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STANDING ON GUARD?

A BENCHMARK COMPARISON OF CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Charles Davies

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“There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens.”

Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (2004)

“...there is no higher responsibility for a government than the security of the nation.”

Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security (2013)

All Western leaders place national security at or very near the top of their list of priorities for ongoing focus. They may view “national security” in somewhat different ways or define it slightly differently, but all understand their responsibility to lead national efforts to safeguard the country, its interests, and its people.

How this is achieved naturally varies somewhat from country to country and government to government, but Canada is unique in important respects compared to other Western states. Some of that uniqueness derives from the nature of our country and its population, and some of it derives from choices made by government. Achieving success here requires integrated effort across a broad spectrum that encompasses domestic security, continental security in cooperation with the United States, and appropriate contributions to international efforts to maintain global peace and security.

To date, Canada has been largely effective in meeting its national security challenges in the domestic and continental realms, although arguably less so internationally. An important question to consider, however, is: has the success we have enjoyed been built upon good foundations that will sustain us going forward?

This paper takes a high-level comparative look at some of those foundations in the form of three core elements of national security architecture:

- Policy and national strategy, i.e., the stated national security policy of the country and whether it has a defined national security strategy;
- National-level governance; and
- The administrative structures supporting the nation’s political leadership in planning, integrating, coordinating and managing national security efforts.

It compares Canada’s architecture with those of four other countries: France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, with a view to identifying similarities and differences, and highlighting possible opportunities for strengthening Canada’s architecture. Clearly the American

model will have elements that are not relevant to this country, but it is included here because of our need for close cooperation in continental security. There has to be appropriate security architecture alignment with the United States.

Context

“Establishing effective national security is a ‘no-fail’ task for any government. It requires careful orchestration of actions across a broad spectrum of organizations at local, regional, national, and international levels.”

Establishing effective national security is a “no-fail” task for any government. It requires careful orchestration of actions across a broad spectrum of organizations at local, regional, national, and international levels. The tools include police, security, intelligence, scientific, military, economic, diplomatic, international development, and many other capabilities. None of these can be effective in isolation so major national security responses have to be centrally planned, and both horizontally and vertically integrated and managed. All Western countries have created significant political and administrative frameworks for doing this complex task.

In Canada, geography, history, and our constitutional foundations all influence our approach to national security. Cooperation is essential between federal departments and agencies; among the federal, provincial and local governments; between government and key industries; and internationally with our US neighbours, NATO allies, “Five-Eyes” countries,¹ and other partners. The necessary linkages create a complex web of connections for a multitude of activities that must succeed.

No one can afford to maintain 100 percent protection against every conceivable threat, so it is the task of government to correctly assess global, regional, and domestic threats, determine the relative risks, and make the right investments in the capabilities needed to effectively protect the nation – now and in the future. The realities facing governments also need to be clearly explained to their citizens in a coherent narrative showing how national security investments will help safeguard the nation and its interests.

Parts of this narrative are not difficult to build. For example, the fact that regional problems are increasingly capable of developing global reach and threatening the international stability Canada’s economy needs to remain strong and grow is hard for anyone to convincingly refute. Similarly, the long-term threat to global peace and security emerging from the ongoing modernization of force projection capabilities of Russia² and China, coupled with their growing predisposition to act unilaterally outside international norms and ignore their treaty commitments, is easy to explain – particularly as it has happened before within living memory and with catastrophic results.³ No less worrying is the slow but ongoing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their delivery means, among rogue states such as North Korea and possibly even non-state actors.

However, threats also need to be placed in proper perspective. The world around us is continually evolving in directions that are sometimes beneficial, sometimes benign, and sometimes detrimental to our national security. We should not overstate the third category, but nor can we afford to ignore it or try to wish it away. We also need to be realistic about how we approach responding to global security threats, either with our own resources or collectively with partners.⁴

Governments further have to connect the threat portions of the national security narrative to an accepted need to fund specific, potentially expensive, investments in solutions. Many diverse responses can be attempted by nations acting alone or collectively – the questions are: which ones are the most likely to be successful, and which ones can be afforded? Debates around these questions can be politically debilitating and long. The problem is, many of the tools needed for effective national security responses cannot be built up quickly when a popular consensus finally emerges around a particular threat. These requirements have to be anticipated long in advance, so governments have to build a convincing case for the investments, but before doing so they must first come to that conclusion themselves. None of this is easy and none of it happens automatically.

It is therefore essential that governments establish and nurture an effective architecture for: evaluating global and domestic threats to the safety and security of the country and its citizens over both near and long terms; objectively determining requirements for national security capability investments; building and sustaining those capabilities; and planning, managing, and evaluating successful national security responses now and in the future. Only then can confidence be progressively built within the government, the legislature, and the population in the investment decisions being taken and the effectiveness of their national security institutions. Each country has its own architecture for doing this, and we will now briefly look at those of four of Canada's security partners.

France

Policy and Strategy. France's national security policy and strategy are set out in its 2013 *White Paper on Defence and National Security*,⁵ which replaced a 2008 White Paper. Although the publication of the current policy pre-dated a number of major events, including Russian interventions in the Ukraine and major terrorist attacks inside France, its analysis and articulated strategies remain largely valid and continue to be followed by France. The main impact of these more recent events has been to reverse planned expenditure reductions on defence and security capabilities.

Governance. National security is managed personally by the President through the Defence and National Security Council, which includes as members the Prime Minister and Ministers of the Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economy, and Budget. Sub-councils focus on particular areas such as intelligence and France's nuclear deterrence.⁶ The president is also supported by an external

Advisory Board for Defence and National Security.⁷

Administration. The Council and sub-councils are supported by the Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security,⁸ which provides secretarial support and manages cross-government tasks.

United Kingdom

Policy and Strategy. United Kingdom policy and strategies are defined in the 2015 *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review*.⁹ There is a five-year cycle for reviewing and updating the document and the current version merges what had previously been two separate documents. The process typically involves a greater level of cross-party consultation and discussion¹⁰ than we see in Canada.

Governance. The Prime Minister chairs the National Security Council.¹¹ Its membership includes: the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Foreign Secretary; Defence Secretary; Home Secretary; International Development Secretary; Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Secretary; and the Attorney General. The Leader of the Opposition is sometimes invited to sit in. As in France, sub-councils focus on particular areas such as intelligence, cyber, counter-terrorism, and nuclear deterrence.

Administration. A National Security Secretariat provides coordination on major security and intelligence issues across government,¹² and a Joint Intelligence Organisation produces independent all-source assessments on issues of national security and foreign policy importance.¹³

Australia

Policy and Strategy. Australia's policy and strategy are defined in a 2013 document titled *Strong and Secure: a strategy for Australia's national security*.¹⁴ It is Australia's first national security strategy document and follows a 2008 *National Security Statement*, which articulated Australia's national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen its national security architecture. As in the UK, there is cross-party discussion in the development of defence and security-related policies and strategies.

Governance. The Prime Minister chairs the National Security Committee.¹⁵ The Deputy Prime Minister is the deputy chair and members include the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Attorney General, Treasurer, Minister of Defence, and the Cabinet Secretary (a Cabinet minister).

Administration. The Secretaries Committee on National Security (Deputy Minister-level committee in Canadian parlance) supports the National Security Committee.¹⁶ The Department of the Prime

Minister and Cabinet coordinates national security policy across agencies, states, and territories; provides the secretariats for the Secretaries Committee, the National Security Committee, and the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee; and advises the Prime Minister. The Attorney General's Department is lead agency for domestic national security responses and provides operational coordination across government. The Office of National Assessments provides analysis of international political, strategic, and economic developments for the National Security Committee.¹⁷

*“The only publicly available Canadian policy statement was published in 2004 by the Martin government in *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*. The document was the first of its kind in Canada...”*

United States

Policy and Strategy. United States policy and strategy are defined in the 2015 *National Security Strategy*,¹⁸ as well as a number of Presidential Directives on specific issues. The National Security Strategy is an Executive Branch document, however it is used as an important input to the dialogue with Congress on budgets. Ultimately, it is Congress that decides the allocation of the funding required to implement it.

Governance. The President chairs the National Security Council, much of whose composition and mandate are specified in legislation dating back to 1947.¹⁹ Statutory Members of the Council include the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. Non-Statutory Members include the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of the Treasury. Statutory Advisors to the Council include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence. Additional Non-Statutory Advisors attend as required.

Administration. The National Security Advisor is a Presidential appointment that does not require Congressional confirmation.²⁰ The office is part of the White House staff and provides advice and support to the President and Council, but has no legal authority. Its influence and moral authority within the administration are directly dependent upon the relationship between the Advisor and the President. Under the American system, horizontal integration is often achieved by assigning lead responsibility for issues to particular departments, with others collaborating as required.

Comparing the Four

The four countries have a number of similarities in their national security machinery, and some differences. All four have thought deeply about their national security policies and strategies and have published comprehensive statements about them encompassing most or all of the instruments of national security – including defence policy.²¹ Indeed, there is a tight linkage between national security and defence policy in each case. All four have adopted the practice of cyclically reviewing

and updating their policies every four or five years, so their national strategic direction is regularly adjusted in the face of evolving events.

In terms of governance, all have unified political structures at the top level in which the head of government personally leads the management of the national security architecture, and oversees related programs and activities, through a National Security Council or Committee of key ministers. Consistently among them, membership includes the defence, foreign, and finance ministers, with national variations when it comes to others. This is summarized in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1: National Security Council or Committee Structures of Selected Countries

	France	United Kingdom	Australia	United States
Chair	President	Prime Minister	Prime Minister	President
Vice-Chair	Prime Minister		Deputy PM	Vice-President
Membership				
• Defence	Defence Minister	Defence Secretary	Defence Minister	Secretary of Defense
• Foreign	Foreign Minister	Foreign Secretary	Foreign Minister	Secretary of State
• Finance	Budget Minister	Chancellor of the Exchequer	Treasurer	Treasury Secretary
• Interior	Interior Minister	Home Secretary		
• Economic	Economy Minister	Business Secretary		
• Legal/Police		Attorney General	Attorney General	
• Others		Int'l Development Secretary	Cabinet Secretary	National Security Advisor

Finally, all four have some form of administrative structure for supporting the head of government in coordinating and managing activities. The precise scale and scope of their respective capacities and exact roles may vary, but they all support policy development, analysis of national security issues and needs, horizontal management of responses across government, and vertical integration with other levels of government and international partners.

Canada

Policy and Strategy. The only publicly available Canadian policy statement was published in 2004 by the Martin government in *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*.²² The document was the first of its kind in Canada and included a broad outline for a national security strategy. It introduced a number of significant changes to the national security machinery of the country, most of which remain in place today. In that sense, it was a very successful first step in the development of a policy framework, although less so as a strategy document. However, it has never been updated by succeeding governments beyond publication of a progress report on implementation in 2005.²³

Governance. Unlike the other four nations discussed above, Canada has multiple Cabinet committees responsible for various aspects of national security:²⁴

- The Cabinet Committee on Intelligence & Emergency Management is the only one chaired by the Prime Minister. Its vice-chair is the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, and the members are the Ministers of: Global Affairs; Public Services and Procurement; Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard; Health; and National Defence;
- The Cabinet Committee on Canada in the World and Public Security is chaired by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the vice-chair is the Minister of International Trade. Committee members include the Ministers of: International Development and La Francophonie; Global Affairs; Science; Transport; National Revenue; Agriculture and Agri-Food; Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship; Environment and Climate Change; and National Defence;
- The Cabinet Committee on Canada-US Relations is chaired by the Minister of International Trade and the vice-chair is the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Members are the Ministers of: Small Business and Tourism; Global Affairs; Science, Transport; Agriculture and Agri-Food; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship; Environment and Climate Change; and National Defence; and
- The Cabinet Committee on Defence Procurement also operates within what in most other nations would be considered the national security envelope, although clearly with a different focus than the others. This committee is made necessary by Canada's unique multi-department machinery for defence procurement and is chaired by the Minister of Natural Resources.²⁵ The vice-chair is the President of the Treasury Board and the members are the Ministers of: Innovation, Science, and Economic Development; Global Affairs; Science; Public Services and Procurement; Transport; and National Defence.

The Minister of Finance and the President of the Treasury Board are *ex-officio* members of all Cabinet committees, including these four, however they clearly cannot attend all meetings and there is no reason to expect that they will be more active participants in national security-related committee meetings than any other. Committee membership is summarized in Table 2 below.

In 2005 the Martin government established an external Advisory Council on National Security similar to that of France, however this was eliminated by the Harper government in 2012.²⁶ The Cross-Cultural Round Table on Security, established at about the same time, still exists but it has

TABLE 2: National Security Committee Structures in Canada

Minister	National Security-Related Cabinet Committees			
	Intelligence & Emergency Management	Canada in the World & Public Security	Canada-US Relations	Defence Procurement
Prime Minister	X (Chair)			
Public Safety & Emergency Prep.	X	X(Chair)	X(Vice-Chair)	
Agriculture & Agri-Food		X	X	
Global Affairs	X	X	X	X
Immigration, Refugees & Citizenship		X	X	
President of the Treasury Board	(Ex-Officio)	(Ex-Officio)	(Ex-Officio)	X(Vice-Chair)
Fisheries, Oceans & Coast Guard	X			
Innovation, Science & Economic Dev.				X
Minister of Finance	(Ex-Officio)	(Ex-Officio)	(Ex-Officio)	(Ex-Officio)
Justice & Attorney General	X(Vice-Chair)			
Public Services & Procurement	X			X
International Trade		X(Vice-Chair)	X(Chair)	
Health	X			
Transport		X	X	X
International Development		X		
Natural Resources				X(Chair)
National Revenue		X		
Environment & Climate Change		X	X	
National Defence	X	X	X	X
Science		X	X	X
Small Business & Tourism			X	

a relatively narrow mandate to ensure “an ongoing dialogue on national security in a diverse and pluralistic society.”²⁷ It is not an advisory body on the full breadth of national security.

Administration. All of the committees are supported by the Privy Council Office. Within it, several secretariats contribute to the development of relevant policies and support the conduct of required activities.²⁸ These efforts are coordinated by the National Security Advisor,²⁹ who is responsible for several functions:

- Providing information, advice and recommendations on security and intelligence policy matters to the Prime Minister;
- Co-ordinating across the security and intelligence community;
- Along with the Deputy Minister of National Defence, is accountable to the Minister of National Defence for the Communications Security Establishment; and
- Overseeing the intelligence assessment function, specifically the production and co-or-

dination of intelligence assessments for the Prime Minister, other Ministers, and senior government officials.

An Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre provides threat assessments related to possible terrorist attacks, terrorist trends, and special events taking place in Canada and globally.³⁰ The original title of the organization when it was created in 2004 was the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre and it had a broader national security-focused mandate.³¹ This wider responsibility now resides in the Privy Council Office.

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Comparative Analysis

Several things become immediately apparent when comparing Canada’s national security architecture to those of the other four countries. First, Canada’s policy is by far the most dated and, while not necessarily irrelevant today, is farthest removed from contemporary challenges. Unlike the others, Canada also lacks a well-articulated national security strategy. This absence of clear and current strategic guidance from the national government inevitably creates particular problems in a federal state such as Canada’s as individual organizations at all levels are left to plan, build, and manage their capabilities on their own, with sometimes divergent views on current and future risks and no sense of national priorities across a broad and complex security landscape. Whether there are offsetting benefits in a more organic, locally responsive, and less directed approach is difficult to objectively assess.

Second, unlike the United Kingdom, Australia, and in a different sense the United States, historically there has been very little meaningful cross-party consultation or dialogue in Canadian national security policy development. Each Prime Minister more-or-less unilaterally sets their own policy, whether formally articulated or not. This absence of political consensus-building in national security makes establishing long-term consistency in national policies, strategies, plans, and investments difficult, especially when the political dynamics of the day result in costly over-politicization of some decisions. The result too often is expensive flip-flops with changes in administration and less national security capacity for the money spent.³²

Third, Canada’s political governance framework for national security is, to say the least, highly dispersed across four Cabinet Committees in contrast to the other four countries reviewed. Also, no less than 21 of the government’s 31 ministers sit on one or more of these bodies, perhaps bringing a sometimes useful breadth to their various deliberations but more often raising questions about the committees’ ability to focus on the complex essentials of difficult national security issues. The other nations studied all have more tightly focused political leadership of national security matters.

Other notable differences in Canada's committee compositions include:

- Only one of the four security-related Cabinet bodies is chaired by the Prime Minister;
- Only two ministers (Global Affairs and National Defence) sit on all four,³³ although the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness sits on all but the Committee on Defence Procurement and the Ministers of Transport and Science sit on all but the Committee on Intelligence & Emergency Management; and
- The Minister of Finance is only an *ex-officio* member of the four committees and the President of the Treasury Board is similarly an *ex-officio* member of three and a full member of only one: the Committee on Defence Procurement. In the four other countries the ministers responsible for aligning government resources and finances to national priorities are core members of the top national security body.

This dispersed Cabinet committee structure leads to the fourth major issue: in Canada the horizontal planning, direction, and management of national security responses inevitably defaults far more heavily to the administrative apparatus of the Privy Council Office, and in particular the National Security Advisor's office, than is the case in any of the other four nations. The national security architectures in those countries are deliberately designed to place the head of government and their key ministers personally at the centre of establishing unity of thought, purpose and action across the many agencies engaged in national security, not the bureaucracy.

Possible Lessons for Canada

Canada does not necessarily need to manage its national security the way other countries do, but it is useful to see whether those other examples offer any lessons are worth considering. Were Canada to adopt some of the key national security architecture features common to France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, a number of changes would be necessary. These are discussed in turn below.

Policy and Strategy. Canada would need to establish a framework for regularly reviewing and updating its national security policy and strategy. This would ideally be a relatively broad-based cyclical process led by the federal government but engaging Parliament (and especially the Parliamentary Opposition); provincial governments; and major industry and municipal players as a minimum.

The outcome should be a national security policy and strategy that reflected a reasonably broad national consensus (though not necessarily unanimity) on current and likely future threats and the appropriate national responses to them. This would bring greater long-term unity of thought, pur-

pose, and action to the plans, investment decisions, and other initiatives of the many government and non-government entities involved in national security. Equally importantly, it would bring greater strategic coherence to the vertical and horizontal integration of effort on the part of governments and the private sector, as well as our cooperation with other countries. The challenge would be to avoid having the periodic review process drift into becoming a mere rote exercise conducted for its own sake. It would need to stay focused on the core purpose.

Governance. A unified Cabinet-level national security governance model comparable to those of France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States would look something like this:

Cabinet Committee on National Security

Core Membership:

- Prime Minister (Chair)
- Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
- Minister of National Defence
- Minister of Global Affairs
- Minister of Finance
- President of the Treasury Board

As Required:

- Minister of Justice and Attorney General
- Minister of Fisheries, Oceans, and the Canadian Coast Guard
- Minister of Transport
- Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs
- Minister of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development
- Minister of Infrastructure and Communities
- Minister of the Environment and Climate Change
- Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship
- Minister of International Development
- Minister of Public Services and Procurement

Inviting the Leader of the Opposition to sit in at appropriate times, as is done in countries like the United Kingdom, may be unrealistic under current Canadian political dynamics. However, a measure such as this could be a useful future step towards establishing better long-term stability, consistency, and efficiency in national security planning and management.

Supporting this main committee could be sub-committees on key areas such as intelligence, infrastructure protection, defence procurement, and so on.

Administration. Canada's current national security administrative support to Cabinet is already fairly consistent with those of the other four nations, with Privy Council Office secretariats for: Foreign and Defence Policy; Intelligence Assessment; and Security and Intelligence. There is also a secretariat for the Cabinet Committee for Canada in the World and Security.³⁴ Most of these secretariats are responsible to the National Security Advisor, so the structure supports good integration of planning, analysis, issues management, and the formulation of advice. However, the publicly available information is very thin so there may be gaps and the relatively small size of the organization may limit its capacity to manage whole-of-government actions. It would be a useful exercise

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for the government to benchmark the current Privy Council Office national security structure against those of France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, and adopt any improvements this may identify.

Conclusion

Canada's national security architecture clearly has flaws but it cannot be said to be broken. It has delivered, by all objective measures, quite well on at least the first two of the three core national security interests set out in the 2004 national security policy:

- Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
- Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
- Contributing to international security.

Whether it is as efficient and effective as it might be, or can continue to be successful into the future in the face of evolving global and domestic threats, is less certain. National security is a hugely dynamic and deeply complex problem area for any country, and it increasingly requires very agile and adaptive integrated responses from all of the instruments of state power across all levels of government and major industries. It also requires an ongoing sophisticated effort to understand the changing nature of many kinds of threats; assess risks; determine and implement responses with our own capabilities or cooperatively with allies or partners; and anticipate the future in order to effectively prioritize necessary investments in new or improved capabilities. All of this demands clear strategic direction from the very top level of government, supported by effective research, intelligence gathering, analysis, planning, and coordinating machinery. It requires a purpose-designed national security architecture.

Canada does not have this. Its current architecture is clearly less the result of thoughtful, purposeful

design than incremental evolution in response to events. To be fair, it has nevertheless been reasonably successful, at least in the domestic and continental realms, and this is certainly not due to just good luck. There clearly has been adequate ongoing political direction and leadership, however unstructured the framework may have been within which it was managed.

Going forward, though, the global security environment is becoming more complex, perilous and difficult as we go through what some see as a period of potentially tectonic change in world affairs. This will demand that governments make far-sighted decisions on potentially significant investments in the national security tools they will need – not only for the home game but also the away game. A short-term incremental approach to these investments is not likely to be effective in these circumstances, and to guide good decision-making and keep the nation secure into the future Canada needs a clear, relevant, well-thought-out policy and strategy.

It also needs more unified and consistent ongoing political leadership on national security if it is to successfully face the challenges of the future. Threats are rapidly evolving in complexity, and responses similarly need to be more multi-dimensional. The long-term sustained unity of thought, purpose, and action needed to be successful in these circumstances can only be created from the top.

This paper has looked at how the national security architectures of France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States are structured and found a remarkable degree of consistency among them. All four have:

- Robust policies and strategies, plus machinery for cyclically reviewing and updating them;
- Unified political leadership formally embodied in the machinery of government, personally led by the head of government and often incorporating regular engagement with the political opposition; and
- Administrative structures supporting the political leadership and coordinating or managing the integration of national responses to security threats and events.

Canada has only one of these three critical elements – the administrative structure. Of the other two, its policy and strategy are seriously dated and not necessarily very relevant to current circumstances, and its political leadership structure is fragmented and only partly led by the Prime Minister. Engagement with the political opposition is generally sporadic at best, where it occurs at all.

Canadians, their government, and their Parliament need to carefully consider whether the current national security architecture is capable of meeting the challenges of the coming years and de-

cares. This paper suggests that it is not, and that a more effective purpose-designed framework is needed to take us into the future. It also finds that the solutions adopted in the four other countries examined offer some useful guideposts as to what that should look like. Whether the government decides to adopt something similar or a different model, the deficiencies in the status quo must be fixed.

About the Author

Colonel Charles Davies (Retired) is a CDA Institute Research Fellow and former Logistics office with wide executive-level experience in force planning, strategic planning, business planning, program planning and policy development. Since retiring in 2013 following a 42-year military and Public Service career, he has been researching and writing extensively on defence management, defence procurement and defence policy issues. He is the author of, among others, Vimy Paper 18: “Defence Transformation and Renewal: Teeth, Tails and Other Myths;” Vimy Paper 20: “Canada’s Defence Procurement Strategy – An End or a Beginning?” and Vimy Paper 26: “Competition in Defence Procurement: The Popular Choice, but not Always the Right One.”

Notes

1. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. Although Tony Rodger has argued in a recent article that fears over Russian military modernization are overblown for several reasons, in particular the current economic conditions in the country. He does acknowledge, however, that it remains a formidable regional power and has global aspirations. Tony Rodger, "Is Russia Mobilizing for War?" *Policy Options*, 28 July 2016, <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2016/is-russia-really-mobilizing-for-war/>.
3. A similarly disturbing trend emerged among Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s and progressively grew throughout the run-up to World War II. See Professor Patricia Clavin of Oxford University in a chapter she contributed to Richard Overy, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of World War II* (Oxford University Press, 2015). While current circumstances are clearly not identical, governments need to be cognizant of how past events evolved – and what worked and what didn't in the international responses.
4. Recognizing that Canada is not the small player in the world some like to portray. Its population is in the top 25 percent of nations in the world, its economy is 10th or 11th, and its resource base is among the largest on the planet. Its ability to influence global events to protect its interests is therefore less constrained by national capacity than by national will. See the remarks of Professor Elinor Sloan of Carleton University on 11 May, 2016 to members of the panel advising the Minister of National Defence in the current Defence Policy Review, "CDA & CDA Institute Special Event – Defence Policy Review: Opening Remarks and Written Statements," *CDA Institute Analysis* (May 2016). https://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/Analysis/DPR_Event_Analysis_May_2016.pdf.
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 34. Privy Council Office.

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151 Slater Street, suite 412A , Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5H3
Phone / Téléphone: +1 (613) 236 9903

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