

VIMY PAPER

**TIME TO RESET THE CANADIAN
MILITARY COLLEGES AS MILITARY
ACADEMIES**

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TIME TO RESET THE CANADIAN MILITARY COLLEGES AS MILITARY ACADEMIES

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INTRODUCTION

In her final report published in May on the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada Louise Arbour states that “The military colleges appear as institutions from a different era, with an outdated and problematic leadership model.” Arbour believes it is time to “question the wisdom of maintaining the existence of these



military colleges, as they currently exist.”¹ Even though the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs) were not the primary targets of this review (which focused on sexual misconduct within the larger context of the CAF), her warnings must be heeded. Her report becomes the latest over the last thirty years highlighting structural issues in the training and education program imparted at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and at Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean).² Observers would ask why after so many critical reports, the CMCs have been unable to correct these issues.

As each report was produced, individual piecemeal measures were implemented to specifically answer each problem identified in the report. For example, following the *Withers Report*³, the decision was made in 1999 to integrate senior non-commissioned officers into the military staff of each squadron. Similarly, after the Deschamps Report in 2015, mandated “bystander training” sessions were instituted for all Naval/Officer Cadets⁴. In 2018, each CMC appointed a harassment counsellor following the *SSAV* Report. These different initiatives certainly allowed for corrections to be made to some of the most obvious problems⁵. But in

addressing only the specifics, each report neglected the essence of the problem. We argue that what was missing in response to all these reports was a *detailed study and review of the fundamental mission of the CMCs*; the origin of the problems faced by the institution stem from the fact that over the years the CMCs have lost their *raison d'être*.

To survive and to thrive in the future, the CMCs must *return to their primary and essential mission: to train and educate officers who are ready to serve in the CAF and undertake their responsibilities, and most important of all, to lead in operations*. This reset requires a clear vision of the mission and identity of the institution. RMC and RMC Saint-Jean must not be seen as “Universities with a Difference” – as was advertised in some recruiting efforts in the 90s; a vision still extant today – but they should be seen as true “military academies”. Although the CMCs do dispense a university degree like civilian universities, this should not define the essence of these unique establishments. These are not universities *first* while *also* providing some military training to CAF officers. They are and should be military academies, i.e., institutions for the training and education of future officers of the armed forces in which one of the aspects of the multidisciplinary program is a university degree. Whereas universities are by definition general educational institutions that serve to provide higher learning to citizens who will undertake diverse roles, responsibilities and positions in society, military academies serve only one profession, that of officer.⁶ In addition, they also have the mission to provide a complete programme of training and education, which goes beyond that of a university. So, a return to the essential nature of the academy also requires the development of a clear vision of this singular profession, that of the officer – something that until recently inspired pride but today seems confused which in return confuses the fundamental mission of the CMCs.

To be clear, although our study uses the Arbour Report as a start point, our intention is not to propose solutions to the issue of sexual misconduct discussed in the report as urgent as it may be. Fundamentally, we wish to propose a vision for the CMCs which will allow the correction of numerous criticisms voiced over the last thirty years. In fact, we are certain that reconnecting the CMCs to their *raison d'être* will help RMC and RMC Saint-Jean to deal with the issue of sexual misconduct. By returning to their essential mission, both institutions will better fulfil their mandate, to train and educate future officers able to undertake the vast range of responsibilities that are theirs, including to foster an inclusive and respectful culture for all who serve in the CAF. In other words, it is precisely by reconnecting the CMCs with their *raison d'être* that they will be able to prepare, train and educate Naval/Officer Cadets, making them agents of cultural change within their units. Finally, let us add that this article is an opinion piece providing a vision for the CMCs with some possible solutions.⁷

We will begin by briefly recalling the role of the CMCs in the training and education of CAF officers, then discuss the imbalance in the four pillars of the current program of RMC and RMC Saint-Jean. We will then compare the CMCs to some of the dominant models of military academies in other nations and end with five proposals to help reconnect the CMCs with their *raison d'être*.

THE CANADIAN MILITARY COLLEGES IN THE SERVICE OF THE OFFICER PROFESSION

Founded in 1876 a few years after Confederation, RMC was created to fulfil a specific need, to train and educate artillery and engineer officers to serve in the British Empire forces in Canada or abroad. Unlike infantry and cavalry officers who could learn their trade at their unit after a basic training course, ballistics or construction theory required detailed and specialized training at an advanced level. Canadian universities, at that time, were scarce and not all could offer this more technical instruction. It was therefore to meet this specific training need that RMC was founded at the end of the 19th century; first and foremost, as a school of artillery and engineering for officers. The focus on engineering and science continues at RMC today where more than half the student population are enrolled in these programs.

Since that time, the military colleges as well as the military officer's profession have evolved greatly. Naturally the differences between the RMC of 1876 and today's CMCs are enormous and any comparison would be beyond the scope of this paper.

First, and like many other countries, the CMCs now educate officers of all arms and elements (armor, infantry, pilots, maritime operations, etc.), not only artillery or engineer officers. Only specialist trades (doctors, dentists, lawyers, etc.) must receive their trade training through a civilian university under a different program.

Secondly, the CMCs have evolved over time to provide a full university undergraduate degree to all officers who complete their program successfully. While a federal institution, RMC received its charter from the Government of Ontario in 1959, so it can award recognized university degrees to successful students.⁸ A university degree is accepted today as an essential prerequisite to undertake officer responsibilities and to exercise command in today's complex operating environment.⁹ This is also why all military academies, with few exceptions, provide a university education as part of their programs.

It was not until the mid-20th century that the officer corps was recognized throughout the Western world, as a true profession. The foundational works of Samuel Huntington (*The Soldier*

and the State. Theory of Civil-Military Relations, 1957) and of Morris Janowitz (*The Professional Soldier*, 1960), traced the evolution of the officer corps and concluded that as “managers of violence”, officers are to be recognized by the State as professionals, with a special status in society and with responsibilities similar to those of doctors or lawyers, for example. As discussed in many studies on civil-military relations, the role and place of the officer in our Western societies has certainly evolved since the middle of the 20th Century in response to changes in the military domain or in society. But the profession continues to occupy a singular place within our society due to the nature of the responsibilities with which it is charged – essentially the management of violence on behalf of the state. This recognition of the officer corps as a true profession has raised the status of military academies everywhere in the West, including at the CMCs. Therefore, RMC and RMC Saint-Jean represent today much more than military schools for the initial training of Officer Cadets. Along with staff colleges and the war colleges (in Canada, Canadian Forces College in Toronto), they have become the true heart of the officer profession where their members begin to acquire the competencies, the practical aptitudes, and the theoretical knowledge of the profession of arms. The CMCs today provide a complete training and education program to future officers.

Additionally, the CMCs occupy the central part of an officer’s corporate identity inherited through the conduct, codes, and symbols of the profession, whose traditions date back to the beginning of modern armies, and which provide the inspiration, pride, and loyalty to succeed in the business of planning and managing military operations. It is in the CMCs that future officers are taught to espouse the notion of military service, with its inevitable ‘unwritten clause of unlimited liability’, to quote John Hackett ¹⁰. Finally, the CMCs play a central role in the development and passage of the military ethos not only to Naval/Officer Cadets, but to all military members.

Military academies seem today to be inescapable and unique institutions in all countries who have permanent forces ¹¹. Their uniqueness is first defined by the symbolic place they occupy in the armed forces of a country because they appear within a network that spans more than the military realm (partnering with civilian universities, research centres, foreign academies, etc.), and because of their presence in public opinion ¹². They are different from trade schools because of the university education they provide, and they are different from civilian universities because their program is much more comprehensive in scope. Unlike other professions, Officer Cadets reside at the colleges and the institution becomes their home where they are taught, moulded, and socialised, and where they live for the entire duration of their educational period, with a strict regime of leave periods and constant supervision. Military academies are “total or closed institutions”¹³ in that they seek to transform the candidates that attend into officers ¹⁴. Academies are not content to simply pass on knowledge to students or practical competencies to

military candidates. Their final objective is to bring young men and women, who are usually civilians at enrolment, to adopt a new personal identity by embracing the military life, and by adhering to a new set of values, cultural norms and the way of life of military officers. In that manner, military academies with their total approach, are perhaps closer in comparison to Catholic seminaries that produce priests.

Another singular aspect of military academies is the unique activity for which they prepare students: military operations ¹⁵. Obviously, the responsibilities of officers are much wider in scope; there is the management of units in garrison, strategic planning, troop training, etc. However, preparing future officers to lead or as staff officers in operations constitutes an exclusive responsibility of the profession in that it is the only one that can undertake it; it could be seen as the ultimate *raison d'être* of the officer profession. It seems rather ironic that at the time the Arbour Report was released, we were spectacularly reminded that the idea of war, which was fading from the Western mind, is still possible and requires countries to be prepared to wage it to defend themselves and their allies. This necessity seems to be totally absent from the deep reflection conducted by Arbour as she reviewed the organisational culture of the CAF. As qualified by historian Michel Goya, the military domain is nothing “normal” compared to other professional activities; it is an “extraordinary activity and those who participate in it do not do so in an ‘average’ manner” ¹⁶. Thus, the task of *preparing officers to assume their role as military professionals is and remains the ultimate objective of military academies*.

ENSURING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THE ACADEMIC AND MILITARY PILLARS

We contend that over time, the CMCs have lost their true *raison d'être* as military academies. There are several reasons for this state of affairs primarily in both Canadian politics and society, that the warrior ethos has virtually disappeared so that for Canadians in general and elected officials in particular, the maintenance of large military forces, including the CMCs, is almost a historical anomaly. Additionally, regular, and substantial defence budget cuts, to which non-operational units such as the CMCs contributed greatly, i.e., in 1997 (Forces reduction plan) and in 2012 (Workforce adjustment), had a major impact on the mission of the institution. Finally, the CMCs do not seem to have learned from the best practices of international military academies – an issue we will address later in this article.

The main reasons for the *loss of raison d'être* are seen in the *lack of coherence between the four pillars of the program of RMC and RMC Saint-Jean* ¹⁷. Tensions and competition for time and effort between sections of a multidisciplinary program are more common than not and have been a constant at the CMCs. But when the tensions become overbearing, the overall

mission of the institution can be affected. As time went on within the CMCs, the tensions between the pillars increased as the institutions slowly lost their *raison d'être* and conversely, the gradual move of CMCs away from their true mission aggravated the existing tensions. In other words, as the unifying vision of a military academy faded, tensions caused by divergent objectives of each pillar of the Regular Officer training Plan (ROTP) increased. The *Arbour Report* states that “the four-pillar model shows some strains. The governance structure at the military colleges is one of ongoing conflict and confusion between academic and military missions and visions”¹⁸.

In more specific terms, of all tensions within the four pillars of the CMCs, the greatest is between the military and academic pillars. As was raised in the *SSAV Report* in 2017, this tension has a direct effect on the morale of the Naval/Officer Cadets who feel torn between the often-divergent norms, requirements, and cultures of these two pillars¹⁹. Actually, given the resources allocated to the maintenance of a quality university program, the number of hours spent on classroom instruction as well as the prestige accorded to university studies, *the academic pillar has, over the last few years, come to occupy a preponderant place in the CMCs to the detriment of the coherence of the total program*. As pointed out in this report, there exists a:

“sub-culture where some educators and professors were of the belief that RMC is first and foremost a university and not a unique national institution. As such, some viewed that other elements of the programme, specifically the Military Pillar, were carried out at the expense of study time and academic preparation for the N/OCdts. The Training Wing, in particular, was often identified as being responsible for over-programming N/OCdts and impinging on their study time.”²⁰

The decision by RMC in the 1950s to increase the level of studies offered to future officers and to pursue a university charter followed a trend in the Western, then global, context to enhance the educational standard required by military professional officers. This choice is still pertinent today and it could be argued that the complexity of today's operational theatres requires officers who are even more educated, able to use complex analytical and synthetic tools and able to think critically. This may explain the decision by some European military academies to provide a Master's degree (graduate studies in the European Higher Education Area) as a terminal degree in their academies. By agreeing to offer a university degree to future officers, the CMCs had to follow norms and standards external to the military institution. In other words, CMC command authorities had to relinquish total control of the standards they had exercised until then. University norms are complex and are based on a number of rules imposed by governmental authorities in higher education (in Canada by the governments of the provinces of Ontario and Québec, where the two CMCs are situated), as well as practices and conventions in

existence in the university milieu, which, while they are unofficial, are so solidly anchored in the culture of these institutions as to be impossible to bypass. Let us add that all universities, because of their institutional freedom, often impose on themselves specific rules and regulations that have no legitimacy outside their jurisdiction but become part of their organisational culture. The challenge is not that the CMCs have chosen to provide a university education to their Naval/Officer Cadets appropriate to their military profession, nor that they must adhere to the rules and norms of civilian universities, since all military academies must do so. The problem is that the integration of these norms in the CMCs in the last few years has gradually eroded the internal coherence of the multidisciplinary program.

One of the most visible signs of the loss of focus on the *raison d'être* of the CMCs can be found in the relative weakness of the military pillar, highlighted in the *Withers Report* in 1998 that qualified the situation as “unacceptable”. The same comment was noted in 2017 in the *SSAV Report* that stated: “RMC did not sufficiently balance and integrate military training and academic education. As a result, military training at RMC was secondary to the culture and demands of the academic program” ²¹. Compared to the standards and exigencies of the academic program, the standards required in the military pillar of the CMCs seemed rather modest, if not anemic as reported further:

“Overall, we found that the Royal Military College of Canada emphasized academic education over military training and that there were weaknesses in military training. Recommendations from previous reviews of the Royal Military College of Canada to enhance military training did not result in fundamental changes. We also found that there was no clear measurable standard for leadership qualities and ethical military behavior that graduates were required to demonstrate before receiving their commissions.” ²²

In practical terms, we have observed for several years a desire by many in the faculty to bring the CMCs closer to the civilian university model ²³. The *SSAV Report* noted specifically that “some educators and professors were of the belief that RMC is first and foremost a university and not a unique national institution” ²⁴. However, bringing the CMCs closer to civilian universities would be removing, finally and completely, the *raison d'être* of these institutions. Were the objective reached and the CMCs become in fact like any other university, this would then make them completely redundant. Why would the CAF retain colleges that seem to cost more to produce the same level of officers when any civilian university could do the same job?

Improving the training and education program of the CMCs must first pass through a rebalancing of the pillars. We are convinced that the best way to prepare future officers of the CAF for their unique profession and the immense responsibilities that await them is to provide a rich and demanding multidisciplinary training and education program.

Therefore, a reset of the CMCs would involve returning them to their fundamental mission. Institutionally, RMC and RMC Saint-Jean are not simple military units, even if they have a military command structure; they are not simple professional schools, even if they train professional officers; and they are not simple universities even if they provide a university education. As unique institutions, *they are military academies*.

THE CANADIAN MILITARY COLLEGES COMPARED TO OTHER MILITARY COLLEGES IN THE WORLD

In her report, Justice Arbour recommends CAF authorities conduct a detailed analysis of the CMCs using examples "of different models that may be preferable and adaptable in the Canadian context,"²⁵ at first glance from our UK and US allies. Such a comparison should have



taken place long ago and might have prevented some of the negative issues at the CMCs highlighted in all the reports of the last 30 years. Picking up best practices in training and educating future officers from other military academies who face similar challenges might have been useful ²⁶. We are convinced that the challenges faced by the CMCs today are not unique to these institutions. Trying to

emulate the processes within civilian universities seems well ingrained in the CMCs, whereas learning from other military academies is not. And yet, despite national and cultural differences, RMC and RMC Saint-Jean have much more in common with the Royal Military Academy of Belgium, the *Theresianische Militäarakademie* (Theresian Military Academy) of Austria or the Australian Defence Force Academy, to mention only these three, than with any Canadian civilian university.

Let us, however, be critical of the suggestion by Justice Arbour to examine specifically the British and American models. Compared to most if not all models of military academies in

the Western world, the military academies of these two nations are exceptions to the norm. First, in the case of the UK, the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy trains officers of the British Army and since the end of the “long program” in 1972, provides programs of between eight and 44 weeks. The Regular Commissioning Course is not only shorter than those in many Western military academies – whose length varies from three and five years (sometimes even six years) – but importantly, it does not provide a university education. In fact, the program corresponds more to our own Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) taught at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School and our BMOQ – Army (which used to be known as “Common Army phase”) offered at the Combat Training Centre. In addition, the British Army is one of the only Western forces that does not require its officers (outside of specialists) to hold a university degree but require attendance at their military academy. Therefore, we believe the Sandhurst model would not apply in a reset of the CMCs.

Regarding the U.S. example, the considerable size of their armed forces requires the Americans to use a large and complex network of military academies dedicated to the production of their officers, first through the Service Academies such as the U.S. Military Academy (West Point, NY), the U.S. Naval Academy (Annapolis, MD), the U.S. Air Force Academy (Colorado Springs, CO), the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (New London, CT) and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (Kings Point, NY). To these five better-known establishments can be added several private universities known as senior military academies, such as Norwich University, The Citadel, the University of North Georgia, Virginia Military Academy, and others that offer military training to students who elect to become reserve officers and many other civilian universities (public or private) who continue to offer similar programs such as the Regular Officer Training Corps. It is therefore difficult to see how Canada could use this complex network as an example when we only have two joint military colleges. Canada would do better to use examples of other academies as models from smaller nations whose geopolitical weight, military traditions and institutions are comparable to Canada’s such as Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, and even France and Australia.

To begin, let us make five general remarks regarding different models of military academies in the world ²⁷. Our intention is to underline the principles which underpin the principal military academies in the world today to lead us to the proposals we will detail later.

First, *all countries who field permanent armed forces have military academies*, at times organized by Service (e.g., France, Netherlands, or Norway) or as joint academies (as in Belgium, Austria, or Australia). Some smaller countries do not have military academies but prefer to send their officers to those of allied countries. For example, Luxemburg sends their Officer Cadets to the Royal Military Academy of Belgium and Djibouti, until the creation of the

Académie militaire interarmées d'Arta in 2008, sent their Cadets to Morocco or France. The military academy model is universal.

Secondly, *military academies usually have the mission of training all officers of their armed forces without exception*. The Canadian model is therefore unique in that only between 25 and 30% of regular force officers receive their initial training at one or other of the CMCs ²⁸. Thus, the majority of CAF officers do not attend a CMC for their initial training, although many will, later in their career, undertake graduate studies in a Master's or PhD program at RMC. This fact causes a regular questioning of the pertinence of the CMCs, especially on the basis of cost comparison between training an Officer Cadet at a CMC versus other recruiting programs. This is a uniquely Canadian debate since in all other countries, military academies are the only entry program to the profession.

Thirdly, *as the only entry plan for officers, international military academies offer a diversity of programs tied to the provenance of these recruits*. Most applicants admitted to military academies around the world are usually recruited out of high school (or equivalent) into a multidisciplinary 4 or 5-year long program (which corresponds to our ROTP) for service in the regular forces. However, beside this traditional program, there are other training programs of shorter duration that are well-adapted for officers entering directly, for specialists, for officers coming from non-commissioned ranks, for reserve officers and for those on temporary duty. Some military academies, notably in smaller countries, even offer advanced programs normally found in staff schools or staff/war colleges. This is for example the case in the Royal Military Academy of Belgium and at *Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu* (the Finnish Senior school of national defence). So as the heart of the officer profession, military academies offer a great diversity of programs to all officers.

The fourth postulate is that *any long program in a military academy always includes a university degree* (except for the UK as explained above or in some African military academies). The degree programs are accredited in different ways. In some cases, they are accredited as full-fledged universities by each country's educational authorities such as is the case for our CMCs and for the *École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr* in France or the Korean Military Academy. In other cases, recognition comes from partnerships with partner universities such as is the case in Spain for the *Academia General Militar* in partnership with the *Centro Universitario de la Defensa* or in South Africa, where Stellenbosch University teaches courses to Cadets enrolled at the South African Military Academy. Currently, there is a trend of reinforcement of educational programs in military academies. For example, the Bologna process has caused an increase in the level of education within some European military academies to that of Master as is the case in

Poland at the General Tadeusz Kościuszko Army military academy (AWL) and the *Academia Militar* of Portugal²⁹.

Finally, *the faculty of most military academies is usually made up of civilian contracted or part-time professors or of officers* (regular or reserve) whose academic qualifications do not always ensure a quality university level of teaching. In comparison, RMC and RMC Saint-Jean have the benefit of a permanent well-trained faculty whose members usually hold PhDs and who continue to perform scientific research. This is exceptional compared to most Western military academies and is undoubtedly one of the strengths of the Canadian model. Canadian Officer Cadets benefit from high-level teaching from professors who are usually available since only attached to the CMCs, and who expose them to a diversity of opinions compared to faculty who would only be composed of military members. Regrettably, many of the civilian faculty of the CMCs are intent on continuing to make the CMCs more like civilian universities instead of ensuring that they serve the needs of the CAF as military academies.

A RESET OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY COLLEGES THROUGH FIVE GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Resetting the CMCs requires that they reconnect with their real mandate as military academies. This must begin by reinforcing the coherence of their multidisciplinary program with the aim of preparing officers for service in the CAF, including the most important element of that service: military operations. In 1999, the *Withers Report* was already recommending that RMC reconnect with its “raison d’être, the Canadian Forces.” To this end we therefore submit five general recommendations, some of which reiterate ones contained in the different critical reports on the CMCs of the last 30 years. It must be noted that the measures we are calling for can only be adopted gradually, as part of a multi-year program. There is no overnight solution to a problem decades in the making.

- I) *Review the place of the academic pillar in the CMC program.* We mentioned above the lack of coherence in the multidisciplinary program of the CMCs. To remedy this situation requires reviewing the place of the academic pillar in the overall program as it has come to occupy a more prominent place to the detriment of the other pillars.

The need to meet the requirements of university-level teaching forces a series of norms that constrain a program, notably in terms of hours of teaching, faculty qualification, passing standards, governance mechanisms, program management, professional certification for engineers, for example, etc. All universities must meet these requirements, including RMC and

RMC Saint-Jean. However, we believe that it is possible to rebalance the relative weight of the academic pillar in the CMC program without sacrificing the quality of education offered to officer cadets nor failing to meet university accreditation. We understand that such an initiative might collide with a habit of certain members of faculty or military staff of the CMCs who insist they are universities like many others. However, *there is not one unique model of university*.

Because of the institutional autonomy guaranteed by the university charter they hold, universities exist in a great diversity of forms and models. In fact, there is no one model for a university in Québec or Ontario or in any other province in Canada. Saint-Anne University in Nova Scotia, Laurentian University in Ontario and *Université de Montréal* are very different establishments not only by virtue of their size, but by the nature of the programs they provide (Bachelor, Master's and PhD; professional certificates; more technical degrees; cooperative programs; etc.), by the weight of research compared to teaching conducted in the institution (with research centres, research chairs, partnerships with private industry, etc.), and by their level of institutional ambition (serving the local community, specific professions, the international community, etc.). Although *Université de Montréal*, with its 70,000 registered students, promotes itself as a great research university, Saint-Anne University with 540 students mainly offers bachelor-level programs, and Laurentian University with some 7000 students is somewhere in the middle, all are accredited as full universities. This official accreditation comes from the provincial authorities in higher education, from provincial or regional university associations where they reside and more widely, from the community of Canadian universities³⁰. All three hold a university charter, are members of the Atlantic University Association (AUA), the Council of Ontario Universities (COU), or the *Bureau de coopération interuniversitaire (BCI)* in Québec, as well as the Universities Canada network and the *Association des collèges et universités de la francophonie canadienne (ACUFC)* for the first two. It is therefore up to RMC and RMC Saint-Jean to continue to find their place as unique institutions in the network of Canadian universities. This status should not be incompatible with a return to their role as military academies and as *undergraduate institutions* – this is the best way to ensure they serve the training and education of CAF officers.

Finally, the reset of the academic pillar of the CMCs should have as the objective to contribute within the Naval/Officer Cadets to the development of *critical thinking anchored in a broad and solid general culture in the service of the profession of arms*. This objective should be attained through three separate measures.

The first is a *rationalization of the numbers of academic programs available at the CMCs*. Given the size and needs of the CAF, the eight Arts programs, five Science programs and six Engineering programs offered at RMC are too many³¹. For comparison purposes, the Royal

Military Academy in Brussels has two academic programmes: one in military and social science and one in engineering science, with of course a few areas of specialization. France's *École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr* similarly has two programs: engineering science and social and political science, also with several options ³². The Austrian *Theresianische Militärakademie* provides officer cadets only one academic program, a Bachelor's degree in Applied Science in Military Leadership which is in reality a pluri-disciplinary program with a large component of social sciences ³³. The number of programs available at RMC along with different specializations in which few students for many years are enrolled require resources that could be used elsewhere. In addition to providing some cost savings, it may also allow for better alignment of these programs with CAF training needs. In our view, true liberal arts multidisciplinary programs would better support the needs of future CAF officers than traditional discipline-based programs.

The second measure *involves an improvement of the College Core Curriculum*, namely by developing courses that reinforce the “professional” character of the academic programs of the CMCs. The core curriculum came about as a result of the *Withers Report* which saw it as a way to train “a cohort of graduate officers, all of whom share a common, professional body of knowledge in addition to their specialist degree” ³⁴. This objective still applies to this day. The current core curriculum contains a total of 21 credits for those registered in Arts (General or Honours) at RMC and an equivalent number for those in other programs ³⁵. Other courses should be added to this curriculum, in anthropology, critical thinking, communications or sociology, for example. The idea here is not to overload already overcrowded university programs, but to integrate these new courses into the credits required to obtain a degree. The aim would be to reinforce the character of the CMCs as professional institutions, and not to enhance the academic and disciplinary coherence of traditional university programs – say in political science, economy, mathematics or physics, for example. In other words, the only objective of this approach must be to provide Naval/Officer Cadets everything they need to undertake their professional responsibilities as officers in the CAF.

The third action is to ensure the greater integration of military content in the current courses and programs since the institutions are meant to prepare officers for a military career ³⁶. The objective is not to offer programs and courses with only military content, as is done in some military academies such as *Escuela Militar de Cadetes General José María Córdova* (ESMIC) of Colombia. We believe the model followed at the CMCs where students are exposed to a diversity of subjects, opinions and philosophies from civilian faculty within a structured academic program continues to serve the needs of the CAF. But adjustments are necessary if the CMCs are to reconnect with their fundamental objective because currently almost the entire slate of courses and programs at both RMC and RMC Saint-Jean would be the same as any found in a civilian

university. They contain in their themes and subjects, little specific military content or application. This link to the fundamental mission of teaching the profession of arms is essential.

II) Involve the faculty in helping develop in their students qualities specific to the officer profession. The great majority of faculty at both CMCs are civilians – whether contracted or permanent staff. Their principal and sometimes only experience before teaching at a CMC has been in a university setting first through their studies, then sometimes as adjuncts, researchers or even professors. In addition, most have no experience with the military ethos and milieu, having never served in the CAF. It is therefore natural, as a “professional defect” if you will, that they tend to view the CMCs through the eyes of a civilian university. As we have pointed out above, RMC and RMC Saint-Jean are not usual universities. The CMCs should therefore undertake as part of the hiring and onboarding of new faculty and throughout their service, to provide them with all the tools they require to help develop the qualities of professional officers among their students. Currently, no such formal process exists, except for a short introductory briefing on the CMCs, the CAF and DND generally provided at the initial hiring stage of permanent staff; this is not usually offered to contract faculty. Naturally, faculty are hired for their expertise and ability to teach university-level courses (or college-level for some of the faculty at RMC Saint-Jean), for their service to the university or military community and to undertake research in their domain. We feel, however, that being on the faculty of a CMC – in view of their unique role – should entail the contribution of the staff to the professional education of students through their teaching and interaction. Better tools for faculty could take the form of regular visits to CAF bases, training to better familiarize them with the reality of service in the CAF, or even – why not ? – temporary service in non-operational positions in military units. The goal would be for faculty members to experience military life without donning the uniform. We believe that by developing a clearer vision of the CMCs as military academies will help faculty to better contribute to this aim.

Finally, to help in the development of professional officer qualifications, the *CMCs should count on more military faculty* ³⁷. This practice is well ensconced in the Science and Engineering Faculties at RMC where Masters degrees are utilized, but there are few military professors in the Arts departments where PhDs are required. More uniformed faculty would help expose Naval/Officer Cadets to the reality of the profession of arms. Currently, postings as faculty tend to be viewed as career moves that negatively affect career progression. We would propose to create a specific branch of military officers dedicated to teaching and research in the CMCs much as is done in many Western armed forces. The integration of military faculty would help dispel the image of teachers as inconsistent with the officer ideal which is unfortunately present in the mind of many Naval/Officer Cadets. Civilians are seen as holding the side of complex knowledge, science and culture, whereas the military is seen as holding the pragmatic,

simpler and concrete side of operations and their execution. However, even if the expertise of the officer resides in the practical realm as a “manager of violence”, his professional capabilities also make him as capable as his civilian counterparts of contributing to the advancement of knowledge in the military realm but also in the theoretical context of the officer profession.

III) Enhance the military pillar. Developing greater coherence in the program offered in the CMCs also requires the enhancement of the military pillar which seems the most neglected of the four. All the reports published over the last thirty years have reported on this serious issue and no true reform has been undertaken over time. We believe three specific actions need to underpin this reform.

First, and as recommended over and over, is the *lengthening of postings of military personnel* at the CMCs. In 2017, the *AG Report* underlined that one of the causes of confusion regarding the fundamental mission of the CMCs was due to the fact that:

“academic staff are appointed to permanent positions, whereas military training staff, including the Commandant, normally rotate into and out of RMC every two to three years. This rotation among military staff does not support long-term development of a consistent military training program. It also makes it difficult to coordinate planning to achieve both military and academic program objectives.”³⁸

This recommendation stems from the unique nature of the CMCs compared to other units of the CAF, especially for officers and non-commissioned officers. In no other unit of the CAF do you find a large permanent civilian cadre who actually outnumber but also often outweigh in influence their military counterparts. We mentioned earlier that the predominantly civilian faculty of the CMCs are a strength; however, this should not remove the military nature of their mission. So, the first measure to enhance the military pillar is to increase the length of tours of duty for military personnel at the CMCs.

In fact, this recommendation applies particularly to the position of Commandant, whose mandate should be at least five years in duration. This longer posting would ensure RMC and RMC Saint-Jean fulfil their mission as military academies. All the Commandants who served in Kingston and Saint-Jean these last few years were probably unable to follow through the different recommendations of the reports of the last thirty years because they were not in their post long enough.

The second measure to be undertaken to enhance the military pillar would be to *appoint as Commandants of the CMCs, officers who are at the end of their career* but who have shown

loyal and dedicated service throughout, instead of officers in mid-career and who are destined to continue to climb the ranks of the military hierarchy. An experienced long-serving senior officer appointed as Commandant as the culmination of their career would be a great benefit for Naval/Officer Cadets. They would profit from the Commandant's professional experience and maturity. Without prejudice to all the past Commandants, it is also probable that the Commandant would be more fully invested in the position, not seeing it as a stepping-stone to higher duties in the CAF. Finally, such an approach may help mitigate the issue of a longer posting for the Commandant which would otherwise have a major domino effect on the career progression of senior officers. This negative effect has been used in the past to keep from putting this recurring recommendation into action. Appointing an officer as Commandant of RMC or RMC Saint-Jean who is at the end of their career would keep them from blocking the progression of their peers ³⁹.

The third measure involves *the reinforcement of the chain of responsibility of the Naval/Officer Cadets*. Contrary to that suggested in the *Arbour Report* ⁴⁰, the system should not be abolished but reinforced. As it stands, it must be recognized that the “bar system”, in spite of several recent changes, both at RMC and at RMC Saint-Jean ⁴¹, still fails to achieve the objective at which it should aim as detailed in the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges (see article 2.02(2)1.b.): that of training Naval/Officer Cadets in “developing qualities of leadership” through the real and meaningful practice of leadership. This is not a reason to remove it. The CMCs would not accomplish their mission if they only provided initial military training such as that given to all personnel. Any military program in the CMCs must include the development of leadership and command abilities that remain the purview of officers. In fact, we feel abolishing the system would make the CMCs even more meaningless, by bringing RMC and RMC Saint-Jean closer to a civilian university model as opposed to the multidisciplinary model of military academies. The Cadet Chain of Authority must remain a central part of the professional education provided at the CMCs. In the system, the Naval/Officer Cadets have the opportunity to develop their leadership while holding real positions of command and responsibility under the supervision of qualified personnel in a real but controlled environment, where it is possible to make mistakes (and to learn from them) without enormous consequences - contrary to the reality of newly commissioned officers who arrive at their unit. Under close supervision by dedicated personnel, in order to avoid any form of abuse of power, officer cadets assigned to these leadership positions can play a crucial role in developing a healthier organisational culture within CMCs. It is even conceivable that this system could become an effective tool to counter sexual misconduct among Naval/Officer Cadets.

IV) Creating a fifth pillar dedicated to the “officer profession”. Resetting the CMCs as military academies should also mean the *creation of a specific programme dedicated to the officer profession*. The aim would be to develop in Naval/Officer Cadets the values, standards and

virtues inherent to the officer profession, something which should not be accomplished through simple processes, osmosis or personal initiatives as has usually been the case at the CMCs to this day ⁴². The “enriched military pillar” offered since 2019 at RMC Saint-Jean seems a step in the right direction. But overall, the CMCs do not provide enough formal professional development programs for students about to become CAF officers, outside of the basic military training. Again, there are many military academies that have such programs in place and that focus on character education as a central tenet for officer cadets.

The creation of this fifth pillar would involve the split of the current military pillar in two distinct but complementary pillars under separate military cadres. The military pillar would remain with the Training Wing at RMC or the Officer Cadet Wing at RMC Saint-Jean. It would focus specifically on military training, educating Naval/Officer Cadets on leadership competencies in the role of officer required for military service. For example, the First Year Orientation Programs at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean would be the responsibility of this pillar as would military exercises such as *Leadership conquérant* and *Blizzard nordique* at RMC Saint-Jean. The pillar would also be responsible for the administrative support and daily supervision of the Naval/Officer Cadets grouped in squadrons as well as the supervision and evaluation of those holding positions in the Cadet Chain of Authority.

The pillar “officer profession” would be entirely dedicated to the education of Naval/Officer Cadets towards the officer profession they will join at graduation from a CMC. It would be managed with a dedicated cadre of personnel - military and civilian - and under the command of an officer at the same rank as the current Director of Cadets. We feel this structure is essential to ensure the importance of the pillar, the proper balance between pillars and to provide one specific person endowed with the responsibility to manage the pillar ⁴³. So the new “officer profession” pillar would entail a more theoretical vocation compared to the military pillar which would focus on practical instruction. There would be two axes to its approach.

The first would focus on developing what Huntington called the theoretical *knowledge* associated with the profession and the officer’s role in it. This would involve the need for Cadets to deeply reflect on the uniqueness of the profession (the origins of the profession, the place occupied by the Armed forces and by officers in society, civil-military relations, current challenges faced by the profession, etc.) which is currently not covered in any program except perhaps within one of the objectives of the core curriculum fourth year course called *Military Professionnalism and Ethics*. The idea would be for officer cadets to internalise the professional identity of an officer which they would achieve through a socialisation program where they would accept this new identity by adhering progressively to a series of values and cultural standards and adopting a lifestyle coherent with the military in general, and that of officers in

particular. In the current system, this socialisation occurs in the CMCs in a largely informal fashion through imitation and exchanges among and between the military cadre and through the informal passage of lessons and behaviours (good or bad, unfortunately) between senior and junior cadets. The process could benefit greatly from a more rigorous approach to achieve its objective. Finally, the fifth pillar would aim to transmit to future officers the highest standards of *military ethos*, that constitutes in effect the code of ethics of the profession. For example, this could take the form of debates and discussions on the doctrine of the CAF based on basic documents generally not well known by Naval/Officer Cadets such as the newly-published *Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve (2022)* and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations (2005)*.

The second axis would regroup all the *mandated training requirements currently* required to be followed by all members of the CAF, including Naval/Officer Cadets. These mandatory and often complex training sessions are currently an add-on and assigned to instructors who are not always well-prepared, and they have not been well-integrated in the CMC training program. The staff of the fifth pillar would follow in the recommendation of the *Arbour Report* that proposed “forming a new trainer/educator/instructor occupation within the CAF, or a specialty within one of the human resources related occupations, in order to create a permanent cadre of skilled and professional educators and trainers”⁴⁴. These new trainers and educators should be part of the two CMCs as they would then be in a position to influence the entire CAF. In addition, this pillar would also ensure students would learn what Justice Arbour called “soft skills” including communication skills, interpersonal skills, resilience, and conflict management but also “learning to speak up and communicate effectively around difficult issues (like sexual assault and misconduct), to resolve conflicts respectfully, and to help team members understand how to treat others fairly.” In the current context where the CAF are under increased scrutiny regarding professional misconduct and organisational culture, it seems most important to ensure the development of future officers includes these competencies.

V) Ensuring that all regular force officers pass through the CMCs to follow a program dedicated to the profession of officer (the “fifth pillar”). Resetting the CMCs as military academies would also mean that all officers of the Regular forces no matter their entry program would have to *come through one or the other military college to follow a course on the officer profession*. Practically, these training programs would follow the ones created for Naval/Officer Cadets in the fifth pillar proposed above. This would require the creation of a new short and specialized program (of a duration of eventually let’s say three months or one academic term) alongside the current ROTP to accommodate officers recruited through the Direct Entry Officer program and the Commissioning from the Ranks program. The idea is not to require that the ROTP become the sole entry program into the officer corps - as is the case in most countries. But we do believe

that such a stay in the CMCs for all officers, to take this short program would correct what has long been a serious deficiency in the CAF. Officers who come through the two programs above do not receive specific training and education on the profession of arms and the role of the officer within it. The subject is touched upon here and there superficially throughout the Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) or in Development Period 2 - for example BMOQ-Army for officers destined for the Canadian Army. However, this important deficiency must be corrected if we want an officer corps capable of living up to the high responsibilities that are expected of them in this day and age, both in the complex environment in which our armed forces operate today and in the current social context facing the CAF.

In fact, given the challenges faced by the CAF today, it seems the only way to change the organisational culture is to train and educate officers to become and assume the role of primary agents of *cultural change*⁴⁵ themselves. We should not kid ourselves. Fundamental change in the CAF will not happen spontaneously through the creation of new mandatory courses meant to sensitize personnel⁴⁶. Nor will these changes happen by simply training all military personnel, non-commissioned officers and officers to personally be more respectful of others, or by simply changing the uniforms and acknowledging personal pronouns. Changes will happen if we can motivate all officers (and non-commissioned officers of course), at all levels of the military structure to solemnly endorse and undertake the immensely more difficult task of *working proactively to change this culture*. This includes developing and putting in place better practices within their units, having the ability to identify unacceptable behaviour early, and empowering leaders to act quickly to resolve issues. But it also means being able to imagine, conceive and apply a new military organisational culture within the CAF that will replace the current problematic culture. This is not an easy task since much of the current culture is based on practices steeped in tradition, real or imagined, in the collective minds of currently serving personnel and former members of the CAF. In fact, this culture is the result of many generations of socialization and symbolic consolidation into codes, practices and rites solidly established in Western armed forces. The new culture whose parameters are not yet well-defined, will need to be more respectful of each person's contribution while maintaining the high standard of discipline and operational capability expected of the CAF. But of course, for officers to undertake this complex role of primary agents of cultural change, they must be properly trained and educated as such. We proposed above the creation of a fifth pillar dedicated to the officer profession which would prepare them for their role in this function but change of the magnitude required will only be possible at the level of the entire CAF if all officers are engaged in this pursuit and not only those who are graduates of the CMCs - as mentioned previously, only 25 to 30% of officers are currently educated in the CMCs. This is why it is imperative that all regular force officers pass through one of the CMCs to attend a short program on the profession of arms and the specific place of the officer in it.

CONCLUSION

Real change is required in the CMCs. The institution cannot simply carry on internalizing the numerous criticisms they were subject to over the last thirty years, dealing piecemeal with substantial problems raised by various reports. A significant and fundamental reform is needed in the programs of RMC and RMC Saint-Jean. We believe this reform will only be possible after a rethinking and resetting of the *raison d'être* of the CMCs who seems to have lost sight of their fundamental mission which must be to train and educate officers prepared to serve in the CAF and to assume their responsibilities including the most important, serving in operations. The CMCs must reconnect with this mission and become military academies.


We reiterate the importance and scope of this reform in the current context of the need for changes in the organisational culture of the CAF. These changes including those identified in the *Arbour Report* regarding sexual misconduct can only happen if CAF officers undertake their new role as primary agents of cultural change. This will require a greater capacity for officers to think and debate the attributes of their profession, and to act in accordance with the principle of the military ethos, while keeping in mind the fundamental mission of all armed forces, to defend the state and its territory. With a clearer vision of the officer profession, whose identity today seems somewhat confused, officers should be able to truly acquit themselves of their important responsibilities as professionals and contribute to the development of a healthy culture within the CAF.

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Danic Parenteau holds a doctorate in philosophy from the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a master's degree in political thought from the University of Ottawa. He is also a graduate of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean/Royal Military College of Canada. Professor at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean since 2008, he worked from 2017 to 2019 as Associate Dean for University programs for the reestablishment of the university status of this institution. His main research interests include political ideologies, Quebec politics, and the training and education of officers, particularly officer cadets. Over the years, he has had the opportunity to visit several military academies around the world, notably to deliver lectures or to offer workshops on the theme of military ethics for officers (as part of the activities of the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation). During the last winter session, he was a guest professor at the Royal Military Academy in Brussels.



LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL J.O. MICHEL MAISONNEUVE (RET), CMM, CSM, CD

General Michel Maisonneuve is a distinguished Canadian who has dedicated his life to the service of his country, throughout a successful military career spanning 35 years. He spent an additional 10 years after retiring from the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as the Academic Director at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, and three years as the chosen advocate for the Veterans of Ste. Anne's Hospital. His contributions to Ste. Anne's Hospital were exceedingly beneficial as they occurred during the institution's transition from a federal to a provincial mandate.

At home in Canada, he has been a true defender of bilingualism and the use of French in all facets of his career. In every mission, posting, task or event, he always utilized both of Canada's official languages, publicly encouraging the use of both and acknowledging the presence of both linguistic groups in every audience. He also ensured that his subordinates always felt comfortable using both regardless of their skill level. In NATO he challenged himself to learn at least one phrase and greeting in each of the 26 national languages represented at the time.

Leading by example in this enthusiastic manner made him a much beloved officer by the junior ranks and young officers under his command.

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1. Henceforth referred to as the Arbour Report, p. 232. The author later adds that “closing the colleges altogether would be a missed opportunity.”
2. See Robert W. Morton, Report of the Officer Development Review Board, Department of National Defence, 1995 (Morton Report); Ramsey Withers, Report of the RMC Board of Governors by the Withers' Study Group, Department of National Defence, 1998 (Withers Report); Marie Deschamps, External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, Department of National Defence, 2015 (Deschamps Report); Greg L. Maddison (et al.), Special Staff Assistance Visit - Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston, Department of National Defence, 2017 (SSAV Report); Gordon Stock et al., Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report 6 – Royal Military College of Canada – National Defence, 2017 (AG Report).
3. Recommendation #21.
4. The male pronoun will be used throughout this article for ease of reading, although the military profession today is open to both men and women. The term “Officer Cadet” will be used to refer to any person attending a military academy and “Naval/Officer Cadet” will signify the rank of students attending a CMC.
5. For a review of the initiatives put in place as a result of the 2017 SSAV Report and the AG Report, see Harry Kowal, “The Royal Military College of Canada: Responding to the Call for Change”, Security and Defence Quarterly, vol. 24, #2, June 2019.
6. In the last few years, some military academies have also developed training and education programs for non-commissioned officers.

7. Although our analysis is meant to be general in nature, it may seem to focus more on RMC than RMC Saint-Jean; this is mainly because of the smaller size of RMC Saint-Jean and the steps which brought it back to its current status after its closure in 1995: first as a collegiate level institution in 2007, then as a university in 2017. As well, there were a few initiatives implemented in recent years at RMC Saint-Jean that reinforced the military academy aspect of the College, for example in 2019, the “Enriched military pillar” which is not available in Kingston. Nevertheless, all recommendations provided in this paper will apply to both RMC and RMC Saint-Jean.

8. See: Danic Parenteau, “Le lieutenant est un général potentiel et le général actuel fût un jour lieutenant. Réflexions sur la mission de formation de l’académie militaire dans le parcours global de formation de l’officier”, To be published.

9. Founded in 1940, Royal Roads Military College (RRMC; originally HMCS Royal Roads) was granted a university charter from British Columbia in 1975, whereas the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (CMR; today RMC Saint-Jean), founded in 1952 was only admitted as a full-fledged university by the Government of Québec in 1985 after partnering with Sherbrooke University from 1971 to 1985.

10. In 1997, following a recommendation in the Young Report, all officers, no matter their entry plan and with few exceptions, are required to have completed an undergraduate university degree. See Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister on the leadership and management of the Canadian Forces, Department of National Defence, 1997 (Young Report).

11. John Hackett, The profession of arms. The 1962 Lees Knowles lectures, MacMillan, 1983.

12. Their presence in the public eye stems generally from the commentary provided in the media, in different think-tanks and political organisations by some of the faculty of the CMCs .

13. W. H. Smith, “The Education of Officers: Academy or University?”, The Australian Quarterly, vol. 46, #3, September 1974, p. 30.

14. Sanford M. Dornbusch, “The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution”, Social Forces, vol. 33, #4, May 1955, p. 316 and Syed Mohamed, Ahmad Thamrini Fadzlin, “Civilian to officer: threshold concepts in military officers' education”, Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities, vol. 24, #4, 2016.

15. See: Danic Parenteau, “Le lieutenant est un général potentiel et le général actuel fût un jour lieutenant. Réflexions sur la mission de formation de l’académie militaire dans le parcours global de formation de l’officier”. To be released.

16. Michel Goya, *Sous le feu. La mort comme hypothèse de travail*, Tallandier, 2014, p. 23. Our translation.
17. The four pillars are : academics, bilingualism, military leadership and physical fitness.
18. P. 226.
19. Annex E – Moral, “The tension and strain between the academic and military pillars (and Wings) has lowered morale amongst all of the groups including the N/OCdts and Support Staff.”
20. Section “A dynamic tension”.
21. Recommendation 6.21.
22. Recommendation 6.9.
23. Interestingly, this tendency is also observable at RMC Saint-Jean, even though the college has only regained its university status five years ago.
24. Section “A dynamic tension”.
25. P. 233.
26. And yet the CMCs were founding members of the Internal Association of Military Academies (IAMA) which took place in the context of the International Symposium on Military Academies (ISOMA) held in Saint-Jean in 2017. Therefore, RMC and RMC Saint-Jean already have partnerships with many foreign military academies.
27. The best source of information for the European model of military academies can be found in Sylvain Paile’s work : *Europe for the Future Officers, Officers for the Future Europe*, Polish Ministry of National Defence, 2011 (http://www.emilyo.eu/sites/default/files/Gell%20Scientific%20Publications/2011%20Paile%20Compendium_0.pdf ; consulted 18 July 2022).
28. James R. Mackay, H. Christian Breede, Ali Dizboni & Pierre Jolicoeur, « Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army », *Parameters*, vol. 52, #1, 2022, p. 135-148.
29. In a reverse trend, the Theresian Military Academy has removed the master’s level of education and returned to the licence/bachelor level.
30. For the numbers of students, see (as of 22 July 2022) : Université de Montréal (<https://www.umontreal.ca/l-udem/en-chiffres/>); Saint-Anne University (<https://www.usaintanne.ca/>

[actualites/un-nombre-d-inscriptions-record-pour-l-universite-sainte-anne#:~:text=Pointe%2Dde%2Dl%C3%89glise,une%20population%20%C3%A9tudiante%20de%20481.\); Laurentian University \(<https://www.etudesuniversitaires.ca/universites-canadiennes/laurentian-university/>\)](#)

31. Royal Military College of Canada Undergraduate Calendar 2022-23, see: <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/registrars-office/undergraduate-calendar> (Calendar reviewed 14 June 2022). This issue naturally does not apply at RMC Saint-Jean since it offers for the time being only one program – which may eventually be an issue longer term.

32. See Royal Military Academy : <https://www.rma.ac.be/en/information-for/students/future-students/practical-information> (consulted 14 June 2022) and École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr : <https://www.st-cyr.terre.defense.gouv.fr/index.php/L-Academie/L-Ecole-Speciale-Militaire-de-Saint-Cyr/L-enseignement-a-l-ESM> (reviewed 14 June 2022)

33. See Theresianische Militärakademie : <https://www.milak.at/ausbildung-an-der-milak/aus-und-weiterbildung/offiziersausbildung/fh-bachelorstudiengang> (consulted 22 July 2022).

34. Recommendation #13.

35. Royal Military College of Canada Undergraduate Calendar 2022-23, see: <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/registrars-office/undergraduate-calendar> (Calendar reviewed 22 July 2022).

36. This was a Withers Report recommendation (#30).

37. Another Withers Report recommendation (#29).

38. Article 6.69.

39. We recognize that implementing the changes we are calling for will require the involvement of many levels of command, from the Commandants of RMC and RMC Saint-Jean to the Boards of Governors of the CMCs, the principal of RMC Principal, as well as the director of studies at CMR Saint-Jean, to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, and even the Chief of the Defence Staff.

40. Recommendation #28.

41. Because of the size of RMC Saint-Jean and the demographics of its Cadet Wing, relative to RMC - a demographic that has the shape of a true pyramid, with a small number of Third and Fourth Years, and at the base, large cohorts of junior officer cadets - it is easier to put in place a system where all Naval/Officer Cadets can gain a true leadership experience.

42. A one- or two-week program on the profession of arms and the responsibility of officers within it existed in the mid-2000s at the former Canadian Forces Management School located at

RMC Saint-Jean. It was aimed at non-commissioned officers who were commissioned from the ranks. The program was always an ad hoc initiative and was terminated around 2008/9.

⁴³. The same logic should be applied to the bilingualism pillar which requires a specific “pillar owner” to ensure its application.

⁴⁴. Recommendation #24.

⁴⁵. See “Officers Must Play Key Role in Transforming Organizational Culture” by Danic Parenteau, Canadian Military Journal [Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022,]: <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-article-en-page27.html> and Danic Parenteau, « Réduire le fossé culturel entre les forces armées et la société civile sans rompre avec le “compromis huntingtonien” », Res Militaris. Revue européenne d’études militaires (to be published).

⁴⁶. In reality, these mandated programs have been a failure. For example, after more than 30 years of mandated training on anti-racism in the CAF, from the first sessions in the 1990s such as the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) training, we are still in 2022 combating similar issues.

