadian military operations. The current strength of

the CF will therefore not be sufficient to meet the demand. The strength of the CF will have to be substantially increased, up to 75,000, in order to meet these future commitments.

The Federal Government’s new defence policy must therefore provide for both the rebuilding and transformation of the CF. Concretely, it must ensure that both the ‘present’ and the ‘future’ forces are:

- **combat capable;**
- **flexible and adaptable;**
- **deployable and sustainable; and**
- **self sufficient and interoperable.**

Canada’s most important defence relationship is with the United States. Our shared values – liberal democratic society, individual freedom and the rule of law – and our reliance on trade and immigration call for the free flow of goods and people into the continent. Continental defence is therefore not simply another option. If we do not contribute meaningfully to continental defence, the Americans will take responsibility for it themselves, depriving Canadians of an essential element of sovereignty.

The task ahead is daunting. The stakes are high and extend to the very core of the Government’s responsibilities. Canadian security relies on the proper functioning of a security ‘chain’ that includes, as one of its key components, a robust military. The International Security Policy review, hopefully to be completed this autumn, and into which the Minister of National Defence will be inserting his own Defence Policy review, will indicate to us what, among other security needs, Canadians expect of their Armed Forces.

*The problems of the future force are now so serious
that leaving its management to the usual routine will
no longer suffice*

The problems of the future force are now so serious that leaving its management to the usual routine will no longer suffice. The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Prime Minister, even with the aid of an understanding Defence Minister, simply do not have the resources or the power to solve the gathering crisis by themselves. Canada and the government are about to enter a period where there will be few credible resources to ensure Canada’s national defence or ability to pursue a credible and independent foreign policy.

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This is a matter that requires the urgent attention of the Prime Minister, for only he can redirect the resources to begin the long recovery of the CF. Only he can redirect the governing party, or coax a coalition of Parliament, and the federal bureaucracy towards this task.

A Prime Minister who delivers this kind of defence policy will be helping to guarantee the safety and security of Canadians, as well as protecting Canadian values and promoting Canadian interests, at home and abroad. Success in this difficult but necessary enterprise will depend on the depth of commit-

ment and the quality of leadership of our elected representatives, and on the willingness of all Canadians to accept their individual responsibilities.

The federal government has indicated that its foreign and defence policy review is to be founded on a national security framework, the hoped-for principle tenet of which will be “unity of security.” To be clear, security has many parts, yet one purpose – the protection of Canadians and their way of life.

THE SLOW MARCH TO A NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Colonel Gary H. Rice, CA/CF, Ret'd.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author is deeply indebted to General Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army, retired, and a former commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe, and a senior fellow of the Association of the United States Army's Institute of Land Warfare, whose initial article on the same topic inspired the writing of this one, and who graciously granted his permission to quote passages from it.

Barring a complete change in direction by Mr. Martin it is now apparent that the late 1994 Defence White Paper will be allowed to rest in peace, and a successor will not be issued during his watch. Instead, Canadian defence policy makers will have to march to another drummer after Parliament learns what his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence have been

working on for the past six months. Having dutifully complied with the Prime Minister's marching orders to complete in-house reviews of foreign and defence policies in time for the opening of the 38th Parliament on October 4, Messrs. Graham and Pettigrew have so far been keeping their findings under wraps. There is no doubt, though, that they will reflect the direction set out in the National Security Policy (NSP)¹ inaugurated by Mr. Martin on April 27, 2004, shortly after taking office. And these will include recommendations to generate “Canadian Forces that are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, and able to work with our allies, leverage our experience in building peace, order and good government to help developing countries as well as failed and failing states, and continue to play an important role in countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defusing key inter/intra-state conflicts.”²

Canada's first ever NSP identifies what Mr. Martin and his colleagues divined to be the “*Canadian values*” of openness, diversity and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and their *connection* to what was decided upon as our three core National security *interests [goals]*: 1) protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad, 2) ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies, and 3) contributing to international security. Surprisingly, considering the government's quest for a made-in-Canada policy, portions of the introductory passages in Canada's NSP are remarkably similar to, but not identical with, those contained in President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 17, 2002³. Here the President says the NSS reflects “the *union of our values* [unspecified] and *our national interests*” and likewise spells out America's three *goals* of: 1) political and economic freedom, 2) peaceful relations with other states, and 3) respect for human dignity.⁴

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However, unlike Canada's emerging NSP, which in its present version provides only sketchy details about how its goals are to be attained, the United States NSS is explicit.⁵ America intends to achieve its goals with an eight-point programme that will: 1) champion aspirations for human dignity, 2) strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends, 3) work with others to defuse regional conflicts, 4) prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction, 5) ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade, 6) expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, 7) develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power, and 8) transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

The fundamental purpose of both Nation's keystone security policy documents remains clear, however, and that is to provide the essential overarching Parliamentary/Prime Ministerial and Congressional/Presidential direction that is required before Canada's Minister of National Defence (MND) and his United States counterpart, the Secretary of Defense, may discharge their responsibility to articulate an enabling National Defence Strategy/Policy (NDS) and in turn, for Canada's Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and his opposite number, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to evolve a supporting National Military Strategy/Policy (NMS).

The report that Mr. Graham presents to Parliament in October will not constitute our definitive NDS. But only when this important policy is in hand will the CDS be able to draft and recommend a coherent, supporting NMS. The Prime Minister is on the record as saying that the MND's findings will go before a Parliamentary Committee, and although one was not named the logical choice would appear to be the House Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA).⁶ This as yet unnamed all-party committee of the House would constitute a suitable forum in which to critically examine the MND's findings in detail and to receive essential input from those members of the public, industry and academe, who may request to air their views. It is only with SCONDVA's work completed that a final recommended version of a NDS may be drafted and submitted for approval by Parliament. And with a NSP and NDS to guide him, the CDS will then be able to begin the long slow march toward developing and recommending a much needed Canadian NMS.

The recent publication in the United States of "A Strategy for Today, A Vision for Tomorrow"⁷ by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (C/JCS), effectively establishes America's NMS. It illustrates the potential scope for a future Canadian NMS. Based on the four objectives for its armed forces as set

out in the Secretary of Defense's NDS⁸ the C/JCS directs the services to: 1) Win the war on terrorism. Act now to stop terrorists before they attack again, root out international terrorists, eliminate their bases of operation, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and establish a global antiterrorism environment. 2) Enhance our abilities to fight as joint forces, creating a seamless total force. Strengthen our international collaboration. 3) Transform our forces "in stride," fielding new capabilities, adopting new concepts and combining technology, intellect, and culture to ensure the development of forces able to generate decisive results.

The American NMS document then goes on to express in detail the priorities, threats to United States security, campaign capabilities and the parameters of force design and size, in a strategy expressed as "1-4-2-1" (defend the homeland, deter forward in four regions, be capable of two, almost simultaneous "swift campaigns" and win decisively on one of them). It ends with a short paragraph that begins "appropriately resourced, this strategy will achieve the goals of the NSS and 2004 NDS, effectively balancing military and strategic risks over the long term."⁹ That final paragraph, in two words - "appropriately resourced" - sums up one of the two great problems for providing an adequate defence posture. The other is design of the structure needed to accomplish the 1-4-2-1 strategy.¹⁰

...the end of the war on terror is not now predictable

The same holds true for Canada's Armed Forces, and should forewarn our Prime Minister that like the Americans, Canadians too are faced with a long term threat that deserves his government's genuine concern because its responsibility today will ultimately have to be shouldered tomorrow by its successors; "long-term" means the end of the war on terror is not now predictable.¹¹ The threat should provoke Parliamentarians in general and members of SCONDVA in particular to address the adequacy of our ability to cope with the demands upon our armed forces in the ensuing two decades. In this regard, it would seem appropriate that immediately it receives the MND's report and recommendations, a bipartisan sub-committee comprised of SCONDVA members and other informed persons should be struck and given the high priority assignment to conduct two "side-studies." The first would define the total force required and the second would calculate the resources required. Both studies would be obliged to deal with absolutes and not be constrained by the resource limitations¹² which in all probability will be embodied in Mr. Graham's report, and those which are normally set out in routine government

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spending guidelines. Only given a long-term (20-year) identification of need, may the development of budget estimates logically prioritize available resources. Detailed requirements of the first study would also take into account the most recent “vision statements” prepared by the Chiefs of the Maritime, Land and Air Staffs, when identifying the navy, army and air-force’s capital assets needed over time to accomplish the NSP, the training establishments and other infrastructures needed to assure the continuing availability of properly prepared individuals and units, and the logistics and health care structure required to support the anticipated operational effort. The second study would calculate the resources needed, the manpower, the demand on the nation’s industrial base, the transportation and communications systems, and finally the dollar costs.¹³

For the first time, Canada could have an all-party government effort pointing the way to where we are going, how we hope to get there and how much it is likely to cost. The opposition parties have shown their willingness to break precedent and combine forces on matters of future governance. On such crucial issues as the Nation’s security and defence, why should all parties in the House not also join hands? Together, Mister Martin, Harper, Layton and Duceppe could show the Canadian people they intend to lead by example, to take the moral high-ground, and to put the security interests of Canada above party politics. It now remains for all of our Nation’s political leaders to rise to the challenge and stand united as they sound the tocsin to mark the beginning of the long, slow march toward the development of a National Military Strategy.

NOTES

¹ <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=188>, “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy.”

² Ibid.

³ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.

⁶ In the mid-1980s all Standing committees were empowered to examine and report to the House, without first receiving the customary Order of Reference from the House, on any matter relating to the mandate, operation, and administration of the government department falling within their area of responsibility. SCONDVA may thus study matters referred to it by standing or special order or, within its area of responsibility, undertake studies on its own initiative.

⁷ General Richard B. Myers (C/JCS), “National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004: A Strategy for Today; a Vision for Tomorrow,” undated draft, 18.

⁸ The Secretary of Defense’s NDS translates the guidance in the President’s NSS into four objectives for the armed forces: 1) secure the United States from direct attack, 2) secure strategic access and global freedom of action, 3) establish security condition for international order, 4) strengthen alliances.

⁹ General Frederick J. Kroesen, USA, retired, “The National Military Strategy.” *Army Magazine*, Vol. 54, No. 8 (August, 2004), 10, 11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

HAVE YOU HEARD?

Canadians will have to wait for the promised foreign and defence policy review.

Fred R. Fowlow, Director Maritime Affairs, Naval Officers Association of Canada, Calgary Branch

*To rearm the army is to be a good ally and a good citizen of the world. It is to do what we can where we must in good conscience in war and peace as we did before.*¹

The Prime Minister and his Minister of National Defence appear to be following an agenda offering varying interpretations of what one can expect to happen with Mr. Martin’s election promise to revitalize the Canadian Forces.

The situation Canadians are witnessing today owes its origin in part to Mr. Martin’s response to a Conservative Party defence policy statement which was released before the Liberals even recognized there was a need to draft an election

campaign defence policy.

The quickly prepared reaction to the Conservative document brought forward a Liberal Party promise to fulfil a list of defence equipment and personnel requirements, one in particular to fund a 5,000 controversial peacekeeping brigade and 3,000 reserves; a proposal which completely ignored the fact that Canada requires combat-capable forces which have credibility, and are able to respond to a wide range of tasks, some of which fall under the now mythical term “peacekeeping,” which has long been replaced by the more prevalent term “peace enforcement.”

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As if to underscore his newly-found election campaign commitment, Mr. Martin made a hasty visit to CFB Gagetown where he gave the troops news of his collection of promises.

For many years there has been a suggestion that the existing system of governance in Canada had resulted in military leaders supplying the answer that fits what is thought to be government wishes,² or when in doubt, following the implicit code of omerta, in which denial and cover-up, deliberate or otherwise, are the principal strategy and tactics employed. Ultimately, a tightly knit defence headquarters decision making group, comprised of naive or poorly informed politicians and politicized bureaucrats who have accounted for a series of mismanaged decisions too lengthy to describe here.

All is not bad news. Time may reveal that Ottawa made the right decision by awarding the Sea King replacement contract to Sikorsky. The hard fact remains however, that it took almost 30 years before a second contract was awarded after the initial decision. It is expected that it will take another 10 years before all the aging Sea Kings are replaced by a yet to be developed upgrade of a helicopter designed to civilian specifications....Hardly the best way to manage a viable business.

For too long our government has refused to own up to the sobering reality unfolding that perhaps blundering political interference and incompetence at the bureaucratic level in Ottawa has virtually destroyed the Canadian Forces. The time for a change in defence vision has arrived with the hope that opposition parties will recognize that politics must be removed from the security and sovereignty dossier. All parliamentarians must focus their undivided attention on the question: how long will it take to implement the infamous promises made at Gagetown? here is no doubt but that promises made concerning equipment procurement and increases in personnel intended to revitalize our forces to their former level of combat are bound to generate heavy debate. The status quo must be dumped and a new vision for security formulated.

One debatable issue that will certainly warrant reconsideration is the government's planned purchase of 66 Stryker medium-weight armoured vehicles from the US, because in late August, that country's Government Accountability Office (GAO) delivered a new report to Congress stating that the Stryker had serious problems. First, as a consequence of weight and equipment problems it is now recognized it is less than ideal for transport in the C-130s. This results in restricting the C-130's flight range to 500 miles. Also, the C-130 will have difficulty taking off in higher elevations. Although the GAO report claims the Stryker is too vulnerable to enemy fire, and attempts to strengthen it would decrease its ability to be deployed,³ Canada's Chief of the Army Staff assures us the Stryker is a completely acceptable acquisition to replace our

Leopard tanks.

The uncertainty surrounding the rebuilding of Canada's defence capability focused on Defence Minister Graham's announced in-house defence review which will presumably be undertaken by his secretive defence policy makers.⁴ An editorial describing Graham's intentions warns that, "The Martin government and its defence mandarins should not be crafting that vision on the sly. Canadians deserve to be consulted before their pockets are tapped. The public must buy in before it shells out."⁵ There must be some interesting discussions taking place in Ottawa observing that Mr. Graham's preferred in-house review contradicts the Prime Minister's election campaign promise that he would order an immediate rethink of foreign and defence policy.

...a transparent policy review with public and parliamentary input, would result in a public-supported plan for a well-funded defence white paper

Undeniably, a transparent policy review with public and parliamentary input, would result in a public-supported plan for a well-funded defence white paper. In fairness to Mr. Graham it must be noted that he agrees his in-house policy review will fall short of a formal government white paper.⁶

Columnist James Travers offered important words of concern when he wrote, "Martin's strength is connecting Canadians to bold concepts; his weakness is failing to match action to rhetoric. So, simply talking about progress while pushing its delivery further into the future, is hardly a compelling post-election response from a government and a Prime Minister who promised so much only to deliver so little."⁷

For almost a decade Canadians have been slow to recognize the magnitude of the crisis facing our military. They, for want of honest transparent comment from the government, tended to overlook the suggestion that, "within government, it is in everyone's best interest to say that the military is in good shape. Pointing out shortcomings has historically been looked upon as disloyal, disruptive, or suspicious."⁸ Frankly, there is nothing to indicate that behaviour in Ottawa has changed.

One of the prime challenges confronting the government today is that of energizing bureaucracy. "New approaches are necessary, and so far there is little indication that the various government departments that have a stake in national security and defence policy are willing to engage in this type of fresh thinking."⁹

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9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism awakened public interest and worldwide concern which, in Canada, prompted recognition that our armed forces must acquire improved combat capable credibility, an increase in force strength, and properly trained personnel utilizing modern equipment. Concomitantly, the CF must be flexible, adaptable, and prepared for quick deployment utilizing our own air and sea lift capability and, once deployed, be capable of operating independently, or as interoperable elements of military forces from other countries.

Lack of evidence of commitment and interest in following through with the implementation of Mr. Martin's plan, accompanied by fresh visionary thinking in lieu of an in-house bureaucratic review within DND, perhaps prompted a number of senior officers in NDHQ "who have become so peevish with the government's disinterest in their plight—namely lack of progress in developing new, forward looking defence policy backed by commensurate resources—[to say] that they felt compelled to indirectly influence the political process by leaking the government's plans to the media."¹⁰ Not a nice day at the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff, who suddenly found himself calling a special news conference on August 23, 2004. The leaks, which were denied by the CDS, had claimed that in order to fulfil the government's election promise to add a 5,000 peacekeeping brigade, drastic cuts would have to be absorbed by the navy and air force in the form of mothballing three Tribal-class destroyers, and 20 or more CF-18 fighter jets.

Following the 'good news' delivered by the PM when he visited Gaagetown, the military were told that additional funding would not be forthcoming for at least two years. As recent as September 2nd, the MND announced that the forces can expect a major funding increase (provided of course, he can convince the PM to loosen the purse strings!). We note he did not say when, nor did he deny that the cost of setting up the new brigade would have to be funded, at least partly, at the expense of the navy and air force. We have been told that calling on the navy to mothball ships and grounding air craft, would have to cover the cost of the brigade which ranges from \$400 million, to more than \$2 billion.¹¹

Contemplating the drafting of an in-house policy statement written by defence mandarins, reminds one that in 2001, Cedric Jennings, Veterans Affairs editor for Defence Policy Review, when describing what he called a blundering situation in NDHQ wrote, "the law of unintended consequences rules life in the Department of National Defence, for both its military (and civilian) employees."¹² Is the Minister prepared to take an ill-advised gamble when he discards the opportunity to be handed a policy statement prepared by parliamentarians and members of the Canadian public? How can the government expect our armed forces to respond effectively to tasking demands if a

contemporary strategic vision doesn't exist?¹³ An in-house review will be hard pressed to produce such a vision, especially if its drafters ignore sound military advice and are tempted to simply produce a policy document to satisfy the status quo. The Minister's plan appears to fit the recent article entitled "Ottawa turning opportunities into disaster: case studies in mismanagement."¹⁴

Successive Liberal and Conservative governments have without the slightest doubt, provided evidence of unwarranted political influence, incompetence and mismanagement. One editor went so far as to write that, "any civilian organization with so many continuing public setbacks would have gone bankrupt long ago," then adding sadly that, "a civil service mentality is said to pervade the military's commissioned ranks."¹⁵

Canadians have failed to recognize that naive politicians, politicized military and public service mandarins have effectively minimized the relevance of the recommendations of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), the Senate Committee on National Security, and the Auditor-General. Warnings and advice given by our closest allies, and criticisms rendered by defence minded organizations across Canada, have likewise been overlooked, or worse, ignored.

Notwithstanding critical comments rendered here, there have been situations where senior military leaders have been forthright in stating that our military will not be available or ready to undertake certain overseas deployments. That said, it is clear the defence organizational structure in place in Ottawa must change if Canadians are to be given a transparent military opinion from those in the profession of arms.

Canada must have a separate armed forces headquarters staffed only by military personnel and tasked only with military affairs.

The present headquarters configuration virtually mutes military leaders when domestic and international emergencies appear. It is clear that our air force cannot control our air space; our army cannot defend our soil, and, our navy cannot defend our shores.¹⁶

Canadians must react to today's unacceptable defence arrangement and write to their respective Members of Parliament demanding an immediate foreign and defence policy review with input from both the public and parliamentarians.

Surely we do not want to repeat Russian President Putin's comment after the unbelievable tragic terrorist attack on the school in Beslan: "We showed ourselves to be weak, and the weak get beaten."
(continued on page 14)

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- 15 *ibid.*, Jennings, Mar. 19, 2001.
- 16 *ibid.*, Eggenberger, Sept. 27, 2003.

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
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THE RECIPIENT OF THE VIMY AWARD

The Vimy Award is presented annually to a Canadian who had made a significant and outstanding contribution to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values. The Vimy Award Selection Committee had selected Dr. David Jay Bercuson, OC, PhD, LLD, FRSC, as this year's recipient of the award.

Dr. Bercuson is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career in the fields of military and strategic studies. The Vimy Award will be presented at a formal reception and dinner to be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, Québec, on Friday, 19 November 2004, beginning at 6:00 PM.



Dr. David J. Bercuson

LE RÉCIPIENDAIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

La Distinction honorifique Vimy est présentée chaque année à un canadien ou une canadienne ayant fait une contribution exceptionnelle à la sécurité du Canada et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le comité de sélection du Récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy a, cette année, choisi le Dr. David Jay Bercuson, OC, PhD, LLD, FRSC, comme récipiendaire de la distinction Vimy.

Le Dr. Bercuson est un canadien distingué qui a démontré les standards les plus élevés de leadership au cours d'une carrière consacrée aux études militaire et stratégique. La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera remise vendredi

le 19 novembre 2004, lors d'un dîner gala mixte dans la Grande Galerie, au Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau, Québec, débutant à 18h.

NORAD IS DEAD AND CANADA HELD THE KNIFE

JOE VARNER

After years of dithering on the future of NORAD and on the contentious issue of U.S. missile defense, the Martin liberals have finally acted in favour of saving NORAD'S life, but sadly 'the corpse was already cold.'

In August, our former Foreign Affairs Minister and current Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, announced that Canada had amended the NORAD treaty with the United States to save it from oblivion. However, what the government was not telling Canadians was that it was already too late. The amendments to the NORAD treaty reportedly formalized that NORAD could transmit information and warnings to the U.S commanders responsible for Missile Defence. Graham said a new arrangement was urgently required because the United States government had made it clear that it would be prepared to set up a parallel system of air defence, "that would eventually have rendered NORAD obsolete." What the Minister did not tell Canadians was that the United States had already done so and that NORAD and our partnership with the United States in deterrence had changed forever.

Two years earlier, on June 26th 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense recommended the merger of the global-in-scope Space Command and Strategic Command to be implemented by October 2002. This decision has had and will continue to have a profound effect on deterrence, and NORAD, a regional command in which Canada was once an equal partner with the United States. During the Cold War and up until recently, NORAD was co-located with Space Command in Colorado Springs and the American Commander of NORAD was also the Commander of Space Command. NORAD'S sole purpose was to give early warning of Soviet Union or any other state'S in-coming missile and bomber attack on North America and Space Command provided NORAD information on an incoming strike through Space Command'S constellation of satellites operating in space around the Earth. Canada and the U.S. had been equal partners in NORAD since its inception in 1957 and a Canadian served as Deputy Commander of NORAD. Canadian officers have in the recent past filled staff positions in both NORAD and in Space Command, but that has now changed.

Strategic Command based in Omaha, Nebraska, has been responsible and remains so to this day to execute a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union/ Russia and its allies/or other states that have been confirmed by NORAD as having launched an attack on North America. Strategic Command also will reportedly have control over conventionally armed interceptor missiles as part of Missile Defense and the ability to use these interceptor missiles (once deployed) to respond to an attack

upon North America. In the past the Americans separated the functions of NORAD and Strategic Command so that the organization giving the warning to the President of the U.S. of a pending nuclear attack was not the same as the person who would order the counter attack on the President'S instruction. This separation of functions of early warning and retaliation was a check and balance on the American use of nuclear weapons in time of conflict.

But in the aftermath of September 11th, and with plans to push ahead with a Missile Defense program, the Pentagon proposed a reorganization of the U.S. Joint Military Command Structure. Controversy arose when the plan called for NORAD'S Commander to be 'double hatted' as the new Commander of Northern Command, another regional level organization that covered the geographic area of North America. This proposed addition of Northern Command to the Commander of NORAD had the effect of separating NORAD from Space Command. For the Americans this presented the opportunity of making the Commander of Space Command and Strategic Command one in the same. This had the effect of coupling the early warning function through Space Command'S constellation of satellites around the Earth and Strategic Command'S retaliatory forces either nuclear-tipped missiles or unarmed interceptor missiles under the control of one person. While this would remove a check and balance from the equation of American nuclear retaliation, it would also have the effect of speeding up the time for deployment of missile defense interceptors.

For Canada this merger of Space Command and Strategic Command would mean our input into whether or not North America was under nuclear missile attack would be completely dependent upon the United States or virtually eliminated. Indeed, Canadian Forces personnel participating in Space Command might be forced to leave. This would also represent a blow to Canadian-American military cooperation and indeed Canadian prestige.

With Canada dithering on national security in light of September 11th, defence, U.S. Missile Defense, NORAD and constantly 'sticking a finger in the 'American eye' on global issues the United States took the opportunity we provided, and co-located the global Strategic Command and Space Command together in Nebraska, thus 'double hatting' its commander. Now the Commander of Strategic Command has the power to directly gain early warning of a pending missile attack on North America because as Commander of Space Command he or

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she would directly control the satellites providing that warning. In the end, at American whim, the regional level ‘double hatted’ Commander of NORAD and Northern Command and the Canadian Deputy of NORAD have essentially become a client of Strategic Command.

In conclusion, while people on both sides of the border at NORAD will continue to go through the motions, NORAD

and Canada’s small check on deterrence have changed forever. NORAD has essentially lost its direct access to space-based early warning information on a global basis and soon will likely become nothing more than an organization for the monitoring of North America civil air space as a companion to Northern Command, and Canada as a once full partner will continue to be marginalized until it and NORAD are put to rest in a final merger with the regional level, Northern Command.

NOAC JOINS NAVY LEAGUE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

The Naval Officers Association of Canada (NOAC) has joined in supporting the Navy League of Canada’s scholarship program.

Through the NOAC Endowment Fund, \$2,000.00 has been contributed to share equally with the Navy League in supporting two scholarships for the year 2004/2005.

Two Royal Canadian Sea Cadets will each receive \$2,000.00 to support their studies in Maritime related subjects. The recipients of the 2004 Maritime Affairs Scholarships are:

CPO1 Grant Gillard of 83 RCSCC Briton who will be studying Marine Sciences at the Marine Institute of Memorial University in St. John’s, NF.

CM1 Geoffroy Gosselin of 228 CCMRC Iberville who will be studying Marine Navigation at L’Institut Maritime du Québec à Rimouski, QC.

The NOAC Endowment Fund is supported by NOAC members and donations from interested persons. It is dedicated to promote Maritime Affairs in Canada. The annual distribution from the Fund is shared equally in “The Past”, “The Present” and “The Future”. The scholarship program falls into “The Future” category.

For more information about the fund or to make a contribution, please contact the NOAC National Executive Director, Robert Nixon, at: noacexdir@rogers.com or by mail to: 407-207 Bank St., Ottawa, ON, K2P 2N2.

WAR OF ATTRITION

Captain Peter Forsberg, CD (Ret’d), Public Affairs Officer

Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. military intelligence officer, has written an article, “In Praise of Attrition”, which appears in the summer edition of *Parameters*, the US Army War College quarterly (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters>).

Although Ralph Peters presents his support of wars of attrition with well thought out arguments and ideas, it is his articulation of his arguments which some may have trouble accepting. His arguments appear to be in opposition to Western society’s values regarding humanity. Peters, however, recognizes our terrorist enemies for what they are, and understands the strength of their dedication toward their cause.

Peters argues that it is not a question of whether or not we

want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re *in* a war of attrition with them. On the issue of war of attrition Peters presents a number of thoughts that are remarkable for their audacity. Several of them are included here.

Peters writes:

- “The belief that attrition, as an objective or a result, is inherently negative is wrong. A soldier’s job is to kill the enemy. All else ... is secondary.” He bases his argument on the idea that the nature of warfare never changes –

(continued on page 17)

only its superficial manifestations, the principle being that theories do not win wars. Well-trained, well-led soldiers in well-equipped armies do.”

- “There is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood, however politically incorrect this theme may appear to be. Any force that loses its elementary focus on killing the enemy swiftly and relentlessly until that enemy surrenders unconditionally cripples itself.”
- “Far from entering an age of manoeuvre, we have entered a new age of attrition warfare in two kinds: First, the war against religious terrorism is unquestionably a war of attrition – if one of your enemies is left alive or unimprisoned, he will continue trying to kill you and destroy your civilization. Second, Operation Iraqi Freedom provided a new example of a postmodern war of attrition – one in which the casualties are overwhelmingly on one side. Nothing says that wars of attrition have to be fair – and any Al Qaeda member will demonstrate that.”
- “We need plain talk, honest answers, and the will to close with the enemy and kill him. And to keep on killing him until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won...”
- “Our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of manoeuvre than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council, nor do they respect the Geneva Convention. They do not face election cycles... We have many tools – military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement – but we have less freedom of manoeuvre than our enemies.”
- “Western nations are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will have to learn our lesson painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs.”
- “... Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. It is far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they are allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond. Far worse than fighting such a war of

attrition aggressively is to pretend you are not in one while the enemy keeps on killing you.”

- “[In Operation Iraqi Freedom] When the focus of the air effort shifted from trying to persuade Saddam Hussein to give up to destroying Iraqi military equipment and killing enemy troops, the utility of airpower soared.”
- “The enemy has to be convinced that he has been defeated... We must be willing to kill in the short term to save lives and foster peace in the long term. Attrition is necessary: only the shedding of their blood defeats resolute enemies. Especially in our struggles with God-obsessed terrorists – the most implacable enemies we have ever faced – there is no economical solution.”

Peters concludes that no grand manoeuvres, no gestures of humanity, no offers of reconciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt and destroy our way of life. For Peters, anything less than the relentless pursuit of terrorists promotes their recruitment.

we need to understand that we are fighting a religious, political, and social belief system –

Peters’ arguments receive some support from Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney, who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Shiek Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others who were convicted of conducting a war of urban terrorism against the United States that included the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. At an April 2004 conference, sponsored by the University of Virginia School of Medicine’s Critical Incident Analysis Group, McCarthy stated that: “If we are to appreciate the risks to our way of life, and our responsibilities in dealing with them, we need to understand that we are fighting a religious, political, and social belief system – a comprehensive ideology that calls for a comprehensive response.” Although McCarthy’s statement implied a wider ranging response than Peters’, it nevertheless involves the killing and the defeat of our terrorist enemies.

McCarthy notes that Hamas militants systematically instill hatred in children from birth. He adds, “At home, in mosques, in madrassas, in summer camps it [hatred] is fed to them. It is not enough to deplete the militants’ assets. We need to defeat their ideas, and that means marginalizing their leaders... Their war never ends – unless and until all the world accepts their construction of Islam... Jihad, in its seventh century origins, is a forcible, military concept.”

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In collaboration with the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada will host the

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Andrew McCarthy concludes that we are not at war with terror, but at war with militant Islam. “Militant Islam is our enemy. It seeks to destroy us; we cannot co-exist with it. We need to defeat it utterly.”

After reading Ralph Peters’ “In Praise of Attrition”, I remain somewhat doubtful that Western society is convinced, yet, of how dedicated religious terrorists are to their task of imposing their lifestyle values on Western civilization and to destroy our way of life. A study, undertaken two years ago, sought to determine the link, if any, between poverty and a lack of education, and acts of terrorism – the so-called “root causes” of terrorism. The researchers were unable to link, conclusively, poverty and low levels of education with those – including suicide bombers – who participate and support acts of terrorism. Their analysis of the data indicates that members of terrorist organizations, and their supporters, possess higher levels of education and, economically, form a higher socio-economic stratum than originally suspected.

More recently, this past June, Dr. Marc Sageman, counterterrorism advisor to the U.S. government and professor at the University of Pennsylvania, asserted in *Understanding Terror Networks*, that the conventional wisdom on Islamic terrorism is wrong. He stated that Islamist militants defy stereotypes, and the theory that terrorists are poor, angry and fanatically religious is a myth.

Dr. Sageman studied 400 members of terrorist networks from North Africa, the Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia. Of this sample, he showed that 75 percent come from upper- or middle-class backgrounds; and that 60 percent are college educated. From this sample, and from some other similar studies, one would wonder what values are being taught and by whom, to facilitate the recruitment and training of terrorists. This, indeed, raises the prospect, as does Mr. McCarthy, that terrorists are the product of brain-washing beginning at a very early age.

If Western society comprehended how dedicated terrorists are to imposing their lifestyle on us (and to killing us to achieve their objective) we would find it easier to agree with Peters. While, no doubt, it may be a noble intent to seek the resolution of conflict through dialogue and the promotion of ‘human security’, this is not the time for such experiments. Islamic terrorists are not listening to Western dialogue, and have no intention of listening. While Ralph Peters’ comments may appear to be audacious they are, nevertheless, insightful into the type of thinking that must be done to wage a successful War of terror. Accomplishing such a shift in Western society’s thinking to address the issue of terrorism as a threat to our values will be a significant challenge for all of us.

Attrition and Asymmetric Warfare

Brian MacDonald

Tommy Franks and the Lanchester Equations

Ralph Peters is right. At the end of the day, all wars are wars of attrition—always have been, always will be.

And the insights contained in the famous Lanchester Equations are as valid today as they were in 1916 when F.W. Lanchester first published them.

The key insight comes from the Lanchester Square Law which, simply expressed, says that the attrition experienced by Red Force is equal to the size of Blue Force times the combat efficiency of Blue Force, or for those (like gunners) who actually enjoy the mental stimulation of dealing with mathematical formulae:

$$dR/dt = -(bB)$$

where dR/dt is the attrition rate over time experienced by Red Force, B is the numerical strength of Blue force, and b

the combat efficiency of Blue force.

In turn, combat efficiency is dependent on the state of training of Blue forces’s soldiers, and the efficiency of their weapons systems in being able to locate Red force’s soldiers, and to bring accurate lethal fire upon them.

There is, of course, a simultaneous mirror image attrition experienced by Blue Force:

$$dB/dt = -(rR)$$

All well and good in terms of the 1916 battlefield, where the combat efficiencies (b , r) of the two sides were roughly equivalent, with perhaps a slight edge to the Germans against the French and British, and a slight edge to the Canadians against the Germans, and the outcome of the war dependent upon who had the “biggest battalions.”

Where things have changed radically since, especially in the

THE WAR STUDIES PROGRAMME

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA

3rd WAR STUDIES SYMPOSIUMGlobal Insurgency, Terrorism and Special Operations in the 21st Century

20-21 OCTOBER 2004

The War Studies Programme of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in conjunction with the Joint Special Operations University, USA will be holding a Symposium on 20-21 October 2004 on the topic of 'Global Insurgency, Terrorism and Special Operations in the 21st Century'. The speakers are from academia and the intelligence and military communities. The aim of the Symposium is to provide a forum to allow for a rigorous expert analysis of these three intertwined issues by using historical and contemporary case studies.

The fee for Symposium attendees is Can\$116.00, which includes coffee; the price for students is Can\$58.00. The cost for the two social events is extra: the Buffet Supper (Can\$35.00); and the Mess Dinner (Can\$50.00).

For further information please contact the War Studies Programme by e-mail, WarStudies@rmc.ca; or by telephone, (613) 541 6000, ext 3909.

last two decades, has been in the RMA technology multipliers available to American forces, which have achieved a much higher probability of accurately identifying a target location, particularly at night, and a much higher probability, with GPS weapons, of target destruction.

Add to this an intensive American collective training system, which includes de facto rehearsals for situation specific combat, and the *b* of Blue force has now skyrocketed, and with it the Red Force attrition rate dR/dt .

Artillery General Tommy Frank's two brilliant Lanchester blitzkrieg campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq attest to the overwhelming attrition exchange rates now achievable by American forces in conventional operations. The new reality is that no military on the planet can meet the Americans in conventional war, and hope for anything other than their own total battlefield destruction.

The Americans are now *Masters of Lanchester War*.

Sun Tzu and the Art of Asymmetric Attrition

Sun Tzu, of course, says, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."

And this dictum leads to the concept of the possibility of asymmetric responses to the unbeatable American Lanchester

supremacy.

One asymmetric response to the overwhelming American Lanchester advantage has been the search for weapons of mass destruction, delivered by a ballistic or hypersonic cruise missile. The American response has been an attempt to limit the development of such capabilities either by diplomatic means (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime), or by the new doctrine of pre-emption, articulated in President Bush's June 2002 speech at West Point.

The other asymmetric response, however, is far more subtle, and represents an effort to change the nature of war, from the American Way of the physical attrition battle of the Lanchester equations, to one which sidesteps the American Way in favour of a new war of psychological attrition—one which seeks to destroy Blue Force's will to fight, either by destroying the morale and will to fight of Blue Force's military elements, or more pointedly, by destroying the morale and commitment of the Blue Force civilian population and its leadership, and their willingness to continue the war.

The great case study of a successful asymmetric attrition campaign is, of course, Vietnam, where an American military, which won every significant conventional Lanchester battle, nonetheless lost the war of psychological attrition to a militarily inferior opponent.

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A second dimension of an asymmetric attrition campaign is related to the key problem of all coalitions— keeping the coalition together where the individual coalition members do not share identical strategic motivations.

And that brings us to Sun Tzu's second dictum: "Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy."

...if Sun Tzu were living today, he would very much include the concept of "public diplomacy"

No doubt, if Sun Tzu were living today, he would very much include the concept of "public diplomacy" waged through the media, and in particular television, which has such intense power through the presentation of visually powerful images which cause the viewer to "fill in" a "socially constructed" reality which is based, in part, upon the principle of "seeing is believing."

Iraq and The Lanchester Equations: The American Way

From the Lanchester perspectives the Americans are winning.

A quick search of a number of reputable internet sites dealing with contemporary military affairs produces such figures as John Pike's Global Security.Org estimate (www.globalsecurity.org) of about 1,000 American combat deaths in the period March 2003 to August 2004. James Dunnigan's Strategy Page (www.strategypage.com/) agrees broadly with Pike's figures, but Dunigan also points out that 1/3 of the deaths were not combat related.

Moreover, Dunnigan points out that whereas the combat death rate in Vietnam averaged 18.5 per thousand over the seven year period of that war, the combat death rate in Iraq has averaged 3.6 per thousand, or about 22% of the Vietnam rate.

While exchange ratios are notoriously difficult to calculate in urban guerrilla campaigns, it is clear that the exchange rates between American/Iraqi forces and the al Sadr militia do not favour the insurgents. Dunnigan reports that in the nine days of fighting around the Imam Ali shrine complex in Najaf ending on August 16, losses were estimated at around 500 on the insurgent side, as opposed to five Americans and 20 Iraqis, for a 20 to one exchange rate for the combined force, or 100 to one for the American component, a rather impressive Lanchester exchange ratio.

Dunnigan notes, too, that the US Army is having no difficulty in meeting its recruiting goals, and that the rate of re-enlistment of junior officers (Lieutenants and Captains) has risen from about 90% to about 94.5%. So, we are not seeing the morale erosion among American troops in Iraq, that there was in

Vietnam.

Moreover, the Iraqi population itself is divided, with opposition coming primarily from leftover Baathists, disgruntled Sunnis, foreign supported Al-Qaeda forces, and the Iranian supported Al Sadr minority Shia group. But there is significant support for the Americans among the Kurdish and majority Shia populations, including Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani.

One up for the American Way of the Lanchester equations?

Iraq and Sun Tzu - the Asymmetric Attrition Battle

Sun Tzu might argue differently.

Widespread European opposition to the war in the first place, based in part upon traditional anti-Americanism, together with increasing elite uneasiness about the implications of the new American Doctrine of Pre-Emption, led to limited European willingness to deploy troops as part of the American occupation forces in Iraq.

This was followed by the impact of the Madrid train bombing just before the Spanish general elections, which contributed to the Socialist party victory, and the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish troops from the Iraq coalition.

But, the impact upon American public opinion at home is harder to gauge, since poll results on the war correlate highly with political party affiliation in the runup to the elections.

The most recent AP/Ipsos-Reid poll, on Aug 3-5 shows American public opinion about evenly split. Cross break analysis reveals that those opposed include minorities, Northeasterners, Democrats, people who make less than \$25,000 a year and Catholics. Those in favour were Republicans, Southerners, those who earn more than \$50,000 a year, and young adults.

Gallup poll responses to the question "All in all, do you think it was worth going to war in Iraq, or not?" show a decline in support from a high of 76% on May 9, 2003 at the conclusion of Tommy Frank's blitzkrieg, to a low of 44% in a poll taken May 7-9, 2004. By August 8, 2004 support had moved up to 49%.

So, the jury remains out on the asymmetric attrition battle.

Attrition, Peters, and the Siege of Beizers

Peters is quite correct in pointing out that wars continue to be wars of attrition, and we must not shy away from that fact in the "Global War Against Terrorism."

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Whether we are in a ‘Fourth World War’—to use Eliot Cohen’s phrase which has been picked up by a number of the Bush administration’s key figures and supporters (and even given its own section on John Pike’s website)—which is truly a “Clash of Civilizations,” in Samuel Huntingdon’s starkly drawn sense, remains to be seen.

After all, not all of Islam adheres to the ascetic fundamentalism of the Wahabi sect of Sunni Islam.

And, Mr. Peters, there is a fundamental difference between Tommy Frank’s Lanchester campaigns, with low casualties on both sides, and the chilling words of Simon de Montfort after the capture of Beziers in the Albigensian Crusade, “Nec eos omnes—Deus suos agnoset. (“Kill them all. God knows his own.”)

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