

**CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE  
21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**



**LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE DU CANADA ET UNE POLITIQUE DE  
DÉFENSE AU 21 IÈME SIÈCLE**

**Conference of Defence Associations Institute  
L'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense**



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**CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE  
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE**

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## Executive Summary

National defence is an essential component of national security policy and a primary responsibility of government. It is therefore incumbent on government to make available, to those responsible for executing defence policy, the appropriate level of resources. The essential first step in this process is the development of a financially resourced defence policy.

The Canadian Forces (CF) share national security responsibilities with, among others, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canadian Coast Guard), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Border Services Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Cooperation between these actors is high. Each has unique but complementary characteristics/capabilities that provide Canadians with an integrated security capability. However, the strength of this 'chain' of partnerships depends on the strength of each member.

The CF have unique characteristics/capabilities that must be maintained, the most important of which is their ability, as a last resort, to use deadly force at sea, on land and in the air. If these characteristics are not maintained, the integrity of the whole security 'chain' is put at risk.

As the principal custodians of the missions and tasks emanating from Canada's national defence policy, the leaders of the Regular and Reserve components of the CF are those to whom the government turns to ensure the viability of the increasingly interdependent fundamentals of Canadian security: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and contributions to international peace and security. Because of a serious shortfall in personnel and materiel resources, the CF are incapable of sustaining the current operational tempo. They must therefore be given the resources to rebuild the 'present' force; a first and necessary step in the process of achieving military viability; and allowing for the transformation (in mission reorientation and modernization terms) to the 'future' force

As a contribution to the successful prosecution of Canadian foreign policy, and more specifically to international peace and security, the CF regularly deploy

## Résumé

La défense nationale est un ingrédient clé des politiques de sécurité nationale et une responsabilité première de tout gouvernement. Il incombe donc à ce dernier de mettre à la disposition des personnes responsables de l'exécution des politiques de défense, les ressources appropriées. La toute première étape du processus est la formulation d'une politique de défense dotée de ressources financières.

Les Forces canadiennes (FC) se partagent les responsabilités de la sécurité nationale avec, entre autres, le ministère des Affaires étrangères, le ministère des Pêches et des Océans (Garde côtière canadienne), le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada et le ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile. La coopération entre ces organismes est étroite. Chacun d'entre eux a des caractéristiques et des aptitudes uniques mais complémentaires, qui dotent les Canadiens et les Canadiennes d'une capacité intégrée en matière de sécurité. Cependant, la solidité de cette « chaîne » de partenaires dépend de la solidité de chaque maillon.

Les FC ont des caractéristiques et aptitudes uniques qui doivent être maintenues, la plus importante étant leur capacité en dernier ressort, d'employer une force meurtrière sur mer, sur terre et dans les airs. Lorsque ces caractéristiques ne sont pas maintenues, l'intégrité de la « chaîne » de sécurité toute entière est en danger.

À titre de principaux gardiens des missions et des tâches émanant des politiques sur la défense nationale du Canada, les dirigeants de la composante permanente et de la réserve des FC sont ceux vers lesquels se tourne le gouvernement pour assurer la viabilité des bases de plus en plus interdépendantes de la sécurité canadienne: la défense du Canada, la défense de l'Amérique du Nord, et les contributions aux mesures de paix et de sécurité internationales. En raison d'une grave pénurie de personnel et de matériel, les FC ne sont pas en mesure de soutenir la cadence opérationnelle actuelle. Il faut donc les doter des ressources nécessaires pour rebâtir les forces « actuelles »; il s'agit d'un premier pas essentiel dans le cadre du processus de réalisation de la viabilité militaire et de transformation pour devenir les forces « futures », en termes de modernisation et de réaffectation de mission.

overseas on a variety of missions. Canadian military personnel have served and continue to serve with distinction in, for example, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Arabian Sea and Haiti. What is currently an extremely high operational tempo (the minimum time between individual and unit deployments) has, however, come at a price. A serious shortage of personnel and other resources has forced the CF to raid their capital investment funds. As a result, major equipment procurements have been delayed to the point where the CF are currently forced to operate hazardous helicopters, rely on obsolescent supply ships, and deploy without readily available strategic and tactical lift capability for the support and sustainment of overseas operations

If the CF are to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the cycle of dysfunction (where making ends meet takes away from an ability to prepare for and ultimately survive in the future) must be broken. In other words, the days of ‘robbing Peter (the future) to pay Paul (the present)’ must be put behind us.

Three ingredients are needed to rectify this dire situation – resources (personnel, materiel, financial), political commitment, and time, without healthy doses of which the current crisis within the CF will not be resolved.

The Federal Government’s new defence policy must therefore provide for both the rebuilding and transformation of the CF. Concretely, it must ensure that both the ‘present’ and the ‘future’ forces are:

- **Combat capable;**
- **flexible and adaptable;**
- **deployable and sustainable; and**
- **self sufficient and interoperable.**

Canada’s most important defence relationship is with the United States. Our shared values – liberal democratic society, individual freedom and the rule of law - and our reliance on trade and immigration call for the free flow of goods and people into the continent the defence of which is therefore not an option. If we do not contribute meaningfully to continental defence, the Americans will take responsibility for it themselves, depriving Canadians of an essential element of sovereignty.

The task ahead is daunting. The stakes are high and extend to the very core of the Government’s responsibilities. Canadian security relies on the proper

Pour contribuer à l’exercice fructueux des politiques étrangères canadiennes, et plus précisément à la paix et à la sécurité internationales, les FC se déploient régulièrement outre-mer pour une diversité de missions. Le personnel militaire canadien a servi et sert toujours avec distinction dans des régions comme la Bosnie, l’Afghanistan, la mer d’Arabie, et Haïti. Cependant, ce qui représente actuellement une cadence opérationnelle très élevée (soit l’intervalle minimum entre le déploiement individuel et les déploiements d’unité) a coûté cher. Une grave pénurie de personnel et d’autres ressources a forcé les FC à puiser dans leur fonds d’investissement. Par conséquent, les achats de matériel principal ont été tellement retardés que les FC sont maintenant obligées de piloter des hélicoptères dangereux, de dépendre de navires de ravitaillement obsolescents, et de se déployer sans capacité de levage tactique et stratégique rapidement disponible pour l’appui et le maintien en puissance des opérations à l’étranger. Bien que de nouveaux fonds aient été fournis au cours des dernières années, la plus grande partie de cet argent à servi à assumer les frais des opérations en cours.

Pour que les FC soient en mesure de relever les défis du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, il faut mettre fin au cycle de dysfonctionnement où, pour joindre les deux bouts, on enlève à la capacité de se préparer pour l’avenir et au bout du compte, de survivre. Autrement dit, les jours où l’on « déshabillait Pierre (l’avenir) pour habiller Paul (le présent) » doivent prendre fin.

Il faut réunir trois ingrédients pour remédier à cette situation désastreuse : des ressources (du personnel, du matériel, de l’argent), une volonté politique, et du temps; en l’absence d’une dose généreuse de chacun de ces éléments, la crise que traversent actuellement les FC ne sera pas résolue.

La nouvelle politique de défense du gouvernement fédéral doit donc assurer tant la reconstruction que la transformation des FC. De manière concrète, il faut veiller à ce que tant les forces « actuelles » que les forces « futures » soient:

- **aptes au combat,**
- **souples et adaptables,**
- **utilisables et viables,**
- **autonomes et interoperables.**

functioning of a security 'chain' that includes, as one of its key components, a robust military. The International Security Policy review, to be completed this autumn, and into which the Minister of National Defence will be inserting his own Defence Policy review, will indicate to us what, among other security needs, Canadians expect of their Armed Forces.

A Prime Minister who delivers this kind of defence policy will be helping to guarantee the safety and security of Canadians, as well as protecting Canadian values and promoting Canadian interests, at home and abroad. Success in this difficult but necessary enterprise will depend on the depth of commitment and the quality of leadership of our elected representatives, and on the willingness of all Canadians to accept their individual responsibilities.

Dans le secteur de la défense, la relation la plus importante pour le Canada est celle des États-Unis. Nos valeurs communes — une société démocratique libérale, la liberté individuelle et la primauté du droit — et notre besoin de commerce et d'immigration demandent une libre circulation des biens et des gens vers le continent; la défense de ce dernier n'est donc pas un choix. Si nous ne contribuons pas de manière significative à la défense continentale, les Américains en assumeront seuls la responsabilité et priveront donc la population canadienne d'un élément essentiel de sa souveraineté.

La tâche qui nous attend est gigantesque. Les enjeux sont gros et atteignent le cœur même des responsabilités du gouvernement. La sécurité canadienne dépend du fonctionnement correct d'une « chaîne » de sécurité qui comprend, comme ingrédient clé, une force armée solide. L'examen des politiques de sécurité internationale, qui doit être achevé cet automne, et auquel le ministre de la Défense nationale ajoutera son propre examen des politiques de défense, nous indiquera, entre autres besoins au plan de la sécurité, ce que la population canadienne attend de ses forces armées.

Tout premier ministre qui adopte ce type de politique de défense permettra de garantir la sécurité de la population canadienne, tout en protégeant les valeurs canadiennes et en favorisant les intérêts canadiens, tant au pays qu'à l'étranger. Pour que cette entreprise difficile, mais nécessaire, soit fructueuse, il faudra que les représentants élus fassent preuve d'un engagement et d'un leadership poussés, et que la population canadienne dans son ensemble assume ses responsabilités individuelles.

## **CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY/ LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE DU CANADA ET UNE POLITIQUE DE DÉFENSE AU 21<sup>IÈME</sup> SIÈCLE**

### **If the World Needs More Canada, then Canada Needs Credible Armed Forces**

National defence is an essential component of national security policy and a primary responsibility of government. It is therefore incumbent on government to make available, to those responsible for executing defence policy, the appropriate level of resources. The essential first step in this process is the development of a financially resourced defence policy.

Recently, suggesting that Canada has a responsibility to play a meaningful role in the world, Prime Minister Martin expressed the opinion that “the world needs more Canada!” But what, one might ask, does that Canada look like? Is it a prosperous, secure, confident and free Canada, doing its share to ensure that its neighbourhood and the world are stable and secure? Surely, a Canada that does less than that might in fact be a security liability!

As the principal custodians of the missions and tasks emanating from Canada's national defence policy, the leaders of the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces (CF) are those to whom the government turns to ensure the viability of the increasingly interdependent fundamentals of Canadian security: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and contributions to international peace and security. While the CF have done much in the past to preserve our Canadian way of life and help make the world a better place, critical steps must now be taken, in the new, dangerous and challenging post 9/11 international environment, to correct serious shortfalls in military personnel and materiel resources.

Without additional resources, the CF can no longer: sustain the current (and most likely future minimum) number and frequency of operational deployments; rebuild the ‘present’ force (a first and necessary step in the process of achieving military viability); and allowing for the transformation (in mission reorientation and modernization terms) to the ‘future’ force.

Some will dismiss talk of CF operational shortfalls as fear mongering, and as a counter, will point to the Canadian military's legendary record of excellence. There is no doubt that the CF have always carried out their missions and tasks in a most effective and efficient manner, often ‘pulling a rabbit out of the hat’ while operating under the most austere of conditions. However, an inability or refusal to recognize the dire state of today's CF is surely an unacceptable mindset for anyone considering how best to cater for as important a requirement as Canada's national security, nor is it acceptable for Canadians to expect their countrymen and women to guarantee that security with less than adequate resources. It is precisely because they have been called upon so often, and that their numbers and the state of their equipment are now less than adequate that the CF are in need of rebuilding. It is revealing to note, for example, that while the

CF18s of the Canadian Air Force were an important component of the NATO bombing campaign over former Yugoslavia in 1999 (flying over 10% of all sorties, and leading over 60% of all the sorties they flew), this level of commitment proved to be unsustainable because of a lack of resources. Since the end of that campaign, the Air Force has been unable to correct this capability shortfall. Will this operation have been the last of its kind?

Domestically, the CF constantly prepare for existing and potential missions and tasks and are always on call to provide assistance to civil authorities in the event of natural or man-made disasters. As a contribution to the successful prosecution of Canadian foreign policy, and more specifically to the creation and maintenance of international peace and security, the CF regularly deploy overseas on a variety of missions. Canadian military personnel have served and continue to serve with distinction in, for example, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Haiti. What is currently an extremely high operational tempo (the minimum time between individual and unit deployments) has, however, come at a price. A serious shortage of personnel and other resources has forced the CF to raid their capital investment funds. As a result, major equipment procurements have been delayed to the point where the CF are currently forced to operate superannuated helicopters, rely on obsolescent supply ships, and deploy without readily available strategic and tactical lift capability for the support and sustainment of overseas operations. Although new money has been made available in recent years, most of it has served to cover the cost of ongoing operations.

If the CF are to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the cycle of dysfunction (where making ends meet takes away from an ability to prepare for and ultimately survive in the future) must be broken. In other words, the days of 'robbing Peter (the future) to pay Paul (the present)' must be put behind us.

### **The World is a Dangerous Place**

Much has happened, since the 1999 Kosovo mission, to make the world a more volatile and complex place. For example, the safety of Canadians has been more difficult to guarantee since the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, and it cannot be assumed that the international arena, as unstable as it is, will continue to yield the levels of prosperity to which we have become accustomed. The harsh reality is that in today's world, no nation or individual is immune from instability. At home and abroad, Canadian citizens and companies are feeling the pressure of international terrorism. Canadians have relatives in and ties to failing states like Haiti whose populations often require assistance from the international community in order to prevent or recover from large-scale violence. However it is regarded, Canadian domestic security is intrinsically linked to the security of North America which, in turn, is connected to the wider global security system. This is the reason behind the growing interdependence between the three fundamentals of Canadian security: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and contributions to international peace and security.

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, CF 18s have frequently been deployed to investigate and escort unidentified aircraft entering Canadian airspace. During the Kananaskis G8 Summit of June 2002, CF personnel deployed their war fighting skills and equipment to protect the site from potential terrorist

attacks. Further afield, Canadian military operations in Afghanistan are aimed at reducing the ability of international terrorists to operate with impunity.

A recent (April 2004) POLLARA poll, conducted on behalf of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), found that the majority of Canadians support overseas commitments and an increased defence budget:

Fifty-five per cent (55%) of Canadians advocate increased government spending on fighting terrorism here in Canada (as opposed to fighting terrorism in other countries) and fifty-four per cent (54%) believe the national defence budget should be enlarged... In comparison, about two-in-five Canadians support increased spending on the promotion of international trade (42%), peacekeeping (41%), and foreign aid (38%).

This level of support by Canadians for the military is indicative of an “opt- in” attitude.

### **The CF: National and International Security Cooperation**

The CF share national security responsibilities with, among others, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canadian Coast Guard), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Border Services Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Cooperation between these actors is high. Each has unique but complementary characteristics/capabilities that provide Canadians with an integrated security capability. However, the strength of this ‘chain’ of partnerships depends on the strength of each member.

The CF have unique characteristics/capabilities that must be maintained, the most important of which is their ability, as a last resort, to use deadly force at sea, on land and in the air. If these characteristics are not maintained, the integrity of the whole security ‘chain’ is put at risk.

For instance, the CF operate a number of maritime patrol aircraft - the CP-140 Aurora. The primary role for these aircraft is the detection and destruction of submarines and other naval threats. In addition, Aurora aircraft carry out a variety of national surveillance tasks. For example, they fly hundreds of hours, annually, in support of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, tracking vessels entering, using, and leaving our waters. If, as a result of a reduction in the availability of aircrew and maintenance personnel, materiel resources and state-of-the-art technology, this capability were significantly degraded, it would be difficult to confidently and effectively maintain sovereignty over our coastal waters and fisheries. Without effective coastal surveillance by our CF ships, vessels carrying drugs, illegal migrants or terrorists would have an easier time entering Canada; making it even more difficult for the Coast Guard, the RCMP, and the Canadian Border Services Agency to do their work. Ultimately, Canadian security and the security of our neighbours, the United States – upon whose economy our own prosperity greatly depends - could be put at

risk. Not only do the CF work in cooperation with other Canadian security partners, they also cooperate with traditional and other international coalition allies.

For more than 100 years, securing Canadians and defending Canadian interests has included the option of sending troops overseas. In WW II, for example, Canada deployed the Royal Canadian Navy offshore and into the North Atlantic to protect merchant convoys, hunt for German submarines, and deny the Nazis access to our home waters. From 1951 to 1993, throughout and slightly beyond the period of the Cold War, Canada stationed large contingents of Army and Air Force personnel in Western Europe as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s collective defence deployments designed to fend off Soviet aggression on the Central Front. Simply put, Canadians have always believed that taking the fight to the enemy is always preferable to fighting on Canadian territory. One need only call to mind the devastation visited upon Europe during World War II to understand the irrefutable logic of that approach. In today's 'war on terror', this tradition is continued in the form of Canada's presence in the Arabian Sea, in Afghanistan and in other failed or failing states around the world.

The CF conduct international operations to also help manage conflicts and restore order. Peace-building missions not only decrease the amount of human suffering taking place, they also prevent armed violence from escalating or spreading to neighbouring countries. While violence in Ethiopia and Eritrea may not have posed a direct threat to Canadians, CF personnel operated as part of the UN's Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) to help end a long and costly war there. In doing so, the CF improved the lives of citizens on both sides of the conflict, helped re-establish the rule of law, reduced the amount of instability in an area of global strategic importance, and perhaps prevented these countries from harbouring illegal arms merchants and serving as home bases for Al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups.

Canada is a charter member of NATO, an alliance founded on the principle of collective defence under which countries with shared values and interests pledge to cooperate in the face of aggression. Canada is also a founding member of the UN, an organization whose goal is to maintain peace and security internationally. Membership in these and other multilateral organizations requires that the CF work with other countries and make meaningful contributions to building and maintaining peace and security. In these endeavours, Canada has a proud tradition and enjoys an enviable reputation.

### **Immediate Action is Required**

Over the past number of years, diminishing resources and an increasing domestic and international operational tempo have brought the CF to the breaking point. In many cases, equipment is old and replacements are either not planned for or are years away. But that is only part of the story, as armed forces greatly depend on having an adequate number of motivated, dedicated and well-trained personnel in their ranks. It is therefore extremely important to note, here, that the acknowledged most serious problem facing the CF is the shortfall in trained personnel. Characterized by an imbalance between the young and relatively inexperienced on the one hand, and the older and more experienced on the other, this shortfall cannot quickly be overcome. Overseas deployments, coupled with training duties at home, take their toll on

professional and family life. If the tempo of operational demands on the CF over the past 10 years continues, and all indications point to that being the case, then what we see today in Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Arabian Sea, and Haiti will likely become the template for future Canadian international military operations.

Three ingredients are needed to rectify this dire situation. The first is resources, the availability of which very much depends on the second - political commitment. What must be understood, however, is that even if sufficient quantities of both of these ingredients are in place, a third ingredient, time, will be the most critical. The current crisis within the CF will take decades to resolve. Let us examine the nature of these three essential ingredients in detail.

## **Resources**

The CF, both Regular and Reserve components, need more personnel, better equipment, and adequate, stable funding in order to adequately fulfil the complete range of their responsibilities.

- **Personnel.** The CF need more personnel to perform the myriad missions and tasks they are currently assigned. Helping to put out fires in British Columbia, developing a vital Chemical, Radiological, Biological and Nuclear (CRBN) response capability, and hunting down international terrorists, are highly labour intensive tasks. In addition to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women who carry out these and other 'front line' duties, there are scores of other military planners, trainers, maintainers, cooks, logistics professionals, technicians, and medical specialists (to name but a few) who work 'behind the scenes' in support of those on the 'front line'.. It must also be realized that for every person employed on a mission, another is getting ready to replace that person, while another has just returned from that mission and is undertaking a new round of training and development in preparation for the next mission. This means that when a force of 500 is assigned to a mission lasting a year or longer, for example, the total number of military personnel required to deliver on that promise is close to 2000.

Over the last few years, a shortage of trained military personnel has resulted in some members of the CF doing 'double' or even 'triple' duty on foreign missions. For those assigned to these additional deployments, this also means lost opportunity for advanced training, or additional time away from home or family life. Institutional burn-out, a lower-than-optimal level of performance across the organisation, and an increase in the stress and strain on personnel, equipment and the organization are the result.

The current approximate strength of the CF (some 60,000) will therefore need to be increased to approximately 75,000 in order to meet current and projected domestic and international commitments.

- **Equipment.** The sailors, soldiers and air-men and women of the CF are this country's most valuable military resource. They must therefore be equipped to do their jobs well, and in the safest way possible. Unsafe or inadequate equipment endangers lives and requires inordinate amounts of maintenance. If spare parts are unavailable, frustration and lower force readiness result. The procurement, introduction, maintenance and eventual replacement of equipment therefore need to be well planned and executed.

To provide for any less is irresponsible and wasteful.

- **Adequate and Stable Funding.** Efficient and responsible planning of any sort requires a stable and predictable flow of funding. Requiring that the CF work on credit (often performing unforecasted and unfunded tasks out of existing budgets) leads to unhealthy practices, the most pernicious of which is 'capital raiding' – literally, stealing from the 'future' to pay for 'present' contingencies.

Adequate and stable funding is essential to the CF's ability to carry out efficient and responsible planning.

### **Political Commitment.**

The visit of Prime Minister Martin to National Defence Headquarters in November 2003, the publication, in April 2004 of a National Security Policy (to which Foreign and Defence policy reviews will be added by the end of the year), and the Prime Minister's recent and personal announcement, from CFB Bagotown, of funding for a number of military capital acquisition projects, are all very encouraging signs pointing to serious political commitment to the redressing of the ills that plague the CF. The Defence policy review, it is hoped, will spell the beginning of the end of the downward spiral in CF capabilities and the putting off, to another day, of critical decisions. If this process is to succeed, however, political commitment must come with adequate and stable funding.

### **Time.**

The implementation of solutions to the many problems facing the CF will take time. In extreme cases, we cannot expect the resolution of current shortcomings to be in place for a generation. In many other cases, it will take a decade to see real progress. It is therefore critical that action be taken without delay. While a defence policy review needs to be undertaken, there is no requirement for this to include a lengthy pre-consultation process. Ample information is available, from the Senate, from the Auditor-General, from concerned interest groups such as the CDA, from academia (the recent collaborative CDA Institute/Queen's University study entitled *Canada without Armed Forces?* is just such an example), and from the CF leadership. Public involvement (essential to policy credibility and saleability) can be fostered

through judicious and timely television broadcasting of decision-making meetings, such as was done in Britain in their recent landmark Strategic Defence Review.

### **A Defence Policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Way Ahead**

DND's defence policy review must include, as significant outputs, plans for the resolution of two closely related but significantly different issues: the **rebuilding** of the 'present' force; and the **transformation** of the 'present' force into the 'future' force.

Regarding the **rebuilding** of the 'present' force:

- Personnel and training shortfalls must be eliminated through additional recruiting, and through the reduction/cancellation, for a time, of some international commitments (this latter action resulting in an increase in the size of the pool of available qualified instructors);
- capital procurement shortcomings must be rectified through off-the-shelf procurement of equipment that has already been field-tested; and
- funding for these actions must be adequate and stable.

In order for the CF to continue to be a viable and potent force for Canada, their future must be secured. This calls for a process of **transformation** that can be achieved through:

- Longer term investments in research and development, equipment procurement and reorganisation;
- the exploration of new ideas about potential threats;
- the development of new technologies for information gathering and exploitation; and
- the development of new ways of getting the most 'bang for our buck'.

These measures will ensure that the 'future' force is developed in a systematic and effective fashion.

**It must be emphasize, however, that transformation cannot be expected to succeed unless the process begins from a solid base consisting of an adequately rebuilt 'present' force, and unless adequate and stable funding is provided.**

### **What is Needed: Canada's Military Capability Requirements**

The CF must reliably perform the many tasks assigned to them. Since these tasks span the spectrum from the domestic to the international; from aiding the civil authorities to rebuilding war-torn countries; and from deterring aggression to defeating terrorists, the range of capabilities required is vast. A Canadian defence policy must, therefore, ensure that the following capabilities are developed and maintained within both the 'present' and the 'future' forces:

- **Combat capable forces.** The CF are unique among Canada's security agencies in that they alone are charged with the application of deadly force at home and abroad. During what are often euphemistically called 'peacekeeping' missions, the CF must be able to rapidly, decisively, and precisely apply military power to deter or defeat opponents. Combat capable forces must be able to move, shoot, communicate and protect themselves on the battlefield, whether at sea, on land, or in the air. There can be no equivocation here: military forces must be trained and equipped to apply lethal force, if necessary, in the execution of their missions. To think otherwise, or worse still, to organize a force otherwise, is pure folly and potentially and irresponsibly costly in military lives.
- **Flexible and adaptable forces.** In addition to being combat capable, the CF must be able to perform a host of other missions, from defence diplomacy ('showing the flag') to conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance. Canadian foreign policy, Canadian tradition and Canadian public opinion demand nothing less. CF personnel must receive the education and training that allows them to understand and react to the kinds of complex emergencies with which they are faced. Adopting a one-dimensional 'war fighting only' approach is as dangerous as creating a non-combat capable force. 'Peacekeeping' is now better termed 'peace-building', a term that truly reflects the spectrum of operations that now range from active combat through to peace enforcement and humanitarian support. Peace-building is a vital aspect of Canadian international policy, one that is not well understood within the Canadian Government or by the Canadian public, but that the CF must carry out to the highest possible standard.

Currently, the Reserve component of the CF is under-manned, under-resourced, and under-utilized. Given appropriate roles, training, and equipment, these forces can make valuable contributions to the defence and security of Canada and, as they have already done over a number of years, significantly and effectively augment a number of Regular Force combat and support units on national and international deployments.

- **Deployable and sustainable forces.** Our forces must be capable of quick and efficient deployment. Once they are in position, they must be supplied, serviced, and redeployed with equal speed and efficiency. Deployment plans that provide for less can only be characterized as inadequate. Deployability must be made a defence priority, and plans need to be developed for the creation of a robust and reliable long-haul (international) and in-theatre transportation system - most probably made up of a combination of owned, leased, and commercial elements. Whatever the solution, it must be '*up to the job*' whenever our troops are '*on the job*'.
- **Self-sufficient and interoperable forces.** The CF must be capable of operating independently, in some cases, and with military forces from a range of other countries, in others. Extensive efforts, over the years, within NATO and other alliances, have provided the CF with a wealth of experience in achieving equipment and operational interoperability. The 'present' and 'future' CF must strive for the highest possible and affordable level of interoperability possible with traditional and

potential allies, all the while ensuring that a basic minimum level of ability to operate independently is also achieved and maintained.

### **Common Continent, Common Security: Good Forces Make Good Neighbours**

The most important defence relationship for Canada is that which we share with the United States. In international missions, we often find ourselves working together: During Operation Enduring Freedom, Canadian soldiers formed part of the larger American deployment in Afghanistan. Canadian naval vessels have the unique ability to integrate with, and are trusted to perform vital command and control functions within American aircraft carrier battle groups. Our air force pilots and logisticians train and operate together with their American colleagues in transport, helicopter, and fighter squadrons. Beyond international cooperation, though, our two countries are even more fundamentally linked. We share responsibility for the defence of North America, a large and in many ways vulnerable territory.

Our shared values – liberal democratic society, individual freedom and the rule of law - and our common need for trade and immigration mean that we rely on the free flow of goods and people into the continent. Equally, the preservation of both the Canadian and American ways of life depend on the ability of both countries to control and defend access to our territory. Historically, this has led to cooperation; one of the most tangible forms of which is cooperation is the North American Aerospace Defence treaty (NORAD) where Canadians and Americans work side by side to monitor and respond to airborne threats to North America. NORAD was tested, and proved itself up to the challenge, on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, taking control of all air traffic over the continent, efficiently and effectively. As a sign of the seamless cooperation between our two countries' defences, it is instructive to note that the senior officers in charge of both NORAD, in Colorado Springs, and Continental Air Defence, in Florida, that day, were Canadian. Into the future, continental defence will take on other forms, and Canada will need to decide how best to react. Whether a decision is made to create a maritime or terrestrial equivalent to NORAD, or participate in a Ballistic Missile Defence system, Canada will face challenging choices in terms of integrating its security with our American neighbours. The CF need to keep up to date with these developments, and pending a political decision from the Canadian Government, be ready to work side by side with the United States Forces on a number of initiatives. Continental defence is not an option for Canada. If we do not contribute to it, the Americans will take responsibility for it themselves, leaving us in the dark in terms of decisions that affect the safety, the security and the sovereignty of Canadians.

### **Conclusion: Specific Recommendations**

The task ahead, for DND and the CF, is daunting, but not impossible. The stakes are high, and extend to the very core of the Federal Government's responsibilities. Canadian security relies on the proper functioning of a 'security chain' that includes, as one of its key components, a robust military. The International Security Policy review, to be completed this autumn, and into which the Minister of National Defence will be inserting his own Defence policy review, will indicate to us what, among other security needs, Canadians will expect their Armed Forces to satisfy.

Following from the ideas raised above, here is a list of recommendations that should be factored into the development of Canada's new defence policy. The defence policy review should:

- concentrate on the gathering crisis of the 'future' force and its serious consequences for Canadian security, foreign policy, and Canada-United States relations;
- ensure the CF remain integrated into the national security plan for Canada, linking the international with the domestic aspects of securing Canadians, all the while avoiding the tendency to compartmentalize national security and thereby weakening the "security chain";
- provide advice to the government on how Canada is to manage domestic security and foreign policy with ever-decreasing military capabilities, and recommend ways in which capabilities of the 'present' force might be preserved until replacements come on line;
- increase the authorized strength of the CF to 75000, in order to accommodate the challenges facing the 'present' and 'future' forces;
- initiate a fundamental examination of CF personnel policies to bring them into line with predicted operational realities;
- identify high-priority capabilities and ensure that capital investments are made to rebuild them;
- consider the implications and feasibility of further continental defence integration, including the development of a national sea, land, and air surveillance system and participation in a missile defence program;
- examine the roles, training standards and equipment holdings of the Reserve Forces, with a view to assigning them a meaningful role in domestic security and ensuring their capability to support the Regular Force in its missions abroad;
- develop and implement a defence policy that builds a CF that is well armed, organized and supported to function in areas in which violence will occur, regardless of the reasons for deployment (i.e.: peacekeeping or war fighting); and
- develop, for implementation upon completion of this defence policy review, a long-term funding plan for the revitalization of the CF. This may include a re-examination of how the government funds its defence policy and how the Department of National Defence manages that money within the rules that are set out by government.

A Prime Minister who delivers this kind of defence policy will be helping to guarantee the safety and security of Canadians, as well as protecting Canadian values and promoting Canadian interests, at home and abroad. Success in this difficult but necessary enterprise will depend on the depth of commitment and the quality of leadership of our elected representatives, and on the willingness of all Canadians to accept their individual responsibilities.

## **Who Else to Contact for More Information**

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