


# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR CONSERVATIVE TIMES: *PERSONAL REFLECTIONS*

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Pearson Peacekeeping Centre

November, 2006






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2. THE NEW GLOBAL CONFLICT
3. CANADA AT WAR
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5. THE “AWAY” GAME





# 1. LESSONS FROM GROUND ZERO

- A. Open societies are extraordinarily vulnerable to terrorist attack, regardless of the military forces in their possession.
- B. Things could have been much worse.

*For five centuries, only a state could destroy another state. We are entering a period, however, when very small numbers of persons operating with the enormous power of modern computers, biogenetics, air transport, and even nuclear weapons can deal lethal blows to any society.*

(Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*)




C. We need to defend ourselves.

D. But staying on the defensive would be a recipe for disaster, unless governments are willing for populations to live in perpetual fear, suspend civil liberties, and risk bankrupting treasuries in the hope of building impenetrable defences.

E. Defining “the enemy” is a challenge. Some are self-declared, others merely objects of suspicion. Some are states, others not.

F. It is a complex, costly and often thankless task to try to bring order to parts of the world that may never have known real peace and prosperity.




G. The future will not likely feature “splendid little wars” that can be won the cheap, but long grinding campaigns that will test our resolve and ingenuity.

*In conclusion ...*

H. International security is no longer about nuclear deterrence, containment, alliances, spheres of influence, and monitoring peace accords.

It is about active defences and a worldwide struggle to combat Islamic extremism, to counter the proliferation of WMD, and to rebuild war-torn societies from which terrorist organizations could launch attacks




## 2. THE NEW GLOBAL CONFLICT

These conditions amount to a new world war:

- it is global in scope
- it poses a grave threat to Western interests
- it will be prolonged.

The origins of the conflict can be traced to a conflict within Islam that came into the open with the 1979 Khomeini revolution in Iran. It has since metastasized into radical Islamist insurgencies against a variety of Western interests.

The *jihadist* agenda is inchoate and lacks defined objectives. What makes it especially dangerous is the use of terrorism not as a form of coercive diplomacy but for war-fighting purposes.



# WAR ON SEVERAL FRONTS

1. **Afghanistan**
2. **Iraq**
3. **Campaign to counter proliferation of WMD**
  
4. ***Containment of Iran***
5. ***Struggle for the hearts and minds of young Moslems in Western countries***

# AN ALLIED EFFORT

## AFGHANISTAN

36 countries other than US have 18,000 troops deployed in theatre

Participants include most members of NATO and the EU

\$10.5 billion pledged at the London conference

## IRAQ

46 countries supported US including 18 European states


32 countries other than US have 17,200 troops deployed in theatre

Non-NATO participants include Australia, Japan, ROK

## WMD

More than 70 countries involved:

- *Proliferation Security Initiative*
- *Nuclear Suppliers Group*
- *Australia Group*
- *Missile Technology Control Regime*
- *Global Partnership Program*



# AFGHANISTAN

## SECURITY

- 80% of country most peaceful in 30 years
- 60,000 former combatants disarmed, heavy weapons cantoned, commanders integrated into government
- 190,000 landmines removed

## POLITICAL

- New constitution and government
- 10 million voted, 6000 ran, 25% of elected were women

## ECONOMIC

- Economy has grown by 50%, currency stable
- Three million refugees/IDPs have returned
- 80% of population has access to health services
- Six million children in school (94%)
- Roads and power grids being built
- Construction and agriculture booming

# IRAQ

## SECURITY

- Government now has security presence throughout country
- Size of Iraqi security forces on duty has grown from about 9,000 in May/03 to 322,600 in Nov/06
- Rate of attacks at historic highs, but numbers of Iraqis and non-Iraqis killed well below previous peaks

## POLITICAL

- Termination of CPA, new constitution ratified, elections held, government formed in June/06, 740 judges trained.
- 168 commercial TV/radio stations, 268 independent newspapers
- Iraq ranks 4<sup>th</sup> in Mideast on Index of Political Freedom
- 47% confident that Iraq is headed in right direction (up from 30% in Mar/06)

## ECONOMIC

- Nominal GDP increased from \$13.6B in 2003 to \$29.3B in 2005
- Crude oil production below, electricity above pre-war levels
- Non-US pledges of reconstruction aid \$14.5B



# US TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 2003

## US TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 2003



### 3. CANADA AT WAR


**Canada is involved whether it wants to be or not**


- 24 Canadians were killed on 9/11**
- North America is now a theatre of operations**
- Canada lies outside the *Dar al-Islam***
- Greatest threat to Canadians and their economic livelihood would be the detonation of CBRN device anywhere on continent.**

**But Canada's privileged history and past failures of leadership have inured the population to international security threats.**

**Biggest challenge will be to change mindsets. The best way to do that is with facts that explain the new realities.**

# CANADIAN FORCES INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS 1980-2006






## RESPONSE TO 9/11

Canada's initial response to 9/11 was to minimize the impact of the attacks, make only the changes that were absolutely necessary, and try to keep costs down.

Nonetheless, the changes turned out to be substantial:

- The first articulation of a *National Security Policy*
- New machinery of government
- \$10 billion in new security-related expenditures
- A far-reaching transformation of the Canadian Forces
- The largest military engagement abroad since Korea.




## FIVE YEARS LATER

**But five years later, there remains widespread scepticism that Canada has much to fear.**

**In official circles, there is a propensity to believe US policy is the real problem.**

**As a result:**

- Parliamentary support remains fragile for measures to ensure safety and security (anti-terrorism legislation, defence spending, further military involvement abroad)**
- The public is increasingly nervous about the one area where Canada's performance has been outstanding, i.e. Afghanistan**
- Issue of Canadian participation in missile defence continues to defy rational discussion.**




# STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

The goal is the preservation of the Canadian way of life, i.e. to safeguard:

- freedom from physical attack or coercion,
- freedom from internal subversion,
- freedom from erosion of the political, economic and social values that we cherish.


## FOUR LINES OF DEFENCE

1. In the minds of Canadians.
2. Airspace, maritime approaches, ports of entry, and borders.
3. Cooperation with the United States
4. Failed and fragile states



## 4. THE HOME GAME

- **Protection of Canadian Moslem communities vulnerable to exploitation by jihadist elements.**
- **Hardening of the physical and cyber infrastructure that assures the security of food, water, energy, health and emergency response resources.**
- **Enhanced domain awareness.**
- **Development of a common security perimeter with the US.**
- **New continental security and defence architecture.**
- **Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence.**




# CONTINENTAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE ARCHITECTURE

Following 9/11, both Canada and the United States created new institutions with mandates for security and defence.

DHS and PSEPC face special coordination challenges in securing borders:

- Over 5000 kms long
- 37,000 trucks per day
- \$1.8 billion in trade per day
- At Windsor/Detroit, every four-hour delay costs Ontario \$7M and Michigan \$14.3M in lost production.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)	PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC)
US NORTHERN COMMAND (NORTHCOM)	CANADA COMMAND (CANADACOM)




# NORTHCOM AND CANADA COMMAND

**Commands have similar missions to defend homeland and to provide support to civilian authorities for disaster response. Natural partners in the common defence.**

**But differences are important.**

- NORTHCOM has few resources of its own, while Canada Command has operational control over all CF not destined for deployment abroad.**
- NORTHCOM reflects a “never again” spirit that is disinclined to leave any dimension of US security to others.**
- Commander of NORTHCOM is double-hatted as commander of NORAD, placing him in a conflict of interest between his US and bi-national responsibilities. Canada Command is excluded from responsibility for NORAD.**



# NORAD IN EVOLUTION

**On 9/11, NORAD failed to meet its surveillance and control challenge – though it was tardy requests for assistance not rapid response that prevented defence of New York and Washington.**

**Improvements have made a repetition nearly impossible:**

- Links with FAA and NavCan are much improved**
- Increased number of dispersal sites, more interceptors on stand-by, patrols over cities and critical infrastructure.**

**In August 2004, NORAD treaty was amended to permit NORAD's missile warning function to be used by US military commands charged with missile defence.**


**In May 2006, NORAD mandate was expanded to include maritime warning and extended indefinitely.**



# Surveillance / Control Challenge

Canada – 9.98M Km<sup>2</sup>


Europe – 6.57M Km<sup>2</sup>




*Excellence in operations*

Canada

# NORAD AREA OF OPERATIONS






## BUT DOES NORAD HAVE A FUTURE?

*Meanwhile ...*

The commander of NORTHCOM/NORAD has:

- absorbed NORAD's planning staff into NORTHCOM
- announced his intention to shut down CMOC and consolidate the two commands' operations centres at NORTHCOM headquarters



## BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

- The missile threat to North America is small but growing, mostly from North Korea but also from Iran and possibly terrorist groups.
- Two ways to respond (a) arms control, i.e. counter-proliferation and (b) missile defence. Increasingly both are seen as necessary and complementary (NATO policy).
- Current US system designed to meet the limited objectives of 1999 Missile Defense Act employing space-based sensors, ground-based radars, Aegis systems at sea, and unarmed interceptors based in Alaska and California.
- Initial system was stood up in the fall of 2004, but it has yet to be officially declared operational.
- It is highly unlikely Congress would approve any substantial increase in current levels of funding or support significant funding for space-based interceptors.


## BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION 2005

**19 Countries only have ballistic missiles with ranges under 1,000 km**

- |                 |                      |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| Afghanistan     | Ukraine              |
| Armenia         | United Arab Emirates |
| Bahrain         | Vietnam              |
| Belarus         | Yemen                |
| Egypt           |                      |
| Greece          |                      |
| Iraq            |                      |
| Kazakhstan      |                      |
| Libya           |                      |
| Slovak Republic |                      |
| South Korea     |                      |
| Syria           |                      |
| Taiwan          |                      |
| Turkey          |                      |
| Turkmenistan    |                      |



**Countries of concern with ballistic missiles with ranges over 1,000 km**



### Strategic Missiles of 5 Declared Nuclear-Weapon States

Country	Missile	Type	Range
China	DF-5A	ICBM	13,000 km
France	M45	SLBM	6,000 km
Russia	SS-18	ICBM	9,000-11,000 km
	SS-19	ICBM	10,000 km
	SS-24	ICBM	9,000-11,000 km
	SS-25	ICBM	10,500 km
	SS-27	ICBM	10,500 km
	SS-N-18	SLBM	6,500-8,000 km
	SS-N-20	SLBM	8,300 km
	SS-N-23	SLBM	8,300 km
United Kingdom	Trident II/D-5	SLBM	7,400+ km
United States	MX Peacekeeper <sup>1</sup>	ICBM	9,650+ km
	Minuteman III	ICBM	9,650+ km
	Trident I/C-4	SLBM	7,400 km
	Trident II/D-5	SLBM	7,400+ km

1. To be removed from service by October 1, 2005.


### Missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km in 6 Countries of Proliferation Concern

Country	Missile Name	Range
India	Agni II	2,000-2,500 km
Iran	Shahab III	1,300 km
Israel	Jericho II	1,500 km
North Korea	No Dong	1,300 km
	Taepo Dong I	1,500-2,000 km <sup>2</sup>
	Taepo Dong II	5,500 km <sup>3</sup>
Pakistan	Ghauri/No Dong	1,300 km
	Ghauri II	1,500-2,000 km
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	2,600 km <sup>4</sup>

2. The sole test of the Taepo Dong I flew 1,320 km. Some experts speculate that an operational third stage and reentry vehicle would allow the Taepo Dong I to deliver a light payload over 5,500 km.

3. The Taepo Dong II has not been flight-tested. The 2001 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat speculates that, with a lighter payload, it could have a 10,000-km range.

4. Saudi Arabia purchased CSS-2 missiles from China in 1987 and has never tested them.




## CANADIAN PARTICIPATION

***At 2002 NATO summit, leaders approved a study “to examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts”.***

**At least ten Western countries are building ballistic missile defence systems, three of whom are contributing directly to the US BMD system (UK, Denmark, Japan). Others have cooperative MOUs with the US.**


**The Canadian position is that:**

- (a) the government recognizes the threat and understands why US and others would want to have a defence system,**
- (b) the government is not prepared to reopen issue of Canadian participation at present time.**



## 5. THE AWAY GAME

- Organizing for war
- Focusing international assistance on the global conflict
- Creating a full-scope Canadian foreign intelligence capability




## ORGANIZING FOR WAR

**In conditions of global conflict, security needs to become the principal driver of national policy.**

**No “world war” can be fought successfully with a mindset of business-as-usual, providing only for adjustments at the margins of existing attitudes and behaviours.**

**“Victory” needs to be defined, objectives set, resources mobilized, and government structures and spending patterns aligned accordingly.**




## ORGANIZING FOR WAR (II)

Responsibility for leadership ultimately lies with the PM and ministers. In previous global conflicts, governments have established a special committee of Cabinet to manage the war effort.

Apart from the agencies dealing with domestic security, key departments will be those responsible for international operations: foreign affairs, national defence, development assistance.

At issue is the direction and pace of the transformation processes each department has under way. The Canadian Forces have advanced the farthest to date.




# FOCUSING INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Public money directed at protecting and promoting Canadian interests abroad likely exceeds \$20 billion per year.

While much of the total is “non-discretionary”, a significant portion can (and is) reprofiled from year to year in response to shifting priorities.

The largest single pool of money available for “discretionary” international expenditures is CIDA’s annual budget of \$2.7 billion.

In FY 2005-06, not one of CIDA’s nine declared “countries of focus” or 25 “partner countries” included Afghanistan. Only four were among the two dozen worst cases of failed states – and they did not include Sudan or Haiti.




# A CANADIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Canada has long had a security intelligence service (RCMP Security Service, CSIS since 1984). But it is the only G-8 country never to have established a foreign intelligence service.

At issue is whether Canada needs more/better foreign intelligence than it now receives from various sources, and if so whether it should set up a distinct foreign intelligence service.

To date, it has been argued that Canada's needs have been sufficiently well met as not to justify the substantial cost involved in setting up a new agency of government.




## A CANADIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (II)

**The case in favour is a strong one:**

**-- A foreign intelligence capability is a fundamental asset of international statecraft. All of Canada's major allies and adversaries recognize the importance of ensuring national leaders have the best possible information.**

**-- Intelligence-sharing arrangements with allies are no longer an adequate substitute. In the post-Cold War era, friendly agencies collect only what they themselves need. Sometimes, they don't want to share.**

**-- Canada has specific needs of its own. It needs to be able to confirm information supplied by others, and to collect information on adversaries engaged in activities detrimental to specific Canadian interests.**



## A final thought ...

*“The most dangerous enemy to Israel’s security is the intellectual inertia of those who are responsible for security (David Ben-Gurion)”*

Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command