



ON TRACK

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CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW FOR A NEW MANDATE

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ON TRACK

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Énoncé de mission de l'Institut de la CAD: encourager un débat public éclairé à propos des problématiques concernant la sécurité et de défense canadienne, et promouvoir le rôle vital joué par les Forces armées canadiennes dans la société. Nous souhaitons que « ON TRACK » facilite ce mandat éducatif en mettant en vedette une gamme d'articles qui explorent la sécurité, la défense et le domaine stratégique pouvant avoir un impact sur les intérêts du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les points de vues exprimés dans « ON TRACK » reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

COVER PHOTO: Canadian Army soldiers disembark a CH-147F Chinook helicopter during Exercise Common Ground II 2016 at 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, New Brunswick, 25 November 2016.

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Soldats de l'armée canadienne débarquent un hélicoptère Chinook CH-147F au cours de l'exercice Common Ground II 2016 au 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, au Nouveau-Brunswick, 25 novembre 2016.

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FROM THE RESEARCH MANAGER

It is my pleasure to provide part of the introduction to the first of two and possibly three CDA Institute ON TRACK publications for 2017. As many of you who regularly visit the CDA Institute website will have seen, change has been constant over these past months. In addition to saying farewell to several staff members as they moved on to other challenges, the CDA Institute is also moving more surely into the electronic and social media domains. The 2017 Strategic Outlook, like ON TRACK itself, is now uniquely a digital product and we continue to update our website to ensure it has both a look and content that will encourage users to read and then comment upon our articles.

Tout ce changement a pour objectif un engagement fort et croissant avec vous, nos lecteurs. Nous avons, parmi nos auteurs expérimentés et en développement, une perspective large et éclairée sur la sécurité et la défense du Canada, tel qu'illustré par cette édition de ON TRACK. Je vous invite de participer aussi – l'engagement n'est pas unidirectionnelle et nous profitons tous d'un discours actif de votre part. Engagez-vous – notre résultat total sera encore mieux pour l'effort !

Finally, I would like to note particularly one of the most recent additions to the CDA Institute team, that of Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle as the ON TRACK editor. He has some interesting ideas that are sure to attract attention and engagement from you, our readers, in the issues to come. Craig – welcome to the team!

Matthew Overton,
Research Manager *pro tem*.

FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to the Spring 2017 edition of ON TRACK! This issue offers much to contemplate as Canada begins to navigate the Trump presidency, is on the cusp of a (landmark?) defence review and continues to struggle with regional instability in various guises.

As readers are undoubtedly aware, the government will release the much-anticipated Defence Policy Review in the very near future, a document that will surely encapsulate its thinking on the state of the global security environment and, importantly, the role that it wishes the nation's military forces to play within it. Either way, whether it is completely revolutionary or simply maintains the status quo, the DPR will nevertheless provide the Canadian Armed Forces with guidance and direction for the next decade. It is fitting, therefore, that our first article, a posthumous publication by the late Francis Furtado, muses about the possible content of the DPR while concurrently offering sage insights into some of the considerations that the government probably wrestled with in formulating its outlook on defence. Keeping with the DPR, Grant McDonald of KPMG next offers a brief synopsis of his company's submission during the public consultation phase of the Review, essentially contending that the Department of National Defence must adopt a stronger business culture if it is to realize operational savings across the board and maximize its performance. Chris Kilford's insightful discussion of defence spending within NATO suggests that, despite falling short of the targeted 2% of GDP, Canada nevertheless makes a significant contribution to the alliance; how the DPR will affect this historic relationship, now in its 68th year, remains to be seen.

In what has become a landmark event each calendar year, the CDA and CDA Institute once again held the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence in February, bringing together military professionals and civilian experts to discuss a sweeping range of defence issues bearing upon Canada. Provided by Chris Cowan, synopses of the keynote presentations and panel discussions are offered next for the benefit of those unable to attend. Be sure to watch each presentation on the CDA Institute's revamped website, www.cdainstitute.ca!

Shifting focus to the international scene, a series of three articles address global issues that in one way or another impact Canada. Adam MacDonald begins by analyzing how President Donald Trump's "America First" approach to foreign policy may influence U.S. relations with China in particular and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The discussion continues with a thought-provoking piece by Adnan Qaiser on the roots of radical Islam. In it, he provides an interesting introduction to the thought of radical scholars, their publications and the overarching narrative that drives terrorism. And finally, Michael Lambert highlights, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, the complexity that will exist for both states and citizens in deconstructing Europe as it currently exists, with the United Kingdom moving through BREXIT and Scotland considering independence (again).

Reprinted here with the kind permission of the Canadian Military Journal, le Brigadier-général Jennie Carignan discusses in her article the concept of "victory" in war ... how military theorists have defined it over the last two millennia, how it can impact the moral conduct of soldiers either for the better or for the worse, and how politicians and commanders must adequately define what they mean by it before sending military forces into harm's way. Her cogent article provides much to think about as it becomes increasingly difficult in today's conflicts to determine, in her words, the "victor" and the "vanquished".

While looking predominately to the future, this issue also gazes back to the past. Amongst other significant milestones, 2017 marks the 100th anniversary of many important First World War battles like Vimy Ridge, Hill 70 and Passchendaele. It is fitting in this year of anniversaries, therefore, that something should be said within these pages about our predecessors and their accomplishments for our history very much informs our present. My comments to a fundraising event in support of the Hill 70 Memorial Project, an initiative to erect and maintain a permanent monument to this battle in France, touch upon some of the reasons for the overwhelming success of the Canadian Corps in August 1917 and are reproduced here (a coincidence, I assure you dear reader, which was wholly unintended). In a similar vein, Matthew Overton offers his thoughts on Vimy and its legacy, having been fortunate enough to attend the 100th anniversary ceremony in France. If Canada is currently deciding where it should go in the future, with the DPR as its guide, it is important for the country to remember where it has already been and the attendant cost of the journey from "then" to "now".

With its varied fare, touching on the domestic and international, the contemporary and historical, I trust that this edition of ON TRACK will offer a little something for everyone. As always, comments and submissions are most welcome from all.

Until next time, and with warmest regards,

Craig Leslie Mantle, PhD

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW FOR A NEW MANDATE

by Francis Furtado

Editor's note: The following piece, one of the last by Francis Furtado (1966-2017), is published posthumously. It was with a very heavy heart that ON TRACK learned of his sudden and premature passing earlier this year, although we are thankful to have been offered the opportunity to publish his insightful and timely article on the forthcoming Defence Policy Review. As a public servant, Mr. Furtado's career spanned 22 years and took him to the Department of National Defence (Policy Group), the Privy Council Office (Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat), the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. An accomplished scholar as well, his most recent project was a co-editorship with James Fergusson of *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017). The CDA and CDA Institute wish to again extend their sincere condolences to Francis' family, friends and colleagues ... bon courage à tous.

The results of the Government's defence review are due to be released early this year. Originally prompted by the debate on the F-35, the circumscribed approach that the Government has taken to public and parliamentary consultations suggests no great interest in changing the fundamentals of Canadian defence policy. Similarly, the cursory response of the broader Canadian foreign and defence policy community suggests that it is not interested in this either.

That said, the review will ineluctably deliver its results. Even if post-Cold War reviews of Canadian defence policy have tended to return policies that differ only in language, tone, and specific program details, understanding the new Government's approach to defence remains important. What is its understanding of the security environment? How does it see the role of the Canadian military at home? What perspective does it bring to the Canada-U.S. defence relationship? What role does it wish the Canadian military to play in a complicated, often violent, world overseas? To what extent does it understand the long-term fiscal

implications for a military that can deliver its domestic and foreign policy objectives?

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

For the Government, the question is two-fold. First, what would it identify as the salient characteristics of the security environment? (Cold War III? Genocide? Terrorism? Proliferation? Refugees? The environment? The Arctic? All the above?) Second, what is the Government's approach to responding to any of this? (Are these problems threats to Canadian security, values, interests, or all three? In any case, how willing is it to spill blood and treasure to act on these problems as they come up?)

On the one hand, the Government would be wise to avoid designating any one of these problems as the principal threat to Canada. On the other, it should probably also avoid the temptation to use phrases like "human security" to encapsulate them all, if only because such terms are so elastic as to offer little in the way of specific guidance for foreign or defence policy planning.

Defence (and, for that matter, diplomacy

and development assistance) is always going to be an expensive, discretionary item. It poses a key question for both Ottawa and the Canadian voter: Whatever you tell yourself about Canada's role in the world, how much foreign and defence policy do you want?

Similarly, the review will need to address the same issue that has bedevilled Western governments since the end of the Cold War: Once we are secure, to what extent do we care about anybody else that we are willing to expend blood and treasure on faraway problems? This is not to belittle the good-hearted nature of Canadians, but, over the past thirty years, set against the backdrop of fiscal austerity, this question has been a riddle for Canadian governments more than most.

The disappearance of a familiar international framework has had other effects as well. No longer threatened by the threat of imminent nuclear attack, talking about the "defence of Canada" might seem a bit abstruse. The implications of what we do in North America might be easier to understand when set in the context of Canada's relationship with the

United States, but still might come off as a bit exotic. Beyond this, sustaining a capable Canadian military might be more compelling because the media brings images of international conflict and humanitarian tragedies into our living rooms, but it also quietly underlines how much Canadian foreign and defence policy has truly become an expensive, discretionary matter: an area in which we can choose to do as much or as little as we want.

From the point of view of predictability, the international environment offers little relief for Canadian defence planners. By the first part of this year, after a fractious election campaign, the new Administration and Congress will have set up shop in Washington. Further afield – from BREXIT, Russia, refugees, North Korea, proliferation to regional conflicts – interpreting the broader international environment, and sorting out its implications for Canada, will not have grown any easier.

THE BUDGETARY CONTEXT

Defence policy is inseparable from the Government's broader budgetary circumstances. The decision to freeze the defence budget until 2018 was a broken election promise. Moreover, even restoring these previously agreed-upon spending levels will turn on the validity of the Government's economic projections and political decisions on the federal budget as the next election approaches. None of this is all that encouraging. Defence (like its diplomacy and development twins) is always going to be an expensive, high-profile, discretionary item. That said, defence is different from any other government portfolio, if only because planning for the future of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is not based on a three- to five-year cycle, but a twenty-year "cradle-to-grave" plan for the major capital programs that form the spine of the Canadian military.

Playing in the premiere league of international security has never been cheap and requires constant investment.



Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan (Source: Canadian Armed Forces)

At day's end, the decisions that the Government makes on defence spending now – and this includes delays – will have knock-on effects for the long-term future of the CAF, specifically how well-prepared it is when the critical moments come. Once again, the defence review holds up a mirror and asks: How much defence policy are you willing to *pay for*?

A GUIDING CONCEPT FOR THE CANADIAN MILITARY

The Government needs to settle on a fundamental concept of the purpose of the CAF. Is it for the broadest range of missions – from observers to combat – or for more specific missions like peacekeeping or ill-defined concepts like human security?

This is a tedious, unproductive debate. A Canadian military equipped for combat can easily adapt itself for lesser, but still valuable missions. One can expect to encounter a wide range of threats to peace and security abroad, and that Ottawa will be asked to respond. In these circumstances, current and future governments will want a force capable of carrying out the widest range of roles. That is the concept. One can readily tailor a broadly-capable force for less demanding missions; one cannot build

up greater capabilities at a moment's notice.

What has steadily come to infuse this discussion is the notion of "transformation": the tantalizing prospect of a high-technology revolution for U.S. and allied militaries. Twenty years on, some aspects of this process are either complete or well underway, while others continue to find their footing, but, as the new face of interoperability, none of these developments can be ignored by allied governments, including Canada's.

These considerations are fundamental to the broader future of the CAF. What then confronts the Government is how this baseline capability will be used.

THE DEFENCE OF CANADA

Absent the Cold War threat of nuclear war (which, obviously, no one ever wanted), terrorism (which, as a matter of jurisdiction, is more of an intelligence and law enforcement problem), or widespread domestic conflict (which, thankfully, is unlikely), talking about "the defence of Canada" might seem a bit abstruse. Instead, it bears noting that the CAF plays an important, if unadvertised, role in many aspects of Canadian life – from search and rescue and disaster

relief to supporting fisheries patrols and environmental surveillance. Canadian governments and the public rely on the capabilities of the CAF if only because they are the only institution prepared to operate in this vast and demanding environment at a moment's notice.

The arrangements that govern the use of the Canadian military at home are the result of extensive practical experience. As domestic contingencies come up, there has been a natural temptation to reach for the CAF because it is the only instrument at hand. In the aftermath of each event, a more refined sense emerges of the most appropriate ways to deal with these issues over the long-term: other federal, provincial, and local organizations, and law enforcement. This approach, one that is informed by steady, careful learning does not need to be changed.

Indeed, one could do worse than extend this approach to the current fascination with a role for the CAF in the Arctic. The Canadian military *does* have a role in Canada's north and the annual exercises are valuable from an operational and symbolic perspective. But Canada's claims to the Arctic should be less reliant on a periodic appearance of the Canadian military than the presence of our indigenous peoples, permanently stationed military personnel, Canadian research scientists, and the enforcement of Canadian laws and regulations.

THE DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

This discussion should be re-cast as "Canada-U.S. defence cooperation." Clearly, Canada and the United States will want to ensure that the air, sea, and land approaches to North America do not become avenues for an attack on either country, but the benefits of the relationship – in terms of interoperability, integrated command structures, intelligence-sharing, and defence industrial cooperation – extend far beyond the continent.

Obviously, both countries will

continuously explore opportunities to cooperate on defence and security issues as they arise. But one can also expect that they will zealously guard their own national prerogatives to ensure whether bilateral cooperation is the best way to solve the "next, new problem." On the one hand, when these issues emerge in Canada, they will trigger a perennial debate on whether a new initiative either *threatens* Canadian sovereignty or is a pragmatic *exercise* of Canadian sovereignty. On the other, the United States, particularly in Congress, will start to wonder if its fundamental responsibility to protect Americans is being put at undue risk. Beyond this, bilateral defence cooperation has implications for how the two countries engage with the world.

One place where one can see these considerations in play is continental missile defence. It puts into sharp focus how Ottawa sees the relationship between proliferation, the defence of North America, and the management of Canada-U.S. defence relations. For Canada, the requirement is to keep pace with developments, and determine if, when, and how we can make a useful contribution that serves both countries' interests. For the United States, the questions that it asks of Canada will turn on the broader approach of the new Administration and Congress.

CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Generically speaking, the value of the Canadian military as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy will depend on what capabilities the CAF has on offer: the broader, the better. That said, what other considerations are in play?

The United Nations (UN): The UN has turned out to be a little bit like what George Bernard Shaw said about Christianity – a nice idea if it was ever tried. That said, the UN stands to be Canada's initial, preferred institution of choice – as it was in Korea in 1950, Suez

in 1956, and Iraq in 1990. Otherwise, the record has been uneven. This is not the fault of the institution *per se* – the UN is only as effective as its member states want it to be. At the end of the day, Canada should not bank on the UN being the first and only instrument for its responses to international security problems, but neither should it rule it out.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): In the twenty-five years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, initial predictions of NATO's imminent demise have shown themselves to be premature. As a reflection of its promise of collective defence, Western integration and democracy, the Alliance has become something that countries almost compete to join. The result has been an organization whose membership has gone from sixteen to twenty-eight nations, alongside a range of less formal arrangements with other states. Perhaps more importantly, NATO's accumulated experience with multinational operations has made it a useful reservoir of military capability that can be used outside of the Treaty area.

It has not all been plain sailing, though. For Canada, NATO's measures of a country's contributions to allied and global security have not kept pace – most notably in the use of "defence budget as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)." By this measure, at just over one percent of GDP, Canada's commitment to Alliance security should rate as close to dead last. Strangely, however, this same defence budget has consistently been between the sixth- and seventh-largest in the Alliance. More importantly, as a practical matter, it is a budget used to help defend the largest country in NATO, provide for the security of the North Atlantic sea lanes, maintain the possibility of expeditionary deployments to defend NATO-Europe, and address broader security problems that can affect Alliance countries.

Coalitions of the Willing: Arguing that

the use of informal coalitions represents a tragic abandonment of international institutions misses the point. It is more a consequence of the inability of UN member states, or those of regional organizations, to respond to even the most egregious violations of the rights of states and peoples. Coalitions do pose problems of their own: the lack of an institutional structure and agreed-upon procedures carry with them the risk that critical decisions will be swayed by senior coalition members and leave junior partners exposed. Nevertheless, given the choice between working with imperfect arrangements and doing nothing at all, how to put about in coalitions stands to become an essential job skill for smaller powers.

The Participation of the Canadian Armed Forces in International Security Operations: Over the past thirty years, decisions to commit the CAF abroad have moved steadily away from rigid “criteria” in favour of more flexible “considerations.” The reasons are obvious. A fast-moving world in which the use of the Canadian military could range from promoting democratic civil-military relations, helping implement an agreed-upon ceasefire, carrying out more unpredictable peace enforcement missions to engaging in combat operations will put a premium on flexibility and imagination. In the final analysis, what we are able to accomplish is more important than a pre-determined *model* that we should follow, or under which *arrangements* we choose to make our contributions.

THE DEFENCE PROGRAM

Inevitably, a defence policy statement contains some indication about the future of the defence program. One can expect a rough estimate of how the Government and the Department of National Defence plan to apportion the defence budget between operations, capital, maintenance, and personnel. This is complicated, difficult work. These projections may not necessarily bear out

over time, but they do send an important signal about how a government intends to manage defence.

Ironically, to an extent, operations tend to be the most predictable of these costs. New missions will come and go, but the Department is for the most part acutely aware of its current capabilities and the incremental costs of new undertakings. Moreover, when the Department is asked to respond to the unforeseen, it tends to get a good part of its money back.

Capital, maintenance, and personnel are more complicated items. All three are essential to the current and future of the CAF. The importance of each budget is obvious: capital (modern equipment and the infrastructure to support it), maintenance (ensuring that this equipment is ready to go), and personnel (investing in well-trained people to operate and support all this). What a defence policy statement provides is a snapshot of the Department’s situation and aspirations at the time of publication. Striking the right balance amongst these elements is a constant effort that will occupy the Department in the ensuing years. There is no dishonesty here: it is more a reflection of how defence policy aspirations run up against governmental annual fiscal priorities, service politics, individual program decisions, and the simple cost of doing business.

CONCLUSION

How the Government chooses to discuss these issues suggests how it plans to treat the defence portfolio. The policy and planning horizons of defence may well outlast a government’s lifetime, but the willingness of a government to communicate its plans signals how seriously it takes the everyday management of defence and its vision for an important national institution that it will leave to future governments, Canadians, and the people who serve.

TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF DEFENCE

by Grant J. McDonald

(Originally published on LinkedIn.com on January 30, 2017)

Efforts are underway to review Canada's defence policy, inviting all Canadians to provide input on the way that our country uses its military resources both at home and beyond its borders. Launched by the Liberal government in spring 2016, the Defence Policy Review included consultations with civilians, industry experts, and organizations across Canada – a process

through which KPMG was proud to lend its voice.

This year's review not only marks the first re-examination of defence policy since the Canada First Defence Strategy was published in 2008, it arrives at a critical time in Canada's history. In light of global threats, economic challenges, and digital transformations, it addresses an urgent

need to explore new strategies, re-fresh old strategies, and re-examine the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

\$1.2 BILLION IN OPERATIONAL SAVINGS

At the same time, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF are three years into a renewal program launched in 2013 to uncover upwards



(Source: Canadian Armed Forces)

of \$1.2 billion in “operational savings” and put those dollars to better use. The renewal program is focused on transforming the business of defence, which so often takes a back seat to the defence business.

Surely, defence is a business – and a complex and expensive one at that. Canada’s military is a system of systems stretched over 20 divisions and one that marches to the beat of numerous leaders, decision levers, accountabilities, and objectives. Understanding this, KPMG put forward a submission to the Defence Policy Review in July 2016, outlining its recommendations across four key pillars:

- Fostering greater performance management
- Enabling decision rights and management levers for functional authorities
- Establishing single points of accountability for core elements of the business of defence
- Taking an enterprise approach to information management and business intelligence

It is important to emphasize that Canada has much to be proud of when it comes to the handling of its military – and certainly, the global reputation of its forces. However, just as the Defence Policy Review is intent on identifying the roles and tasks that Canada’s military should play, it is equally focused on ensuring the right investment is made to shore up its operations and identify operational savings. To support both needs, adopting a stronger business culture founded on performance management needs to be at the top of its agenda.

Like many government organizations, significant investments have been made in enabling technologies. Yet, all too often, the value of those enabling technologies is not fully realized because there is a lack of an enterprise capability

to use that technology and data both efficiently and effectively.

ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING

Defence organizations are highly dependent upon enterprise resource planning (ERP)¹ systems for the back office and, increasingly, the battlefield. With billions of dollars invested in ERP, these systems have become a central part of the modern defence landscape, speeding up transactions and informing quick, decisive action. ERPs are not a complete solution. In most cases, they are part of a suite of complementary technologies that combine to give defence organizations the data they need, and when they need it, via a common, shared data platform.

The demand for coordinated and reliable information needs to be solved from an enterprise perspective. That said, most deployed defence ERP systems are unable to support the unique challenges of a mobile battlefield, where latency is high, bandwidth is low, and tactical communications networks are often disrupted. They rarely have fully integrated demand / deployment planning capabilities and often require manual intervention. Consequently, many combat ERP systems must be augmented or replaced by bespoke versions, which leads to data and system duplication. It is not efficient (or cost-conscious) to approach data management 20 different times for each division. The DND/ CAF needs more robust data management capabilities that drive towards a single source of truth which, in turn, will enable an enterprise view of what’s really going on.

ROOTING OUT BUREAUCRACY

We realize that none of KPMG’s recommendations can occur overnight, but nonetheless we are confident these suggestions can join other public and private insights in improving the business of defence. Already, our discussions with senior leaders have revealed a genuine willingness at the highest levels to see

improvements like these through and take full advantage of the Defence Policy Review’s public consultations. Royal Canadian Navy Vice-Admiral Mark Norman has also expressed his desire for transformation, telling *The Globe and Mail*, “I intend to root out unnecessary and non-value added bureaucracy and process inside our own lines here at National Defence.”²

The Defence Policy Review holds plenty of promise, and it is this potential that KPMG hopes to help realize by drawing on our global collective experience in the defence space to contribute to its findings. We’re confident that DND/CAF is listening, and through consultations with Canadians like us, it will reach its ambitious targets.

Grant J. McDonald is the KPMG Regional Managing Partner, Regions East & Office Managing Partner, Ottawa and Partner, Tax Services & Aerospace and Defence Industry. Holding a B.Comm. (Hons), Queen’s University, Mr McDonald received his CA designation in 1984.

NOTES

1. Enterprise resource planning (ERP) is a process by which organizations manage and integrate the important parts of their business. An ERP management information system integrates and automates areas such as planning, engineering and maintenance, supply chain, finance and human resources
2. Lee Berthiaume, “Senior military officer blasts onerous oversight, urges political direction,” *The Globe and Mail*, 5 August 2016, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/senior-military-officer-blasts-onerous-over-sight-urges-more-political-direction/article31297067>.

NATO: THERE'S MORE TO BURDEN SHARING THAN 2 PERCENT

by Dr. Chris Kilford

With the release of the NATO Secretary General's 2016 Annual Report it's clear to see why the United States is generally fed-up with most of its NATO allies who it accuses of spending far too little on defence. But the scolding never seems to have much of an impact. Indeed, Washington's allies re-pledged to reach a 2 percent of GDP defence spending target by 2024 at the 2014 NATOSummit in Wales, but then did exactly the opposite. Apart from the US only Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia upped their defence spending but not by much. No wonder that some of the bigger NATO countries like Canada needed to seek cover when US Defense Secretary James Mattis spoke at a gathering of alliance defence ministers in Brussels last month and waved a Marine trained finger at them.

However, as Craig Stone recently noted in a Canadian Global Affairs Institute report "how much a nation spends on its armed forces as a percentage of GDP is not a good measure for determining actual military capability." Some NATO countries, for example, spend huge amounts on salaries and pensions with little left over for arms and ammunition. That's one reason why NATO members also pledged in 2014 to spend a minimum of 20 percent of their defence budgets acquiring major new equipment.

According to NATO, Canada spent about \$20.6 billion on defence in 2016 with approximately 46percent going towards personnel costs, 18 percent for



(Source: Canadian Armed Forces)

equipment, 5 percent for infrastructure upkeep and the rest on such items as operations and maintenance. Overall, it's not a bad record although our defence spending has remained fixed at around 1 percent of GDP for several years given that important defence acquisitions were postponed.

But look at Belgium. NATO figures show that 77 percent of its defence budget went to personnel costs in 2016 and only 4.6 percent for equipment. Portugal spent 78 percent of its defence budget on personnel costs, Slovenia 76 percent, Greece 70 percent and Italy 69 percent. The result is people in uniform but often with aging equipment, no money for training and the potential for a leaky roof overhead.

Turkey might have spent 1.69 percent of its GDP on defence in 2016 and

fielded an impressive 380,000 regular and conscript troops, but a good deal of that combat power was simply not available for NATO's use because much of the army and air force remained focused on combatting the Kurdish PKK in Turkey's south-east. In addition, approximately 30,000 Turkish troops are permanently stationed in Cyprus. And let's not forget Turkey's failed coup last year and its recent military foray into Syria.

The US should also be reminded that the NATO alliance is not the one-way street it routinely makes it out to be. For example, in return for Washington's defensive umbrella many NATO allies have provided troops, often half-heartedly, in support of American-led post-Cold War adventures in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. As a consequence of these interventions, countries such as Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey,

among many others, are now responsible for millions of refugees. Yet soon after assuming office, President Trump was quick to slash the number of refugees the US will take in this year from a planned 110,000 to just 50,000.

The point is that burden sharing and overall military effectiveness in the alliance is more than just spending 2 percent of GDP on defence. Besides, as Stone importantly notes, “Canada’s military is far more capable than those of other nations that spend much more on defence as a percentage of GDP” Not that Canada should ever rest on its laurels, of course.

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(Source: Canadian Armed Forces)

2017 CDA AND CDA INSTITUTE OTTAWA CONFERENCE SUMMARIES

by Christopher Cowan

The Annual CDA and CDA Institute Conference on Security and Defence, held 16-17 February at the Shaw Conference Centre, attracted a wide range of participants and panelists. While disappointed in their expectation of having a Defence Policy Review to examine and discuss, attendees were nonetheless actively engaged by and on issues from Great Power relationships, the balance of Canadian defence activities, the system of defence procurement, the Asia-Pacific region and without great surprise, the impact of the recent U.S. election.

Readers will find below a short synopsis of the keynote presentations and panel discussions, all of which may be found in their entirety on the CDA Institute's newly-revised website at <http://cdainstitute.ca/ottawa-conference-2017>.

Presentation: Dr. Kim Nossal, Strategic Outlook 2017

Dr. Kim Nossal kicked off the 2017 Ottawa Conference with a presentation on the 2017 Strategic Outlook document published by the CDA Institute. In his introduction, Dr. Nossal briefly outlined each of the chapters and their contributors, concluding that a key strength of the document is that it highlights the tough choices and issues that will have to be addressed in the upcoming Defence Policy Review (DPR). Dr. Nossal then noted how the general views of Canadians expressed in the public consultation documents for the DPR reflected many of the myths surrounding Canada's military history and defence policy. He wondered how the DPR would be able to reconcile the myths surrounding Canadian defence policy and the realities of the country's contemporary security environment, especially in the age of Donald Trump. He concluded his remarks by discussing the implications of Trump's election for Canada, Canada-U.S. relations, and the global order.



(Source: Richard Lawrence Photography)

Panel 1: Reviewing Canadian Defence Policy

Moderator: Dr. Elinor Sloan

Panelists: General (Ret'd) Tom Lawson, Dr. Srdjan Vucetic, Dr. Christian Leuprecht

The first panel of the conference focused on the Canadian government's upcoming DPR. General (Ret'd) Tom Lawson's remarks centred on his contention that reviewing Canada's defence policy is not as

difficult as many make it seem. He argued that many of Canada's grand strategic questions—the variables and worries that keep other countries up at night—are already answered and unlikely to change much in the future. This is in part due to Canada's geography that makes it easy to identify direct, existential threats and has allowed it to take a “defence discount”. But, he argued, Canadians' desire to actively contribute to global peace and security means that a homeland-focused Canadian

Armed Forces (CAF) is not feasible. Canada will always be engaged in multilateral institutions and alliances with the goal of making the world a safer and more secure place, and it needs a CAF with the ability to do so. General Lawson concluded his remarks by stating that the most important thing that could come out of the DPR is a stable resource line for the CAF.

Dr. Srdjan Vucetic examined the findings of the DPR's expert consultations in his remarks. He illuminated the openness of this iteration of the DPR, highlighting how the government consulted with four key stakeholders: the Canadian public, parliamentarians, allies and foreign partners, and experts within the defence community. A noteworthy part of his remarks was his finding that Canadian defence experts tended to view Canadian defence policy and its place in the world not through the lens of national interests, but through the framework of Canada's relationships with other states and multilateral institutions (such as the United Nations and NATO). The expert community also tended to categorize "threats" using the terms "challenges" and "risks". After highlighting other noticeable trends from the expert consultations, Dr. Vucetic concluded his remarks by discussing what was not mentioned in the document, notably, Trump!

Dr. Christian Leuprecht rounded out the panel with his reflections on the DPR. He highlighted the challenges brought on by the contemporary global security environment. Globalization has created a world where events abroad can profoundly affect Canada and Canada's security, which complicates defence policymaking. He noted that while procurement issues capture much of the public's attention, it is the personnel of the CAF that is key. Canada is diversifying twice as quickly as the CAF is, and it is critical that the CAF adapt to this new recruiting environment and be truly representative of Canadian society. Dr. Leuprecht also argued that previous defence reviews have all come at times of change in the global threat

environment, offering windows of opportunity for Canada to reflect on its defence policy. He then wondered whether we will see any genuine policy shifts from the DPR or if we will see the return of inter-departmental competition marked by the results of previous reviews. He finished off his remarks by stressing the need for the Canadian government to be proactive in pursuing its defence policy goals in a time of great uncertainty.

Questions for this panel centred on what type of threats Canada faces in the contemporary security environment and how Canada can manage them. Dr. Vucetic and General Lawson highlighted the challenges Canada faces in conceptualizing and dealing with a broad range of threats. Dr. Leuprecht ended the session by noting that Canadian unity and stability are key



(Source: Richard Lawrence Photography)

and that there are forces out there in the world that seek to undermine Canada's democracy.

Speaker: General Lori Robinson

The CDA and CDA Institute were thrilled to have General Lori Robinson, commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and NORAD, give the first keynote address of the conference. General Robinson began by highlighting the bi-national nature of NORAD. She then discussed the close working relationship between the United States and Canada that began in 1940 with the Ogdensburg Agreement—over a decade before NORAD was created. While NORAD has served both Canada and the U.S. well over the past 59 years, General Robinson stated, the evolving

global security environment means that it is time for NORAD to be modernized. She then highlighted the numerous avenues for NORAD's modernization, including new equipment, strategies, and operational concepts. General Robinson concluded her address by stressing the importance of Canada's contribution to NORAD and its upcoming modernization process.

Panel 2: Canada-U.S. Relations in the Trump Era

Moderator: Dr. Stefanie von Hlatky
Panelists: Dr. Joseph Jockel, Dr. Andrea Charron, Dr. Christopher Sands

The second panel of the conference centred on the future of Canada-U.S. relations in the era of President Donald Trump. Dr. Joseph Jockel began his remarks by noting that it is difficult to predict the future of Canada-U.S. relations after the most contentious U.S. presidential election in recent history. Dr. Jockel highlighted the fact that the U.S. has been unhappy with the levels of Canadian defence spending since the days of Pierre Trudeau. But, Dr. Jockel argued, the U.S. has no leverage over Canada because defence spending is not linked with other issues, and the U.S. cannot afford to walk away from North American defence. Dr. Jockel concluded his remarks by stressing that the issue is that the forms of bilateral defence cooperation may change under the Trump administration should they be dissatisfied with Canada's contribution, with "huge" implications.

Dr. Andrea Charron was the second speaker of this panel. Dr. Charron began her remarks by stressing that it is Canada's decisions about NORAD and NORAD's future that are the stumbling blocks in NORAD's modernization process. She argued that Canada needs to focus more on continental defence, emphasizing a return to Canada's core national interests. Dr. Charron then identified the evolving threats to the North American continent, emphasizing the cruise missile threat. These threats require NORAD to have better command-and-control capabilities, institutional linkages, and the ability to

focus on the “archers” rather than the “arrows”. Dr. Charron then worried that Canada will only focus on modernization and not the transformation NORAD needs to remain relevant. She concluded her remarks by stating that Canada needs to start caring about NORAD on days other than Christmas Eve when it monitors the southward flight of Santa Claus.

The final speaker of this panel was Dr. Christopher Sands whose remarks focused on President Trump and the revolt against the Washington establishment. Dr. Sands began by noting that Donald Trump is a discontinuity in American politics – he is an “abnormal” president. Dr. Sands argued that the establishment is what became “abnormal”; it could not see what the average American was going through because of its economic policies. He noted that Donald Trump’s election promises were not new ... George W. Bush and Barack Obama all made similar promises of change in their campaigns. Shifting to Canada-U.S. relations, Dr. Sands stated that we will likely see a revival of the notion of “exemptionalism”; Canada is likely not on Trump’s radar so Canada may be “exempt” from certain U.S. policies. He then concluded by worrying that issue linkage may make a comeback and that Canada should be wary.

Questions for this panel centred on the notion of issue linkage brought up by Dr. Jockel and Dr. Sands and how Canada could better contribute to continental defence. Dr. Jockel stated that if issue linkage becomes a Trump strategy, Canada could be placed in a tough situation and that the way to proceed is to distract Trump by highlighting Canada’s contributions. In response to a question about Canada’s continental defence contributions and potentially joining American ballistic missile defence (BMD), Dr. Jockel noted that the pressure to do so would come from within Canada, as the U.S. does not need Canada to conduct BMD operations. Dr. Charron highlighted the need for better maritime domain awareness, while Dr. Sands noted that improving its cyber



(Source: Richard Lawrence Photography)

capabilities could be the way forward for Canada.

Facilitated Discussion with Rona Ambrose

The final keynote speaker of day one of the conference was the Honourable Rona Ambrose. Ms. Ambrose spoke about her experiences in government, especially in the realm of defence procurement. She highlighted the fact that ninety percent of defence procurement is both on-time and on-budget, but the other ten percent is what makes the news. That ten percent also tends to be the larger projects. She stated that she personally believes that Canadian procurement decisions need to be centralized in the form of an independent secretariat. She argued that this secretariat would need expertise in managing large projects in the defence sphere, or else we would see the continuation of the current trend of delays and further expense. Ms. Ambrose then highlighted the importance of domestic industry in defence procurement, noting that Canadian jobs are a key part of procurement decisions. She then concluded her remarks by stressing the importance of forging links with members of parliament to get the message across that Canadians care about defence policy.

Speaker: General Jonathan Vance

The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance, kicked off day two of the conference with his keynote address. He began his remarks by noting that the past year has been both intense and productive for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), with deployments in Iraq and Ukraine, as well as many domestic operations. Moving on to procurement, General Vance echoed the comments of the Honourable Rona Ambrose from yesterday, stating that most procurement decisions do go smoothly. His focus this past year, General Vance stated, was on personnel. He noted the steps taken by the CAF to improve mental health care and assistance programs. He then discussed the importance of Operation Honour and the CAF’s ongoing commitment to combat harmful sexual behaviour in the military. He also identified the evolving challenges of recruiting in a diversifying Canada, stating that the CAF needs to evolve to attract the necessary talent to be an effective combat force. Moving on to operations, General Vance stated that no decision had yet been made with regards to future peace support operations. He then stated that the CAF will be increasing its presence in the Asia-Pacific region by deploying a naval task group there in 2017. General Vance concluded his speech by thanking the members of the CAF in the audience for

their service.

Questions for General Vance centred on future operations and women in the CAF. In response to a question about the CAF deployment to Latvia, General Vance stated that the CAF deployment was on track. In response to a question about diversity in the CAF, General Vance noted that changes in conflict require new skill sets that can only be obtained through diversity, calling it a matter of “institutional survival”. In response to a question about how to make CAF kit more accessible to women, General Vance stated, “you’re right, we have to do better”.

Panel 3: NATO’s Pivot Countries and Their Threats

Moderator: Richard Cohen

Panelists: Dr. Alexandra Gheciu, Dr. Christopher Kilford, Dr. Samir Battiss

The third panel of the conference focused on the threats facing NATO member states. Dr. Alexandra Gheciu kicked off the panel by highlighting the fact that NATO worried not only about the Soviet Union, as internal discord and fissures were real concerns as well. These internal fissures have returned, Dr. Gheciu argued, noting the rise of illiberalism among member states. She stated that NATO works by consensus and the invocation of Article V requires member states agreeing on the interpretation of events and attribution. Dr. Gheciu stated that she is worried disagreements in other realms (such as Brexit) could spill over into NATO and hurt solidarity. She then argued that other potential complicating factors for NATO solidarity include the rise of far-right politicians and potential bilateral defence deals between members. Dr. Gheciu then concluded her remarks by stating she is not predicting NATO’s collapse, but she is worried about NATO solidarity in the future.

The second speaker of this panel was Dr. Christopher Kilford who discussed Turkey’s role within NATO. Dr. Kilford began by saying that 2016 was a bad year for Turkey due to several bad foreign and domestic

policy decisions. While discussing the 2016 coup attempt, he noted that Turkey’s membership in NATO has been marked by coups, coup attempts and military purges; he says that NATO has always seen Turkey as a “very distracted ally”. According to Dr. Kilford, Turkey has always had to balance its interests with regards to its engagement with both Russia and Europe. In a time when Turkey seems to be moving away from Europe, concluded Dr. Kilford, it is unlikely that it will abandon its links with the West given the value it holds with the Turkish people.

The final speaker of the panel was Dr. Samir Battiss who spoke about NATO’s southern flank. Dr. Battiss began by noting that the collapse of the Soviet Union took away NATO’s *raison d’être* and the alliance has not been able to find a new one since. He argued that European states have become addicted to U.S. military support, saying that they need to learn to live without it for NATO to continue to exist. Moving on to NATO’s southern flank, Dr. Battiss identified the key NATO partners in the Mediterranean, as well as the challenges that they face. He also highlighted the role of Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt in cooperating with NATO to combat violent extremism. Dr. Battiss then concluded his remarks by arguing that NATO needs to become more decentralized to survive.

The question and answer session for this panel focused on how NATO can identify and respond to internal challenges. Dr. Gheciu stated that there are debates within NATO about what the institution should focus on and how. In response to a question about the Turkish military’s ability to recover from the purges, Dr. Kilford stated that this has happened many times before and that the Turkish military would likely step in to “protect” the country if it saw an opportunity.

Speaker: Le général de division aérienne Philippe Montocchio

The final keynote address of the conference was given by général de division aérienne Philippe Montocchio of the French Air

Force. Brigadier General Montocchio began his remarks by stating that the current global security environment has deteriorated and shaken the foundation of France’s security relationship. He identified global Islamic terrorism and the return of superpower competition as key drivers of this deterioration. Brigadier General Montocchio then highlighted the difficulties facing international institutions in dealing with these problems. He emphasized the continued importance of NATO but stressed the need for NATO to self-reflect and show where it can best add value. To meet the challenges of the new security environment, France requires a full spectrum of capabilities, including a nuclear deterrent and a professional army. Moving on to France’s global commitments,



(Source: Richard Lawrence Photography)

he stated that France has taken a leadership role in combatting terrorism in the Sahara and the Sahel region, as well as in Iraq and Syria. Closer to home, Montocchio then described France’s contributions to NATO’s deterrence mission in Eastern Europe. He concluded his address by highlighting the close relationship that exists between France and Canada.

Panel 4: Great Powers and Interventionism

Moderator: Dr. Jim Boutillier

Panelists: Dr. Kenneth Christie, Dr. Kerry Lynn Nankivell, Dr. Roland Paris

The final panel of the conference focused on the role of great powers in interventions. Dr. Kenneth Christie began by highlighting Canada's role in creating the "responsibility to protect" doctrine and the issues associated with it. But, Dr. Christie argued, there has been an ideological shift—from liberal internationalism to moral imperialism—with respect to how intervention is viewed. He cited the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which has been called "imperialism-lite", as an example of the pitfalls of intervention. He then concluded his remarks by stating that the battle for Afghanistan's "hearts and minds" has been lost, for little gain.

The second speaker of the panel was Dr. Kerry Lynn Nankivell who spoke about the South China Sea dispute. She began by stating that the South China Sea dispute is not between the U.S. and China, but between China and its neighbours. She argued that China and the U.S. both use the notion of interventionism to justify their positions on the dispute. She then highlighted the growing professionalism and capability of China's navy and maritime militia, both of which have been used to back China's maritime claims. According to Dr. Nankivell, the artificial islands in the South China Sea are more than just symbols as the bases on them allow China to extend its maritime reach. She then concluded her remarks by discussing the importance of the principle of freedom of navigation to the U.S.

The final speaker of the panel was Dr. Roland Paris whose remarks focused on Russia. Dr. Paris began by stating that Russia is not a great power by GDP or demographic standards, but that its power stems from its military and influence abroad. He then argued that the lines surrounding intervention have blurred, stating that intervention is not just about military force anymore. Intervention has extended



(Source: Richard Lawrence Photography)

into the heart of Western democracies, with attempts to sway their opinions and undermine their institutions. Dr. Paris concluded his remarks by highlighting the importance of these institutions and stressing the need to defend them.

The questions for this panel centred on the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the conflict in Syria. In response to a question about Canada's role in the Asia-Pacific region, Dr. Paris stated that there is a regional disparity in interest in the region within Canada. Dr. Nankivell, in response to a question about ASEAN, identified the internal fissures within the organization that hinder its ability to achieve consensus. And lastly, in response to a question regarding a potential intervention in Syria, Dr. Christie noted the intractability of the conflict, warning that an intervention would achieve little without having a clear end game and strategy.

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SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE TRUMPLAN ERA: MANAGING OR EXPLOITING POWER TRANSITION ANXIETIES?

by Adam P. MacDonald

President Donald Trump's fixation on remaking the United States' global engagements to serve "America First" has designated China a primary target. Talking tough on China – particularly with respect to trade – has been a constant in American presidential campaigns and administrations over the past three decades. What is new, though, with President Trump's corrective policies of rebalancing the budget sheet and restoring manufacturing jobs (which are questionable in achieving these objectives) is the apparent conditionality and subservience of all other facets of Sino-American relations to favouring trade concessions from Beijing. Such an approach suggests the absence of foresight into the strategic ramifications of positioning their interactions within a confrontational and zero-sum terrain, compromising the stability of their ever-evolving and complicated great power relationship and its resultant impact on an international order undergoing profound change. A Trump Administration, as well, exceptionally focused on renegotiating trade and redistributing or simply offloading burdens associated with international commitments may cede, without even knowing it, strategic advantages to China in terms of global leadership that Washington may come to resent after the fact, provoking further hostility and enmity.

To its credit, the Trump Administration, specifically the President himself, has



begun to walk back on some of the more vitriolic and inflammatory commentary and propositions with respect to China espoused earlier on. President Trump, furthermore, following his first face-to-face meeting with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, in April, has taken a pragmatic turn in his dealings with Beijing, working together to address common interests including deterring further provocative actions and language by North Korea with respect to its growing nuclear weapons capability. Their relationship, though, remains vulnerable to theories of power transition and policy prescriptions stemming from the portrayal of the situation as hostile and dangerous, where the established power in the United States must blunt the emergence of a rising challenger in China determined to remove them from their position of dominance. So far President Trump has by and large avoided comment on strategic concerns associated with an ever-capable and powerful China, but it is unclear if and to what degree he will refrain from publicly

attacking China, which plays well to his domestic base but has caused confusion and serious tensions with Beijing. Ensuring the relationship remains on stable strategic ground will require the Trump Administration to become more clear and predictable with respect to its views of and interactions with Beijing, especially towards a plethora of divisive issues that if improperly managed could result in both viewing the other as their greatest and immediate adversary.

SHAPING THE RULES OF GLOBAL TRADE

President Trump recently formally withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), asserting that the 12-nation free-trade deal would be disastrous for American workers; a popular decision as the American populace was not properly educated on the nature and purpose of the TPP. It was not simply an economic pact to produce immediate benefits, but rather a strategic initiative by the United States – and the centrepiece of the Obama

Administration's "Rebalance" strategy¹ – to develop a governance structure constructing the rules and norms of trade in the Asia-Pacific without Chinese (or Indian) input. The merits of denying China entry into such forums is debatable, but by pulling out, President Trump has conferred de facto leadership on Beijing in a region of the world that remains largely supportive of global trade. Beijing is increasingly focused on and determined to create institutional conditions and influences to build an integrated and networked continent, with itself in a central position, through such avenues as the One Belt, One Road Project and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; it may also revise the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as an alternative to the now-deceased TPP.²

These regional undertakings are part of and complemented by Chinese activism internationally. Beijing is becoming one of the most vocal and forceful defenders of trade and globalization, highlighted by Xi Jinping's speech at the recent World Economic Forum, which was a first for a Chinese president. A litany of current practices, both domestic and international,³ though, questions the willingness and sincerity of Beijing towards assuming global leadership duties and responsibilities. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders are sensing an opportunity to exploit the current American Administration's misgivings about global order (and others' apprehensions as a result) to their advantage, along with a strong motivation to maintain and support the global processes that have enabled their rise. These endeavours speak to a more concerted Chinese effort to shape the rules and norms of trade and economic engagements, specifically in Asia, with the United States possibly looking from the outside in on future attempts to gain further entry into the world's fastest growing economic market.

Shaping the rules and structure of trade

– including financial, environmental, labour and intellectual property rights regulations – may not only have a detrimental impact on American companies, but might well alter the strategic landscape of East Asia towards China's favour. Beijing's "assertive" behaviour in the region over the past decade has strengthened military ties between Washington and Asian allies such as Japan and Australia, as well as with new partners including Vietnam. There is no direct correlation, furthermore, between a country's trading patterns and its strategic alignment behaviour, evidenced by the fact that China is the number one trading partner of almost every East Asian state but has no strategic/military allies, with the partial exception of North Korea (relations between the two have become estranged since Kim Jong-Un took over in 2011). The questioning, however, by President Trump of the economic burdens of alliance commitments may provoke some states to move towards a hedging position of strategic ambiguity between Beijing and Washington. Issues of unbalanced alliance costs have a degree of legitimacy, motivating calls by some for the United States to adopt an offshore balancing strategy, placing greater security responsibilities onto regional states and only intervening in a significant way to combat revisionist challengers.⁴ Along with the difficulties of explaining and operationalizing offshore balancing and how this would impact current military and political commitments, allies and partners may be concerned that it would not be out of the realm of possibility for President Trump to make a grand bargain with China over regional security in exchange for trade deals given his "America First" approach to foreign policy.

Growing Chinese power and regional leadership is not translating into neighbouring states jumping onto Beijing's bandwagon, largely due to fears of what an unchecked Chinese regional primacy would entail. American

ambiguity, however, towards sustained, multilateral engagement in East Asia is generating unease amongst allies and partners that their relationship with Washington is not based on shared interests and values, but simply transactional arrangements whose existence solely depends on cost-sharing analyses. The Trump Administration, however, has toned down such talk with Secretary of Defense James "Jim" Mattis reassuring regional allies during his first trip abroad that the United States remains a committed and trusted ally and the President giving personal assurances to Japan's Prime Minister that Washington will continue to uphold its defence treaty obligations with respect to Tokyo's security. A number of high-profile diplomatic visits, including one by the vice-president to South Korea that re-affirmed Washington's defence commitments amidst growing tensions with an ever-proactive North Korea, have also signalled a continuation of traditional American engagement in the region. Though these gestures allay Asian states' concerns of retrenchment on the part of Washington emboldening a rising China, they are also adverse to an overly aggressive American approach towards Beijing transforming the region into a bipolar geopolitical landscape.

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA - A GEOSTRATEGIC FLASHPOINT?

China's expansive claims to the entirety of the South China Sea (SCS) and the topographical features within it have been vocally attacked and rebuked by various Trump Administration officials, continuing in line with the previous Obama Administration's opposition towards Beijing's extensive land reclamation projects; the building and deployment of military infrastructure and weaponry on disputed islets and islands; and any attempts to claim the entire body of water as Chinese internal waters, a territorial sea or an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) according to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Comments



(Source: Reuters)

made, however, by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson during his Senate Confirmation Hearing (and repeated by President Trump's press secretary) that the military buildup by China on disputed islands is unacceptable and proposing a naval blockade to deny Beijing access to them would be a major policy shift both in terms of American formal position on these disputes and the employment of and willingness to use military power.

The United States does not recognize any claimants' assertions to parts or all of the islet/islands groups residing in and waters compromising the SCS. Avoiding comment on the legitimacy of specific island claims, Washington has remained focused on ensuring Freedom of Navigation (FON) via naval FON patrols that challenge excessive maritime claims by states, such as restricting access of foreign military vessels and aircraft operating in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or exercising Innocent Passage through their territorial waters. Blocking China's access to islets/islands under its effective control, therefore, would be tantamount to adopting a formal position on the legitimacy of these territorial claims, shifting the emphasis on maintaining FON towards a surgical focus on the illegitimacy of Chinese claims vice those of the other claimants. If the opposition is towards reclamation work, the United States would have to oppose similar work being done by other claimants as well.

Militarily, establishing a blockade would significantly raise tensions and may force Beijing into a confrontation, not because of any particular islet/islands' geographic or military importance, but rather to save face and defend one of its "core national interests".

The rationales underpinning, and power resources employed to achieve, any sort of blockade are at present vague, causing confusion in Beijing and other regional capitals towards American interests and activities in the SCS. Producing and publicizing a clear and straightforward position on the SCS disputes, detailing the new Administration's legal views, strategic interests, and actions to defend these, is needed to produce predictability in Washington's actions and its expectations towards Beijing and other claimants. Greater American involvement in the SCS, though, requires Washington to elucidate its position on a number of aspects pertaining to UNCLOS (which it has not ratified but accepts as customary international law) in order to form any sort of consistent legal basis for objecting to the illegalities of Chinese claims and actions. It is far from certain at this point that Beijing seeks to limit, let alone control, access and movement to and within the SCS for commercial traffic. Instead, its current actions point more towards a desire to secure marine resource rights and limit foreign military operations in its claimed Extended EEZs⁵. The nature and

rationales of these claims and the degrees of sovereignty that stem as a result are not in accordance with UNCLOS. China, however, as the world's largest trading and shipping country, is broadly supportive of the international maritime legal regime, but in its near abroad adopts a strong position favouring exaggerated rights and powers as a coastal state. Attempts to challenge and call out this dichotomy in Chinese diplomacy adds further justification for the United States to ratify UNCLOS and accept the implications of the regime towards its interests and freedom of action, including restricting much of the "scientific" work it conducts in other countries' EEZs. A strengthened American commitment and adherence to UNCLOS would add further leverage and pressure on Beijing to temper its countervailing views and claims, which China is influenced by as evidenced in its subtle but noticeable clarification about the nature of its maritime claims following the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling.⁶

China, however, is reluctant to meaningfully engage the region towards a diplomatic resolution of these disputes, favouring bilateral vice multilateral negotiations given its asymmetrical power relationship with the other claimants. Beijing, furthermore, maintains strategic and legal ambiguity towards the purpose and basis of its claims in the SCS while changing the facts on the ground, including both military deployment of assets, as well as the "civilianization" of these islands, entrenching its effective occupation of these disputed features regardless of their legal status.⁷ Such endeavours do not point to a reckless strategy of a completely risk-accepting Beijing, but one determined to incorporate these islands – with the legal, economic and military advantages that they offer – into the Chinese state despite the tensions generated with regional powers and the United States. In response to these realities, the United States must determine what behaviours and actions are deemed unacceptable and the degree

to which it will defend against them. This may include any attempts to reclaim other disputed islands – either those occupied or not by another claimant – which may actually be the rationale behind the Trump Administration’s speculative blockade. The legalities and strategic purposes, however, of such a move remain unanswered. Beijing is certainly not assisting in arresting provocative developments or advocating regional management of these disputed waters, but Washington should be careful not to inflate or respond to Chinese actions in SCS at this juncture as if they are an existential threat to American interests and regional stability. Beijing is determined to alter the status quo in these long-standing disputes, but confrontational actions by the United States, specifically in contradiction to or in the absence of a clearly articulated strategy, threaten to propel and inflate this issue of controlling a number of small islets to one conditioning the stability of the entire great power relationship.

Over the past two decades, China has embarked on a military modernization strategy designed to erode American primacy, producing a new military reality in East Asia where Washington remains a formidable and leading military power with strong bilateral alliances and forward deployed forces, but with a reduced ability to move and act unhindered or threatened by ever-improving Chinese sea-denial capabilities.⁸ The military buildup by China on reclaimed islets and islands in the SCS is not fundamentally altering the regional balance of power, but is entrenching its occupation of these features, as well as enabling the expanding range and operations of the Chinese navy that is slowly becoming more active globally. Growing Chinese military power, furthermore, seems to be the primary rationale for President Trump’s 350-ship navy concept. The SCS dispute may, therefore, be seen as a litmus test of American resolve to stunt China’s growing military reach and ability to impose its will on others. President Trump has largely



PLA Navy guided-missile frigate Yancheng (Source: Getty Images)

avoided comment on strategic concerns and challenges regarding China, but if the hostility and visceral tone evident in the early days of his Administration stems into all areas of their relationship, there is the possibility that Washington may eventually view Beijing not simply as an exploiter of global trade and violator of international law in the South China Sea, but as an unacceptable great power competitor.

POWER TRANSITION TENSIONS

China is increasingly becoming active in creating new and influencing existing institutional structures to increase its leverage and say in these bodies, demonstrating a level of dissatisfaction with the current international order in terms of norms, roles and responsibilities. In the most basic sense, therefore, China is a revisionist state, but it is not advocating the emergence of an entirely different geopolitical alternative as it is focused on changes, some of them significant, within the system rather than overturning it. China’s emergence, furthermore, is taking place in an international order far different than others that confronted previous aspirants to great power status – highly networked and integrated; populated by many other established and emerging powers; and becoming more diffuse in terms of power, inhibiting the ability of a small group of actors from completely controlling it. Uncertainty surrounds whether Beijing’s “Peaceful

Rise/Development” is an enduring grand strategy or simply a transitional one, but China has not pursued a warlike rise that is exceptional in the history of rising powers. Despite closing the gap, also, Beijing will not be overtaking the United States in terms of power and influence in the near to medium future as Washington retains significant advantages in both hard and soft power.⁹ American unipolarity, however, is fading as China (and others) become indispensable powers necessary to the successful managing of a number of global challenges, including economic and financial stability; combating climate change; protection of the commons; non-proliferation and new emergent domains such as cyber and space.

Over the last decade, Washington has moved its strategic position on China from debating membership in the international order towards encouraging Beijing to become a “responsible power” in sharing the duties and burdens of maintaining the global political and economic architecture and processes that facilitated and continues to support its rise.¹⁰ As a result, the United States has not opposed China’s rise in any concerted and systemic way, despite the advocacy by those promoting the “China Threat” in the early 1990s.¹¹ Various American and Chinese administrations, furthermore, have played down the possibility of the “Thucydides Trap” – of power transition anxieties between rising and established

states leading to war and conflict – hijacking their relationship, transforming it into a great power struggle where both view the other as an unacceptable peer competitor.¹²

Tensions in Sino-American relations were on the rise before Trump's ascension to the presidency, but the possibility of abdicating global responsibilities while at the same time developing an overtly hostile position towards Beijing threatens to undermine global stability. Publicly musing about withdrawing support of the One-China Policy, the political foundation of their diplomatic relationship, demonstrates the zero-sum nature President Trump appears to be assuming in all of his international dealings.¹³ It would be unwise for Washington to demand everything be on the table in negotiations as there are a number of areas in their relationship – such as the One-China Policy and the nuclear force balance between the two – that have remained isolated from and not conditioned upon the more divisive aspects of their engagements. President Trump's reaffirmation, however, of the One-China Policy was an important move to get the relationship back on track. What remains unanswered, though, are the rationales driving his questioning of this long-standing policy in the first place (especially as it appears that he received nothing in return from Beijing for his pledge) and whether other important aspects of their relationship will be vulnerable to similar public attacks in the future.

As Joseph Nye has aptly warned, globalization should not be seen as simply the sum of international trade deals, but the forces that are producing an interdependent international environment in which global leadership, specifically from the world's established and rising powers, is critical in addressing system-wide challenges.¹⁴ Deferral of such leadership by the United States, combined with an increasingly hostile and zero-sum-based relationship with China, may

produce a landscape where the Trump Administration forces states to choose between the two in a binary system of great power competition. In particular, China's international initiatives may increasingly be seen as a threat to the United States. A premonition of such a condition in part already exists with the Obama Administration's attempt to convince, unsuccessfully, allies and partners not to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, despite the need for such an institution for regional development and against which the West presented no alternative. If such a mindset becomes entrenched, the development of parallel orders or spheres of influence, based on mutually exclusive institutions and pacts anchored by Beijing and Washington, is a real possibility. This development would obstruct the clear need to change existing, inclusive institutional arrangements to accommodate emerging states in the international architecture. Doing so will shape these states' global engagements, and while still acting out of self-interest, will socialize them towards the realization of the necessity for widespread and deep cooperation and compromise towards the management of the collective challenges associated with globalization.

One should not be naïve in supposing the authoritarian regime in China is fully supportive of the liberal international order, especially considering some aspects of globalization (like freedom of information flows) are seen as a national security threat. A dissatisfied China, however, should not be exaggerated either, especially portrayals of its intentions as fixed and hostile, its aims as revisionist and unmovable, and its development of a growing proclivity for risk-taking behaviour. Standing up to China is not a reckless approach, but the motivation for doing so should not be a hopeless attempt to re-assert unquestioned American unipolarity in a world defined by power transition and diffusion; rather, it should focus on how to manage change in a stable manner towards a new geopolitical *status*

quo where the United States will still be the most influential state, but existing in a far more complicated and complex world where others, particularly China, are indispensable in its functioning. American determinations of Chinese support or opposition to the international order should not be arbitrarily linked with Western foreign policy preferences on a case-by-case basis. The United States, furthermore, will have to reinvigorate its commitment to the international order by acknowledging the need for institutional and relational reconfigurations amongst established and emerging powers, while tempering and challenging narratives of exceptionalism that justify the circumscribing of global rules and mechanisms either by themselves as well as others.

MANAGING ANXIETIES

The possibility exists that the global position of the United States and the benefits accrued will socialize and soften President Trump towards system supporting and maintaining a careful balance of working with China to promote its emergence as a “responsible power” while deterring any predilections towards compromising, undermining or holistically challenging the international order. After a rocky start, it appears that the Trump Administration is moving towards such an approach by easing off the hostile rhetoric and affirming key principles and facets of its relationship with Beijing and its alliance commitments. A more active China internationally, also, may actually assist in President Trump's determination to spread the burdens of global leadership to other partners. This would require, though, a deep appreciation that institutional arrangements, and decision-making powers, must be reconfigured to better include and represent rising powers that will diminish American influence to a certain extent.

The world is changing. The United States is not an invulnerable superpower, but unquestionably remains the most

important and powerful actor globally. In the broadest sense of the term, power transition is occurring with China, by almost every metric, the second-most powerful state, but the gulf between the two remains large. This is not to downplay the impressive rise of China over the past four decades, but American weaknesses should not be exaggerated nor that of the international order Washington has built and supported for over half a century. Managing, therefore, power transition anxieties – due to the narrowing power resource differential as well as the differences in regimes, cultures and histories defining the two – will increasingly become important as Beijing and Washington continue to calibrate and reconfigure their relationship within an altering international environment where globalization is a reality, not a policy position. Given the structural tensions defining their relationship, furthermore, both sides must continue to be conscious of maintaining stability, avoiding outbursts and preventing the influx of unpredictability into their interactions. The main challenge for the Trump Administration (and one its counterpart in Beijing confronts as well) is of exploiting these anxieties in the name of populist fervor amongst domestic constituents by constructing simple narratives of the other as the reason for their decline in power, status and wealth internationally and ultimately questioning their legitimacy as a great power. Such rhetoric, regardless of the underlying rationales, endangers an already complex and complicated relationship between the world's two most important states in an age of uncertainty and pessimism.

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well, a member of the Nova Scotia Health Research Ethics Board.

NOTES

1. The 2012-announced Pivot (later renamed Rebalance) Strategy by the Obama Administration signalled an American refocus towards the region across diplomatic, military and economic fronts following more than a decade of interest in other regions, specifically the Middle East. The rationale is to ensure the stability of East Asia amidst altering power dynamics, specifically the rise of China and resultant concerns by neighbours of Beijing's intentions and behaviours as its power and influence grows. Washington perceives itself as a strategic counterweight whose regional leadership, military presence and bilateral alliances help counteract any revisionist predilections on the part of China or any other state from challenging the status quo. Despite Washington's objections to the assertion, many in China believe the strategy is aimed at containing China and stunting its rise as a great power.
2. The One Belt, One Road Project is a comprehensive development strategy proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 to build a diverse network of transportation infrastructure to better connect China with the rest of Asia, consisting of two major components: The Silk Road Economic Belt (land-based) and the Maritime Silk Road (maritime-based). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is another initiative launched by President Xi Jinping to establish a multinational development bank focused on providing funding for sustainable development projects, specifically in Asia. Despite being portrayed as a rival to the World Bank by Japan and Washington, the AIIB enjoys diverse and growing membership including a number of Western states such as Canada. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed free-trade agreement between the member states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the six states that have existing free-trade deals with ASEAN: Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. The RCEP is seen as an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and favoured by Beijing as it is excluded (along with India) from the latter process.
3. Elizabeth Economy, "Beijing is No Champion of Globalization", *Foreign Affairs*, 22 January 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-01-22/beijing-no-champion-globalization>.
4. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing>.
5. Same Bateman, "South China Sea Dramas Distract From Bigger Problems Between America and China", *National Interest*, 30 December 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/south-china-sea-dramas-distract-bigger-problems-between-18906>.
6. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling on the South China Sea concerned a case brought forward by the Philippines to seek clarification on the legalities of specific Chinese actions (such as land reclamation work) in disputed waters, as well as the le-

- gitimacy of China's "Nine-Dash Line" claims based on "historic rights". Though the Court by and large ruled in favour of Manila's positions (Beijing did not participate in the proceedings), it clearly stated it was not ruling, nor had it been asked to rule, on the sovereignty of the disputed topographical features in the SCS or delineate any maritime boundaries. See Andrew Chubb, "Did China Just Clarify the Nine Dash Line?", East Asia Forum, 14 July 2016, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/14/did-china-just-clarify-the-nine-dash-line/>.
7. Zhibo Qiu, "The 'Civilization' of China's Military Presence in the South China Sea", The Diplomat, 21 January 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-civilization-of-chinas-military-presence-in-the-south-china-sea/>.
 8. Adam P. MacDonald, "The New Military Reality in East Asia", Frontline Defence, 2014, <http://defence.frontline.online/article/2014/5/140-The-New-Military-Reality-in-East-Asia>.
 9. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won't Overtake the United States", Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower>.
 10. The term and characteristics of a "Responsible Stakeholder" were first laid out by then Deputy-Secretary of State Robert Zoellick with specific reference to an emerging China. See Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?", Remarks made to the National Committee on US-China Relations, 21 September 2005, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>.
 11. For example: Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China", Time Magazine, 31 July 1995, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983245,00.html>.
 12. Graham Allison, "The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?", The Atlantic, 24 September 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>.
 13. The One-China Policy is a jointly-held position between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) that there is one China, though each claims to be the legitimate government of the state. In 1972, the United States formally accepted the One-China Policy and that Beijing was the legitimate government, which paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two alongside the maintenance of unofficial ties with Taiwan. Though Washington has never formally commented on the sovereignty of Taiwan, any decision to retract support for the One-China Policy would in effect recognize Taiwan as an independent state and almost certainly destroy diplomatic relations with Beijing.
 14. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Will the Liberal Order Survive?", Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive>.

RADICAL ISLAMISM: UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST NARRATIVE AND MINDSET

by Adnan Qaiser

As Muslims celebrated the birth anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in December 2016, the Islamic world was rocked by a total of 107 terrorist attacks, killing 346 innocent people and leaving 370 injured. It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the West, only, is targeted by Islamic terrorism; the Muslim world remains its victim too. In order to fight extremism, it is imperative to first understand the drivers and dynamics of radical militancy.

Historically, the roots of Muslim unrest lie in the Middle East's oppressive monarchies and autocratic regimes, buttressed for the West's foreign policy objectives. While terrorism cannot be condoned, a distinction needs to be made between a terrorist and someone struggling for democratic rights.

Contemporary Islamic extremism resulted from the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916), when state boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers with little or no regard for tribal affiliations or sectarian sensibilities. The 11th Century Crusades were not as cataclysmic as the abolition of the six-century old Ottoman Caliphate after the First World War. This was when a "Khilafat Movement" erupted in the Indian subcontinent for the restoration of the caliphate and revolutionary Muslim scholars, such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Moududi, led Muslim societies into obscurantism under the banners of Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood.



(Makkah Madina)

Advancing the reclusive dogmas of Ibne Tammiyyah and Jamal-ud-din Afghani, Islamic intellectuals propagated the notion of Islamic statehood "beyond boundaries" and brought *Sharia* and "political Islam" into the lives of ordinary Muslims. Sayyid Qutb, who was hanged in Egypt in 1966 for his rebellious ideas, laid the foundation for contemporary Islamic militancy. In his scholarship, *Milestones*, Qutb advocated a new social and economic / political system after annihilating tyrannical forces. Linking the Muslim (disorderly) state with the pre-Prophet time of *jahiliyya* (ignorance), he argued that what is necessary "is a full revolt against human ruler-ship in all its shapes and forms, systems and arrangements ... It means destroying the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth."²

Drawing inspiration – and legitimacy –

from the Quranic "Sword verses," militant ideologues find the survival – and expansion – of the Islamic faith lying in *jihad*³. The Muslim Brotherhood's slogan meaningfully endorses: "Allah is our objective; the Prophet is our leader; The Quran is our law; *jihad* is our way; and dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope." Against the backdrop of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989), Osama bin Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian scholar who fought in the Arab-Israel War of 1967, issued a *fatwa* (religious edict) declaring *jihad* obligatory for all believers irrespective of which part of the Islamic world had been invaded. Azzam's *jihad* consisted of: 1) Offensive *jihad*, to terrorize the enemies of Allah; and 2) Defensive *jihad*, to be waged upon the invasion of Muslim lands.⁴

Islamic militancy has three protagonists:

1) al-Qaeda; 2) Daesh/Islamic State; and 3) Sectarian bands (*Jundullah*, *Lashkar-e-Jhangavi al-Almi* and many others). Despite President Barack Obama having proclaimed that “al-Qaeda is on the path to defeat,” the terrorist organization, with its loose-knit groups, remains a potent threat, because unlike Daesh, it does not subscribe to holding land. al-Qaeda has a global presence: (i) al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen; (ii) al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Mali and Mauritania; (iii) al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in Pakistan; (iv) *Jabhat-al-Nusra li Ahl-al-Sham* in Syria; (v) *Harkatul-al-Shabaab-al-Mujahideen* in Somalia; (vi) *Boko Haram* in Nigeria; and (vii) at least 23 smaller groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as *Tehrik-e-Taliban* (TTP), *Jamaat-ul-Ahbaar*, *Lashkar-e-Khorasan*, as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Driven by self-legitimized dogmas, the “core” (ideologues) has always relied upon local criminals for its security, offering in return money, protection from the law, training and combat experience, a well-oiled transportation fleet and hi-tech communications. While Daesh is already dying its death, Islamic extremism may not end until the basic fundamentals of the Islamic world are corrected and ordinary Muslim grievances are addressed.

Admittedly, the West’s Middle Eastern policies, including the unresolved Palestinian issue and the unjustified wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have fostered the notion of an assault on the Islamic faith. The stories about rendition by the CIA; the inhumane treatment of prisoners at Abu-Gharaib and Guantanamo Bay prisons; the carpet bombings of villages and funeral and marriage congregations in Afghanistan; and indiscreet night raids (desecrating the sanctity of Afghan households) undoubtedly caused Muslim abhorrence.

The so-called “threat of radical Islam”

never existed before 9/11. As the neo-conservatives coined the term, it was widely seen by Muslims as a pretext for waging war against Islam – after the end of the Cold War – and granted the extremists a rallying cause to carry out terrorism around the world⁵. Finding a justification for al-Qaeda’s mindless terror, Osama bin Laden told an interviewer that his own “life or death [did] not matter [because] the awakening [had] started.”⁶ Egypt’s notorious “Blind Sheikh,” Omer Abdel Rahman, also issued a fatwa from his jail cell in the U.S. calling on “Muslims everywhere ... to cut-off all relations [with] the Americans, the Christians and Jews, tear them into pieces, destroy their economies, sink their ships, shoot-down their planes and kill them wherever you may find them.”⁷

Militant ideologues believe that past Muslim victories were God’s favour; whereas their later subjugation resulted from abandoning the divine path. The “Mecca Siege,” led by Juhayman al-Otaibi in November 1979, demonstrated an undercurrent to rid the Arab world from oppressive regimes. Otaibi’s *Saba Rasail* (*Seven Letters*), published in 1978, called for inviting people to join Islam, organizing them, and then migrating to a secure base to launch a movement for Islam’s domination – similar to the Prophet Muhammad’s struggle⁸. Success in the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviet Union further cemented the idea of a “global Islam” by targeting the “near enemy” (Islamic rulers) and “far enemy” (the West).

Al-Qaeda’s philosophy, *Edarat-ul-Wahash* (*Management of Savagery*) by Abu-Bakr Naji⁹ – an extension of *Qawaid-ul-Takfir* (*Rules for Expulsion from Islam/Apostatization*) written by Abu Baseer al-Tartusi after the Afghan *jihad* in 1994 – aims at transforming Muslim societies by turning *Ibn-ul-Balad* (sons of soil) into blood brothers (devoted militants) and invoking *Khuruj* (revolt against deviant Muslim rulers) and *Takfir* (apostatization).

¹⁰ Later, Abu Musab al-Suri drafted *The Call for Global Islamic Jihad* to terrorize the Western world, reinforcing al-Qaeda’s “seven-stage terror strategy.”¹¹ Negating the Islamic injunction of *jihad* as a state’s prerogative, all these publications legitimized an individual to wage jihad in his personal capacity. Calling Muslims around the world to arms in the holy war against the godless Soviet Union, Abdullah Azzam had already decreed: “[J]ihad will remain an individual obligation until all the other lands that were Muslim will be returned to us so Islam will reign again.”¹²

The terrorists’ strategy of “morphing, mutating and dispersing” allows them to fight another day. While they need physical control of an area to motivate people toward *Khilafat*, these groups quickly dissolve and relinquish ground under duress, only to pop-up at another place, sometimes with a different name or under new leadership. Lacking a Clausewitzian “centre of gravity,” the extremists generally operate without a centralized command and control architecture. Not only do they keep evolving by fragmenting into smaller offshoots, they also thrive through their network of “abettors, facilitators and sympathizers.”

Their skilful use of the internet and modern apps further allow them to survive in the digital world undetected. Militant publications – *Inspire* (al-Qaeda); *Resurgence* (AQIS); *Azan* and *Ahya-e-Khilafat* (TTP); *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* (Daesh); and *Harvest* (Jabhat-al-Nusra) – underpin the utility of powerful messaging through video footage and propaganda tools, which help them proliferate into Muslim and non-Muslim societies to recruit. The terrorists’ barbaric publicity in cyberspace is akin to German anarchist Johannes Most’s *Philosophy of the Bomb* (1880) that advocated “outrageous violence,” which he believed “will seize the imagination of the public and awaken its audience to political issues.”



(Makkah Madina)

Militants find no dearth of funds or arms as well. Bypassing international monetary checks, the supporters of the “Islamic cause” [sic] in oil-rich Gulf countries ensure *Hawala/Hundi* (cash-courier and reference) transactions. A European Parliament June 2013 report found Middle Eastern Wahhabi and Salafist groups “supporting and supplying arms [to rebel groups] all over the globe.”¹³ Elsewhere, militants make effective use of the narcotics trade, kidnappings for ransom, human trafficking, illicit smuggling, mercenary services and organized crime.

Notwithstanding an odd fatwa rejecting terrorism and suicide bombing¹⁴, no substantial rebuttal has so far challenged the terrorists’ (preposterous) narrative¹⁵. Briefly:

1) The Muslim community (*Ummah*) is essentially an ideological and supra-territorial fraternity whose Islamic identity is supreme and cannot be subordinated to the concepts of the modern nation-state, man-made laws, a constitution or democracy. Considering that the Islamic ethos is rooted in the golden era of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs, its institutional functions can only be run by the most pious or ulema (religious scholars) who

determine issues of governance, lifestyle, citizens’ rights and freedom, women’s roles and the status of minorities.

2) Muslims are prohibited from identifying themselves with their hereditary lands, ancestral cultures or indigenous ethno-linguistic nationalities, except that of the sacred birthplace of Islam. Since Arabs invaded territory to spread Islam, all non-Arab land constitutes *Dar-ul-Harab* (enemy territory), requiring Muslim inhabitants to disown their lineage.

3) While the liberal arts, women’s empowerment, freedom of expression, human rights, international law, due process, family planning and the market economy are all proscribed, polygamy, patriarchal dominance and intrusion into privacy remain permissible. Since religion provides the ultimate knowledge, all man-made social and physical sciences, research and inventions are illegitimate.

4) Present-day Muslim decline is owed to abandoning puritanical Islam. It is legitimate to carry out individual *jihad* and *qital* (mass killings) and to declare opposing sects *kafir* (apostate), that is, liable to be killed. Equally permissible is violent vigilantism to check/prevent un-Islamic practices. Morality is absolute, thus unchangeable.

5) All religions, except Islam, are based on falsehood; their adherents are misguided

and can never be friendly to Muslims. Plotting against the *Ummah*, the modern world has usurped Muslim resources. External enemies comprising Hindus, Jews and Christians are the main cause of all Muslim tribulations, including Muslim backwardness, deprivation, deviation, sectarian infighting, weakness and ignorance. 9/11 was a conspiracy hatched by Jews and Christians to malign Muslims.

Such an outrageous narrative can only be countered by the Islamic provisions of *Ijtehad* and *Ijmah* (scholarly discourse and consensus) explicitly denouncing extremism and terrorism. The uninspiring “Marrakesh Declaration” (January 2016) and Jordan’s “Common Word” initiative have proved that moderate Islam cannot be promoted through “selective” publicity stunts by tyrannical regimes, which are largely seen as ways to target political opposition, frighten the world and attract Western support.

The Islamic world remains at war with itself. The 7th century *Shia-Sunni* (political) feud has, meanwhile, metastasized into a *Wahhabi-Sunni*, as well as a *Deobandi-Brelvi* (sub-sects), power struggle. Declared as *rafidah* (rejecters of faith), the Shias’ *Takfir* (apostatization/targeted killings) remains sanctioned under the *Radd-e-Rawafiz* (repudiation of the rejectionists) fatwas of Islamic scholar Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi (1562-1624) and by Deoband seminaries (1986).¹⁶ Vali Nasr documents in *The Shia Revival* that despite Shias accounting for “10 to 15 percent of the total” Muslim population, “in the Islamic heartland, from Lebanon to Pakistan, there are roughly as many Shias as Sunnis” with some 80 percent living in the “geostrategically sensitive rim of the Persian Gulf.”¹⁷ However, a 2012 PEW survey of 39 Muslim countries found “at least 40% of Sunnis do not accept Shias as fellow Muslims.”¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, Pakistan – a sectarian battleground having 148 sectarian organizations – saw heightened Shia-Sunni violence in 2013: 687 killed and 1,319 injured in a total of

220 sectarian attacks.¹⁹

In their quest for regional dominance and to become *paterfamilias* of the religion, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been tarnishing the image of Islam worldwide by pitting innocent Muslims against their fellow believers. Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism has not only distorted the largely-followed Sunni rituals, through its extreme Salafist practices, but also brought the (hardline) *Deobandis* into conflict against the (mystic) *Barelvis*, resulting in frequent bombings of *Sufi* ('saints') shrines in Iraq and Pakistan, denounced as un-Islamic.

Blaming the West for their political and economic marginalization, bitterness keeps brewing amongst Muslim youth. The Iranian Revolution of February 1979 demonstrated how violently a liberal society could vent its anger when provided an opportunity. By abandoning the Arab Spring of 2011, the international community did not win any friends in the Arab streets.

In his book *The New Arab Wars*, Marc Lynch notes: "Autocratic regimes, in their single-minded pursuit of survival, are the root cause of the instability and have fueled the region's extremism and conflicts." In order just to stay in power, states opened the floodgate of both money and weapons to non-state actors in both formal organizations, as well as informal networks, who employed every technique – even sectarian politics – to impress their patrons. Lynch further finds modern-day "Sectarianism, [as] one of the most disturbing forms of regional identity politics ... driven more by power politics and regime survival concerns than by ancient hatred."²⁰

Islamic radicalism, thus, forms part of the larger Muslim world's conundrum with eight overlapping conflicts: 1) A broader struggle between the despotic Middle Eastern regimes (backed by Western powers) on the one side and mobilized Arab societies and extremist militants on the other; 2) Brinkmanship and a battle for regional influence – employing

proxies and non-state-actors – with Saudi Arabia (supported by the Gulf states and Turkey) competing against a resurgent Iran (relying on Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Shiite communities in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and Azerbaijan); 3) The unresolved Palestinian issue, aggravated by Israel's obstinacy and the Trump administration's abandonment of the "two-state solution;" 4) Survival battles of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist movements; 5) An exodus of Muslim refugees and revenge attacks against Europe under global *jiḥād*; 6) A quest for puritanical Islam based on *Sharia* and establishment of a global caliphate; 7) Creating chaos among civilizations to fulfil Prophet Muhammad's "end of times" prophesy about "Ghazwa-e-Hind" – the last battle of Islam²¹; and 8) The purification of the Islamic faith by eliminating opposing sects.

Driven by emotions, terrorism is more a mind game, uncontrollable by kinetic force alone. Here, people like bin Laden or al-Baghdadi are irrelevant; while leaders come and go, the ideology – and grievances – stay. Countering the mindset through a convincing dialogue and by addressing the root causes of Muslim unrest and alienation are, therefore, vital. Until then, the past and present not only remain painful, they also obstruct the way to constructing a new future.

Adnan Qaiser began his professional career as a commissioned officer in the Pakistan army and took early release as a Major. While working at various command and staff positions, he developed a thorough understanding of national politics, civil and military leadership, intelligence establishment, regional geopolitical players and the security and policy issues that preoccupied them. Moving on to international diplomacy, he fostered political, economic and cultural relations for the next 12½ years at bilateral and multilateral platforms, watching closely some of the most turbulent times in the South Asian and Middle Eastern politics from a G7 perspective. Emigrating to Canada in 2001 he upgraded his

education and continues with his professional development while working at various senior positions in public, private and not-for-profit organizations. Speaking many of the languages and having deep insight into the region he has written and published papers on Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Middle East and Canada's military engagement in Afghanistan and has been a regular commentator at Canadian television talk-shows as well as a speaker at various Canadian think tanks. Adnan Qaiser can be reached at: a.qaiser1@yahoo.com.

NOTES

1. Meaning conservativeness or orthodoxy, including a narrow-minded mindset or isolationist approach. The approach of the scholars mentioned throughout is "regressive" and "reclusive." In order to establish the primacy of Islam; regain the glory of earlier era (of Muslim victories); and to instill a sense of pride amongst Muslims, these intellectuals led Muslim societies into "seclusion."
2. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (American Trust Publications, 1990), p. 49.
3. Bill Warner, *The 149 Sword Verses of the Koran*, Political Islam (15 March 2009).
4. Jason Burke, *The New Threat: The Past, Present and Future of Islamic Militancy* (The New Press, 2015), pp. 38-39.
5. Timothy J. Lynch, *Kristol Balls: Neoconservative Visions of Political Islam*, Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions Granada, Spain, 14-19 April 2005.
6. Burke, p. 55.
7. Peter Bergen, *The Osama bin*

- Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader (Simon & Shuster, 2006), pp. 204-5.
8. Saleem Shahzad, *Inside A-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond bin Laden and 9/11* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 129.
 9. Abu Bakr Naji, trans. William McCants, *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass* (23 May 2006).
 10. Shahzad, pp. 125, 134, 140-142.
 11. Bill Roggio, *The Seven Phases of The Base*, FDD's Long War Journal (15 August 2005).
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L'INDÉPENDANCE DE L'ÉCOSSE, UNE MENACE POUR JAMES BOND ET LE SOFT POWER DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ?

par le Dr. Michael Eric Lambert

Le célèbre Agent 007, personnage inventé de toute pièce par l'auteur Ian Fleming après son expérience en tant qu'agent du renseignement pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, arrive en tête des figures les plus populaires au Royaume-Uni. Si l'on demande à l'Homme de la rue ce que lui évoque la "Grande Bretagne", que cela soit en Europe, en Amérique du Nord ou sur le continent asiatique, James Bond arrive largement en tête aux côtés de la Reine, du whisky Écossais, et même devant Harry Potter.

L'agent du MI6 est tellement connu de tous que l'on oublie souvent ses origines, sans même oser questionner son affiliation à la Couronne. La question semble cependant d'actualité avec le référendum sur l'indépendance de l'Écosse. En effet, en cas d'indépendance, celui-ci devra choisir d'entrer dans les futures Services Secrets Écossais, ou bien de revenir dans son pays maternel, la Suisse. Une perte nette pour le soft power de ce qui resterait de la Grande Bretagne.

La personne de Ian Fleming est en effet pleine de contradiction. Le père de James Bond remonte à 1953 où il apparaît pour la première fois dans le roman "Casino Royal", son père "Andrew Bond" est un écossais originaire de Glen Coe, lieu où - non sans une certaine ironie - 38 membres du clan MacDonald furent tués en refusant de prêter allégeance à Guillaume II d'Angleterre en 1692. Le film Skyfall se déroule dans cette même région. Ce dernier rappelle lui-même les origines de l'agent 007, qui même s'il affirme ne



(Source: Eon Productions)

“jamais avoir aimé cet endroit”, y a passé son enfance. Tout dépendra naturellement des conditions du futur gouvernement écossais sur l'obtention de la citoyenneté, et des négociations avec ce qui restera du gouvernement à Londres, mais si celles-ci déterminent l'appartenance à l'Écosse avec le Droit du sang, ou le Droit de la terre, Bond deviendra immédiatement Écossais. D'une manière assez paradoxale, celui-ci pourrait demander la citoyenneté britannique et refuser ou cumuler la citoyenneté écossaise. Malheureusement pour Bond, cela dépendra de son temps de résidence en Angleterre, qui est probablement inférieur à 6 mois par an du fait de ses nombreux voyages, ce qui l'empêcherait possiblement de clamer son obtention.

Cette spéculation d'une demande de 007 pour rester “britannique” et refuser d'être “Écossais” part du principe que celui-ci ne

souhaite pas rejoindre les futurs Services Secrets écossais, ce qui n'a rien d'une certitude dans la mesure où l'on ignore encore les avantages que ces derniers proposeront par rapport à ce qui restera du MI6. Il semble important de noter qu'à ce jour le MI5 et MI6 sont parmi les services de renseignement les moins flexibles en termes de nationalité, et obtenir un travail implique souvent de renoncer à la double citoyenneté, ce qui s'avérerait être un problème majeur pour l'ensemble des personnes qui y travaillent. À l'inverse, l'Écosse indépendante pourra décider ou non, comme le font beaucoup d'autres pays d'Europe, d'accepter la double nationalité dans ses services. Les origines de Bond se retrouvent dans les premiers films, où l'Écossais Sean Connery joue le rôle du personnage, avec un accent prononcé.

La mère de Bond est pour sa part originaire de Suisse, Fleming s'inspirant

de sa propre fiancée Monique Panchaud de Bottens, probablement francophone. Cela explique les nombreuses aventures et séjours de 007 en Suisse, le fait qu'il parle parfaitement français, et qu'il perde tragiquement à l'âge de 11 ans ses deux parents dans un accident d'alpinisme à Chamonix-Mont-Blanc. Bond a également étudié à l'Université de Genève, probablement en français à une époque où les cours en anglais étaient plutôt rares.

007 pourrait donc probablement réclamer la double citoyenneté Suisse et envisager de rejoindre les Services Secrets de la Confédération, avec un salaire bien plus conséquent, d'autant plus que ce dernier parle le français, mais aussi l'allemand, deux des quatre langues officielles du pays.

Il reste donc difficile de dire si l'agent secret le plus connu au monde pourra et décidera de rester dans un Royaume Uni sans Écosse, le Brexit jetant également une incertitude sur ses avoirs et sa capacité à voyager librement dans toute l'Europe, où il apprécie notamment de faire du ski. À ce propos, rappelons que 007 fut brièvement marié à une française d'origine Corse, qui décèdera tragiquement. Il semble donc fortement apprécier ses séjours en Europe. Les femmes du continent ne sont pas sa seule "préférence", celui-ci apprécie le champagne français Taittinger, le whisky Macallan, la vodka des pays Baltes, et le Bourbon. Ces cigarettes de prédilection sont également les Morland Specials de Macédoine.

En bref, le James Bond de Ian Fleming est "international", mais avec la construction de l'Union européenne, celui-ci est en réalité de nos jours l'exemple type de l'Européen qui aurait effectué un Erasmus en Suisse, aimerait certaines choses qu'il aurait découvertes lors de ses voyages dans l'espace Schengen, et serait tombé amoureux des femmes qu'il aurait rencontrées lors de ses vacances, ce que vit actuellement toute une génération de

jeunes européens sur le continent.

Sa relation de proximité avec l'Europe ne se limite pas à ses choix dans sa vie privé, mais également dans son travail. Impossible de détacher de son Aston Martin anglaise, mais il lui préfère la marque bavaroise BMW entre 1995 et 2002. Son arme, le Walther PPK est également le fleuron de l'industrie militaire allemande, même si dans les romans de Fleming il aborde un Beretta 6.35 mm d'origine italienne.

Quelles seraient les conséquences d'une indépendance de l'Écosse pour James Bond ? La figure populaire devrait justifier son affiliation au MI6, ce qui s'avérerait difficile à concevoir sur un plan psychologique, celui-ci n'aurait donc pas ou peu d'attachement émotionnel au pays de son père. Il serait juridiquement contraignant pour 007 de devenir un citoyen britannique au regard de la loi et du manque de flexibilité du processus de recrutement du MI5 et MI6. Cependant, rester dans un MI6 post-Brexit n'apporterait que de nombreux désavantages pour l'agent, rejetant son identité "européenne" résolument ancrée par Ian Fleming dans ses habitudes quotidiennes.

La possibilité de rejoindre les Services Secrets d'Écosse s'avérerait loin d'être improbable. Premièrement car James Bond aurait la possibilité juridique de la faire sans entraves, deuxièmement car il obtiendrait probablement une promotion au regard de son expérience au sein d'un nouveau Service, ce que ne lui propose pas l'actuel MI6.

Dans le monde réel, cela signifierait une perte nette pour le soft power de ce qui resterait de la Grande Bretagne, qui devrait renoncer à son drapeau en même temps qu'à l'agent secret le plus connu au monde. En revanche, cela s'avérerait un splendide coup de communication pour l'Écosse, qui aurait à son service une figure populaire de renom, et pourrait l'utiliser tant dans ses campagnes de recrutement

pour sa future armée, que pour ses services de renseignement. 007 sera-t-il l'apanage du soft power de l'Écosse dans un avenir très proche? Les Écossais en décideront dans les prochaines années.

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LA VICTOIRE COMME OBJECTIF STRATÉGIQUE : UN CONCEPT AMBIGU ET CONTRE-PRODUCTIF POUR LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT

par Jennie Carignan

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« En guerre, il n'y a pas de victoires. Il n'y a que divers niveaux de défaites. » [TCO]

INTRODUCTION¹

La source d'inspiration pour un sujet de dissertation survient souvent à des moments tout à fait inattendus. L'idée de ce texte m'est venue à la suite d'une discussion avec un de mes démineurs au camp Nathan Smith à Kandahar, en 2009. Ce dernier me brossait le tableau de sa situation tactique quotidienne dans le secteur de la ville de Kandahar. Celle-ci exigeait qu'il neutralise parfois jusqu'à 9 ou 10 engins explosifs dans une seule journée, ces derniers se trouvant souvent aux mêmes endroits qu'il avait déminés quelques jours auparavant. Pour conclure la discussion, il a dit « écoutez madame, on ne la gagne pas cette guerre ». Situation, il faut l'admettre, plutôt alarmante et décevante considérant les efforts, les pertes humaines et l'intention des Forces armées canadiennes de mener ce combat vers la victoire. La question se pose donc, qu'est-ce que la victoire au juste? Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire : gagner une guerre? Pourquoi mon démineur – malgré son engagement total, les nombreux sacrifices pour son pays et les risques pour sa vie – avait-il cette perception que ses actions

ne conduisaient pas à la victoire?

Plusieurs experts militaires éminents ont affirmé que l'objectif principal en guerre est de gagner² ou encore « [qu'] en guerre, il n'y a pas de substitut à la victoire³ ». La notion de victoire tourmente l'institution militaire. En effet, une force armée est employée en dernier recours et doit donc gagner ses batailles pour assurer la survie de son pays. La perception de la victoire comme une fin en soi – et synonyme de succès stratégique – est donc très présente dans l'esprit du haut commandement militaire. Mais quelles sont les implications de la victoire comme objectif stratégique pour le haut commandement et les militaires déployés sur le terrain?

Cette question à la fois fondamentale, importante et d'actualité sert de toile de fond à toute réflexion stratégique du haut commandement qui doit décider de la façon dont les forces armées seront employées lors d'interventions militaires. Le présent essai examinera donc les opérations militaires dans le contexte stratégique de la guerre. Par conséquent, cette étude se place du point de vue de

la relation entre la fin, la victoire, et les moyens, l'usage de la force armée. Ce texte s'intéresse aussi à ce que cette relation implique pour la manière et l'esprit dans lequel sont menées les actions militaires sur le terrain.

Ce travail est organisé en trois parties. Dans la première, les théoriciens et les stratèges qui ont contribué au culte de la victoire dans la pensée militaire seront examinés pour comprendre ce qu'ils ont laissé en héritage : nous verrons qu'il s'agit d'un ensemble d'idées plutôt ambiguës et incohérentes. Dans la deuxième partie sera examinée la prépondérance du concept de victoire dans le récit quotidien des décideurs politiques et experts militaires. L'utilisation du mot « victoire » (ou encore « succès ») par le commandement stratégique, sans prendre la peine de le définir clairement, cause de la confusion tant chez le pays qui se mobilise pour la guerre qu'à celui des forces militaires chargées d'exécuter les opérations. Enfin, en troisième partie, des pistes de solutions seront proposées pour se libérer de la notion de victoire et ainsi offrir une approche peut-être mieux

adaptée à la réalité de la guerre moderne pour laquelle il est souvent impossible de déterminer clairement qui a perdu et qui a gagné.

Ce travail démontrera que la victoire n'est pas utile comme objectif stratégique. Nous ne remettons donc pas en question ici l'importance de l'efficacité opérationnelle des troupes ni le succès tactique. Il serait frivole de penser que les troupes se présentent sur le champ de bataille pour perdre. Gagner oui, mais pas à tout prix et dans quelle mesure? Comme le phénomène de la guerre est quasiment incompréhensible, surtout du point de vue de la morale⁴, et que les guerres concrètes souffrent souvent de l'absence de directions stratégiques claires, je soumets que les décideurs politiques et le haut commandement militaire qui commettent des forces militaires à l'étranger doivent penser au-delà du concept de la victoire.

L'HÉRITAGE DES THÉORICIENS : L'AMBIGUÏTÉ

Le récit de la victoire qui s'est développé depuis les écrits de Sun Tzu jusqu'au début du XXe siècle peut être divisé en deux familles théoriques principales. Pour les penseurs classiques et prémodernes, le but stratégique de la guerre est de conquérir un territoire par une série de victoires tactiques. En conséquence, ils ont mis l'accent sur les conditions nécessaires pour vaincre les armées sur le champ de bataille. Avec l'arrivée de l'ère industrielle et des forces mécanisées, les penseurs militaires tels Napoléon Bonaparte, Antoine de Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz et John Frederick Charles Fuller ont favorisé la guerre totale impliquant toutes les ressources humaines, économiques, technologiques et industrielles de l'État pour mener à la destruction de l'ennemi et ainsi remporter des « victoires décisives⁵ ». Pour plusieurs stratèges, les défaites allemandes pendant les Première et Deuxième Guerres mondiales ont accrédité l'idée que l'objectif de toute guerre est l'accumulation de succès



(Le source: Bibliothèque et Archives Canada)

tactiques jusqu'à la victoire finale.

L'éminent stratège chinois Sun Tzu qui a écrit au IIIe ou IVe siècle av. J.-C. affirme que « La victoire est l'objectif principal de la guerre⁶ ». L'essence de la victoire pour Sun Tzu est qu'elle devrait être acquise rapidement et, si possible, sans combat. Cependant, il nous met aussi en garde contre la poursuite aveugle de la victoire en suggérant que cette dernière n'est pas strictement tactique mais essentiellement reliée à la stratégie. Ce que Sun Tzu suppose ici est que la victoire est difficile à définir et que les événements post-conflits sont imprévisibles et difficiles à contrôler⁷. Dans un survol des penseurs militaires de l'Antiquité, le distingué chercheur et professeur d'études sur la sécurité internationale, William Martel, souligne que Sun Tzu comprenait l'importance de la victoire au plan stratégique, mais sans toutefois en avoir approfondi la signification plus en avant. Quant aux Grecs, et plus particulièrement Thucydide, il constate, toujours d'après Martel, les avantages et inconvénients d'une victoire stratégique, mais, encore une fois, sans en tirer une théorie plus approfondie de la guerre. Enfin, les penseurs militaires occidentaux, fascinés par la supériorité militaire romaine, se sont concentrés sur la victoire tactique, ce qui sera reflété dans les écrits de

nombreux stratèges de la Renaissance, des Lumières et du XIXe siècle⁸.

Bâtissant sur le précédent établi par la levée en masse pendant la Révolution française, Napoléon Bonaparte a grandement influencé le développement et la pratique de l'idée que les États puissent mobiliser leurs citoyens et développer de grandes armées pour mener des guerres totales. Napoléon croyait que le succès sur le champ de bataille lui apporterait la paix et la prospérité alors que tout ce que ses victoires lui ont valu, et ce n'est pas négligeable, c'est la gloire militaire, comme ce fut le cas notamment aux pyramides d'Égypte et, surtout, à Austerlitz et Iéna où il a remporté des victoires totales⁹. Même si l'empereur ne définissait pas la victoire seulement en termes d'interactions entre armées et d'engagements tactiques, ses idées ont contribué à la conception de la victoire comme résultat stratégique décisif.

Le stratège allemand Carl von Clausewitz est sans contredit l'un des plus grands penseurs militaires de l'histoire, notamment grâce à la publication de son œuvre inachevée *De la guerre* en 1831. « La guerre est une simple continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens¹⁰ », son célèbre axiome, illustre explicitement le lien entre les moyens militaires et les fins

politiques d'une guerre. Sa conception de la guerre repose sur l'importance des conséquences politiques et sociales qu'elle engendre. Pour comprendre et interpréter Clausewitz, il faut se familiariser avec les idées d'Immanuel Kant¹¹, notamment celle de « la chose en soi¹² » : « dans l'ensemble [le] caractère distinctif [de la bataille] est que, plus que tout autre engagement, elle existe par elle-même¹³ ». Ou encore « la destruction des forces armées de l'ennemi est le principe suprême de la guerre, et la voie principale vers le but pour tout ce qui concerne l'action positive¹⁴ ».

Malgré la théorie très nuancée et sophistiquée de Clausewitz sur la guerre, c'est le principe de destruction qui a retenu le plus l'attention. En effet, cette dépendance au principe de destruction a radicalement influencé la pensée militaire occidentale et aussi la façon de faire la guerre partout dans le monde. Le stratège israélien Shimon Naveh affirme que la fortune de cette idée est fondée sur un raisonnement assez simple et brillamment défendu. Le fait que son auditoire ait été dépourvu d'outils pour la critiquer a favorisé la prédominance de cette idée et, par conséquent, de cette manière de faire la guerre basée sur la destruction¹⁵.

À travers l'œuvre de Clausewitz, nous assistons à la « tacticismation » de la stratégie. « La planification stratégique doit sans cesse tendre aux résultats tactiques et [...] ceux-ci sont la cause foncière de toute solution heureuse, que cette solution se produise d'ailleurs avec ou sans effusion de sang¹⁶. » Pour Clausewitz, le combat est d'abord et avant tout une fin en soi. Même s'il fut le premier théoricien à explicitement distinguer entre les moyens militaires et les fins politiques d'une guerre, il n'a insisté que marginalement sur le concept de victoire puisqu'il croyait que les batailles tactiques seraient suffisantes pour atteindre les objectifs stratégiques.

Le concept de guerre totale et de

destruction hérité du XIXe siècle a donc dominé le mode de pensée pendant la première moitié du XXe siècle. Pendant les deux Grandes Guerres, les États ont mobilisé un niveau de ressources sans précédent pour produire des machines de guerre pouvant anéantir des nations antagonistes¹⁷. La conception de la victoire retenue par cette expérience fut, en conséquence, que l'objectif stratégique (la victoire par reddition complète et inconditionnelle) s'obtient en employant des moyens militaires. Ainsi, selon le sociologue Eric Ouellet, la victoire peut être construite tant au sens légal (signature d'un traité de reddition) qu'au sens empirique (les objectifs stratégiques annoncés ont été atteints).

Chez le militaire, c'est le désir d'une victoire stratégique conduisant à un traité de reddition qui prime implicitement ou de façon inconsciente. L'importance de cet objectif provient du fait qu'il peut être clairement défini. Mais, cette clarté théorique ne veut pas dire qu'elle mènera infailliblement à sa réalisation pratique. L'atteinte des objectifs stratégiques au sens militaire et la signature d'un traité de reddition sont les deux facettes d'une réalité difficilement réconciliable dans le contexte historique actuel, où la guerre n'implique pas seulement des armées régulières et des États, mais des organisations aux contours flous dont les motivations débordent souvent la politique au sens traditionnel du terme. C'est pourquoi les opérations dans lesquelles le Canada et ses alliés s'engagent ne facilitent aucunement l'accomplissement du « désir de victoire stratégique » tel que nous l'avons défini plus haut.

La victoire au sens empirique suggère quant à elle que les objectifs stratégiques aient été clairement énoncés, puis qu'on évalue les résultats – et donc la victoire – selon l'atteinte de ces objectifs. Cependant, cette évaluation risque fort de ne pas être interchangeable avec la victoire au sens légal. Cette inadéquation sème la confusion. Le concept de victoire

signifie tantôt un résultat tactique et fondamentalement militaire, tantôt un résultat stratégique et fondamentalement politique, voire idéologique et culturel. L'ambiguïté du concept de victoire pose donc un problème important pour le haut commandement, y compris dans son usage traditionnel.

LE BOURBIER DE LA VICTOIRE

Selon l'éminent psychologue Elliot Aronson, « du joueur de base-ball des petites ligue qui éclate en sanglots quand son équipe perd, jusqu'à l'étudiant au stade de football qui scande : "Nous sommes les champions"; de Lyndon Johnson, dont le jugement était presque certainement altéré par son désir tant de fois formulé de ne pas être le premier président américain à perdre une guerre, jusqu'à l'élève du primaire qui déteste son camarade de classe parce qu'il a mieux réussi son test d'arithmétique; nous manifestons une étonnante obsession culturelle pour la victoire¹⁸ ».

Ainsi, pour la majorité des gens, l'image des Forces alliées marchant victorieusement dans les rues de Paris à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale illustre bien ce que représente la victoire militaire. Toutefois, la guerre, une des plus vieilles activités humaines, reste encore aujourd'hui inexpliquée au niveau théorique quant à sa nature et à la façon dont elle devrait être conduite. Comme nous l'avons vu en première partie, en dépit de la vaste littérature disponible sur le sujet de la victoire, la majorité des écrits se concentrent sur les aspects mécaniques (le « comment ») de ce qu'un État doit faire pour gagner la guerre sans vraiment décrire ce qu'on entend par « victoire ».

Il n'existe donc pas de théorie, de langage approprié ou de récit qui définit la victoire en termes d'évaluation des résultats obtenus après une guerre ou bien de ce que les décideurs politiques veulent accomplir en utilisant des moyens militaires¹⁹. Curieusement, le problème de la victoire, d'une importance

fondamentale pour un État, s'habille d'un langage incohérent, imprécis et confus. Nous n'avons qu'à penser au débat public au Canada sur ce que veut dire le « combat » pour nos troupes et sur ce qui ne l'est pas, sur ce qui est une guerre et sur ce qui ne l'est pas, ce que représente une victoire ou une défaite²⁰. Les récents cas d'intervention canadienne en Afghanistan et en Libye illustrent bien la difficulté d'arriver à un constat clair entre qui a gagné et qui a perdu. Car c'est justement là le problème : si on accepte d'utiliser le langage de la victoire, on doit automatiquement décider qui est le vainqueur et qui est le vaincu.

Pour le commandement stratégique, le principe de base est clair et habituellement implicite. Tel que mentionné par le général américain Douglas MacArthur, « en guerre, il n'y a pas de substituts à la victoire ». Ou encore par le maréchal britannique Bernard Montgomery dans sa publication de 1945, *High Command in War*, « une guerre se gagne en remportant des victoires sur le terrain²¹ ». Si on accepte cet axiome, comment explique-t-on que depuis la fin de la Guerre froide, les triomphes militaires n'aient pas généré les bienfaits positifs escomptés? Un des exemples les plus retentissants est celui du Vietnam. Les Américains ont gagné toutes les batailles tactiques mais ont perdu la guerre. Le colonel (retraité) de l'armée américaine et stratège Harry Summers a dit à son homologue de l'armée du Vietnam du nord à Hanoi, cinq jours avant la capitulation de Saigon, « vous savez, vous ne nous avez jamais battus sur le champ de bataille » [TCO]. Et Vietnamien de répondre « peut-être, mais c'est sans importance²². » [TCO] Il en va ainsi avec le cas de la Bataille d'Alger en 1957 qui est aussi très instructif sur la notion de victoire. Malgré l'utilisation systématique de la torture à grande échelle permettant de gagner la bataille tactique, les Français ont perdu la guerre. Ces victoires tactiques totales furent d'ailleurs très coûteuses stratégiquement sur les plans humain, matériel ainsi qu'en crédibilité internationale, tant pour les

États-Unis que pour la France.

Plusieurs experts s'entendent aujourd'hui pour affirmer qu'il n'y a pas de relation causale entre les victoires tactiques et la réalisation d'objectifs stratégiques sur le plan politique²³. Les guerres récentes en Iraq, en Libye et en Afghanistan représentent de bons exemples des limites du succès tactique et de l'emploi de la force. Bien que les Forces armées canadiennes aient « gagné » toutes leurs batailles tactiques en Afghanistan, il est impossible d'arriver à la conclusion que nous avons gagné la guerre. De ce fait, Blanken, Rothstein et Lepore illustrent clairement, dans leur œuvre récente *Assessing War*, le défi de relier le succès tactique sur le terrain à un éventuel succès stratégique²⁴. Au fil du temps, des circonstances et des cultures, le mot victoire a revêtu différentes significations parfois confuses et contradictoires pour les perdants comme pour les gagnants²⁵. Aujourd'hui, la norme est donc d'utiliser le terme victoire librement en assumant que tous le comprennent, sans toutefois lui donner de définition précise.

Pour les militaires, la participation aux combats implique un engagement physique et psychologique intense. Ils endurent l'impensable durant ces missions où ils doivent côtoyer la mort et la violence au quotidien, ainsi que la perte de leurs camarades, en plus de vivre séparés de leur famille pour de longues périodes avec toutes les perturbations que cela implique. Le militaire a donc un grand besoin d'être convaincu qu'il fait la bonne chose et que ses efforts en valent la peine. Lorsque les termes de la victoire – le but à atteindre, la fin – ne sont pas clairement définis ou, pire, lorsque ce qu'ils observent sur le terrain ne correspond pas à l'idée qu'ils s'étaient faite d'une victoire, il s'ensuit une impression profonde de participer à quelque chose de futile.

Par conséquent, une fixation sur le concept de victoire par le haut commandement serait dommageable

pour le militaire opérant sur le terrain puisqu'il risquerait de tenir pour acquis que la fin (la victoire) justifierait l'emploi de moyens inacceptables pour gagner. La notion de victoire transcendant tous les niveaux, de la tactique à la grande stratégie, peut changer de statut et de signification dans le temps et dans l'espace. Dans ce contexte, elle influencera fortement les moyens employés pour remporter la victoire dite « décisive ». Le militaire peut perdre de vue le fait qu'une victoire tactique n'est qu'un des moyens d'atteindre l'objectif stratégique²⁶.

La psyché du militaire est bercée par divers slogans qui donnent le ton à la façon dont il doit agir pour obtenir cette victoire si importante. Comme on l'a vu plus tôt, il n'y a pas de substitut à la victoire est un dicton très courant au sein des forces armées. Il y a d'autres exemples comme « la guerre c'est l'enfer », « tuez ou soyez tués », « si ça bouge détruisez-le », « go ugly early », « shoot them all and let God sort them out ». Donc si la destruction constitue le but des manœuvres de combat et que le combat est la base de la guerre, la destruction et la victoire deviennent l'objectif de la guerre. Démontrer de la clémence devient une faiblesse qui doit être éliminée au bénéfice de la « victoire »... La morale, c'est pour les perdants.

Si nous poussons encore le paradoxe, nous constatons que même si le militaire veut agir moralement, gagner à tout prix peut le pousser à commettre des atrocités au nom de la victoire ordonnée par le haut commandement – que ce soit explicitement ou implicitement. Pour citer Démosthène, « la difficulté n'est pas de vous apprendre ce qui vaut le mieux, disait-il aux Athéniens – je crois qu'en général, vous le savez tous fort bien. C'est de vous persuader de le faire²⁷ ». Dans son article Le paradigme analytique du tortionnaire, le philosophe Marc Imbeault explique que plus la cause est juste, plus le but est noble et urgent, plus la fin semble justifier les moyens. Ainsi, l'utilisation de la torture pendant

la bataille d'Alger et dans la guerre contre le terrorisme démontre nettement l'effet pervers de la poursuite apparemment noble de la victoire à tout prix²⁸.

DÉPASSER LA NOTION DE VICTOIRE

Alors, si on ne peut se fixer comme but stratégique la victoire, quelle est l'autre possibilité? Dans la présente section, quatre pistes de solution seront explorées, soit les relations civiles militaires et le processus décisionnel, l'établissement d'objectifs limités, le concept de viser la paix et l'évaluation des moyens employés.

On trouve une partie de la réponse en examinant les relations civiles-militaires. Risa Brooks, politologue de l'Université Marquette, conteste la croyance populaire voulant que les démocraties prennent de meilleures décisions stratégiques grâce à la nature participative du système et à la présence des débats publics. Selon elle, ce sont plutôt des relations civiles-militaires conflictuelles jumelées à une coordination maladroite, un manque de consultations et un processus décisionnel ambigu qui agissent négativement sur la qualité des décisions stratégiques rendues par les décideurs politiques²⁹. De ce fait, pour les décideurs politiques, l'utilisation du concept de victoire sans le définir en objectifs stratégiques peut résulter en paralysie décisionnelle, en perte de soutien populaire, en explosion de violence post-intervention et, ultimement, en échec politique. Le discours de la victoire flatte les intérêts nationaux, mais ne clarifie pas nécessairement les intentions du pouvoir³⁰ et favorise souvent, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, l'utilisation d'un langage incohérent pour le militaire. Le commandement stratégique se doit donc de développer des processus décisionnels efficaces et d'entretenir des relations saines avec les décideurs politiques de façon à assurer la qualité des stratégies militaires émises.

Le haut commandement doit aussi s'attendre à ne pas recevoir d'ordres clairs des décideurs politiques et, ultimement, à

la responsabilité en tant que professionnel des armes de poser les bonnes questions au moment propice. Cela afin d'ouvrir un dialogue sur ce qu'on entend par victoire ou succès, et ainsi encourager les décideurs politiques à préciser leurs intentions et leurs objectifs stratégiques. En d'autres mots, le haut commandement doit tenir compte des enjeux politiques et les décideurs politiques doivent être conscients des limites et réalités de l'usage de la force et ne pas abandonner la conduite de la guerre aux généraux sans poser les questions difficiles³¹. Par conséquent, la conduite de la guerre est un acte tout autant politique que militaire.

Considérant les cultures militaires et politiques, les relations civiles-militaires représentent un défi de taille, le professionnel militaire préférant instinctivement se concentrer sur les opérations militaires et le décideur politique sur les luttes politiques à livrer avant et pendant la guerre. De par son expérience, sa formation et ses connaissances en matière de défense, le professionnel militaire a l'ultime responsabilité d'entamer, de générer et de poursuivre un dialogue continu avec les décideurs politiques afin de bien exposer ce qu'il est réellement possible de réaliser militairement. De plus, il doit se garder d'être trop optimiste quant à la possibilité d'atteindre des objectifs stratégiques par l'emploi de la force et ne pas promettre l'irréalisable³². Pour citer le chef d'état-major de la défense, le général Jonathan Vance : « Quand nous disons que nous allons faire quelque chose, nos politiciens écoutent et ils nous croient. Il vaut mieux nous assurer que nous sommes capables de faire ce que nous avons dit, ce qui veut dire que nous devrions plutôt viser des objectifs limités et réalisables³³ » [TCO]. Enfin le haut commandement se doit de traduire ces objectifs stratégiques parfois flous en actions cohérentes pour les troupes déployées de façon à agencer ce qu'elles vivent en réalité sur le terrain avec les objectifs de la mission.

Subséquentement, reprenons l'idée

d'objectifs limités énoncée par le général Vance. Selon le philosophe américain John Dewey (1859-1952), « ce qui arrive n'est jamais final, en ce sens que cela fait toujours partie d'une séquence d'événements en cours³⁴ ». Dewey considère que le concept de finalité est défaillant en ce sens qu'il maintient que la fin en elle-même n'a pas vraiment de valeur à moins de considérer les moyens pris pour y arriver. Par exemple, lorsqu'on examine l'intervention canadienne en Afghanistan entre 2001 et 2014, force est de conclure que les opérations militaires n'ont pas mené à un résultat final, que ce soit en termes de progrès démocratiques ou même de stabilité et de sécurité. Le commandement stratégique doit donc s'équiper d'un cadre de référence où le succès tactique ne constitue pas le but poursuivi ou l'état final. Car, comme le succès ou la victoire est difficile à définir et que, de plus, une guerre peut avoir une « valeur morale » variable au cours du temps³⁵, le but devrait être non pas la victoire, mais bien la paix.

En 1961, J.F.C. Fuller, dans son œuvre *The Conduct of War*, affirme que « l'objectif réel de la guerre est la paix et non la victoire. En conséquence, la paix devrait être l'idée maîtresse derrière les politiques et la victoire devrait être uniquement le moyen vers cet objectif³⁶ ». [TCO] Cela implique que le haut commandement devrait se donner des objectifs limités lorsqu'il engage des forces militaires dans une guerre et qu'il devrait être prêt à envisager les choses au-delà du succès militaire. De plus, plusieurs experts aujourd'hui s'entendent pour dire qu'on doit réduire le nombre de guerres se terminant par une victoire tactique et rechercher plutôt une fin négociée³⁷. Cet argument se base sur le raisonnement que les conditions qu'un conquérant impose au vaincu contrecarrent toute possibilité de paix durable. Une paix négociée permet la compréhension mutuelle et le respect des parties opposées. Le haut commandement devrait donc réfléchir à la paix que l'on recherche une fois la guerre terminée plutôt que la victoire

totale à tout prix. Si le militaire sur le terrain recherche une paix négociée au lieu d'une victoire complète, cela aura une incidence significative sur sa façon de se battre. Agir de façon honorable pourrait devenir ainsi plus important qu'une victoire à tout prix.

Enfin, l'évaluation des moyens mis en œuvre lorsque l'intervention a lieu devient cruciale, puisque ces moyens auront des effets à long terme après l'intervention. Timothy L. Challans, du US Army Command and Staff College, propose le principe de réciprocité, c'est-à-dire que si la fin détermine les moyens, peut-être que les moyens devraient déterminer la fin. Et pour citer Dewey : « peu importe le domaine, aucune réalisation notable ne peut être citée pour laquelle les personnes ayant amené la fin n'avaient pas donné des soins affectueux aux instruments et aux agences qui en sont responsables³⁸ » [TCO]. Les moyens employés durant une guerre deviennent ainsi plus importants qu'une victoire à tout prix. On devrait donc s'attendre à ce que le commandement stratégique ait une connaissance pratique des conséquences de l'emploi des moyens militaires utilisés pendant une intervention. Cela inclut non seulement les actes individuels des soldats et leaders sur le terrain, mais aussi les politiques nationales liées à la conduite de la guerre telles que le traitement des prisonniers ennemis, la qualité de l'entraînement et la sélection du personnel³⁹. Ces politiques nationales, ou leur absence, influencent grandement les actions posées par les militaires lors des opérations. Et pour citer Sun Tzu : « Ceux qui excellent dans l'art de la guerre cultivent d'abord leur propre justice et ils protègent leurs lois et leurs institutions. De cette manière ils rendent leur gouvernement invincible⁴⁰. » La débâcle de la mission canadienne en Somalie après la torture et le meurtre du Somalien Shidane Arone aux mains des militaires canadiens représente un exemple retentissant où le haut commandement a failli à ses obligations. Somme toute, le commandement



(la source: Forces armées canadiennes)

stratégique a la responsabilité morale de concevoir des stratégies employant des moyens militaires justes afin de créer les conditions nécessaires pour que les troupes puissent agir de façon honorable.

CONCLUSION : PENSER ET AGIR AU-DELÀ DE LA VICTOIRE

Peu importe le débat sur ce que signifie la victoire ou sur la valeur de l'intervention dans laquelle le Canada s'est engagé, et parfois même en l'absence de directives stratégiques claires, le militaire est appelé à se déployer sur le terrain et doit agir. L'idée de victoire stratégique légale et claire entre alors en conflit avec la réalité quotidienne vécue par le militaire. Une réalité qui donne au soldat l'impression qu'il perd la guerre, du moins cela peut-il être le cas dans la guerre moderne où le vainqueur et le vaincu sont difficiles à distinguer. En fait, la loi – et donc la victoire au sens légal – n'a vraiment de sens qu'au passé, qu'après les événements, alors que ce dont le soldat a besoin pour affronter la complexité du champ de bataille est un regard vers le futur, vers la paix. Si le militaire doit choisir, il vaut mieux qu'il perde avec honneur. Car la victoire dans le déshonneur est la pire de toutes les défaites. « La morale va au-devant de l'action, la loi l'attend⁴¹ ».

Dans cet exposé, nous avons examiné le concept de victoire pour démontrer l'ambiguïté qui l'entoure et son insuffisance en tant qu'objectif stratégique. En fait, non seulement la victoire est peu utile comme concept, mais elle est aussi contre-productive puisqu'elle peut servir à justifier l'emploi de moyens militaires inacceptables pour gagner décisivement. À mon avis, *les moyens employés pendant les hostilités sont plus importants que l'obtention de la victoire à tout prix*. Ainsi, les gestes posés par les militaires sur le champ de bataille, si cruciaux pour bâtir la paix à venir, le *jus in bello*, pour employer la terminologie de la théorie de la guerre juste, dépendent du « ton » employé et des directives transmises par le haut commandement militaire. De ce fait, le commandement stratégique a donc la responsabilité morale, dans l'élaboration des stratégies militaires, de s'assurer que les moyens employés soient cohérents avec la fin envisagée. En conséquence, pour dépasser la notion de victoire, nous proposons la poursuite d'objectifs stratégiques limités et une fin négociée, ce qui devrait créer les conditions nécessaires à des actions militaires honorables sur le terrain et mener vers une paix durable. Car la seule option possible pour les militaires c'est d'agir de façon honorable. C'est d'ailleurs

la seule chose que les militaires contrôlent sur le terrain : leurs moyens, leurs actions et leurs réactions; et le souvenir de ces actes est tout ce qui leur reste lorsqu'ils rentrent au pays.

Le brigadier-général Jennie Carignan, OMM, MSM, CD, est sapeur de combat. Diplômée du Collège militaire royal du Canada, elle s'est spécialisée en génie des combustibles et du matériel. Par ailleurs, elle possède une MBA de l'Université Laval et une maîtrise en arts et sciences militaires de la US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth), et elle est diplômée du Programme de sécurité nationale (CFC Toronto). Elle cumule trois affectations opérationnelles avec la FNUOD (plateau du Golan), la SFOR (Bosnie Herzégovine) et la Force opérationnelle Kandahar (2009-2010), où elle agissait comme commandant du Régiment du génie. Plus récemment, elle a occupé les fonctions de chef d'état-major de la 4e Division de l'Armée canadienne et de commandant du Collège militaire Royal Saint-Jean. Le général Carignan est actuellement chef d'état-major des opérations de l'Armée – Armée canadienne.

NOTES

1. Je voudrais remercier les professeurs Marc Imbeault du Collège militaire royal Saint-Jean et Eric Ouellet du Collège des Forces canadiennes, le Mgén (retraité) Daniel Gosselin ainsi que M. Éric Lefrançois pour leur aide précieuse au cours de la rédaction de ce travail dont je prends toutefois l'entière responsabilité.
2. Plusieurs théoriciens actuels décrivent la guerre en termes de gagnant-perdant avec des recommandations sur les moyens à employer et les paramètres à utiliser pour gagner. Voir par exemple Ryan Grauer et Michael Horowitz, « What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System », dans *Security Studies*, 2012, no 2, p. 83 112; Steve Do-

bransky, « The Dawn of a New Age? Democracies and Military Victory », dans *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2013, vol. 7, no 1, p. 1 15.

3. Le général américain Douglas MacArthur lors de son discours d'adieu au Congrès, le 19 avril 1951.
4. Michael Walzer, *Guerres justes et injustes*, Paris, Belin, 1999, p. 436.
5. William Martel, *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 98.
6. Sun Tzu, *L'art de la guerre*, Paris, Flammarion, 2008, p. 132.
7. Ibid, p 106-107.
8. William Martel, p. 66.
9. Nicholas Stuart, « Finding the Hinge: The Western Way of War and the Elusive Search for Victory », dans *Australian Army Journal*, p. 223, vol. II, no 2, p. 217 225.
10. Carl von Clausewitz, *De la guerre*, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1984, p. 67.
11. Martin Van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, Londres, Harper Collins, 2000, p. 109.
12. Selon le professeur Marc Imbeault, dans la philosophie de Kant, la chose en soi est inconnaissable et s'oppose au phénomène, ce que nous connaissons. La connaissance n'est donc pas la vérité, mais plutôt une construction de la réalité qui est, en soi, inconnaissable!
13. Carl von Clausewitz, p. 267.
14. Ibid, p 279.

15. Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, Abington (R.-U.), Frank Cass Publishers, 1997, p. 71.
16. Carl von Clausewitz, p. 435 436.
17. Peter Paret (dir.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton (N.J.), Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 528, et William Martel, p. 98.
18. Cité par Dudley Lynch et Paul L. Kordis, *La stratégie du dauphin : Les idées gagnantes du 21e siècle*, Les Éditions de l'Homme, 2006, p. 36.
19. William C. Martel, p. 374.
20. <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/gen-jon-vance-says-hes-the-expert-on-what-is-combat-if-you-dont-agree-iraq-mission-is-non-combat-then-too-bad-for-you>
21. Cité par William Martel, *Victory in War*, p. 102.
22. Timothy L. Challans, *Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare*, Albany (N.Y.), State University of New York, p. 106.
23. Bernard Fook Weng Loo, « Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution in Military Affairs », dans *Journal of Strategic Studies*, p. 195, avril 2009, vol. 32, no 2, p. 189-211.
24. Leo J. Blanken, Hy S. Rothstein et Jason J Lepore, *Assessing War: The Challenges of Measuring Success and Failure*, Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2015, p. 9.
25. Robert Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory*, Boulder (Colo.), Lynne Rienner Publish-

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26. Julian Alford et Scott Cuomo, « Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer », dans JFQ, p. 94, numéro 53, 2e trimestre de 2009, p. 92-98.
27. Cité par Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, *La guerre au nom de l'humanité : tuer ou laisser mourir*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, p. 498.
28. Marc Imbeault, « Le paradigme analytique du tortionnaire ou La nouvelle philosophie du bourreau » à l'adresse <http://www.cmrsj-rmcjsj.forces.gc.ca/cb-bk/art-art/2014/art-art-2014-3-fra.asp>
29. Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*, Princeton (N.J.), Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 4-9 et 15-18.
30. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, p. 323.
31. Leo J. Blanken, et al., p. 21.
32. James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics and Theory*, Lexington (Ky), The University Press of Kentucky, 2016, p. 139.
33. Cité avec la permission du général Jonathan Vance par courriel daté du 22 novembre 2016, Session des officiers généraux, Ottawa, 31 août-1er septembre 2016.
34. Cité par Timothy Challans, *Awakening Warrior*, p. 113.
35. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, p. 486.
36. J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War 1869-1961*, Boston (Mass.), Da Capo Press, 1961, p. 76.
37. Robert Mandel, p. 177.
38. Cité par Timothy Challans, *Awakening Warrior*, p. 126.
39. James M. Dubik, p. 167.
40. Sun Tzu, p. 156.
41. Cité par Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, *La guerre au nom de l'humanité*, p. 496.

CURRIE'S GAMBLE: THE BATTLE OF HILL 70, AUGUST 1917

By Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle


*This after-dinner talk was originally given at the **Battle of Hill 70 Gala** in Peterborough, Ontario on 7 April 2017 in support of the Hill 70 Memorial Project. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of R. Kenneth Armstrong, Honorary Colonel, Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, and Captain (Ret'd) Robert Ough.*

Good evening.

Your Honour, Your Worships, Veterans, Serving Military, the Regimental Family, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is my distinct pleasure to be here with you this evening in this historic armoury where, one century ago, undoubtedly to the day, men prepared for war.

2017 is a year of significant anniversaries. I suppose every year is in one way or another. But this year marks the 175th of the founding of Queen's University in Kingston (1842), the 150th of Confederation (1867), the 100th of many important First World War battles (1917), and sadly, the 50th of the last time that the Toronto Maple Leafs won the Stanley Cup (1967)! Even Lord Stanley's chalice, that coveted prize won by every child who has ever braved sub-zero weather to play a game of road hockey in Canada, is a very respectable 125 years old this year (1892). Without a doubt, 2017 marks the confluence of many important events and institutions that make up our national fabric.

1917, however, was a very different year. It was by any measure an annus horribilis, a year of immense challenge for the Allies with very few bright spots to cheer the war-weary soul ... the French were in mutiny, the British were bogged down at Passchendaele, the Russians were in the throes of revolution and the Americans were much too small



(Source: David Freeley Photos)

in number to make any meaningful difference. Interestingly, 1917 was for Canada a banner year, at least as far as its army was concerned. If domestic issues like conscription were tearing Canada apart at the seams, overseas the Canadian Corps was meeting with considerable success ... a well-planned victory at Vimy, a gambling victory at Hill 70 and a muddy victory at Passchendaele. All three of these Canadian battles share more than a mere temporal connection.

At the end of July 1917, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig began his campaign in Flanders for the purpose of securing the vital Channel ports and eliminating the bases from which German U-boats operated. Although meeting with some

initial success, his offensive soon stalled amidst heavy rain, even heavier mud, a resolute opponent and horrendous casualties. By the time that it was all over, it had cost the British Empire an estimated 275,000 men. Later, in 1918, all of this territory gained at such a terrible cost was effectively handed back to the Germans in the face of a looming offensive. Not surprisingly, Passchendaele, along with the Somme in 1916, ranks as one of the most controversial and hotly-debated operations of the entire First World War.

Nevertheless, early into the campaign, Haig believed that an attack to the south, in France, would prevent the relief or reinforcement of the tired German divisions opposite him. A major attack

elsewhere along the line would hopefully divert the enemy's attention and "fix" or "hold" some of his forces in place. A significant enough threat would demand a serious enough response. Haig eventually ordered the First Army, under the command of General Sir Henry Horne, to attack and capture Lens (ou Lens, si vous préférez) for this purpose. In turn, Horne assigned the task to the Canadian Corps and its new commander, the recently-promoted and -knighted Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie. Here, Currie, much like the soldiers of his corps, would be put to the test.

Assessing the ground over which his Canadians would soon attack, Currie quickly appreciated the ramifications of his orders. To the north-northwest of Lens lay Hill 70, an elevated feature on an otherwise flat battlefield that gave a commanding view of the coal-mining city itself, the German lines both within and around it, and the Douai Plain beyond it. Currie reasoned that capturing Lens while leaving the high ground in enemy hands was unwise and would invite disaster. From the hill, so it followed, the Germans would be able to observe the Canadians in their newly-won positions and lob artillery shells at them with impunity. Casualties, perhaps prohibitive casualties, were the predictable result. A frontal attack against a well-concealed enemy, as well as the urban fighting that would occur if the Canadians reached the city, spelled massacre.

Because the hill afforded significant advantages to whomever controlled it, Currie reasoned that the Germans would not tolerate its loss and would quickly counter-attack. He further believed that concentrated small-arms fire from machine guns and rifles, as well as artillery fire from guns well back of the lines, could effectively deal with the inevitable and inflict significant casualties on the enemy, always an important consideration in this grinding war of attrition. Currie thus suggested that Hill 70, not Lens, become the Canadian objective.

In proposing a different plan altogether and thereby disagreeing with both Horne and ultimately Haig, Currie demonstrated significant moral courage. What pluck it must have taken for a freshly-promoted militia officer from the dominions with limited, albeit exceptional, wartime experience to challenge superior British officers and push for a new plan, one that he knew was right, and one that would not squander the fighting strength of his corps. That is leadership. Yet, we must not be too quick to condemn or dismiss either Haig or Horne, for leadership is very much a two-way street. The initial idea to attack Lens may have been ill-conceived, but both officers listened to their subordinate, evaluated an alternative, and agreed upon a new approach to the battle. That too, I would suggest, is leadership. Such interplay was not necessarily a common part of the military culture of the time, but that is exactly what makes this exchange all the more remarkable. If Currie was persuasive and convincing, then Haig and Horne were receptive and supportive. We would do well to remember that elevated rank does not automatically confer a monopoly on good ideas. (There's probably a joke in there somewhere about colonels and generals, but, I think I'll leave it at that!)

Hill 70 was Currie's first major battle as a newly-minted corps commander and in many ways it was a gamble with national stakes. If he was successful, then he would add to his reputation and prove that both his promotion and new command were warranted; perhaps more important, he would again demonstrate that the Canadians could fight just as well as (aside: if not better!) than the British. On the other hand, if he failed, surely some it is reasonable to assume would take it as a sign that Canadians could not yet be trusted to lead their own, that whatever their individual prowess, they still needed the professional, experienced hand of career British officers to guide them, much like Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng had done at Vimy only a few

months before. In this battle, in a sense, Canada would either prove that it had become a master in every sense of the word or remain a senior apprentice for some time still.

But Currie made other gambles too. He took a chance that the Germans would counter-attack and that his preparations would be sufficient to stop them. The first wager was a pretty safe bet. Years of fighting on the Western Front had taught him that the Germans always counter-attacked with lightening rapidity before their enemies had time to consolidate their gains. Hill 70 would probably be no different. Where he took the greatest risk, however, was in his plan to stop the inevitable response with overwhelming firepower. His Canadians would suffer mightily if he erred.

At 4:25 on the morning of 15 August, the Canadians attacked Hill 70 across a frontage of 3,900 yards. Ten battalions from the 1st and 2nd Divisions climbed out of their trenches and began the harrowing advance toward the German lines. The resistance, and thus the intensity of the fighting, was uneven in places, with some battalions reaching their objectives with "relative" ease (by First World War standards) and others finding the going quite difficult. In the span of roughly 90 minutes, the Canadians had all but captured the hill; some positions, however, remained in enemy hands until the following day. The now-exhausted soldiers quickly consolidated what they had gained by bringing forward heavy machine guns and reversing the German trenches, making the old parados the new parapet. Was Currie right? Would the Germans counter-attack? Could the Canadians stop them? They would not have to wait for long to find out.

Hill 70 was in many ways a repeat of Vimy. What had worked so successfully in April was again employed with great effect in August: considerable time was devoted to training and rehearsal prior to the attack so that every man knew his job and the

ground; counter-battery fire neutralized German guns that could break up the Canadian advance; a creeping barrage sheltered the vulnerable infantry as they navigated No Man's Land; assaulting battalions were assigned limited objectives; and reinforcements passed gingerly through captured positions to continue the attack with renewed momentum and greater weight. Where the two battles differed, however, was at the top – while Byng led the Canadians at Vimy, Currie led them at Hill 70. For all the nation-building importance that is attached to Vimy, whether rightly or wrongly, we must remember that it was a battle run by a British general; Hill 70, in contrast, was a battle run by a Canadian general, the first time that a Canadian commanded substantially at the corps-level. And what's more, the soldiers going into the attack at Hill 70 had the confidence and spirit that only their recent success at Vimy could instill.

True to form, and as Currie had anticipated, the Germans quickly counter-attacked. Although this initial assault was easily repulsed, it marked the beginning of a prolonged attempt by the Germans to regain Hill 70, so vital was this ground. For four days, from 15 to 18 August, the Germans launched no fewer than 21 separate counter-attacks against the Canadians. Advancing in waves over open ground or worming their way forward from shell hole to shell hole, a few German soldiers managed to reach the Canadian positions; they were eventually ejected however, but not before inflicting casualties. But on the whole, the sheer volume of fire that the Canadians poured onto the axis of advance stopped each attempt in its tracks. Cold. A few statistics are illuminating. The 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade fired no less than 120,000 rounds in one day; the 1st Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery, numbering 24 guns, fired slightly more than 11,000 shells in a 24-hour period. That anyone could survive such a maelstrom defies comprehension. In time, the Germans gave up, conceding that the Canadians

now possessed the hill. Currie's gamble had paid off.

But the story has more to it than that. A few days later, on 21 August, Currie launched a probing attack against Lens to test German defences and to determine if the Canadian possession of Hill 70 had encouraged them to pull back from the city. It had not and they did not. After making some minor advances, the Canadian assault was repelled with considerable loss. Once Currie gained this vital information, that there indeed was no success to be exploited, he should have ended the battle and been satisfied with its lop-sided results. Instead, he allowed another attack on a heavily-defended part of Lens to occur on 23 August, with predictable and unfortunate results. Ten days after its start, Currie finally called off operations. Historians claim that it was his inexperience as a corps commander – he had been “in harness” for only a month or so – that led to the unnecessary prolongation of the fighting. Undoubtedly they are right, but perhaps his elation at such a one-sided victory only a few days before, a sense of over-confidence in his own abilities, or the desire to prove himself to everyone who was watching, like Haig and Horne from above, also contributed in some small way to this sad denouement.

The two failed attacks on Lens – the first excusable, the second much less so – cost many Canadians their lives and took a little something away from the success at Hill 70. But what a success it was. In the end, the battle achieved its strategic objective by diverting German forces away from Passchendaele. Currie had delivered what Haig had asked for, and this would become a pattern in the months following. (Of note, later, in October and November 1917, the Canadians helped end the fighting at Passchendaele on orders from the field-marshal. Currie and his corps were quickly earning a reputation as elite troops, something that the battles of 1918 only reinforced.) In addition, the Canadians had exacted a

heavy toll on the Germans at Hill 70: by the cold calculus of attritional warfare on the Western Front, 9,000 Canadians traded for an estimated 15,000 Germans was a fair return on investment, a ratio of almost two to one.

Even though Currie took some calculated risks in proposing the attack on Hill 70 and for dealing with the inevitable German response, he was by no means reckless or flippant. Over the course of the war, he earned a reputation for preferring to waste shells rather than men's lives: shells could be easily replaced, casualties could not. His actions at Hill 70 prove no exception to this general rule. During the battle, a First Army staff officer informed Brigadier-General Edward Morrison, the General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, that the army commander was quite “appalled” at the prodigious Canadian consumption of shells; Morrison dryly replied with some wit, “So are the Germans.” Even Sir Douglas commented with some exasperation on the Canadian propensity to ensure that the corps' guns never went hungry, writing as he did, “The Canadians always open their mouths very wide!” Currie was not averse to committing his forces to battle and absorbing the cost of such a decision, yet, with only a few instances notwithstanding, he tried to give them every possible advantage that would make success on the battlefield more likely. Victory was the usual outcome when planning and preparations were meticulous, as at Vimy and Hill 70 proper; when they were rushed, as during the probing attacks into Lens, the opposite was generally true.

So why is Hill 70 important? Why should you care? The fact that the battle ultimately proved to be a way station along the path of Canada's military evolution and national development is certainly one good reason. In addition, it was a battle planned, orchestrated and fought almost entirely by Canadians. And, on a higher plane, it was one of those rare instances on the Western

Front where the attackers suffered fewer casualties than the defenders.

But more than this, in my ever-humble opinion, it is important that we as a people, both individually and collectively, understand the circumstances under which some 118,000 Canadians, both men and women, gave their lives in conflict stretching from the 19th to the 21st Centuries; how many more gave of body or mind is less easy to determine. By understanding the events surrounding Hill 70, indeed by understanding all battles in which Canadians have fought, from Paardeberg in South Africa to Panjwai in Afghanistan, we attach meaning to otherwise anonymous names. Rather than making the ultimate sacrifice for vague and non-descript terms such as “freedom” and “honour,” Private Bloggins died stemming the German onslaught following the use of gas at Ypres; he died securing a strategic piece of ground at Hill 70; he died, tragically, entering the city of Mons on the last day of the war.

If we remember the fallen on Remembrance Day and other important occasions throughout the year, we honour them by knowing a little something more about the circumstances of their deaths. In light of the astounding casualties of the First World War, numbering into the millions of both dead and wounded on both sides, the stories of individual soldiers are oftentimes lost, drowned out by sheer volume. Yet, if we endeavour to know something about them – where they fought and why, for instance – we reclaim some of their individuality and life-story, making them less anonymous and perhaps more “real.”

Now that they have been set in context, the names of the twelve men from Peterborough and the surrounding area who died at Hill 70, which were read aloud earlier this evening, will possibly take on a greater significance to us in the 21st Century, some 100 years removed from the event. Maybe the history behind the Hill 70 battle honour that appears on

the regimental colour of the “Hasty Ps” (and pretty much every other infantry regiment in Canada) will also have been explained. And surely, if this does occur, it will not be because of anything that I have said necessarily, but rather will be due to the excellent work undertaken by the members of the Hill 70 Project. Their efforts to “rescue” this battle from the historical subconscious are commendable and we all owe them a great debt.

Perhaps this push to understand is all very naïve and too much to hope for – after all, Canadians were once labelled an “unmilitary people” – but it is, again in my humble opinion, a worthwhile goal. If we are to enjoy the fruits of sacrifice, then it behooves us to understand the circumstances under which that sacrifice was made. We owe them that much ... at the very least.

Thank you.

Craig Leslie Mantle received his PhD in military and strategic studies from the University of Calgary in 2013. He has taught courses for both the Royal Military College of Canada and the Canadian Forces College. After working for a decade at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute where he had the opportunity to publish widely on a number of leadership-related topics from both an historical and contemporary perspective, he spent a further year and a half working as the post-1945 historian at the Canadian War Museum. He is affiliated with two professional organizations: the Conference of Defence Associations Institute as a research fellow and the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University as an adjunct faculty associate. His research interests, broadly speaking, include oral history, leadership, material culture and the experience of military service from South Africa to Afghanistan. A strong believer in community service and involvement, Dr. Mantle is actively involved with St. John Ambulance in Kingston; he currently sits on the board of Loyalist Branch, as well as on a number of separate committees.

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Further reading: Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durflinger, eds., *Capturing Hill 70 – Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), passim; Tim Cook, *Shock Troops – Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918* (Toronto: Viking, 2008), 255-307; G.W.L. Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 – Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), 283-297; Matthew Walthert, “Neglected Victory: The Canadian Corps at Hill 70,” *Canadian Military History* 19, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 21-36.

REMEMBERING VIMY AND THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE GREAT WAR

By Brigadier-General Matthew Overton
(Retired)

The Battle of Vimy Ridge, it seems, continues to evoke a wide variety of emotions and commentaries, even though it is now 100 years in the past. Like the Great War itself and the campaigns of 1917 – for which the seizure of the Vimy heights was a part – Canadians have no consistent, accepted and full story from the Canadian perspective to understand the horrific, self-generated catastrophe that engulfed the European nations, their empires and colonies. While Canada officially recognizes Vimy as a significant and largely positive event on the slow road to true independence from Great Britain, Canadians are perhaps not so sure.

Even while tens of thousands of Canadians, young and old, flocked to the site for the commemorations accompanied by their French counterparts, who remain steadfastly appreciative of the Canadian sacrifice, old arguments and criticisms resurfaced once again in national news media: “Vimy was not that important strategically”, “there were more important battles for Canadians”, “it was nothing but Canada doing what it was told”, “it wasn’t really a Canadian victory because there wasn’t a Canadian in command”, “it more split than unified the country – look at the conscription crisis” and even “Chanak, when Canada said ‘no’ (sort of) to the UK, was the true birth of our nation as an independent entity”. Lacking a substantive, inclusive and widely accepted core narrative, these differing perspectives endure as isolated and discordant elements. Mustered to



(Source: Canadian Armed Forces)

argue against Vimy as the most deserving point of remembrance for Canadians in honouring the sacrifices of the Great War, they have a collective weight and logic, but alternative options are not individually any more compelling or resistant to the same weight of criticism when applied against them in turn.

The truth of the matter is that Canada and Canadians have no intimate, compelling and visceral memories of the Great War. This was unlike the European nations where intense fighting was daily life, or death, for not only the soldiers and sailors thrown into battle in unheard-of numbers, but their citizens and communities as well. It is our blessing as a nation that we dodged this intimate knowledge of the war – we suffered other difficulties to be sure, as well as significant casualties for our size of population – and it changes the quality of our recollection of the events when

compared to Europe. Canadians, like Australians, South Africans and many others outside of Europe, collectively struggle to recall individual details from the great sweep of the conflict, except for one or two that come to encapsulate all the suffering, heartache and loss that their nations experienced, distant from the battle sites. Names like Gallipoli, Beaumont-Hamel, Vimy and Belleau Wood invoke memories of not just those battles, but become the lens through which the entire war is recalled.

Vimy, for many reasons well-documented by Tim Cook in his recent book *Vimy: The Battle and the Legend*, has become that lens through which most Canadians view the Great War when it is not Remembrance Day (most, as Newfoundland and Labrador have developed a comparable relationship with Beaumont-Hamel). It may not have been the most strategically important

victory won by the Canadian Corps, but it was the first. With the capstone success provided by the Corps at Passchendaele for the British/Imperial army several months later, Canada provided glimmers of hope in a year of unmitigated suffering for the Anglo-French forces. It might not have been a truly independent statement by Canada in opposition to the desires of the UK, but it set Canada upon the path where such an option could be exercised not so many years later. It may not have provided the solid point about which all Canadians could rally during the war – the political and community divisions across the country were far too deep and complex to be swept away so easily – but it has over time provided Canadians with all that is required to remember with pride and humility the commitment, sacrifice and humanity of so many men and women in the service of their nation – that day and for the entire conflict.

The iconic Vimy monument and the dozens of young women and men that each year guide visitors through the site and speak to the Canadian contribution to success, not just at Vimy but for 1918, are the envy of every other nation, Great War participant or not, something that we scarcely acknowledge. Vimy the battle is not the full story of Canada in the Great War, but Vimy the memorial can provide the point from which to tell that story – from trench to Main Street, from desperate battles and mounting military success to domestic crisis and ongoing doubts. This past 9th of April 2017, listening and watching as Canadian Armed Forces members, artists, national leaders and others played their part in focusing our remembrance on the momentous events of Vimy and the Great War as known by Canadians, it seemed that perhaps after 100 years, it was not too early to accept that full story a little more fully.

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Officer, culminating in the command of the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, he commanded the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and held a number staff appointments within Military Personnel Command, including the post of Assistant Chief of Military Personnel. In addition to operational deployments, he completed defence diplomacy posts as the Military Advisor at the Canadian High Commission in London, Defence Attaché in Kabul and then Defence Advisor at the London High Commission once again as the capstone to his career.

In addition to holding a BA in Physics and Oceanography from Royal Roads Military College, and an MA of War Studies from Royal Military College of Canada, he is a graduate of the National Strategic Studies Programme at the Canadian Forces College and is Certified Human Resources Leader.



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