



SECURITY & DEFENCE BRIEFING

FROM THE DESK OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

“REMEMBRANCE AND REMINDERS”

22 MAY 2015 (05-2015)

This month has been marked by remembrance, in light of the 70th anniversary of the Liberation of the Netherlands and Victory in Europe. The ceremonies and festivities that took place, in Canada and abroad, serve as a reminder of the enduring bond between the Netherlands and Canada as a result of the determined actions of its Canadian liberators from Nazi occupiers. Canada acted as a valued member of the international community over the course of the Second World War and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) assumed an important role, especially in the wartime campaign in the Netherlands.

I also had the distinct honour, together with Steve Gregory from Canada Company – Quebec (Canada Company is now an Associate Member Association of the CDA) and Captain Lee Bellemore, Operations Officer of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA) Petawawa, to attend a beautiful ceremony in Pontecorvo, a city in the Liri Valley liberated by Canadian troops as they forced themselves against the Hitler Line just north of Monte Cassino. Thanks to the extraordinary *personal* efforts of Steve Gregory and gener-

ous support from Veterans Affairs Canada, a badly deteriorated artillery gun was restored and re-dedicated in the City centre as a permanent reminder of the sacrifices and valour shown by the Canadian soldiers during the Italian campaign, along with the tremendous appreciation from the local population towards Canada and Canadians.

It was also with great pleasure that I attended and spoke at the 10th annual Kingston Conference on International Security and Defence at Queen's University, co-hosted by Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy in conjunction with key partners, Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, Canadian Army Command and Staff College, and the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. As the final panelist for this event, I had the fortune of being able to offer concluding thoughts on the challenges presented by the use of robotics and advancing technology in military operations. Geopolitics, technology, and war are inseparable, and like-minded nations around the world need to strengthen their focus on Collaboration, Interoperability/Integration,

and Innovation – which I like to think of as CI2I (see-eye-to-eye) – of new and emerging technologies, especially autonomous systems. Change is inevitable, and this is particularly true when examining technological advances in the past decade alone. Drawing from the reflections of George Friedman, I would argue that war is an old dance that is now being accompanied by new musical instruments.

L'Institut de la CAD a également été une des deux seules organisations non gouvernementales invitées à amener des représentants au panneau exécutif pour l'inauguration du Programme de coopération présenté par le Département de Défense Nationale. Cet événement d'une journée, qui a été organisé antérieurement à la participation officielle du DDN au sommet de Shangri-La à Singapour, a mis en vedette des individus provenant du Canada et de l'étranger, qui sont experts en sécurité de la région de l'Asie-Pacifique, ainsi que sur la politique de défense du Canada. J'ai été très heureux d'avoir eu l'opportunité de représenter l'Institut de la CAD lors de cet événement, ainsi que d'avoir eu à mes côtés notre directeur de recherche et rédacteur en

chef Dr David McDonough et le Vice-amiral Drew Robertson (retraité) faisant partie de notre conseil et Comité exécutif de l'Institut de la CAD.

Dans le cadre de ses activités de plaidoyer, indépendamment de son mandat de recherche, d'analyse et d'éducation qu'exécute l'Institut de la CAD, la CAD a bienvenue la nomination du Premier ministre Harper du Lieutenant -Général Jonathan Vance en tant que chef d'état-major de la Défense (CEMD) des forces armées canadiennes. Destinataire du Prix Vimy 2011 offert par l'Institut de la CAD, le Lieutenant-Général Vance apportera une ample expérience opérationnelle pour le plus haut poste aux FAC, démontré par ses plus récentes missions en tant que commandant de l'état-major interarmées stratégique, ainsi pour ses Commandement des opérations interarmées. Son expérience et leadership remarquable lui seront très utiles, notamment pour ce qui concerne les présentes opérations des FAC en Irak / Syrie, les déploiements en Europe de l'Est et les Pays baltes, la mission de formation en Ukraine, et le renouvellement de l'approvisionnement en encours pour les FAC.

With the 25th anniversary of the Vimy Award and the Gala Dinner only several months away, I wish to remind everyone about our [open call for nominations](#) for the **prestigious 2015 Vimy Award**. Nominations need to be sent in by 7 August 2015, so please contact us soon and complete the

required supporting narrative if you would like to nominate an outstanding Canadian. For further information, please contact our Administration and Public Relations Manager Meaghan Hobman at mhobman@cdainstitute.ca.

We are also delighted to have the generous support and leadership of Jennifer Pouliot and her outstanding team of volunteers in the creation of a **commemorative limited edition book highlighting the history of the first 25 years of the Vimy Award**. Those interested in placing early orders for this special commemorative book as well as in reserving seats/tables for the Vimy Gala Dinner on 6 November are asked to contact our Business Development and Program Manager, Denise Lemay at denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca.

Une partie du mandat de l'Institut de la CAD est d'aider au mentorat des étudiants ayant un intérêt dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. Il est pour cette raison que nous organisons le symposium populaire des étudiants diplômés qui aura lieu au Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston du 15-16 octobre 2015 - s'il vous plaît sauvez la date!

Nous sommes toujours heureux d'accueillir des analystes étudiants à notre bureau. J'aimerais d'ailleurs souhaiter la bienvenue à notre nouvelle étudiante à temps plein, l'analyste Celeste Longo qui embarque dans notre équipe à l'Institut de la CAD, et qui sera

aux côtés de l'analyste Lindsay Coombs qui fait son retour avec nous pour l'été. Les étudiants jouent un rôle crucial à l'Institut de la CAD, et j'espère fortement que vous pensiez à devenir un donateur ou un commanditaire de notre programme d'analyste pour nous permettre de maintenir notre rôle important dans la formation de la prochaine génération de spécialistes et dirigeants en sécurité et défense.

This summer will prove to be an exciting time for the CDA Institute and we encourage you to stay involved in our upcoming activities, whether by attending our series of Roundtables in June or by perusing our frequently updated website and the recently renamed CDA Institute Blog: The Forum. **Speaking of our revised CDA Institute Blog (The Forum), thanks to the vision and energy of the CDA Institute Research Manager and Senior Editor, Dave McDonough, we are very pleased with its recent success in carrying a range of thoughtful and timely articles.**

To keep our vast readership informed and connected, we will be sending out notices on our posts (as well as announcements/media roundup) starting Monday. **Take a moment and check out our website (www.cdainstitute.ca).**



Tony Battista

CDA INSTITUTE BLOG: THE FORUM

Special ops photo ops and strategy

By Eric Morse

Apart from reaffirming that photo ops and special ops rarely mix well, this month's brazen gaffe by the Prime Minister's Office in posting video clips with the faces of Canadian special operations forces personnel is notable because it highlights what may be a trend among the world's higher-end militaries— looking to special operations forces as a tool of first resort.

[READ IT HERE](#)

China's South China Sea strategy: simply brilliant

By William Choong

In the past 12 months, China has provoked considerable attention with its reclamation activities in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratlys where it controls seven maritime features. (*Originally published in ASPI's The Strategist.*)

[READ IT HERE](#)

Hybrid war at work in the post-Soviet space

By Michael Lambert

War is based on the use of the military force to dominate or weaken an opponent, to ensure that it no longer represents a potential threat. For centuries, victory relied on the size of the army, but the traditional approach changed due to nuclear deterrence.

Thus, peace on the European continent is also due to the psychological trauma of the Second World War and Cold War.

[READ IT HERE](#)

NATO's Meeting of Foreign Ministers: An Opportunity for Canadian Influence?

By Mina Jasarevic

Today and yesterday, Canadian Foreign Minister Rob Nicholson joined allied foreign ministers of NATO countries in Antalya, Turkey for a series of meetings that reaffirm the Alliance's support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to examine violence across the Middle East and North Africa.

[READ IT HERE](#)

Bombing an Ideology: Why the aerial campaign against ISIL is going to fail

By Amanda Claypool

For more than six months, the United States has led a coalition of regional allies to bomb the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) out of existence. In September 2014, President Obama outlined the primary objective of the new anti-ISIL campaign, stating "we will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy."

[READ IT HERE](#)

Turkey risks isolating itself with missed opportunities

By Rob Burroughs

Turkey's miscalculated foreign policy gambles and the governing party's obsession with the executive presidency have left the country in an uncomfortable state. No longer the blossoming regional economy, Turkey's prospects for European membership have dimmed significantly and it has been shunned by its Middle Eastern partners. Even its competitive advantage, interoperability with NATO partners, has lost its impact as Alliance members sideline Turkey over growing frustrations...

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Islamic Extremism: Why the West doesn't get it

By Adnan Qaiser

The violence and brutality perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), which has spread as far afield as Libya, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – manifested through recent beheadings of Ethiopian Christians in Libya and Jalalabad's bank-bombing claimed by IS – should make us question why Islamic extremism is festering.

[READ IT HERE](#)

Strategic Considerations in the Indian Ocean: India's Maritime Ambitions

By Andres Gallacher

Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India has steered the Indian state in a direction that promotes greater influence both in the Southeast Asian region and globally. This is partially a reaction to increased Chinese interest in the trade routes that govern the Indian Ocean. About two-thirds of Chinese oil imports must go through the Indian Ocean. These sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are crucial for many countries in the Indo-Pacific for economic trade, particularly China's.

[READ IT HERE](#)

Canada's Effort to Boost Defense Spending May Be Too Little, Too Late

By Shaun McDougall

Ottawa has announced a plan to provide the military with sustained annual budget growth of three percent beginning in 2017, providing a cumulative CAD11.8 billion in additional spending through 2026. (*Originally published in Forecast International.*)

[READ IT HERE](#)

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation role

By Marius Grinius

Next week, 189 states, including Canada, will meet at the United Nations in New York City to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT, in force over the past 45

years, has long been called the “essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation régime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.” (*Originally published in The Embassy.*)

[READ IT HERE](#)

Troubling report on 'sexualized culture' in Canada's military may overstate problem

By Christie Blatchford

At first blush it's a withering report — there's a “sexualized culture” within the Canadian Forces that is so pervasive it's “conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault” and so hostile to women that victims rarely bother to report or complain. (*Originally published in National Post.*)

[READ IT HERE](#)

In Search of Enhanced Defence Cooperation in Europe

By Alexandra Gheciu

On April 9, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland agreed on closer defense ties and increased solidarity with the Baltic states, in a move designed to enhance regional security through deterrence. In a joint declaration, the defense ministers of four Nordic states and the foreign minister of Iceland insisted that, given Russia's growing assertiveness, Northern Europe must prepare for possible crises or incidents.

(*Originally published in CIPS Blog.*)

[READ IT HERE](#)

The rise of the European Union as a military power in the 21st century

By Michael Lambert

Having received the Nobel Peace prize in 2012 for decades of work, the European Union stands out on the world stage to be the main promoter of dialogue as a tool to solve conflicts. This pacific attitude stems from the two World Wars that have marked profoundly the continent by their violence. These traumatizing experiences, and the division in two blocks during the Cold War that resulted from them, bring European citizens to consider the use of strength only as a last resort.

[READ IT HERE](#)

Pakistan's Nuclear Insecurities: The United States Factor

By Adnan Qaiser

Nation-states often behave like human beings. While Pakistan's anxieties can be blamed on its archrival India's regional hegemonic designs, the country's nuclear sensitivities are only pronounced by a focused apprehension that United States is out to denuclearize Pakistan. In an interview on 7 August 2014, Pakistan's defence minister, Khawaja Asif, raised alarms over dangers to Pakistani nukes from the Western world.

[READ IT HERE](#)

CHINA'S BURGEONING NAVY: ASSESSING PRIORITIES, INTERESTS, AND OBJECTIVES

SELECTED POST FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

CDA Institute Blogger Adam MacDonald, an independent scholar on Canadian foreign policy and Asia-Pacific security, explores China's naval modernization efforts, which first appeared in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#).

The People's Liberation Army's Navy (PLAN) has become the most visible, and concerning, aspect of Beijing's military modernization program to Western and Asian policy communities. Ambiguity remains over the priorities, interests, and objectives governing the PLAN's development and employment. This uncertainty is enflamed within a number of contentious regional maritime disputes, which some argue may be a barometer of China's future intentions towards the international system as its power and influence grows, specifically within East Asia.

Building regional power projection

Since the deployment of two American aircraft carrier battle groups during the 1994–95 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing has become keenly aware of its strategic and military inadequacy in the maritime domain of East Asia. This has led to a comprehensive transformation of the PLAN into a blue-water force capable of various warfare and non-warfare operations in waters close to home and further abroad. China's naval modernization, however, is largely, though not exclusively, focused in the short term on developing capabilities and

strategies which will marginalize American sea and air control over their adjacent seas.

For the past four decades, American military supremacy – encapsulated and promoted within a regional 'hub-and-spoke' bilateral alliance network – has dominated the Asia-Pacific defence architecture. The region, however, is now entering a new military reality where many states possess the ability to seriously disrupt and degrade Washington's access to and its freedom of manoeuvre within the region – defined in American defence literature as Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) technologies and capabilities. China's military emphasis on A2/AD, and the associated reconfiguration of intra-regional defence relations and spending priorities of worried neighbours as a result, are driving this process.

Chinese investments in ballistic and cruise missiles, larger and longer range surface vessels, submarines, and cyber and space technologies challenge the US ability to maintain regional sea control via its aircraft carrier battle groups. Such capabilities represent a sizable risk to American assets, should they enter conflict zones along China's maritime periphery. The PLAN could be employed in order to bring about a military centred resolution to ongoing regional disputes. More likely, though, it will aim to limit Washington's influence and weaken security guarantees to regional states to allow China's economic and political leverage

to ultimately strong-arm its smaller neighbours towards a favourable solution for Beijing.

Within these ongoing maritime disputes, in both the East and South China Sea, Beijing is employing law enforcement bodies, such as the newly created Chinese Coast Guard. The PLAN, however, is exercising frequently within these regions, facilitating their availability for quick response and needed assistance, as well as being an unmistakable signal to their neighbours and the US. Furthermore, in the South China Sea, China is literally changing the status-quo on the grounds of many disputed reefs and islets through multiple reclamation projects, many of which will have direct military application.

Operating abroad in support of 'New Historic Missions'

Alongside this predominant regional focus, the PLAN has – on President Hu's 2004 direction of preparing for 'new historic missions' – conducted a growing number of missions abroad. Many of these deployments are designed to promote China's image as a responsible stakeholder in global security governance while developing competencies in a variety of operations besides conventional warfare.

Examples include continuous anti-piracy patrols in Gulf of Aden since 2009, escort duties of Syrian chemical weapons shipments in 2014, the Hospital ship *Peace Ark's* deployment

to the Caribbean and South America, participation in international exercises such as RIMPAC in 2014, and the recent evacuation of Chinese and other nationals from Yemen. Although these operations remain small in scale and intensity, as Chinese

capital and citizens

continue to span out into the international realm, the PLAN will augment its presence globally. These forays are largely non-controversial, designed to give the PLAN greater blue-water operational exposure and promote China's participation in the global commons.

Building a robust submarine nuclear deterrent

Another aspect of the PLAN's modernization program is the construction of a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, part of a comprehensive effort to develop a more robust and survivable nuclear force structure.

Beijing continues to build the Jin-Class ballistic missile armed submarines, as they project to complete a total of five in order to satisfy the end state of maintaining continuous deployments. This will imply the expansion and diversification of China's nuclear arsenal and posture, but Beijing appears uninterested in a



PLAN destroyer Qingdao (DDG 113) departs Pearl Harbor following a port visit. (Image courtesy of US Pacific Fleet via Flickr Commons.)

ships, and the wider public sentiment of 'naval nationalism,' all influence the development trajectories of the PLAN. It is unclear how these areas influence decision-making, due to secretive nature of PLA and their relationship with the Communist leadership.

large-scale quantitative growth of its inventory, nor on implementing fundamental changes to its nuclear policy.

Committed to the PLAN

Development priorities and defence policies point towards a PLAN largely focused on limiting US military power in their immediate environment, especially over 'core interests' such as the eventual unification with Taiwan. Nevertheless, it is not definitive that Chinese naval strategy represents a revisionist challenge to US global leadership.

There is, furthermore, a common bias within the literature assuming capabilities stem from strategic intention without appreciating the possibility that the causal arrow is more dialectic. Moreover, besides the often assumed realpolitik raw balance of power calculations at play, issues of bureaucratic politics over competition of resources between the services, relations between the naval and national leader-

What is certain is the broad consensus amongst the Chinese leadership prioritizing continued PLAN modernization. China, however, is not like other rising powers historically, particularly in regards to its reluctance to militarily challenge the US in any comprehensive fashion. Within East Asia, however, China is building naval strength in order to neutralize American power projection regionally. It does so in support of creating space for larger economic and political reconfigurations. Despite ongoing disputes and regional tensions regarding Chinese military power, Beijing is successfully promoting the development of new institutions, which places itself in a central leadership position. Marginalizing the military primacy of the US opens greater degrees of freedom to continue changing economic and political realities. These realities are beneficial to Beijing, as it strives to become more of a decision-maker with greater powers than under the current regional architecture.

DEFENCE BUDGET SCANS: CANADA, THE US AND AUSTRALIA

SELECTED POST FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

CDA Institute Research Fellow Chuck Davies examines the Canadian defence budget in light of Australia's recent tabling of its budget and ongoing talks between the White House and Congress on the US defence budget, which first appeared in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#).

Defence budgets have been going through annual renewal cycles in Canada and two other nations with whom we have important relationships: the United States and Australia. Canada's Federal Budget was tabled on 21 April 2015, allocating about \$19B to defence for 2015/2016. Australia's Federal Budget was tabled on 12 May and included a defence budget of \$38.2B (\$36B CAD). In the US, the second movement in the annual defence budget dance between the Administration and Congress began on 27 April with the release by the House Armed Services Committee Chairman of his version of the 2016 defense spending bill. Both sides agree on a budget amount of \$604B (\$728B CAD) but differ on the details.

The budgets and supporting departmental spending plans reveal some striking contrasts among the three countries, beyond the differences in overall funding for defence. The US plans to spend roughly 24 percent of its budget on military personnel, and Australia 33 percent. These percentages tend to be generally consistent year-over-year. Canada in recent years has been spending about 50 percent, in part because the government has not been



Technicians working at Halifax Shipyard in Halifax, NS. (Image courtesy of Canadian Press/Andrew Vaughan.)

prepared to allow the CAF to reduce numbers in line with cuts in defence spending. This has resulted in the Department of National Defence (DND) having considerably less capacity in its smaller budget to fund the other essential elements that must be balanced with personnel to establish and maintain effective defence capabilities: equipment, infrastructure, spare parts, support services, training, and so on.

DND also has much less capacity to develop and build its future force, and is consequently mortgaging at least some future defence capabilities to keep the current force in being. Between its R&D, Test & Evaluation and acquisitions programs, Washington spends a little over 30 percent of its defence budget to assure the future viability, relevance, and strength of

its military forces. Australia allocates about the same percentage to the equivalent functions. In both countries, this spending is guided by long-term defence capability plans that are aligned with future funding and cyclically updated every four or five years. There is also a reasonable political consensus around the broad thrusts of these plans so they are usually only moderately impacted, if at all, by changes in administration.

In Canada, R&D, capital and other spending on developing and building the future force is only around 20 percent of the defence budget and the process is often highly politicized. Moreover, as David Perry has shown in the CDA Institute's Vimy Paper 21, Canada chronically fails to execute even this compara-

tively modest capital acquisitions program, and is very cash-inefficient in getting results from it. This is a long-standing failing not unique to the present government, and so far not visibly improved by the 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy – an assessment that is explored in greater detail in my recent Vimy Paper, Canada's Defence Procurement Strategy: An End or a Beginning?

This chronic underinvestment in future Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) capabilities will have the greatest impact on future generations of Canadians and their political leaders, but also affects us today. The very painful and expensive process the RCN went through to re-establish a submarine capability after being forced to finally retire the 1960s vintage Oberon fleet without immediate replacement in 2000, the more recent similar loss of naval at-sea replenishment capabilities due to rust-out of the legacy fleet, and the continued operation of other CAF platforms well beyond their optimum operating lives are symptomatic of serious long-term weaknesses in Canada's stewardship of its defence capabilities.

These problems can't simply be dismissed as DND bungling, not when they clearly reach well beyond that department and speak to fundamental weaknesses in the wider Federal Government business architecture around defence capability management and major capital procurements. Similar problems are arguably



The RCN's Oberon-class submarines were replaced by the Victoria-class vessels, which required extensive repairs and upgrades to make them operational. (Image courtesy of Seaspan Shipyards.)

evident in the government's stewardship of its non-defence assets such as the Parliamentary Precinct and the Champlain Bridge in Montréal, among others.

Fixing this problem in defence does not rest solely on allocating more money (although that would clearly help) or promises of long-term funding predictability. The fact is, Canadian governments will always allocate larger or smaller budgets to defence based on their assessment of current need and willingness to pay. It is therefore critically important to improve the Government of Canada's long-term stewardship of its defence institution by doing a number of things, including:

- Addressing the mismatch identified by the Parliamentary Budget Office, CDA Institute and others between the current force structure and DND's funding by either decreasing the former or increasing the latter, or some combi-

nation of the two;

- Whatever the resourcing level, establishing and maintaining over the long term an appropriate balance of investments in current and future capabilities; and
- Correcting the chronic decision constipation and inefficiency in the execution of major acquisition programs.

More broadly, Parliament and the government need to work towards a wider national consensus and more consistent long-term view of Canada's defence capability needs, and begin to overhaul the government-level structural and legal machinery governing defence capability management.

EVOLVING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

SELECTED POST FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

CDA Institute guest contributor Adam Lajeunesse, a SSHRC postdoctoral fellow at St. Jerome's University in the University of Waterloo, explores Canada's Whole of Government approach to the Canadian Arctic, which first appeared in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#).

Over the past decade, resource development and receding sea-ice have transformed the Arctic from a political afterthought to an area of immediate and expanding security concerns. One of the results has been a focus – perhaps even too much of a focus – on the geopolitical and strategic questions raised by these changes. Beginning in the mid-2000s, discussion of Arctic security typically revolved around concerns of re-militarization, control over strategic sea routes, and the potential for resource and “territorial” (extended continental shelf) disputes. Lately, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a new geopolitical clash that has seen Moscow reassert itself militarily in the Arctic– both to demonstrate control for a domestic audience and as a highly visible message to the West.

In spite of the headline grabbing nature of these activities, and behind much of the posturing, the reality is that most strategic issues have been resolved. Circumpolar resource wealth is, for the most part, safely divided according to well entrenched international law; shipping lanes are well managed; remilitariza-

tion has not spiraled out of control; and there seems little real threat of a military confrontation between NATO and Russia. Indeed, if such a conflict were to erupt, the Arctic would hardly be either side's first priority. While the delineation of the outer limits of the polar continental shelf remains an unresolved issue, each side has agreed to abide by established legal procedures to resolve the matter (as laid out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). That is not to say that this issue will not turn eventually into a more heated dispute, but the slowness of UN procedures will at least push any such conflict years (or decades) into the future.

Confident in the stability of the strategic situation in the Arctic, Canadian analysts should focus more time and energy examining our operational capabilities and frameworks – the manner in which the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and other government departments (OGD) and agencies execute Canada's northern responsibilities on a regular basis. These responsibilities are well understood to the CAF and amongst other government agencies with northern mandates. For years, official DND policy has sidelined the hard security concerns that academics and analysts have so enjoyed debating, and focused instead on the unconventional threats that the Department foresees emerging. These threats will not be Russian bombers or submarines; they are more likely to be natural or human disasters,

search and rescue emergencies, espionage, organized crime, or pandemics and these situations will require responses that integrate both military and civilian resources.

To address these issues, and establish the framework needed to meet these challenges, the Government of Canada, led by the CAF, has spent the past decade rehearsing a Whole of Government (WoG) approach. As my current research with Whitney Lackenbauer reveals, this approach has emerged as a centerpiece of federal policy because it offers a way to address these unconventional security threats while rationalizing services and leveraging capabilities across governments, while avoiding costly redundancies. This integrated, comprehensive approach is designed to compensate for the dearth of infrastructure and assets in the region, while ensuring a more focused response to threats that fall within the purview of multiple departments and agencies.

The CAF maintains a leading role in the Arctic not because its combat capabilities are needed but because it possesses the transportation assets, the platforms, and (most importantly) the funding needed to support other government departments (OGD) and to finance large-scale training exercises. In spite of this role, and the emphasis placed on WoG in multiple defence policy statements, exercises over the last decade reveal myriad



Canadian soldiers taking part in Operation Trillium Response close to Rankin Inlet, Nunavut in 2014. (Image courtesy of Wayne Cuddington/Postmedia File Photo.)

barriers to effectively integrating this strategy.

The CAF is a combat force and, as such, its new responsibilities in the North have been something of a culture shock. The military plans, communicates, trains, and operates differently than civilian agencies and these differences have defied years of training and the tens of millions of dollars spent on WoG exercises – most notably the annual Operation Nanook. While progress has been made, it is too often temporary. The process of building a strong WoG framework is fundamentally different than a traditional military skill set.

Training for effective WoG responses means building relationships and connections to ex-

pedite a government-wide reaction on a short timeline. It means harmonizing planning and training processes, learning other departmental cultures, and finding ways to sync different organizations together in common purpose. Downsizing, departmental reorganization, and even the military's own rotation schedule have made these lasting connections harder to maintain. The fact that the Arctic is seen as a sideshow in many quarters has, likewise, hindered efforts to embrace any wide-scale change in CAF approaches – or those of other government departments.

Understanding exactly how well the CAF and other departments and agencies have managed to harmonize their planning

and operational processes is likely a more important (if less dramatic) question than the grand strategic Arctic issues that so frequently grace the newspaper headlines. Through our research, we hope to gain a better understanding of Canada's Arctic capabilities and what exactly can be done to improve them in preparation for the most probable challenges that lie ahead.

ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY – HOW COST ESTIMATING CAN IMPROVE THE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PROCESS

SELECTED POST FROM OUR BLOG: THE FORUM

The following is a summary of the CDA Institute roundtable “How Cost Estimating can Improve the Defence Procurement Process” held in Ottawa on 15 April 2015, which first appeared in the [CDA Institute Blog: The Forum](#). These roundtable discussions are held under the Chatham House Rule. This summary reflects Analyst Melissa Hawco’s perception of the discussion. The CDA Institute thanks Lockheed Martin Canada for its generous sponsorship of the 2015/16 Roundtable Discussion Series.

The event began with an introductory discussion on the topic of cost estimating in the defence procurement process in Canada. By definition, the process of cost estimating collects and analyzes historical data in order to apply quantitative models and techniques that can predict the costs of future projects. Significantly, despite the best efforts of these professionals, cost does not equal price. During the estimating process, cost estimators must analyze historical data from identical or similar projects, and then adjust for a variety of factors, such as new technologies and inflation. Of course, there are cases in which relevant historical data is difficult or impossible to find. Innovative projects, such as NASA’s mission to Mars, is an example. In such cases, any possibly relevant data may be used to predict mission expenses.

Costs are predicted by employing a number of

standard methodologies, including analogies (subjective comparisons), parametric (statistical patterns from multiple systems), build-up (“bottom-up” compositions), and lastly, expert opinions. For defence procurement, seasoned cost estimators recognize a strong correlation between cost and weight. Fortunately, weight and other basic physical parameters are often the first pieces of available data from the engineering crew of any new project, therefore allowing an early cost estimate from a very limited amount of information.

The discrepancies between cost and price in defence projects is often created during the execution stage. For example, during the Afghanistan mission, cost estimators were provided with certain figures regarding mission length and intensity that resulted in forecasts for the cost of that mission. However, the Afghanistan mission ultimately extended in length and increased in intensity, thus rendering the previous estimates inappropriate for the actual project prices.

Moreover, cost estimating is not a practice that produces a single correct answer for policy makers. Rather, estimators are able to produce a range of possible correct answers based on historical data, project adjustments, and risk analysis. This process is anchored not by certainties, but by probabilities. Knowledgeable

professionals describe the process of their predictions in terms of ‘completeness,’ ‘reasonableness,’ ‘credibility,’ and ‘analytic defensibility.’ For policy makers and contractors, these descriptors and range of probable possibilities for costs are not wholly compatible with the precise nature of budgeting or the approval decisions being made.

Finally, communication is key to help bridge the gap between estimators and policy makers. It is notable that there are no undergraduate and only a very few graduate courses specifically dedicated to cost estimating. As a result, the community of cost estimators is comprised of a wide variety of former accountants, mathematicians, economists, computer scientists, logisticians, and engineers. During communications between cost estimators and policy makers and project managers, it is important to ask and prepare for the right questions. It is advisable to engage in a discourse about the underlying historical data used, assumptions and labour rates, data sources, risk analyses and the many unavoidable uncertainties of predicting costs for defence procurement.

Also discussed were the significant problems still embedded in the Canadian defence procurement system and the notable underspending of the allotted defence budget. Historically, DND’s main challenge has been insufficient

funds, but in recent years the real challenge is the inability to spend between a fifth and quarter of DND's capital budget. According to charted data from the past few decades and predictions for 2014/15, the current level of underspending in DND is both unique and does not appear to be improving. A major procurement backlog now exists, while for current equipment the metaphor of rust-out is transforming into a reality, such as in the case of naval ships being removed from service due to deteriorating hulls. Significant losses in purchasing power and de-scoping project requirements in order to fit within budgets also constitute major issues with the procurement process.

There is a mismatch between DND's current workload and their available workforce. While defence projects are increasing in scale, time, and complexity, the workforce has decreased in number and capacity training. In fact, the

workload in terms of the ratio of Vote 5 / ADM Material workforce has near doubled, and other departments are facing comparable struggles. The important training and job experience required for defence procurement positions in DND is often curtailed by the swift 'revolving door' rotation of the workforce. Moreover, the lack of trust and clear communication internally and externally with departments is producing enough friction to significantly slow down the procurement process.

In order to address issues of trust and communication in departments, and improve the current pessimistic perception of the defence procurement process, new governance structures have been imposed to modify behavior and institute double or triple checks into the procurement system. It is essential to improve capacity training in the defence procurement process through relevant education in master's

programs for project management and slowing down job rotation to attain more substantial job training and experience. There should also be a thorough rationalization of the capital plan on how much money realistically there is to spend, a renewal of the Canada First Defence Strategy, and a complete prioritization from the Capital Investment Program Plan Review

Common costing practices that are standard across the government for contingencies, cost escalation, and operating and supporting costs will facilitate predictability and easy communication between departments. The use of an external review system for budgeting in the defence procurement process would not prove amiss either. Finally, sharing a bit of good news with the public and across various departments will help restore trust and revitalize defence procurement.

EVENTS

The CDA Institute held a successful Roundtable with Dr. Rouben Azizian on "Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Before and After Ukraine" on 7 May 2015 and with Dr. Craig Mantle on his recent book "In Their Own Words: Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery from Afghanistan, 2001-2007" on 20 May 2015. A summary of these events will be posted on the CDA Institute Blog: The Forum shortly.

We are pleased to present **our next Roundtable with former Canadian diplomat**

Paul Heinbecker on "Syria, ISIS and the Canadian Military Mission," which will take place on 2 June 2015. [Click here to register for this event.](#) The CDA Institute would like to thank Lockheed Martin Canada for its generous sponsorship of this event under the 2015/16 Roundtable Discussion Series.

The **25th anniversary Vimy Award Gala Dinner** will be held at the National War Museum in Ottawa on 6 November 2015.

This year's event is especially important, as it marks the silver anniversary of the Vimy Award. **For ticket purchases please contact Denise Lemay at denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca and 613-290-6198.**

The CDA Institute could not host events without the generosity of its numerous sponsors and donors. We are seeking sponsorship for our 2015-2016 activities. Further information can be found on [our website](#).

IN THE NEWS

In an interview with CBC News, Executive Director **Tony Battista** discussed the recent report on [sexual misconduct in the military](#) by former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps.

Colin Robertson provided commentary on the degree to which Canada's political parties are [committed to freer trade](#) in light of the closing

negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He also penned an article on the [necessity of the European Union](#) in Canadian affairs, despite its flaws.

George Petrolekas authored an article also [discussing the Deschamps report](#). Additionally, Petrolekas commented on the [strength of the](#)

[Kurdish forces](#) in the wake of the friendly-fire incident that claimed the life of Sgt. Andrew Doiron.

Correction: An earlier version of this Briefing incorrectly stated that Petrolekas was “against the call for an independent body to handle reports of sexual misconduct.” We regret that error.

MEDIA ROUNDUP

Canada's vast shipbuilding plan still at starting line ([CBC News](#)): June 3 will mark the first anniversary of the \$40 billion National Shipbuilding Procurement strategy. Five years have passed, however, and no new ships have been built.

Envisioned power increase for CSIS is “not so terrifying” ([La Presse](#)): According to Richard B. Fadden, national security adviser, the power that the federal government intends to give to CSIS is ‘not so terrifying.’

Ukraine minister praises Canada's military ([Globe and Mail](#)): Canadian Forces trainers will bring Ukraine's country's military forces and National Guard up to a higher standard so they can better repel Russian aggressors, says Ukrainian foreign minister.

Stephen Harper's media team admits Iraq, Kuwait videos a security risk ([CBC News](#)): As consequence of breaking protocol, the Prime Minister's Office has removed two videos from its own promotional website. PMO is now reviewing protocol for videos shot by its staff.

Military leaders must move fast to address 'sexualized culture' ([Globe and Mail](#)): Marie Deschamps, former Supreme Court justice, declares, after conducting interviews with 700 CAF personnel, that there is a certain 'sexualized culture' towards women and gays within the Canadian Armed Forces.

Canada to provide counterterrorism support to Philippines ([Globe and Mail](#)): Canada to offer counterterrorism and anti-crime aid to Philippine police to reinforce trade/security ties.

Canada lacks long-term strategy in ISIS fight ([CBC News](#)): According to an independent report on Canada's war against ISIS, Ottawa has not clearly set forth a long-term strategy to defeat the 'extremist' organization.

Royal Canadian Navy used eBay to try to find parts for HMCS Preserver ([Ottawa Citizen](#)): Government records show that mechanics in Halifax had to surf through eBay in order to find parts for one of its two retiring supply ships.

CSIS can't keep up with daily state-sponsored cyber attacks ([The Star](#)): According to the CSIS “threat overview,” hostile state-sponsored actors target Canadian public and private computer networks to advance their economic, military, (and) political agendas.”

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