



ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

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DND Photo: Master Corporal Robert Botrill/Photo MDN: Caporal Chef Robert Botrill

- From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier
- NATO Transformation: Canada's Contribution, by General Rick Hillier
- La Militarisation des espaces nationaux
- Our National Interests: What's Worth Fighting For?



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Our Cover

La couverture

Private Will Salikin, from the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI), provides security cover in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Members of 3 PPCLI serving with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) stopped at various locations in Kandahar city to fill out questionnaires presented to a variety of Afghans about various issues. The PRT will reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in and around Kandahar and help stabilize and rebuild the region./Le soldat Will Salikin, du 3^e bataillon de la Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry, assure la sécurité à Kandahar (Afghanistan). Les membres du 3^e bataillon de la Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry qui servent avec l'équipe provinciale de reconstruction (EPR), se sont arrêtés à divers emplacements à Kandahar pour remplir des questionnaires présentés à divers Afghans sur une variété de sujets. L'EPR renforcera l'autorité du gouvernement afghan à Kandahar et ses environs, et contribuera à stabiliser et à rebâtir la région.

The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - defence issues. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive ON TRACK and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.

The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux questions de la défense. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront ON TRACK et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs.

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GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CANADA

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard J. Evraire, Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), is pleased to announce that Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean has accepted his invitation to become Patron of the CDA.

From Rideau Hall we are advised that Her Excellency extends her very best wishes for the continued success of the CDA.

PRÉSIDENT D'HONNEUR
SON EXCELLENCE
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MICHAËLLE JEAN, CC, CMM, COM, CD
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Le Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard J. Evraire, Président du conseil de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) est heureux d'annoncer que Son Excellence la Très Honorable Michaëlle Jean a accepté son invitation de devenir Président d'honneur de la CAD.

Rideau Hall nous a avisé que Son Excellence communique à la CAD ses meilleurs souhaits de succès pour l'avenir.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD



The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) was honoured when the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, presented the Vimy Award to Mr. Gordon Hamilton Southam at a formal dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization on 18 November. Amongst those in attendance were many corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and of the CDAI to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The very significant support of our corporate sponsors and of the member Associations contributed to a very successful event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. We look forward to even more popular corporate support of the Vimy Award Dinner on 17 November of 2006. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors can be read elsewhere in the issue of ON TRACK.

Coincident with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award to Mr. Bruce Campion-Smith, of the Toronto Star, by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Bob Millar, President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated by CDA in collaboration with the CDFAI. The purpose of the award is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of Canada's defence and security issues.

The President of the CDAI, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, recently invited a number of eminent Canadians to take up membership on the Institute's Board of Directors. As a result, I am pleased to announce that the Board of Directors of the CDAI has been expanded considerably with the appointment of Canadians from various walks of life including the profession of arms, Parliament, business, academia and diplomatic service. We are pleased to be able to include their names on the preceding page. We believe that their appointment will enhance the ability of the Institute to carry out its mandate to promote informed public debate on national security and defence. It is gratifying that such prominent Canadians are supportive of the work of the CDAI.

MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD) a été honoré lorsque l'honorable Bill Graham, ministre de la Défense nationale, a remis le Prix Vimy à M. Gordon Hamilton Southam, lors d'un dîner officiel donné à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, le 18 novembre dernier. Au nombre des participants, figuraient plusieurs dirigeants d'entreprises qui appuient les objectifs de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) et de l'ICAD, qui est de sensibiliser le public à la contribution importante et remarquable d'un Canadien ou d'une Canadienne à la sécurité du pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

L'appui considérable de nos sociétés commanditaires et des associations membres a contribué à une soirée extrêmement réussie qui a été appréciée par tous les participants. Nous nous réjouissons déjà d'assister au témoignage d'un appui encore plus solide des entreprises au prochain dîner du Prix Vimy, qui aura lieu le 17 novembre 2006. Ailleurs dans le présent numéro d'ON TRACK, figurent nos remerciements à nos sociétés commanditaires.

En même temps que le dîner du Prix Vimy, avait lieu la remise du Prix Média Ross Munro à M. Bruce Campion-Smith, du quotidien Toronto Star, par le brigadier-général (ret.) Bob Millar, président du Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Le Prix Média Ross Munro a été lancé par la CAD, en collaboration avec le CDFAI. Ce prix vise à reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions de défense et de sécurité canadiennes.

Le président de l'ICAD, le général (ret.) Paul Manson, a récemment invité certains Canadiens éminents à devenir membres du conseil d'administration de l'Institut. Par conséquent, je suis heureux d'annoncer que le conseil d'administration de l'ICAD a été considérablement élargi, grâce à la nomination de divers Canadiens de tous horizons, dont la profession des armes, des membres du Parlement, le milieu commercial, le milieu universitaire et le service diplomatique. Nous sommes heureux de faire figurer leur nom sur la page précédente. Nous sommes d'avis que leur nomination améliorera la capacité de l'Institut à s'acquitter de son mandat, qui est de promouvoir un débat public éclairé sur la sécurité et la défense nationale. Nous sommes heureux que des Canadiens aussi éminents appuient nos travaux à l'ICAD.

I am pleased to report that the 8th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Security and Defence: National and International Issues, 28 and 29 October, was the most successful we have held. The symposium was sponsored by the CDA Institute and the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. The Institute for Research on Public Policy; the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University; and Defence Management Studies, Queen's University supported the symposium. The Symposium was made possible through the generous financial assistance provided by the Walter Duncan Gordon Foundation, General Dynamics Canada, Mr. David Scott, and the DND Security and Defence Forum Special Project Fund. Matthew Gillard, the CDA Institute Intern, was the principal organizer of the symposium. Elsewhere in this publication Matthew has provided us with a report on the proceedings.

Three cash prizes of \$3,000 (the D Scott GD Canada Prize), \$2,000, and \$1,000 were awarded to the top three presentations. Justin Massie, from l'Université du Québec à Montréal, earned the top prize for his paper, *Une culture stratégique idéaliste, libérale et défensive? Analyse de l'Énoncé de la politique internationale du Canada.*

The CDA Institute will present its 22nd annual seminar, *NATO in Transition: the Impact on Canada*, on Thursday, 23 February 2006, followed by CDA's AGM on Friday, 24 February, at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa. The theme of the seminar is timely, given the transformation initiatives that the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, is bringing to Canada's armed forces. The Minister of National Defence has been invited to present the seminar with an introductory address.

We are lining up a very impressive roster of prestigious speakers for the event, including General Ray Henault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and the most recent former Chief of the Defence Staff, who will deliver the keynote address; Admiral (Ret'd) John Anderson, a former Chief of the Defence Staff; Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation; General (Ret'd) Jean Boyle, former Chief of the Defence Staff; General (Ret'd) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman NATO Military Committee; to name a few. Dr. Michael Ignatieff, Director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, has been invited to be the luncheon speaker. General Manson will provide the summary.

The CDA Institute's 22nd Annual Seminar is an important platform from which important defence and security issues will be explored.

Those attending the seminar are also invited to attend the 69th

J'ai le plaisir d'annoncer que le 8^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, intitulé « Sécurité et Défense : Enjeux nationaux et internationaux », qui a eu lieu les 28 et 29 octobre, a été le plus réussi en date. Le symposium est parrainé par l'Institut de la CAD et le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. L'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, le Centre des relations internationales de l'Université Queen's et le programme des études de gestion de la défense de l'Université Queen's ont également appuyé le symposium. Il a été rendu possible grâce à l'aide financière généreuse de la Walter Duncan Gordon Foundation, de la Société General Dynamics, de M. David Scott, et du Fonds pour projets spéciaux du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du MDN. Matthew Gillard, stagiaire de l'Institut de la CAD, était le principal organisateur du symposium. Dans ce numéro, il nous donne un compte-rendu du Symposium.

Trois prix en espèces de 3 000 \$ (le prix Canada D Scott GD), de 2 000 \$ et de 1 000 \$, respectivement, ont été remis aux trois meilleurs exposés. C'est Justin Massie, de l'Université du Québec à Montréal, qui a remporté le premier prix pour son document, intitulé *Une culture stratégique idéaliste, libérale et défensive ? Analyse de l'Énoncé de la politique internationale du Canada.*

L'Institut de la CAD présentera son 22^e séminaire annuel, intitulé « L'OTAN en transition : répercussions canadiennes », le jeudi 23 février 2006, qui sera suivi de l'AGA de la CAD le vendredi 24 février, au Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Le thème du séminaire est ponctuel, vu les initiatives de transformation que le Chef d'état-major de la défense, le général Rick Hillier, opère sur les Forces armées du Canada. Le ministre de la Défense nationale a été invité à présenter le séminaire en donnant l'allocution préliminaire.

Nous dressons une liste impressionnante de conférenciers prestigieux pour cette manifestation, dont les suivants : le général Ray Henault, président du comité militaire de l'OTAN et Chef d'état-major de la défense sortant, qui donnera le discours-programme, l'amiral (ret.) John Anderson, ancien Chef d'état-major de la défense, l'amiral sir Mark Stanhope, Commandant suprême allié adjoint Transformation de l'OTAN, le général (ret.) Jean Boyle, ancien Chef d'état-major de la défense, et le général (ret.) Klaus Naumann, ancien président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN. M. Michael Ignatieff, directeur du Carr Center for Human Rights Policy de l'Université Harvard, est le conférencier invité au déjeuner. Le général Manson fournira le résumé.

Le 22^e séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD est une plateforme importante où seront étudiées d'importantes questions de défense et de sécurité.

Les participants au séminaire sont également invités à assis-

CDA Annual General Meeting (AGM), Friday, 24 February. We are very pleased that General Rick Hillier, the Chief of the Defence Staff, will deliver the keynote address. Moderators and panelists for two panels will include Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman CDA; Lieutenant-General J.H.M.P. Caron, Chief of the Land Staff; Major-General H.M. Petras, Chief Reserves and Cadets; Lieutenant-General Steve Lucas, Chief of the Air Staff; and Vice-Admiral Bruce Maclean, Chief of the Maritime Staff. As well, Mr. Jayson Spiegel will address the AGM on the impact that Iraq is having on the U.S. National Guard and Army Reserves.

It was gratifying to see the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier filled to capacity, last March, for the 21st Annual Seminar and the 68th AGM. Based on that experience, I would recommend our supporters to register soon to avoid disappointment. Please refer to the notice of the CDAI Annual Seminar and the CDA AGM elsewhere in this issue for more details. I urge our readers to attend what promises to be a very stimulating and informative period of discussion.

This issue of ON TRACK contains articles that cover a range of issues that reflect, to a large extent, the theme of transformation. We are pleased to present General Rick Hillier's vision for the Canadian Forces (CF), in "NATO Transformation: Canada's Contribution". General Hillier describes the CF's new command structure and how Canada's armed forces are able to make a significant contribution in NATO's ability to execute its mandate to address the defence and security concerns of the Alliance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Mariano, U.S. Army Fellow at Queen's University, writes about the transformation that is taking place in the NATO command structure. In "NATO Command Structure: Rearranging the Deck Chairs?" Lieutenant-Colonel Mariano outlines the new command structure that is evolving within NATO, and provides some interesting comments on where the success of NATO's transformation will lead.

Colonel Richard Giguère has written on North American security, transformation of the Canadian Forces, and provides for us an overview of the new command structure that is being created. In 'La Militarisation des espaces nationaux' Colonel Giguère has outlined the challenges to responding to man-made disasters as well as acts of terror. Colonel Giguère is the Canadian Army's defence attaché in Washington and is a political science doctoral candidate at l'Université Laval.

ter à la 69^e assemblée générale annuelle (AGA) de la CAD, le vendredi 24 février. Nous sommes très heureux que le général Rick Hillier, Chef d'État-major de la défense, prononce le discours-programme. Au nombre des modérateurs et des panélistes des deux panels, figurent le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire, président du conseil de la CAD, le lieutenant-général J.H.M.P. Caron, Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre, le major-général H.M. Petras, Chef - Réserves et cadets, le lieutenant-général Steve Lucas, Chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne, et le vice-amiral Bruce Maclean, Chef d'état-major de la Force maritime. De plus, M. Jayson Spiegel parlera, dans le cadre de l'AGA, des répercussions de la situation en Iraq sur la Garde nationale et la Réserve des États-Unis.

Il était gratifiant de voir la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier remplie à craquer, en mars dernier, à l'occasion du 21^e séminaire annuel et de la 68^e AGA. Fort de cette expérience, je recommande à tous nos sympathisants de s'inscrire tôt pour ne pas être déçus. Veuillez consulter l'avis du séminaire annuel de l'ICAD et de l'AGA de la CAD qui figure dans ce numéro pour obtenir de plus amples renseignements. J'encourage tous nos lecteurs à participer à ce qui promet d'être un débat des plus stimulants et des plus informatifs.

Le présent numéro d'ON TRACK comprend des articles sur une gamme de questions qui témoignent en grande partie du thème de la transformation. Nous avons le plaisir de présenter la vision du général Rick Hillier des Forces canadiennes (FC) dans l'article intitulé « NATO Transformation : Canada's Contribution ». Le général Hillier décrit la nouvelle structure de commandement et la manière dont les forces armées du Canada peuvent contribuer de manière importante à la capacité de l'OTAN de s'acquitter de son mandat, qui est d'apaiser les inquiétudes de l'Alliance aux plans de la défense et de la sécurité.

Le lieutenant-colonel Stephen Mariano, boursier de l'armée américaine à l'Université Queen's, parle de la transformation que connaît la structure de commandement de l'OTAN. Dans son article intitulé « NATO Command Structure : Rearranging the Deck Chairs ? », le lieutenant-colonel Mariano décrit la nouvelle structure de commandement qui évolue au sein de l'OTAN et fait des commentaires intéressants sur la direction dans laquelle mènera cette transformation.

Le colonel Richard Giguère a écrit un article sur la sécurité nord-américaine, la transformation des Forces canadiennes et nous donne un aperçu de la nouvelle structure de commandement qui est en cours de création. Dans son article intitulé « La militarisation des espaces nationaux », le colonel Giguère décrit les défis que comporte la réponse aux catastrophes causées par l'homme, ainsi qu'aux actes de terrorisme. Le colonel Giguère est attaché de défense de l'armée canadienne

Brigadier-General Daniel Gosselin and Dr. Craig Stone, together, have written "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding Some of the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the CF and Transformation". The authors aim to dispel the idea that both the focus and the intentions of the new Canadian defence policy (DPS 2005) have similarities with those of the Honourable Paul Hellyer, the defence minister who unified the Canadian military in the 1960s. They have presented a comparative review of the vision that the former defence minister had for Canada's armed forces with that of today's Chief of the Defence Staff and the intent of DPS 2005.

Meaningful improvements to operational viability and sustainability will continue to elude the CF unless procedures surrounding the public administration of defence are given a major overhaul. Two recently published Queen's University Claxton Papers describe well Canada's military situation. Faced with obsolete equipment fleets of various kinds, the Government has sought to redress the situation by increasing the defence budget. However, its own equipment procurement system continues to be one of the greatest impediments to solving this serious problem. We are pleased to include for our readers two articles that provide thoughts on why the current procurement policy may be considered an obstacle to facilitate the timely and efficient way in which the materiel requirements of the Canadian Forces can be met.

In 'Procurement Deferred is Policy Denied: The Major Impediments to Defence Procurement' Colonel Howard Marsh, the CDA Institute's Senior Defence Analyst, examines two long-standing causes of procurement delays and recommends a strategy that would substantially enhance the current system. Monsieur Pierre Lagueux writes that a lot has been said about defence procurement reform in recent years but notes that in its reformation remains elusive. In 'Procurement Reform – Why is it so difficult?' Monsieur Lagueux identifies five actions that must be taken as a precursor to any successful attempt to truly reform defence procurement.

In 'Our National Interests: What's Worth Fighting For?' Richard Cohen and Major-General (Ret'd) Clive Addy note that, while the National Security Policy identifies three core national security interests, no mention is made of what they describe as the core national security interest. The authors posit that the maintenance of a united and sovereign state should be one Canada's most important National Interests.

à Washington et candidat au doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Laval.

Le brigadier-général Daniel Gosselin et M. Craig Stone ont collaboré à la rédaction de l'article « From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier : Understanding Some of the Fundamental Differences between the Unification of the CF and Transformation ». Les auteurs réfutent l'idée que la cible et les intentions de la nouvelle politique de défense canadienne (EPD 2005) ont des similarités avec celles de l'honorable Paul Hellyer, le ministre de la défense qui a unifié les forces armées canadiennes dans les années 60. Ils présentent un examen comparatif de la vision que l'ancien ministre de la défense avait pour les forces armées canadiennes avec celle du Chef d'état-major d'aujourd'hui et l'intention de l'EPD 2005.

Toute amélioration solide de la viabilité opérationnelle des FC restera insaisissable à moins que l'on n'effectue un remaniement important de l'administration publique de la défense. Deux documents Claxton publiés par l'Université Queen's décrivent clairement la situation militaire du Canada. Face à des parcs de matériel de toute sorte obsolètes, le gouvernement a voulu remédier au problème en augmentant le budget de la défense. Or, c'est son propre système d'approvisionnement en matériel qui constitue toujours l'un des grands obstacles à la résolution de ce grave problème. Nous sommes heureux de joindre à l'intention de nos lecteurs deux articles qui expliquent pourquoi la politique actuelle d'approvisionnement pourrait être un obstacle à la facilitation d'une manière efficiente et ponctuelle dont on pourrait répondre aux exigences des Forces canadiennes en matière de matériel.

Dans un article intitulé « Procurement Deferred is Policy Denied : The Major Impediments to Defence Procurement », le colonel Howard Marsh, analyste principal de l'Institut de la CAD en matière de défense, se penche sur deux causes déjà anciennes de retards d'approvisionnement, et recommande une stratégie qui améliorerait considérablement le système actuel. Monsieur Pierre Lagueux explique que l'on a beaucoup parlé, ces dernières années, d'une réforme de l'approvisionnement pour la défense, mais souligne que cette réforme reste insaisissable. Dans son article, intitulé « Procurement Reform – Why is it so difficult ? », M. Lagueux identifie cinq mesures à prendre avant toute tentative de réforme véritable du système d'approvisionnement de la défense.

Dans un article intitulé « Our National Interests : What's Worth Fighting For ? », Richard Cohen et le major-général (ret.) Clive Addy expliquent que bien que la politique sur la sécurité nationale identifie trois intérêts principaux de sécurité nationale, elle ne mentionne pas ce qu'ils appellent un intérêt fondamental de la sécurité nationale. Les auteurs postulent que le maintien d'un État unifié et souverain devrait constituer l'un des principaux intérêts nationaux du Canada.

I would like to draw your attention to a very topical article on national security that is posted on our website instead of publishing in ON TRACK, and that is: 'A Canada Security Act as Party Policy' by Colonel (Ret'd) Gary Rice. Colonel Rice notes that unforeseen and unpredictable events make any national security policy 'time-limited'. In this regard, he believes that the Defence Policy Statement (DPS 2005) represents only the outgoing government's 'fix' for the immediate future. Colonel Rice's article can be read at <http://cda-cdai.ca/pdf/CanadaSecurityAct05.pdf>.

The CDA believes that the first priority of our government is to ensure the security of its citizens. Canada's foreign policy options are now at risk because of the limited capacity of the Canadian Forces to back up those policy objectives, especially the 3Ds of Defence, Diplomacy, and Development. At this time of national events, such as the Federal General Election, we encourage Canadians to engage their local candidates in discussions on the issues of security and national defence.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, a charitable institution, needs the financial support of the pro-defence community of Canadians to remain effective in the debate on issues of security and national defence. With your support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. Your continued financial support as donors to the Institute is vital to our continuing success. Please renew your annual donation when you are asked – and introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.

Je voudrais attirer votre attention sur un article d'actualité sur la sécurité nationale qui est affiché dans notre site Web, plutôt que publié dans ON TRACK; il s'agit du suivant : « A Canada Security Act as Party Policy », par le colonel (ret.) Gary Rice. Le colonel Rice indique que des événements imprévus et imprévisibles rendent toute politique sur la sécurité nationale d'une « durée d'application limitée ». À cet égard, il est d'avis que l'Énoncé de la politique de défense (EPD 2005) ne représente qu'une correction temporaire pour l'avenir immédiat par le gouvernement sortant. On peut lire l'article du colonel Rice à l'adresse suivante : <http://cda-cdai.ca/pdf/CanadaSecurityAct05.pdf>.

La CAD estime que le premier impératif de notre gouvernement est de veiller à la sécurité de ses citoyens. Or, les choix de politique étrangère du Canada sont compromis en raison de la capacité limitée dont disposent les Forces canadiennes pour appuyer ces objectifs de politique, particulièrement les 3D : défense, diplomatie et développement. Vu la situation au plan national, comme les élections fédérales, nous encourageons les Canadiennes et les Canadiens à engager une discussion avec leurs candidats locaux sur les enjeux de la sécurité et de la défense nationale.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense, une organisation caritative, a besoin de l'appui financier de la communauté des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui sont en faveur de la défense, pour continuer d'être efficace dans le débat sur les enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationale. Grâce à votre appui, nous sommes en mesure promouvoir l'étude des affaires militaires canadiennes et la sensibilisation à celles-ci. Pour que l'ICAD puisse poursuivre ses réalisations, il a besoin de votre appui financier soutenu en tant que donateur. Veuillez renouveler votre don annuel lorsque vous en recevez la demande et introduisez donc un compatriote à l'Institut.

NATO Transformation: Canada's Contribution

by General Rick Hillier

In a rapidly changing security environment, we are faced with evolving threats that force us to adapt quickly and aggressively. Key international institutions, including NATO, must similarly adapt or face challenging questions about their continued relevance. Drawing on the mandate outlined in the Defence Policy Statement, Canada is playing its part in supporting the Alliance's transformation into a proactive, agile organization capable of achieving results well outside the traditional NATO area.

One of my first priorities as Chief of the Defence Staff was to provide advice to shape the military aspects of the Defence Policy Statement. With it, the Government of Canada acknowledged and committed to address the changing nature of national and global security. It is important to acknowledge how our security environment has changed since the 1990s. During the Cold War, our forces were built to deter hostile nation states with heavy conventional forces, backed up by nuclear forces. The strategy of NATO was oriented toward

General Rick Hillier is the Canadian Forces' Chief of the Defence Staff.

deterrence of conflict that would have seen static forces engaged in a reactive high-intensity response on a regional basis. As the millennium closed, some parts of NATO were still predominantly configured to fight old threats, rather than to confront emerging ones.

We now face a different threat, which I have euphemistically called the “snakes” – non-state actors who respect no boundaries, obey no rules and are impossible to deter. Western militaries have reacted to this threat, but often in an ad hoc manner. In today and tomorrow’s security environment Canadians must act not only for our interests, but also for our values. We cannot ignore failed and failing states, where local governments are unable or unwilling to maintain political authority, to provide security and other basic services, or to protect essential human rights. Corrupt or ineffective governments have trapped millions in a desperate cycle of poverty, misery and violence. These conditions are an affront to Canadian values, and demand concerted international action.

These conditions also plant the seeds of regional and global instability. Impotent or abusive governments make their countries fertile breeding grounds for terrorism, illegal drug production, genocide, pandemics or organized crime. It is in Canada’s interest to counter this instability, before it reaches our shores. Development assistance, defence diplomacy and security sector reform programming are crucial components of Canada’s approach to the problem of state collapse. At the same time, we will continue to prepare and be ready for those occasions when the ability to apply decisive military force is crucial.

Mirroring Canada’s recognition of the changed reality of the

post-9/11 world, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has asserted that the Alliance has adapted to changed circumstances, and is a valuable anchor of stability in the new international security environment. NATO has recognized that it cannot wait for problems to show up at its door, and is reshaping itself to be a more agile and flexible instrument, able to project stability whenever and wherever our common security interests demand. To help the Alliance achieve this goal, Canada is demonstrating leadership in the Alliance’s transformation by participating in its new missions, developing future capabilities, and contributing to the evolving command structure.

New Missions

Afghanistan is the defining mission for NATO, as we collectively demonstrate that we are transforming to go beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan will continue to further develop NATO’s expeditionary abilities as the mission enlarges. Our leadership in ISAF, and the substantial and sustained Canadian contribution, is a reflection of our commitment to a transformed NATO with global impact. NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan are surely relevant to the new security environment; our forces are establishing the conditions needed for the rule of law, democracy and prosperity to take root in the country that was the source for attacks against North America. I am proud that Canada has maintained a leading role in Afghanistan, which will be reinforced in 2006 when Canada deploys over 2,000 men and women in support of our operations in Kandahar province, leads a Multi-National Brigade of allies, and helps pave the way for the expansion of ISAF throughout southern Afghanistan.

The deployment of additional NATO-led combat forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams into southern Afghanistan will help create the climate of security and stability that is essential for the rebuilding of Afghani society. This rebuilding is a huge task, involving the Government of Afghanistan, the UN, G-8 lead nations and many international organizations and agencies. NATO’s role is vital to the overall effort. National strategies, including Canada’s integrated 3D - defence, development and diplomacy - approach, will help foster and contribute to the collective NATO effort. If we do not help build a legitimate and competent government, a capable police force, and a proficient Afghan National Army that is responsive to civil authority, then we will fail. Our 3D effort will help ensure that NATO is capable of achieving the desired effects.

New Capabilities

Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, has noted that success in NATO transformation is directly linked to the ability of Alliance nations

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to modernize and transform their national forces and military organizations. Canada has anticipated the demands of the new security environment. Under the aegis of the Defence Policy Statement, Canadian Forces transformation will enhance our relevance, responsiveness and effectiveness. Transformation will be driven by the capabilities we need to perform our roles, both domestically and abroad. Although the defence of Canada remains our first priority, the Canadian Forces will be prepared to play an increased international role.

Much of what we will accomplish as we transform the Canadian Forces will be of potential benefit to the Alliance in its operations and ongoing transformation. The stand up of Expeditionary Forces Command, with its exclusive focus on the direction of operations overseas, and the establishment of fully integrated units such as the Special Operations Group and the Standing Contingency Task Force, will all contribute to the greater effect we will achieve abroad. The substantial increase in the size of the Canadian Forces now underway, our ongoing efforts to ensure interoperability, improve information management and situational awareness and the ongoing acquisition of capabilities critical for our operations overseas all demonstrate our commitment to achieving real transformation. Indeed, the Government's recently announced competition to provide new tactical airlift for the CF to replace our aging C-130 Hercules aircraft is being undertaken in a way that places the emphasis on the ability to deliver effects in the mission area, and is transformational in itself.

NATO recognizes the need for, and is building, new capabilities. The Secretary General contends that the main reason for NATO's enduring resilience is its adaptability – its ability to react to changing circumstances, and to deal with new challenges. We have been encouraged by the changes to date, but much remains to be done.

New Command Structures

NATO has moved decisively to reduce the number of headquarters and the number of personnel assigned to headquarters staff positions. Strategic command responsibilities for all NATO operations have been consolidated under Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium.

In 2003, NATO created Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, as NATO's forcing agent for change, leading the continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to uphold NATO's global security interests. Canadians fill key positions in the ACT Headquarters and contribute to its activities. The Canadian Forces

Experimentation Centre, for example, cooperates on a daily basis with ACT. An example of practical cooperation is the work done on the Multinational Exercise (MNE) series, such as MNE 4 taking place from 27 February to 17 March. These exercises refine and assess processes, organizations and technology to support both NATO and Coalition Effects Based Operations. As a result, command structure concepts will be thoroughly tested and validated, fully exploiting technology and simulation.

One of the most significant recent developments in NATO's operational capability has been the creation of the NATO Response Force...

One of the most significant recent developments in NATO's operational capability has been the creation of the NATO Response Force or NRF. The Alliance's high readiness force is planned to be a powerful, rapidly deployable force of approximately 25,000, and is already playing a central role in 'operationalizing' transformation. In my view, the NRF is the kind of concept NATO must develop to foster change, build military effectiveness, and deliver relevant and responsive options for the Alliance. The practical implementation of the NRF is still evolving. In the coming year NATO will conduct an important exercise centred on the NRF, with the overall aim of achieving full operational capability late in 2006.

For Canada, as for many countries, our other essential domestic and international operational commitments will determine the nature and scale of our contributions to the NRF. Given our current commitments, I do not anticipate that we will be able to contribute significant land forces to the NRF at least in the near term, but we will continue to regularly support the NRF with naval units and likely some air assets as well. To highlight this commitment, in January 2006, Canada will take command of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 for 12 months. This includes six months as the NRF standby high readiness maritime force.

Conclusion

As Joey Smallwood said, "It's not where you are, it's where you're headed that matters." Canada will continue to be a driving force in ensuring that NATO remains headed in the direction of both political and military relevancy. The Canadian Forces will both support ongoing Alliance operational success, and the transformation of the Alliance for the future, ready to deploy new capabilities with global reach to confront evolving threats.

NATO Command Structure: Rearranging Deck Chairs?

by Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Mariano

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the (U.S.) Army, the (U.S) Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Transformation was a major aspect of NATO's 2002 Summit in Prague. One of the stated objectives was to, "streamline NATO's military command arrangements."¹ This round of reform is the third since the end of the Cold War and is scheduled to reach full operational capability in the summer of 2006. What remains to be seen is whether or not the restructuring will help transform NATO into an organization that is more effective in countering current threats or whether NATO is simply rearranging headquarters deck chairs.

The subject of NATO headquarters is particularly important given Canada's gradual withdrawal from Europe and struggle to (re)define its military relationship with the United States. Outside of a few Defense Attachés, Canada's sole military presence on the European continent is through the various NATO headquarters. Given Canada's recent recoiling from the United States Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives, Canada needs to find another forum for remaining militarily relevant in North America. Right now, and despite an exchange program with the United States that posts a Canadian general officer to an operational headquarters in Fort Hood, Texas, the hub of United States transformational activity is at the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, where no Canadian general office is present.

What exactly are "command arrangements?"

To understand NATO's transformation effort in the command and control arena, it is necessary to understand the differences between NATO's command structure, force structure and the theoretical constructs that allow them to command deployed forces.

The term "NATO Command Arrangements" refers to NATO's structures, forces, and operational concepts that link them. Command structure is roughly defined as fixed headquarters throughout the United States and Europe that fly a NATO flag at the entrance. Force structure is defined as the people,

tanks, airplanes, and ships that nations offer to NATO to be commanded by NATO headquarters, although recent developments have caused NATO to expand the traditional understanding of "forces" to include multinational headquarters. The two theoretical concepts that NATO uses in the operational planning process are the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the newly developed NATO Response Force (NRF). While these concepts are both important parts of NATO command arrangements, the foundation of command for any NATO operation lies in the command structure block.

NATO Command Structure

Command structure reform in the early and late 1990s made some positive steps in reducing the numbers of headquarters yet both resulted in an excess of headquarters that were inefficient and consumed large portions of the NATO common fund.

Each attempt to restructure the headquarters has demonstrated some success. An early effort cut the number of headquarters from almost 130 down to 78. The next iteration brought the number to 20. In the existing round, operational headquarters were reduced to 12 although several centers and schools were retained but fell short of the criteria to be officially called "headquarters".

The Operational Structure

All of the operational headquarters were placed under the command of one strategic commander: the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE) retained its name but the Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command Operations (ACO). Consequently, ACO is responsible for all Alliance operations and is still based in Mons, Belgium. Its commander also remains dual-hatted as Commander of the United States European Command (USEUCOM). (Figure 1).

At the operational level, his command consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs), one in Brunssum, The Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy. They can conduct joint operations from their static locations or (hypothetically) provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters.² There is also a Joint Headquarters (JHQ) in

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Lisbon, Portugal from which a sea-based CJTF capability can be drawn. Alliance Chiefs of Defense agreed this last headquarters was a military necessity but debate continues

about the JHQ's operational role. Because this Portugal-based headquarters is barely supportable on military grounds, it is the first of at least three entities that should be scrutinized in next round of command structure reductions.

Allied Command Operations




Figure 1

At the component or tactical level, nations agreed to six component command headquarters, which provide service-specific (land, sea, air) expertise to the command structure. Two Air Component Headquarters were retained, with one staying at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and the other moving from Naples, Italy, to Izmir, Turkey. Two Maritime Component Headquarters were retained, one conveniently co-located with the United Kingdom's Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood, and the other opportunely located near the United States Sixth Fleet in Naples, Italy. The need for, and location of, two Land Component Headquarters was also controversial on military grounds, but they eventually found homes in Heidelberg, Germany and Madrid, Spain. Given the low quality rationale for these land headquarters, they are a second area

needing attention in future discussions. The next restructuring exercise may show that one of these two land facilities will either disappear or transform into another, more useful entity.

The Transformational Structure

The most important result of the command structure was NATO's agreement to create an entire command dedicated to the idea of transformation and to promote new ways of thinking. Unlike SACEUR, its new commander did not keep his old name. The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created as a functional command out of the remains of the old Allied Command Atlantic; its commander is now the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). The

¹ NATO Summit Declaration, Prague, Czech Republic, 21 November 2002. "NATO approved the Defence Ministers' report providing the outline of a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. ... The structure will enhance the transatlantic link, result in a significant reduction in headquarters, ... and promote the transformation of our military capabilities."

² A Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defence of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. It provides a flexible and efficient means where-by the Alliance can generate rapidly deployable forces with appropriate command and control arrangements." (Italics emphasized); this definition found at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm> and raises more questions than answers about, "appropriate command and control arrangements."

United States offered to keep NATO's transformation headquarters in Virginia, as a literal next-door neighbor to the United States organization charged with the same transformation mission, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), "thereby bringing obvious advantages to NATO."³

SACT commands a loose network of centers and schools depicted in a "wireless" diagram (figure 2). The former Joint Headquarters North in Stavanger, Norway, reinvented itself as the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) and is designed along the lines of the United States Joint Training and Simulation Center. Though the JWC is not yet a comparable organization, it has provided its immediate worth by training headquarters

deploying to Afghanistan, played a key role in the NATO training mission in Iraq and will continue to do so. NATO also hatched the fledgling Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, though its contribution less immediate and its future less certain.

Since transformation is as much about changing the way the military thinks about problems, NATO attempted to change traditional education roles, too. But because nations still bear the responsibility to provide the basic training and education to their personnel, NATO was forced to lower the objectives bar in this area. With the exception of the NATO School in Germany becoming involved in the Iraq Training Mission, business was pretty much as usual at the schools in Rome, Latina and Oberammergau.

Allied Command Transformation




Figure 2

While research, technology, development and experimentation can be conducted at the ACT headquarters in Virginia or any of the loosely affiliated "centers of excellence" throughout Europe, ACT has only one dedicated research facility. It is narrowly focused on a vestige of the cold war, renamed Undersea Research Centre (URC)⁴ in La Spezia, Italy, which formerly provided NATO with a capability to conduct undersea research on issues like underwater acoustics. Today it nominally does the same, but in the relatively stagnant area of undersea

warfare, the URC is mostly a facility searching for a mission and a third entity needing further review.

An odd result of the command structure machinations was the creation of the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay on the island of Crete in Greece. It is positioned awkwardly in the structure and will probably lack funding and customers. Proponents say it will make a contribution to the war on terror, particularly

³ "NATO Transformed", North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, Belgium, 2004 p. 10

because NATO commands a maritime interdiction operation in the Mediterranean and needs a touchstone for that special duty. Critics accuse it of being a new deck chair on another doomed reform effort. Along with the JHQ, the land headquarters in Germany/Spain, and the URC, many see this Greek training facility as something that needs to go away.

Deck Chairs into Hobby Horses?

NATO's two command structure modifications in the 1990s were done without the benefit of much operational experience but the Alliance has since gathered lessons from its activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and Afghanistan. A consensus will likely develop around pressing operational issues like training and employment of special operation forces, the inefficiencies associated with deploying and maintaining national logistics systems and the lack of multinational intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. Improving linkages between these functions and deployed commanders will advance NATO's ability to operate in the next war, rather than the cold war.

In Afghanistan, United States special operations forces worked side-by-side with those from, inter alia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. No NATO headquarters has the lead for developing special operations doctrine for training, organizing and employing these type units. Developing a NATO Special Operations Command would allow nations to build on the considerable successes of recent experience and better align NATO and national doctrine.

Logistically, "up to 30 per cent [of deployed forces] of any NATO-led operation are purely there to support their own national contingents. That is wasteful, inefficient and it must be transformed in the future."⁵ Even though NATO has tinkered with the Multi-national Joint Logistics Center (MJLC) concept, it has not blossomed. Modifying the MJLC idea for

deployed operations and creating a more meaningful headquarters in Europe that could manage everything from strategic airlift to fuel storage to ammunition distribution, would help alleviate the burden currently imposed by bloated national support elements.

Another shortfall concerns NATO's lack of intelligence capability. Turning nationally obtained information into NATO intelligence is a tortured process because of a combination of NATO and national inability and unwillingness. Creating a NATO command along the lines of the Multinational Joint Intelligence Center, which sits outside US EUCOM's Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom, and improving system connectivity would be a huge step and a meaningful contribution to international security.

...when NATO announces the success of its transformation objectives, it should be careful not to declare victory too quickly lest it endure the rearranging deck chair critique.

It is possible that during the next round of discussions, that instead of deleting the headquarters in Lisbon, Heidelberg, Madrid, La Spezia, or Souda Bay those headquarters/centers could find new life by filling the special operations, logistics and intelligence gaps. It is more likely, however, that they will become hobby-horses for NATO nations hopelessly clinging to the past.

In the fall of 2006, when NATO announces the success of its transformation objectives, it should be careful not to declare victory too quickly lest it endure the rearranging deck chair critique. Instead, NATO should announce another round of transformation discussions in order to finish the restructuring job. Taking aim at the several unnecessary entities and transitioning headquarters to meet genuine Alliance requirements would be welcome steps.

⁴ Formerly known as the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic Research Centre or SAACLANTCEN.

⁵ James Jones, "NATO Transformation and Challenges," RUSI Journal, London, Apr 2005, Vol. 150, Issue 2; p. 19

LA MILITARISATION DES ESPACES NATIONAUX

par le Colonel Richard Giguère

L'environnement stratégique contemporain, secoué constamment par des attentats terroristes à l'échelle de la

Le colonel Giguère est attaché de défense de l'armée canadienne à Washington et candidat au doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Laval.

planète, malmène sérieusement la traditionnelle coupure politique intérieure/politique extérieure au sein du fonctionnement des appareils étatiques. La nature terroriste

(voir p. 15)

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des menaces actuelles à notre sécurité fait en sorte que l'espace de bataille se déplace sur notre propre territoire, avec tout ce que cela implique en terme militaire et juridique. La mise en place le 1^{er} octobre 2002 du Northern Command américain et l'entrée en fonction le 1^{er} juillet 2005 de son penchant canadien, le Commandement Canada, constituent des preuves irréfutables de la militarisation graduelle des espaces nationaux. L'Amérique du Nord est maintenant considérée comme un théâtre d'opérations potentiel, et des mesures concrètes ont été prises pour tenter d'assurer le commandement et contrôle efficace des potentielles actions à caractère militaire pouvant y être exécutées.

Ces initiatives apportent cependant leur lot de défis car l'utilisation des forces armées en territoire national, que ce soit pour contrer des menaces terroristes ou pour appuyer les autorités civiles lors d'un désastre naturel, constitue toujours un acte lourd de conséquences et de signification. Les difficultés encourues lors des opérations militaires lancées dans le sillage de l'ouragan Katrina démontrent bien qu'il reste encore beaucoup à faire afin d'élaborer un modus operandi entre les divers paliers étatiques qui permettra une intervention efficace et efficiente des militaires sur leur propre territoire lorsque requis.

Il n'est pas question de savoir qui est le premier, le deuxième ou le troisième intervenant, il est question d'être prêt à agir quand les demandes d'appui commenceront à arriver

La friction est souvent reliée au fait que traditionnellement, les militaires ne sont perçus comme les premiers intervenants sur leur territoire national. Ils n'ont pas à s'imposer dans les crises locales, municipales ou provinciales qui devraient être en tout premier lieu du ressort des ressources civiles, policières ou autres. Le problème, c'est que par exemple confrontées à un cas de crise majeure comme Katrina ou une attaque biologique terroriste dans un grand espace urbain, les ressources des premiers intervenants seraient très rapidement dépassées, obligeant les autorités à recourir immédiatement aux forces armées, généralement mieux équipées, organisées et entraînées pour parer aux crises de grande envergure. Il n'est pas question de savoir qui est le premier, le deuxième ou le troisième intervenant, il est question d'être prêt à agir quand les demandes d'appui commenceront à arriver.

Les intervenants de deuxième ou troisième ligne n'auront pas toujours le loisir de profiter d'une longue période de planification en cas de crise majeure. S'il est une leçon que nous pouvons déjà tirer de Katrina, c'est que la population américaine éprouvée espérait voir arriver les forces armées en plus grand nombre et beaucoup plus rapidement et ce désir était à mon

avis bien légitime.

La création de quartiers généraux tels que le Northern Command ou le Commandement Canada tombe sous le sens à la lumière des attentats terroristes qui frappent un peu partout dans le monde. En effet, rien ne nous autorise à penser que jamais notre territoire national ne fera l'objet d'une attaque et les Américains en ont fait l'éprouvante expérience le 11 septembre 2001. "Le Canada n'est pas à l'abri de la menace que constitue le terrorisme. Il est une cible" déclarèrent l'honorable Anne McLellan, vice-première ministre et ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile, et l'honorable Irwin Cotler, ministre de la Justice et procureur général du Canada, à l'occasion de leur comparution devant le Comité sénatorial spécial sur la Loi antiterroriste et le Sous-comité de la sécurité publique et nationale de la Chambre des communes le 14 novembre 2005.

L'émergence des menaces asymétriques oblige les stratégies politiques et militaires à revoir le rôle des armées à l'interne, à la frontière des tâches habituellement confiées à la police, et en ce sens, la création du Commandement Canada devrait permettre justement de s'attaquer immédiatement aux diverses embûches juridiques et bureaucratiques à une intervention vraiment coordonnée qui ne manqueraient pas de ressurgir en cas de crise majeure, terroriste, environnementale ou autre, sur notre territoire.

Traditionnellement, au niveau étatique, la sécurité du monde de l'intérieur s'appuie sur les services policiers, le monde de l'extérieur disposant de l'armée, ces deux domaines étant clairement séparés et mutuellement exclusifs et occupant des niches bien spécifiques, l'une tournée vers l'intérieur, et l'autre vers l'extérieur de la vie étatique. Ce partage des responsabilités est aujourd'hui beaucoup moins évident en pratique. Les risques et menaces propres à notre ère ne nécessitent plus tout simplement une réponse policière ou militaire mais plus souvent qu'autrement un amalgame des deux. Par exemple, dans un pays comme le Canada, qui devrait contrer les menaces que font planer les cyber-pirates ou les terroristes menaçant d'utiliser des armes biologiques ou chimiques? L'armée ou la police? En fait, la question devrait peut-être se poser ainsi : Qui est organisé, équipé et entraîné pour contrer ces menaces? Si la réponse à cette question nous renvoie à une entité qui ne figure pas parmi les premiers intervenants, nous avons un problème.

L'administration américaine a été l'objet de nombreuses critiques pour sa gestion de la crise provoquée par le passage de l'ouragan Katrina. Cette nouvelle épreuve en sol américain a mis en évidence cette friction entre les divers intervenants, mettant parfaitement en évidence la question primordiale de

(voir p. 17)

69th ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the CDA
and
22nd ANNUAL SEMINAR of the
CDA Institute
23-24 February 2006
Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON

The 22nd annual seminar, NATO In Transition: the Impact on Canada, will be presented by the CDA Institute on Thursday, 23 February 2006, commencing at 0830 hrs. The Minister of National Defence has been invited to present the seminar with an introductory address. Other participants will include General Ray Henault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and former Chief of the Defence Staff, who will deliver the keynote address; Admiral (Ret'd) John Anderson, a former Chief of the Defence Staff; Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation; General (Ret'd) Jean Boyle, former Chief of the Defence Staff; General (Ret'd) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman NATO Military Committee; and Lieutenant-General James N. Mattis, Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command (invited). Dr. Michael Ignatieff, Director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, has been invited to be the luncheon speaker.

24 February, 0830 - 1515 hrs - Addresses by: General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General J.H.M.P. Caron, Chief of the Land Staff; Major-General H.M. Petras, Chief Reserves and Cadets; Lieutenant-General J.S. Lucas, Chief of the Air Staff; Vice-Admiral Bruce Maclean, Chief of the Maritime Staff; and Mr. Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director, US Reserve Officers Association. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire will preside over the discussion period.

Registration Fees (includes luncheon and reception, 23 February):

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| • CDA Institute donors, CDA Members and Associate Members | \$150 |
| • serving Regular and Reserve Force personnel, DND civilians, Military Attachés, and civilians | \$200 |
| • participant from non-sponsoring industry | \$250 |
| • full-time students (captain/Lt (N) and below) | \$20 |

Enquiries and individual registration by 1 February 2006, by tel: (613) 236 9903; fax: (613) 236 8191; e-mail: projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca; website: www.cda-cdai.ca

69^{ième} ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE ANNUELLE de la CAD
et
22^{ième} SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL de
l'Institut de la CAD
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Le 22^{ième} Séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD, intitulé, l'OTAN en transition: l'Impact sur le Canada, aura lieu jeudi, le 23 février, à 8h 30. Le ministre de la Défense a été invité à présenter le discours-préliminaire. Le général Ray Henault, Président du conseil du Comité militaire de l'OTAN et ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense, présentera le discours-programme; l'amiral (ret) John Anderson, un ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense; l'amiral Sir Mark Stanhope, Commandant-adjoint suprême des forces de l'OTAN - Transformation; le général (ret) Jean Boyle, un ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense; le général (ret) Klaus Naumann, ancien Président du conseil du Comité militaire de l'OTAN; et le lieutenant-général James N. Mattis, Général Commandant du Marine Corps Combat Development Command (invité); feront aussi partie du séminaire. Monsieur Michael Ignatieff, Directeur, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, de l'université Harvard, a été invité à être le conférencier lors du déjeuner.

24 février, 8h 30 - 15h 15 - Présentations par: Le général Rick Hillier, Chef d'état-major de la Défense; le lieutenant-général J.H.M.P. Caron, Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre; le major-général Herb Petras, Chef des Réserves et Cadets; le lieutenant-général J.S. Lucas, Chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne; et le vice-amiral Bruce Maclean, Chef d'état-major des Forces maritimes; et Monsieur Jayson Spiegel, Ancien Directeur Exécutif de la US Reserve Officers Association. Le lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire présidera les discussions.

Frais d'inscription (incluant le déjeuner et la réception du 23 février):

- | | |
|---|--------|
| • membres, membres associés, donateurs de l'Institut de la CAD | 150 \$ |
| • membres des Forces canadiennes, réguliers et réservistes, civils du MDN, attachés militaires, et civils | 200 \$ |
| • représentant d'industrie | 250 \$ |
| • étudiants à temps plein (équivalant du grade capitaine/Lt (N) ou inférieur) | 20 \$ |

Renseignements et enregistrement, avant le 1^{er} février 2006, par tél: (613) 236 9903; télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courrier électronique (e-mail): projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca;

toute intervention en case de crise majeure sur notre territoire national : à la fin de la journée, qui est responsable? Les divergences quant à la gestion de Katrina entre les autorités de la Nouvelle-Orléans, la gouverneure de la Louisiane, le Département du Homeland Security, le Northern Command et la Maison Blanche, étalées à la face du monde et bien alimentées par les médias, doivent nous inciter à définir davantage le rôle des divers intervenants potentiels en amont d'une crise. Les relations de commandement et contrôle et les responsabilités doivent être bien cernées maintenant et non pendant la crise. Northern Command et le Commandement Canada sont des entités qui ont été créées en réponse à l'environnement stratégique émergent. Le cadre de leurs responsabilités dans l'ensemble de l'appareil étatique doit être cependant bien défini afin d'assurer leur intervention efficace et efficiente. Et ce, le plus rapidement possible.

La politique canadienne de sécurité nationale, publiée en avril 2004, ne renferme pas de précisions à ce sujet et doit en ce sens faire l'objet d'une révision.

Il est évident que les menaces militaires traditionnelles sont graduellement remplacées par des risques plus diffus mais aussi menaçants. Nous pouvons imaginer ici la répétition de l'histoire de David contre Goliath, un État-nation confronté à des groupes armés qui ne sont pas nécessairement des forces armées, commandés par des entités sociales qui ne sont pas nécessairement des États. Les divers types de terrorisme, les menaces nucléaires, biologiques et chimiques, la désinformation, l'attaque des réseaux informatiques, l'atteinte à nos valeurs les plus fondamentales, voilà des exemples de menaces asymétriques, des menaces contre lesquelles les armées, traditionnellement organisées, équipées et entraînées dans le cadre de la Guerre froide, ne peuvent réagir facilement. Pas en tout cas dans le cadre juridique et bureaucratique actuel. En ce sens, il est intéressant de noter que le dernier énoncé de défense canadien découle de l'énoncé de politique internationale.

Quid de l'action des forces armées sur notre propre territoire dans le cadre d'opérations gérées par le Commandement Canada? La politique canadienne de sécurité nationale, publiée en avril 2004, ne renferme pas de précisions à ce sujet et doit en ce sens faire l'objet d'une révision.

S'il n'y a plus d'ennemi désigné comme au bon temps de la Guerre froide, il faut donc revisiter la raison d'être et les rôles confiés à nos forces armées. L'apparition de menaces

asymétriques exige une remise en question de l'implication de l'armée vers « l'intérieur », dans des domaines habituellement confiés aux forces policières, qui au Canada, ne sont pas organisées, équipées et entraînées pour contrer cette gamme de nouvelles menaces, pas nécessairement militaires, mais beaucoup plus dangereuses que les menaces habituellement prises en charge par les forces publiques. Nous devons donc en fait revoir la légitimité de l'emploi de l'armée à l'intérieur des espaces nationaux et évaluer la possibilité de voir l'armée s'impliquer potentiellement à l'intérieur de nos frontières nationales. La disparition des menaces traditionnelles et l'apparition de nouvelles menaces, asymétriques dans leur nature, nous obligent à cette remise en question. La coupure traditionnelle entre l'armée et la police est définitivement brouillée. Le rôle des forces de réserve dans ce cadre mérite d'être particulièrement analysé.

Ces nouveaux paradigmes influencent fortement les rôles confiés aux armées. Les forces armées demeurent et doivent demeurer garantes de la protection de l'État. Ce rôle ne devrait pas être remis en question étant donné l'instabilité actuelle du système international. Les menaces traditionnelles se sont définitivement estompées mais elles ne sont tout de même pas disparues, le risque d'une résurgence de telles menaces étant toujours présent. Dans le contexte actuel, l'absence d'une menace imminente ou d'un ennemi désigné ne nous autorise pas à baisser la garde.

Les environnements externes et internes sont de plus en plus entremêlés. Par le fait même, les responsabilités propres aux forces policières et aux forces armées se heurtent de plus en plus aux marges de leurs domaines respectifs. La coupure traditionnelle politique intérieure/politique extérieure est de plus en plus floue dans le contexte global actuel et les réactions de l'État face aux défis qui lui sont posés. Est-il interdit de penser qu'en cas de forces majeure ou de menaces imminentes, les forces armées auront par exemple à patrouiller les ports canadiens ou à surveiller nos frontières?

Le rôle des armées doit être évalué à l'intérieur de l'environnement étatique dans le but de contrer les menaces asymétriques émergentes. Si l'on répugne à l'emploi de l'armée à l'intérieur de ce cadre, il faudra alors évaluer l'efficacité des forces policières pour contrer ces menaces et peut-être envisager la création d'un troisième type de force publique, de type gendarmerie, dont les pouvoirs pourraient être un amalgame des pouvoirs traditionnellement confiés aux forces militaires d'un part et aux forces policières de l'autre.

« It is not the strongest species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the ones most responsive to change. » Il est bon de se rappeler à l'occasion les fameux mots de Darwin.

From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding Some of the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the CF and Transformation

by Brigadier-General Daniel Gosselin and Dr. Craig Stone

(Note that this article contains facts and opinions which the authors alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect policy or opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence. This is an abridgement of an article that will appear in the Winter 2006 edition of the Canadian Military Journal – ed.)

The release of a new Canadian Defence Policy Statement has planted the seeds for a major transformation of the Canadian Forces (CF) in the coming years. Since its release, there has been a sense that both the focus and intentions of the new policy have similarities with those of Paul T. Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence (MND), who unified the Canadian military in the 1960s. The CF vision outlined in the new defence policy speaks of integrated forces and unified command structure and system. Terms such as “integration” and “unification” have come to be associated with Minister Hellyer and, because of the emotions surrounding unification, have been avoided at Defence since then.¹

With terminology in the new CF vision resonating with ideas of the 1960s, it may be tempting to liken the unification initiative with the current CF transformation. As this article points out, comparing the unification of the CF with this CF transformation is misguided.² Two important factors make this CF transformation different from the unification of the CF: the context of the two periods is markedly different and the fundamental ideas underpinning both initiatives are poles apart.

Context of the Two Periods

Minister Hellyer arrived at National Defence in 1963 with a clear mandate to reform Canadian defence. A series of events had taken place in the period 1957-1963 that convinced Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson that significant changes at Defence

were required. First, a number of defence procurement challenges had plagued the Diefenbaker Government. Second, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the Canadian military response to it, which saw “control of the armed forces passed briefly out of the government’s hands,”³ was a determining event to help convince the government that the command structure of the military had to change. Third, Minister Hellyer was very much influenced by the report of the government-appointed Royal Commission on Government Reorganization (Glassco Commission), mandated to review, in the interest of management efficiency, the organization and methods of the federal government.

The challenge facing Minister Hellyer as he crafted the 1964 White Paper was not a military threat specifically, but rather the increasing cost of defence for a government facing a fiscal crisis; moreover, this minority government was also more inclined to spend on national social programs than on defence. To justify many of the changes required at Defence, Minister Hellyer relied to a great extent on the conclusions of the Commission “which had done such a splendid job of exposing the waste and extravagance resulting from duplication and triplification [at Defence].”⁴ Finally, when he arrived at National Defence, Minister Hellyer was a veteran MP, with hopes that his achievements at Defence would help him be an obvious choice to succeed Lester Pearson.

To contrast the early 1960s with the current period, an operationally-focused General Hillier assumed command of the CF in early 2005 with the events of 9/11 still fresh in the mind of Canadians, and with a prime minister in office who has expressed his desires, through many statements and the new Canadian International Policy Statement, to “restore” Canada’s place on the world scene. The CDS, influential in the writing of the new CF vision, urged new thinking about the CF and proposed new roles for the Canadian military, these being focused on establishing Canada as a theatre of operations and on stabilizing failed and failing states around the world. Moreover, he assumed command of the CF with public confidence in Canada’s armed forces at its highest level in decades.

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Dr. Craig Stone is the Deputy Director of Academics at Canadian Forces College in Toronto and an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Politics and Economics Department at Royal Military College, Kingston.

Being conscious of the different context of the two periods under which each initiative – unification and transformation – was shaped is critically important to appreciate the impact that the domestic and international environments have on the formulation of ideas in government and at defence.

Ideas in Action at Defence

In 1963, the new Liberal government was determined to conduct a comprehensive review of defence policy. In addition, Minister Hellyer believed that the mechanisms of civil control of the military needed a major overhaul. In his mind, this was best achieved through the integration of the command structure to streamline the organization and through a centralization of the control and administration of the CF into one CDS (instead of three service chiefs reporting independently to the minister). Consequently, under Minister Hellyer, there would be one integrated defence policy, one overall defence program, one CF Headquarters, and one CDS with authority over the three service chiefs.

On the heels of the Glassco Commission, the new minister also viewed a major reorganization of the defence forces as the only means of reducing the problems of tri-service inefficiencies and freeing up resources for future capital equipment acquisitions. He was convinced that a streamlined bureaucracy and the modernization of defence management methods would help significantly to realize the desired economies. His ultimate solution to achieve these objectives was complete integration of the services – unification.

By late 1966, Minister Hellyer had created the office of the CDS, centralizing decision-making, and had changed the field command structure, creating six functional commands in lieu of the three services' eleven subordinate headquarters. He had also achieved reduction in duplication and triplication of facilities and services. Service resistance to his integration efforts, however, convinced him that only unification of the services would truly institutionalize the changes he was seeking, and help develop "a sense of purpose and a sense of belonging to one single Service."⁵ Unification of the three services took effect in February 1968.

Hellyer did not seem overly concerned with the potential adverse impact that the administrative centralization he was proposing would have on the operational effectiveness of the various CF components. As one Canadian historian contends, "[t]he creation of a truly effective fighting force did not figure in the government's agenda."⁶ Indeed, it appears that Minister Hellyer was also more interested in unification as a means to "broaden the opportunities available to service-motivated and expensively trained personnel,"⁷ reflecting in many ways his own frustrating wartime experience with the services.

To Minister Hellyer, unification was "the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression"⁸ that started with integration, and that remained the best way to pursue his objective of reducing overhead costs, realizing greater administrative efficiency and achieving bureaucratic control of the military. These themes would come to dominate the Hellyer period, and eventually have a significant influence over Defence throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

In recent years, military analysts and senior officers have recognized the need for a new vision to guide the CF in meeting the defence and security challenges of the 21st century. The previous CDS and senior leadership had clearly recognized that fundamental changes to the CF were necessary to better position the institution for the coming decade. Transformation and change were the main themes of the last two CDS Annual Reports to Parliament. However, transforming the CF without the benefit of a new defence policy, without an overarching CF vision, and a limited budget, proved to be near impossible; consequently, little progress could be made in this regard in recent years. The arrival of General Hillier as CDS in February 2005 and the issue of a new defence policy would provide the opportunity awaited for.

This new vision articulates that, for the CF to achieve greater operational effects in Canada and around the world, the CF will need a more integrated approach to operations and a more unified command structure. The CDS believes that this can best be achieved through a transformation of the existing command structure – making it more operational and more command centric, with the introduction of new operational capabilities, and the establishment of fully integrated units capable of a high-readiness response to foreign and domestic threats.⁹

...the mere fact that there is no mention of objectives such as "controlling defence costs," "improving management methods" and "creating administrative efficiencies" in the 2005 Defence Policy is quite revealing.

Minister Hellyer's primary reason for initiating changes to the CF in the 1960s was centred on achieving greater administrative efficiencies, to create economies that could be directed toward capabilities. In contrast, this government and General Hillier's ideas are clearly focused on the need to increase CF operational effectiveness – the strategic imperative of this transformation, which have been shaped by General Hillier's many operational command experiences in the past decade. Effectiveness in the CF vision stands for "better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces;" the mere fact that there is no mention of objectives such as "controlling defence costs," "improving management meth-

ods" and "creating administrative efficiencies" in the 2005 Defence Policy is quite revealing.¹⁰ The federal government is running a budget surplus – for eight years in a row – and has made a solid financial commitment to Canadian defence with the 2005 federal budget, a step unparalleled in the past two decades. The CF is expected to grow in the coming years. All these elements are indicative of the type of dominant ideas that shaped the writing of the 2005 defence policy and that are driving the current CF transformation.

In summary, equating the 2005 CF transformation with the 1960's unification of the CF is mistaken, and could only be based on a superficial comparison of the two large-scale initiatives. It is evident that this transformation is not the last chapter of the unification story; rather, it is another important waypoint in the continued evolution of Canada's military forces.

ENDNOTES

¹ The term "integration" has different meaning in Canadian defence, depending on the period being discussed. Before 1972, "integration" refers to the amalgamation of the headquarters, commands, and support establishments of the three services, while preserving the services themselves as separate institution, while "unification" means the establishment of a single military service in place of the army, navy and air force.

² For the purpose of this article, the 1960s integration and unification initiative launched by Minister Hellyer will be referred to as "CF unification" while the implementation of the 2005 defence policy by General Hillier will be referred to as the "CF transformation."

³ Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 2

⁴ Paul Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify the Canadian Forces* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Canadian Publishers, 1990), 36.

⁵ Hellyer, "Canadian Defence Policy," *Air University Review* 19, 1 (November-December 1967), 7.

⁶ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, The Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996), 72.

⁷ Hellyer, "Canadian Defence Policy," 7.

⁸ Hellyer, in Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2, Defence Organization* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1998), 132.

⁹ General Rick Hillier, "Canadian Forces transformation: from vision to mission," *The Hill Times*, 26 September 2005, 24, and 2005 Defence Policy, 11.

¹⁰ That being said, for DND, many "efficiency" themes will be captured through the implementation of the Treasury Board-initiated Public Service Modernization Act that will affect many areas of public sector management, and may have important repercussions on the way National Defence conduct its business.

Procurement Deferred is Policy Denied: The Major Impediments to Defence Procurement

by Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh

The year 2005 will most certainly be remembered as a very good year for the Canadian Forces, given that a multi-year financial package was announced in February to implement a new Defence Policy (DPS 2005) that emanated from the Federal Government's first-ever International Security Policy Statement. Assuming the approaching Federal election does not substantially alter these important security and defence strategies, optimists will continue to see them as the tonic the Canadian Forces (CF) need for their essential transformation and modernization. Others are less hopeful, believing, as I do, that meaningful improvements to operational viability and

sustainability will continue to elude the CF unless procedures surrounding the public administration of defence are given a major overhaul.

Background

Two recently published Claxton Papers¹ describe well Canada's military situation. They point to years of equipment replacement deferrals that have rendered several navy, army and air force capabilities nearly ineffective. Faced with obsolete equipment fleets of various kinds, the Government has sought to redress the situation by increasing the defence budget. Alas, its own equipment procurement system

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continues to be one of the greatest obstacles to solving this serious problem. For example, although all agreed, two years ago, on the need to replace the now defunct CC-115 Buffalo Search and Rescue aircraft, a procurement decision has yet to be announced.

The DND equipment procurement system, one of many systems administered by the Government, requires some 16 years to complete the purchase and field major military platforms (ships, planes, trucks, etc.). If this situation is allowed to continue, the implementation of DPS 2005 will be delayed beyond 2020, a dangerously long time for Canada to go without essential sea, land and air capabilities.

Ideally, changes brought to the system of public administration of defence should be rooted in a national industrial policy without which the exercise to improve procurement could be likened to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. In view of the fact that previous efforts to develop an industrial strategy have failed, a more modest (in scope) undertaking, that of developing a military equipment national acquisition strategy (viewed by this author as second best to a national industrial but nevertheless a step in the right direction) might have a greater chance of success.

But wait! Is the National Aerospace and Defence Strategic Framework, announced on 25 November last, by the Hon. Jean-C. Lapierre, Minister of Transport, on behalf of Industry Minister David L. Emerson, and aimed at helping leaders in the aerospace, defence and space sectors identify where and how they can be globally competitive, a workable umbrella strategy for military equipment acquisition? Will this strategy eliminate the many pitfalls in and roadblocks to timely and efficient military equipment procurement? Will the public administration of defence be enhanced as a result of the implementation of this new national industrial strategy?

It is of course too early to tell, but one would hope that the implementation of such a strategy would substantially enhance the procurement of military equipment for our Canadian Forces.

Aim

Acknowledging that major improvements must be brought to the procurement system, this article briefly examines two long-standing causes of procurement constipation, and recommends to elected officials, who must find the right balance between military and political (read: Regional Industrial Benefits) requirements, the incorporation into its newly announced National A & D Strategic Framework a military equipment national acquisition strategy that would substantially enhance the current system.

Procurement Problems

A fifty year (1950-2000) analysis of DND procurement reveals that in the 1950s and 1960s, when procurement staffs were smaller, the Department richer, and the threat more clearly defined, major equipments (excluding ship fleets) were procured in less than 7 years. In the 1970s and 1980s, defence budgets shrank, the bureaucracy expanded and procurement times increased to over 15 years. In the last 15 years, budgets have shrunk further, the procurement staffs have been halved and procurement times have again shrunk to about seven years (except for the Maritime Helicopter Project). What can be made of these seemingly counter-intuitive procurement outcomes?

The airborne truck and the family of modular armour vehicle projects died in the doctrine-defence policy conflict.

Doctrine vs. Policy: It is offered that when the military requirement supports Government policy and also aligns with the Canadian industrial lobby, procurement is rapid. A good example is the Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III), produced by General Motors Diesel Division between 1994 and 1997. However, when a military requirement is defined more by military doctrine than by defence policy, the project is in for rough sledding. The example of the Leopard C1 tank replacement project that spanned the years 1983 to 1997 is illustrative.

The era of equipment projects emanating from doctrine that is at odds with defence policy would now appear to be at an end. The Army was caught in the doctrine first - policy be damned cycle for most of the 1980s. The Army combat development process that created Corps 86 - a robust formation designed to defeat a Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group - produced projects that spent years trying to obtain Department approval. Some never did. The airborne truck and the family of modular armour vehicle projects died in the doctrine-defence policy conflict. Very familiar with these potential pitfalls, the current Chief of Defence Staff, General Hillier, now insists that policy, doctrine and requirements align very early in the procurement process. As an example, the requirements for heavy-lift helicopters and air transport are solidly linked to the 2005 foreign policy trinity of defence, diplomacy and development.

Conversely, a project can be clearly grounded in doctrine and policy, but become ensnared in industrial lobbying. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Project, started in 1973 and concluded in 1989, proves the point.

Affordability: One should of course not lose sight of the obvious fact that a lack of money will result in all projects moving at a snail's pace and, in some cases, in projects deemed as unaffordable being reduced in scope, possibly to the detriment of established military strategic objectives. The 1980s Submarine Replacement and Anti-Armour Vehicle projects were initially eliminated; they then reappeared in cheaper project versions in subsequent years.

Whether DND's current list of capital equipment projects is affordable is not clear. Budget 2005 increased defence allocations, but the Department is still running a \$1.5 billion deficit in business accounts. Other deficits, caused by infrastructure neglect, by personnel and professional development debts, and by expensive deployments, are also poised to render many procurement projects unaffordable.

Assessments of affordability have been further clouded by Cabinet's adoption of full, life-time cost accounting. It is indeed necessary to know the full cost of options when evaluating competitive bids, but few are accustomed to Cabinet evaluation procedures. The full, life-time cost of procurement renders political decision-makers cautious; for example it is difficult to convince the Canadian taxpayer that the purchase of 16 transport planes, 15 helicopters, 15 search and rescue aircraft, and 4 utility aircraft will cost only \$12.1 billion. Some taxpayers might wonder why one of these aircraft seems to cost more than a Boeing 747; but then the consumer is not interested in knowing 20-30 year (life-time) costs of a purchase. Should the consumer apply government procurement rules, the price of the average car in Canada would balloon to \$195,000. This issue of affordability has recently resulted in the deferral of the purchase of essential aircraft to post-Election 2006.

Military procurement would accelerate if decision-makers and the media understood the concepts of purchase price, life-time support costs and the industrial development surcharge of major projects, e.g. the now retired Itis jeep cost \$26,500 to purchase, \$20,000 per chassis for integrated logistic support, \$250,000 to operate and maintain for 20 years, and some \$40,000 as an industrial surcharge (transference of fabrication from Belgium to Canada). If life-time cost accounting had been in force in 1982, it is unlikely that Cabinet would have been persuaded to procure a \$336,500 jeep. The current life-time costing approach, while essential for evaluation, does inflate the purchase price and creates the perception that military equipment is unaffordable. As long as this approach continues, it is very unlikely that any government would procure the next jet fighter.

Industrial Strategy: The creation of a Canadian industrial strategy (a complex process fraught with political difficulties) has long eluded government and industry. Unfortunately, in my

view, the lack of such a national strategy greatly increases the complexity of procurement because in its absence no control is exercised on the number of procurement options Government must examine. The now defunct Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) project is a good example of the problem.

The UAV project was doctrinally sound; it was included in Prime Minister Trudeau's April 1969 defence policy statement; but proved 'too difficult' in that there were over 50 procurement options, and the international contenders offered products that were a fraction of the cost of similar products that were made in Canada. Canadian Regional aerospace lobbies made the process even more complicated by arguing that at least parts of the equipment manufactured in their 'back yard'. Given that any one of the procurement options might further frustrate the aerospace industry and alienate Regions, the Government chose to put an end to the procurement process that effectively froze UAV procurement for ten years.

Some made-in-Canada military products are a liability; others are an asset. Decision-makers need to know the difference.

Recent acquisition decisions that led to the fabrication of military truck fleets in Canada turned into a commercial fiasco and eroded operational credibility. The truck manufacturing enterprises set up in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia to execute the contract did not long survive beyond the end of the initial government contract. In fact, not one of these companies exists today. As a consequence, DND pays exorbitant operations and maintenance costs for the built-in-Canada truck fleets (from \$25,000 to \$50,000 a year per vehicle, depending on age and size). Likewise, Canadian shipyards have proven expensive. It is calculated that the Canadian Patrol Frigate project spent \$4 billion on ships, \$2 billion on new Integrated Logistics and Support and \$3 billion on shipyards. Conversely, investments in built-in-Canada light armoured vehicles and tactical radios and networks are paying dividends to Canadians.

Some made-in-Canada military products are a liability; others are an asset. Decision-makers need to know the difference.

Industry Canada has recently put forward a proposal that calls for competing Industrial Regional Benefits (IRBs) in every major defence project; a proposal that would, in the opinion of this author, pit Region against Region, intensify lobbying, and paralyze political decision-makers. Imagine the Regional expectations and complexities of the Joint Support Ship project. A Canadian compromise could result in assembly of the bow being carried out in Vancouver, the stern in Ontario, the deck in Quebec, and the hull in New Brunswick, with all

parts being integrated in Nova Scotia. Since 1995, the Canadian Forces have sought to replace its replenishment ships. Initially the doctrine-policy conflict kept the project within the Canadian Forces. Now, the Department is seeking that ever-elusive industrial strategy for ship replacements. The affordability factor demands an offshore, in-production solution. Industrial Regional aspirations demand otherwise.

It would seem clear that politicians, government officials and military staffs need an acquisition strategy without which they will languish for years, probably decades, waiting for direction and decisions.

A Military Equipment Acquisition Strategy

The foregoing illustrates the fact that the existing military equipment procurement process, for which the Department of Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC) is principally responsible, regularly fails to respond in a timely and financially viable manner to the statements of requirements emanating from DND's capital acquisition program.

The following are, in my view, elements that are essential to an improved national military equipment acquisition strategy:

- Buy off-the-shelf from Canadian sources. If not available in Canada buy off-the-shelf from foreign sources. If not in production then;
- Produce the item, consistent with:
 - Existing and viable Canadian industrial expertise;
 - Timeliness of production;
 - Practicality (in Canada) of full equipment life-cycle support;
 - The need for national independence of supply and support;
 - Achieving maximum value for money;
 - Achieving maximum value from Canadian R & D;
 - The relative importance of equipment interoperability with principal Allies; and
 - The promotion of niche Canadian industrial expertise and capacity.
- Maximum recognition of a need to develop a viable Canadian military industrial base in areas of expertise, such as:

Command and control, telecommunications, information, surveillance and imagery fusion technologies;
Sea, land and air command and control, combat and flight simulation technologies;
Northern and polar equipment expertise and products;
Bomb and other unexploded ordnance disposal protective equipment;
Soldier systems; and
NBC defence.

Conclusion

It is this author's belief that the lack of a coherent national military equipment acquisition strategy is the Achilles Heel of existing procurement procedures and the single most important impediment to transforming and modernizing the Canadian Forces. Politicians need this decision-making template without which efforts to balance Regional industrial aspirations and military requirements could result in denying Canada's military the capabilities they so desperately need, and burden the country and the military with inefficient outcomes.

Waiting for decisions and paying too much for military equipment may well result in the Canadian Forces consisting of three relatively ineffective Services or foregoing one of their current three Services. Neither of these two results is acceptable to Canadians.

Recommendation

Federal and Regional representatives should therefore ensure that the newly announced National A & D Strategic Framework pursues as its first priority the effective and timely acquisition of military equipment for the Canadian Forces.

FOOTNOTE

¹ Douglas L. Bland, *Canada Without Armed Forces*, (Claxton Paper # 4, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, 2003); *Transforming National Defence Administration*, (Claxton Paper # 6, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, 2005).

Procurement Reform – Why is it so difficult?

by Pierre Lagueux

A lot has been said about Defence Procurement Reform in recent years. Not just here in Canada, but in the U.S., UK,

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Australia – in fact in most major Defence Departments in the world. Judging by the amount that has been written and said, it surely must be a high priority in all those Defence Departments – so why haven't we had success? Not just in

Canada – witness the headline in a recent edition of Jane's Defence Weekly (19 Oct 2005) in reference to the UK: "Smart Acquisition still not working, says committee".

Procurement reform hasn't had much success to date because it can't! Notwithstanding that everyone wants procurement reform, there are too many systemic and structural impediments to it happening. Unless these are addressed, we can keep on talking about the need for Procurement Reform, but little in the way of real reform will ever be achieved.

What are those systemic, structural impediments that must first be tackled vigorously if we are to truly have Defence Procurement reform in Canada? I believe there are at least five actions that must be taken as a precursor to any successful attempt to truly reform defence procurement.

...if procurement reform is to take place, not only must change occur inside the government, but also in industry.

First and most critical to a successful reform of procurement, is a complete review and restructure of the human resource infrastructure that is responsible for the procurement function. In this I include the military officer classifications, military trade occupations as well as the civilian classifications. Most of these have been in place since the 1960's, but compared to then, today's technology is vastly changed, support concepts have changed, industry capabilities are very different and the needs of the CF are quite different. Yet our HR resources are essentially trained and grouped along the same specialty lines as over 40 years ago. Is it any wonder then that they respond to the need for reform by simply trying to do the same things better, rather than doing things differently? They have not been shown how to do things differently so it is not surprising that the skills do not exist to support a change even if one is initiated. By and large, the desire to protect and preserve existing classifications always trumps the need to institute reform of the procurement process.

Second, and closely related to the previous point, there is no longer a specialized procurement group (including both military and civilian members) in the Defence department. There is a vacuum of acquisition and procurement leadership brought about as a result of the significant downsizing that occurred in the 1990's. Defence procurement is a complex and often risky business with huge dollars at stake, where even the slightest error is immediately put under the scrutiny of public second guessing. Procurement is more than contracting; it is more than engineering; it is more than inventory management, supply management, life cycle management, logistics, etc. although all these skills and knowledge are necessary. And within a government context, the key skill is often the ability to manage

conflicting objectives and still satisfy the operational requirement. Such an environment requires well trained, experienced people who maintain currency in a changing environment and can adapt the process to the environment. It also requires personnel who have a good knowledge of industry, the industrial base and business processes. We have a significant shortage of such personnel in DND.

Third, if we really want to move towards performance based specifications, then we need to put in place a contracting regime that supports it. Performance specifications must be written in such a way that competing bids can be objectively compared, evaluated and contracted for. Sounds easy – but obviously if it was, we would have been doing it long ago. The reality is that we don't know how to do it successfully. Even the much touted performance specs for the recently announced airlift requirement have yet to actually lead to contract based on those specs. Invariably DND reverts to detailed engineering specs (remember my first point) and PWGSC gladly accepts them as it is easy to draft a contract with objective, measurable metrics on which to bind a contractor, based on engineering specs. It is not so easy to hold a contractor accountable on much more general and less precise performance specs.

Until we develop and become comfortable with a new contracting structure that will deliver what is needed, the tendency is to stay with detailed specs written by staff who are experts at doing just that! As an aside, I really wonder if performance specs can ever really apply when considering the procurement of exacting military equipment that must be integrated into a total system or capability. Where performance specs surely have their place is in contracting for services, rather than specific equipments or weapon systems.

Fourth, if procurement reform is to take place, not only must change occur inside the government, but also in industry. Notwithstanding its repeated calls for change inside the government, there is little evidence that there is a collective will and agreement in industry as to what the change should be, other than at the most general level, but with little detail on specifics. For example, everyone condemns the process as taking too long. If that is the key issue, a simplistic way to solve that easily, is to do a lot more sole-source procurement! Obviously, the issue is more complex than that. But it simply illustrates the differences between how DND views industry's role and how industry feels it should contribute.

There often seems to be little in the way of common ground, hence it is very difficult to make end to end changes when the two ends expect to meet in a different place. We need a made in Canada Defence Industrial Base Policy that clearly enunciates the role that industry must play in today's world. Equally important it must fully recognize the geographic, economic and trade reality of being smack up against the

United States, and not just attempt to emulate what European or other countries are doing. Those geographic, economic and trade realities are different! Without a recognized industrial base policy that paints a clear expectation of all parties, we just won't get there from here!

Lastly, financial and budget management within DND needs to be restructured. The headlong rush to decentralize budgets a few years ago has led to financial management inefficiencies that directly impact on and create procurement inefficiencies.

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of CFN Consultants)

You can do a lot more with one ten million dollar pot than you can with 10 one million dollar pots! Without the ability to manage finances globally, there is no ability to anticipate changes in financial requirements and adjust quickly to ensure we avoid the yearly cycle of "no money at the beginning of the FY, only to be awash in cash at the end".

So just like the weather, while we have been talking about procurement reform for a long time now, we seem to have been able to do very little about it. It really is not surprising.

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE / CANADIAN DEFENCE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS INSTITUTE GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

Matthew Gillard, Project Officer, CDA Institute



future of Canada's armed forces.

This year, 37 individuals (out of a total of 50 people who submitted abstracts), gave stimulating presentations on various defence, security, and development issues. The presenters were mainly from eight Security and Defence

forum (SDF) centers: Université Laval, Dalhousie University, Université du Québec à Montréal, University of Calgary, Université de Montréal, Queen's University, Carleton University, and Wilfred Laurier University, as well as the War Studies Program at RMC. Additionally, some of the presenters were from Simon Fraser University, National Defence Headquarters, and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) 8th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Security and Defence: National and International Issues, held in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) and with the support of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, the Walter Duncan Gordon Foundation, General Dynamics Canada, and the DND Security and Defence Forum Special Project Fund, was one of the most successful symposia held yet.

Every year, the Symposium provides a unique venue for graduate students to present scholarly works on defence, security, and development issues in a public forum. It also provides graduate students with a unique opportunity to interact with key members of the defence community.

The two-day Symposium was held in at Royal Military College (RMC), October 28-29, 2005. Over 100 graduate students, military personnel, government officials, and academics people attended the conference, making it our most well-attended Symposium ever.

The Graduate Student Symposium featured 2 keynote speakers: Senator Hugh Segal and Major-General Andrew Leslie. Both exceptional presentations featured the role and

The presentations were highlighted in 11 panels addressing issues that included the Canadian military, state sovereignty, concepts of security, terrorism, US security policy, civil-military relations, and conflict prevention and resolution. Panel chairs were Dr. Allan English (Department of History, Queen's University), Dr. Brian McKercher (Chair War Studies Program, Queen's University), Dr. Charles Pentland (Director Queen's Centre for International Relations), Dr. Joel Sokolsky (Dean of Arts, RMC), David Harris (Director INSIGNIS International and Terrorist Intelligence Program), John Noble (Senior Distinguished Fellow, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs), Major Andrew Godefroy (Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts), David Rudd (President Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies), Dr. Bob Martyn (Queen's University), Dr. Roch Legault (RMC), and Dr. David Bercuson (Director of Programs, CDFAI).

Three cash prizes of \$3000 (D Scott GD Canada Prize), \$2000, and \$1000, were awarded to the first, second, and third best presenters, respectively. This represented a doubling of the value in prizes from previous years. The overall winner was Justin Massie, from l'Université du Québec à Montréal, for

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his paper, *Une culture stratégique idéaliste, libérale et défensive? Analyse de l'Énoncé de politique internationale du Canada*. The second-place prize was given to Ty Curran, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, for an essay entitled *Sole Sourcing Naval Procurement*, while Bruno Charbonneau, Queen's University, received the third-place prize for a paper entitled *Repenser l'Etat et la Sécurité Nationale : Le cas de la France au Rwanda*.

Eight presenters were deemed worthy of honourable mention. They are Julie Boileau, Andrea Charron, Michael Cole, Jeremy Lammy, Jeevan Nallainayagama, Ben Zyla, Julie Auger, and Alexandre Wilner.

The top eleven presenters were chosen by a three-person selection committee. This year, the selection committee members were General (Ret'd) Paul Manson (President CDAI), John Noble, and Dr. François-Emmanuel Boucher (RMC).

Participants were invited to fill out a questionnaire rating their perception of the Graduate Student Symposium. The questionnaire asked five questions:

1. On a scale of 1 to 10, how much did you like the graduate student symposium? (1 is strongly dislike and 10 is strongly like)
Average score: 8.1

2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how well organized was the graduate student symposium, on the whole? (1 being disorganized and 10 being very organized)
Average score: 8.6
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, what did you think of the lunches and coffee breaks at the symposium? (1 being very bad and 10 being very good)
Average score: 8.5
4. On a scale of 1 to 10, what did you think of the dinner at the graduate student symposium? (1 being very bad, 10 being very good, and NA meaning that you did not go to the dinner)
Average score: 8.8
5. Given the opportunity, would you consider going to the symposium another year? (yes or no?)
94.8 percent of respondents said yes

These numbers speak for themselves: most of the people attending the Symposium greatly enjoyed the experience.

The top three papers will be posted on the CDFAI website (<http://www.cdfai.org>). The rest of the papers are available online on CDAI's website at: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2005/presentations05.htm>. The top eleven papers will be distributed to SDF centers and to presenters in the coming months.

Mark your calendars for next year's Symposium, to be held at the RMC on October 27-28, 2005.

Our National Interests: What's Worth Fighting For?

by Major-General (Ret'd) Clive Addy and Richard Cohen

Canada is an "old" democracy in a world of newly free and democratic states. But along with many other long established democracies, Canada has a 'vision' problem. We are a country that has not yet thought through its national interests. This stands in stark contrast to the new democracies of the former Soviet Bloc who have responded to the drastically changed circumstances since the end of the Cold War by developing integrated security and defence policies, usually from scratch, based on careful consideration of where their interests lie. Canada must recognize that it lives in a new world

and that we are jeopardizing our future internationally, but more importantly nationally, unless we get on with the job of developing a national strategy based on a clear perception of the priority interests of this country.

National security is not just protection of Canadian citizens from terrorists, weapons of mass destruction or pandemics. In its broadest sense security encompasses virtually every area of government, business and civil society. It is an essential element of foreign policy, economic and trade policies, inter-provincial relations, immigration and refugee policies, energy, infrastructure, the health system, science and technology, fisheries protection and a host of other things as well as defence, law enforcement and the security services. The very breadth of national security is a challenge to addressing it

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Richard Cohen is President RSC Strategic Connections

effectively. Governments in Ottawa have traditionally reacted to security challenges without a clear vision of what the overarching long term interests of the country are and consequently without a rational strategy of how best to preserve and defend them.

National Interests are the highest expression of a country's vision of its integrity, its sovereignty, the well-being of its citizens and its place in the world. Canadians often talk about 'values' but rarely about 'interests.' Do the terms mean the same thing? If not, how are interests different from values?

Most people in this country are justly proud of Canadian 'values' such as liberal democracy, tolerance of differences, respect for diversity, universal access to health care, amongst others. But are these values enough to build a sound foundation for long term policy, at home and abroad?

It is a national shame that the vital issue of Quebec separation and what to do about it has cowed almost every politician outside Quebec into an embarrassed silence.

In recent years it has become fashionable for many Canadians to define a Canada, which in many ways is becoming less and less distinguishable from the United States, by citing our 'superior' values. These values, some argue, prove our moral superiority over Americans by implying that their values are somehow inferior to ours.

Americans, however, live in a hard world. The majority of Americans hold values that are virtually identical to ours. But most Americans instinctively know that it is their national interests that ultimately count at home and on the world stage. The US has real enemies and huge worldwide security and other commitments. Like it or not, there are not many issues of importance anywhere in the world that can be settled or even discussed in a meaningful way without American leadership or influence.

However we might like to imagine Canada's importance in the world, Canada is not a 'frontline' state on the international scene. Many Canadians believe that we should base our policies, at home and abroad, on our values. Many probably assume that our values and interests are the same. This is a dangerous illusion. Canada does have vital national interests, at home and abroad, quite apart from its values. But those interests are only dimly recognised and rarely discussed.

The National Security Policy published in April 2004 by the new Martin government was a brave first attempt to bring Canada's diverse security issues together into one policy framework. Unfortunately, the NSP, as important as it is, is not a document that is well-known to more than a handful of

Canadians. Nevertheless, it does identify three "core national security interests" as the starting point for Canadian security policy:

1. Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad
2. Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies
3. Contributing to international security

But there is something very important missing from this list.

Almost every other developed country in the world has thought about its National Interests and tried to build its national security policy, its foreign and defence policies and its economic and social strategies to protect these interests. Almost without exception, the most vital National Interest of every country can be paraphrased as:

"The maintenance of a united and sovereign state within recognised territorial boundaries."

This "core national security interest" is missing from the Canadian National Security Policy document or in any other official document. In fact, it begs the question of what we mean by "Canada" in the first two national security interests of our NSP.

Recently, Canadian politicians were agitated over the sovereignty of a tiny island off the coast of Greenland. Yet, no one seemed ready to even acknowledge the far greater danger developing on our own doorstep, the threat that could dramatically affect the lives and the future of all Canadians.

Once again there looms the real possibility that a large piece of our country will break away from the rest of Canada. This would most certainly lead to the dissolution of our Confederation built up so painstakingly and successfully over the last 150 years. All this could happen, it seems, without reference to the population of Canada as a whole. It is a national shame that the vital issue of Quebec separation and what to do about it has cowed almost every politician outside Quebec into an embarrassed silence.

Notwithstanding the Prime Minister's recent campaign declaration in Montreal that "We are talking about the future of Canada and we are going to defend the unity of this country," the future of Canada will not be a major issue in the current federal election campaign outside Quebec. The political rhetoric on this issue from all parties is short term and will be quickly forgotten after polling day.

The new party program of the Parti Quebecois, adopted in June, states that, a referendum in Quebec would be held

without reference to the Clarity Act. A (for them) successful outcome, won by even one vote, "would lead the National Assembly to declare sovereignty of Quebec and give immediate effect to this by posing acts of national and international sovereignty." The spectre of a 'unilateral declaration of independence,' is a hot potato that hardly anyone in Canadian public life wants to handle. The Clarity Act itself was passed by parliament, most Canadians felt, on the basis that it would be enforced if violated. It would seem to have defined a clear "National Interest".

A country's most important National Interests are defined as those interests so crucial to its future and well-being that it would be willing to go to war if necessary to defend them. At least theoretically, and in most cases realistically, almost every country in the world would fight to preserve its unity and territorial integrity. But Canada has not even discussed what its most important National Interests are and whether "the maintenance of a united and sovereign state" should be one of them. Because of this, a government in Ottawa of any party would have no idea how to react if a separatist

government in Quebec declared independence unilaterally and without reference to the rest of the country.

Politicians in Ottawa and the vast majority of voters outside Quebec have not begun to seriously think about the threat to what is arguably our most vital National Interest, the continued existence of Canada itself. Corruption, health and child care, immigration, education, Aboriginal rights, and many other issues dominate the election platform of the national parties. Important as these things are, a debate over how to deal with the looming danger to Canada's future is lost in the polemic of political rhetoric. With our heads deeply buried in the sand of superior Canadian 'values', by the time the danger is upon us, it may be too late to react in a well-planned and rational way to a threat our most vital National Interest.

It is late in the day but perhaps not too late to launch the debate over what our real interests as a nation are and how best to preserve them.

Is Canada worth fighting for?

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