On 6 April 2016, Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan officially launched the government’s Defence Policy Review (DPR), expected to conclude early in the New Year, perhaps as early as January 2017. The DPR will have an important public consultation element, including six stakeholder roundtables taking place in six cities across Canada (Toronto, Vancouver, Yellowknife, Edmonton, Montreal, and Halifax) from April to June. Sadly, Ottawa is not on the list of cities to have these stakeholder roundtables – although I am confident the CDA and the CDA Institute will be in a position to help fill this particular hole, as well as to assist the Ministerial Advisory panel and the Parliamentary Committees on National Security and Defence, when called upon!

Also of note, the Department of National Defence has a new web portal devoted to the DPR, where individuals can provide commentary and input into the review process using both an e-workbook (for anonymous comments) and a public virtual forum. You can also download a copy of a consultation paper which outlines some of the key issues and questions facing the Canadian Armed Forces to help guide the DPR. If you have not already done so, I would recommend exploring this material.

La Conférence des Associations de la Défense (CAD), ainsi que l’Institut de la CAD, attendent avec intérêt pour participer aux processus de consultations publiques sur la révision de la politique de défense, incluant notre engagement avec le panneau ministériel des quatre membres sélectionnés: L’honorable Louise Arbour, l’honorable Bill Graham, le Général Raymond Henault (en retraite), et Margaret Purdy. En tant que p-dg de la CAD et de l’Institut de la CAD, je tiens à féliciter les quatre membres et en particulier le Général Henault, le président passé de l’Institut de la CAD.

You may have noticed some recent changes to the Governance of the CDA Institute, including changes in titles and nomenclature. This is the result of our ongoing CDA Institute Governance Review undertaken...
The work of the CDA and CDA Institute have not at all slowed down with the Governance Review; in some respects, it has only accelerated! Indeed, the Board and AGM meeting that took place on 18 February occurred in the midst of a very successful CDA and CDA Institute's Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence. The Theme of the Conference was: **National Security Strategies and the Future of Conflict.**

All told, some 630 registrants were at the Chateau Laurier for this major event, which featured the Honourable Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Kent Hehr, Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff.

We were also pleased to have a number of other prominent keynote speakers, including: Lieutenant-General Stephen Wilson, Deputy Commander USSTRATCOM; John Wright, Chief Strategist and Advisor at John Wright Consulting, Jim Thomas, Vice-President and Director of Studies, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, United States; General Tom Middendorp, Commander of the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; General Gratien Maire, “Major Général des Armées,” France; Lieutenant General Mark Poffley, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capabilities), United Kingdom; Lady Olga Maitland, Founder, Defence and Security Forum, United Kingdom; and Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander NORAD & US Northern Command.

Scholars, policy-makers, and other experts took part on four panels at the Ottawa Conference to discuss issues ranging from Canadian security and defence to conventional threats and the danger of terrorism.
Ferry de Kerckhove, membre du conseil de l’Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense - qui a servi aussi comme Vice-Président Exécutif - a présenté le Cahier Vimy 27: Les Perspectives Stratégique du Canada 2016, au tout début de cet événement, qui est disponible pour le téléchargement sur notre site web. Ce document offre de nombreuses pensées, des considérations, et d’analyses importantes sur la sécurité et la défense du Canada. La lecture de ce document est hautement recommandée, et surtout pour ceux qui sont impliqués avec la révision de la politique de défense. Également, nous avons eu le plaisir de présenter le Prix Médias Ross Munro à la lauréate 2015, Christina (Chris) MacLean de FrontLine Defence. Un résumé des deux jours de la conférence, préparé par les analystes actuels et anciens, peut être trouvé sur notre site Web, à côté des photos et des liens aux vidéos de CPAC.

La Conférence d’Ottawa 2016 sur la sécurité et la défense organisé par la CAD et l’Institut de la CAD a été un grand succès grâce à tous les participants, et à la générosité de nos nombreux commanditaires, incluant nos partenaires stratégiques: General Dynamics et Lockheed Martin-Canada; nos commanditaires de niveau platine: CIGI, le Département de la défense et les Forces armées canadiennes; et nos commanditaires de niveau bronze: ADGA et Boeing. Je veux aussi remercier Daniel Gosselin et Richard Evraire qui ont fait un travail extraordinaire en tant que hôtés de la conférence, et remercier ma petite équipe d’employés et de volontaires – et surtout Denise Lemay, l’organisatrice principal – ils se sont tous dévoués à cette grande tâche de façon exceptionnelle. Un gros a merci à tous et à chacune!

J’ai aussi voulu rappeler à tous que la prochaine Conférence du CDA et de l’Institut du CDA à Ottawa sur la sécurité et la défense aura lieu les 16-17 février 2017 qui je pense sera bientôt après la fin de la « DPR » et sera probablement le premier événement majeur pour le gouvernement et la communauté de la sécurité et de la défense. Il sera donc un événement particulièrement important et en temps opportun, et un que je souhaite que vous gardez à l’esprit!

Il a aussi été organisé un forum pour une déclaration de valeur et une analyse des questions de défense. En ces dernières semaines, le Blog: The Forum a publié un certain nombre d’articles avec les opinions des commentateurs qui parlent de différentes questions de défense qui affectent le Canada et de ce que les planificateurs de défense peuvent apprendre de l’expérience de nos alliés clés. De plus, il est prévu de publier plusieurs articles par des experts de la défense dans notre série d’analyse du CDA. Deux ont déjà été publiés – one by Dr. Alexander Moens from Simon Fraser University, the other by our Research Fellow Chuck Davies. Our website also has a resource page on the DPR.


With the DPR’s public consultation taking place until July, the next few months promise to be especially interesting. Stay tuned and do keep checking daily updates on our website!

Tony Battista
The CDA Institute is proud to announce the release today of *Vimy Paper 27 – The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2016: In Search of a New Compass*. This study is unique by providing a holistic strategic survey of the global strategic environment and an assessment on the future direction of Canada’s foreign, security and defence policy.

A must read for anyone interested in Canada’s evolving international role under a new government, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2016* reflects on the security challenges facing Canada and explores its security and defence priorities. Over 25 academics, security and defence consultants and retired leaders from the Canadian Armed Forces were consulted as part of the process of putting together the *Strategic Outlook for Canada 2016*.

The study was authored by Ferry de Kerckhove, Executive Vice-President of the CDA Institute.

”The next year will be crucial for Canadian defence,” says Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Retired), President of the CDA Institute. “We will continue our focus on education and enlightening Canadians on security and defence issues while helping the government to give substance to its desire for Canada to provide constructive leadership in the world.”


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**VIMY PAPERS - GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM**

The CDA Institute is pleased to release the top three papers from its 18th Annual Graduate Student Symposium as part of its Vimy Paper series:

- **Vimy Paper 28**: “Bombs at Home or Fighters Abroad: Domestic Security Policy and its Impact on Migration of Foreign Fighters” by Raphaël Leduc;

- **Vimy Paper 29**: “Innovation in Contact with the Enemy: Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” by Rebecca Jensen;


The 19th Annual Graduate Student Symposium will take place on 16–17 October 2015 at RMCC in Kingston, Ontario. The call for papers is now available.

**Vimy Papers 28-30 can be found at the following link:** [http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/research-and-publications/vimy-papers](http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/research-and-publications/vimy-papers)
The CDA Institute is pleased to release two new CDA Institute Analyses. These Analyses are part of a special series designed to offer independent input on Canadian defence policy in light of the government’s recently launched defence policy review (DPR).

The first Analysis, authored by Dr. Alexander Moens from SFU, explores the benefits of Canada having a maximum range of modest defence capabilities and the need for an Allies and Partners Framework in pursuit of international peace and security. The second Analysis, written by CDA Institute Research Fellow Charles Davies, looks at the recent defence policy updates of key allies, and explores how Canada might best approach building a rational and comprehensive defence policy.

CDA Institute Analyses are available at the following link: http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/research-and-publications/cda-institute-analysis.

NEW RESEARCH FELLOW - ANDREA CHARRON

The CDA Institute welcomes Dr. Andrea Charron as its most recent Research Fellow. Dr. Charron grows a growing list of notable Research Fellows, including Dr. Howard Coombs, Dr. Michael Cessford, Richard Shimooka, Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle, and Col Chuck Davies (Ret’d), as the CDA Institute continues to grow its Fellowship Program.

Dr. Andrea Charron holds a PhD from the Royal Military College of Canada (Department of War Studies). She obtained a Masters in International Relations from Webster University, Leiden, The Netherlands, a Master’s of Public Administration from Dalhousie University and a Bachelor of Science (Honours) from Queen’s University. Dr. Charron worked for various federal departments including the Privy Council Office in the Security and Intelligence Secretariat. She is now Assistant Professor at the University of Manitoba, Political Studies and Deputy-Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

Dr. Andrea Charron détient un doctorat du Collège militaire royal du Canada (en études sur la conduite de la guerre). Elle a obtenu une maîtrise en relations internationales de l’Université Webster à Leiden au Pays-Bas, une maîtrise en administration publique de l’Université Dalhousie et un baccalauréat en sciences (distinction) de l’Université Queen’s. Elle a travaillé pour plusieurs ministères fédéraux incluant le Conseil privé au sein du Secrétariat de la sécurité du renseignement. Elle est maintenant professeur adjointe à l’Université du Manitoba en études politiques. Elle est aussi Directrice-adjointe du Centre de défense et études en sécurité.
CDA Institute Research Fellow Richard Shimooka explores what Canada’s experience at Vimy Ridge can tell us about its future military role. This post first appeared (with hyperlinks) on the CDA Institute Blog: The Forum on 13 April 2016.

Last Saturday marked Vimy Ridge Day, the 99th anniversary of the battle on the Western front of First World War. Routinely cited as the birth of the Canadian national identity separate from Britain, perhaps more directly, it left an indelible mark on Canadian military culture. It emphasized perseverance through immense sacrifice, while maintaining practicing to a high professional standard and innovative thinking.

During the battle, the Canadian Corps fighting together for the first time, conceived and implemented new tactics, and displayed unflinching courage in taking the seemingly unconquerable hill. Vimy was not an isolated event: rather it was reflective of the general conduct of the Canadian military over its modern history. This includes the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, Dieppe, Juno Beach, and Kapyong, to name a few. Despite the unfavourable outcome of several of these battles, Canadian soldiers, sailors, and aviators have consistently displayed remarkable resilience, determination and professionalism.

This legacy is an important to highlight under current circumstances. The Trudeau government has decided to conduct a defence policy review to chart a course for the military’s future. It will focus on the increasingly complex nature of conflict in the international system, characterized as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Certainly warfare has become more visibly violent, as even basic moral considerations often being discarded for military or propaganda purposes. However the increasing prevalence of social media has stripped away the fog of war that once obscured events on the ground. Consequently, even small indiscretions can have major consequences for an intervention’s outcome.

Being aware of cultural contexts and other considerations are now part and parcel of these new campaigns for international security. Given these challenges, Canada’s resourcefulness, professionalism and courage, are critical advantages for this new era of conflicts. The military’s contributions are highly valued among our allies, despite the relatively small size of our forces.

Nowhere was this more evident than during Canada’s decade-long commitment to Afghanistan. Canadian soldiers routinely
faced immensely challenging situations, which was not simply related to combat with the resourceful and tenacious Taliban. They often navigated the confusing and corrupt morass of local Afghan politics, as well as the country’s unique local society.

In the face of this challenge, many allies established well-fortified bases in comparatively peaceful areas, and rarely ventured outside of the wire. Other states took a much more aggressive posture in their areas, which often upset the delicate balance and turned the local populations against them. The Canadian Armed Forces left Kandahar and its environs in a much more stable condition than it had received it.

Another example can be found in the aerial campaign against the Islamic State (IS). Many pointed out that Canada’s six CF-18s represented a small proportion of the overall air effort against IS, and could be easily replaced once withdrawn. However, that view belies the exceptionally high professional standards present within the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), which makes preventing civilian casualties a primary consideration. Through a rare combination of exceptional training, precision weapons, and dedicated organizational structure, Canada’s CF-18s greatly minimized collateral while playing an important role in the conflict. As in Afghanistan, several other states participating in the air campaign do not possess the rigorous process and standards for precision weapons delivery, and Canada’s withdrawal means they will play a larger role in the conflict, to the detriment of all involved.

In the past, the Canadian Armed Forces have also made valuable contributions was UN peacekeeping, such as in the Sinai and Cyprus. In these difficult operations Canadian soldiers applied the same dedication, professionalism, and resilience readily apparent in their conventional war-fighting experience to make a positive difference. However, the nature of peacekeeping has fundamentally changed in the past twenty years, reflecting the new realities of international conflict. Most UN interventions are better described as peace enforcement missions, whereby foreign forces attempt to stabilize a collapsed state in the throws of a violent conflict. Moreover the UN is often unwilling and ill equipped to intervene in more serious outbreaks of violence. They often pose too great a challenge for the organization, with the similar risks and challenges that afflicted Canadian military operations in Afghanistan. Consequently, these crises are typically managed by coalitions-of-the-willing or regional security organizations like NATO.

If the current government desires to make a real contribution to peace and security in the international sphere, it should be made on the basis of the Canadian Armed Forces’ capabilities and an accurate assessment of what are the actual requirements of the international community. Canada has a history of operating with its allies and providing professional, highly capable, and courageous soldiers. This is a legacy that should be understood and not be disregarded lightly.

Richard Shimooka is a research fellow at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.
Australia and Canada are sometimes considered as ‘Strategic Cousins,’ so as Canada embarks on a Defence Review, it is worth considering what might be gained by examining Australia’s recent Defence White Paper of 2016 (DWP16).

Of course, the biggest enduring difference between Canada and Australia is their geostrategic location. For Canada, defence for decades was considered a necessary evil, largely as defence against help from its giant southern neighbour. On the edge of Asia, however, Australia has long seen itself as more vulnerable. In the post-Cold War years, as Canada faced west across the Pacific to Asia, there appeared less need to spend as much on defence as Australia which faced an Asia much closer to its north.

Today, though, it isn’t just Asia that focuses the mind over strategy and defence. The world that DWP16 describes seems very much like the world Canada now faces as well: it is one that looks increasingly Hobbesian with a confluence of factors presenting increasing signs of an ominous future. As the Australians observe, there is a spectrum of compelling reasons to bolster defence expenditure as the ultimate national insurance policy.

First the issue of terrorism, which appeared to burst onto the world stage on 9/11 in 2001 and then appeared slowly to ebb away, has returned with a vengeance. Toxic terror cells have emerged not only in the Middle East and North Africa but in the heart of Europe and Southeast Asia as well as in the cities of Australia and Canada. This is unlikely to become an existential threat – particularly if these great societies remain mindful of the need to ‘keep calm and carry on’ and if the security forces and agencies remain vigilant and maintain high levels of cooperation.

Second, with society becoming ever-more web-enabled and web-dependent, the cyber security threat has mushroomed into a potential existential threat. Several state and non-state actors, operating with high levels of deniability and impunity, leave society with a great challenge to which it must respond on an industrial scale. Current levels of complacency in government and industry point to disturbing levels of vulnerability.

Third, emerging transnational threats including organised crime, people smuggling, and drug trafficking are generating
greater security challenges. Adequately responding to these issues requires more and more-capable air, sea, land, space and cyber capabilities.

Fourth, climate change is generating more and more-destructive natural and man-induced disasters. The security challenges arising as a result are potentially enormous and require imaginative rethinking about what needs to be done in response.

Fifth, there are the ongoing and nuclear-tipped tensions on the Korean peninsula. North Korea presents a grave threat not only to South Korea, but to the international order. Preventing that situation from triggering a wider conflagration remains of vital interest and Australia and Canada retain UN-linked obligations from the war fought there more than sixty years ago.

Sixth, is an increasingly aggressive Russia under Vladimir Putin, which has demonstrated it no longer considers itself a status quo power by seizing the Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, threatening Eastern Europe, and aggressively and decisively intervening militarily in Syria. Putin’s Russia is hurting financially, following sanctions and the drop in oil prices, and demographically with a shrinking population. Russia increasingly is demonstrating its unwillingness to accept the international status quo. This nuclear superpower has re-emerged as one of the greatest threats on the planet.

Seventh, China’s rise has generated remarkable economic growth and prosperity but this has been matched with a striking rise in geo-strategic tensions and uncertainty as the East Asian power balance alters. As a result, there are simmering tensions in Asia, notably over competing island claims by Japan and China (particularly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands). Balancing the desire to urge Chinese restrain and avoid unduly emboldening Japan requires a fine balance.

Eighth, there are growing disputes in the South China Sea, where regional claimants...
have competing and overlapping zones. There, China’s so-called nine-dash line remains largely undefined. Yet the ambiguity surrounding it is being used conveniently as a foil for its dramatic and rapid expansion of manufactured islands, guarded by a flotilla of well-armed but white-painted ‘maritime law enforcement’ ships, rather than the more provocative grey-painted naval warships.

While both Pacific-rim nations, Canada, like Australia, has no direct interest in these maritime disputes, but they both have a clear interest in seeking their peaceful resolution. Canada and Australia also have long supported the global ‘rules-based order’ that is widely recognised as having enabled the spectacular economic growth in Asia and the Pacific in recent decades. Ensuring competing claims are settled peacefully and lawfully is in Canada’s interests.

Support for the rules-based order presupposes that the virtual guarantor of that order, the United States, is prepared to continue backing it indefinitely. Indeed, DWP16 is premised on the United States remaining ‘the pre-eminent global power and Australia’s most important strategic partner.’ This applies equally to Canada.

Some see that if Donald Trump becomes President and is true to his word on alliances and his isolationist declarations, we may witness a significant decline in US willingness to take the lead in maintaining the current order. This, in turn, could lead to considerably greater Chinese and Russian assertiveness.

To be sure, like Australia, Canada is heavily invested in and reliant on US ties for intelligence, technology, and leading edge military proficiency. Similarly, the United States is enormously invested in Canada. Both Canada and Australia have an enduring interest in working closely with the United States to mitigate the risks arising from these unsettling dynamics.

With the future unknowable, Australia’s calculated outlay is always a gamble, particularly with so many long-lead-time and high-technology capabilities being planned for. These include:

- six dozen F-35 fighter aircraft and a spectrum of supporting aircraft and ground-based infrastructure to make the F-35 a highly-capable node in a sophisticated network,
- a dozen each of highly advanced naval warships and submarines on top of the new amphibious ships entering service, and
- a suite of new armoured vehicles, missiles and enhanced special forces capabilities to add greater lethality and flexibility.

The prognostications and calculations about what is needed to defend Australia and its interests have a time frame of multiple decades in mind and Australia has matched the DWP with a detailed investment program and industry plan.

With so much remaining opaque and unknowable, Australia’s adjustment from 1.9 percent to 2 percent of GDP is reasonable: it is costed, has bipartisan political support and looks as robust a plan as has been seen in decades. The contrast with Canada’s current levels of resourcing on defence matters is instructive.

There is much there in Australia’s recent Defence White Paper for Canada to consider.

Dr. John Blaxland is a senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and author of Strategic Cousins. Follow him on twitter @JohnBlaxland1.
THINKING ABOUT STRATEGIC POSTURE OPTIONS: DUTCH LESSONS FOR CANADA?

CDA Institute guest contributor Srdjan Vucetic, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa, looks at what lessons Canada could learn from the Netherlands as it proceeds with its defence policy review. This post first appeared (with hyperlinks) on the CDA Institute Blog: The Forum on 6 April 2016

The Trudeau government’s maiden budget pledged important new commitments, but defence spending was not one of them. One could argue that this is only logical: money should not be spent before the defence review is completed and Canada’s priorities in this policy area are set.

At the moment, the government is getting ready to kick-start the defence review public consultation process that will give Canadians an opportunity to have their say on what they think are the major threats, risks, and challenges to Canada’s security, the appropriate roles of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the types of capabilities these roles require, and so on. If done well, the process will help everyone—that is, military personnel, the defence industry, the academic and think tank communities, and the general public—understand what is at stake. The last real defence policy consultation took place in 1994, which is also the year of Canada’s last Defence White Paper. Since then, the world has greatly changed, and the new Defence White Paper will in no small part be judged by the way it takes these changes into account.

Some continuities must be taken into account as well. The outstanding case in point is the persistent underfunding of the Canadian military. Phrases like “limited budget” and “narrow budgetary scope” tend to irk people in the CAF, but they reflect Canadian preferences today. Indeed, while many expect future budgets to be more generous to the Department of National Defence (DND) than Budget 2016, no one envisions Ottawa suddenly committing 2 percent of national income to defence. These preferences are not uniquely Canadian by the way. Within NATO, 2 percent may be a formal requirement for membership, but today only five of its 28 members meet it. The justification is always the same: size of defence budget counts less than what one does with it. One could argue that this is only logical, too.

The challenge of the defence review consultation process will be to bring these two conversations together: the abstract one about the nation’s place in the changing world and the practical one about the likely allocation of funds. For clues on how this can be done most effectively, Canadians might wish to consider the experiences of their NATO allies. A good model comes from the Netherlands. In 2013, the Hague-based Clingendael, a.k.a. the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, provoked a nationwide debate on defence policy by releasing an imaginative think piece on the “future of the armed forces of the Netherlands.”

The report, which the think tank made available in English as well, was written on the basis of three sets of assumptions. The first one was to treat budgetary constraints as a given. At the time when this report was written, the Dutch government had not only cut defence spending, but also publicly acknowledged that maintaining near-full spectrum capabilities of all three armed services – the army, the navy and the air force – was no longer possible.

The report’s second working assumption was that the Netherlands would continue to maximize its comparative advantages within the collective security architecture in the transatlantic region and work closely with its friends and allies in NATO and the EU. The assumption was not heroic in light of the enduring consensus on what the Dutch armed forces are for: to defend the nation (territory,
people, economy, infrastructure, etc.) and its allies; to contribute to the rules-based international order; and to support civil authorities, if and when needed.

The third assumption was that countries have multiple interests, not one. According to Clingendael, in 2013 the Netherlands had four key interests: (1) influence in the international community; (2) preservation of prosperity and economic development; (3) enhancing security and stability; and (4) promoting human rights. Although mutually inclusive, these interests imply very different types of the armed forces:

1. An “influential” Netherlands implied an “air-based intervention force”;
2. A “trading” Netherlands prioritized a strong “maritime force”;
3. A “global stability” contributor called for a force capable of conducting “small but robust” overseas expeditions; and

By all accounts, the report succeeded in getting the government, the media, and the public to think harder about various trade-offs that arise in deciding what the main threats and risks are for the Netherlands, as well as determining which operational capabilities to prioritize in light of the available resources. Clingendael’s conclusion was that the sharp edges of these trade-offs would be blunted most effectively with Option 3, a.k.a., “robust stabilisation force.” The most controversial part was the argument that the acquisition of the new F-35 fighter jet served fewer national interests than investment in other operational capabilities (The Dutch government ended up ignoring this particular recommendation.)

Dutch and Canadian defence debates are obviously very different, but, as Mark Collins at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute pointed out three years ago, parallels exist. Clingendael’s working assumptions travel well. For one thing, much like their Dutch counterparts, the CAF are under-funded and coalition-oriented. For another thing, Canada’s core interests, too, are multiple, ranging from international influence-seeking to peacekeeping. The fact that these interests, taken together, imply a continuing commitment to a multiservice defence force that can combine homeland defence with multilateral coalition operations overseas, does not negate trade-offs. Some of Canada’s interests are best served with large troop numbers in the army, others with sound naval capabilities, and still others with an air force capable of carrying out day one bombing missions. The Clingendael re-

For this reason alone, participants in the Canadian defence review and its public consultation process would do well to read and learn from it.

Dr. Srdjan Vucetic is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.
CDA Institute Research Manager and Senior Editor David McDonough recently published an article in The Embassy commenting on the government’s promise to renew Canada’s role in UN peace operations. This was reposted on the CDA Institute Blog: The Forum on 11 April 2016.

The new Trudeau government has shown an interest in renewing Canada’s commitment to United Nations peace operations. The ministerial mandate letter given to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion spelled out this promise quite clearly, even if neither went into much detail on how this commitment will be realized.

A key problem is the commitment’s lack of context. By itself, it is hard to argue that renewing Canada’s role in UN peace operations is a bad thing. But such policy options cannot be judged in a vacuum. They must be placed within a context that recognizes the national interest, competing policy priorities and limited resources available to achieve such priorities, as well as the inevitable trade-offs that come with such a means-ends chain. Such a commitment should more properly be assessed as part of the government’s recently announced defence policy review.

The three pillars of priorities

It’s useful to return to the key priorities outlined in the last defence white paper: defence of Canada, continental defence, and international security. In some respects, these three reflect a rising degree of discretion for Canadian decision-makers: no discretion when it comes to Canada, very little for North America, and greater discretion in how we approach expeditionary operations abroad.

Clearly, UN commitments relate to international peace and security. Canadian decision-makers need to ensure that their non-discretionary priorities are achieved first—such as monitoring our coastal waters, aerospace surveillance and defence of North America, search and rescue, and protection of our Arctic sovereignty and resources—before opting for more discretionary missions abroad like UN peace operations.

Yet not all missions in the third pillar are created equal or are equally discretionary. Canada also has the option of working primarily with key allies in pursuit of international security, including the United States, key European countries in NATO, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among others. In so doing, Canada can better align its military role abroad with its interest in maintaining and strengthening relations with such countries.

The same cannot readily be said about UN operations, which might help burnish Canada’s reputation with the world body but where the national interest is hard to identify—a fact that will undoubtedly cause problems if and when a UN mission results in casualties.

A different, more dangerous, era

Such a possibility should not be discounted. Today’s UN missions are distinct from the past. Current missions retain the size and complexity of post-Cold War operations, but now Blue Helmets can quickly become a participant in the conflict, such as when an “intervention brigade” was mandated to neutralize armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

We need to understand and appreciate that the game has changed. Future so-called peace operations, including those established by the UN, will likely require robust military capabilities and entail possibly more dangerous operations, especially if more UN peacekeepers begin to fully apply their more proactive mandates.

Importantly, if Canada does under-
take peace operations, it might be better served working with key allies and organizations like NATO. Canada would gain the additional benefit of working with like-minded states with advanced, interoperable militaries that can bring considerably more firepower and sophistication to any mission. In NATO’s case, Canada would benefit from an organization with a strong command structure and extensive experience with robust peace or stabilization missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

One should also remember the continuing gap between UN mandates and deployed forces. A good example is the hybrid UN-African Union force in the Darfur region of Sudan, which despite a robust mandate adopted a non-confrontational approach that has failed to halt attacks against both civilians and its own peacekeepers.

It might even be worse if peacekeepers began fulfilling their Chapter VII mandates to use force. Blue Helmets, not all of whom will be well-trained or armed, will then likely be seen as more legitimate targets by non-state armed groups with an increasingly sophisticated capacity for violence.

These missions can also not be easily separated from the wider post-9/11 environment, given the presence of jihadist groups from Boko Haram to Al Qaeda to ISIL (also called ISIS and the Islamic State) in numerous failed or failing states like Mali and Libya. This might increase the Canadian interest in undertaking such missions, but it also raises important dangers—from the possibility of our soldiers being specifically targeted to potential terrorist blowback both in Canada and to its interests overseas.

**Context is key**

This does not mean that Canada should eschew UN peace missions. But the Canadian government needs to take into account competing priorities and the possible dangers that could arise from such missions. Above all, strategic-level thinking on the benefits, value, and possible costs and trade-offs of undertaking these missions need to be carefully and diligently assessed.

In other words, if Canada chooses to undertake a significant UN mission, it needs to first ensure that this does not come at the expense of its non-discretionary missions. Then it needs to assess its capacity to undertake such a mission in addition to its current operational tempo.
and, if that proves impossible, weigh the relative merits of a UN mission compared to other missions abroad, such as its role in NATO reassurance measures or as part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Of course, Canada could try to avoid such trade-offs by simply adding a significant UN role to its other commitments. But, absent a significant and sustained infusion of resources, this will prove exceedingly difficult.

What needs to be avoided at all costs is a fixation on UN peace operations that overshadows and supplants other priorities. This could endanger the non-discretionary missions crucial for Canadian security and defence, as well as damage our relations with allies and long-standing alliances like NORAD and NATO.

It could also have serious consequences to the future force structure of the Canadian Armed Forces. In light of budgetary shortfalls and recapitalization challenges, the government may be tempted to achieve cost savings by opting for an unbalanced force structure—one that is lightly armed, constabulary focused, and specializing in peace operations rather than combat-capable, multi-purpose, and joint.

Yet such a force would be ill-suited for the range of missions (from constabulary to combat, and including robust peace operations) facing today’s CAF. It would also necessarily be manpower rather than capital intensive, meaning that the high personnel costs eating up much of the defence budget are unlikely to dissipate. As such, any cost savings will likely prove more illusory than real.

The strategic consequences of such a short-sighted move will be severe and long-lasting. Rather than simply affecting the government’s current choices, it would constrain the policy options available to Canadian decisions-makers for decades to come. In that case, the Trudeau government’s adage that “Canada is back” may be remembered as more of a lament rather than the dawn of sunnier ways.

Dr. David S. McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the CDA Institute, and a research fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

CALL FOR PAPERS

CDA Institute 19th Annual Graduate Student Symposium: “Canada’s Security and Defence Interests,” 13-14 October 2016, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston

Abstracts of proposed presentations (200-400 words) from Masters and Doctoral students in the realm of security and defence are now being accepted. Deadlines for submission: 16 May and 5 September. The final draft of complete presentation papers (maximum 4,000 words) must be submitted by no later than 28 September 2015.

Cash prizes of $1,000, $500 and $250 will be presented to the top three presenters. They will also be given an opportunity to develop their presentations for publication with the CDA Institute. If accepted, they will receive an honorarium of $1,500. An additional prize of $750, the Colonel Peter Hunter Award will be presented by the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI), and the winner will be given an opportunity to turn this paper into an RCMI publication.

Please send all presentation abstracts with your institutional affiliation and contact information (one page max) to denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca.
CDA Institute guest contributor Tom Ring, a Senior Fellow at uOttawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, comments on some of the challenges facing the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. This piece was first published on the CDA Institute Blog: The Forum on 7 April 2016.

With some observers and pundits clamouring for the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy to be completely scrapped, we should take the time to examine where we are and indeed whether the program is failing to meet its objectives. In a detailed analysis recently published by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, the conclusion reached tells a very different story. This blog post provides a short summary of the issues that I explored more fully in the above paper, and concludes with identification of some of the very real challenges involved in implementing such a complex undertaking.

In 2006, the federal Government made a bold strategic decision – it would use the renewal of the Navy and Coast Guard fleets to rebuild Canada's shipbuilding industry. The concept became the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS). The economic benefits of this construction would accrue not only to the shipyards which eventually won the bidding process. Ancillary benefits would also be received by the hundreds and thousands of suppliers in this decades-long, multibillion dollar commitment.

Rather than the well-trodden practice of shipyards bidding on a project-by-project basis, they would bid on the entire package, one for the combat package, the other for the non-combat package. There would be two winners among Canada's five shipyards capable of doing this work, meaning that there would be three losers. This was not how shipbuilding procurement had ever been done.

Much has been written recently about the NSPS, not all of which has been favourable. To be sure, any initiative that has the goals and ambitions of the NSPS will be (and ought to be) subject to considerable scrutiny. Healthy public debate on matters of important public policy is vital to democracy. Differing points of view and outright opposition should be a welcome part of a debate on an issue as important as the NSPS. Let me briefly outline the original goals of NSPS and assess where we are in achieving them.

Goal 1 – Rebuild the Federal Vessels in Canada: This is currently being accomplished. While it has been suggested that the ships can be built cheaper elsewhere, no evidence has ever been provided to substantiate this assertion.

Goal 2 – Revitalize the Shipbuilding Industry in Canada: This has been accomplished and the resulting job creation and associated economic benefits are being felt across Canada and will continue to be for some time to come.

Goal 3 – Build The Federal Vessels in a Manner that Maximizes Value for Taxpayers and Fosters Economies of Scale: This goal is perhaps one of the more contentious elements of NSPS, in so far as it implies acceptance by the Government of a "premium" for building vessels in Canada. There is likely no counter argument to the fact that shipyards in Canada cannot match the low labour rates charged by shipyards in Asia. However, for most Canadians, it is also likely a common sense proposition that if we need to invest $30–50 billion to rebuild the Navy and the Coast Guard we should do so in Canada – as long as we do it in such a way as to maximize productivity and efficiency. This is why Canada engaged First Marine International (FMI), the recognized world leader in assessing shipbuilding processes. Measuring over
183 different processes, FMI established efficiency and productivity standards for the winning shipyards, based on leading practices world-wide. Any contract to be subsequently awarded is conditional on these standards being maintained. We are only able to assess achievement of this goal after the two shipyards achieve their “target state” as established by FMI, and subsequently verified by them as required by the Umbrella Agreement (UA). If one assumes that target state will be reached, then FMI has stated that the facilities will be a significant national strategic asset. The resulting economic impact for Canada in the long-term will not be only jobs created, but careers created that will last for decades.

Goal 4 – Establish a Long Term Strategic Relationship with Two Shipyards: The elements of this arrangement are set out in the two partnership agreements called Umbrella Agreements, and include all of the provisions needed to permit value for money assessments, open book accounting, risk sharing, cost/capability trade-offs, etc.

Goal 5 – Realization of the Shipyards Commitments on ITB’s and Value Proposition: The achievement of this goal will require continuous assessment but there is no evidence to date that this will not happen.

There are, nonetheless, some very real and problematic challenges to be addressed and, to date, real solutions have not yet been identified. The first of these is the acknowledged inadequacies of the project budgets. The second is the ongoing challenge of program management for a multi-billion dollar endeavour. Neither is new nor unexpected.

The risk that intended capabilities might not be achieved within the established project budgets was identified by officials involved in implementing NSPS even before the shipyard selection process began. Officials with the Department of National Defence (DND) and Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and well as at Public Works and Government Services Canada (now renamed Public Services and Procurement Canada) knew
that most of the project budgets had been developed many years earlier and needed updating to reflect cost escalation, technology improvements, and new capability requirements. However, given the delays incurred due to the failed vessel procurement processes, and having nothing better to inform the new budget numbers before design work was well underway, it was decided to proceed with the overall program of work knowing that budgets would have to be re-visited at the design stage in any event.

In his 2013 assessment of the NSPS, the Auditor General noted that inadequate project budgets could constrain the achievement of required capabilities. No specific action was taken to address the observation. Cost estimation on projects that will be realized many years in the future is an imprecise undertaking, to say the least. Of course, every effort is made to account for inflation, currency fluctuations, and other known variables. Nevertheless, some factors cannot be fully accounted for. Innovation, advances in technology, and adjusted requirements due to new threats and changing circumstances will always have an unknown impact on a project that will only be realized in 10 years.

Still, the recent Australian Defence white paper estimated the cost of nine future frigates, to be built in the 2020 time-frame, at more than AUS$30 billion. And this number is for design and construction only, and does not include costs for weapon systems, or project management costs etc. Of course, there is no way of knowing whether Canada’s future naval vessels will be similar but the broad range of numbers provided by the Australian government should be instructive to those who are making similar estimations in Canada.

The second issue is the ongoing management of the program. This is also a critical shortcoming. If not addressed adequately, it will continue to hamper the achievement of the overarching goals and objectives of NSPS. Much like the issue of inadequate project budgets, the ongoing management of NSPS implementation was identified as a significant vulnerability in the fall of 2011, shortly after the selection process was completed. The challenge identified at the time was how to ensure that the entire implementation of NSPS was managed as one program and not a series of related projects. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was engaged in late 2011 to conduct a review and make recommendations on the “most appropriate governance and operating model to manage the Umbrella Agreements and long term sourcing relationships that have been created by the NSPS process.” PwC’s recommendations were never fully implemented.

The major criticisms of the NSPS are well known. The various vessel construction projects are over budget and have yet to be delivered. (It should be noted that construction is well underway on vessels in both packages, and construction on the second vessel in the non-combat package began on March 29th at Seaspan in Vancouver.) Has the Government maintained sufficient control/authority in the UA for its partnership arrangement with the shipyards? Does the UA sufficiently protect the Crown’s interests? Whether such concerns are real or could now be mitigated if they are real, is a question that deserves to be continually examined given the size, scope, and complexity of the program to re-build the federal fleets. In order to contribute to the public debate, I will more fully explore the nature of the challenges outlined above and discuss options for dealing with them in a policy brief in the coming weeks.

Tom Ring is a Senior Fellow at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He retired from the Public Service in January 2015 following a 39 year career, the last five of which were as the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Acquisitions Branch at Public Works and Government Services Canada. In that role he was responsible for the implementation of the selection process for the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.
The Political Dynamics of Security in Fragile States
By Erwin van Veen

Whether it is in the slums of Nairobi, the port of Karachi, or the corridors of power in Bujumbura, in many fragile societies state security organizations serve the interest of ruling elites in maintaining political power or their own institutional interests. What they often provide little of is security for ordinary people. READ MORE

From Strategic Buffer to Strategic Liability: China’s North Korea Dilemma
By Adam MacDonald

China’s long-standing support for North Korea, rather than being rooted in any common bonds between the two ‘communist’ countries or historical affinities as allies, is almost exclusively due to geopolitical reasons. To Beijing, North Korea is a buffer state in Northeast Asia.... READ MORE

The search for stability in Eastern Europe: Policy options for Canada
By Andrew Rasiulis

The war in Ukraine that started in 2014 and that was brought under some measure of control through the Minsk process in February 2015 has claimed more than 8,000 lives. Diplomatic and political steps are underway in the hopes of bringing this conflict to a negotiated settlement. (Republished from The Embassy.) READ MORE

Russia’s Syrian Intervention: A temporary reprieve won with a heavy political sacrifice
By Richard Shimooka

By the summer of 2015, the fortunes of Bashar al-Assad’s régime in Syria appeared to be flagging. To the Russians, the slow advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Free Syrian Alliance (FSA) forces into the government’s territory held out the possibility of the collapse of its long-standing ally in the region. READ MORE

Between Traitors and Politicians: Pakistan military’s internal battlefronts – Part 1
By Adnan Qaiser

Nations’ history is often dull and boring; not so Pakistan’s, whose civil-military power-politics remain full of intrigues, treachery, and conspiracies. The country, which has lately been called a disastrously dysfunctional country by President Barack Obama, remains an enigma for the world. READ MORE

Between Pragmatism and Internationalism: The German Army in Ukraine and Syria
By Michael Lambert

German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to send troops to Syria to fight against the Islamic State. Yet French intelligence reports, however, suggest a lack of equipment of the German army to carry out the very actions on the ground. To these voices are added... READ MORE

Arctic Ports for Canadian Seapower – Part 2
By Timothy Choi

My previous post explored some of the benefits that could be accrued from establishing ports in the Arctic, not least in possibly strengthening Canada’s claim to a contested extended continental shelf if it were to reach... READ MORE
Arctic Ports for Canadian Seapower – Part 1
By Timothy Choi

Seapower is the ability to influence events at sea or from the sea, and consists of inputs (the sources of power) and outputs (what that power accomplishes). Traditionally, Canadian seapower inputs...
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Arms to Saudi Arabia: No happy solution
By Richard Cohen

Governing can be hard work. Especially when the policies you were elected to make may be challenged by university professors and overturned by the courts. And it's particularly embarrassing when those challenges are the very same charges you made to Government...
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When it comes to Turkey, Canada needs to continue speaking out
By Chris Kilford

Yet another suicide bombing took place recently in Turkey. Since October last year, the Turkish capital has witnessed three such bombings with another two in Istanbul. In total, almost 200 people have been killed and many more wounded.
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Budget 2016 – Overview of security & defence-related commitments
By Chuck Davies and David McDonough

The 2016 Federal budget is primarily focused on setting new paths in economic and social development. It has relatively little to say about the government's defence and security agenda...
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China's Arctic Engagements: Differentiating Reality From Apprehension
By Adam MacDonald

China's increasing Arctic engagements overall have been welcomed by the region's stakeholders. There are, however, arguments in the media and some academic quarters that China's growing involvement threatens to destabilize the region.
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Les réfugiés comme nouvelle arme de guerre
By Michael Lambert

Tandis que les Occidentaux continuent de s'indigner des conditions d'accueil des réfugiés en Europe, et que l'Union européenne accentue les coopérations bilatérales avec la Turquie en vue de limiter l'afflux de migrants, la Russie né cesse pour sa part d'accueillir les bombardements dans des zones fortement peuplées de Syrie et d'Irak.
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North Korea and Asymmetric Naval Warfare
By Paul Pryce

In recent years, several detailed analyses have been produced on Iranian efforts to develop the doctrine and capabilities necessary to wage 'asymmetric naval warfare.' (Republished from CIMSEC.)
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Why Washington Won't Waltz
By David Law

It has become part of the mainstream security discourse in Western capitals to accuse Washington of failing to exercise leadership in the crisis situations now afflicting Ukraine and Syria.
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The future of French intelligence after the Bataclan's attacks
By Michael Lambert

European intelligence services today differ from their American counterparts due to the legacy of the Second World War. Like the United States, Western European countries still have bitter memory of the use of certain state structures that served the filing of people considered undesirable by the Nazis during the occupation.
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Saving Islam from its Saviours: The Feuds Within
By Adnan Qaiser

Sometimes it is hard to decide whether the world of Islam should fear itself more or its enemies. The 1,400 year old 'political conflict' that has haunted the Muslim world in the...
The CDA and CDA Institute 2016 Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence, held on 18 and 19 February, attracted significant media attention, due not least to the keynote speakers and the content of their remarks. 45eNord covered Chief of the Defence Staff General Vance’s statement on why Canada’s mission in Iraq is not a combat mission, the discussion on the importance of intelligence, and Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence Kent Hehr’s words on supporting Canada’s veterans. An article from CTV News highlighted the new ad campaign aimed at growing Canada’s military, while another article from Toronto Star noted CSIS’ intention to expand their role in combating ISIL. Further, CDA and CDA Institute CEO Tony Battista was featured on The Vanguard Podcast to discuss the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence.

CDA Institute Board Member Ferry de Kerckhove published an article in Frontline Defence summarizing key points from his Strategic Outlook for Canada 2016. He was also interviewed on video and radio multiple times by ICI Radio-Canada in which he spoke of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Washington visit (here and here). Canada’s relations with Turkey, the Russian troop withdrawal from Syria and Geneva meetings, and the recent attacks on Brussels. Other issues he explored at ICI Radio-Canada include Canada’s ongoing arms deal with Saudi Arabia and the surrounding controversy.

Further, Kerckhove was featured on CPAC to discuss the Liberal governments’ plans for the Canadian Armed Forces in Iraq. Additionally, Kerckhove and CDA Institute Research Fellow Howard Coombs contributed articles to the Mackenzie Institute’s Security Matters magazine; Kerckhove wrote of Canada’s pursuit for a new foreign and defence policy, while Coombs focused on the Canadian Armed Forces Reserves. In a Globe and Mail article, Kerckhove also looked at the prospect of opening Canada’s airways to help Bombardier and the economy.

CDA Institute Board Member MGen David Fraser (Ret’d) was quoted in Vanguard saying that regime change was strategically disadvantageous in Afghanistan and Libya, and would be in Syria, too. He also CDA Institute Board Member George Petrolekas was quoted in a CBC News article on the government interest in buying drones, and by The Canadian Press with regard to Canada’s dysfunctional procurement process.

CDA Institute Research Manager and Senior Editor Dr David McDonough wrote an article featured in The Embassy, suggesting that Canada should ‘proceed with caution’ when investing in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, he was quoted in La Presse on Canada’s re-examination of a national missile defence program.

CDA Institute Advisory Council Member Colin Robertson was quoted in Global News, Everything is Political, and Reuters, commenting on Prime Minister Trudeau’s recent Washington, DC trip. Additionally, Robertson wrote an article in the Globe & Mail concerning how Prime Minister Trudeau can sustain Canada’s international momentum.

IN THE NEWS
Stéphane Dion approves export permits for $11B in LAVs to be sent to Saudi Arabia (CBC News): Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion approved the sale of $11-billion worth of Light Armed Vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia, with the total deal worth $15-billion. The government has faced criticism due to the alleged human rights violations by the Kingdom; however, the Liberals assure that this sale is not linked to any abuses.

Chances of Brussels-style ISIL attack less likely in Canada, Senate committee told (National Post): A senate committee was told by the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) that the chances of a Brussels-style ISIL attack in Canada is unlikely. Retired Major-General Rousseau, the centre’s executive director, notes the lack of evidence that ISIL has support networks in Canada – unlike in Europe.

Liberals launch review to reshape military in face of new threats (Globe and Mail): Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan announced a year-long defence policy review, alongside a four-person panel of experts to advice him on the review. This advisory panel includes the Honourable Louise Arbour, the Honourable Bill Graham, General Raymond R. Henault (Retired) – who is also immediate past President of the CDA Institute – and Margaret Purdy.

Sajjan shies away from endorsing controversial 2011 Leslie Report (Chronicle Herald): With a new defence review, the Liberal government seems to be moving away from their campaign commitment to implementing the comprehensive 2011 Leslie Report on Transformation. Sajjan would not say point blank whether this means axing the initial plan to implement the report’s 43 recommendations.

Le conseiller à la sécurité nationale du premier ministre prend sa retraite (98.5 FM) : Le conseiller à la sécurité nationale du premier ministre canadien, Richard

1ST ANNUAL GOLF TOURNAMENT FUNDRAISER

The CDA Institute invites you to the 1st Annual Golf Tournament Fundraiser
Hylands Golf Course starts at 1330 followed by a BBQ June 10, 2016

Program
Registration: 12:45 hours
Instructions: 13:15 hours
Shotgun start: 13:30 hours
Reception: 16:30 hours
Barbeque: 18:00 hours

L’Institut de la CAD vous invite à le 1er Tournoi de golf
Club de golf Hylands commence à 1330 suivi d’un barbeque le 10 juin 2016

For more information or to register, please go to our website (www.cdainstitute.ca) or contact Denise Lemay at denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca
Fadden, qui a déjà dirigé les services canadiens d’espionnage, prend sa retraite après une carrière de 39 ans dans la haute fonction publique.

ISIS seen as growing threat to Canadian peacekeepers in Sinai (CBC News): In a briefing note prepared for Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion in early November, officials warn that an “escalation of terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula poses new challenges with respect to the security of (Multinational Force and Observer) personnel, and has raised concerns about force protection.”

Liberals face decisions on navy’s $104B frigate replacement program (CTV News): The federal cabinet will soon be asked to make an initial down payment on the navy’s $104-billion frigate replacement program with an approval that will lay the groundwork for the new fleet.

Le Canada veut un plan détaillé de ses alliés avant de s’engager en Libye (La Presse): Le Canada doit obtenir plusieurs choses de la part de ses alliés, notamment une stratégie à long terme, avant de contribuer à des troupes à une mission menée par l’Italie en Libye pour contrer les avancées des extrémistes islamistes, a dit le ministre de la Défense Harjit Sajjan.

Canada’s F-35 decision anxiously awaited, says U.S. deputy secretary of defence (CBC News): The U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense says he’d like the Canadian government to make up its mind, one way or the other, whether it will replace its aging CF-18 fleet with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jets.

Premier tir d’essai de missiles surface-surface de la Marine Royale canadienne (45e Nord): Le NCSM Vancouver est entré dans l’histoire dernièrement en devenant la première frégate canadienne modernisée à effectuer avec succès des tirs d’essai de missiles surface-surface, de type Harpoon Block II, sur des cibles situées à terre.

Matthew Fisher: Suitability for Arctic defence, lower cost may put F-35s on Liberals’ radar (National Post): Matthew Fisher reports that the F-35 might again be on the government’s agenda due to the jet’s continuously-decreasing price and suitability for Arctic missions. Once estimated at $145-million per unit, the price per unit is expected to drop to $80-million by 2019.

Security on military bases to be reviewed by all-party Commons committee (Metro News): The House of Commons defence committee will hold closed-door hearings on the state of security at Canadian military bases. Conservative MP James Bezan, the party’s defence critic, proposed the idea, which was recently accepted by the all-party committee, although a date for the investigation has yet to be scheduled.