



# SECURITY & DEFENCE BRIEFING

FROM THE DESK OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR



## “ELECTION SEASON IS UPON US!”

1 SEPTEMBER 2015 (08-2015)

It has been over a month since our last *Security & Defence Briefing*, when rumours and uncertainty still surrounded the expected start date of the official election campaign (even if the unofficial one had started many months before). Yet, at the beginning of August, Prime Minister Stephen Harper dropped the writ – Parliament was dissolved and the election campaign was finally, officially on.

The next several weeks will prove very interesting, albeit in some ways equally exhausting. The first of many political leaders debate has already taken place, with all four leaders (Stephen Harper, Justin Trudeau, Thomas Mulcair, and Elizabeth May) coming out of it relatively unscathed. Political ads of all stripes now dominate the airwaves, and the lawn signs of various candidates are being seen across Canada (including here in Ottawa).

All three major political parties (Conservatives, NDP, Liberal) have already staked out different positions on key security and defence issues, not least on current government's decision to commit air assets

for operations in Syria/Iraq and military trainers to support Iraqi Kurdish forces; the NDP being wholly against such a campaign, and the Liberals criticizing the utility of Canada's role in the air war but also arguing for a more vigorous training role in Iraq, although without sufficient details.

Their policy announcements have also dealt with defence issues, with the Conservatives promising an increase in the Reserve Force from 24,000 to 30,000 personnel, the Liberals pledging \$300 million for military and veteran support programs per year, and the NDP possibly proposing a modest increase in defence spending, if recent rumours are to be believed.

The CDA Institute remains committed to offering a range of different voices to comment on security and defence issues. We are pleased that our forthcoming issue of *On Track*, to be released in late September shortly before the federal election, will feature numerous articles exploring different facets of Canadian security and defence policy. This issue has a broad

theme of giving advice to the new government that takes power after 19 October, so its planned release in late September is a timely one indeed.

Furthermore, the Institute's *Blog: The Forum* has played an important role as a platform for different security and defence voices, where we can have commentators criticizing Canada's current approach to ISIS from different perspectives ([here](#) and [here](#)), arguing against the tokenism of our recent [military engagements abroad](#), exploring the issue of [defence policy in the federal election](#), and covering a number of timely international security issues with important implications for Canada, from [nuclear weapons in the Arctic](#) to the [Islamic State](#) to [China's rise](#).

I would be remiss if I did not also mention the important media engagement role played by our CDA Institute Board of Directors and the CDA Regular and Associate Member Associations (CDA RMA and AMA). We do our best to capture their commentaries and interviews on our website, and I would certainly encourage

Board Members and CDA Associations to inform our Administration and Public Relations Manager, Meaghan Hobman ([mhobman@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:mhobman@cdainstitute.ca)), of any media engagement. I would also encourage all CDA Institute Board Members to use their affiliation with the CDA Institute when speaking to media or writing op-eds – although I certainly understand that it might not always be possible, especially for those who have multiple affiliations. But it would certainly help to magnify the CDA Institute’s media outreach.

I am pleased with the efforts being made to complete our 25th Anniversary Vimy Award commemorative book, *The Vimy Award 25 Years with a Companion History of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute*, which has come together extremely well over the past few months. Volunteers and staff have dug through the records and done interviews to produce a document that has some interesting insights and even a few surprises.

Il me fait très grand plaisir que le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy de l’Institut de la CAD, présidé par le Major-général Daniel Gosselin (ret.) a choisi à l’unanimité comme lauréat du Prix Vimy 2015 l’honorable Hugh D. Segal, C.M. Ce prix prestigieux est présenté annuellement à un canadien ou à une canadienne qui a contribué de façon exceptionnelle à la sécurité



et à la défense du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le prix Vimy est ainsi nommé en l’honneur de la bravoure et des sacrifices des soldats canadiens qui ont été victorieux lors de la bataille de la Crête de Vimy, en avril 1917. M. Segal est un canadien de grande renommée qui a démontré un dévouement hors-pair au service du Canada.

**The Vimy Award will be presented to the Honourable Hugh Segal on Friday, 6 November**, at a mixed gala reception and dinner in the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. To purchase tickets or inquire about sponsorship opportunities, please contact

our Business Development and Programs Manager, Denise Lemay ([denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca) or 613-290-6198).

In addition, planning for the 18th Annual Graduate Student Symposium that will take place on 15-16 October at the Royal Military College of Canada is going extremely well. Numerous young scholars and graduate students from across North America have agreed to participate at this seminal graduate student event. Registration will be available early September.

Lastly, with summer almost over, I also wanted to offer my sincere thanks to our hard-working co-op student Analysts, Lindsay Coombs and Celeste Longo. Celeste did a truly remarkable job translating a large section of the Vimy commemorative book, and we wish her all the best in her studies at the University of Ottawa. We are pleased that Lindsay will be staying on with us for one-day per week for the fall. She will be joined by two new Analysts: Bradley MacKay and Ariel Shapiro. We look forward to welcoming them to our small but mighty team.

Tony Battista

# NEW RESEARCH FELLOW - RICHARD SHIMOOKA

Between 2007 and 2012, Richard Shimooka was a fellow at the Defence Management Studies Programme at Queen's University. Richard has written several works that cover a diverse array of topics, including Canadian defence and foreign policy, procurement policy and organizational culture. This includes several articles for the *Canadian Military Journal*, and a book, *Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: The Influence of External Studies and*

*Reports on National Defence Policy - 2000 to 2006* (Queen's School of Policy Studies) with Douglas Bland.

Richard holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the University of Wales Aberystwyth and a Bachelors with Honors in Political Studies from Queen's University.



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# AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE: CAN THERE BE COOPERATION UNDER THE COUNTERFORCE DILEMMA?

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SELECTED FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

*CDA Institute guest contributor Nancy Teeple, a PhD candidate from Simon Fraser University, examines the prospects of an Arctic nuclear weapon-free zone in light of recent US-Russian tensions and the growing nuclear counterforce capabilities of both countries. This piece was first published in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#).*

The promise of stability-enhancing and confidence-building measures under the New START agreement is waning. Obama's Prague Agenda and New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed between the United States and Russian Federation in Prague on 8 April 2010, hoped to see reductions in nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems by 2018 – an agreement made at a time of significantly reduced tensions between the former nuclear competitors. The renewal of tensions between the West and a revanchist Russia under President Putin, particularly apparent in the Ukraine crisis, threatens the longevity of arms control.

The possible results of this trend are worrisome. We could see the deterioration of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and any prospects for global disarmament enshrined in the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and promoted by groups like Ploughshares and the Nuclear Security Project. These conditions have implications for proposals for an Arctic nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) promoted by notable individuals from foundations such as the Canadian Pugwash Group, Gordon Foundation, and Science for Peace.

The fear of nuclear weapon use for the most part declined since the end of the Cold War. The reduction of tensions between the East and West encouraged bilateral arms control negotiations not seen since détente in the 1970s. The emergence of movements promoting a world without nuclear weapons reinforced notions that the nuclear era was over, and that remaining stockpiles had to be destroyed to prevent potential accidents. Not surprisingly, nuclear weapons are considered by many to be a relic of the Cold War.

However, following the rise of Putin, the emergence of asymmetric threats, and new near-peer competitors such as China, the Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and pursued rapid modernization of the US nuclear triad in order to counter the threat of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) from rogue nations and terrorists. These actions reinvigorated the security dilemma between the US, on one side, and China and Russia, on the other, with the latter two viewing the development of offensive nuclear weapons systems as threatening – in so far as the development of counterforce capabilities geared towards targeting another state's nuclear arsenal can be seen as both a challenge to their second-strike capabilities and a repudiation of mutually assured deterrence. A new arms race ensued. Both China and Russia are modernizing their own nuclear arsenals, and Russia has ignited a new Cold War over the North with the renewal of long-range bomber patrols near the airspace of NATO member Arctic states.

Geopolitically, the Arctic may become a region of military confrontation, particularly with the rapid militarization by the Arctic-5 states (Canada, Norway, Denmark, Russia, and the United States), especially Russia, in enhancing their Arctic capabilities to defend economic interests in the region. In addition, although the United States, Russian, and NATO articulate an interest in reducing their nuclear arsenals and missions, they also reaffirm

reliance on a credible deterrent capability so long as nuclear weapons are in the world.

This is the context within which global players must consider the feasibility of an Arctic NWFZ. Is such an initiative in the national interests of the United States and Russia? Would such a régime provide the stability needed for further cooperation on arms control and disarmament? What sort of role could smaller but influential states, such as Canada, play in encouraging bilateral negotiations to consider reducing nuclear forces in the Arctic? These are the questions that must guide any Arctic NWFZ initiative. Options must also be considered that involve compromises and concessions in order to

minimize possible defections. What sort of agreement could find receptivity in both the United States and Russia?

An Arctic NWFZ must be tailored to the unique geographical and geopolitical character of the region and boundary options may not start out as comprehensive zones. Inclusion and exclusion zones involving the seabed, subsea, surface, and airspace must be considered. It might be prudent to explore provisions from existing NWFZs and other regional treaties banning nuclear weapons, such as the Antarctic Treaty, Seabed Treaty, and Outer Space Treaty. Limited geographical zones have been proposed, such as the Northwest Passage, which would open up opportunities either for resolution of the

disputed status of the strait, or provide options for joint Canada-US monitoring and enforcement.

Another option involves establishing an exclusion zone in the Canadian Basin, located north of the Beaufort Sea. If Canada's claim to the seabed that extends into the Basin is recognized by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ottawa may be able to promote a NWFZ through administering its sovereign rights to protect the sea life by prohibiting nuclear-carrying vessels that pose a threat to the environment.

In establishing an Arctic NWFZ régime that would be receptive to the US and Russia, a potential option has been proposed by experts at Pugwash. This would

Two Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines of the newer Project 955 Borei-class at the Northern Fleet submarine base in Gadzhiyevo. (Image courtesy of Russia Defence Policy Blog.)



be a treaty to prevent nuclear weapons in the entire region above the Arctic Circle. In order to be strategically feasible, this option would have to be adapted to the counterforce postures of the US and Russia by allowing the continuation of nuclear deterrence operations, as well as the replacement of nuclear warheads with conventional alternatives.

The modernization of the US nuclear triad is already being adapted for conventional counterforce options on both ballistic missile and air delivery systems. Russia is also developing a hypersonic conventional delivery system – an answer to the US Conventional Prompt Global Strike program. Like the United States, Russia’s air and sea-based deterrents can be outfitted with conventional warheads. This option acknowledges the reality that Russia’s Northern Fleet, which includes its ballistic missile submarines, is based

mainly above the Arctic Circle. Russia would not likely be receptive to any arrangement that would restrict its sea-based deterrent, placing it at a strategic disadvantage to the United States.

These options may have been possible before the spring of 2014. However, under current conditions getting the US and Russia to the negotiating table to consider new arms control agreements does not seem feasible. Relations between the US/NATO and Russia can be characterized by Russia’s mistrust of NATO in Eastern Europe, accusations on both sides of violating the INF Treaty, Russia’s perception of the threat posed by US offensive counterforce weapons, Russia’s growing declaratory reliance on nuclear weapons, and the growing military and economic competition in the Arctic pitting Russia against the other Arctic states. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in early

2014, followed by military interventions in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, has intensified conditions of mutual mistrust, threat, and uncertainty.

Such conditions tend to militate against the potential for an Arctic NWFZ and must be mitigated before the nuclear powers are likely to consider cooperation. Unfortunately, a new détente is very unlikely in the foreseeable future. ■


*Nancy Jane Teeple is a Doctoral Candidate in Political Science at Simon Fraser University. Her areas of study include nuclear strategy, arms control, Arctic security, and intelligence.*

## CDA Institute Blog: The Forum

The CDA Institute Blog: The Forum (<http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog>) covers issues related to the Canadian Armed Forces, Canada’s security and defence policy, and international security.

We welcome original submissions on a variety of security and defence topics. Submissions should range from 800-1000 words (and 1200 max).

Publication on The Forum is at the discretion of the Editor. Posts should be sent to the Editor, David McDonough, at [david.mcdonough@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:david.mcdonough@cdainstitute.ca).



# GRIDLOCK ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: IS THERE A WAY OUT?

SELECTED FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

*CDA Institute guest contributor Leszek Buszynski from the Australian National University discusses North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the challenges facing the Six Party Talks. This piece was first published in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#).*

There has been gridlock on the Korean Peninsula since the Six Party Talks – involving North and South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan – were terminated by North Korea's withdrawal in April 2009.

Initiated in August 2003, their immediate purpose was the termination of North Korea's nuclear program, but they held out the prospect of a wider security régime for Northeast Asia. It was hoped that the Six Party Talks could be the vehicle for the integration of North Korea into the region, bringing peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. However, North Korea refused to cooperate and managed to exploit the divisions between the parties to bring its nuclear program to completion. The North conducted three nuclear tests, in October 2006, May 2009, and April 2013, which negated the very idea of Six Party Talks as they were originally conceived. Nonetheless, China has been pressing for their revival and has worked

to obtain North Korea's agreement.

The North has declared that it will only come to the talks if its nuclear status is recognized by the other parties, and by the US in particular. In Pyongyang's view the US has learned to live with India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons even though both have violated the non proliferation régime, and it could therefore also learn to live a nuclear North Korea. In the US view there are very great differences between North Korea and India and Pakistan, as the North threatens its neighbours and with its on going ballistic missile program could also threaten American territory. The US and South Korea demand that the North accept denuclearization as a precondition for a revival of the Six Party Talk, which Pyongyang pointedly rejects.

South Korea has been searching for ways to promote inter-Korean dialogue in a way which would reduce tensions on the peninsula and bring about favourable conditions for eventual unification. Two South-North summits were held; one was in 2000 when President Kim Dae-jung met Kim Jong-il, and another in 2007 when President Roh Moo-hyun also met Kim Jong-il. However, the South's hopes were dashed when the North launched two provocative attacks:

the sinking of the South Korean naval frigate Cheonan, with the loss of 46 sailors in March 2010, and the North's artillery shelling of Yeongpeong island in November the same year, provoking a well-deserved uproar in the South. For the South, the unconditional revival of the Six Party Talks would be tantamount to condoning the North's provocations and signalling that it could resort to the same behaviour whenever it wanted.

The US expected that China could use its influence with the North to bring about its denuclearization. However, while China supported the aim of denuclearizing, it also regarded the North as an ally against the US and South Korea. Despite American entreaties, China refused to use its leverage to prod the North towards denuclearization while it was constrained by its relationship with Pyongyang. After its ballistic missile and nuclear tests, China protected the North against American and Japanese demand for tough UN sanctions under Chapter VII. Rather than immediate denuclearization, Beijing sought a freeze of the nuclear program, similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton Administration, and incentives for the North to open up to the world and follow the Chinese path of econom-

ic reform. In the context of reformed North Korea, a less paranoid leadership in Pyongyang might accept denuclearization, such indeed was the hope.

China, however, has experienced much frustration in dealing with the North, which has resisted all pressure to reform; when reforms were attempted by Kim Jong-il in 2002, the whole experiment was quickly aborted. The North ignored Chinese warnings when it conducted its nuclear tests, which revealed that Pyongyang had been exploiting Chinese reluctance to press it over this issue. More recently, China lost its ally in the North Korean system when Jang Song-taek was executed in December 2013. Jang was Kim Jong-un's uncle by marriage and leaned towards China, and his removal revealed the limits of Chinese influence and increased Chinese frustration with the North. China was obliged to approach the South with its proposal for the revival of the Six Party Talks in the expectation that this would have an impact upon its relations with the intractable North. This move is an indication of deep trouble in China's relationship with the North and its inability to press the North to denuclearize.

Six Party Talks are out of the question while the North insists on acceptance of its nuclear status. At least five of the parties (the US, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea) can meet to discuss a

negotiation framework for the Korean Peninsula. Five parties could coordinate their policies on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and bring pressure to bear upon the North to accept this position as a starting point for negotiations. Five party talks could be extended into a framework for cooperation and conflict prevention in the event of régime collapse in the North. They could discuss the management of refugee flows into South and China, the extension of food assistance to the population, and most importantly its missile and nuclear sites.

Without agreement between the parties over these issues, conflict may arise should South Korean and Chinese forces move in to take control in the aftermath of régime collapse. However, it would be in the interest of all to avert the collapse of a nuclear-armed régime with its unpredictable and possibly catastrophic consequences.

It may be possible to encourage trends within the North that could in time bring about changes to the régime. Indeed, trends within the North point to weakened controls over the economy; autonomous management practices have been introduced in farms and factories, private markets have proliferated, and officials have moved into business dealings to secure their economic future. In this context it would be important to in-

crease business contacts with the North in a way that would allow Pyongyang officials to benefit, stimulating those market forces that would bring about eventual change in the North.

South Korea should expand the Kaesong industrial park to include more companies than the current 124 operating there today, and could encourage international participation. Similar initiatives could be proposed where South Korean business groups take advantage of lower wages in the North. To do this, Seoul would have to lift or ease its sanctions on the North, imposed in May 2010 after the sinking of the Cheonan. Rather than quarantining the North, the South's policy should be to engage it in lucrative business deals that would meet the self interest of the Pyongyang leadership and their desire for profit. This approach would demand considerable patience from the external players. But a long term strategy like this is better than no strategy at all. ■

*Leszek Buszynski is a Lecturer at National Security College, Australian National University. His latest book is Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue (Routledge 2013).*

# SCANNING A CLOUDY HORIZON: THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

SELECTED FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

*CDA Institute contributor Meghan Fitzpatrick, who holds a PhD from King's College London (Department of War Studies), comments on the current challenges facing the British Armed Forces. The post was first published (with hyperlinks) in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#).*

Since the end of the Cold War, the British Armed Forces have seen a significant increase in operational tempo. Over the past two decades, troops from the United Kingdom have been deployed on numerous occasions to theatres such as the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. They have been called upon to engage in a variety of activities including high intensity combat operations, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts.

2015 represents a pivotal year for the future of UK defence and security. Several months ago in early May, Prime Minister David Cameron was re-elected in a surprise landslide victory for the Conservative Party. Furthermore, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) are both due for publication later this year. The NSS and SDRS will define and outline British strategic interests and the shape of the Armed Forces for the foreseeable future. Therefore, this is an opportune moment to reflect on the present state of the

British military, the major problems that it currently faces and consider prospects for the future.

In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the military experienced severe budgetary cuts. As spending declined, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was forced to abandon major projects such as the development of the Nimrod surveillance aircraft fleet. During the recent general election campaign, all of the major political parties promised to ring-fence or increase spending in areas like health and education. However, the MoD has received no such assurances (see here and here).

On top of its financial problems, the Armed Forces have seen related reductions in manpower. Moreover, there are plans to further reduce the number of Regular soldiers in the Army from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020. Under the terms of the Whole Force Concept, the military will employ reserve troops and civilian contractors more extensively to save on costs. The MoD is already the biggest user of the private sector within central government and at the height of operations in Afghanistan; around 40 percent of UK personnel in theatre were contractors. This process of outsourcing appears set to continue. Most recently, the MoD decided to outsource its defence logistic commodities and services

to the American company Leidos.

While fighting in Afghanistan has come to an end, the British military remains actively engaged in operations around the world. As Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute noted, the UK is now “facing a level of strain not seen since the end of the Cold War.” The last few years alone have seen continued tensions in the Middle East, the emergence of the Islamic State, military intervention in Ukraine and the subsequent rise of tensions between Russia and NATO. Furthermore, there are growing security concerns in relation to domestic terrorism and migration.

The financial difficulties, manpower cuts and rapidly evolving security environment have all thrown Britain's role in the world and the country's strategic interests into question. Old alliances have also come under strain.

Since WWII, Britain has enjoyed a special relationship with the United States as a key ally and defensive partner. However, tensions between the two countries are beginning to emerge. As British defence spending dipped below the 2 percent GDP target set by NATO, UK officials have met with criticism from their American allies. US Army Chief of Staff General Raymond



Odierno has expressed his concerns about, “the impact of UK defence cuts on...levels of UK-US military cooperation.” In a January 2014 interview with BBC Radio 4, former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates also indicated that, “with the fairly substantial reductions in defence spending in Britain, what we’re finding is that it [the UK] won’t have full spectrum capabilities and the ability to be a full partner as they have been in the past.”

Moving forward, the military will likely face further budgetary challenges, owing to the present limitations on government spending and the continued volatility of the financial markets. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, has suggested that further cuts may be on the way. At the end of May, he “signalled a willingness to go on reducing the department’s [MoD] budget...when he said it would have to make £500m of savings –

1.5 per cent of its budget – this year alone.” If this trend continues, the military will find it difficult to attract and retain skilled personnel or maintain the morale of its present workforce.

However, it is essential that they address this issue. While the ability to generate kinetic force remains paramount, it is becoming increasingly important to develop new capabilities such as cyber warfare.

The modern battlefield requires the recruitment and retention of highly skilled, adaptable and resilient personnel.

Throughout its history, the Ministry of Defence has been accused of not thinking strategically and been characterised as a reactive organization. The upcoming NSS and SDSR both present a critical opportunity to clarify Britain’s strategic priorities and the means to achieve those goals. Many commentators have focused on

Britain’s failure to meet the 2 percent GDP spending target as a sign of a military in decline. However, embracing such decline would be a mistake.

It is obvious that the Armed Forces face significant challenges. Having said that, they are not insurmountable. In a 2013 article for Foreign Affairs, historian Melvyn P Leffler argues that periods of austerity have actually improved US defence strategy. Leffler concludes that, over the past century, these restrictions have helped to underline, “the importance of having a coherent strategic concept, a clear assessment of threats, a precise delineation of interests and goals, and a calibrated sense of priorities.” In other words, tight budgets are not a reason for despair but an opportunity to think outside the box.

By embracing a spirit of perseverance and creativity, the British Armed Forces can forge a new path that embraces innovation without abandoning the lessons of the past. ■

*Dr Meghan Fitzpatrick is a graduate of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She has presented at major conferences across Europe and at the UK Defence Academy. You can find her on Twitter @ kmegfitz*

# WHERE IS DEFENCE IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION?

SELECTED FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

*CDA Institute Research Manager & Senior Editor David McDonough explores the issues of defence policy and procurement in Canada's federal election. This piece was first published (with hyperlinks) in the [CDA Institute's Blog: The Forum](#).*

On 2 August 2015, Prime Minister Stephen Harper asked Governor-General David Johnston to dissolve Parliament – and dropping the writ for what promises to be one of the longest election campaigns in recent history. As I write this, the election is now in full swing, with the first leaders debate having taken place a few weeks back (and an unknown number to go), all parties ramping up their fundraising and “ground game,” political ads increasingly dominating the airwaves, and still with almost two months to go.

All three major political parties (Conservatives, NDP, Liberal) have already staked out different positions on key security and defence issues. The Conservatives have now promised to expand the Reserve Force from 24,000 to 30,000 personnel in its next mandate, which represents a return to its original 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy promise, albeit at a much quicker rate. The Liberals, on the other hand, have pledged \$300 million annually for military support programs, including lifelong pensions for injured veterans.



HMCS Athabaskan is currently undergoing repairs in Halifax. (Image courtesy of the Royal Canadian Navy.)

Of course, it remains to be seen if the next government's funding envelope will increase sufficiently to fulfill either campaign promise. Interestingly, rumours already abound that the NDP may soon propose a small increase in defence spending, which would represent an important turnaround for a party historically ill-inclined towards national defence and overseas military operations. But whether such rumours materialize as campaign promises, and are actually acted upon, is more uncertain.

Yet what is most noticeable about the campaign so far is that defence has been a relatively quiescent topic – a fact that many informed commentators have noted. Even in the 2011 election, political leaders were

quick to raise the issue of Canada acquiring the controversial F-35 aircraft (or, in the case of the government, to defend that decision).

Today, the government faces an even more uncertain procurement record – not least when it comes to fleet replacement for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), evident in the continuing delays in the acquisition of major surface combatants, Arctic ships, and supply ships. Indeed, some worrisome gaps in naval capabilities have now emerged, given the decommissioning of its supply ships (sorely needed for the RCN's blue-water operations) and destroyers (with their crucial command and control and area air defence capabilities). The sole remaining



Political leaders from the Macleans debate in an informal discussion. (Image courtesy of Mark Blinch/Reuters.)

destroyer, HMCS Athabaskan, was damaged in a storm earlier in the year and is currently being repaired in Halifax. But some say the ship is no longer seaworthy, and even with repairs, few people expect it to remain operational for long – perhaps not even until its planned retirement in 2017.

The procurement problems might be most acute for the RCN, but they are far from confined to naval matters. One need only look at the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) fighter-aircraft replacement. Several years after announcing the F-35 with great fanfare, we appear to be no further along in selecting (let alone procuring) a replacement aircraft for our aging CF-18 fighters and the government continues to

meagrely extend the life of its current air fleet.

Fortunately, we have had some recent good news on procurement, such as the long-delayed acquisition of the CF-148 Cyclone maritime patrol helicopter and the commissioning of an interim supply ship to be built at Davie Shipyard (as well as leased ships from Spain and Chile to handle refueling along the east and west coasts, respectively). Furthermore, the successful HCM/FELEX modernization of RCN frigates, which will entail crucial command and control upgrades and improved air defence systems, partially compensates for the loss of our destroyers.

Yet such announcements do little to hide

the many procurement failures over the past several years. The government even seems to have tacitly accepted such a criticism, as shown by their efforts to fix defence procurement with the 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy, although little in the way of concrete evidence on improved efficiency and effectiveness has resulted.

To be sure, it is still very early in a rather extensive election campaign. As such, discussion on the absence on defence issues seems premature. The Munk Debate between political leaders scheduled for September will focus on foreign policy, and one would expect that defence procurement and the country's broader security policy will be discussed in more detail. Neither the NDP nor the Liberals have put out their

own defence policy platforms, and both will likely speak more openly about such issues once their platforms are finally released.

Even then, however, defence issues will likely remain far from the forefront of policy platforms in this election. Simply put, as important as such issues may be, elections are almost never won or lost on defence, national security, or foreign policy in Canada – as all political parties are well aware. It is the economy that has been the pivot by which elections are often determined, even if a case can be made that security and defence should then be a close second. However, one needs to go back to Diefenbaker's defeat in 1963 for the last time such issues took centre stage in Canada.

On top of that, as Steve Saideman has recently said, “[n]one of the three parties are going to want to actually talk about this.” The Conservatives are unusually weak on the defence procurement file, so it is only natural that they would prefer to focus on other issues. The NDP might be keen to criticize the government's handling on this issue. But their supporters will likely be wary of the party drifting too close to the military, especially in light of the more centrist positions the party has staked on economic matters in recent months. And the Liberals have their own historic baggage, given that it was under Jean Chrétien that many of the challenges facing the Canadian Armed Forces began to mount.

Still, if it was only a question of procure-

ment management, both the NDP and Liberals would likely show greater emphasis on this issue, especially as it does not reflect well on the Conservative claim of being competent and sound managers of government. But, as the Parliamentary Budget Office notes, the real challenge facing Canadian defence policy and procurement is a financial one – specifically a budgetary shortfall of between \$33–42 billion, which ongoing procurement delays and management issues have increased. Consequently, it is likely that neither opposition party will be eager to address such an issue; not the NDP, which have never been close to the military and are now eager to show their fiscal bona fides, and not a Liberal Party currently reminding the electorate of their past stewardship of the economy.

In that sense, the absence of defence issues in this election really comes down to a question of money. Simply put, addressing defence challenges requires a greatly expanded defence budget (or at least a significantly altered force structure, which might no longer be “multi-purpose” or indeed “combat-capable,” if one is not careful). And it is likely that no political party would be willing to countenance such a prospect.

The Conservatives would prefer to offer promises of significant funding in the future, with no guarantee such a promise would be kept. If rumours are to be believed, the NDP might accept a minor increase in funding – although this will likely result in a modified force structure geared

towards less combat-focused operations, as described in a recent Rideau Institute-CCPA report – and which I have criticised elsewhere (here and here). It remains to be seen what approach the Liberals will ultimately pursue, but it is difficult to be optimistic.

Political parties focus on getting votes. And unless voters cast their ballot on issues on security and defence, such matters will remain of secondary (if not tertiary) importance. This is an unfortunate situation. It would certainly behoove politicians to treat such issues with both thought and seriousness, as part of their responsibility to safeguard the country and its citizens. And, given the sizable number of serving and retired military personnel and their families, many of whom still pay close attention to such issues, they might even find an unexpected electoral benefit of treating security and defence like a statesman rather than a politician.

Of course, if the past is any indication, I also don't really expect things to change any time soon. It is not without reason that Winston Churchill stated that “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.” ■

*David McDonough is Research Manager and Senior Editor at the CDA Institute, and a research fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. He received a PhD in Political Science from Dalhousie University in 2011.*

## 2015 VIMY AWARD

*HUGH D. SEGAL, C.M. – CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE 2015 VIMY AWARD WINNER*

28 August 2015, Ottawa. The CDA Institute is pleased to announce that the Honourable Hugh D. Segal has been unanimously selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2015. This prestigious award is presented annually to one prominent Canadian who has made outstanding contributions towards the security and defence of Canada and the preservation of our democratic values. The Award honours the bravery and sacrifices of the Canadian soldiers who were victorious at the Battle of Vimy Ridge in April 1917.

Mr. Segal is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of service to Canada. Among his many prominent responsibilities, he was Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Canada in the 1990s; taught at the University of Toronto Law School; and lectured in Strategic Studies on a pro-bono basis for over 20 years at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He was appointed to the Canadian Senate in August 2005.

Mr. Segal retired from the Senate in June 2014 to accept an academic appointment as Master of Massey College, Toronto. He is also an Adjunct Professor in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University and is a Lifetime Fellow of the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Mr. Segal was recently re-appointed Honorary Captain (N) of the Royal Canadian Navy. He has served as Chair of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and as founding Executive Vice President of the Canadian International Council. He has also served on the Council of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute, the Fort Henry Guard, Kingston General Hospital and the Walter Duncan and Duncan Gordon Foundation. He is now Chairman of the NATO Council of Canada.

Recipients of the Vimy Award include eminent Canadians, from a wide variety of backgrounds. The complete list of the recipients for the first 25 years of the Vimy Award (listed in chronological order and with their title/rank – serving or retired – when they received the award) is as follows:



1991 – The Right Honourable Joe Clark  
1992 – General John de Chastelain  
1993 – Major-General Lewis Mackenzie (Ret'd)  
1994 – Major-General William Howard  
1995 – Major-General Roméo Dallaire  
1996 – Dr. Jack Granatstein  
1997 – The Right Honourable Brian Dickson  
1998 – Vice-Admiral Larry Murray (Ret'd)  
1999 – Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile (Ret'd)  
2000 – The Honourable Barnett Danson  
2001 – Air Commodore Leonard Birchall (Ret'd)  
2002 – Colonel, the Honourable John Fraser  
2003 – General Paul Manson (Ret'd)  
2004 – Dr. David Bercuson  
2005 – Mr. G. Hamilton Southam  
2006 – Brigadier-General David Fraser  
2007 – General Raymond R. Henault  
2008 – General Rick Hillier (Ret'd)  
2009 – Warrant Officer William MacDonald  
2010 – The Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson  
2011 – Major-General Jonathan Vance  
2012 – Honorary Colonel Frederick Philip Mannix  
2013 – Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Ret'd)  
2014 – Honorary Colonel Blake Goldring (who dedicated the award to Warrant-Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo)  
2015 – The Honourable Hugh D. Segal

The 2015 Vimy Award Selection Committee was composed of Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret'd) as Chair and, as Members, Lieutenant-General Guy Thibault, General Ray Henault (Ret'd), Lieutenant-General Richard J. Evraire (Ret'd), Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard (Ret'd), Vice-Admiral Ron Buck (Ret'd), Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier (Ret'd), Dr. Oonagh Fitzgerald, Mme Louise Mercier, and Mr. Richard Bertrand.

The award will be presented to Mr. Segal on Friday, 6 November, at a mixed gala reception and dinner in the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. Dinner tickets and corporate sponsorship opportunities are available by contacting Denise Lemay at [denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca).

## PRIX VIMY 2015

*HUGH D. SEGAL, C.M. – GAGNANT DU PRIX VIMY 2015 DE L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFERENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DEFENSE*

Le 28 août 2015, Ottawa. L'Institut de la CAD a le plaisir d'annoncer que l'honorable Hugh D. Segal a été choisi à l'unanimité comme lauréat du Prix Vimy 2015. Ce prix prestigieux est présenté annuellement à un canadien ou à une canadienne qui a contribué de façon exceptionnelle à la sécurité et à la défense du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le prix Vimy est ainsi nommé en l'honneur de la bravoure et des sacrifices des soldats canadiens qui ont été victorieux lors de la bataille de la Crête de Vimy, en avril 1917.

M. Segal est un canadien de grande renommée qui a démontré un dévouement hors-pair au service du Canada. Il occupa le poste de Chef de cabinet du Premier Ministre du Canada dans les années 1990; a enseigné à l'université de Toronto (Faculté en Droit); et pendant plus de vingt ans, a été conférencier invité au collège d'État-major des Forces canadiennes à Toronto. Il fut nommé Sénateur en août 2005.

Le Sénateur Segal a pris sa retraite du Sénat en juin 2014 afin d'accepter le poste de Recteur du Massey College à Toronto. Il est aussi professeur-adjoint à l'université Queen's (School of Policy Studies) et membre à vie du «Institute for Research on Public Policy».

M. Segal a récemment été nommé une deuxième fois au poste de capitaine de vaisseau (capv) honoraire de la Marine royale canadienne. Il a occupé le poste de président du «Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies» et celui de vice-président fondateur du «Canadian International Council». Il siège aussi à titre de membre du «Council of the International Institute of Strategic Studies», du «Fort Henry Guard», de l'hôpital général de Kingston et des fondations Walter Duncan et Duncan Gordon. Il est l'actuel président du «NATO Council of Canada».

Les récipiendaires du Prix Vimy sont d'éminents Canadiens provenant d'une grande variété de milieux. La liste complète des 25 premiers récipiendaires du Prix Vimy (en ordre



chronologique, et incluant le titre/g rade – en service ou à la retraite – qu'ils détenaient lors de leur intronisation au palmarès des lauréats du prix Vimy) est la suivante:

- 1991– Le très honorable Joe Clark
- 1992– Le Général John de Chastelain
- 1993– Le Major-général Lewis Mackenzie (ret.)
- 1994– Le Major-général William Howard
- 1995– Le Major-général Roméo Dallaire
- 1996– M. Jack Granatstein
- 1997– Le très honorable Brian Dickson
- 1998– Le Vice-Amiral Larry Murray (ret.)
- 1999– Le Lieutenant-Général Charles H. Belzile (ret.)
- 2000– L'honorable Barnett Danson
- 2001– Le Commodore de l'air Leonard Birchall (ret.)
- 2002– Le Colonel, honorable John Fraser
- 2003– Le Général Paul Manson (ret.)
- 2004– M. David Bercuson
- 2005– M G. Hamilton Southam
- 2006– Le Brigadier-général David Fraser
- 2007– Le Général Raymond R. Henault
- 2008– Le Général Rick Hillier (ret.)
- 2009– L'Adjudant William MacDonald
- 2010– La très honorable Adrienne Clarkson
- 2011– Le Major-général Jonathan Vance
- 2012– Le Colonel honoraire Frederick Philip Mannix
- 2013– Le Brigadier-général W. Don Macnamara (ret.)
- 2014– Le Colonel honoraire Blake Goldring (qui a dédié le prix à l'Adjudant Patrice Vincent et au Caporal Nathan Cirillo)
- 2015– L'honorable Hugh D. Segal

Le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy de 2015 était composé du Major-général Daniel Gosselin (ret.) qui le présidait, du Lieutenant-général Guy Thibault, du Général Raymond Henault (ret.), du Lieutenant-général Richard J. Evraire (ret.), du Lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard (ret.), du Vice-amiral Ron Buck (ret.), du Lieutenant-général Michel Gauthier (ret.), de Madame Oonagh Fitzgerald, de Madame Louise Mercier, et de M. Richard Bertrand.

Le prix sera remis à M. Segal le vendredi 7 novembre au cours d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala au Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa. On peut se procurer des billets pour le dîner et profiter d'occasions de commandites d'entreprises en joignant Denise Lemay à l'adresse [denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca).

# CDA INSTITUTE BLOG: THE FORUM

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## **If Only There were Real Baathists in the Islamic State...**

By Craig Whiteside

There is a school of thought in the media and elsewhere that the Islamic State is best described as a hybrid of former Baathists from Saddam Hussein's régime and Salafijihadists – a mutation that has supposedly been blessed it with X-Men style super-powers. Proponents argue the presence of these former military officials has given the group more experience and made it more brutal. [READ MORE](#)

## **The Radicalization of the Sinai Insurgency**

By Emmanuel Seitelbach

On 1 July 2015, a series of simultaneously orchestrated attacks against Egyptian forces in the Northern Sinai Peninsula killed 17 soldiers and policemen across five military checkpoints. Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis, an insurgency group that recently swore allegiance to the Islamic State, claimed responsibility for the attacks. [READ MORE](#)

## **Rethinking the 'Hard Approach' to Online Extremist Content**

By Nick Glavin

International terrorist organizations continue to exploit the Internet for propaganda, recruitment, financing, and logistics. Governments and their policy-makers

around the world are struggling to develop sound responses to online extremist content. Implementing reactionary policies and a "hard approach" to counterterrorism may trigger adverse effects. [READ MORE](#)

## **China's 'Space Silk Road' and Strategic Competition in Space**

By Malcolm Davis

In May 2015, the Chinese government released its latest Defence White Paper simply titled 'Military Strategy.' This year's Defence White Paper has been notable in particular for an elevation of the prominence of the People's Liberation Army's Navy's (PLAN) role and a greater attention on building China as a full maritime power. [READ MORE](#)

## **The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century**

By Audrey Kurth Cronin

Warfare is changing, and not just in the most obvious and visible ways. Yes, there are new technologies, newly assertive foes, and new ideologies. But to fully understand how it's evolving, you must examine the broader context in which we are fighting. *(Reposted with permission of ASPI.)* [READ MORE](#)

## **The Iranian Bomb and its Geopolitics**

By Adnan Qaiser

Like family members, hostile neighbours also know you all too well. In the backdrop of the recently concluded Iran's nuclear deal on 14 July 2015, allowing Tehran to pursue its so-called peaceful nuclear program – though with additional checks and protocols – the consternation in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Cooperation Countries is but natural. [READ MORE](#)

## **Media and "Framing" in the Anti-ISIS Campaign**

By Christian Medina-Ramirez

Canada is once again engaged in fighting an insurgency in the Middle East. The "surprising" rise of the so-called Islamic States (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq has left many policy makers baffled. The West, Canada, and our NATO allies seem to be admittedly ignorant on the source of this success. [READ MORE](#)

## **Despite relative merits, Iran nuclear deal may not pass muster**

By Frank Harvey

The U.S. congress has about six weeks to debate and vote on the Iran nuclear deal. Judging by the grilling Secretary of State John Kerry and his team are getting in House and Senate hearings, the deal's proponents are having a hard time addressing at least four key problems. *(Reposted with the author's permission.)* [READ MORE](#)

## **Rising Alone: China's lack of strategic allies**

By Adam MacDonald

Notwithstanding strategic concerns from other great powers, China is accepted as a legitimate actor and a member of the international community. This state of affairs is in stark contrast from the era of Maoist China during much of the Cold War (particularly the Cultural Revolution), when Beijing had an antagonistic relationship with the international system and the two superpowers. [READ MORE](#)

## **Another Take on "Canada's Policy to Confront the Islamic State"**

By Ann Griffiths

Thomas Juneau's recent CGAI policy update, "Canada's Policy to Confront the Islamic State," is an excellent examination of Canada's participation in the multilateral operation to 'degrade' Islamic State (IS) forces in Iraq and Syria. [READ MORE](#)

## **What the West is forgetting: Turkey matters**

By Paul Heinbecker

The situation in the Middle East is never so bad that it can't get worse. Turkey, an island of comparative stability in a sea of unrest, is at risk from a rising tide of insecurity on its borders and instability inside them. Others, including Canada, can and should relieve Turkey's burden and resettle more of the two million refugees that Turkey is

sheltering who can never go home again. (Reposted with the author's permission.)

[READ MORE](#)

## **Nukes: Never again?**

By David Law

The sixth and ninth of August 2015 mark the seventieth anniversaries of the nuclear bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The total death toll exacted by these first ever, and as yet only, use of nuclear weapons may never really be known. [READ MORE](#)

## **Peace in Afghanistan: A Talk that Never Walks**

By Adnan Qaiser

What remains static while travelling around the globe? The dispiriting peace pursuit in Afghanistan, which has become a joke after more than 12 international conferences – including in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Norway, China, and Pakistan – failed to resolve the 14 year conflict. [READ MORE](#)

## **The Laboratory in Discord: The European Union at the 2015 NPT Review Conference**

By Michael Smetana

In late April 2015, the gates of the United Nations headquarters in New York opened for months-long negotiations related to the past and future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This ninth review conference was supposed to follow up on

the developments within the nuclear non-proliferation régime in the last five years and find a consensus on the final document that would outline the steps to be taken in the next review period. [READ MORE](#)

## **Post-NATO Afghanistan: Coping, but only just**

By William Maley

The political and military environment in Afghanistan remains extremely challenging. While recent international attention has been drawn to the rise of the 'Islamic State' group in Iraq and Syria and by the Greek financial crisis, profound tensions continue to haunt both Afghanistan's state-building endeavor and its security environment. (Reposted with the permission of ASPI.) [READ MORE](#)

## **Canada's role in the Anti-ISIS Campaign: Quo Vadis?**

By Lindsay Coombs

Since the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has become a primary focal point of international attention and political debate. News headlines, posts on social media, and scholarly articles depicting the brutality of this group are almost commonplace. [READ MORE](#)



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En tant qu'organisme de bienfaisance, nous cherchons des donateurs pour l'année fiscale 2015-2016. En plus de ses nombreuses publications, durant cette année fiscale l'Institut de la CDA sera l'hôte des événements listé ci-dessous :

1. Le 18<sup>e</sup> Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, 15-16 Octobre, Kingston, ON
2. Le 25<sup>e</sup> Anniversaire du Souper-Gala pour le Prix Vimy, 6 Novembre, Musée Canadien de la Guerre
3. La Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Défense 2016, CAD/CAD Institute, 18-19 Février, Château Laurier
4. Entre 10-12 séances de discussion en table ronde

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As a charitable organization we are seeking donors for Fiscal Year 2015-16. In addition to its many publications the following is a list of events the CDA Institute will host this fiscal year:

1. 18<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium, October 15-16, Kingston, ON
2. 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Vimy Award Dinner Gala, 6 November, Canadian War Museum
3. CDA/CDA Institute 2016 Ottawa Conference on Security & Defence, 18-19 Feb, Chateau Laurier
4. 10-12 Rountable Discussion Series

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# IN THE NEWS

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Selon **Ferry de Kerckhove**, [le Canada n'est pas aussi bien vu à l'étranger qu'auparavant](#). Dans un autre ordre d'idées le Premier Ministre Stephen Harper promet d'élargir [la législation interdite sent aux Canadiens de voyager à l'étranger pour combattre dans les rangs de groupes jugés terroriste](#) par le gouvernement fédéral.

Ferry de Kerckhove also commented on how [GCC countries have responded to the spread of extremism](#) with the adoption of a new policy of interventionism, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring.

A recent article by **Colin Robertson** examines

the Canada-European Union deal and the still-to-be-negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership. He argues that [North American regional co-operation must be taken seriously](#) - and subject that he would later be quoted on in a [Globe and Mail article](#). Mr. Robertson also penned an article outlining [the role of Canadian food production and consumption patterns](#) with regards to the declining rates of those who suffer from hunger.

**George Petrolekas** wrote a piece describing [why focusing on defence during the Canadian election is important](#). In line with this, he also examined how the [Department of National Defence has been silent during the election](#) in

spite of ongoing Canadian air strikes against the Islamic State. In addition, he penned an article on the [usefulness of Mediterranean islands to NATO](#), which largely focused on the possibility of a Greek fifth column.

The CDA Institute's own Executive Director, **Tony Battista**, made an appearance on CTV News where he commented on the [suspension of LCol Mason Stalker](#) in light of charges of sexual misconduct.

# MEDIA ROUNDUP

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**Opération Impact: les CF-18 canadiens ont frappé une cache de munitions et des bateaux de l'EI (45eNord):** Le 28 août 2015, alors qu'ils participaient à des opérations de la coalition en soutien aux forces de sécurité irakiennes, deux de nos CF18 Hornets ont frappé une cache de munitions du groupe armé l'État islamique (EI) ainsi que des bateaux utilisés par ce groupe pour transporter des munitions dans les environs d'Al-Baghdadi à l'aide de munitions à guidage de précision.

**Pentagon taps General Dynamics to test fireball bunker bomb (Flightglobal):** The US Air Force recently awarded a \$7.2 million

contract to General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems Aerospace to develop rocket-propelled fireballs that would have the capacity to incinerate chemical and biological agents.

**Photo: HMCS Summerside and U.S. Coast Guard conduct mock medical evacuation (Ottawa Citizen):** On 24 August 2015 a helicopter rescue crew from Air Station Cape Cod in Massachusetts trained with the Royal Canadian Navy to conduct a mock medical evacuation.

**Ships deploy to the Arctic for Operation NANOOK (Navy News):** HMCS Nanaimo and Saskatoon have recently become engaged

in a 6-week sovereignty operation in the Arctic. Upon arrival, the ships will "conduct surveillance and presence activities in the area for this year's Operation NANOOK."

**Bangkok bombings: Broken security cameras hinder manhunt (CBC News):** The investigation into the explosion in Bangkok has been hindered by broken and blurry security cameras along the getaway route of the primary suspect.

**Les experts ne s'entendent pas sur l'approche du Canada en matière de drones (FM 93):** Des experts partagent des opinions différentes sur l'émergence du drone au Canada. D'une part, des experts croient qu'il y a un manque de fermeté

dans l'application des règles concernant les drones récréatifs, et d'autres affirment que cette approche plutôt permissive permet le Canada de devenir un chef de file mondial dans le domaine.

**United States, Germany ending anti-Assad air defense mission in Turkey (UPI):** The US informed Turkey that its deployment of Patriot air/missile defence units in the country, which expire in October, will not be renewed. Germany's defense ministry has also announced they will be withdrawing their Patriot missiles as well as around 250 troops from Turkey in January 2016.

**Rwandan intelligence agents harassing opponents in Canada, border service says (National Post):** A "secret" Canada Border Services Agency report disclosed in Federal Court, described "a well-documented pattern of repression of Rwandan government critics [by Rwandan intelligence agents], both inside and outside Rwanda [involving threats, attacks and killings]".

**Le Hamas et le Hezbollah tendent la main au Canada (Le Devoir):** Le Hamas et le Hezbollah, deux groupes désignés terroristes par le Canada, suggèrent l'idée d'une coopération avec le Canada afin de parvenir à défaire l'EI, un ennemi commun.

**Russia's Arctic claim to North Pole could be an election issue (CBC News):** Russia's foreign ministry stated that Russia is claiming 1.2 million square kilometres of Arctic sea shelf. According to Robert Huebert from the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, "the election will have a very strong influence on the immediate reaction of the Canadian government."

**Montréal serait le premier foyer de terrorisme au pays (La Presse):** De nouveaux chiffres compilés par Statistique Canada relève que près du quart des infractions criminelles reliés au terrorisme surviennent de Montréal.

**Gormley: Canada's international influence continues to erode (Ottawa Citizen):** Canadian journalist Shannon Gormley explores three key ways in which Canada's international influence continues to erode. Gormley says she is confident that "poor treatment of the United Nations, Canada's diplomats, and its own people can only contract, not expand, our country's international influence."

**One year on, drone attacks against ISIS increasing (CBC News):** Drones have taken on an expanded role in the military campaign against ISIS. But questions remain as to their effectiveness, especially given the recruitment efforts of ISIS. British academic Paul Rogers

concludes that the "Islamic State is able to adapt pretty rapidly to this level of air war, including drone strikes."

**Canadian military cadet websites hacked by Islamic State sympathizers (Ottawa Citizen):** The Canadian Armed Forces have advised military cadet organizations to be cautious of cyber-attacks following a recent incident involving Islamic State sympathizers.

**Steven Blaney announces new funding for cyber security (CBC News):** Public Safety Minister Steven Blaney declared that the Canadian government has committed to providing an additional \$142.6 million over the next five years to "bolster the protection of essential cyber systems." Blaney notes that this will, in turn, assist the private sector in protecting against cyber-attacks.

**New navy tactical unit confronts danger on the high seas (Ottawa Citizen):** The newly established Maritime Tactical Operations Group (MTOG) is anticipated to expand over the next several years. This highly specialized team will be able to perform support tasks to Canadian Special Forces.

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