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**THE CANADIAN RESPONSE
TO RADICALIZATION TO
VIOLENCE**



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The Canadian Response to Radicalization to Violence

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Author's Note

In preparing this paper, the author complemented open source research by conducting separate interviews with a Government of Canada official and a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer in November, 2014. Both these individuals reviewed the final draft of the paper. Although these discussions were held at the unclassified level, the interviewees requested to remain anonymous.

The research presented here is current to the end of 2014. Unless otherwise noted, all views expressed in this paper belong solely to the author.



The Canadian Response to Radicalization to Violence

Introduction

Political violence that is executed by citizens or residents without the direct involvement of foreign terrorist organizations (often called “homegrown terrorism”), is a highly salient issue for Western counterterrorism (CT).¹ This threat features prominently in the first official Canadian CT strategy.² Additionally, recent evidence indicates homegrown terrorists have evaded detection by security services by plotting relatively simple, low-tech attacks.³ Terrorist attacks in October, 2014 in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa (which respectively consisted of a vehicular hit-and-run and a shooting with a low capacity, slow-firing hunting rifle), exemplified this trend.⁴ Growing numbers of young Westerners are also travelling abroad to join organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).⁵ Canada is one of many countries which have identified such “foreign fighters” as a pressing threat, which is rooted in the concern that these individuals may return home with increased capabilities to carry out attacks or inspire others to do the same.^{6*}

Homegrown terrorists create a challenging threat environment, in part because they may not interact with terrorist organizations that are already being monitored by security services, and also because of legal constraints which restrict the ability of democracies to surveil their own citizens.⁷ In this context, many governments have identified the need to respond to radicalization to violence (R2V) as a discrete policy area distinct from other CT measures. In a process referred to here as counter-radicalization (CR), governments conduct CT at a preventative level by attempting to discourage people from adopting beliefs or ideologies that may serve to justify terrorist violence. While R2V and CR have been key concerns for European governments since at least 2003 (and since the 1990s for countries such as Saudi Arabia), it only began to receive systematic attention from Canadian policymakers relatively recently.⁸ Accordingly, the academic literature on Canadian CR initiatives (and, to a lesser extent, on R2V in Canada), is less developed compared to scholarship on these issues in the context of European or Muslim-majority countries.⁹

This paper presents an early response to the gap in the Canadian literature by examining initiatives related to R2V that are being pursued by the Government of Canada (GoC). It draws on government documents, testimony by officials to the Senate of Canada, secondary literature, and interviews with two Canadian officials. In so doing, the author will demonstrate that current Canadian responses to R2V are characterized by two tendencies: decentralization and desecuritization. In the context of Canadian federalism, decentralization refers to the process of devolving the ability to make decisions on the design and implementation of public policy from the federal government to subnational actors. Despite the national security mandate and expertise of federal institutions, their role has focused on supporting municipal authorities and their constituent communities in initiating and delivering CR activities in Canada. Desecuritization, in this paper, refers to a government response to an issue which utilizes conventional (rather than extraordinary or emergency) procedures and de-emphasizes the exclusionary or coercive aspects of state power, while avoiding presenting the issue as exceptionally or existentially threatening.¹⁰ There is a clear priority on the part of actors involved in CR activities to avoid creating perceptions within communities that the government views them as suspect or threatening, and to ensure that CR has a distinct and autonomous (albeit complementary), relationship with law enforcement and intelligence investigations.

These characteristics reflect a commitment to incorporate both knowledge of R2V from the academic literature, and recent innovations in the field of public safety at the municipal level. Despite this, it is still possible to draw attention to broader challenges the Canadian approach will likely face moving forward. As such, this paper proceeds with a very brief literature review before examining the ongoing development of counter-



radicalization initiatives in Canada in detail. It concludes by identifying possible challenges for policymakers to consider at this still-early stage. As it is the intent of this paper to provide the documentary basis for further analytical work, the author also identifies areas for future scholarship on the topics of R2V and CR in Canada.

Current Understanding of Radicalization to Violence and Implications for Counter-Radicalization Policy

This paper uses the following definitions: R2V is the process by which an individual adopts an activist ideology which provides the normative justifications for terrorism, as defined by the Criminal Code of Canada.** Simply adopting an extreme set of beliefs may not, on its own, lead to terrorism: an individual who holds radical views only becomes a threat after making the decision to commit or enable violence. CR is distinct from the related processes of deradicalization and disengagement. Deradicalization is the process of causing an individual to abandon these beliefs, whereas disengagement is when an individual makes the decision to cease the pursuit of violence, but retains extreme beliefs.¹¹ Finally, CR is the process of preventing an individual from internalizing such beliefs that are likely to lead to political violence in the first place.

Existing academic literature offers an imperfect understanding of R2V. Many explanations are unable to demonstrate why supposed causal factors lead some people to undergo R2V, but not the vast majority of others affected by the same factors.¹² The extent of consensus within the R2V literature is primarily over four points. The first is that R2V is an idiomatic process that is tied to subjective experience.¹³ Secondly, the distinguishing characteristic of most people who undergo R2V is their normality.¹⁴ Many have the outward appearance of being well-integrated into the societies they plot against, and in almost no documented cases do they radicalize *as a result* of personal socio-economic deprivation.¹⁵ Thirdly, R2V tends to be a gradual process, with “stages” between the point at which individuals attain interest in an extreme ideology and the point where they begin plotting violence.¹⁶ Finally, theories with the most empirical support predict that group dynamics drive the decision to turn to violence. The radicalization process often begins when individuals connect, in person or virtually, with others who already harbour extreme views. As individuals focus on these interactions and self-isolate from mainstream society, they become more likely to view violence as a logical, legitimate and necessary solution to the problems they perceive.¹⁷

Considering these definitions, the author proposes that there are a number of key implications for CR policy which respectively follow the points of general agreement in the literature identified above. First, it is not possible to predict who will radicalize or who will not, meaning R2V must be identified after it is already occurring. Second, it may be possible to prevent a radicalizing individual from reaching the stage where they are plotting violence. Third, interventions made to this end should reflect unique individual circumstances in order to be effective. Finally, early detection and intervention is crucial to prevent someone from reaching the decision to commit violence, and thereby become a security threat.

As is the case for most Western nations, Canada lacks a detailed, dedicated CR strategy.¹⁸ However, CR falls under the “Prevent” element of the Canadian CT strategy, published by Public Safety Canada (PSC) in 2012, which lists three goals: building resilience to violent ideologies in Canadian communities; reducing the risk that individuals will undergo R2V; and producing counter-narratives to challenge violent ideologies.¹⁹ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is the term used by GoC to refer to practical steps to realize these goals. The CT strategy highlights PSC and RCMP community outreach and national security awareness activities, as well as support for non-government efforts to counter terrorist propaganda. The most recent PSC report on terrorism

** Violence committed, “in whole or in part for political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause,” in order to intimidate the public, “with regard to its security . . . or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or international organization to do or refrain from doing any act.” *Criminal Code*, RSC 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.01.



also references ongoing community policing and a forthcoming RCMP-led intervention program as key CVE efforts.²⁰ This paper will now examine these and other initiatives by PSC and the RCMP in detail.

Canadian Counter-Radicalization – Public Safety Canada Initiatives

PSC is the portfolio lead on CVE and, in addition to general policy work, its activities fall under two broad categories. The first is interdepartmental and intergovernmental coordination and cooperation. PSC works to coordinate the R2V-related activities of its portfolio agencies, primarily the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and Correctional Services Canada (CSC). An example of this kind of coordination is the adaptation of longstanding RCMP training programs on R2V for the use of correctional officers.²¹ PSC also represents Canada in international R2V projects. Notably, the department led the development of outreach principles and training for the International Association of Chiefs of Police.²² It is also currently leading a project by the Global Counterterrorism Forum to develop evaluation metrics for various forms of R2V programming.²³

The second category of PSC CR activities is public engagement programming. The key goals of this activity are to improve the ability of communities to recognize and respond to instances of R2V, and to facilitate initiatives that are intended to reduce the appeal of violent ideologies to young people.²⁴ Regarding community outreach, the most visible activity is the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS), a forum of prominent Canadians chosen by the Ministers of Justice and Public Safety to represent various religious and ethnic communities. Through meetings and conferences, the goal of CCRS is to foster national security awareness and also facilitate public input on policy.²⁵ Less well-known are meetings organized by PSC in specific communities across Canada. These follow requests by community leaders who also promote attendance at the events. The nature of the event varies, depending on the relationship between a community and PSC. However, over time the focus tends to evolve from trust-building to dialogue on R2V and its indicators, in the hope that “localized action plans” will follow.²⁶ Where this is the case, PSC will follow up play an advisory and assistive role. Common requests for PSC include detailed sets of R2V indicators, or information on programs to fund community-organized initiatives (which are often intended to reduce the appeal of violent ideologies or groups). PSC has not instituted dedicated funding for radicalization risk reduction, and instead directs communities to existing channels such as crime prevention or social programs at various government levels.²⁷ This is to avoid program duplication and, presumably, to adhere to government fiscal priorities. There is also the logic that initiatives will benefit from reflecting local circumstances and the legitimacy of being community-driven, rather than being imposed from a central authority. In the words of one official: “I don’t think there’s going to be a single Canadian model. If you look at one that is based on [the Charter of Rights and Freedoms], sure, but it won’t look the same across Canada.”²⁸

Canadian Counter-Radicalization – RCMP Initiatives and the Influence of the “Hub” Model

The work of the RCMP mirrors that of PSC in the sense that it is a decentralized approach largely based around community engagement, and supporting the development of local responses to the problem.

Beginning with engagement, the RCMP instituted the National Security Awareness and Community Outreach Program to rebuild trust with communities, “affected by national security criminal investigations,” following the conclusion of the O’Connor Inquiry in 2006. Under this initiative, officers within Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams built relationships with community leaders and hosted meetings to, “help communities and the RCMP better understand common objectives, as well as identify and resolve local concerns.”²⁹ While a key goal of RCMP outreach has been to encourage cooperation with investigations, it also supports work focused on R2V.³⁰ A Senior Director at PSC described the relationship between RCMP outreach activities and CVE activities before the Senate: “Law enforcement in Canada enjoys the trust of many communities . . . now that we have



that, people are willing to have a focused discussion on radicalization to violence . . . [o]ur way forward is to leverage those good relationships in general and to now do the early intervention and prevention.”³¹ An important component of this outreach approach, is that dialogue takes place between law enforcement and communities on the issues that the latter deem to be salient concerns.³² Communities may therefore identify other problems, for instance drug abuse, as more pressing priorities than R2V. This reflects both decentralization and desecuritization. That the RCMP engages on R2V at the behest of the community, rather than the other way around, emphasizes the agency of local actors. It also supports the notion that law enforcement engages with communities out of a concern for their general wellbeing, not because the government views them as potential threats to be managed.

Where the RCMP does engage with communities on R2V, the Force is supporting the development of “community hubs” capable of intervening in cases of R2V.³³ Similar to the work of PSC to connect communities with existing conventional crime prevention programs, the RCMP’s goal is to “layer” a CVE dimension into intervention programs which deal with conventional criminal activities, such as gang violence.³⁴ While the RCMP emphasizes that the form and mandate of community hubs will vary depending on choices made at the local level, the Force views a program developed in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan as a model approach.³⁵

Community Mobilization Prince Albert (CMPA) is a formal system for collaboration between various public institutions to intervene in cases that present an “elevated risk” for crime, violence or victimization. It consists of a “Hub” of representatives from provincial social services, health and public safety ministries; local government, school boards, and law enforcement; First Nations; and the RCMP.³⁶ The Hub meets twice weekly to share information on elevated-risk cases: if participants determine there are risk factors for violence present in a case which could realistically be mitigated by services offered by more than one institution, they develop a collaborative plan to do so.³⁷ In this way, the Hub rapidly deploys a response that reflects the unique circumstances of a particular case in order to prevent criminal incidents.³⁸ Crime indicators fell in Prince Albert in the years following CMPA’s implementation in 2011, and an independent 2014 preliminary assessment of the program evaluated it favourably.³⁹ As such, CMPA has enjoyed considerable attention from other levels of government across North America.⁴⁰

As cities or communities adopt similar models to CMPA, the goal of the RCMP is to incorporate R2V into their work, in an initiative the Force refers to as the CVE program. In practical terms, this effort entails including individuals knowledgeable of R2V issues in the different hubs established by communities. A GoC official cited Hussein Hamdani (a Hamilton lawyer and member of CCRS who claims to have dissuaded at least ten young people from joining groups such as ISIL), as a good example of such an individual.⁴¹ The RCMP is also providing training to the frontline law enforcement and human service professionals involved in these hubs to recognize and respond to R2V.⁴² While it builds on existing RCMP training initiatives (namely the Counterterrorism Information Officer program), this new initiative will be based on a dedicated CVE course.⁴³ Additionally, the RCMP avoids focusing on a single religious or ethnic community, or form of ideology, as part of this initiative. Rather, the emphasis is on identifying indicators or risk factors associated with individual behaviour as well as engaging as many communities as possible.⁴⁴ As such, the CVE program is intended to respond to a full spectrum of ideologies which motivate political violence and avoid creating the perception that certain communities are being singled out because the government views them as threatening. These goals reflect a desecuritization agenda as the RCMP works to ensure that CVE activities have a distinct (albeit complementary) role from national security investigations by law enforcement.

Canadian communities are beginning to establish hubs which resemble CMPA to varying extents, (for instance, there were six operating in southern Ontario by late 2014).⁴⁵ The RCMP has begun formally engaging these hubs, so that they are able to identify individuals undergoing R2V and intervene to, “provide them with the necessary support in order to change their way of thinking...”.⁴⁶ Despite this, the RCMP does not intend to



impose a R2V dimension on any community hubs that may emerge across Canada. Rather, the goal of the RCMP (shared by PSC) is that the impetus will come from communities themselves. Engagement and outreach efforts which increase awareness of R2V and improve perceptions of the government as a partner, thus support this goal.⁴⁷ Additionally, the extent of the RCMP's involvement in hubs will vary depending on its existing role in a given community; municipal police services will likely represent law enforcement in areas where they have primary jurisdiction.⁴⁸ Moreover, informed by lessons from CMPA and federal research into R2V, ideally most interventions concerning R2V will not be led by law enforcement, as interventions are supposed to be directed at activities in the "pre-criminal space."⁴⁹ In the words of PSC Assistant Deputy Minister while testifying before the Senate: "Early intervention . . . is a constructive alternative to investigation and prosecution."⁵⁰ The central role of non-law enforcement actors suggests the importance of ensuring a positive outcome *before* an individual begins to present a threat, which is a further indication of the desecuritized nature of this approach to CR.

Conclusions:

While its development and implementation is ongoing at the time of writing, the key characteristics of Canada's approach to CR are decentralization and desecuritization. As the lead agencies dealing with R2V, PSC and the RCMP intend to act as partners in programs developed at the local level, rather than imposing a national approach. In doing so, they will integrate a CR focus into general crime prevention programs rather than singling out R2V for its national security implications. This priority and the focus on trust-building, indicates that it is a priority for the government that communities do not perceive they are being targeted because they are viewed as potential threats. Moreover, community initiatives which resemble the CMPA "hub" model have the potential to offer early detection and individually-tailored interventions for R2V cases. These benefits reflect important lessons about the R2V process found in the broader academic literature. Equally important, if initiatives also resemble CMPA in the sense that interventions are multi-agency and community-led (rather than centred around law enforcement), then they will support the goal of desecuritization. While the preceding points are all promising, there are still potential challenges.

The unique nature of R2V and terrorism presents the first challenge. The notion underlying CVE work (explicitly articulated by both the officials interviewed for this paper and by those which appeared before the Senate in late 2014) is that, because terrorism is a form of crime, it can be prevented with similar means used against other criminal activities.⁵¹ The criminal dimensions of terrorist activity in legal and practical terms are not in dispute here, nor are the benefits of an overall CT approach based in criminal justice. However, when discussing the *motivations and antecedents* for terrorism versus those for conventional criminality it is debatable whether the two phenomena can be understood in the same terms and thus mitigated with the same tools. At the organizational level, political goals generally provide the *raison d'être* of terrorist groups while the pursuit of profit drives criminal groups.⁵² At the individual level, socio-economic factors such as substance abuse, mental illness and poverty may explain some forms of criminal violence as data reported by CMPA suggest.⁵³ The extent to which the same criminogenic factors also apply to terrorists is unclear, to say nothing of the ideational dimension which terrorism has and other forms of violent behaviour usually lack. Notwithstanding the background of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, the Ottawa shooter, the literature generally disregards socio-economic deprivation or mental health as causal factors behind R2V and terrorism.⁵⁴ All of this implies an important challenge for incorporating R2V into the activities of community hubs or other crime prevention programs: they will need to somehow develop the capacity to effectively respond not only to the variety of belief systems that can drive R2V, but also to the complex, intangible factors which inform deeply-held ideological convictions.

A related issue is that it is unclear how partners involved in CR intervention programs will distinguish between pre-criminal and criminal space when it comes to R2V. This is despite the importance of the distinction between the two spaces to the Canadian approach. Evidence of activities prohibited by the Criminal Code obviously



represents the threshold after which crime prevention activities should end and investigations should begin. Because R2V is a precondition for terrorism, it may be challenging to determine whether evidence R2V is occurring merely indicates the adoption of extreme views, or the adoption of extreme views *and the intent* to plot and carry out terrorist activities. Indeed, even after national security investigations have begun, the intent to carry out an attack may not be immediately obvious. The case of Martin Couture-Rouleau, who carried out an attack despite being the subject of “aggressive” surveillance and engagement efforts by the RCMP, exemplifies this problem.⁵⁵ The RCMP Officer-in-Charge for Public Engagement recently told the Senate: “If [a community hub] intervention is taking place and the individual is not responding to support, an assessment is done, and that’s when a decision will be made as to what the next steps will be.”⁵⁶ However, the criteria for determining whether someone presents a threat, despite being the subject of an intervention, and therefore must be referred to investigators is unclear. This ambiguity reflects a dilemma for the hub approach with respect to R2V and terrorism. Pursuing preventative actions to support an individual, who then goes on to commit an attack, would be a disaster for any CR initiative. Conversely it would also be problematic to undertake any actions which create the perception that a program is being used to police individual thoughts or beliefs. The involvement of highly capable partners focused on R2V and, to the greatest degree possible, transparency about the relationship between the preventative and investigatory realms, will be important considerations when addressing this challenge.

In closing, it must be emphasized that the Canadian response to R2V is still in its early stages, and the preceding comments should therefore not be interpreted as a judgement on its prospects for success. Rather, by raising potential concerns, the goal of this paper is to contribute to the successful planning, implementation and evaluation of current and forthcoming CR initiatives. Similarly, this paper is by no means an exhaustive account, let alone analysis, of R2V in Canada or the response to this problem. There are many areas to still be addressed in future scholarship. For instance, there is a strong case to analyze the Canadian approach compared to strategies in Europe and elsewhere. It is also worth examining the extent to which there is a significant empirical relationship between the criminogenic factors at the centre of the “hub” approach and terrorist cases in Canada and other countries. As Canada continues to prosecute successful CT cases, there is also a growing need for public study on the extent of prison radicalization and possible responses in the Canadian context.⁵⁷ As is always the case with this complex and urgent problem, there is much left to say, and to learn, about radicalization to violence.

NOTES

¹ See Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 23, no. 4 (2011): 521-36, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2011.571556>; Rick Nelson et al, *A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011* (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), https://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf;

² Public Safety Canada (PSC), *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Ottawa: 2013), <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/rsln-c-gnst-trrrsm/rsln-c-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf>, 7-9. See also Postmedia News, “Tories target homegrown terrorists and ‘lone wolf’ attackers in new counter-terror plan,” *National Post* (February 9, 2012), <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/02/09/tories-target-homegrown-terrorists-and-lone-wolf-attackers-in-new-counter-terror-plan/>; Aamer Madhani, “White House unveils new strategy to combat homegrown terror,” *USA Today* (December 8, 2011), <http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/12/white-house-unveils-new-strategy-to-combat-homegrown-terror/1#.Ux1DRPldUrU>.

³ Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), *Counter Terrorism Agenda 2014* (Ottawa: 2014), <http://www.itac.gc.ca/pblctns/pdf/2014-ITAC-Agenda.pdf>, 8.



⁴ Laura Payton, “Martin Couture-Rouleau case underscores passport seizure dilemma,” CBC News (October 21, 2014), <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/martin-couture-rouleau-case-underscores-passport-seizure-dilemma-1.2807239>; Canadian Press, “Michael Zehaf-Bibeau threatened to act ‘in the name of Allah in response to Canadian foreign policy’: source,” *National Post* (October 27, 2014), <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/10/27/police-investigating-whether-michael-zehaf-bibeau-told-anyone-about-his-plans-before-ottawa-shooting/>; Tu Thanh Ha, “Low-tech weapon probably limited Zehaf-Bibeau’s damage,” *The Globe and Mail* (October 24, 2014), <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/low-tech-weapon-probably-limited-zehaf-bibeaus-damage/article21305403/>.

⁵ *The Washington Post*, “Foreign fighters flow to Syria,” *The Washington Post* (October 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html.

⁶ Stewart Bell, “Canadians fighting in Syria could pose ‘immediate’ threat to national security when they return: CSIS,” *National Post* (February 3, 2014), <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/02/03/canadians-fighting-in-syria-could-pose-immediate-threat-to-national-security-when-they-return-csis/>; Gary Robertson, testimony to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (November 17, 2014), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/sec2/51734-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=41&Ses=2&comm_id=76.

⁷ See Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 5, no. 5-6 (2011), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lone-wolf/html>; Victor Asal et al, *Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis with Violent Hate Crimes and Group-based Terrorism: Report to the Resilient Systems Division, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security*, (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses Terrorism, September, 2013), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IUSSD_UnderstandingLoneactorTerrorism_Sept2013.pdf.

⁸ Lorenzo Vidino, *European Strategies Against Jihadist Radicalisation*, CSS Analysis in Security Policy, no. 128 (Zurich: Centre for Security Studies, 2013), <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-128-EN.pdf>, 1; William Sheridan Combes, “Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi Arabia’s PRAC and the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy,” *Small Wars Journal* (July 9, 2013), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-two-countering-violent-extremism-programs-saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-prac-and-the-united-king>; Steve Hutchinson, testimony to the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism, *Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism*, Issue 4 Evidence (June 21, 2010), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/403/anti/04ev-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=40&Ses=3&comm_id=597.

⁹ See David C. Hoffman and Alex P. Schmid, “Selected Literature on (i) Radicalization and Recruitment, (ii) De-Radicalization and Dis-Engagement, and (iii) Counter-Radicalization and Countering Violent Extremism,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 6, no. 6 (2012), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/235/html>.

¹⁰ The author based this definition on the discussion of desecuritization found in Ole Wæver, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders,” in eds. Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams, *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community* (London: Routledge, 2000): 250-92, 254. Cited in Paul Roe, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, no. 3 (September, 2004): 279-94, http://resolver.scholarsportal.info.proxy.library.carleton.ca/resolve/09670106/v35i0003/279_samrcod.xml, 284

¹¹ For discussions of the distinction between counter-radicalization and deradicalization see Angel Rabasa et al, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf; Alex P. Schmid, *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*, ICTT Research Paper (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, March, 2013), <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf>.

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