

General Rick Hillier Has Led the Way

Resource Challenges of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force

Destroyers, Frigates, Canadian
Naval Needs: Interpreting the Canada
First Defence Strategy

CF-18 replacement

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COVER PHOTO: Former Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier salutes from a tank during a change of command ceremony in Ottawa July 2, 2008 PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: L'ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense, le Général Rick Hillier, salue du haut d'un char d'assaut pendant une cérémonie de changement de commandement, à Ottawa, le 2 juillet 2008.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

ON TRACK, now in its thirteenth year, has become more widely read with each succeeding edition. We attribute *ON TRACK*'s increasing readership to the excellent quality of the material that is provided by members of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and by academics and researchers who are the acknowledged experts in their respective fields.

The intent of *ON TRACK* is to provide a medium of informed and *non-partisan* debate on defence and security matters of importance to the interests of Canada. We will continue to publish credible, informed research as well as opinion which we believe will provide Canadians with insight to the concerns of the defence community. The articles that are published express the views of the authors – and may not necessarily coincide with those of the CDA Institute.

This autumn edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of Canadian Naval needs, common issues facing the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, the military budget, the CF 18 replacement, NATO, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, amphibious forces requirements, North Korea, the Caucasus, and book reviews.

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Terry Thompson writes, in '*General Rick Hillier Has Led the Way*', that in every generation, an individual emerges who will make a difference and leave a legacy for others to follow and historians to ponder. He notes that Canada did not have a Churchill or a Mackenzie-King to lead this country's military out of its decade of darkness but we had a strong top general who knew the difference between politics and soldiering. Terry Thompson is a retired air force officer.

In the same vein, readers will be pleased to learn that General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier has been selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2008. General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier is being recognized for his immense contribution to Canada's defence and security as Chief of the Defence Staff and as an outstanding leader who constantly reminded Canadians of the importance and contribution of the Canadian Forces, its members, and their families. The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, has graciously accepted the invitation of the



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

ON TRACK, qui en est déjà à sa treizième année, a élargi son cercle de lecteurs à chaque nouvelle parution. Nous attribuons ce succès à l'excellente qualité des textes qui nous sont fournis par les membres de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense (Institut de la CAD) et par des universitaires et de chercheurs qui sont les experts reconnus dans leur domaine respectif.

Le but de *ON TRACK* est de d'offrir un support de débat éclairé et *impartial* sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui ont leur importance pour les intérêts du Canada. Nous allons continuer à publier des recherches crédibles et éclairées, ainsi que des opinions qui, d'après nous, donneront aux Canadiens une bonne idée des préoccupations des milieux de la défense. Les articles qui sont publiés expriment les points de vue des auteurs – et peuvent ne pas nécessairement coïncider avec ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

Ce numéro d'automne de *ON TRACK* présente des articles d'intérêt actuel dans les domaines suivants : les besoins du Canada en matière de marine, les enjeux communs auxquels font face la Marine, l'Armée et la Force aérienne, le budget militaire, le remplacement des CF 18, l'OTAN, l'ancien chef de l'état-major de la Défense, les besoins d'une force amphibie, la Corée du Nord, le Caucase et un compte rendu de livres.

Dans son article « *General Rick Hillier Has Led the Way* », le Lieutenant-colonel (ret.) Terry Thompson écrit que, à chaque génération émerge un individu qui fera une différence et qui laissera un héritage que suivront les autres et sur lequel les historiens réfléchiront. Il note que le Canada n'a pas eu un Churchill ou un Mackenzie King pour conduire les militaires de ce pays hors de leur décennie d'obscurité, mais que nous avons eu un général chef qui connaissait la différence entre la politique et la vie de soldat. Terry Thompson est un officier retraité de la force aérienne.

Dans la même ordre d'idée, nos lecteurs seront heureux d'apprendre que le Général (ret.) Rick Hillier a été choisi comme récipiendaire du prix Vimy pour 2008. Le Général (ret.) Rick Hillier est ainsi reconnu pour son immense contribution à la défense et à la sécurité du Canada en tant que chef de l'état-major de la Défense et en tant qu'un leader exceptionnel qui a constamment rappelé aux Canadiens l'importance et la contribution des Forces canadiennes, de ceux qui en font partie et de leurs familles. La très honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en

CDA Institute to present the Award to General (Ret'd) Hillier on 14 November, at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum.

Canadians may be surprised to realize how much is going on in the NATO Alliance, especially that Afghanistan is but one activity amongst a myriad of global engagements that has raised NATO's profile on the world stage. General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault writes, in *'NATO re-identified and better prepared for new challenges'*, that there is an opportunity for our nation to broaden its view of NATO and take advantage of this dynamic Alliance. General (Ret'd) Henault is a former Chief of the Defence Staff, past Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, and a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Recent developments in the Caucasus could bring us to re-focus on Georgia's and Ukraine's application for admission to NATO. Frederic Labarre, in *'The Derailment of Western Security Policy in the Caucasus'*, argues that the West has miscalculated Russia's motivations and capabilities with regards to the recent crisis between Russia and Georgia. Mr. Labarre is Head of the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George MacDonald, a former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, reports on the challenges faced by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in *'Resource Challenges of the Army, Navy, and Air Force'*. He notes that the challenges are similar for all three Services and corroborate the need for attention across the entire Canadian Forces. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) MacDonald addresses some of the key issues to allow us to gain a perspective into their depth.

In August, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence released its report, titled *"Four Generals and an Admiral: the View from the top"*. The Senate study examined the government's *Canada First Defence Strategy* long-term budget for defence. In its report the Senate made a number of references to comments by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, the CDA Institute's Senior Defence Analyst. See <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Finance/CFDS%202008%20Budget%20-%20CDA.pdf> for commentary on the subject. In *'Reservations about the Canada First Defence Strategy Budget'*, Colonel (Ret'd) MacDonald provides us with a risk analysis of the long-term planning values that went into the *Canada First Defence Strategy* long-term budget.

The Conservative Government confirmed that

chef du Canada, a gracieusement accepté l'invitation de l'Institut de la CAD de présenter le prix au Général (ret.) Hillier, le 14 novembre prochain, lors d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Les Canadiens peuvent être surpris de réaliser tout ce qui se passe dans l'Alliance de l'OTAN, particulièrement que l'Afghanistan n'est qu'une activité parmi une myriade d'engagements à l'échelle mondiale qui ont relevé le profil de l'OTAN sur la scène mondiale. Le Général (ret.) Raymond Henault, dans *« NATO re-identified and better prepared for new challenges »*, affirme qu'il existe une opportunité pour notre pays d'élargir sa vision de l'OTAN et de profiter de cette dynamique Alliance. Le Général (ret.) Henault est un ancien chef de l'état-major de la Défense, président sortant du Comité militaire de l'OTAN, et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Les développements récents dans les Caucases pourraient nous amener à refocaliser sur la demande de la Géorgie et de l'Ukraine d'être admises comme membres de l'OTAN. Frédéric Labarre, dans *« The Derailment of Western Security Policy in the Caucasus »*, fait valoir que l'Ouest a mal calculé les motivations et les capacités de la Russie en ce qui a trait à la crise récente entre la Russie et la Géorgie. M. Labarre est chef du département d'études politiques et stratégiques au Collège de la Défense de la Baltique, à Tartu (Estonie).

Le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) George MacDonald, ancien vice-chef de l'état-major de la Défense, fait rapport sur les défis auxquels font face l'Armée, la Marine et la Force aérienne, dans son article *« Resource Challenges of the Army, Navy, and Air Force »*. Il note que les défis sont les mêmes pour les trois services et il corrobore le besoin d'attention à travers l'ensemble des Forces canadiennes. Le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) MacDonald traite de quelques-uns des principaux enjeux pour nous permettre d'approfondir la compréhension que nous en avons.

Au mois d'août, le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a publié son rapport intitulé *« Quatre généraux et un amiral : La situation vue d'en haut »*. L'étude du Sénat a examiné le budget de défense à long terme de la stratégie de défense *« Le Canada d'abord »*. Dans son rapport, le Sénat a fait un référence à des commentaires du Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald, analyste principal de la Défense de l'Institut de la CAD (<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Finance/CFDS%202008%20Budget%20-%20CDA.pdf>). Dans l'article *« Reservations about the Canada First Defence Strategy Budget »*, le Colonel (ret.) MacDonald nous donne une analyse de risque des valeurs de planification à long terme qui ont servi dans le budget à long terme de la stratégie de défense *« Le Canada d'abord »*.

Le gouvernement Conservateur a confirmé

the CF-18 aircraft will be replaced by a next-generation fighter. General (Ret'd) Paul Manson and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George MacDonald point out, in *'The Next-Generation Fighter for Canada'*, that the term 'fighter aircraft' is a misnomer based on historical usage, and go on to outline some of the major considerations that should be assessed in consideration of the purchase of the next-generation aircraft. General (Ret'd) Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff and is a member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.

Senators Hugh Segal and Colin Kenny, along with Dr. Jack Granatstein, have all recently stated that Canada requires a fleet size in the order of 60 major surface combatants. Captain (N) (Ret'd) Ian Parker writes, in *'Destroyers, Frigates, Canadian Naval Needs: Interpreting the Canada First Defence Strategy'*, that we should look at the overall requirement and how best to replace existing classes to meet that requirement. Captain (N) (Ret'd) Parker, following his naval service in the Canadian Forces, is a keen observer of Canada's defence and security environment.

In *'Where's the 'Big Honking Ship?'*, a long-time contributor to *ON TRACK*, Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice, notes that nowhere in *Canada First Defence Strategy* is there any hint of plans for the construction of amphibious warships. In his commentary he provides an analysis of the requirement for an amphibious capability for Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command. Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice served in the Canadian Army and the Canadian Forces.

27 July, 2008, marked the 55th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that brought an end to combat on the Korean Peninsula. The politico-military situation on the Korean Peninsula is such that pragmatic realism must trump any moralistic desire to see the collapse of the North Korean regime and the unification of the Peninsula. Thomas Adams writes, in *'Be Careful What you Wish For: A Divided, Militarized Korean Peninsula Is a Good Thing'*, that we should remember the possible consequences that would follow the collapse of the North Korean regime and the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Jack Granatstein has provided us a review of *Soldiers Made Me look Good: A Life in the Shadow of War*, Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie's latest book. In his review Jack examines a few of the chapters of the book, including the one in which Major-General (Ret'd) MacKenzie explores the very different ways in

que l'avion CF-18 sera remplacé par un chasseur de la prochaine génération. Le Général (ret.) Paul Manson et le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) George MacDonald font remarquer, dans « *The Next-Generation Fighter for Canada* », que le terme « avion de chasse (fighter aircraft) » est une erreur d'appellation basée sur l'usage historique, et ils continuent en soulignant quelques-unes des considérations majeures qui devraient être évaluées en considération de l'achat d'avions de la prochaine génération. Le Général (ret.) Manson est un ancien chef de l'état-major de la Défense et il est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Les Sénateurs Hugh Segal et Colin Kenny, à l'instar de Jack Granatstein, ont tous deux récemment déclaré que le Canada a besoin d'une flotte dont la taille serait de l'ordre de 60 bâtiments majeurs de combat de surface. Le Capitaine (M) (ret.) Ian Parker écrit, dans « *Destroyers, Frigates, Canadian Naval Needs: Interpreting the Canada First Defence Strategy* », que nous devrions regarder le besoin d'ensemble et chercher quelle est la meilleure façon de remplacer les classes existantes pour répondre à ces besoins. Le Capitaine (M) (ret.) Parker, suite à son service dans les Forces navales canadiennes, est un observateur assidu de l'environnement de défense et de sécurité du Canada.

Dans son article intitulé « *Where's the 'Big Honking Ship?'* », un collaborateur de longue date de *ON TRACK*, le Colonel (ret.) Gary Rice, note qu'à aucun endroit de la Stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord » il n'y a d'indication de plans pour la construction de vaisseaux de guerre amphibies. Dans son commentaire, il donne une analyse du besoin de capacité amphibie pour le Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada. Le Colonel (ret.) Gary Rice a servi dans l'Armée canadienne et les Forces canadiennes.

Le 27 juillet 2008 marquait le 55^e anniversaire de la signature de l'armistice qui mettait fin aux combats dans la péninsule coréenne. La situation politico-militaire de la péninsule coréenne est telle que le réalisme pragmatique doit l'emporter sur tout désir moral de voir l'effondrement du régime de la Corée du Nord et la réunification de la péninsule. Thomas Adams écrit, dans son article « *Be Careful What you Wish For: A Divided, Militarized Korean Peninsula Is a Good Thing* », que nous devrions nous rappeler les conséquences possibles qui suivraient l'effondrement du régime nord-coréen et l'unification de la péninsule coréenne.

Jack Granatstein nous offre une lecture de « *Soldiers Made Me look Good: A Life in the Shadow of War* », le dernier livre du Major-Général (ret.) Lewis MacKenzie. Dans son compte rendu, Jack examine quelques chapitres du livre, dont celui dans lequel l'auteur explore les façons très différentes de fonctionner, de lui-

which both he and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Roméo Dallaire functioned as military leaders. Jack Granatstein is a member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors and is Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.

The summer of 2006 was a critical time for the Canadian and international mission in Afghanistan. *National Post* reporter Chris Wattie's first book, *Contact Charlie*, is a compelling narrative that offers up a vivid picture of the conduct of Canada's soldiers fighting the Taliban during that period. We are pleased that Arnav Manchanda, the CDA Institute's Project Officer, has provided us with a review of Mr. Wattie's book. In his review Mr. Manchanda outlines some of the highlights of the events that that the author has included in his narrative.

Earlier this year the CDA Institute released Vimy Paper 3, 'Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security', a study that provides a stimulating and useful foundation for the development of a coherent and timely national defence strategy vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific region (http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Papers/vimypaper2008.pdf). In this issue of *ON TRACK* Richard Desjardins provides us with a review of the book, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, by Xiaobing Li. In his review Mr. Desjardins notes that Professor Li has provided readers an understanding of the Chinese military's relation to contemporary Chinese society as well as the prospects for success in the military's current stage of reform. Mr. Desjardins is a civil servant with the Canada Border Services Agency.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA-CDAI has been and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence interests, such as the Vimy Award Dinner (as mentioned earlier), as well as the annual Graduate Student Symposium, the annual seminar, and numerous round table discussions.

The CDAI will be hosting its 11th annual graduate student symposium on 31 October and 1 November at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, in collaboration with Queen's University's Defence Management Studies Programme and Breakout Educational Network, and the War Studies Programme at Royal Military College of Canada, and with financial assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Senator Hugh Segal, Mr. David Scott, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, General Dynamics Canada, the DND-funded SDF programme. The

même et du Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Roméo Dallaire, comme leaders militaires. Jack Granatstein est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD et agrégé supérieur de recherche au Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

L'été 2006 a été une période critique pour la mission canadienne et internationale en Afghanistan. Le premier livre de Chris Wattie, reporter au *National Post*, intitulé « *Contact Charlie* », est un compte rendu irrésistible qui brosse un tableau saisissant de la conduite des soldats canadiens dans leur combat contre les Taliban pendant cette période. Nous remercions Arnav Manchanda, l'agent de projets de l'Institut de la CAD, de nous avoir donné un compte rendu du livre de M. Wattie. Dans son article, M. Manchanda souligne quelques-uns des points saillants des événements que M. Wattie a couverts dans son livre.

Plus tôt cette année, l'Institut de la CAD a publié le troisième Cahier Vimy, sous le titre de « *Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security* », une étude qui offre une fondation stimulante et utile pour le développement d'une stratégie nationale de défense cohérente et opportune vis-à-vis la région de l'Asie-Pacifique. (http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Papers/vimypaper2008.pdf). Dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*, Richard Desjardins nous donne un compte rendu du livre « *A History of the Modern Chinese Army* », de Xiaobing Li. Dans son compte rendu, M. Desjardins note que le Professeur Li a permis aux lecteurs de comprendre la relation de la force militaire chinoise avec la société chinoise contemporaine, ainsi que les prospects pour le succès dans l'étape actuelle de réforme du système militaire. M. Desjardins est un fonctionnaire de l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, la CAD-ICAD a participé et participera à diverses initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité et de défense, comme le dîner du Prix Vimy (tel que mentionné ci-dessus), ainsi que du Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, le séminaire annuel en février et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

L'ICAD tiendra son 11^e symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés le 31 octobre et le 1^{er} novembre, au Collège militaire royal du Canada, à Kingston, en collaboration avec le programme d'études en gestion de la défense de l'Université Queen's, ainsi que Breakout Educational Network, et le programme d'Études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada, et avec l'aide financier de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord, le Sénateur Hugh Segal, M. David Scott, le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, General Dynamics Canada, le FSD (Forum sur la sécurité et la défense) que

symposium will highlight the work of graduate students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally, and cash prizes will be awarded for the top three papers presented. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen links between civilian and military educational institutions and to promote the work of graduate students. Keynote speakers will be Senator Hugh Segal and Mr. Mel Cappe, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy. Anyone with an interest in defence, national and international issues is welcome to attend.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the CF, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available on line at <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>.

Thank you. ©

finacent MDN. Le symposium soulignera le travail des étudiants diplômés d'universités civiles et militaires de partout au Canada et au niveau international, et des prix en argent seront remis aux trois communications gagnantes présentées. Le but visé du symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires et de promouvoir le travail d'étudiants diplômés. Les conférenciers invités seront le Sénateur Hugh Segal et M. Mel Cappe, président de l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques. Tous ceux qui s'intéressent à la défense et aux questions nationales et internationales sont invités à participer.

Au cours de la dernière année, le gouvernement fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à une telle initiative, il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés sur les enjeux majeurs des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et des pénuries continues dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins à long terme de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Mais l'Institut de la CAD va continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, ce qui nous permet de réaliser notre mission. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous inviterais à le devenir et à recruter un/e ami/e. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut se les procurer en ligne à l'adresse <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>.

Merci. ©

General Rick Hillier Has Led the Way

by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Terry Thompson

It has been said since the beginning of time that the generals always plan for the last war. The statement conjures up the vision of a teetering old soldier, gin in hand, expounding on how wars are or should be fought.

In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. Yes, soldiers, sailors and airmen, whether they are young or old, do study past wars. It is not only part of their early training but it becomes endemic to their military culture to examine the successes and failures of their predecessors. Those who do not study the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them.

Politicians, when playing their partisan cards and expounding from their superficial knowledge of military sciences, take delight in accusing the generals of planning for past wars. But this is only part of the story. No matter how well a plan of military action has been developed or how successfully it has been executed, there is always room for improvement.

New weapons systems are tried, improved and modified as each new conflict or threat of conflict unfolds. Of equal importance, these systems undergo continuous modification along with realignment of the doctrine and tactics to meet changing conditions in any given theatre of military operations. This process has been at the root of military science since the invention of the sword.

To the military mind, the statement that the military are always fighting the last war is a reflection of the ignorance of those who profess it. Some politicians seem to think that, upon being sworn into office, they have been bestowed with the qualifications to command the country's military and determine the orders of battle and the resources to support it. Over the past forty years this has become almost second nature in our political/military relationship.

Canada emerged victorious from the Second World War as one of the largest military powers among the allied forces. As a small nation of 12 million people we had earned an honourable position among our friends in the western world and had gained international respect far out of proportion to our population.

For a time we maintained a position of high regard among our friends and allies. Our forces remained strong as the Cold War loomed and we quickly modified

our strategies, tactics and supporting resources to meet the new threat. Strategic bombing and the threat of nuclear war forced the transition of our military capabilities to meet these new challenges. Through four decades under a nuclear umbrella, we continued to improve our weapons systems, both nuclear and conventional, as technology exploded into the space age.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was developed as a defence against a growing Soviet threat. New strategies were developed to meet that threat. The NATO model represented the first of its kind, a fully integrated multi-national mutual defence force. To this day its success cannot be questioned.

But somewhere along the way, Canada got it wrong. We emasculated our military through the integration of both civilian and military components in the Department of National Defence. The Canadian military has always considered itself subservient through Parliament to the government in power. The politicians formed the international policy and the military recommended the resource structure to support it. This simple division of responsibilities worked well during wartime. However during times of relative peace, the politician found it expedient to venture across the line between political diplomacy and military strategy.

While the military continued to inform the politician of the implications and cost of any given government programme involving the armed forces, the politician, unwilling to back down from some grand political or diplomatic strategy, found it much easier to cut the military programme costs in order to support sacred political initiatives. This left the military attempting to meet government demands with less than optimum resources.

The impact of departmental integration had an additional emasculating effect on the Canadian military. A fresh political focus on a newly emerging and misunderstood peacekeeping role became a debilitating encumbrance. Ignoring the fact that a peace had to be achieved before a peacekeeping force could be inserted only helped to accelerate the deterioration of Canada's military capability.

The failure of the politicians to heed the advice of the generals began in the mid-1960s. They felt they knew better than many of those in uniform who had been through at least one war and had a sound knowledge of how future wars might be fought. Unfortunately, general

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officers began to bow to their political masters and their faulty assessments of military strategies, and Canada's once viable political/military establishment began to wither. It became obvious to our allies who questioned both our political and military intentions. We had become an enigma among our friends and staunchest allies. Our armed forces faded from the public mind as politicians and bureaucrats took over the military and rendered it totally ineffective.

Canada's military became adept at dealing with this inconsistency over the years to some degree. Canada's men and women in uniform became known among NATO members as a military that could build silk purses out of sows' ears. The generals could brag about the resourcefulness of Canada's military personnel, and their achievements cannot be minimised. But (and it's a significant "but") the lack of up-to-date interoperable weapons systems would never stand the tests of the battle field.

One only has to examine the early phases of Canada's contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan to witness the sorry state of the Canadian Forces during the opening phases of the conflict. Neither the military nor the politicians were adequately prepared for an Afghanistan campaign. Importantly, both failed miserably to prepare the public for the raw images and bloodshed that were accurately predicted by military planners prior to deployment.

In 2003 the government in power, looking for some prestige with our allies and based on little more than its own political assessment of a geopolitical conflict, undertook to put a small ill-equipped force into a region over-run by terrorists. The first combat casualties took the country by surprise. Shock and awe suddenly assumed a new meaning as Canadians were exposed to international coverage of their battlefield casualties.

Images of Canadian soldiers dressed in dark green forest camouflage stood out like beacons on the desert battlefields of Afghanistan. What combat support equipment was available was either outdated or in short supply. Flag-draped caskets bringing soldiers home to their loved ones tore at the hearts of Canadians suddenly

finding themselves deeply involved in a shooting war for which they had not been prepared. Politicians were besieged by their constituents, and the generals nervously shuffled their resources in the vain attempt to do as they had become accustomed: simply to make do.

In every generation, an individual emerges who will make a difference, and leave a legacy for others to follow and historians to ponder. General Rick Hillier learned his lessons well as a young soldier, and like all young soldiers he studied past wars; but he studied them in relationship to modern weapons systems. As a senior officer, he was single-minded in his duties and as he assumed more responsible positions, he learned from his own mistakes and those of others. He studied the unique political culture of Ottawa and saw its strengths and its pitfalls.

In his progression, he became Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff with a clear vision of the line between political and military imperatives. He expected much from his troops and respected them in return. He showed a deep concern for the welfare of the members of the armed forces and their families. Probably more important than all of his achievements was the re-establishment of a military presence in military matters and the exclusion of the civilian in the development of military policies, plans and strategies.

To put it simply, General Hillier, based on his years of military experience at home and abroad, re-established a purely military command and control structure unencumbered by political or bureaucratic interference.

During times of crisis societies look to a leader with the clear vision to guide them safely out of harm's way. Canada did not have a Churchill or a Mackenzie King to lead them out of danger, but they had a strong top general who knew the difference between politics and soldiering.

We can only hope that the organisations, structures and new imperatives that General Hillier has brought back to the Canadian Forces will endure, and that the return to a strong military culture subservient only to a government elected by the people will continue to succeed without him. ©

NATO re-identified and better prepared for new challenges

by General (Ret'd) Ray Henault



In the closing weeks of my 40-year military career, capped by three years as the senior military advisor to the North Atlantic Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General, and four years as the Canadian Forces' Chief of the Defence Staff, I see an Alliance

that, similar to the Canadian Forces a few years prior, has embraced transformation, adjusted to an increasing operational tempo, and enhanced its ability to respond to new challenges.

While the changes that have taken place within NATO since the end of the Cold War have been dramatic, the past three years are considered by many as a defining period of change for an Alliance that continues to adapt to new challenges, even after nearly 60 years in the security business.

The biggest driver of this recent evolution has been operations, which have increased significantly in response to security concerns, to a point where there are more than 60,000 troops deployed, on three different continents – a 50% increase since 2005.

In addition to these operational demands, NATO has been focused on a transformational effort that is developing, managing and sustaining new capabilities and new methodologies, which in the past few years has included innovative strategic airlift solutions, enhanced common funding formulae and more flexible readiness forces.

The Alliance itself has grown significantly since its formation in 1949, from twelve original members to 26 Allies, as of 2004. It will grow to 28 in the coming year, with the addition of Albania and Croatia. Together with 23 Partnership for Peace nations, three of which were recently added in 2006, they currently represent a potent security forum of 50 like-minded nations in the Euro-

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Atlantic Partnership Council. Added to this are the seven Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) partner countries that were welcomed in a separate partnership in 2004, the four Gulf States, with which NATO has been cooperating since the 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and contact countries to include Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, which have been actively involved with NATO in dialogue, consultation and military-to-military cooperation since 2006.

I base these assessments on having had the great fortune of being able to visit many of the Alliance's operations, all 26 NATO nations, 14 Partner countries – including Japan, Australia, and those aspiring to join – plus our important partners Pakistan and Russia. This outreach function has provided the opportunity to meet with military and political leaders at the highest levels to exchange views, discuss issues of mutual importance, encourage continued or enhanced contribution in NATO operations and, importantly, talk about NATO's evolution with all their publics through national and international media.

As a large international organisation whose activities are based on the principle that all its members have an equal voice and equal vote, NATO can at times make for an easy target to criticize. It can sometimes take a long time to agree policy. Transformation is happening more slowly than we would like. There are force generation and capability shortfalls in Afghanistan and for other NATO operations and activities. Declarations of political commitment do not always directly equate to deployable, or deployed, military capabilities.

That is an often-told narrative. What is less often told or shown, and thus less well understood, is the story of how much NATO has changed, how it is adjusting to meet the security challenges of tomorrow.

Less than 20 years ago, NATO consisted of 16 members, counted none as partners, and had conducted no operations or exercises outside its member states' borders. It prepared for high-intensity defensive operations on European soil and relied on a well developed and in-place logistics and communications infrastructure to support it. The organisation was buttressed by literally thousands of bases and stations and an enormous quantity of materiel and personnel available on short notice to guard against direct military attack.

Today, NATO counts 26 members and 38 other countries in four Partnership arrangements. Two of these

countries, Albania and Croatia, are joining NATO and two others, Georgia and Ukraine, are engaged in intensified engagement, leading to their own membership.

Collectively, NATO has increased the deployability of its forces; significantly upgraded equipment; closed scores of bases; destroyed thousands of pieces of materiel; and shed hundreds of thousands of personnel – all simultaneously. In a few short years, NATO has conducted 8 operations on 4 continents. Many NATO allies also support military operations under the auspices of the United Nations, the European Union, or in coalitions.

That is a remarkable transformation record by any standard.

Still, NATO is not resting on its laurels. It is actively engaged in the debate about broader security issues, including what role NATO should play in energy security, cyber defence, enhanced maritime security, and how to work more closely with all actors involved in major operations. It is working hard to re-adjust and retool its mechanisms and processes to more effectively deal with the growth in the number and complexity of issues and initiatives, including pressure to find further savings in headquarters overheads and concurrently to be more deployable.

It does not seem that the pace of activity will lessen anytime soon. The upcoming Summits are going to be critical to the future orientation of the Alliance and its Partners, resulting in key political decisions on enlargement, enhancements to our military capabilities, and will shape how we conduct our operations.

On a more personal note, I have learned and take away many insights from my time as Chairman of the Military Committee, among which are:

- Consensus-based decision making is key to the work this Alliance does. Having all nations agree to a policy (or at least, have them agree not to say no!) can be time-consuming, and at times result in “lowest common denominator” language. Still, consensus is the very basis on which the small and moderately resourced have the same voice as the large and the relatively well resourced, and is the founding and enduring principle of an Alliance dedicated to all having equal rights and responsibilities.
- Communicating with our publics is an increasingly important undertaking for all who

serve the Alliance. At virtually every country visit, military and political leaders were joined in one message – that in a crowded information marketplace, the Alliance and its Partners need to increase their efforts to explain, tell and show the NATO story to all of our publics, and as well to our adversaries.

- The forum that NATO provides for discussion and dialogue of security and defence matters is unmatched. The unparalleled access and exposure to policies, programs, activities and undertakings of the various nations make for a tremendous forcing agent for change and driver of operational interoperability.

Finally, what does all this mean for Canada?

Having seen NATO emerge from this challenging period stronger and more sure of its identity, and having a good idea where this transformation will take the Alliance, I would suggest that Canadians may be surprised to realize how much is going on in this Alliance, especially the fact that Afghanistan, while important, is only one activity amongst a myriad of global engagements that have raised NATO’s profile on the world stage.

Given how well respected Canada is within the Alliance, I believe there is an opportunity for our nation to broaden its view of NATO and take advantage of this dynamic Alliance, by investing with more senior civilian and military representatives in Brussels and throughout the chain of command, who can ensure that Canada’s best interests continue to be understood and appreciated by its Allies and Partners. I further believe that the Conference of Defence Associations and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute can help broaden the debate on NATO, by highlighting not just the Afghanistan mission but the other equally important issues facing this Trans-Atlantic Alliance.

CDA and the CDA Institute are well placed to help Canadians better understand where our nation can help make a difference in the world, by enhancing their engagement with the Defence Department but also Foreign Affairs and Canadian International Development Agency, as well as other Government institutions, who all have a role to play in Canada’s security and future prosperity. I firmly believe that now, more than ever, NATO is good for Canada and Canada is good for NATO.

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The Derailment of Western Security Policy in the Caucasus

by Frederic Labarre

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration in the United States has been obsessed with terrorism, and has cultivated this obsession in its own population and in its allies to the point of launching two wars whose outcome, whether favourable or not, will not make an iota of difference to Western security. During that time, the leadership of the United States, and to some extent of a European Union that was too busy criticizing its stronger ally, have been unable to divert their attention from the respective follies of Islamic fundamentalism and the critique of American adventurism.

During that time, the government of Russia has been orchestrating conditions for authoritarian domestic rule by shutting down non-governmental organizations, expelling non-Russian interests from the strategic sectors of natural resources, defence and metals, and has carefully played to the nationalistic impulses of a people who have never seen better standards of living in their history.

I have argued before¹ that Russia was engaging in neo-mercantilist practices, shutting out foreign investment to reap the spoils of globalised trade. I have pointed out the alarming disdain of the major powers for the instruments of multilateral power at their disposal, namely those contained in the rules of procedure of international organizations of their own making and those contained in treaties and international law.

By not ratifying the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) of 1990, some Western powers, including the United States, have given the moral right to Russia to disengage from the Treaty, enabling it to move troops in quantity and quality which had hitherto been forbidden. This should have been clear when, in an apparent move to demonstrate goodwill, Russia withdrew troops from Georgia but – inexplicably at the time – transferred them to Armenia.²

When the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Russia countered that any attempt to develop anti-missile technology could be done in cooperation with Russian installations, and even offered the use of infrastructure (outdated, according to American sources). Instead, the United States has pursued the development of ABM technology and seeks to deploy

capabilities in Poland, if not Lithuania. That is not to say that America has the intention to specifically target Russian missiles, or that it is part of a greater plan to constrain Russia in that region.

Analysts of American policy and decision-making know that many factors weigh in such a decision, including the impossibility of navigating the Black Sea for American warships equipped with the materiel to bring down missiles from Iran. It must be remembered that much of the American ABM capability was developed around a network of Aegis cruisers. The Montreux Convention forbidding access to the Black Sea to non-littoral navies means that a land-based solution must be sought. Another reason may be the power of the Polish lobby in America, which has significant pull in the Midwest. Alternatively, there may have been greater industrial benefit to the United States in having a land-based system rather than a maritime one.

For Russia, international custom was violated when NATO launched airstrikes against Serbia in protection of Kosovo Albanians in 1999 without a United Nations mandate. Georgia now stands as a ‘reverse’ Kosovo. Russia is recognizing Kosovo in its own way by extending the same courtesy to South Ossetians – helping a small portion of territory escape central control.

Suggesting that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence would have no consequences is unreasonable judging by the conditions under which it gained independence. The unoriginal and unworkable solutions provided by the inept bargaining of Martti Ahtisaari were the last in a long list of tactical mistakes. By providing no solution, the Ahtisaari plan could only lead to a unilateral declaration that neither Russia nor Serbia could accept. No surprises then at the impossibility of reaching consensus at the UN Security Council this time around either.

We cannot ask Russia, a country jealous of its security and forever suspicious about Western intentions, to integrate all these facets into its analyses of Western policies. Much like us, they go by their recollection of history. Russia was repeatedly invaded from the West, and much like we remind ourselves of its forays in the Baltic States, Finland, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, both sides will tend to point at Georgia to prove to themselves that ‘old habits die hard,’ as President Saakashvili of Georgia said on CNN on August 9.

The enlargement of NATO in its 1990s rationale

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as a cooperative and stability-oriented outlook is not equivalent to a movement of troops. However, the presence of a non-combatant US warship at anchor for some months in Tallinn harbour in 2006, the creation of a NATO-sanctioned Centre of Excellence in Cyber Defence in Estonia and the air policing programme out of Siaulai, Lithuania, set to continue until 2018, run contrary to that impression.

The desire to extend the Alliance to Georgia and Ukraine is laudable in the sense that it is an attempt at propagating Western values. However, pragmatism is also a value, and there are limits to what the West can hope to achieve. We should not be surprised at Russia's reaction: throughout the Cold War, the strategy of containment was meant to prevent fragile regimes from toppling like dominoes into the Soviet camp; now, Russia is preventing its own domino effect.

Russia is making a significant move on the world chess board...

If Russia is now more comfortable with a realist, power-dependent outlook, the review of our policies in the last decade and a half has shown us why. Proselytising about democratic practices, human rights, and the rule of law will not be interpreted as such when Western practices point to evident influence in the affairs of third parties. This is true especially when certain practices, evidenced in the scandals of the Abu Ghraib prison, secret interrogation locations in Eastern Europe and false [misinformed? – *ed.*] premises for the invasion of Iraq, seem to show the ill-intentioned side of Western influence.

At the present moment Russia is making a significant move on the world chess board. This makes regional and domestic military reforms in Europe ill-advised. Georgia was invaded by some 6,000-10,000 personnel. Only the United States, its hands tied by Afghanistan and Iraq, can match the sort of equipment that Russia is sending into Georgia. Europe can only do so in unison, and with Russia as a prime supplier of oil and gas it is unlikely that Europe will find consensus on demonstrating the sort of muscular resolve needed. Yet, as the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has said,³ Europe must not waiver in its response if it is to maintain its credibility in the eyes of its newest members.

Since the early 1990s, when European countries started to cash in the 'peace dividend' of the post-Cold War era, military spending and force structure have steadily decreased to a level barely appropriate for low-intensity warfare, usually muscular peacekeeping missions in

faraway places, never nearer than the Balkans.

One NATO Summit after another has called for increases in lift capability and rapid reaction, and only in 2004 were these calls partially heeded. European governments have been lukewarm at the thought of increasing defence spending and developing new capabilities, and when they did, it was to foray into Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries do not represent a threat to the survival of any NATO, Partnership for Peace or EU member, whereas Russia is directly challenging the existence of a sovereign state.

The sequence of events shows Russia as the culprit, even if Georgia seems to have been provoked into retaliating to strikes from within South Ossetia.

The Russian incursion was planned long in advance, especially in the narrow confines of Caucasus valleys. First, the invasion coincided with the opening of the Beijing Olympics, and this is not an accident. Russia has an interest in keeping control of the information that comes out, and launching an invasion at the moment when all the cameras of the world would be pointed at China makes sense. Georgia, on the other hand, can only survive if it internationalises the dispute, something it had been unable to do until the weekend of August 8.

Second, the pristine condition of the armour that entered Georgia betrays the fact that it has probably rarely been used before, if at all. This means that they had been locked into a relatively distant arsenal some months prior, and that this equipment is not 'local', that is, it is not the equipment normally at the disposal of Russian peacekeepers that have been stationed between Georgia and its two breakaway provinces since the mid-1990s.⁴ Here the significance of Russia's non-extension of the CFE Treaty may be most acute.

Prospects for the Future

Georgia is not a member of NATO, but at no point in its history has the Alliance been closer to a large-scale conflagration outside of its area of operation. NATO could actually have to come to the aid of a non-member simply because those would-be members do not have the force structure to perform expeditionary missions, and barely enough to defend themselves.

John Mearsheimer predicted in a 1990 article that the post-Cold War era would turn out to be like the 1930s. With nationalism returning to the domestic stage as a key political motivator, it is difficult to disagree with the notion, even if the evidence of such a change was nearly 20 years in the making.

Speculating about how the crisis may unfold, Georgia will likely not keep South Ossetia, and it does not have an interest in doing so. The fact that it was taken

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away by Russia effectively gives an objective reason to the Georgian government to abandon that claim, and so to kill the issue domestically. Letting Russia have South Ossetia and Abkhazia also means that the political situation between Georgia and Russia will regularize itself after the test of arms.

With no further border disputes, the irony is that Georgia will be in a better position to become a member

of NATO. There may be the possibility of a deal between Russia and Georgia concerning participation in prized multilateral organization: Georgia could be made to give South Ossetia and to guarantee that it would not obstruct Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), of which Georgia is inexplicably a member, and in exchange Georgia could be allowed to join NATO. Or the reverse: Georgia would keep a Georgian-dominated

South Ossetia in exchange for WTO guarantees and the promise not to join NATO.

There are other interests to take into account. South Ossetia is a piece of territory that could be used for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Russia may have invaded to avoid losing control of the distribution to the South, and so this would be the first manifestation of aggressive mercantilism, of old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy. Georgia could be made to relinquish any interest or control over the flow of natural resources over its territory. The Russian aim here could be to avoid being served the same oil politics that they have dished out to Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus over the last few years.

There could also be an element of internal struggle in Russia at play. This event may have been triggered to demonstrate that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was much more present during the crisis, visiting the area and wounded personnel and refugees.

In a televised meeting with President Medvedev, who was not in control of the discussion, Putin gave a report that the situation in South Ossetia was akin to genocide and recommended continued military action. President Medvedev was deafening by his silence and revealing in his assent.

Vladimir Putin may be setting himself up as the

legitimate leader in Russia, creating a new form of national leadership based on custom, similar to what can be seen in certain Commonwealth countries: the legislative making suggestions to the executive with no expectation that the solution will be turned down.

If Putin is using Georgia the way he has used Chechnya to develop his personal power, his actions, including public displays of compassion, will resonate deep within the Russian psyche. This would contrast him against Medvedev, who remained away from – and was evidently asked to do so – the fighting so that the Prime Minister could take centre stage.

What this demonstrates is a Russian grasp of the national tools of diplomacy and coercive power at the domestic and external level. In contrast, Western diplomacy and military power, whether it be at the EU or US/NATO level, is momentarily weak, due to the lack of credibility and the exhaustion generated by seven years of pointless conflict in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Even the Euro-Atlantic community's best intentions are turning against it, as the Kosovo impasse is providing a form of precedent on which Russia can act with impunity.

Finally, the neglect of institutions, including that of international law, has convinced a resurgent Russia that the future lies in self-help and not in functional or multilateral cooperation.

(Endnotes)

- 1 See: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2007/LABARREFrederic.pdf>
- 2 Vladimir Socor, "Agreements signed on Russian military withdrawal from Georgia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, April 4, 2006, accessed August 11 2008. http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370944
- 3 Televised interview with the BBC, August 9th 2008.
- 4 For support of this assertion, see Chris Donnelly, *Red Banner* (London: Brassey's, 1989). ©

Resource Challenges of the Army, Navy and Air Force

by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald

The business plans of the Chiefs of the Land, Maritime and Air Staffs became available earlier this year, creating quite a flurry in the media with their reporting on the related impact statements. These statements are important, but we should not attribute too much to them.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald was Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff from 2001 to 2004. He is the Honourary National President of the Air Force Association of Canada.

It is important to keep in mind the process that generates the business plans. Each of the Environmental Chiefs of Staff has their assigned missions and tasks, along with projected resources. They assess what they need, reallocate where necessary, prioritize, assign risk, etc. to come up with strategic assessments and impact statements of their ability to do what is expected of them for the next few years, but most importantly for the coming year.

While they have to be innovative and disciplined

in employing their resources, the business planning process presents an opportunity to solicit more resources – and each of them traditionally does so. The media, in focusing on the business plans themselves and at one point in time, can only report on one side of any issue. That is, they do not know what has been done to address the resource demand and supply challenges.

Additionally, with the concentration on the stark quantitative aspects of each business plan, the more profound underlying realities of the persistent challenges facing all three environments can miss the principal attention they merit. These challenges, which are generally longer term, are uncannily similar for all three commanders and corroborate the need for attention across the entire Canadian Forces. Some key ones are addressed here to gain a perspective into their depth and importance to future military operational capability. Of note, the procurement of major capital equipment is not normally addressed in business plans and is, therefore, not discussed here as a specific business planning challenge. Having said this, business plans must deal with the issues related to the introduction and support of new weapons systems.

Personnel

The army has been most identified with a need for more people. Even with additional authorized positions, the number of actual trained and effective Regular land force personnel has remained almost static. This is due to continued high attrition, the siphoning off of personnel to staff the new headquarters structure, and the lack of aggressive retention incentives.¹ Compounding the problem is the need to conduct basic training for a large number of recruits, ongoing training to maintain readiness of existing units, and specific pre-deployment training for expeditionary missions, notably Afghanistan. And when personnel are deploying to places like Kandahar, one simply cannot compromise the quality of their training – the necessary time, money and equipment must be provided.

The air force and navy have similar, but more incipient, issues with personnel. While they are deploying relatively large numbers on international missions, they are generally not exposed to the level of ‘operational intensity’ inherent in operating on the ground ‘outside the fence’.

The air force faces chronic shortages, precipitated in large part by the dramatic reductions of the 1990s and aggravated by the demands of transformation and operational tempo. The cohort of trained air technicians, which constitutes 40% of the air force population, is aging

and the dramatically-skewed demographic distribution will present challenges for years to come.² This is all compounded by the need to adapt to evolving technologies to support new equipment and the highly-skilled nature of the work.

Like the air force, the navy is challenged to fill skilled positions in a number of stressed occupations. The Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS) identifies a significant ‘rust-out’ gap that exists between the number of positions to be filled and the trained effective strength of the navy.³ The navy will be redoubling its efforts to sustain these critical operational positions by seeking improvements to recruiting, training and retention, to include a review of the balance of Reserve and Regular force components. Navy requirements are also compounded by an increasing demand for experienced project management personnel to address the long term concurrent recapitalization of major weapon systems.

Although each environment has its unique issues, the overall challenge to find, train and keep the right personnel is huge, and will never be totally resolved if the necessary resources are not applied to proven remedies. These challenges will dominate force generation efforts for all three environments for years to come.

Sustainment Funding

In addition to the maintenance and sustainment funding allocated to each of the Environmental Chiefs, centrally-managed national procurement funding provides support to military capabilities in the form of spares, repair, overhaul and professional services. While this spending is managed by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, each of the three Chiefs has an operational input into how the funding is allocated. Sustainment funding has traditionally always been under pressure and has often been difficult to manage effectively due to an incremental allocation process which decreases the predictability of funding availability.

The Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) reports the diversion of significant sustainment funds to higher operationally-critical priorities and a seemingly never-ending need for additional resources. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), who is heavily dependent on National Procurement (NP) support due to the vast amount of aircraft repair and overhaul which is contracted out to industry, indicates a deficiency of over 20% at the beginning of the fiscal year. The operational impact of this kind of shortfall is significant, and ultimately forces a reduction in the flying rate, especially for the more costly fleets. CMS concerns in this area relate to the funds provided for personnel to work in the Fleet Maintenance Facilities,

but also to the consequences of NP funding limitations, similar to that of the air force. The ultimate result is a decrease in the readiness and availability of the fleet.

It is usually difficult to determine the precise impact of sustainment funding shortfalls, because there is often a work-around or a means to reallocate resources to the higher priorities to meet the immediate need. However in the longer term, the insidious nature of such shortfalls has caused serious deficiencies in areas such as operational readiness, surge capacity, and responsiveness to unforeseen requirements. Moreover, continued inadequacies in this area precipitate inefficiencies in support functions and the continuance of some systems long after their economical and effective operational life has expired.

Operational Readiness

The Environmental Chiefs of Staff have all repeatedly identified areas where they are unable to properly fund the necessary training and operational activities to maintain their mandated capabilities.

The Environmental Chiefs of Staff have all repeatedly identified areas where they are unable to properly fund the necessary training and operational activities to maintain their mandated capabilities. As force generators, they must be able to provide the necessary opportunities for quality training, exercise and evaluation if they are to fulfill their responsibilities in support of force employment activities.

For the army, the burden of training individuals and units to participate in Afghanistan has been significant. Training times have been extended to properly educate personnel on force protection issues, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations. This is compounded somewhat by the heavy reliance on Reserve forces to augment deployed units. The air force, not surprisingly, is acutely affected by rising fuel costs. Without relief, this forces a reduction in flying hours, which reduces readiness, training and capability to conduct operations – and the significant fixed overhead costs must still be borne. Stable funding to address price fluctuations is essential for the planning and conduct of operations. The navy’s situation is similar, where the investment in capital equipment, maintenance, and personnel is relatively fixed, leaving no other option than to reduce sea-days, aggravated by increasing costs for fuel, when unexpected

shortfalls arise.

Infrastructure

Perhaps the easiest area not to spend money is on infrastructure. As long as health and safety issues can be satisfied, ways can be found to defer major repair or replacement of buildings, utilities and special facilities. Unfortunately, this has been a *modus operandi* in the Department of National Defence for far too long. The only relief in this area has been a trend to downsize and consolidate infrastructure over the past fifteen years, but even that has created resource demands.

Now, all environments face acute problems in replacing crumbling, operationally-essential structures and providing the necessary maintenance funds for the rest. The estimated demand, not to mention new requirements, is daunting. CLS estimates a \$2.2B recapitalization backlog.⁴ CAS identifies a shortage of \$32M in the current year just to make ends meet and cites continued rationalization,⁵ along with a dependence on major equipment projects to provide appropriate funding, as the way ahead to manage the problem. For his part, CMS also identifies a shortfall in funding for realty maintenance.

In sum, all three Environmental Chiefs continue to divert resources from infrastructure to meet essential operational requirements. Interestingly, the three commanders also identified shortcomings in the process, level of staffing and authorities for implementing infrastructure projects. It would appear that there is considerable room for improvement in facilitating the application of resources to where they are most needed.

Future Relief

Regarding personnel, the Government has committed to a gradual increase to 70,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves by 2028. This is important to address some of the quantitative personnel shortfalls, but will not, in itself, alleviate the shortage of specific skill sets and specialists, which will persist as a major challenge for years to come.

In recognition of the challenges which affect readiness, the Government in its recent Canada First Defence Strategy has identified “[a]pproximately \$140M/year in new spending on spare parts, maintenance and training.”⁶ Acknowledging the importance of this shortfall, the Strategy addresses it specifically as a pillar for future investment. Indeed, infrastructure is also one of the pillars – and is singled out for some 8% of overall defence spending, with an increase of \$100M annually for rebuilding and maintenance.⁷

Overall, this support is positive, but can only be effectively realized if more urgent operational needs can be properly funded. When tough decisions have to be made to employ limited resources, it is difficult to support refurbishing or replacing a building, or to fill the spares bins, if it could compromise the ability to provide troops

in harm's way with essential equipment. The good news is that the problems and issues seem to be recognized. Some can be wholly or partially addressed with additional funds. Almost all will, however, remain as challenges to manage effectively under a continuing environment of limited resources.

(Endnotes)

- 1 Chief of the Land Staff, *Chief of Land Staff Strategic Issues – Land Force Command Level 1 Business Plan 2008*. 10 January 2008, p.3.
- 2 Chief of the Air Staff, *CAS Strategic Assessment*, 20 November 2007, p. 4-5.
- 3 Chief of the Maritime Staff, *MARCOM Strategic Assessment*, 5 December 2007, p.5.
- 4 Chief of the Land Staff, *Strategic Operations and Resource Plan 2008*, Draft 1, 7 June 07, p.3.
- 5 Chief of the Air Staff, *CAS Strategic Assessment*, 20 November 2007, p. 8-9.
- 6 Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 19 June 08, p. 12.
- 7 Ibid. ©

Reservations about the *Canada First Defence Strategy* Budget

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald



Two very recent studies have taken a look at the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) long-term budget. Both have expressed reservations as to whether the funding will be adequate to support the strategy. The first was the CDA's recent Commentary, "The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) of 2008 and the 20 Year Defence Budget," which appeared on July 28, 2008.¹ The second was the report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, titled "Four Generals and an Admiral: the View from the top," which appeared on August 6, 2008.²

Key Components of the CFDS 20-Year Budget

The CDA Commentary observed that the CFDS provided an interesting and helpful innovation in the inclusion of a twenty-year "new long-term funding framework" for the Department of National Defence, a feature which was not characteristic of previous White

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Papers and Policy Statements.

Three things stood out in that "long term funding framework." The **first** was the promise of an annual "Real Growth" in the defence budget of 0.6% from a FY2008-9 baseline of "approximately \$18 billion." The **second** was the promise that any operational deployments, such as that to Afghanistan, would be funded separately from the baseline defence budget. The **third** was the impact on the capital budget of the adoption of Accrual Accounting and Budgeting.

The "Real Growth" Promise

Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced at the CDA Institute's annual seminar on February 21, 2008 that the annual automatic increase to the defence budget to compensate partially for the "loss of purchasing power" would be increased from 1.5% to 2%, starting with FY2011/12.

The CFDS repeated the promise, but the charts and tables provided led to a bit of confusion with respect to the 2% figure. Chart 2 of the CFDS, "Defence Average Growth," covered three periods: the first was the 20-year period from FY1986/87 to FY2005/06, the second was the two-year period from FY2006/07 to FY 2007/08 (the defence programme re-set' years), and the third was the 20-year period from FY2008/09 to 2027/28.

It provided a column showing a "Nominal

Growth” (which includes both a Real Growth component and an Inflation component) and a Real Growth column. It did not provide an Inflation column; however, it is easy to calculate one, as has been done in the following table:

Period	Nominal Growth	Inflation	Real Growth
FY1986/8 to FY2005/6	2.2%	2.6%	-0.4%
FY2006/7 to FY2007/8	10.8%	2.3%	8.5%
FY2008/9 to FY2027/28	2.7%	2.1%	0.6%

It appears that the 2.0% increase is really a 2.1% inflation increase, which, when coupled with a 0.6% Real Growth increase, produces a Nominal Growth (Real Growth plus Inflation) increase of 2.7% annually over the twenty-year timeframe of the CFDS.

Whether the CFDS estimate of future inflation rates of 2.1% annually will be correct is a vital question, since the assumed rate for the future 20-year period is a smaller figure than that experienced in the previous 20-year (2.6%) or 2-year (2.3%) periods.

Both the Senate and the CDA papers have expressed concerns about whether the inflation forecasts are robust enough to guarantee the real growth in the defence budget that the CFDS promises.

The Senate Committee asked the CDA to provide an analysis of the potential for the CFDS budget projections to miss their targets by forecasting the CFDS budget, an analysis which is reflected in Appendix A of the Senate Report. The Senate Committee then asked the Economics Division of the Library of Parliament to review the the CDA report’s methodology. The Economics Division of the Library of Parliament subsequently responded as follows:

“The Parliamentary Information and Research Service was asked to review the assumptions underlying the calculation of the defence spending to GDP ratio presented by Col. (Ret.) Brian MacDonald of the Conference of Defence Associations.

The proposed calculations depend on expectations about the future trend of two variables: Canadian defence spending and GDP. The defence spending figure

for fiscal year 2009-2010 comes from the *Department of National Defence: 2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities*. Funding figures from 2010-2011 onwards are based on increasing the 2009-2010 figure by the spending growth committed to in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* . . .

. . . Long-run estimates of GDP growth are more difficult to predict than short-run estimates. For this reason, the calculations consider three long-run growth rate scenarios: low (3.1% per year nominal growth), medium (4.1% per year nominal growth), and high (5.1% year nominal growth) for GDP growth from 2010 to 2027 . . .

The assumptions underlying these calculations are one out of many sets of possible reasonable assumptions . . .”

The Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP

A statistic that appears frequently in the discussion of defence budgets is that of military spending as a percentage of GDP (ME/GDP). It is a useful concept as a means of providing comparative analysis, either between countries, or within a single country when comparing defence spending in different years. Its value in cross-country comparisons is that it is independent of movements in exchange rates, and its utility in within-country time series comparisons is that it allows for nominal GDP growth rates to be accommodated.

In preparing Appendix A of the Senate paper the CDA used inflation projections from the Conference Board of Canada. The CDA Commentary had access to slightly more recent figures based on The Bank of Canada *Monetary Policy Report Update* of July 15, 2008. The differences between the two sources are not particularly significant.

The following table from the CDA Commentary provides three different scenarios in which Nominal growth in GDP of 3.1%, 4.1%, and 5.1% (which corresponds to the CFDS projection of 2.1% inflation, plus real GDP growth of 1%, 2%, or 3%) and shows the ME/GDP prediction for each scenario.

Year	ME/GDP at 3.1% GDP Growth	ME/GDP at 4.1% GDP Growth	ME/GDP at 5.1% GDP Growth
2009	1.19%	1.19%	1.19%
2011	1.18%	1.16%	1.14%
2013	1.18%	1.13%	1.09%
2015	1.17%	1.10%	1.04%
2017	1.16%	1.07%	0.99%
2019	1.15%	1.04%	0.95%
2021	1.14%	1.01%	0.90%
2023	1.13%	0.99%	0.86%
2025	1.12%	0.96%	0.82%
2027	1.11%	0.94%	0.79%

Implications of the Forecast

The CDA Commentary observed that it is hard to avoid concluding that CFDS, welcome as it is, has come too late to solve the severe operational risk associated with continuing to employ platforms which, in some cases, will still be operating at twice their accrual lifespans when they are finally replaced. Moreover, the apparent advantages inherent in the move to Accrual Budgeting still rests on the willingness of future governments to provide the actual ‘Cash’ payments necessary to purchase major equipments. Additionally, the level of ‘Procurement Risk’ in being able to ensure timely delivery with respect to major projects remains high. Finally, the degree of ‘inflation protection’ remains problematic since the assumption that the Consumer Price Indicator can be reliably used to project the rate of defence inflation is questionable.

The Senate Committee was more blunt:

“Again, we come back to funding. The problem is that the ‘guaranteed’ increase in the DND budget will in fact be a decrease in any year that defence price inflation exceeds 1.5 percent (until

2011), and 2 percent thereafter. It is inconceivable that inflation on defence costs will come in under 2 percent over the next decade. This means that the ‘guaranteed *increases*’ will almost surely be ‘guaranteed *decreases*.’

Why isn’t 2 percent enough? For a start, the Canadian Forces should be playing catch-up. Long years of underfunding by previous Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments, and now the current Government, calls for a surge in funding, not a diminution. With only the lowest-common-denominator funding required for *replacing* current equipment and personnel, there is nothing left for the growth and revitalization of the Canadian Forces that Canada needs and that this Government promised during the last election campaign. With this kind of minimalist funding, the Canadian military will remain over-stretched, with only enough capacity to sustain 1,000 troops on the battlefield in a single location, and no more. That equates to the same kind of overstretching of our military that Canadians have had to endure for more than two decades.”

The CDA Commentary was more cautiously optimistic, concluding that:

“As the old adage goes, ‘The proof of the pudding lies in the eating,’ and the defence community will remain closely engaged in watching how *CFDS 2008* will eventually evolve, particularly after the next election.

The caveats and cautions expressed in this paper are real enough, but at least there is hope that we have made the initial steps in avoiding the ‘Canada Without Armed Forces?’ [2004] crisis that we had previously warned against.”³

(Endnotes)

- 1 See: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Finance/CFDS%202008%20Budget%20-%20CDA.pdf>
- 2 See: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep11aug08-e.htm>
- 3 See: <http://mqup.mcgill.ca/book.php?bookid=1734> ©

The Next-Generation Fighter for Canada

by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald

Canada's fleet of CF-18 Hornet aircraft has been around now for more than a quarter-century, and our front line fighter will be operating for another nine to twelve years, by which time its operating cost and operational efficiency will have dropped to unacceptable levels. In its recently published *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS), the Conservative Government confirmed what has been widely expected, that the CF-18 will be replaced by a next-generation fighter aircraft beginning during the period 2017 to 2020.

In anticipation of this major procurement, detailed planning is already underway in National Defence Headquarters. The project will have to move quickly if there is to be no break in the continuity of fighter operations and a consequent loss of critical air and ground skills. In recent decades Canada has had some bad experiences in the timely completion of major defence acquisitions, with ten years or more not uncommon, as a 2006 CDA Institute study showed.¹

Inevitably, there will be controversy; this is also part of the Canadian tradition. If past experience is any guide (and it usually is) some will criticize the choice of aircraft, the program cost, fleet size, industrial regional benefits, and even the basic need. In regard to this last, there is a common misunderstanding out there about the very name 'fighter aircraft,' which in fact is a misnomer based on historical usage.

Both the CF-18 and its eventual successor go far beyond the traditional understanding of what fighters are for. Today's 'fighters' are designed to do much more than shoot down enemy aircraft. For example, they are also precision bombers. Modern combat aircraft are therefore extremely effective ground attack weapon systems, both

1 Vimy Paper 1: *Creating an Acquisition Model that Delivers*. Conference of Defence Associations Institute, April 2006.

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Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald is a former fighter pilot.

in direct support of armies in the field and in what is called interdiction (isolation of the battlefield through destruction of the enemy's transportation and communications facilities). They are also excellent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, given their long range, high speed and relative invulnerability. In the Canadian context, as the CF-18 has demonstrated throughout its service life, the modern fighter-type aircraft is also a major instrument of sovereignty assertion, especially in the relatively unpopulated northern regions.

All of these modern capabilities can be summarized in a single concept, namely 'multi-role flexibility.' Back in 1980, the CF-18 was chosen largely on the basis of its remarkable ability in this respect, and subsequent experience over the years has demonstrated the wisdom of the multi-role approach.

The world has changed greatly since 1980, yet the CF-18 has adapted extremely well to the new strategic order. Note, for example, how well our Hornet squadrons performed in combat in both the First Gulf War and in the Balkans.

If there is anything certain about the post-2017 era, it is the inevitability of change in the operational challenges facing the Canadian Forces, here at home, in the defence of North America, and in overseas operations. The old saw about the military always preparing to fight the last war is no longer valid.

Today's war happens to be in Afghanistan, and this conflict understandably dominates the current tactical scene. To be sure, the struggle with militant Islam, of which Afghanistan is one element, will likely be around for decades, but it will inevitably take on new forms which are difficult to predict at this juncture. The answer to this and other future challenges, from Canada's strategic perspective, is flexibility across a broad range of military capabilities, of which modern combat aircraft will be an essential component.

All of this will surely be taken into account by NDHQ and ultimately by the government in the quest for a successor to the CF-18. But there are also other important aspects calling for careful judgments as the program proceeds. Here are some of the more critical.

Cost

Too often in the past, the cost of a new weapon system was looked at almost exclusively in terms of the

**THE RECIPIENT
OF
THE VIMY AWARD**

General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier has been unanimously selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2008. The award will be presented on Friday, 14 November, at a gala dinner in the LeBreton Gallery of the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa.

The Vimy Award will be presented to General (Ret'd) Hillier in recognition of his immense contribution to Canada's defence and security as Chief of the Defence Staff and as an outstanding leader who constantly reminded Canadians of the importance and contribution of the Canadian Forces, its members, and their families.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.

**LE RÉCIPIENDAIRE DE
LA DISTINCTION
HONORIFIQUE VIMY**

Le Général (ret.) Rick Hillier a été choisi à l'unanimité comme récipiendaire du Prix Vimy 2008. Le prix lui sera remis le vendredi 14 novembre, à l'occasion d'un dîner de gala qui se tiendra dans la Galerie LeBreton du Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa.

Le Prix Vimy sera présenté au Général (ret.) Hillier en reconnaissance de son immense contribution à la défense et à la sécurité du Canada alors qu'il était le chef de l'état-major de la Défense et en tant qu'un leader exceptionnel qui a constamment rappelé aux Canadiens l'importance et la contribution des Forces canadiennes, de leurs membres et leurs familles.

Le Prix Vimy a été inauguré en 1991 par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD) pour reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.



Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or téléphone (613) 236 9903.

acquisition itself, with little consideration given to the lifetime costs, which can often be two or more times the purchase price. Additionally, a consideration of the value of the capability being acquired, including growth potential, should figure predominantly in the decision process. Overall, careful analysis must be made of the initial investment, the capability which can be achieved over the life of the aircraft, and the long term support costs.

Contenders

There are several possible contenders under production in western countries. The Swedish Gripen, the French Rafael, the European consortium Typhoon,

the US Super Hornet and the US Joint Strike Fighter (F-35 Lightning) are advanced fighters that might be considered by Canada. Factors such as operational performance, interoperability with our allies, support system effectiveness, system growth potential, safety, structural life and – of course – life cycle cost would be some of the more important criteria.

Fleet Size

Back in the 1950s Canada had about 750 operational fighter aircraft, but the number has consistently diminished since then. By 1980, the number of CF-18s purchased (138 aircraft) was significantly fewer than the total of the three fleets it replaced.

After the CF-18 modernization program currently underway there will be 79 aircraft available for operational service. Looking ahead, the CFDS indicated an intent to purchase 65 next generation fighter aircraft. This drastic reduction in total fleet size over the years has to be seen from the perspective that modern combat aircraft are dramatically more capable than the first generation jets we flew in the early post-war years, and this increase in capability is reflected in much higher acquisition and support costs. In any case, detailed analysis of fleet size will need to take into account capabilities of new fighter technologies, the increasing sophistication of unmanned air vehicles and space-based surveillance, and the considerable size of Canada's sovereign airspace.

Whether for domestic or international operations, there will always be a need for the flexibility to provide enough aircraft to deploy to dispersed sites, to carry out diverse missions, prosecute multiple targets, and other operational factors.

In-Service Support

Increasingly, modern aircraft fleets are moving towards long term contractual arrangements with a single accountable agent, normally the aircraft manufacturer. It is likely that this practice will be adopted for the next generation fighter, for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency. A combination of contracted support and military servicing would exploit the best of both. The cost effectiveness of fleet support over what is expected to be a lengthy operational life will certainly be a most important decision criterion, given the significance of the expenditures that will be incurred in the long run.

Procurement Strategy

There is an obvious need for the Canadian taxpayer to obtain the best value for money in any major military purchase. Intuitively, the optimum way to accomplish this would appear to be through a tight competition with two or more contenders, as was the case with the CF-18 selection back in 1980. Given the possibility that more than one contender will appear to meet the requirements of Canada's new fighter program, there could well be a major competition, with a fairly lengthy bid process, evaluation and contract negotiation.

If for some reason (or set of reasons) it is determined that only one contender presents a viable option for Canada, the government would still be able

to negotiate an advantageous price for the aircraft, given the visibility it would have on sales to other customers. A 'sole-source' procurement of this kind, although usually subject to criticism, could present advantages in cost and a much shorter procurement phase.

Industrial and Regional Benefits

For good reasons, our government insists that Canadian industry benefit from large offshore military purchases. Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) have traditionally become an important element of such acquisitions, and the norm is to demand that 100% of the value of a contract be offset by work in Canada. Additionally, vendors are required to provide specified proportions of this value in work directly related to the fleet being acquired, to advanced technology work, to smaller companies, and to geographical regions of the country. Although this fundamental approach will likely be adopted in the fighter replacement project, there could be variations based upon the specific circumstances presented by competing options.

Whatever the final requirement, the inclusion of reasonable industrial benefits will be a major component of the program and these should be of substantial value to Canadian industry and the defence industrial base.

... The Way Ahead

Now that the government has confirmed the requirement to replace the CF-18 with a next generation fighter, there is a need to move briskly.

Although the CF-18 will continue to serve Canada well for some years yet, the time has come to consider in detail the options available for its successor. The complexity of the procurement process and the long lead time required to bring the new fleet into operational service suggest that a selection decision by the government will have to be made within the next two years or so. It is not too soon, therefore, to detail the performance requirements, assess the alternatives, and to move quickly with the project, thereby ensuring that an appropriate future capability is in place when the CF-18 is retired from service.

The timely introduction of Canada's new fighter fleet will be a critical element in maintaining our sovereignty, participating in North American defence, and acting in support of our national interests within the international community. ©

Destroyers, Frigates, Canadian Naval Needs: Interpreting the *Canada First Defence Strategy*

by Captain (N) (Ret'd) Ian Parker

Author's note - This article will not address the government's recent decision to cancel the JSS project. Although both JSS and the destroyer/frigate replacement are part of the government's defence strategy, this article addresses strategic need, whereas the JSS cancellation is seen as a tactical decision.

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* has raised as many questions as it has answered. Acquiring three destroyers as the start of a common class to eventually replace the current fleet of frigates naturally begs the questions of, why two classes of ships and why three? Inevitably, related questions such as cost and the nature of the program also arise.

These questions are not as simple as they might seem. First, we need to stop using the terms 'destroyers' and 'frigates,' terms that are based on fleet functions which long ago passed into history. The size (displacement) of ship types has changed – at one point a light, 6-inch gun, cruiser, by treaty and definition, displaced 10,000 tons. Destroyers displaced 2,500 tons. Today, the US Navy (USN) ARLEIGH BURKE class displaces 9,200 tons, the Royal Navy (RN) DARING class displaces 8,100 tons, and the conceptual USN ZUMWALT class will displace around 15,000 tons. Even between the current Canadian IROQUOIS (destroyer) and HALIFAX (frigate) classes there is marginal difference in displacement (both around 5,000 tons).

Thus, although class designations occur, they are less important than the mission and the capability of the ship. Indeed, in some cases frigates are more capable than destroyers. For Canada, we should be looking at a multi-purpose capability and what the fleet size needs to be before we designate a class. We have two classes now because we had destroyers, with specific capabilities, before the frigates.

For the future fleet, we should look at the overall requirement and how best to replace existing classes to

meet that requirement. To maximize efficiency we should be looking at a single class of major surface combatants that will replace both our destroyers and frigates. This is what the Navy calls the 'Canadian Surface Combatant,' or CSC. It started life as the 'Single Class Surface Combatant' (SCSC), but over time and with massaging within NDHQ it re-emerged as the CSC.

The CSC is intended to develop a single class of multi-purpose ships to maximize production efficiencies, training, support, life cycle costs, infrastructure, flexibility and capability.

Capability differences can be introduced in 'flights' or 'batches' of, ideally, 4-6 ships. The size of the CSC will be dictated by the fitted systems as well as the intended areas of operation.

In practical terms, the CSC should be expected to displace between 6,500-8,500 tons. Some critics reflexively will say that this is too large. But it must be remembered that class growth has occurred in all countries as the nature of requirements has changed. Also, long experience in the sub-arctic open-ocean Canadian operating environment dictates that larger size equates to better efficiency; we have come a long way since the corvette.

Having addressed displacement we now turn to numbers. Three ships makes no sense. It is used because, at the moment, we have three of the original four IROQUOIS class in service. HURON was paid-off due to NDHQ politics. Therefore, the purely artificial number three is neither a valid nor meaningful requirement. LEADMARK, the Navy's strategic document, states:

“Operational research consistently has demonstrated that the minimum number of warships needed to provide appropriate coverage and reaction in the Canadian areas of responsibility is 24 frigate or destroyer-type vessels. These numbers were presented to and approved by Cabinet in the course of the decision to build the Canadian Patrol Frigate (see “Maritime Surface Ship Requirements,” Privy Council Office, Cab 545-77RD, 22 December 1977). Most recently, they were confirmed in Massel et al, “The Canadian Maritime Forces 2015

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Study, Phase II: Analysis of Maritime Force Structure Alternatives Using the FleetSim Model” (Ottawa: NDHQ ORD Report R9903, July 1999). Interestingly, the number has remained consistent over time, despite the increasing capabilities of modern warships, primarily because the type and scope of challenges also has increased over time.”

While this information may be seen as dated, it remains true as a minimum requirement. Consequently, rather than looking at a one-for-one replacement, there should be a focus on the real requirement. Indeed, Senators Hugh Segal and Colin Kenny, along with historian Jack Granatstein, have all recently stated that Canada requires a fleet size of in the order of 60 major surface combatants.

Thus, although the CFDS discusses 15 major surface combatants, this should be looked at as a departure point and not an end point.

A build program of 15 CSCs will generate considerable lifetime savings in production, training, support and infrastructure, thus maximizing operational capability.

It is a known fact that a longer production line generates savings and reduces production time. The Canadian Patrol Frigate project is a good example – costs and time to build were reduced throughout the project.

The first three ships were the most expensive, but with experience they were delivered quicker and cheaper. If the production number had been greater than 12 the final costs proportionately would have been significantly less; this also has been borne out in the very successful ARLEIGH BURKE class, coupled with the planned injection of technology upgrades between ‘flights’ or ‘batches.’ In a perfect world we should thus aim to build more of a class rather than fewer.

...there is a need to develop multi-purpose ships where not only is the capability requirement important, but so is the operating environment.

Two other points need to be addressed: design and where to build.

First, design. All nations design ships for specific missions and operating environments. An example is the ZUMWALT class. It is designed to operate with nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) in littoral operations and the high seas. But for those missions the USN is also deploying the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the CG(X) future cruiser. Consequently, when looking at the

ZUMWALT you must also consider the capabilities inherent in the CVN, the CG(X) and the LCS, otherwise you will compare apples and oranges. The same goes for the RN DARING class which is designed for operations with the UK carrier.

Regrettably Canada does not seem to have the luxury of a carrier or cruisers or indeed an LCS. Thus there is a need to develop multi-purpose ships where not only is the capability requirement important, but so is the operating environment.

For the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) anti-air warfare (AAW) Destroyer project, they initiated a competition to select an existing hull design to insert their preferred weapons suite (more on that acquisition decision below). The operating environments are different – the RAN is a sub-tropical Pacific and littoral navy, whereas the Canadian Navy operates as an Atlantic, a Pacific and an Arctic navy in both blue and littoral waters. Thus the ship designs selected by the RAN were from nations that mainly operate in the Mediterranean (essentially a littoral sea), which compared to the Atlantic is benign.

Our ships need to be able to operate in all ocean and littoral areas, as that is where the government sends them.

Finally, other than the current ANZAC frigate, the RAN has never designed and built a major surface ship. It has always acquired warships and warship designs offshore, whereas Canada (with the exception of submarines) has, since WWII, purpose-designed and built warships to meet our demanding operating environment. Only the USN is faced with the same operating environment as the Canadian Navy. Thus, North American warships tend to have ‘longer legs’ (endurance), better sea-keeping, greater sustainment, and are more broadly deployable than other navies’ individual platforms.

Although buying a design offshore seems at first cheaper, in the end the modifications needed to adapt to our operating environment makes it more expensive.

Second, where to build? Building offshore may seem, on the surface, to be cheap. But care must be taken when comparing costs for foreign built warships.

Most estimates by foreign builders look at ‘sail away’ costs, in comparison to the ‘life cycle’ costs which we tend to use; they are different. Additionally, most European yards are subsidized while ours’ are not. Thus, comparing foreign and domestic costs is comparing apples and oranges.

Although our Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) ships were found to be marginally more expensive than some foreign ships, our design had greater capability, more advanced systems, greater survivability and greater growth potential. Canada got more bang for the buck!

Furthermore, rather than employing foreign workers and transferring Canadian wealth out of the country the CPF project employed Canadian workers, kept Canadian wealth here, as well as developed world-class technology, such as the ICMS Integrated Machinery Control System by CAE (now L3 MAPPS) and the CCS Command and Control System by PARAMAX (now LMC), that other countries have emulated. On this note, a study on a program undertaken by the US between 2004 and 2008 similar in size to the Joint Support Ship has shown that, should Canada decide to build off-shore, we will lose at least \$750 million in wealth to our national economy (25 times any potential cost savings), we would not create at least 2,000 new domestic jobs, and we would eliminate \$250 million in earnings to Canadians. Canadian wealth and jobs would be transferred to foreign nations for no savings and less capable ships.

It is appropriate at this point to return to the specific example of the RAN AAW destroyer project, which some have suggested could be a candidate for the CSC program. Not to discount their selection (the Spanish F100), in the case of the CSC, the capability of the platform and how many are required will determine the overall cost of the program. The Australian numbers (AUS\$8B for three ships) simply converted to the CSC program is essentially AUS\$40B (\$8B/3x15) and would, at this point, be at best a wild guess. AUS\$8B converts to about Cdn\$7.4 making the simple conversion to the CSC program \$37B (\$7.4B/3x15). A three billion differential is quite significant! Moreover the dollar values are old numbers and do not take into account any increased cost of materials and systems. As the RAN is acquiring the combat suite by Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, the overall cost and the life cycle cost of the ship will be different, depending on how the RAN intends to manage this latter issue.

Thus before any comparison can be made, we need to find out exactly what is in the \$7.4B number and what is outside it. Additionally, it is crucial to note that the F100 only has an endurance of 5,000 nautical miles compared to the HALIFAX at 9,500nm. Recall the point above about differing types of navies and where they operate. This difference alone will dictate size and cost, and I do not believe our navy can reduce the endurance requirement given the oceans we need to cross to conduct operations. Where and how many also need to be factored in – in this respect recall also my point that the first three HALIFAX class were the most expensive; when using the RAN example, all three will be expensive, whereas a Canadian CSC build will be cheaper over the intended build program of at least 15.

Thus, ship acquisition and building cannot – nor should it be – a matter of comparison of apples and oranges.

In costing the CFDS, until the Navy determines what it is that they need, any number will be +/- 50%, which incidentally is how the CPF funding evolved. The CPF Project ran at about \$10.4B back in 1995; today, in today's dollars, to deliver the exact same ship would be about \$14.4B. But this does not take into account the increased cost of materials and the fact that the ship would be out of date.

Clearly, defining warship types and their build processes are complex issues, and should not be a matter of 'destroyers vs. frigates' and 'what is the cost of a ship?' To look at the issues in simple terms does a disservice to the navy and the country.

Designing, building and delivering a modern warship is probably the single most complex and demanding undertaking that a nation can embark upon.

The economic spin-off from designing, building and integrating complex warships exceeds all other industrial sectors when it comes to knowledge and technology industries.

As a trading nation, there is a direct linkage between the ability to build and maintain warships and national well-being. Why else would the US and the major European shipbuilding nations such as Britain, France, Holland, Germany and Italy continue to subsidize warship shipbuilding?

In the end, Senators Segal and Kenny and historian Jack Granatstein are correct: Canada requires a fleet renewal beyond what has been announced in the CFDS. Moreover, Canada needs to meet the expectations of the Prime Minister when he stated:

“Long term funding will provide good jobs and new opportunities for thousands, for tens of thousands of Canadians who work in defence industries and communities with military bases. We intend to implement the defence strategy in tandem with a revised long-term procurement strategy designed to not just benefit but to build commercial capacity in the relevant knowledge and technology industries.”

Re-building the fleet will achieve both objectives but only if government recognizes the importance of building warships in Canada and is willing to invest in Canada, not other nations. ©

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Where's the 'Big Honking Ship'?

by Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Harold Rice

22 August 2008. Preface – Like the absence of any mention of a “Big Honking” amphibious ship in its Canada First Defence Strategy the Conservative government’s late night decision to shut down construction of the navy’s long awaited Joint Support Ships (JSS) also smacks of wooden-headedness, the source of self deception. This aberrant mindset is a factor that all too frequently plays a remarkably large role in government. Typically, it consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contrary signs. It is also acting according to wishes while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts. Most significantly, wooden-headedness is also seen to be the refusal to benefit from experience.

Mr. Harper’s government’s puzzling decision effectively ignores the navy’s case supporting an urgent requirement to replace its two aging and obsolescent fleet supply ships. It also fails to take into account today’s geopolitical reality, and the divergent policies of some of our closest allies. Had it been otherwise, the Prime Minister would have come to the ineluctable conclusion that a forward maritime defence strategy underpinned by joint sea, land and air expeditionary forces is the optimal solution for Canada in such turbulent times. Such a strategy cannot be accomplished without a mix of fleet supply vessels and amphibious warships.

Canadians, and especially its men and women in uniform who today are representing them so proudly, and who selflessly devote themselves to ensuring their fellow citizens’ security, are surely worthy of much more than wooden-headed leadership.

Recently, *The Globe and Mail* reported that the Conservative government had revised its expectations of

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success in Afghanistan. Knowing that the situation on the ground is ever-changing and our military commitment in Kandahar is slated to end in 2011, such a policy shift may indeed prove to be a good one. What does not seem to tally, however, is the absence in Mr. Stephen Harper’s government’s Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) of any provision for the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) that would enable it to fully discharge its intended role through the acquisition of a capability to field a Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF). This omission is puzzling, considering that Conservative Party defence policy under Mr. Harper’s leadership had long recognized the need for strategic sea and air mobility of rapid reaction forces by heavy airlift and amphibious ships. The recent purchase of four C-17 Globemaster III aircraft adequately addresses the former, but the latter requirement remains unsatisfied.

If correct, the reduction of CEFCOM’s mission capability is a most worrisome turn of events, given that in 2005 the intention was to increase the deployability of the Canadian Forces (CF) to trouble spots around the world through the creation of the SCTF.

Without sea-lift amphibious carriers for the delivery of combat and logistic support of our ground forces in security and humanitarian missions, CEFCOM will remain a hollow command, unable to field rapid response and contingency task forces.

It is noteworthy that in a speech delivered at the April 29, 2008 Navy Summit, Honourary Navy Captain and Senator Hugh D. Segal boldly advocated for the addition of an entirely new and global maritime capability in the form of amphibious ships, and said, “we need to be able to have it in more than one theatre at a time.” Later, the esteemed military historian Dr. Jack Granatstein wrote and expanded upon Senator Segal’s suggestion: “Our sailors must be able to transport and support Canadian troops operating overseas, sometimes perhaps on a hostile shore. The presently planned three Joint Support Ships [JSS] can’t do this; four might be able to manage, but six would be better, along with what General Rick Hillier called ‘a big honking ship’ that could transport four to six helicopters and a battalion-sized expeditionary force. Such ships can also do humanitarian work – in tsunami-hit Indonesia, for example – that we can scarcely tackle today.”

Similar viewpoints addressing the need for a Canadian amphibious capability were also recently expressed in the CDA Institute's 2008 Vimy Paper, *Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security*, by the former commander of our Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral (Ret'd) Roger Girouard, and Rear Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers, the former Commander CF Middle East during the 1990 Gulf War. Their assessments reinforce the fundamental need and critical lack in Canada's capability to deploy and support our forces in the world's littorals from their bases in Canada.

...the envisaged SCTF was to be comprised of forces from the navy, army, air force and special operations, and of representatives of key government departments, all ready to deploy anywhere in the world with ten days notice

This joint seaborne quick reaction force was to have had an initial operating capability by 2007

Based at Shearwater, Nova Scotia, and employing a whole of government approach, the envisaged SCTF was to be comprised of forces from the navy, army, air force and special operations, and of representatives of key government departments, all ready to deploy anywhere in the world with ten days notice. Indeed, the recent construction at Shearwater of a force headquarters building and the Minister of National Defence's wise decision on March 28 to regain a priceless strategic national asset by recovering Crown ownership of Shearwater's upper airfield and other lands that were previously sold to the Canada Lands Corporation gave every indication that the future of CEFCOM and the SCTF was assured.

Implicit in the government's vision for the SCTF was the requirement to acquire one or more amphibious assault ships, specifically designed for the embarkation and transportation of a credible battle group comprised of 700-800 troops, their vehicles, weaponry and other paraphernalia, and the enabling sea and air connectors.

With no requirement for government to secure prior airspace or port clearances, the SCTF's amphibious ships would allow political decision-makers the option to pre-position the SCTF in international waters in the vicinity of a gathering security crisis or impending natural disaster. This joint seaborne quick reaction force was to have had an initial operating capability by 2007, but unforeseen budgetary and operational pressures arising largely from our mission in Afghanistan obliged the

government to direct the former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier to suspend its development until after the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.

At this time, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Canada's navy comprises a total of 47 ships: four submarines, three destroyers, 12 frigates, 12 patrol and coastal defence vessels, two fleet supply ships (AOR), and 14 logistics and support vessels.

Current plans – which call for the commissioning of three JSS to replace the two AORs, adding two more logistics and support ships by 2010, up to eight Arctic Patrol Vessels, and, starting in 2015, constructing 15 ships to replace Canada's destroyers and frigates – could ultimately increase the fleet size to some 58 ships. However, nowhere in the CFDS are there plans for the future construction of the additional amphibious warships that would be required by CEFCOM if it were to develop the required amphibious capability.

Numerical objectives and force capability requirements assume meaning only in the context of rigorous political and military assessments and approved programme goals. They beg two larger issues: what political, economic, and security interests are Canadian naval forces intended to serve? And what is to be the navy's distinctive contribution to Canada's national security in this new century? It was thought that part of the answer would lie with the SCTF and its fully developed amphibious capability.

Acknowledging that the Harper government is fully aware that in addition to its responsibility to adequately provide for the defence of our northern arctic, carrying on the transformation of our forces, and successfully pursuing Canada's mission in Afghanistan, it must also prepare our nation and its armed forces to respond to the global geostrategic revolution that is now underway. This is a change that is rapidly shifting North Americans' and Canadians' focus from Europe and the Atlantic to the vast reaches of the Pacific and peoples of the teeming nations of the Asia-Pacific littoral. This is where Canada's future prosperity lies. This is where Canada's future body politic must be engaged. This is where Canada's future battles will be fought. And this is where Canada's future military must be prepared to fight in the defence of her national interests.

Recognizing the importance of the burgeoning flows of people, commerce and natural resources between Canada and the Asia-Pacific region implies that Canada must turn its national face westward and significantly expand its now Lilliputian diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence.

To properly defend and advance Canada's interests in this vast area will require combined soft and

hard power initiatives underpinned by a standing military presence in the waters off our west coast and in the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. This force must comprise a militarily credible surface and sub-surface fleet, and the ready availability of a joint seaborne amphibious capability that is fully interoperable with our closest allies in the region, the United States and Australia – the former possessing the world’s most powerful navy and amphibious forces, the latter now swiftly moving to acquire its own amphibious capability.

The sad reality of the apparent current situation with regard to a future SCTF, however, may well be that efforts made under the former CDS to implant ‘jointness’ within the CF are now beginning to give way to much of the old myopic, parochial and service-centric approaches to the nation’s defence strategy that have so often failed Canada in the past. In this context our navy’s long and continuing lack of purpose-built expeditionary ships to deliver and support security and humanitarian forces in the world’s littorals at an effective level represents a critical deficiency.

Contrast this with the nation’s amphibious

capability that was so effectively demonstrated in 1956 during Operation Rapid Step by Canada’s aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent, when it was quickly reconfigured for troop lift and speedily dispatched by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in response to the United Nations’ request to send a peacekeeping force to Egypt.

Sadly, such a national capability was destroyed long ago with the scrapping of our last carrier, HMCS Bonaventure, in 1970. Since then we have seen the humiliating consequence of leasing civilian cargo ships, the GTS Katie incident, and the gallant effort by the ships of Atlantic Command to deliver aid at New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

So long as Parliament, the government of the day and the CF leadership remain willing to accept that our nation’s future strategic, political and military options will be reduced by the absence of a credible seaborne joint expeditionary capability, Canada will never live up to its full potential as an influential global middle power.

It is time for Mr. Harper to clearly state his government’s intentions with regard to the future fielding of a SCTF. ©

Be Careful What You Wish For: A Divided, Militarized Korean Peninsula Is a Good Thing

by Thomas Adams

July 27, 2008 marked the 55th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that brought an end to combat on the Korean Peninsula. The armistice, however, did not officially end the war. The result is a highly militarized demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel, effectively dividing the Peninsula between a democratic, peaceful,

and prosperous South Korea and a belligerent, despotic, and impoverished North Korea. Some 75,000 US troops remain deployed in Northeast Asia, with approximately 26,000 US troops still stationed in South Korea.

However, every time the Kim Il Sung regime in North Korea initiates a nuclear missile crisis, or we are told stories of oppression by the regime against its people, we should remember the possible consequences that would follow the collapse of the regime and the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

America, China, Japan and South Korea all share the same basic interests when it comes to North Korea: the complete dismantlement of and end to its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. At the same time, these players in the region desire to prevent the sudden collapse of the regime.

Should the North Korean regime collapse, the costs for South Korea to absorb the North into a unified Korea would be enormous. Given much less favourable

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North to South population and GDP ratios than that of East to West Germany, many analysts suggest that the cost would far exceed that of German unification, with estimates ranging from \$120 billion to \$2 trillion.¹ In the event of a rapid collapse of the North Korean government and the subsequent absorption of North Korea into South Korea, the South would require substantial outside help given the enormous costs involved, though it would have to bear the brunt of the burden, adding a further strain to its economy.

There is a high likelihood of a great refugee and humanitarian crisis occurring in the chaos associated with the collapse of the regime. Millions of North Koreans could end up fleeing into China and South Korea in such an event. Tens of thousands of North Koreans have already fled the brutal conditions in the North into Northeastern China, further aggravating the unemployment problems that exist there.²

American retrenchment from the region would create a power vacuum that all the major players in the region would potentially try to fill in an effort to achieve maximum security.

The potential consequences of collapse can help to explain why China has been reluctant to withdraw aid as a means of punishing the regime for its bad behaviour.³ Similarly, Seoul has often cited the numerous headaches and human costs a humanitarian crisis would cause for it and North Korean refugees.

A potentially major implication for regional stability in the event of regime collapse would be America's military presence in both Korea and Japan being called into question. Two scenarios are likely, both of them potentially troublesome.

On the one hand, with the North Korean military threat no longer existing, it is possible that a united Korea and Japan would no longer need to rely on America as much as they currently do to ensure their security. US forces might be asked to leave in such an event as they would no longer be needed to serve as a deterrent against potential North Korean aggression. Indeed, the North Korean threat has remained the primary rationale for the presence of some 75,000 total American forces in both countries. If asked to leave, this could allow for the type of regional power struggles that America's presence inherently precludes.

American retrenchment from the region would create a power vacuum that all the major players in the region would potentially try to fill in an effort to achieve maximum security.

Whether coincidental or intentional, America's presence in the region has served as a way to constrain China's room for manoeuvre. China is growing at a tremendous pace, both economically and militarily. It will wish for a bigger role in the region commensurate with its ever increasing power. Without the constraints of America's presence in the region, China may be predisposed to act more assertively in Northeast Asia.

It is entirely possible that with a unified Korea devoid of American troops, China may seek to gain an influential foothold on the Peninsula as part of its suspected regional hegemonic aspirations.⁴ The absence of US forces in the region would give China a greater ability to achieve this objective. This goes a long way to explaining why China has a keen interest in seeing the departure of US forces from South Korea in the aftermath of unification.⁵

As a result, such a scenario may lead others in Northeast Asia, most notably Japan, to become even more worried about Chinese ambitions and lead them to take security into their own hands to a greater extent than they do now. Japan has a great domestic capacity to increase its conventional military capabilities, and it could also easily develop nuclear weapons if it so desired in order to offset China's nuclear arsenal. Japan's neighbours have not forgotten its past actions during the 1930s and 1940s.

Fear and resentment of a highly militarized and assertive Japan could spread throughout the region, most notably in China and a unified Korea. Should Japan be required to fully remilitarize in order to fend for itself against China, especially if China has a significant influence over a unified Korea, regional stability could be greatly compromised as mutual fear and suspicion and subsequent security competition could become rampant.

Such an assertive China, especially one with close economic and military ties with a unified Korea, could have a serious potential to challenge American power regionally if not globally. Indeed, considering that both China and South Korea are in the world's top 16 largest economies,⁶ their consolidation under the control of Beijing could have the effect of seriously challenging American power, especially if this consolidated economic wealth is translated into military power.

Moreover, with America out of the region, it would be infinitely more difficult for the US to come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese provocation. Beijing may feel that it would be easier to reclaim the island with American forces no longer present. The ramifications of this include China finally securing unencumbered blue water access for its otherwise bottled-up navy to project power abroad, as well as the ability to cut-off American oil shipments coming from the Middle East via the Straits of Malacca.

The consequences could be disastrous for America.

Thus, while America strongly desires to see the end of North Korea's WMD programs, there must also be a strong interest in ensuring that the conventional military threat that the North poses endures. This threat has served as the justification for the forward deployment of US forces in South Korea and Japan for decades. Not only do US forces in the region serve to deter any North Korean invasion into South Korea and ballistic missile strikes on Japan, but it inherently denies China the ability to assert itself more forcefully in the region without coming into conflict with America. This provides America with the simultaneous ability to contain China militarily in the region by stealth, while still maintaining cordial economic and political relations, a policy known as 'congameant.'

On the other hand, should American troops be asked to remain on the Peninsula (and in Japan) in the event of peninsular unification, China may feel threatened by the US military's proximity to its border.

China went to war against US-led United Nations forces during the Korean War when the latter moved up the Peninsula and neared the Yalu River along the Chinese-North Korean border. Since that time, North Korea has served as a buffer zone to alleviate potential

security dilemmas between American/South Korean and Chinese forces.

The lack of such a buffer zone in the event of unification may serve to aggravate the security dilemma. Moreover, in the absence of the North Korean threat, and with American troops remaining in both Korea and Japan, China may view such enduring security ties as one whose primary objective is the explicit containment of the People's Republic, especially if America's current bilateral security ties with the South and Japan are turned into a trilateral security arrangement. Additionally, China may fear that a unified Korea might serve as an additional base of operations for America should it be required to come to the aid of Taiwan.

All of these potential scenarios can help explain why China has been one of North Korea's largest sources of aid, has arguably not applied enough pressure on the regime to end its WMD programs, and by and large wishes for the Peninsula to remain divided.

Unfortunately, the politico-military situation on the Korean Peninsula is such that pragmatic realism must trump any moralistic desire to see the collapse of the North Korean regime and the unification of the Peninsula. Policy makers should be conscious of these, and other, potentially disastrous outcomes in the formation and execution of policy vis-à-vis North Korea.

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Soldiers Made Me Look Good: A Life in the Shadow of War

by Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie

Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein



General Lew Speaks Out – Again

Lewis MacKenzie, *Soldiers Made Me Look Good: A Life in the Shadow of War*. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, \$32.95.

Roméo Dallaire and Lewis MacKenzie are the only two Canadian generals who have a high profile outside Canada. With the recently retired

Rick Hillier, they are the only military officers with a public reputation in Canada, all recognizable names regularly quoted in the media, and listened to by their compatriots.

MacKenzie and Dallaire have some similarities. Both made their reputations on peacekeeping missions, MacKenzie in the Former Yugoslavia, Dallaire in Rwanda. Both have dabbled in politics, MacKenzie as a failed Progressive Conservative candidate in 1997, Dallaire as a present-day Liberal Senator. Both have written books, though Dallaire's *Shake Hands with the Devil* achieved huge international success and became a film while MacKenzie's *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo* was merely a Canadian bestseller (merely! I wish any of my books had sold as well!). Both have their supporters and friends in the Canadian Forces, MacKenzie certainly more than Dallaire. And both have been lightning rods for criticism at home and abroad, as inevitably befalls any public figure with a high profile.

What is interesting, however, is that the two senior officers/public figures, despite their similarities, are very different in the way they functioned as military leaders, and this difference, explored in full in a chapter in MacKenzie's new book, is worth some discussion.

Major-General MacKenzie begins his chapter

by referring to a talk Lieutenant-General Dallaire gave at the Canadian Forces College in 1997, where he said that a leader's priority had to be his mission first, then his soldiers, and lastly self. But, MacKenzie said, one of the bright young majors on the course said to the General that MacKenzie a few weeks before had offered the list of priorities in the same order. But, the major went on, MacKenzie had insisted that there will be rare occasions when the orders received make so little sense that a commander must change his priorities to his soldiers first, then his mission, and finally self. Dallaire had not answered the query satisfactorily, or so MacKenzie writes, and this provoked a discussion on leadership in the Canadian Forces.

So it should. This was a fundamental disagreement that cut right to the heart of General Dallaire's Rwanda mission and its failure in the midst of massacre and the killings of a substantial number of his Belgian soldiers on United Nations (UN) service.

MacKenzie's position, in my view, was and is the more sensible. He cites one example when UN Headquarters in 1992 ordered his men in Sarajevo to "use such force as necessary" to get food supplies into Sarajevo. MacKenzie disregarded the order, he says, because he had fewer than a thousand troops in a large city which was not wholly friendly, and he was surrounded by a First World military force numbering in the tens of thousands. His men might have pushed through the first road block, but he knew there would be twenty more, and soon his troops would be outnumbered 100-to-1.

Why throw away lives to obey a foolish order? My soldiers before my mission, in other words.

MacKenzie then carefully and politely analyzes Dallaire's Rwanda mission, using the account in *Shake Hands with the Devil*. The analysis is devastating. He notes that Dallaire had never served on a UN mission before he reached the rank of brigadier-general and, without pointing a finger at Dallaire, he states the fact that

J.L. Granatstein is author of Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. He was Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century and Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum. He is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute and is the Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.

ambitious officers avoided UN postings in favour of “real work”, that is, service at army headquarters or at NDHQ. But that changed when Yugoslavia blew up, when UN missions became dangerous and attracted much publicity, and officers who sought high rank now tried to get UN tours, “particularly in a command role if at all possible.

Perhaps that is why, in spite of having no operational experience with the UN in earlier ranks, General Roméo Dallaire volunteered for overseas duty.” There is not a word badly chosen or misplaced in these few pages that dice and slice his brother officer. Nor is there a slip in MacKenzie’s comment that Rwanda was expected “to be a quiet, safe and routine challenge, well out of the public eye and easily within [Dallaire’s] capability to command.” Ouch.

MacKenzie then turns to the debacle in Kigali. With chaos breaking out and death everywhere, UN headquarters told Dallaire to order his troops to return fire only if fired upon. This, MacKenzie says, was the point at which a commander with UN experience “would indicate that the telephone connection had gone bad and he couldn’t understand what was being said at the other end – and then hang up.”

Dallaire instead metaphorically saluted and then went off in mid-morning to meet the coup leader, passing by Camp Kigali where he could see two Belgian soldiers on the ground and where he was told by a Ghanaian UN observer that Rwandans were holding Ghanaian and Belgians nearby.

Dallaire had 400 Belgian paras in his force who might have made a useful show of force that could perhaps have rescued their comrades and possibly even restored order in the face of bands of cowardly thugs. But Dallaire, MacKenzie notes, did not notify his HQ of what he had seen and learned and proceeded to his round of meetings, which produced nothing but words.

Not until after 6 p.m. did he demand that the Belgian paras be released; instead, he was shown their bodies stacked on top of each other like potato sacks.

To MacKenzie, this is the nub of the leadership issue. Soldiers must obey orders in a war, orders that emanate from the highest level of national decision-making. But orders from the UN are more complex.

The Security Council is “a lowest common denominator” body, producing mandates and orders that can avoid a veto, not ones that can work.


To MacKenzie, Dallaire failed to recognize that his mandate and his orders from New York made no sense in the dreadful situation in which he found himself. He took “no action to shift his priorities, to concentrate his forces, particularly his Belgian paracommandos, and to place his soldiers’ security first in the order of priorities.”

Instead, he put his mandate first, and this led to the needless deaths of his soldiers. To MacKenzie, this is the guts of the issue between him and Dallaire. And, of course, MacKenzie is correct. Canadian officers should read this chapter and ponder MacKenzie’s devastating analysis of General Dallaire’s Rwandan choices.

There is much more in *Soldiers Made Me Look Good*. MacKenzie writes about his parents and his youth, his troublemaking nature, and the experiences in training and on exercises that turned him into the good soldier he became. And he distills his experiences into ten “tips” on leadership, all sensible, useful, and clear. The book is a bit of a grab bag, short chapter following short chapter. But MacKenzie writes so well that interest never flags.

But there is one more chapter in this volume that will re-ignite a major controversy. In 2000, Canadian journalist Carol Off published *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle*, an examination of three Canadian heroes – Dallaire, Louise Arbour (then the chief prosecutor for the UN war crimes tribunal) and MacKenzie, the “fox” of her title.

In Off’s pages, the Bosnian “justice” system’s charges that in 1992 MacKenzie had visited cafés/brothels where captive Muslim girls serviced Serbian officers and had taken away young Muslim women, later found murdered, for his sexual uses were presented as almost literal truth. Interviewed by Off while she was researching her book, MacKenzie showed her his diaries, suggested she interview members of his multinational staff for confirmation that he never went anywhere alone, and pointed out that the media dogged his footsteps in Sarajevo and presumably would have reported any such activities. None of this mattered: Off’s book, MacKenzie says, “read like it had been lifted from the professional propaganda that the Bosnian government had commissioned since the earliest days of the Bosnian war.”



He thought of suing for libel but took the (probably good) advice that all that would do was sell more of Off’s book. I am quoted by MacKenzie as writing that Off’s hatchet job plumbed new depths in Canadian journalism. I stand by that characterization.

MacKenzie brings his discussion of Off’s book back to where this review began: leadership priorities.

Contrasting Dallaire and MacKenzie, Off opts for the ‘mission first, last and always’ approach and chides MacKenzie for what she saw as his always putting his soldiers first, ahead of the mission. (At the same time, she chides MacKenzie for volunteering his soldiers for the Sarajevo aid mission, “one of the most violent and questionable United Nations peacekeeping missions of the 1990s.”). As Off put it, “I think that if my son was going to war to be a peacekeeper someplace [sic], I would want him to [be] there under Lewis MacKenzie because I know that he would come back alive. But if I was in a distant village about to be ethnically cleansed, I would really hope it was Roméo Dallaire out there, because he’d have my interests in mind.”

That complete misreading of two terrible situations says it all and should let us dismiss Carol Off as

a historian, a journalist, and as a hypothetical concerned parent or villager.

I have no interest in writing a critique of Dallaire’s actions in Rwanda or in quarreling with his popular status as a wounded hero. He is a man I have admired and still do. But on the basis of the two generals’ books, if I were a soldier I would rather serve under MacKenzie. If I were a resident of Sarajevo, I would rather have had MacKenzie in command of the UN forces. And if I had been a Rwandan as hell on earth erupted around me, I would have wished that Lew MacKenzie had been in command of the UN forces.

Canadian soldiers should read MacKenzie and Dallaire – there are lessons about leadership and command in them. They should also read Off’s book, which can serve as an object lesson in the harm that journalists can do. ©

Book Review

Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, the Taliban and the Battle that Saved Afghanistan

by Chris Wattie

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda



Chris Wattie, *Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, the Taliban and the Battle that Saved Afghanistan*

Key Porter Books Ltd, October 2008. Hardcover, 304 pages, \$32.95.

The summer of 2006 was a critical time for the Canadian and international mission in Afghanistan. Not only were Canadian troops deploying in strength to Kandahar province, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency, but the NATO alliance as a whole was preparing to take command of western forces under the banner of the International Security Assistance Force from the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. The Taliban, led by Mullah Dadullah Akhund, prepared to

launch a series of high profile suicide and roadside attacks against the newly arrived Canadian troops. These were to culminate in a large-scale ‘invasion’ of Kandahar City on Afghan Independence Day, August 19, and thereby weakening Ottawa’s and the Canadian public’s resolve and driving a wedge between the US and its NATO allies.

National Post reporter Chris Wattie, who was embedded with the Canadian battlegroup in Kandahar for eight weeks in early 2006, covers this critical period (6 May – 3 August 2006) through the eyes of the soldiers of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1PPCLI). Wattie’s first book, *Contact Charlie* is an account of the actions of the soldiers who prosecuted the battle for the villages and ground of Kandahar and Helmand province. Readers hoping for a strategic debate or academic overview of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan should look elsewhere – *The*

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Unexpected War by Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein, for instance. Chris Wattie's effort gets down in the dirt with the officers and grunts of the Canadian Forces (CF), and the result is something quite unforgettable.

Wattie's account is set largely in Panjwayi district in Kandahar province, which was the ground for much Canadian activity in summer 2006. The setting is what this reviewer would consider a nightmare for counterinsurgents: a labyrinth of compounds and orchards, interlinked with narrow footpaths, dry riverbeds and irrigation ditches. In addition, the Taliban insurgents remain an anonymous bunch in Wattie's account. They are determined fighters of varying skill, fighting with ferocity and bravery until the last man, even in the face of overwhelming firepower. They plan ambushes and bombs with great accuracy (if not originality), attacking when the Canadians are at their most vulnerable. They are nimble on the battlefield and quick to carry away their dead and wounded, making them a highly elusive foe.

Not only did the Canadian troops face a difficult terrain and determined enemy, the 'development' and 'diplomacy' faces of the Canadian mission were sorely lacking that summer. Glyn Berry, the senior Canadian diplomat who was meant to head the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team's foreign affairs section, was killed by a bomb on January 15, 2006, and this led the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency to suspend operations in Afghanistan for several months. The work of NGOs and other development agents are noticeable by their complete absence in Wattie's account. What this translates into is the impression that it is almost impossible for Canadian troops to maintain a lasting impact on the ground after they return to Kandahar Airfield. One can feel the frustration of the troops as they are unable to develop long-lasting contacts with Afghan civilians and ordinary Afghan life.

What this book truly excels at are the descriptions of the people, battles and events; they provide colour and texture to the largely bland accounts that we receive in Canada about the work of the CF in Afghanistan. We meet outstanding individuals and read of their extraordinary work and bravery under extremely trying conditions.

For instance, one's spine tingles as Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope plans his force's next move against the Taliban, or as Captain Ryan Jurkowski plans night-time patrols to catch teams of Taliban ambushers. The

heart races as Sergeant Mike Denine leaps atop his Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV), in the midst of incoming RPG and machinegun fire, to single-handedly take on a Taliban ambush, or as Sergeant Pat Tower dashes through machinegun fire to rescue his comrades, or as artillery is called in and coalition helicopters and aircraft strafe and bomb insurgent positions.


We experience the boredom and terror of foot patrols, the debilitating heat, and the darkness and quiet of a night patrol.

We encounter often bizarre and morbid humour: an officer falling on his backside during an assault on a compound, a soldier vomiting after getting shot in the chest, two soldiers swearing at each other during a firefight, or a medic accidentally injecting himself with morphine after an RPG flies through a LAV without exploding.

Tears are shed when we read of those wounded and killed – the account of the deaths of Corporal Chris Reid, Private Kevin Dallaire, Corporal Bryce Keller and Sergeant Vaughn Ingram during the firefight at the 'White Schoolhouse' on August 3 is especially moving.

As I mentioned earlier, this book does not delve deeply into the strategic impact of the actions of the CF in Afghanistan during that long summer. However, no major attack materialized on Afghan Independence Day in August 2006. Furthermore, the work of Charlie Company and 1PPCLI set the stage for Operation *Medusa* that September, disrupting Taliban activities and establishing the Canadians as a credible force on the ground. We can only hope that the weak points of the mission then – an unreliable Afghan Army and Police, the absence of diplomacy and development efforts, weak ground-level intelligence, and a lack of a systematic NATO strategy – have been developed since.

This book is not for the squeamish. There are bullets and rockets, blood and guts, cursing and graphic language, triumph and sorrow, and death. Those who feel that Canada's soldiers should not engage in counterinsurgency, or are opposed to the so-called 'glorification of war,' should stay clear. However, if you want to read what life outside the wire for the CF in Afghanistan is really like, this book is for you. ©



A History of the Modern Chinese Army

by Xiaobing Li

Reviewed by Richard Desjardins

Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*. University Press of Kentucky, June 2007. Hardcover, 413 pages, \$25.72 (Amazon.ca).

A review of the recent literature dealing with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) reveals a broad focus on the reforms that began in the mid-1980s. Largely forgotten in current scholarship is the context in which the PLA emerged. Awareness of this aspect of the PLA would improve our understanding of the Chinese military's relationship to contemporary Chinese society as well as the prospects for success in the military's current stage of reform.

Professor Xiaobing Li has done us a great service with this contribution. Among the conclusions that we can draw from his book are that China's military remains behind in its evolution in spite of many years of efforts at modernization, and that its dependence on foreign expertise, particularly Russian, continues.

Professor Li argues that his approach includes looking at the neglected life cycles of the Chinese armed services. Specifically, his work draws on the relationship between the soldiers and society, to bring out the distinct nature of the Chinese military's development. While it was not always clear to this reviewer that this approach prevailed in the exposition of the author's argument, there was a clear attempt to draw out individual contributions to the development of the PLA.

Professor Li, himself a former member of the PLA and currently the director of the University of Central Oklahoma's Western Pacific Institute, drew on an extensive set of sources to write his history. In particular, these include Chinese records such as Communist Party documents, archives, memoirs of Communist and Nationalist leaders, and interviews with low- and mid-level officers. He also relied on more recent Western research into newly-accessible records from Russia and China on the Korean War.

The emergence of the PLA during the Chinese civil war and the Japanese occupation gave it a unique character. It was a time of both political and military struggle; each one fed on the other. Failure to appreciate


the politics involved could and did impact on the success of the military fight. For instance, following the disastrous experience of cooperation with the Kuomintang in 1927, Mao's identification of the countryside and peasantry as the necessary base for the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) confrontation with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists directly impacted on recruitment and the strength of his appeal.

The Korean War provided the PLA its first opportunity to test its strength against a Western force. Just emerging from the exhausting civil war, the PLA was not prepared to get involved in a major conflict. The sources now available make it clear that Stalin played some role in pushing Mao to support the North. In the end, the Chinese learned that they were no match for American military technology.

While Li provides some details on the discussions that went on within the Chinese leadership in these challenging times, his is not an exhaustive study. At just over 400 pages, it would have been an impossible task.

The new material provided by post-Cold War access to Russian archives alone has led to the publication of dozens of books on various aspects of the confrontation between the Soviet Union, China and the United States. Instead, Li's contribution is to bring all of these events under one roof. His work provides an insightful picture of the short history of the PLA that had not been available elsewhere.

Professor Li belongs to an indispensable and distinct group of scholars that has emerged in the post-Mao period. They are of Chinese descent with unmatched language skills. Any serious research on the Chinese military requires that Western scholars undergo years of study of a difficult language. Their contribution to our understanding of the PLA, a force that will require our increasing attention, cannot be ignored. ©



Richard Desjardins is a civil servant with the Canada Border Services Agency. He holds an MA in Chinese politics.



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