VIMY PAPER

DEFENCE LEADERSHIP OF INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION

BRIGADIER-GENERAL
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

OCTOBER 2022 — VOLUME 51

Conference of Defence Associations Institute

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INTRODUCTION

Canadian security and intelligence discourse leans more to security than intelligence, as can be seen in two recent studies from the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Policy and International Affairs (GSPIA) and the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI).[1] The latter includes a rare and interesting contribution about Canadian intelligence development.[2] Reports of security and intelligence review bodies lately deal more with operational security aspects than intelligence issues.[3] Intelligence is not entirely ignored, but it certainly is not accorded the attention it merits.

There is no national intelligence policy or strategy in Canada or any strategic level intelligence doctrine in government. Given the complexities and instabilities of the international security environment, and the fundamental importance of intelligence capabilities and capacity to defend the nation, this is a worrying circumstance. Among other things, it could indicate a troublesome lack of serious thinking about the intelligence function generally, in government and across the Canadian public at large. This lacuna is apparent in the fact that the academic field of intelligence studies in Canada is weak and much less developed than in our closest intelligence

allies. While some intelligence training is found in government departments and agencies, there are no intelligence education programs in government and few courses, at any level, are found in Canadian universities at large.[4]

There is much more to intelligence than generally acknowledged or discussed in Canada. Canadians generally know little about intelligence practices beyond what appears in the media. Within government, departments and agencies tend to see intelligence only as what they do in their own specific area of effort.[5] Analysts in particular confidently see their role as somewhat synonymous with the intelligence function as a whole, but analysis is only one specialty within an intelligence enterprise. Canadian media persistently and erroneously calls anyone associated with intelligence work, a "spy." Professional academics generally resist being associated with an intelligence organization and many among the public think intelligence involves sinister agendas aimed at eliminating the civil rights and liberties of citizens.[6] Among many who know about intelligence practices in Canada, there is a growing recognition of the need for more intelligence education, both within government and for the public at large.[7]

This paper argues that the lack of intelligence education in Canada generally, but more specifically in government, can be significantly mitigated by Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) sponsorship of credible advanced intelligence studies programs, in partnership with eminent Canadian universities. The DND/CAF are well placed to lead a renaissance in Canadian intelligence studies and set the example by first engaging the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston, and the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto, and by establishing an intelligence studies research centre at RMC, with an endowed Chair.

The argument is presented in three parts. First, the case is made that intelligence is a legitimate field of academic study and intelligence education plays a foundational role in generating, preserving, and advancing a relevant body of theoretical and practical knowledge. The second part shows the central importance of intelligence education to the notion that intelligence is a formal professional field of endeavour. Intelligence education is an essential

ingredient of true intelligence professionalism. The third part describes the nature of the strategic opportunity available to DND/CAF, to lead the enhancement of Canadian intelligence studies.

With the case made and opportunity identified, three specific recommendations are offered. First, DND/CAF should encourage and support development and delivery of graduate and post-graduate level intelligence education programs in partnership with Canadian universities, principally through engagement with the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN), but also by participating in and supporting Canadian intelligence association activities.[8] Second, DND/CAF can champion interest in, and new growth of, Canadian intelligence education by establishing an interdisciplinary graduate degree program in Canadian Intelligence Studies at the RMC, and building more robust, modernized intelligence modules within the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP), and the National Security Program (NSP) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC). Third, DND/CAF should establish and fund a Canadian intelligence studies research centre at RMC, to become the premier, world-class Canadian intelligence centre of excellence and thought leader, at the leading edge of advanced Canadian intelligence studies. The research centre would be reinforced by DND/CAF sponsorship of an endowed Chair, Canadian Intelligence Studies and Research. Taken together, these proposals represent a strategic leadership opportunity ready to be exploited.

The recommendations are explained below, but first, to justify such significant efforts, the importance of intelligence education must be explained.

UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH EDUCATION

There are at least two general, but related ontological frameworks within which the study of intelligence can be pursued; one academic, the other professional.

Intelligence as an academic field of study

Academically, intelligence merits much broader consideration than it is normally accorded. Intelligence is a legitimate field of academic study, with an emerging formal body of knowledge. It touches upon many other fields of scientific inquiry too, for example, all biological, human,

physical, quantum, and social sciences.[9] There are emerging related fields of intelligence philosophy, and critical intelligence studies as well.[10] Intelligence involves much more than commonly thought.

Advanced intelligence studies are exceedingly rare in Canada and certainly are not established to the extent found in our closest intelligence allies – Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). There are many reasons why this is so, but prominent among them is that the intelligence function is not as well appreciated or understood in Canada.[11] Perhaps consequently, Canadian intelligence organizations have never received the attention or resources they need or deserve. Greg Fyffe's instructive 2021 monograph points out that, among other things, the Canadian intelligence enterprise needs much more analytical capacity, to at least match its collection capacity.[12] Fyffe contends that interest in intelligence seems to be growing across government, so it is reasonable to conclude that the need for a well-educated intelligence workforce, with enhanced and wider of understanding what intelligence is, what it does and how it works, will only become more acute.[13] More recently, Professor Thomas Juneau and Vincent Rigby, a former national security and intelligence advisor to the prime minister, led a task force of eminent Canadians who examined the need for a new national security strategy. Their 2022 report makes a number of calls for more intelligence capacity, to address foreign intelligence, open-source intelligence, and intelligence analysis requirements.[14]

Today however, there are no intelligence education programs in government and no intelligence education programs in Canadian universities that can match those found in our closest intelligence allies.[15] To reach the level found in Five Eyes partners, Canadian academic intelligence studies require leadership, mentorship and stewardship, if they are to be of any value in enhancing and broadening professional expertise across the current and future Canadian intelligence workforce, and among government decision-makers.

Intelligence as a profession

Do Canadian intelligence practices constitute a legitimate field of professional work? They could, and perhaps should.

Maria Morrow recently reviewed relevant field literature and identified five key indicators on the path to professionalization: 1) a shared identity; 2) a body of knowledge and knowledge enhancement; 3) an accepted code of ethics; 4) training and education based on accepted competencies and standards; and 5) certification and licensing.[16] However, other scholarship shows that professionalism generally is not binary, but a spectrum. George Allen described intelligence professionalism as being "relative" rather than absolute.[17] Stephen Marrin offered a similar continuum, from a craft to a formal profession.[18] In fact, Andrew Abbott, in his seminal work in *The System of Professions*, said, "a firm definition of profession is both unnecessary and dangerous; one needs only a definition strong enough to support one's theoretical machinery."[19]

But here is the rub when examining the Canadian intelligence enterprise – what theoretical machinery? Abbott tells us that:

> The organizational formalities of professions are meaningless unless we understand their context. This context always relates back to the power of the profession's knowledge systems, their abstracting ability to define old problems in new ways. Abstraction enables survival.[20]

"A profession's knowledge system is ordered by abstractions alone," says Abbott, "organized along logically consistent, rationally conceptualized dimensions." He continues, "… the abstract classification system is thus dictated by its custodians, the academics, whose criteria are not practical clarity and efficacy, but logical consistency and rationality." Finally, according to Abbott:

> … the ability of a profession to sustain its jurisdictions lies partly in the power and prestige of its academic knowledge…. Academic knowledge legitimizes professional work by clarifying its foundations and tracing them to major cultural values. In most modern professions, these have been the values of rationality, logic, and science. Academic professionals demonstrate the rigor, the clarity, and

> the scientifically logical character of professional work, thereby legitimating that work in the context of larger values."[21]

Abbott adds, "… the academic knowledge system of a profession generally accomplishes three tasks – legitimation, research and instruction …." And concludes, "The academic, abstract knowledge system is thus universally important throughout the professions."[22]

So, what constitutes the abstract knowledge system in the overall Canadian intelligence enterprise? Is there one? Is there even an authentic "intelligence enterprise"? In 2016, University of Ottawa legal scholar Craig Forcese wrote, "… development of the Canadian security and intelligence (S&I) community has been episodic, and largely reactive rather than strategic."[23] Moreover, recent works by Forcese, in the company of Thomas Juneau at the University of Ottawa, and Stephanie Carvin at Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) describe a security and intelligence community that continues to function largely as a collection of "parochial fiefdoms," cooperating and collaborating when directed to do so, but not necessarily habitually.[24] In their work on the relationship between intelligence analysis and policy making in Canada, Juneau and Carvin conclude:

> The relative weakness of institutions in the intelligence community and the immaturity of Canada's national security culture raises the question of whether there truly is an intelligence "community" in the federal government. Ideally, the intelligence community should consist of a sum greater than the total of its parts, but in reality, that is not the case; it has not truly reached "community" status. There is, in particular, still too much competition between agencies, and work is too often done in silos. There are also no common standards in human resources (hiring, training, promotions, or performance evaluation). As many interviewees emphasized, more broadly, there is no strong sense of belonging uniting its members.[25]

It is difficult to mentor an intelligence workforce, or exercise stewardship over the function if one is not educated in the field. Unlike related organizational functions such as administration, communications, engineering, finance, human resources, legal, logistics, medical, and operations, there are few professional designations or qualifications available or required for

employment in a government intelligence organization. This is not to say that intelligence practitioners are not educated. Many are highly educated, with extensive and varied experience, but few are educated *about* intelligence as a broad body of knowledge.

Beyond conceptual understanding, informed application of intelligence theory by leaders and practitioners requires that they know and understand the extended context in which intelligence must work. Within government, senior practitioners and managers should learn about the entire intelligence eco-system involving departments; agencies; inter-departmental/agency cooperation; personnel generation; capability development and delivery; the evolving nature of conflict, warfare, and the security environment at home and abroad; applicable legislation and regulations; relevant policies and objectives; processes and protocols; and technological development. As well, for functional self-preservation, there is a need for intellectual reflection on the future of the intelligence function itself and how it might evolve and adapt effectively.

So, debate remains open as to whether Canadian intelligence practices constitute a formal profession. Many like to think so, but even if it is not actually the case, there is sufficient evidence to warrant a continuing claim. There is also benefit in continuing to strive for professional status. If intelligence work is to be considered a legitimate profession, it must demonstrate its capacity for the generation, preservation, and advancement of a specialized body of knowledge, with associated, relevant concepts and theories. Today, no such complete, constructed, formal body of intelligence knowledge is found in any Canadian educational program. Generation, preservation, and advancement of specialized intelligence knowledge all remain to be established and nurtured.

A DND/CAF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY

An historic opportunity might exist for DND/CAF to lead and champion Canadian intelligence studies into the future, but like all worthwhile endeavours, there is much work to be done. Today, current circumstances might seem to inhibit a significant initiative. Given current CAF and

CFINTCOM, there might be insufficient senior level support for the resourcing of another major program, particularly if it is is not tied directly to CAF reconstitution or any defence policy update. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to make the case for the importance of intelligence education for the future Canadian intelligence workforce generally, and to discuss how it might be developed when conditions are right.

It seems unlikely that the professional generation, preservation, and advancement of specialized intelligence knowledge will be formally pursued by government before the overall intelligence enterprise is itself consolidated. It might take one of the more robust constituent intelligence organizations in government to step forward and cohere all others, to go beyond a simple *community* construct, to establish a robust Canadian intelligence *enterprise* – the integrated, purposeful, seamless complex adaptive system of systems that provides a broad range of intelligence assessments to government, enabling it to act with advantage in the pursuit of national objectives and defence of national interests, at home and abroad. DND/CAF could lead the intelligence community (a group of organizations) into the promised land of a true intelligence enterprise (the cohesive body of work).

Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy (SSE) prioritizes defence intelligence development, but not to the extent it could.[26] SSE prioritizes enhancements to joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the integration of information and analytical assets into an integrated system of systems to increase the ability of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) to deliver advanced intelligence support. A number of projects are underway to do all that, but amid all the enthusiasm there is a critical shortcoming. Apart from promising talk about enhancing intelligence *training*, SSE makes no mention of intelligence *education.*



Defence intelligence is a major player in Canada's intelligence framework and compared to all other Canadian intelligence functions, it might offer an attractive example of a forward-thinking intelligence system that habitually integrates its efforts with operational functions. DND, and particularly the CAF, operate a comprehensive and proven intelligence enterprise that includes all aspects of building and operating intelligence establishments, including force generation, force development, leadership training, intelligence planning, lessons learned, and all-source integration. Moreover, CFINTCOM is currently implementing the Defence Intelligence Enterprise Renewal (DIER) project, which is perhaps the most dynamic and exciting future-oriented intelligence development in government.[27] The project addresses many of the historical challenges inherent in the defence intelligence program and will take about a decade to complete. DIER might be government's best chance to 'up' its intelligence game, but it needs an intelligence education component to do so.

Education and training are different things. The CAF professional development framework (CFPDF) is built on four pillars: experience, self-development, training, and education. The CFPDF defines training as "the provision of specific skills, knowledge and attitudes required to perform assigned tasks and duties." Training teaches you how to *do a job*. Education is different. It develops understanding *about* a body of knowledge within which a job exists. According to the CFPDF, education is "the provision of a body of knowledge and intellectual skill sets, upon which judgement among competing facts, information and ideas can be critically examined, assessed and interpreted." [28] Within defence intelligence generally and the DIER project specifically, the education pillar is missing in action. One former senior defence intelligence practitioner put it this way:

> … in terms of DI [defence intelligence] education in the CAF, this is a serious problem. … There is no "how to" employ DI. There is nothing to educate operators etc. on what the different Ints [intelligences] are, strengths, limitations, there is nothing on how to employ them, there is nothing on what commanders (at all levels) ARAs (Authorities, Responsibilities, Accountabilities) are with respect to Int. Somehow, commanders come to think that signing off PIRs [Priority Intelligence Requirements] is direction, whereas in reality, direction is a priorities/ focus aperture as well as creating command and staff conditions for int[elligence]

> to be successful (resourcing, priorities of effort etc.) So, no doubt educating Int professionals has a way to go, but so does educating operators.[29]

Formal educational programs contribute to and sustain bodies of professional knowledge that, to be of any real value, require mechanisms for the exploitation and application of that knowledge, usually through force and doctrine development processes. Unfortunately, for many years at the strategic level, the defence intelligence function has not had an enterprise-wide force development process like those found in each of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and Canadian Forces Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM). However, DIER is building a defence intelligence force development process to serve the DND/CAF intelligence enterprise.

Across government generally, many decision-makers with intelligence oversight responsibilities either arrive in their position having no intelligence background or have "picked it up along the way."[30] Some will claim that there is already a meaningful degree of intelligence training in government, but as shown above, training is not education. Beyond training courses, there are no established intelligence education programs. Consequently, there is no systematic, structured theoretical thinking about intelligence.

Developed capabilities require doctrine to be fully effective. While there is a solid foundation of enabling doctrine at the operational level, there is no overall capstone defence

intelligence doctrine at the strategic level. In fact, there is no national intelligence policy, intelligence strategy, or strategic level intelligence doctrine elsewhere in government either.[31] Operational level intelligence doctrine benefited from study of past practices, relevant lessons learned, 'imagining the future' exercises, some specific trials of future operating concepts, and the authorship of very experienced practitioners. But at the strategic level in DND, there seems to be little in the way of intelligence 'visioning.'[32] Moreover, DIER has been unable to draw on any substantial guidance from any formal national security policy, grand strategy, or strategic intelligence doctrine.[33]

DND/CAF currently have the most extensive intelligence professional development program in government, but military thinking on intelligence is capped at the level of doctrine, largely drawn from British, American and NATO intelligence doctrine, not from original Canadian scholarship. Doctrinal thinking has been largely delegated to contractors, mainly former serving military intelligence officers and non-commissioned members who, while substantially experienced in intelligence tradecraft, have no advanced academic background sufficient to escape the inferential reasoning of experience. They have also been unable to keep up with the pace of work required in an unstable, changing world. The 'current' defence intelligence doctrine is outdated, having been published over a decade ago, in 2011.[34]

All these higher order requirements constitute a substantial part of any intelligence education curriculum. Without an established intelligence education program, DND/CAF, like the government intelligence function generally, runs the risk of denying itself the breadth and depth of research, study, and thinking required to understand the inevitable complexities inherent in any expected, or unexpected future international security environment. Without a credible forward-looking intelligence education component, the defence intelligence enterprise, or any other government intelligence activity, can hardly be considered a fully professional endeavour. Moreover, without an academically sound conceptual and theoretical base, defence intelligence will remain unable to claim the degree of professional sophistication inherent in the theoretically-based expertise found in the more mature Commands (RCN, CA, RCAF, CANSOFCOM).

At lower levels, intelligence practitioners are trained how to *do* tactical level intelligence at CAF and allied schools. At senior levels, no one is taught much *about* intelligence *qua* intelligence. DND/CAF can elevate itself above the level of tradecraft training at early- and mid-career levels found elsewhere in government. Some solace can be drawn from the fact that at least seven graduate level courses relating to intelligence are listed in the RMC War Studies Programme.[35] On the other hand, there is only one intelligence course offered in the JCSP Residential Syllabus at the CFC, but not in the distance learning version.[36] There is no intelligence course or module on the senior NSP at the CFC.[37]

DND/CAF can contribute to motivating the overall Canadian intelligence enterprise to walk the talk and reach the intellectual heights occupied by close intelligence allies, and demanded by today's international and domestic security environments, by developing an intelligence education program that can produce future leaders and practitioners who are educated about intelligence as an operational enterprise, not simply as a staff activity. There is nothing of the sort right now.

Circumstances are ripe for effective remedies. DND/CAF are superbly placed to lead an historic initiative to champion Canadian intelligence studies and build a truly world-class defence intelligence education program within the framework of the current DIER. The next section explains how.

THREE ENABLING RECOMMENDATIONS

Three recommendations follow. Collectively, they will enable DND/CAF to embrace intelligence education, both intellectually and in practice.

Recommendation One – Champion Canadian intelligence education programs in partnership with Canadian academia

DND/CAF have an opportunity to 'steal a march' on the entire Canadian intelligence enterprise and take the lead in establishing a truly foundational and professional intelligence education framework in Canada, to serve and educate DND/CAF, all government and eventually Canadians

at large. To educate and build a more mature intelligence workforce in the future, DND/CAF could sponsor and support intelligence studies programs in universities across Canada, working in partnership with the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN).[38]

CFINTCOM already has a number of outreach initiatives aimed at Canadian intelligence associations and post-secondary professional development programs. The Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) holds an annual symposium for academics and practitioners in Ottawa. A CASIS affiliate, CASIS-Vancouver, conducts the annual West Coast Security Conference, probably the largest annual security and intelligence event of its kind in Canada. The Canadian Military Intelligence Association (CMIA) conducted the annual Canadian Intelligence Conference (CANIC) for many years, but the effort has recently floundered due to lack of support. CFINTCOM funding and planning support for a resurrection of CANIC would be a welcome development. Finally, the new Canadian Intelligence Network (CIN) aims to champion intelligence education at all levels, in all sectors in Canada, by linking intelligence scholars in academia, practitioners at all levels in government, private sector corporate officers, and interested citizens at large, to facilitate collaboration among their various intelligence education initiatives. Association activities have the potential to reach a much wider audience than traditional closed, in-house meetings. They may well be critical to DND/CAF ability to engage and inform the public.

Recommendation Two – Establish interdisciplinary graduate and post-graduate level degree programs in Canadian intelligence studies at the Royal Military College

Generally, education, is delivered in post-secondary institutions, at the undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate level. The only degree granting institutions in government are the RMC in Kingston and the Collège militaire royale Saint-Jean (CMR), but intelligence studies courses at the graduate and post-graduate level are only available at the RMC. The RMC offers an array of

degree-granting programs at all levels that can contribute to the wider field of intelligence studies, and it administers graduate degree programs within professional development programs for senior military officers and selected civilians at the CFC, in Toronto.

It is recommended that the RMC, in collaboration with CFINTCOM, design, develop and implement a graduate level, degree-granting, interdisciplinary Canadian intelligence studies program, patterned on the popular and successful RMC War Studies Program. Program leadership, administration and development would reside within the RMC faculty, but teaching faculty would purposely and necessarily include affiliated academics from other universities (e.g., Carleton University, Queen's University, and the University of Ottawa) and engage academically qualified serving or former serving members of the Canadian intelligence community. This 'hybrid' faculty idea could eventually lead to a profitable habit whereby, from time to time, intelligence studies faculty members might move from academia into government intelligence appointments, and serving intelligence practitioners might move into academia during the later stages of their career. The ultimate goal would be to cross-pollinate both academia and government with experienced intelligence scholars.[39]

Given workforce adjustments developed during the period of COVID-19, RMC intelligence courses could be delivered online, or in some hybrid fashion, either synchronously or asynchronously, purposely taking advantage of the flexibility offered by a varied and widely connected program faculty.

A supporting effort would see the CAF bolster intelligence modules in JCSP and NSP courses conducted at the CFC. Within the JCSP program, there should be a minimum three-day intelligence module that goes beyond operational level intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE), to introduce course candidates to the entire Canadian intelligence enterprise and include a day-long tabletop exercise that involves pan-government intelligence planning for a major Arctic defence scenario. At the NSP level, the intelligence module should fill one-week, also involving a national level intelligence planning exercise scenario that calls up pan-government intelligence collaboration and places excessive demands on defence intelligence. It

will be important to study the legislated intelligence responsibility and accountability regime in Canada, as well as structured consideration of future government intelligence capability and capacity development. A national intelligence strategy should be on the agenda too.

Recommendation Three – Establish a Canadian intelligence enterprise research centre with an endowed Chair

As conceived in the national security context, intelligence has long been considered perhaps the most under-theorized, under-studied and therefore misunderstood phenomenon in any field of government generally.[40] Conceptually, what is intelligence? How did it come about? Where does it come from? What does it do? Why is it here? How does it work? How is it best organized? How do we sustain effectiveness? In what manner should we adapt to exploit it? What are the normative criteria that might guide development? How is intelligence affected by quantum technology? These questions invite philosophical and professional reflection, none of which currently happens as a matter of habit in government.

If defence intelligence is to be considered a truly professional endeavour, in which leaders and intelligence practitioners enjoy profound understanding of an overall conceptual framework and its modern application, the intelligence function needs a universally accepted and respected definition, and a tested theoretical base. At present, it has neither, largely because no one is thinking about it deeply enough. Despite literally tens of centuries of material, Canadian academic research in the field of intelligence is scant at best.

To build the conceptual and theoretical foundations on which the intelligence profession must be based, and to show the way to world-class capability and capacity, DND/CAF should establish a Canadian Intelligence Studies Research Centre (CISRC) at the RMC, reinforcing its leadership with a new endowed Chair of Canadian Intelligence Studies and Research. CISRC would serve the entire range of Canadian intelligence enterprises at municipal, provincial and federal levels. In fact it would serve all Canadians and be a source of seminal intelligence scholarship that can support intelligence studies programs at universities across Canada. It would be staffed by a range of suitably qualified intelligence scholars and serving or former intelligence

practitioners, and also provide a venue for ongoing intelligence research conducted by eminent Canadian professional academics and intelligence practitioners seconded from a variety of Canadian intelligence organizations.[41]

CONCLUSION

If there is to be a true Canadian intelligence enterprise that is to walk the talk of credible academic outreach and collaboration, and reach the professional academic heights demanded by today's security environment, it must be served and enabled by an embedded intelligence education program. The time has come to substantially enhance the breadth and depth of intelligence in the Canadian intelligence and security discourse. Circumstances are ripe for DND/CAF to take the national lead in championing a renaissance in Canadian intelligence studies. By tapping the spirit and momentum of DIER, DND/CAF have an opportunity to exercise historical leadership in developing the future intelligence workforce and elevating the intelligence function to its proper profile, justifying more attention, resources, and respect. DND/CAF can show the way by sponsoring intelligence education programs in eminent Canadian universities and supporting Canadian intelligence associations. DND/CAF can establish robust intelligence-oriented graduate and post-graduate intelligence studies programs at the RMC and enhance intelligence education modules in senior officer courses at the CFC. Finally, DND/CAF could establish and promote the Canadian Intelligence Studies Research Centre at the RMC, with an endowed Chair of Canadian Intelligence Studies and Research, and use it to generate leading-edge conceptual and theoretical developmental thinking about intelligence in Canada. Under DND/CAF leadership, these initiatives would help to educate all Canadians about Canadian intelligence generally, and add considerable and necessary substance to the ongoing development of the Canadian intelligence enterprise.

Dr. James Cox is a CDAI Fellow and a retired Canadian Armed Forces Brigadier-General who served for 35 years in operationally-oriented command and staff positions. For many years, he also served as a Library of Parliament analyst is support of parliamentary committees studying national security and defence issues. Today he teaches graduate level intelligence courses for Wilfrid Laurier University and serves as Chair, Canadian Intelligence Network CIN).

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2. Greg Fyffe, *Prepared: Canadian Intelligence for the Dangerous Decades: Reimagining a National Security Strategy Report No. 6* (Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation, November 2021), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/prepared-canadian-intelligence-for-the-dangerous-decades/

3. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), "Reports," https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports-rapports-en.html. National Security and Intelligence Agency (NSIRA) "Reviews," https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/reviews; Office of the Intelligence Commissioner (ICO), "Annual Report," https://www.canada.ca/en/intelligence-commissioner/annualreport.html. The author appeared before NSICOP in May 2022, to offer advice on subjects for future NSICOP study and recommended a study into the status and need for intelligence education programs in government, to enhance public service professional development programs.

4. The important difference between education and training is explained later in this paper. As will be mentioned later, there are some graduate level intelligence courses conducted at the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston. There are also four intelligence courses in the MA program at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, at Carleton University in Ottawa.

[5]. There are many department/agency-specific definitions of intelligence in government, none of which are academically sound. See more discussion of definitions of intelligence in James Cox, "A Fundamental Reconceptualization of Intelligence: Cognition and the Pursuit of Advantage." *Intelligence and International* Security, 37:2 (Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, December 2021): 197-215. DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2021.2005884.

[6]. See survey at See https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pwgsc-tpsgc/por-ef/canadian_security_intelligence_service/2018/101-17-e/report.pdf.

[7]. There are at least three Canadian intelligence-interested associations in Canada that champion intelligence studies: The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS - https://casis-acers.ca/), which conducts an annual symposium catering to academics and practitioners; CASIS-Vancouver (https://casisvancouver.ca/), a semi-autonomous branch of CASIS associated with The Canadian Centre for Identity-based Conflict at Simon Fraser University; and the Canadian Intelligence Network (CIN – www.canintnet.ca) that champions intelligence education by facilitating linkages between practitioners, academics, and the corporate/private sector. In a number of private discussions with people involved, in some way, with the implementation of the Defence Intelligence Enterprise Renewal (DIER) project, recognition of the absence of intelligence education in DND/CAF, and the need for it, is openly acknowledged.

[8]. Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN), https://www.cdsn-rcds.com/

[9]. For a more fundamental description of the fundamental nature of intelligence, see Cox, "A Fundamental Reconceptualization of Intelligence," mentioned in Footnote 5.

[10]. Jules J.S. Gaspard, and Giangiuseppe Pili, "Integrating intelligence theory with philosophy: introduction to the special issue," *Intelligence and International Security* (Taylor and Francis Group, May 2022): https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2022.2076327; "Critical Intelligence Studies – Special Issue," *Intelligence and National Security*, 36:4 (Taylor and Francis Group, March 2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fint20/36/4.

[11]. In 2018 a government study of public attitudes towards the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) revealed that when it came to basic knowledge of CSIS, a full third of respondents (33 per cent) said they had never even heard of the agency. See https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pwgsc-tpsgc/por-ef/canadian_security_intelligence_service/2018/101-17-e/report.pdf. Then in a 2020 public survey commissioned by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) found that only 2% of respondents correctly named CSE, while an additional 1% named CSE and the Cyber Centre. See https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2020/cstc-csec/D96-16-2020-eng.pdf.

[12]. Fyffe, "Prepared: Canadian Intelligence for the Dangerous Decades,", 1.

[13]. Phil Gurski, "Greg Fyffe: Intelligence Analysis in Canada," *Canadian Intelligence Eh!* YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FChT2vjep4I.

[14]. Drohan, *A national Security Strategy for the 2020s*.

[15]. See Charles Sturt University, https://study.csu.edu.au/courses/police-security-emergency/master-arts-intelligence-analysis; Brunel University, https://www.brunel.ac.uk/study/postgraduate/intelligence-and-security-studies-ma; University of Leicester, https://le.ac.uk/courses/intelligence-and-security-ma-dl/2022; Mercyhurst University, https://www.mercyhurst.edu/ridge-college-intelligence-studies-and-applied-sciences/department-intelligence-studies; and the US National Intelligence University, https://ni-u.edu/wp/

[16]. Maria A. Robson Morrow, "Private sector intelligence: on the long path to professionalization," *Intelligence and National Security*, 37, 3 (2022): 404-422. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2022.2029099.

[17]. George Allen, "The Professionalization of Intelligence," In *Ethics of Spycraft: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional*, Vol. 2, 3-12, edited by Jan Goldman, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009.

[18]. Stephen Marrin and J.D. Clemente, "Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 18, 4 (2005): 707-729. https://doi:10.1080/08850600590945434. Interestingly, Marrin points out that one must have a medical degree to practice medicine, but no equivalent requirement exists for intelligence work.

[19]. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 318.

[20]. Ibid., 30.

[21]. Ibid., 54.

[22]. Ibid., 55-56.

[23]. Craig Forcese, "Canada's Security & Intelligence Community after 9/11: Key Challenges and Conundrums," *Working Paper Series*, WP 2016-35 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, October 2016), 2.

[24]. Stephanie Carvin, Thomas Juneau, and Craig Forcese (eds.), *Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020; and Thomas Juneau, and Stephanie Carvin, *Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience* (Stanford CA: Stanford University), 2022.

[25]. Juneau and Carvin, *Intelligence Analysis*, 168.

[26]. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy (*2017), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy.html?utm_source=dgpaapp&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=redirect (modified 2021-06-07).

[27]. CDAI interview of Rear Admiral Scott Bishop, Commander CFINTCOM at https://cdainstitute.ca/brigadier-general-dr-james-cox-retired-interview-of-rear-admiral-scott-bishop-commander-canadian-forces-intelligence-command-and-chief-of-defence-intelligence/; and CDAI interview of Brigadier-General Greg Smith, Director General Intelligence Enterprise at https://cdainstitute.ca/interview-of-brigadier-general-greg-smith-msm-cd-director-general-defence-intelligence-enterprise-dgie/.

[28]. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "Canadian Armed Forces professional development framework," http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page (modified 2018-12-13).

[29]. Personal discussion, 1 June 2022.

[30]. In a recent graduate level course on *Intelligence and Analytics in Public Safety* (Wilfrid Laurier University), taught by the author, four students (two from the Canada Border Services Agency, one from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and one from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) commented on being surprised to learn the extent of the overall Canadian Intelligence Enterprise (CIE). In a webinar, sponsored by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) about pursuing a career in security and intelligence, a former national security and intelligence advisor to the prime minister recognized his luck to have been one of the few in that post who had gained some intelligence experience along the way. See CGAI, "National Security Challenges in the 21st Century: A Discussion with Vincent Rigby (8 June 2021), https://www.cigionline.org/multimedia/national-security-challenges-in-the-21st-century-a-discussion-with-vincent-rigby/

[31]. Allied examples are available. See the US *National Intelligence Strategy* at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf; and the US *Defense Intelligence Agency Strategy* at https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/DIA_Strategy_2021.pdf.

[32]. A UK example of intelligence 'visioning' is found in the UK *Strategy for the Intelligence Function: Strengthening Intelligence for the whole of Defence* (2021).

[33]. The last national security policy was published in 2004 and has been moribund for many years.

[34]. An updated CAF intelligence doctrine is expected this year (2022), but despite references to defence intelligence, the draft doctrine remains confined to military intelligence activity in support of CAF and allied operations.

[35]. Royal Military College of Canada, War Studies Programmes, https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/registrars-office/war-studies-programmes (modified 2019-11-27).

[36]. Canadian Forces College, *Joint Command and Staff Programme Syllabus*, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/118/406/cfc300-46-eng.pdf. Material is generally restricted to Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE).

[37]. Canadian Forces College, *National Security Studies Programme Syllabus*, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/119/187/323/331-eng.pdf

[38]. Canadian Defence and Security Network, https://www.cdsn-rcds.com/

[39]. I am indebted to Greg Fyffe for his help in developing this idea, as discussed over a private lunch on 10 June 2022.

[40]. Christopher Andrew (2004) Intelligence, International Relations and 'Under-theorisation', *Intelligence and National Security*, 19:2, 176, DOI: 10.1080/0268452042000302949; Scott, L. and P. Jackson, "The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.19, No.2, Summer 2004, 141. DOI: 10.1080/0268452042000302930; and J. Der Derian, (1993) Anti−diplomacy, intelligence theory and surveillance practice, *Intelligence and National Security*, 8:3, 29-51, DOI: 10.1080/02684529308432213

[41]. There is an argument to be made that a new CISRC should be located in Ottawa, to be intimately available to the mixed civilian/military defence intelligence team, and to the wider government security and intelligence community at large.