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The coat of arms of Canada is partially visible on the left side of the page. It features a golden eagle with its wings spread, holding a sword in its talons. The eagle is set against a purple shield with a white cross. Above the shield is a golden crown. The entire emblem is surrounded by red maple leaves.

SENATE STANDING  
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL  
SECURITY AND DEFENCE:  
WRITTEN STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONY  
ON THE DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

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June | juin 2016

At the request of Minister of National Defence, Harjit Sajjan, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence was requested to make submissions on the Defence Policy Review (DPR), with particular reference to peace support operations.

On 20 June 2016, the Conference of Defence Associations and the CDA Institute were invited to send expert witnesses to address the Senate Standing Committee in two groups. The first group was composed of Daniel Gosselin, Chair of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute, CDA Institute Research Fellows Charles Davies and Mike Cessford, all of whom submitted written statements.

The second group was composed of Chair of the CDA Denis Rouleau, Research Fellow James Cox, and CDA and CDA Institute CEO Tony Battista. Tony provided the opening remarks (with input from Denis Rouleau, Jim Cox, David McDonough and others).

The DPR is an important initiative by the new Canadian government. The CDA and CDA Institute were pleased to have had the opportunity to send witnesses to discuss broader defence policy issues, including renewed (UN) peace support operations with the Senate Standing Committee, as part of the DPR's public consultation process.

We are also very happy to publish three written statements submitted to the Senate Standing Committee, alongside a transcript of remarks by one of the witnesses. We hope you find this particular Analysis of interest.

**Dr. David McDonough**

Research Manager and Senior Editor, CDA Institute

Directeur des recherches et rédacteur en chef, L'Institut de la CAD

## WRITTEN STATEMENT – TONY BATTISTA

Mr. Chair, Honourable Members of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence,

Merci pour avoir invités 6 membres de la Conférence des associations de la défense et/ou de l'Institut de la CAD. Je suis Tony Battista Président/Directeur-Général de ses deux organisations. Vous venez tout juste de recevoir les présentations et témoignage de trois autres membres, le Président du conseil de l'Institut de la CAD, le Major-général Daniel Gosselin, ainsi que deux professionnels-en-résidence de l'Institut, les colonels Charles Davies et Michael Cessford. Les trois sont retirés des forces armées canadiennes.

Together with the President of the Conference of Defence Associations, VAdm Denis Rouleau (retired), and BGen Jim Cox (retired), Research Fellow of the CDA Institute, we wish to thank you for this opportunity. At the Conference of Defence Associations and the CDA Institute we welcome your very important work and contribution to this major government initiative – a Defence Policy Review with an outcome likely to have a major impact on the Security and Defence of Canada and Canadians for years to come. We will start with a brief presentation comprising a pre-amble followed by 5 recommendations. We will then be pleased to address individually questions you might have.

So let me begin:

**Preamble:** We note that this Defence Policy Review (DPR) is being conducted somewhat in a 'vacuum,' without the articulation of a higher-order national security policy framework, a national security grand strategy, or an international policy review process, in which to nest defence policy, domestic security policy and foreign policy. It is also a concern that defence policy pronouncements have already been made, despite still being in the midst of the public consultation phase of the DPR. We also note that most discussion thus far on the DPR seems to be focused on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), but a comprehensive and credible Defence Policy involves much more than the CAF. As well, peace support operations (which arguably is almost an obsolete term – we should be talking of 'conflict management' and international stabilization operations instead) involve more than simply military forces. If 'whole-of-government' is truly 'whole,' then many other departments and agencies should be involved and committed.

**Recommendation #1** – We recommend that the central piece of the new Defence Policy for Canada must be based on a clearly articulated argument driven by the National Interest. This sounds rather self-evident and simplistic, but articulating a strong, compelling 'National Interest' narrative is essential to convince Canadians (and other Government departments and agencies) of the necessity to

formulate and support a credible Defence Policy, and to identify the necessary funds to acquire the required Defence capabilities that will allow the CAF to accomplish its assigned missions and tasks effectively. Such focus on a well-articulated National Interest narrative will also allow the Government to prioritize competing defence requirements and to apportion and commit finite resources to execute the missions and tasks assigned to DND and the CAF over time. Defence, like charity, begins at home!

**Recommendation #2** - Cascading directly from Recommendation #1, is the need to articulate with sufficient clarity and purpose that the CAF Force Structure must first and foremost be focused on the Defence of Canada, including identified and well-structured support to other Government departments and agencies so as to lend full credibility that the Canadian Government can and will apply the full range of 'Whole of Government' actions in any given situation at home. The next priority must be the Defence of the North American continent in close cooperation with the USA. This requires a clear policy statement along with both organizational and force structures that are more than just compatible with US Forces; they must be fully interoperable and in many cases integrated – in terms of Command, Control and Execution. For this to take hold, Canada MUST assume its fair share (but not necessarily equal) of the Defence burden for protecting the North American continent, including Air, Land, Sea, Space and Cyber approaches to the Continent and the Arctic. Particularly important in our Continental Defence Policy is the role NORAD, which should remain prioritized for the foreseeable future.

**Recommendation #3** - With a National Interest well articulated and a homeland and Continental Defence Policy and the required Force Structure and capabilities well-defined and resourced, the next priority is to identify in the new Defence Policy the essential elements and requirements for Canada to lead and/or contribute to International Operations. In doing so, the following must be satisfied:

- (a) Canada must retain essential Sea, Land, and Air combat capabilities, fully interoperable with major allies (NATO, US, Five Eyes community);
- (b) Canada should strengthen and even expand its specialization in Cyber and Space defence and increase the size of its Special Forces. These capabilities will act as force multipliers and even create effects of their own;
- (c) Similarly, the Defence Policy should identify, and express the intent to fund, acquire, and sustain select specialized capabilities that are sufficiently flexible to insert in any future pre-kinetic, kinetic and post-kinetic scenarios. (These specialized capabilities might include engineers, policing, medical, and other capabilities that allow for effective humanitarian operations, and MUST have integral combat-capable elements to defend the task force, protect

those in grave danger, and extract itself in extremis.

**Recommendation #4** - The Canadian Defence Policy should dedicate a chapter on identifying and selecting portions of its Force Structure to either lead and/or contribute to UN-sanctioned Stabilization and Peace Support operations (including the prospect of being a lead country for training and task-organizing). Intrinsicly entrenched with this recommendation is that Canada's participation in these 'Peace Support' operations must first and foremost be based on the National Interest and remain largely discretionary, so as NOT to degrade or detract from the Force Structure and capabilities essential to our first 3 Recommendations.

**Recommendation #5** - Finally, we cannot emphasize enough that whatever new Defence Policy is eventually approved by the Canadian Government, the resources to actuate it must be fully identified, committed, and sustained for the full life of the Policy. For example, at present, without a significant increase in defence spending, it does not look likely that the CAF will be able to proceed successfully with its recapitalization plans, maintain adequate readiness levels, retain its current force structure, and pursue its existing defence commitments – to say nothing about the government's new focus on UN peace support operations.

The Government therefore has two options – increase funding to adequate levels to fulfill these defence requirements or recalibrate these requirements (and the force structure that goes with it) to fit better the prospective spending envelope. Neither option will be easy. The first will require the Government to substantially and immediately increase the resources allocated to defence, even though such a move may not be politically expedient at a time of larger than expected deficits. The second will also require being highly disciplined in prioritizing defence commitments, making hard choices on the CAF Force Structure, and even then there are dangers of getting it wrong.

In either case, the government cannot focus too narrowly on parochial, electoral or even 'politicized' service-specific concerns, but must be guided instead by something broader – the National Interest. Anything less will be fraught with challenges, will assuredly increase the "capability-commitment gap" that has long plagued defence planners, and may well be a disservice to Canada and Canadians, thereby creating an even more serious 'credibility gap.'

We thank you for your invitation and your attention. We are happy to take your questions.

***Tony Battista** is Chief Executive Officer of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and the CDA Institute. He would like to thank the Denis Rouleau, Jim Cox, David McDonough and others for their helpful input on earlier drafts.*

## WRITTEN STATEMENT – MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL GOSSELIN (RET'D)

Mr Chair, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and offer some thoughts to assist the important work of your Committee.

With me today are Cols (Ret'd) Michael Cessford and Charles Davies, two Fellows of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute with significant operational experience. We trust that our remarks and the answers to your questions will assist you with your work.

This afternoon, I will speak to you about the challenges of maintaining strategic coherence when Canada makes the important national decision to participate in overseas operations, be in a coalition of like-minded nations – like we did after the events 9/11 or as we are currently doing in Iraq, or with a United Nations multi-national force, as the government indicated we will do in the coming months and years.

### Strategic Coherence

First, let me explain what I mean by strategic coherence.

Strategic coherence speaks to the link between politics, national policy and strategy. Politics here is meant in the context of national decision making.

When speaking of military operations or activities, strategic coherence describes the requirement to maintain a clear, shared political-military understanding of the aim and objectives of a military operation, particularly as it evolves over time.

At its core, strategic coherence is about the continual alignment between politics and military strategy, or put another way, the need to maintain ends, ways and means aligned in the face of contemporary strategic complexities and evolving situations. This requirement includes the development and maintenance of a coherent national strategic narrative.<sup>1</sup>

### Contributors to Strategic [In]Coherence

So what contributes to strategic incoherence.

There are many factors and reasons why we can have a divergence between political ends and the military strategy. Let me give you four, looking at the lessons of the past two decades.

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from various sources including Timothy Edmunds, "Complexity, Strategy and the National Interest," *International Affairs* 90, 3 (2014), and Hew Strachan, "Conclusion," in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan, eds., *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (Ashgate, 2013).

**The first one** is not defining with compelling clarity the reasons for Canada's participation in a given overseas operation. When the nation is ambiguous in defining those ends and goals, it makes the development of the military strategy inherently more difficult. It also makes the articulation of a coherent strategic narrative – when speaking to Canadians, to our allies, and to our military – nearly impossible.

Domestic politics, election campaigns, changes of government, to name a few, are all reasons that make it difficult to maintain this strategic clarity, and to ensure that the military strategy and ensuing actions on the ground are always well synchronized with the policy objectives.

*“In short, we can not confuse ourselves as a nation...into why we are engaging in demanding, expensive, high-risk operations around the world. The consequences are too serious. We need clarity of thinking not only to make the initial decision to participate and to deploy forces, but especially after the forces have deployed across the world...”*

The direct consequence of 9/11 for many Western nations, including Canada, was to subordinate their strategy, and initial operational thinking, to the US. There was little incentive or pressure to separate strategy from national policy, or to explore, with the sort of rigour required, the relationships between means, ways and ends. Many nations paid a heavy price for this intellectual sluggishness.<sup>2</sup>

In short, we can not confuse ourselves as a nation – and confound the public – into why we are engaging in demanding, expensive, high-risk operations around the world. The consequences are too serious. We need clarity of thinking not only to make the initial decision to participate and to deploy forces, but especially after the forces have deployed across the world, and we have now turned our national attention to something else.

**A second one**, often overlooked, is the evolution of the coalition or of the multinational force dynamics. The withdrawal on a nation that is making a significant contribution to the multinational force, or the loss of key force enablers – such as key firepower assets, medical evacuation, intelligence and surveillance assets – can significantly alter the conditions in the theatre of operations, potentially demanding important adjustments to the military strategy, and even perhaps to the national policy objectives.

**A third one** is the challenge of implementing a whole-of-government effort over time, particularly as the mission mandates, political and military situations on the ground, the threats, and the regional dynamics evolve.

As we have seen during the Afghanistan campaign, it takes a significant and constant intellectual

<sup>2</sup> Strachan, “Conclusion,” in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan, eds., *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (Ashgate, 2013), p. 330f.

effort – political, bureaucratic and military – to maintain national focus and strategic coherence.

The previous government even had to launch an important study – the Independent Panel led by the honourable John Manley - to take stock and look at Canada’s future role in Afghanistan. It led to some important changes, including the formation of a Cabinet committee on Afghanistan and an inter-departmental Afghanistan task force to help with national strategic planning, coordination, and coherence.

In short, directing and managing the whole-of-government effort is a demanding task, particularly when there is lack of political clarity and direction, and with Departments having their own perspectives of the policy objectives sought by the government.

Finally, a **fourth one**, is the complexity of “partnering for peace” in today’s UN multinational operations.

Most UN Chapter 7 missions today include the protection of civilians. Several states, including some contributing troops, do not necessarily accept the more ambitious requirements of civilian protection and robust peacekeeping.

Despite the best efforts of the UN, troop contributing nations continue to operate with caveats and take directive from the national capitals, particularly when it comes to the use of force.

“The tenuous consensus on peacekeeping that once existed is also deteriorating due to a lack of accord on the extent of the ambition and on the dimensions of UN mandates.”<sup>3</sup> There are deep divisions and divergent understandings within the UN about the nature and purposes of peacekeeping. The new missions challenge the UN principles of consent, impartiality and non use of force, and create a gap between strategic considerations and operational realities.<sup>4</sup>

All those elements will demand significant intellectual engagement by Canada with the UN, on many levels.

## Summary

In summary, Canada’s participation in UN modern peacekeeping can include some idealism, but this idealism needs to be blended with a strong dosage of pragmatism.

Without this clear thinking, we risk significant gaps between the political ends our government is seeking to achieve with participating in UN peacekeeping operations and the national and military

<sup>3</sup> Emily Paddon, “Partnering for Peace: Implications and Dilemmas,” *International Peacekeeping* 18, 5 (November 2011): p. 520.

<sup>4</sup> Peter Mateja, “Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma,” *Global Governance* 21 (2015): pp. 351-370.



strategy to accomplish those objectives.

I will be pleased to amplify on any of the points I made, and to answer your questions.

Thank you.

**Daniel Gosselin** has over 39 years of experience in the Canadian Armed Forces, having served in several command and staff assignments. He enrolled in the CAF as a military engineer. He retired from the CAF as a Major-General in 2011, and his last three tours of service included Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, Director General International Security Policy in the Policy Group at NDHQ, and Chief of Staff of the CF Transformation Team in 2005-06. He is a former Commandant of the Canadian Forces College. In 2012-2013, he completed a ten-month assignment as the Senior Strategic Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, a role he continues to perform occasionally.

## WRITTEN STATEMENT – COLONEL CHARLES DAVIES (RET'D)

Thank you Mr Chairman.

I've been asked to focus my remarks on the subject of peace support operations in the context of the current defence policy review, but before turning to that question I'd like to take a couple of minutes to look more broadly at the review itself.

Defence policy is not about the missions or tasks the government of the day assigns to its military. Those decisions are matters of foreign policy or national security policy. The three, along with others, form a broad continuum. Defence policy is fundamentally about the military capabilities the nation will acquire, maintain or divest, and how they will be resourced. These capabilities may be used for many purposes, ranging from disaster relief to peacekeeping to combat missions.

*“Defence policy is not about the missions or tasks the government of the day assigns to its military. Those decisions are matters of foreign policy or national security policy. The three, along with others, form a broad continuum.”*

Military capabilities are integrated combinations of four core elements:

- **Personnel** (primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, military personnel) including their recruitment, training, organization, management and care;
- Major defence **equipment** such as ships and aircraft as well as other equipment, information systems, supplies and services needed to conduct operations and train to be ready for those operations;
- Essential defence **infrastructure** needed for operations, readiness, and training such as dockyards, airfields and training facilities; and
- Military **doctrine** and the professional body of military knowledge required to knit the other elements together into effective force elements; plan and command assigned operations; adapt quickly to changes in operational, technological, geopolitical or other conditions; and sustain the nation's defence institution over the long term.

The four elements have to be present in an appropriate balance, and well integrated, readied and supported, before a defence capability can be considered operationally effective.

Military capability investments often have time horizons reaching years or decades into the future, so decisions taken by previous governments largely define the military options available to the current government, and decisions taken today will similarly establish the options available to future governments. It is therefore important that this Committee, Parliament, and the government take a long-term view in defence policy development.

I recently undertook a high-level analysis of the current defence policies of four other Western nations: France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. They all reflect a very disciplined and comprehensive development process, generally moving sequentially through five key steps:

1. Defining a view of the nation's place in the world and, in broad terms, how the instruments of state power, in particular their defence capabilities, will be used to support a national strategy;
2. Analysis of the global and regional strategic outlook, including "future shock" risks, and the military options current and future governments will need to have in order to face them;
3. Defining the defence strategy each nation intends to follow;
4. Defining the defence capabilities each nation will acquire, maintain or divest and the force structures to be adopted to implement the strategy; and
5. Defining the financial means by which the required capabilities will be acquired and sustained.

If we consider the concept of peace support operations in the context of this analytical process, they clearly merit a mention as an example of the kinds of tasks Canada needs its military to be able to do – but they represent only one area of the spectrum. National responses to events will always require a wider range of options.

Consequently, it would be a profound mistake to give peace support a defining place in the current defence policy review. Any objective analysis of the future security environment would have to conclude that the greatest risks Canada is likely to face in the next decade or two are of such a nature that peace support missions will not be central to any national response to them. Unlike things such as surveillance and protection of our maritime and air approaches, peace support is not, and will never be, a "no fail" task for the nation.

At most, peace support is a potentially useful contribution to a foreign policy objective to support international efforts aimed at containing events and improving global security. However, to be effective those efforts require Western nations like Canada to bring robust, modern capabilities to the table, including the ability to precisely use, or threaten to use, controlled lethal force. This is not new. The 1956 Suez crisis was not contained by peacekeeping or peace support forces. It was contained by political and diplomatic action backed up by disciplined, well-trained, well-equipped

military forces delivered to the scene relatively quickly. The forces were not sent with the intention of engaging in combat, but all sides knew they could if they had to, and this was essential to the mission's success.

In closing, therefore, I would urge this committee to view peace support in its proper light. It is a sometimes useful response to events in certain circumstances, but it is only one of a range of options current and future governments will always need to be able to consider. Further, peace support has to be viewed as a task, not as a defining element of military capability, so it merits no substantive role in defining the future capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces.

I would be pleased to answer any questions honourable Senators may have.

**Colonel Charles Davies (retired)** is a CDA Institute Research Fellow and former Logistics officer with wide executive-level experience in force planning, strategic planning, business planning, program planning, and policy development. Since retiring in 2013 following a 42-year military and Public Service career, he has been researching and writing extensively on defence management, defence procurement and defence policy issues.

**OPENING STATEMENT (TRANSCRIPT) – COLONEL MICHAEL CESSFORD (RET'D)**

I would like to speak to you today about the evolution, over the past two decades, of Canadian support to international peace and stability operations, probably offering a bit more of a tactical perspective, if you will, from the contemporary coalface.

My first exposure to peacekeeping was in 1975, with the United Nations in Sinai. I served for six months. I was also in the Golan Heights. That really was my first exposure to classic peacekeeping operations. Later I served in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I observed the evolving nature, the changing face, of peace and stability operations, a very difficult operational theatre. Of course in

my time in the Pearson Centre, I became intimately involved with challenges that the hybrid mission in Darfur was experiencing, the UN/African Union mission. Finally, with two tours in Afghanistan, much of my work was focused on what were really classic peace and stability operations.

I, essentially, have come across a spectrum of operational experience. I would like to begin by correcting what I believe is a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada's engagement over the past 15 years in global peace and stability operations. There is an enduring perception that Canada abandoned peace and stability operations in the late 1990s, following the debacles in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. For example, to cite but one of many articles, the Toronto Star, in June 2015, published an article entitled, "How Canada has abandoned its role as a peacekeeper." In my opinion, nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact is that the Canadian military recognized in the mid-1990s that the UN, as it was then, was incapable of effectively responding to the new forms of peace and stability operations that were needed for an increasingly dangerous and complex operational environment. In this, they were joined by virtually every other Western military force.

The first evidence of this transition can be seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN protection force, deployed in February 1992, had established safe areas but lacked the means to protect them. These safe areas were for the civilian population. These safe areas, however, inadvertently facilitated the committing of war crimes by concentrating vulnerable civilian populations where they were at the mercy of their enemies. Virtually all safe areas came under sustained mortar and artillery attack, which inflicted serious casualties, but the worst atrocity took place in Srebrenica, where over 8,500 Bosnian boys and men were rounded up under the eyes of a small UN battalion and led away to

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execution.

These acts were the catalyst that saw the transition in the operation from UN command to NATO leadership. On August 30, 1995, NATO initiated Operation *Deliberate Force*, which began combat operations against the belligerents. Approximately six weeks later, all belligerents accepted a truce, which then led to the signature of Dayton Peace Accords only a month later.

The point is that the Canadian Forces in the theatre, which, at the stroke of a pen, transitioned from UN to NATO command, did not cease peace operations. Rather, they were integrated within a far more capable force to achieve a strategic effect, in six to eight weeks, that had eluded the UN over the course of almost four years, at a cost of over 100,000 Bosnian dead, about a third of whom were civilians.

The employment of NATO forces on peace and stability operations continued beyond Bosnia. For example, NATO and coalition operations against Kosovo and Libya and, today, in Syria and Iraq are probably the closest we will come to implementing the UN concept of Responsibility to Protect. This R2P initiative came about after the genocide in Rwanda and supported external engagement and involvement in the sovereign affairs of nations in which genocidal acts were taking place. It was adopted unanimously at a UN-sponsored world summit in 2005. However, in my opinion, mainly for political reasons, this type of mission has little if any chance of ever being executed by UN forces.

Let me conclude by stating that NATO or the UN or other regional entities, such as the African Union, have the potential to initiate and oversee peace and stability operations; but the capabilities and operational constraints that each organization can bring to the types of operations will vary dramatically. In my opinion, the UN is not yet capable of resolving the types of complex and difficult peace and stability operations that we might see, for example, in the near future in Yemen or Syria, a point accepted by many senior officials within the United Nations. For example, the UN report of the high-level independent panel on peace operations published in June 2015 recognizes that the UN could not effectively conduct what were deemed to be counter terrorist operations or operations against enemies such as ISIL and what you would find in Yemen as well.

Given this, care must be taken by the Government of Canada in advance of any commitment of forces to UN operations to assess the potential for mission success and to ensure that the planned operations carry an acceptable level of risk. Shortfalls in UN capabilities and imposed constraints in mission mandates must be critically reviewed to ensure that Canada does not run the risk of mission failure or of seeing the diversion of scarce resources for the achievement of only local, tactical and

other transient successes. This is not to say Canada should not commit forces to operations but rather that we should support those missions that best make sense.

I would suggest that any analysis of a potential Canadian contribution to a UN mission must answer one fundamental question: Will the commitment of Canadian personnel offer the potential to attain a positive, enduring, strategic outcome within a reasonable period of time at an acceptable level of risk for our personnel? If the answer to this question is no, the government may still choose to commit our women and men to these sorts of missions, but at least they will do so cognizant of the risks.

Thank you very much. I will be happy to answer any questions.

**Michael Cessford** is a retired military officer and part-time academic who is currently employed by a major defence and aerospace company. He is affiliated as a Research Fellow with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

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The Conference of Defence Associations Institute is a charitable and non-partisan organisation whose mandate is to provide research support to the CDA and promote informed public debate on security and defence issues and the vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces.

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The CDA Institute was created in 1987, with charitable status, to provide research support to the CDA and to promote informed public debate on security and defence issues and the vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces.

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