

# VIMY PAPER

**STANDING ON GUARD:  
CANADA'S STRATEGIC  
INTERESTS IN A  
COMPETITIVE WORLD  
ORDER**

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**MARCH 2021 – VOLUME 47**



**CDA INSTITUTE**

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# STANDING ON GUARD: CANADA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD ORDER



**BY GAËLLE RIVARD PICHÉ\***

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Canada has long shied away from identifying and openly pursuing its strategic interests. Now that the international environment is becoming rapidly more challenging and that geography no longer offers the country the sanctuary it once did, taking a sober and pragmatic look at what is essential to Canada is critical. A strong, sovereign, and united Canada, acting alongside its partners and within the rules-based international order, is less likely to face threat to its national security and defence. In a complex strategic environment and anticipating the lasting financial consequences of the pandemic, prioritization will be essential to the pursuance and defence of those strategic interests: national sovereignty, integrity and independence, the alliance with the United States, the preservation of the rules-based international order, and positioning Canada advantageously in relations to other major powers. Bringing back strategic interests at the centre of Canadian defence and foreign policy should start with a national conversation about the threats and challenges laying ahead.

Canada has benefited immensely from the liberal international order that emerged in the wake of the Second World War. Under American global leadership, Canada harvested the fruit of stable alliances and international institutions promoting free trade, democracy, and multilateralism. At home, Canadians experienced remarkable security and stability, at least when it came to the absence of threat to national security and defence.<sup>1</sup> As a result and in the spirit of the late John McCain's words, Canadian values have often defined Canadian interests.



The world is changing, however, and Canada is experiencing those transformations firsthand. The core assumptions upon which Canada's security has traditionally relied, from unquestioned multilateralism to U.S. security guarantees, are now brought into question. Growing strategic competition between major powers and Washington's recalibration toward peer adversaries are leaving Canada exposed, as illustrated by the detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor by China in reprisal for the arrest of Huawei's Executive Meng Wanzhou. The diplomatic riff with Saudi Arabia over human rights, the crash of flight PS752 outside Teheran with 57 Canadians onboard days after Iranian General Qassem Soleimani's assassination, and the dramatic consequences of the pandemic on public health, the economy, and foreign policy all speak to growing challenges to the country and its population.

Ensuring security and prosperity—Canada's enduring and explicit national interests—will be more important and challenging than ever in this new environment. To do so, a more pragmatic and sober evaluation of what is critical to Canadian security and prosperity is required. Ensuring the country's security and prosperity will require a strong and realistic vision of Canadian strategic interests, understood as those factors in the international system that affect the likelihood of an attack against Canada. Additionally, an increasingly demanding strategic environment and the lasting financial consequences of the pandemic will put unprecedented strain on the Canadian government and its national security and defence organizations. Ruthless prioritization will be essential to the security and defence of Canadian strategic interests.

In the absence of a clear articulation of Canadian strategic interests by successive governments, this paper provides some guidance to make sense of developing strategic trends and how they will likely shape those interests moving forward. After defining strategic interests, this paper presents Canada's primary strategic interests: sovereignty, integrity, and independence, Canada-United State alliance, the current rules-based international order, and Canada's strength in its relations with other states, particularly China and Russia. This paper adopts the Australian terminology of *strategic* interests rather than *national* interests, and it is particularly interested in the role of armed forces in the pursuit and defence of strategic interests. It therefore focuses on those aspects most likely to rely on military power to address threats to Canada through the promotion and defence

of a strong, sovereign, and united Canada, carrying its share of the burden in acting alongside its partners and within the liberal international order.

## WHAT ARE STRATEGIC INTERESTS?

In June 2017, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland asked the House of Commons, “Is Canada an essential country, at this time in the life of our planet?”<sup>2</sup> Arguably, the question referred to Canada’s place in the world and the many ways through which the country can leverage and maximise its position on the international stage. However, when defining Canadian national interest, the corner stone of foreign policy, the question should rather be: what is essential to Canada?



According to strategist Colin S. Gray, “The state of the world carries no inherent implications for Canada; a Canadian national interest ‘discriminator’ needs to be applied to events and trends.”<sup>3</sup> Determining a country’s interests is inherently political. It is up to the government of the day to identify them, prioritize certain issues over others, and allocate resources to protect those interests. Yet, it is notoriously difficult to pinpoint Canadian interests, usually associated to a

more pugnacious view of foreign policy and international affairs. Successive governments have preferred to talk about Canadian values over Canadian interests. Indeed, from peacekeeping to the responsibility to protect and from economic liberalism to gender, ideational principles have been front and center to Canadian foreign policy without much consideration about why those values were so essential to Canada’s security and prosperity.

### *Canadian defence policy and strategic interests*

Even in the realm of security and defence, Canadian governments have avoided defining Canadian strategic interests in great detail. In fact, the objectives of Canadian defence policy have remained largely unchanged over the last 80 years. Defending Canada against external threats, defending North America in partnership with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security have become axioms for the country’s defence and security community. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy* (SSE) itself is named after those interests: strong at home, secured in North America, and engaged in the world.<sup>4</sup> SSE posits Canadian security and prosperity

as the country's primary strategic interests, supported by global stability, the rules-based international order, and collective defence.<sup>5</sup>

Broad-stroked, those interests only provide limited guidance to defence planners, analysts, and scholars about Canadian security and defence priorities. Furthermore, if such constancy reflects the stability of Canadian alliances and Canada's remarkable strategic geography,<sup>6</sup> the absence of direct threat to Canada has resulted in a lack of seriousness given to defence policy.<sup>7</sup> Security and defence issues are only marginal matters in the public debate. Even SSE fails to identify specific threats to the country, despite discussing the global context and the major strategic trends.<sup>8</sup>

Yet, the strategic environment is changing, and geography might no longer be sufficient to maintain Canadian adversaries at bay. New domains of operations—cyber, space, and information—and fast advancing technology mean that Canada can now be reached more easily. These evolving trends are now forcing a change in tone in the national security and defence community. In February 2020, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Commander warned that Canada and the United States had lost their military edge against Russia in the Arctic.<sup>9</sup> Days later, the Chief of Defence Staff Jonathan Vance warned that Russia now posed the most immediate military threat to Canada.<sup>10</sup> Canada's top general also cautioned against the significant risk posed by China's coercive diplomatic tactics and malign activities, particularly in the cyber domain.<sup>11</sup> In fact, ahead of the 2019 federal elections, the Communications Security Establishment released a report on cyber threats to the democratic process.<sup>12</sup> Since then, the detention of the two Michaels has raised awareness among Canadians about the challenges China poses to the country.<sup>13</sup> Despite this reckoning, Canada still falls short of clearly identifying its strategic interests.



### *Defining strategic interests: insights from Australia*



By not defining threats and laying out its strategic interests, any government arguably gains flexibility in times of uncertainty. However, in the current context, a complex threat environment and difficult financial forecasts due to the Covid-19 pandemic call for greater prioritization.<sup>14</sup> For better or worse, Canada and Australia are often compared when it comes to security and

defence, given they are both middle powers, members of the Commonwealth, and close Five Eyes partners. Australia is often presented as better prepared and more strategically aware when it comes to defending the nation.<sup>15</sup> Yet, the two countries face widely different neighbourhoods. While Canada has greatly benefited from its proximity to the United States and its isolation from sources of turmoil, Australia experiences the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region more directly.

Given its strategic geography, Australia became aware of the potential consequences of certain systemic changes unfolding in its immediate regional situation and Asia Pacific more broadly as soon as the 1990s. Its 2000 Defence White Paper lauded U.S. supremacy and the resulting world order, but also recognized the rise of China and its potential consequences for regional dynamics, explicitly evaluating the risk associated to different threats.<sup>16</sup> Of the factors contributing at the time to Australian security—geography, strong armed forces, a good relationship with the U.S., and low prospect for regional conflict—only the first one was deemed immutable.<sup>17</sup> Two decades later, the 2020 *Defence Strategic Update* raised the alarm. Australia is now particularly concerned about the rapid military modernisation underway in the Indo-Pacific, the intensification of major power competition and its regional repercussions, and the expansion of grey-zone activities in the region. In response, Australia is reviewing its force posture and structure to deliver credible deterrence, shape the strategic environment, and better respond when its interests are threatened.<sup>18</sup>

To do so, Australia defines strategic interests as follows:

“[Strategic interests are] those elements of the international order that affect, directly or indirectly, the likelihood or seriousness of an attack against us. They reflect the ways that our vulnerability to attack might be increased or decreased by changes to the international system, the distribution of power and influence, and the balances of military capabilities.”<sup>19</sup>

Clear strategic interests help clarify strategic objectives, or what a country wants to do with its armed forces.<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, military force should be used in ways that reduce the likelihood or seriousness of military threats. Other instruments, such as aid or diplomacy, can also protect and even be better suited to advance certain strategic interests and objectives. For instance, foreign assistance toward democratization is based at least in part on the precept that democracies do not go to war against each other.

This definition can be adapted to identify Canadian strategic interests, which should not be solely concerned with conventional military attack. Given the current shift in the operating environment, attacks against Canada can also include hostile activities, unconventional means, and other measures short of war. Indeed, if a conventional military invasion of the Canadian north is unlikely, a cyberattack against Canadian infrastructures or disinformation during electoral campaigns to undermine the democratic process seem more likely.<sup>21</sup> So, what are Canadian strategic interests?

## CANADA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Canada's principal strategic interests are national sovereignty, integrity, and independence, the Canada-United States alliance, maintaining the rules-based international order, and ensuring a position of strength in relation to adversaries in the international system. Indeed, a strong, sovereign and united Canada, acting alongside its partners and within the rules-based international order, is less likely to face an attack against the country. These interests are dynamic; they affect each other and their relative importance will vary as the strategic environment continues to evolve.

This section unpacks each of Canada's strategic interests and discusses which factors are likely to influence their relative importance. Ultimately, the pursuit and defence of these four core strategic interests will ensure Canada is safe, secure, and well-defended in various future contingencies, from a prolonged status quo under American leadership to a multipolar order where the United States is no longer able to project power globally. Most fundamentally, interests two, three, and four should be pursued and balanced to preserve Canada's most fundamental and existential strategic interest: the country's sovereignty, integrity, and independence.

### *1) Canada's sovereignty, integrity, and independence*

States are by definition sovereign. However, a quick look back at recent history shows that the definition of sovereignty varies.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, modern state sovereignty has revealed gaps and limits in recent years, from the importance of recognizing and consulting with Indigenous peoples to the emergence of new domains such as the cyber space. Notwithstanding, Canada has the responsibility to ensure its territorial integrity, to ensure the safety, security and wellbeing of its population, and to maintain its political independence. Growing strategic competition combined to new domains of operation and rapidly evolving technology is reducing the geographic advantage that has long ensured Canada's sovereignty, integrity, and independence.

Three main strategic objectives will become particularly important in the coming years. First and most fundamentally, Canada must deter and defend against a conventional armed attack. Already, SSE directed the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to increase its reach and presence in the Canadian Arctic and to renew the country's commitment to NORAD. Investments in continental defence come with a major price tag in a context of budgetary crisis that is likely to linger well past the Covid-19 pandemic.



Second, Canada must deter and defend against hostile activities. At least in the near future, successful American-led conventional and strategic deterrence will continue to force adversaries to opt for measures short of war. At the same time, these measures offer a significant advantage to malign actors since they can generate strategic effect while remaining relatively cheap and offering enough deniability to prevent escalation and retaliation. Despite the publication of yearly reports by Canadian intelligence agencies, these challenges to Canadian security remain under the radar among the general public.

Third, foreign interference in Canadian affairs also threatens the country's political independence, national unity, and cohesion. Domestic polarization in the United States and authoritarian tendencies in some European countries are cautionary tales. Canada is not immune to disinformation campaigns and other hostile measures that can undermine the credibility of authorities, instrumentalize and intensify social and political cleavages, and cultivate angst and mistrust within the population. The pandemic has only accelerated disinformation, as Canadians battle with lack of scientific literacy, unfounded rumours, and conspiracy theories.<sup>23</sup>

## 2) *Alliance with the United States*

Its privileged partnership with the United States has served Canada well in the past, and there is no question that maintaining the alliance will be crucial to the country's future security and prosperity. As wisely put by Roland Paris, "by virtue of Canada's history, geographical location, economic imperatives, security requirements, values and cultural connections. The [United States] will remain Canada's closest ally and trading partner – even if the U.S. administration does not see Canada in precisely the same light."<sup>24</sup>



Ottawa certainly breathed a sigh of relief with the election of Joe Biden. So far, his nominations for national security and foreign policy positions suggest a preference for a return to global leadership and engagement, a reversal of Trump's America First foreign policy. Under the Trump administration, "making America great again" meant pursuing an America First foreign policy. It translated into security guarantee withdrawals, and a harsher rhetoric toward traditional allies, including Canada and NATO. However, despite an expected reengagement under Biden, the pandemic and extreme domestic polarization are likely to force the new administration to focus on the home field. The economic consequences of Covid-19 will also have long-term consequences on American finances and future defence budgets, forcing the United States to revisit its priorities.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, growing Sino-American competition will likely require a reassignment

of U.S. efforts, resources, and capabilities toward China. As a result of those two trends the United States is likely to ask more from its allies, independently of who the president is.

To protect this relationship, it is up to Canada to demonstrate its credibility as an ally and partner. Militarily, it means stepping up to the plate when it comes to continental defence, strategic deterrence, and main alliances. Of particular importance will be meaningful contribution to continental defence through NORAD, both in terms of sensing and kinetic capabilities. In addition, advancing cyber capabilities, reinforcing intelligence gathering and analysis, developing strategic communications tools and expertise, and increasing CAF ability to operate in the grey zone through appropriate authorities and oversight mechanisms would all contribute to make Canada a valuable partner. If the CAF cannot get bigger, it must get better, focussing on agile military statecraft in coordination with other tools of state power.<sup>26</sup>

### *3) Maintaining a rules-based international order*

Canada has benefited immensely from the post-WWII liberal international order. For better or worse, Ottawa has often presented itself as a beacon for liberal values and democracy. The promotion of those ideals in international forums also certainly benefited Canada in terms of visibility and influence. However, one can argue whether successive governments actually dedicated enough resources to support this narrative. Constant criticism around defence spending as part of NATO, or the recent failure of the Trudeau government to obtain a seat on the United Nations Security Council, suggests that the country has in fact often fallen short of meeting its commitments. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the current system of institutions, rules, and norms has advantaged Canada, perhaps best exemplified by the country's seat at the G7 table.

If the jury is still out on whether the liberal international order can survive growing strategic competition, preserving its institutions and ensuring continued multilateralism is crucial to Canadian strategic interests. On the one hand, the current order supports the United States' role as a global leader, which in turn advantages Canada. On the other hand, and particularly in the case of further American disengagement, maintaining a rules-based international order provides Canada with a framework to continue to foster coalitions and multilateral solutions to international problems. While it does not offer the same protection as U.S. security guarantees, institutions and multilateralism provide cover when facing adversarial states.



Consequently, maintaining traditional alliances and partnerships, whether through the Five Eyes Community and NATO, but also the UN, the World Trade Organization and regional economic agreements such as the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (known as CETA), will be crucial

to Canadian security and prosperity. Canada should also actively support the reform of international institutions to address inequalities that disadvantage developing countries while preserving the spirit of those arrangements. Additionally, Canada should explore new partnerships with like-minded countries in regions of strategic importance to Canada, including Latin America and the Asia Pacific. Ultimately, strength can be found in numbers and Canada should be seen as a reliable partner, not a free rider. Coalitions offer a strong deterring effect and a critical comparative advantage against countries like Russia and China who are notoriously bad at winning friends. Indeed, Canada has friends, whereas authoritarian states have clients.

#### *4) Canada's strength in a competitive order*

Notwithstanding the faith in American global leadership and the liberal international order, the future of Canada's security and prosperity will depend on the country's ability to avoid being unnecessarily targeted by adversarial states. Recent disputes with China and Saudi Arabia show how Ottawa has faced reprisals for its actions, suffering the consequences of coercive diplomatic measures in both cases.<sup>27</sup> U.S. disengagement is at least in part responsible for the assertiveness of authoritarian states who are no longer deterred to retaliate.

Moving forward, Canada should take a sober look at its foreign policy, seeking actively to position itself in a way that avoids needlessly provoking adversaries. This approach implies letting go of principled positions that do not serve Canadian strategic interests. In particular, a more granular approach toward China and Russia might help avoid what Pascale Massot calls "a sharp conflict of hearts and minds [...], which would not serve Canadian interests."<sup>28</sup> Canadian actions should not undermine the country's strategic interests.

Furthermore, and perhaps more fundamentally, Canada should become more comfortable with the idea of having competitors. Competitors are not necessarily enemies, nor are foreign affairs a zero-sum game. Idealism should be balanced with pragmatism in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, which means cultivating relations that enable dialogue, which could well in time avoid unnecessary escalation and conflict. Banking on cooperation and dialogue on issues and areas of common interest can help manage more difficult questions. For instance, Arctic governance provides Ottawa with a unique opportunity to level up to Russia and engage Moscow diplomatically. Failing to do so is only likely to further sever ties between the two countries, already strained by the conflict in Ukraine. It also risks isolating Russia on Arctic matters and ultimately creating the right conditions for formal strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow north of the 60<sup>th</sup> parallel.

Ensuring Canada's strength in a more competitive strategic environment also means increasing the CAF ability to deny, signal, and even punish when Canadian redlines are crossed—or about to be. From a strategic standpoint, it implies increasing the country's capacity to deter attack and malign

activities against Canada, either through denial or punishment. It also means working hand in hand with our partners and allies to adapt international rules and norms to the reality of state competition in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## CONCLUSION: AN ESSENTIAL NATIONAL CONVERSATION

The sanctuary in which Canada has found itself since the Second World War is eroding. The complex strategic environment the country faces, compounded by the financial and strategic consequences of the pandemic, will require ruthless prioritization. In order to do so, it is critical to understand how the international environment is shaping Canadian strategic interests, and what can be done to preserve and advance them. As a first step, the Canadian government, supported by the defence community, academia, media, and civil society, should foster a national conversation on threats and challenges laying ahead. Too often, those conversations happen behind closed doors and in small circles. It is time to open up those debates.

Strategic communications will be critical in the years to come and should be anchored in facts, sound analysis, transparency, and accountability. Informed Canadians are more likely to understand the importance of those issues and support government officials in making difficult decisions for the safety and security of the country. Ultimately, if Canadian values are not necessarily interests, those same values—democracy, transparency, and accountability—will be critical to the preservation and defence of a strong, sovereign and united Canada, carrying its share of the burden in acting alongside its partners and within the liberal international order.

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<sup>1</sup> A human security lens would most certain shed a different light on questions of safety and security for certain Canadians, particularly indigenous peoples and minority groups, but this paper focuses on external threats to Canada's security and defence.

<sup>2</sup> Global Affairs Canada, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities," June 6, 2017, [https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address\\_by\\_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html).

<sup>3</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Canadians in a Dangerous World* (Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1994), 9.

<sup>4</sup> Canada, National Defence, *Strong, Secured, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, (Ottawa, 2017), 59.

<sup>5</sup> Canada, National Defence, *Strong, Secured, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, (Ottawa, 2017), 59.

<sup>6</sup> C.P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada. A Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940); and R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation," *International Journal* 17, 3 (Summer 1962), 199-223.

<sup>7</sup> Kim R. Nossal, "The Imperatives of Canada's Strategic Geography," in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé and Srdjan Vucetic. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 20.

<sup>8</sup> Lindsay Rodman, "You've Got It all Backwards, Canada's National Defence Strategy," in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé and Srdjan Vucetic. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 273.

<sup>9</sup> Lee Berthiaume, "NORAD commander says Canada, U.S. have lost military edge over Russia in the Arctic," *The Globe and Mail*, February 13, 2020, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-norad-commander-says-canada-us-have-lost-military-edge-over-russia/>.

<sup>10</sup> Jonathan Vance, "Jonathan Vance Speaks at 2020 Ottawa Conference," CDA Institute, March 4, 2020. <https://cdainstitute.ca/jonathan-vance-speaks-at-2020-ottawa-conference/>; Michelle Carbert, "Russia poses most

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immediate military threat to Canada, top general says,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 4, 2020.

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-russia-poses-most-immediate-military-threat-to-canada-top-general/>.

<sup>11</sup> Jonathan Vance, “Jonathan Vance Speaks at 2020 Ottawa Conference,” CDA Institute, March 4, 2020.

<sup>12</sup> Canada, Communications Security Establishment, *2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process* (Ottawa, 2019).

<sup>13</sup> Roland Paris, “Canadian Views on China. From Ambivalence to Distrust,” Research Paper, Chatham House, July 2020.

<sup>14</sup> <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/528447-top-us-general-pentagon-needs-reality-check-for-2021-military-spending>

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Matthew Fisher, “Australian defence spending puts Canada to shame,” *The National Post*, February 6, 2012, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matthew-fisher-australian-defence-spending-puts-canada-to-shame/>; Andrew Coyne, “Good on ya: Australia is bravely showing Canada the pain and promise of a principled approach to Beijing,” *The Globe and Mail*, November 20, 2020, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-good-on-ya-australia-is-bravely-showing-canada-the-pain-and-promise/>; Andrew Davies, “Australia and Canada—what price defence?,” *The Strategist* (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), June 22, 2015, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-canada-what-price-defence/>.

<sup>16</sup> See chapter three on the Australia’s strategic environment in Australia, *Defence 2000 : Our Future Defence Force*, Canberra : Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, 15-23.

<sup>17</sup> Australia, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Canberra : Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, 23.

<sup>18</sup> Australia, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020, 34.

<sup>19</sup> Hugh White, “Strategic Interests in Australian Defence Policy: Some Historical and Methodological Reflections,” *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (2008): 66.

<sup>20</sup> Hugh White, “Strategic Interests in Australian Defence Policy: Some Historical and Methodological Reflections,” *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (2008): 66-67.

<sup>21</sup> Communications Security Establishment, Canadian Center for Cyber Security, *National Cyber Threat Assessment* (Ottawa : Government of Canada, 2020) 21; Canada, Communications Security Establishment, *2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process* (Ottawa, 2019).

<sup>22</sup> Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research,” *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1995):

<sup>23</sup> Christopher Dornan, *Science Disinformation in a Time of Pandemic*, Public Policy Forum, June 2020;

<sup>24</sup> Roland Paris, “Canadian Views on China: From Ambivalence to Distrust,” Chatham House Research Paper, July 2020: 11.

<sup>25</sup> Ellen Mitchell, “Top US general: Pentagon needs 'reality check' for 2021 military spending,” *The Hill*, December 2, 2020. <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/528447-top-us-general-pentagon-needs-reality-check-for-2021-military-spending>.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Roi, “The return of great power competition and the importance of military statecraft. In *Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft*. Edited by B.J.C. McKercher. New York: Routledge, 2021 (forthcoming).

<sup>27</sup> Roland Paris, “Alone in the World?,” 152.

<sup>28</sup> Pascale Massot, “Global Order, US-China Relations, and Chinese Behaviour: The ground is shifting, Canada must adjust,” *International Journal* 74, no. 4 (2019): 605.