




Recipient of the 2006 Vimy Award / Le récipiendaire de la Distinction Honorifique Vimy 2006: Brigadier-General David Fraser



DND Photo / Photo MDN: Lieutenant Gregory Chan

- *Canada's Military Fix: The illusion and the Reality*
- *Understanding the New International Reality*
- *What to Expect from the Riga NATO Summit*
- *After a Year in Kabul: Strategic Reflections*



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<i>Contents</i>	<i>Contenu</i>
<i>From the Executive Director</i>	
Colonel Alain Pellerin.....	1
<i>Le Mot du Directeur Exécutif</i>	
Le colonel Alain Pellerin.....	1
<i>Canada's Military Fix: The Illusion and the Reality</i>	
Senator Colin Kenny.....	5
<i>Understanding the New International Reality</i>	
Major-General (Ret'd) Doug Dempster.....	8
<i>What to Expect from the Riga Summit</i>	
General (Ret'd) Klaus Naumann.....	10
<i>A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan</i>	
Colonel Mike D. Capstick.....	13
<i>After a Year in Kabul: Strategic Reflections</i>	
Colonel Mike D. Capstick.....	16
<i>Realpolitik Extraordinaire: Hans Island and Canadian Diplomacy with Muscle</i>	
Mr. Kyle D. Christensen.....	19
<i>CF Manned Strategic Capability</i>	
Colonel (Ret'd) Terry E. Chester.....	22
<i>Anti-Ballistic Missiles as Antisatellite Weapons: Implications for Canada</i>	
Mr. Matthew Gillard.....	23
<i>A Debt Owed to the Traditions of North America's Aboriginal Peoples</i>	
Dr. John Cowan.....	28
Book Review:	
<i>We Lead, Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918</i>	
J.L. Granatstein.....	28
Foreword:	
<i>Re-inventing Defence Procurement in Canada</i>	
Dr. Douglas Bland.....	30
 <i>Our Cover</i> <i>La couverture</i>	
Brigadier-General David Fraser prepares to meet with locals at Tarin Kowt, Urzgan Province, Afghanistan. Brigadier-General Fraser is the Commander of the NATO Multi-National Brigade in Kandahar. He will be presented with the Vimy Award for 2006 at the Canadian Museum of Civilization on 17 November 2006. / Le brigadier-général David Fraser s'apprête pour une réunion avec des autorités locales à Tarin Kowat, en Province de Urzgan, Afghanistan. Le brigadier-général Fraser est le général commandant la brigade multinationale de l'OTAN à Kandahar. Il va recevoir la Distinction Honorifique Vimy au Musée canadien des civilisations, le 17 novembre 2006.	

The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive **ON TRACK** and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.

The views expressed in *ON TRACK* are those of the authors.



La Conférence des associations de défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront **ON TRACK** et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD



27 - 28 October, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) and the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada will host the 9th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally. Cutting edge research from young scholars will be showcased and cash prizes, totalling \$6,000, will be awarded for the best three papers presented.

The aim of the symposium is to strengthen the linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Keynote speakers will be Monsieur Claude Leblanc, Acting Director General Policy Planning, Department of National Defence; and Dr. John Cowan, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada.

Anyone with an interest in defence, national and international issues is welcome to attend. Mark the dates of 27 and 28

MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

27 et 28 octobre prochains, l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD) et le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, le Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's et le Programme des études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada animeront le 9^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés. Le symposium mettra en valeur les travaux des étudiants de doctorat et de maîtrise des universités civiles et militaires du Canada et d'ailleurs. De jeunes universitaires mettront en valeur de la recherche d'avant-garde et les trois meilleurs exposés recevront une récompense en argent, d'une valeur totale de 6 000 \$.

Le symposium a pour objectif de renforcer les liens entre les établissements d'enseignement civils et militaires. Au nombre des conférenciers d'honneur, figurent Claude Leblanc, Directeur général par intérim, Conception de la politique de défense, au ministère de la Défense nationale et John Cowan, directeur du Collège militaire royal du Canada.

Toute personne qui s'intéresse à la défense, et aux enjeux nationaux et internationaux, est invitée à participer au

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Major (Ret'd) Mirosław K. Szulc; Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Lucien R. Villeneuve, CD; Mr. W.H. Young

October on your calendar to attend a most stimulating gathering of Canada's best young military thinkers. For more information please read the symposium notice elsewhere in this publication.

ON TRACK readers will be pleased to learn that Brigadier-General David A. Fraser has been selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2006. Brigadier-General Fraser is an honourable Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career in the Canadian Forces and in a very challenging and high-profile international position in Afghanistan. The Honourable Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, will present the award on 17 November, at a mixed formal dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization.

We congratulate Ms Christie Blatchford who has been selected as the recipient of the Ross Munro Media Award for 2006. Ms Blatchford has consistently demonstrated the finest qualities of a journalist on her reporting of defence issues. The Ross Munro Media Award Selection Committee singled Ms Blatchford out from the other candidates for her compelling work and very moving articles on the Canadian Forces, particularly in Afghanistan. The Conference of Defence Associations, in association with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, is the sponsor of the Ross Munro Media Award. The Award will be presented at the Vimy Award Dinner.

I wish to take this opportunity to welcome our new DND-sponsored Security and Defence Forum (SDF) Intern, Ms Elizabeth A. Sneyd. Elizabeth is completing her master's degree in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

We are pleased to feature in this edition of *ON TRACK* articles from our contributing writers that are reflective of global events that are challenging the Canadian Forces and that can bear an influence on federal government policy.

Within the past year the former and current federal governments have provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. This is quite a refreshing change, when matters of defence and security were low on the federal government's radar screen. Another bright spot has been Senator Colin Kenny, Chair of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Senator Kenny, for many years, has been reminding Canadians of what they should expect of their armed forces. Recently, the Senate

symposium. N'oubliez pas d'inscrire sur votre calendrier les dates du 27 et du 28 octobre et de participer à cette assemblée des plus stimulantes des meilleurs jeunes penseurs militaires au Canada. Veuillez lire l'avis du symposium qui figure dans le présent numéro pour avoir de plus amples renseignements.

Les lecteurs de *ON TRACK* seront heureux d'apprendre que le brigadier-général David A. Fraser a été choisi le récipiendaire du prix Vimy en 2006. Le brigadier-général Fraser est un Canadien honorable qui a fait preuve des normes les plus élevées de commandement tout au long de sa carrière dans les Forces canadiennes et a rempli un poste international de prestige comportant de nombreux défis en Afghanistan. L'honorable Gordon O'Connor, ministre de la Défense nationale, remettra le prix le 17 novembre prochain, dans le cadre d'un dîner de gala mixte qui aura lieu à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations.

Nous félicitons Mme Christie Blatchford qui a été choisie comme récipiendaire du Ross Munro Media Award pour 2006. Mme Blatchford a constamment démontré les plus belles qualités de journaliste dans ses reportages sur les questions de défense. Le comité de sélection de Ross Munro Media Award a distingué Mme Blatchford des autres candidats en se basant sur son travail convaincant et ses articles très émouvants sur les Forces canadiennes, particulièrement en Afghanistan. C'est le Conférence des associations de défense, de concert avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, qui est le commendant du Ross Munro Media Award. Le prix sera présenté à l'occasion du dîner de remise du prix Vimy.

J'en profite pour souhaiter la bienvenue à notre nouvelle stagiaire du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense (FSD) parrainé par le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), Elizabeth A. Sneyd, qui terminera bientôt sa maîtrise d'études sur la guerre au Collège militaire royal du Canada.

Nous avons le plaisir de publier, dans le présent numéro de *ONTRACK*, des articles de nos collaborateurs qui débattent d'événements mondiaux qui mettent au défi les Forces canadiennes et qui pourraient influencer sur les politiques gouvernementales fédérales.

Au cours de la dernière année, l'ancien et le nouveau gouvernement fédéral ont concentré l'attention des citoyens canadiens sur les besoins du pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Ce changement est bien agréable, car les questions de défense et de sécurité figuraient jusque-là bien bas sur la liste des priorités du gouvernement fédéral. Un autre élément positif a été le sénateur Colin Kenny, président du Comité sénatorial de la sécurité et de la défense nationale. Depuis

Committee on National Security and Defence released its latest report, 'Managing Turmoil - The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change'. The report is available at www.sen-sec.ca. In this edition of *ON TRACK* Senator Kenny provides us with a critical overview of the capacity that the Canadian Forces needs to deal with the security threats that Canada faces today.

Major-General (Ret'd) Doug Dempster has observed that the volatile parts of the world may not desire or aspire to our values, and indeed promote active hatred and intolerance and that developing nations face internal security challenges when their economies cannot expand at a rate to take up the increasing labour force. In 'Understanding the New International Reality' he explains why we are now seeing so much conflict in Africa, the Middle-East, and South West Asia, and notes that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism is a process with momentum. Major-General (Ret'd) Dempster is now the Assistant Secretary General for Executive Management at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

NATO will be holding its forthcoming summit in Riga, in November. General (Ret'd) Klaus Naumann writes, in 'What to expect from the Riga NATO Summit', that the Riga Summit will be characterized as a summit that was placed on the international agenda before the political leaders had agreed on the issues to be discussed. He offers his views on what is to be expected of the issues which may dominate the Summit's agenda. General (Ret'd) Naumann was the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999.

If the Canadian public and policy makers form their perceptions of Afghanistan based on the situation in Kandahar, they are looking at Afghanistan "through a straw". It is appropriate to provide Canadians with some insights into the overall situation from a strategic perspective. As tremendous as the performance of Canada's troops in Kandahar has been, it is not the whole story. Colonel Mike Capstick outlines for us, in 'After a Year in Kabul: Strategic Reflections', national issues that clarify some of the myths and misconceptions that are part of Canada's national discourse on Afghanistan. In a following article Colonel Capstick outlines his year-long experience as head of a strategic advisory team that was set up to assist the Government of Afghanistan.

ien des années, le sénateur Kenny rappelle aux Canadiennes et aux Canadiens ce qu'ils devraient attendre de leurs forces armées. Récemment, le Comité sénatorial de la sécurité et de la défense nationale a publié son plus récent rapport, intitulé «Face aux turbulences - De la nécessité d'actualiser l'aide extérieure et la force militaire du Canada en réponse aux changements à grande échelle». Dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*, le sénateur Kenny nous donne un aperçu critique de la capacité dont ont besoin les Forces canadiennes pour traiter les menaces actuelles à la sécurité canadienne.

Le major-général (ret.) Doug Dempster a remarqué que les coins instables de par le monde ne souhaitent ni n'ambitionnent nos valeurs, et en fait appuient activement la promotion de la haine et de l'intolérance, tandis que les nations en développement sont aux prises avec des défis de sécurité internes, car leur économie ne peut se développer suffisamment rapidement pour absorber la croissance de la population active. Dans l'article intitulé « Understanding the New International Reality », il explique pourquoi nous voyons tant de conflits en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie du Sud-Ouest, et il souligne que l'essor de l'intégrisme musulman en est plein élan. Le major-général (ret.) Dempster est maintenant secrétaire général adjoint de la direction supérieure du Siège de l'OTAN à Bruxelles.

L'OTAN tiendra son prochain sommet à Riga en novembre. Le général (ret.) Klaus Naumann écrit, dans son article « What to expect from the Riga NATO Summit », qu'il se caractérise comme un sommet inscrit au programme international avant même que les dirigeants politiques se soient entendus sur les sujets à traiter. Il donne son opinion sur ce que l'on peut attendre des enjeux qui pourraient dominer le programme. Le général (ret.) Naumann a été président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN de 1996 à 1999.

Si le public et les décideurs canadiens fondent leur opinion de l'Afghanistan en fonction de la situation à Kandahar, ils regardent ce pays au travers d'une paille. Il est important de donner aux Canadiens un aperçu de la situation globale d'un point de vue stratégique. Bien que les troupes canadiennes à Kandahar accomplissent des exploits, il ne s'agit pas d'un tableau complet de la situation. Dans son article intitulé « After a Year in Kabul : Strategic Reflections », le colonel Mike Capstick nous décrit les enjeux nationaux qui permettent de clarifier certains des mythes et idées fausses qui font partie intégrante du discours canadien sur l'Afghanistan. Dans un article qui suit, le colonel Capstick décrit son expérience d'un an à titre de chef d'une équipe consultative stratégique mise sur pied pour aider le gouvernement afghan.

Over the years, Canada and Denmark found themselves revisiting a dispute over Hans Island. Ottawa and Copenhagen perpetually negotiate with each other over the island without seeking a settlement to the dispute. Kyle Christensen writes, in 'Realpolitik Extraordinaire: Hans Island and Canadian Diplomacy with Muscle', the best possible outcome to this dispute is the one that already exists: a string of diplomatic negotiations where both parties can declare success without actually challenging the claim. Kyle further explains the consequences to Canada should the dispute result in a settlement of claims. Kyle Christensen, a former DND SDF Intern at the CDA Institute, is now a strategic analyst with the Directorate of Maritime Strategy at National Defence Headquarters.

Colonel (Ret'd) Terry Chester writes, in 'CF Manned Strategic Capability', that Canada's abilities to survey and protect our coastline and littoral waters, ocean approaches and northern regions, are decreasing. The Aurora CP 140, along with our Regular Force, have been our principal legal claim to sovereignty over those regions, a claim which is being openly questioned. Colonel (Ret'd) Chester notes that these long range patrol aircraft have been conducting anti-submarine warfare, fisheries and pollution surveillance, covert drug operations and general surveillance duties over the ocean approaches and land mass of this nation, but much of their capability has become diminished and outdated. Colonel (Ret'd) Chester is engaged in Air Force activities through the Reserves and the Air Force Association in Comox, British Columbia.

Both the potential value of ABMs and the prospect of further Canadian participation in the American national ABM system have been the subjects of much discussion in recent years. However, the debate has largely overlooked the inherent antisatellite (ASAT) capability of terrestrial and space-based ABMs. Matthew Gillard explains why, in 'Anti-Ballistic Missiles as Antisatellite Weapons: Implications for Canada, why increased global ABM deployment could result in an ASAT arms race. Matthew is a former CDAI intern. He is preparing for NGO work in Southeast Asia.

Dr. John Cowan has provided our readers with a very interesting observation that the evolution of key elements of the ethos of the Canadian Forces owes a debt to the traditions of North America's aboriginal people. In 'A Debt Owed to the Traditions of North America's Aboriginal Peoples', Dr. Cowan attributes to MA-KA-TAI-ME-SHE-KIA-KIAK's

Au cours des années, le Canada et le Danemark se trouvent à réexaminer un différend sur l'Île Hans. Ottawa et Copenhague négocient à perpétuité le problème de cette île sans jamais arriver à régler le problème. Kyle Christensen écrit, dans « Realpolitik Extraordinaire : Hans Island and Canadian Diplomacy with Muscle », que la meilleure solution pour le règlement de ce différend existe déjà : une série de négociations diplomatiques à l'issue desquelles les deux parties peuvent déclarer victoire sans vraiment contester la revendication. De plus, Kyle explique quelles seront les conséquences pour le Canada si le différend devait aboutir à un règlement. Kyle Christensen, un ancien stagiaire du FSD du MDF à l'Institut de la CAD, est maintenant analyste stratégique auprès de la Direction de la stratégie maritime au Quartier général de la Défense nationale.

Dans son article intitulé « CF Manned Strategic Capability », le colonel (ret.) Terry Chester affirme que les capacités du Canada à protéger sa ligne côtière et ses eaux littorales, les approches océanes et les régions nordiques, sont en déclin. L'aéronef CP-140 Aurora, aux côtés de notre Force régulière, a constitué notre principale revendication de souveraineté sur ces régions, une revendication qui est maintenant ouvertement mise en question. Le colonel (ret.) Chester souligne que ces patrouilleurs à long rayon d'action servent aux guerres anti-sous-marines, à la surveillance des pêches et de la pollution, à la lutte contre le trafic de drogue et aux missions de surveillance générale aux abords des océans et sur la masse terrestre du pays, mais que leurs capacités ont dans une large mesure diminué et sont dépassées. Le colonel (ret.) Chester s'occupe des activités de la Force aérienne par le biais des Réserves et de l'Association de la Force aérienne à Comox (Colombie-Britannique).

Tant la valeur potentielle des ABM que l'éventualité d'une participation canadienne accrue au système américain des ABM ont fait l'objet de bien des débats au cours des dernières années. Cependant, les discussions ont largement négligé la capacité inhérente antisatellite (ASAT) des ABM terrestres et ceux qui sont installés dans l'espace. Matthew Gillard, dans « Anti-Ballistic Missiles as Antisatellite Weapons : Implications for Canada », explique pourquoi un déploiement accru des ABM à l'échelle mondiale pourrait entraîner une course aux armements ASAT. Matthew vient de finir un stage à l'ICAD. Il se prépare à travailler pour une ONG dans le Sud-Est asiatique.

M. John Cowan a offert à nos lecteurs une observation très intéressante à l'effet que l'évolution d'éléments clés de l'éthos des Forces canadiennes doit beaucoup aux traditions des peuples autochtones de l'Amérique du Nord. Dans son article intitulé 'A Debt Owed to the Traditions of North America's Aboriginal Peoples', M. Cowan attribue à MA-KA-TAI-ME-

examples of leadership and the conduct of war that are still evident in the ethos of today's CF.

We are, again, very pleased to include as an important feature for *ON TRACK* a book review provided by Jack Granatstein. Dr. Granatstein reviews *We Lead, Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918*, by Kenneth Radley. Dr. Granatstein notes that this book could only have been written by an army officer, Kenneth Radley, and points out that his book is the first published history of a Canadian division in either of the two world wars. Jack Granatstein is one of Canada's best-known military historians and is a member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose mandate is to undertake research and promote informed public debate on national security and defence issues. It is not secret that the Institute's mandate is not yet over and that the CF are deserving of the nation's support for their rejuvenation, more than ever, as they undertake their assigned hazardous missions.

In closing I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute. When we tell a donor the CDAI needs money, this is not asking, but saying that Canadian society wants and needs a safe and secure country; that providing it is one of the tasks of the military; and that the donor can contribute to that peace and security with his or her financial support of the work of the CDA Institute. Please consider an increased contribution to the Institute. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one. Donor forms are printed on the past page of this journal and are available on line at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>

Thank you.

HE-KIA-KIAK des exemples de leadership et de conduite de guerre qui sont encore visibles dans l'éthos des FC d'aujourd'hui.

Nous avons une fois de plus le plaisir de publier dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*, une critique de livre par Jack Granatstein. Il passe en revue l'ouvrage *We Lead, Others Follow : First Canadian Division 1914-1918*, par Kenneth Radley. M. Granatstein indique que seul un officier de l'armée pourrait être l'auteur de cet ouvrage et il souligne qu'il s'agit du premier récit historique jamais publié à propos d'une division canadienne dans le cadre d'une des deux guerres mondiales. Jack Granatstein est l'un des plus éminents historiens militaires du Canada et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense est un organisme caritatif et non partisan qui a pour mandat de mener de la recherche et de promouvoir un débat public éclairé sur les enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationales. Ce n'est un secret pour personne que le mandat de l'Institut n'est pas terminé, car les FC méritent plus que jamais l'appui de la nation pour leur renouvellement, alors qu'elles entreprennent les missions dangereuses qui lui ont été confiées.

En conclusion, je voudrais remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos mécènes, compagnons et officiers pour leur appui financier des travaux de l'Institut de la CAD. Lorsque nous indiquons à un donateur que l'ICAD a besoin d'argent, nous ne demandons pas, nous affirmons que la société canadienne veut et exige un pays sûr et protégé; or, assurer cette sécurité est une des tâches des militaires. Un donateur contribue donc à la paix et à la sécurité grâce à son appui financier des travaux de l'Institut de la CAD. Veuillez envisager d'accroître votre contribution à l'Institut. Si vous ne contribuez pas déjà à l'Institut de la CAD à titre de donateur, je vous exhorte à le faire. Une formule de don est imprimée en dernière page du magazine et est disponible en ligne à l'adresse suivante : <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdaifrançais.htm>

Je vous remercie.

CANADA'S MILITARY FIX: THE ILLUSION AND THE REALITY

by Senator Colin Kenny

Conventional wisdom is that the new government has the Canadian Forces perking again, and that Canada – after years of shirking its responsibilities – is now ready to step up to the

plate and take on a variety of important international tasks.

The hard truth, however, is: *Not yet*. Not by a long shot, and

not even a decade from now unless the military budget is boosted and the government quits backloading its spending commitments. More money is needed, and it is needed more quickly than current plans call for.

Even if the government expands the Canadian Forces to 75,000 by 2015 as scheduled, Canada won't be able to do more than we are doing now: take on one major task, and hope more important ones don't sneak up behind us and bite deeply on our backside.

The government has announced that it isn't thinking about missions to Darfur or Lebanon or anywhere else but Afghanistan right now. With good reason. The Canadian Army doesn't have the capacity to multitask now and never will have unless Canada's political leaders recognize that we need 90,000 military personnel, not 75,000.

Does it matter that we can't tackle more than one major mission at a time? It does, because the times are so tumultuous and unpredictable. Canadians must recognize that trouble is likely to brew in many places at home and abroad in the coming decades.

Right now the Army has its military engine revving at the red line just to keep the Afghanistan mission going. All the Canadian Forces have left in reserve is air force and navy capacity – not troops on the ground.

In a perfect world, crises would emerge one at a time, every six months. If they did, 75,000 military personnel might give us barely enough resources to scrape by, as we have done so often in the past.

But even then we would be in trouble. Remember, just scraping by got us to the burnout point two years ago that forced the government to swallow its pride and declare a moratorium on deployments. My second point is that crises never emerge in predictable patterns.

Why do we need the surge capacity to be able to address more than one crisis at the same time? Let's start at home. Canada has always been a pretty calm country, with the notable exception of the Quebec crisis in the early 1970s. But there is no guarantee that will continue.

What if First Nations militants became *really* militant – not in the blockade tradition, but in ways that have become commonplace in the Middle East and elsewhere?

What if Middle East radicals decided that the best way to bring the western world to heel was by focusing on radicalizing “home grows” and giving them the capacity to wreak havoc? Or what if they snuck in from abroad to do the same thing?

What if a medical pandemic – either natural or man-made – were to sweep North America? Or some country decided that it was worth a war to come after our water, oil or other resources.

On the international front, anything could go topsy-turvy over the next few decades. New economic powerhouses are emerging, new political ambitions will come at us, old grievances will continue to fester, new ways of waging war will be invented.

Can anyone honestly say that it is a sensible gamble for a country like Canada to confine its military capacity to one mission at a time?

I mentioned the conventional wisdom that seems to be lulling journalists and the public to sleep – the illusion that Canada's military rebuilding process is well underway. Well, some renovations are in the works. The new government deserves credit for well-publicized commitments that will patch some of the worst holes. Even though it is continuing the sleight of hand tradition of backloading expenditures so needs don't get met as quickly as they should.

But, while these commitments attract headlines, nearly all of them consist of no-brainer replacement programs that even Homer Simpson would have had to commit to. As for more sophisticated improvements, the Department of National Defence has been slow in pointing to what needs to be done.

So, for a start, DND should get on with providing the ingredients for a Defence Capabilities Plan. That plan was supposed to be forthcoming last fall, then last June. It now appears that we won't even be getting a document to debate until September at the earliest.

Even if DND does get its act together, the government's budget projections won't get Canada past the one-trick pony stage. We won't get there until we have 90,000 people in uniform.

If you don't believe me, go to the Committee's last report, *The Government's No. 1 Job* (go to www.senate-senat.ca/securing_the_military_options.asp) and turn to page 62. We document personnel needs there, and demonstrate clearly that the real need is not to have 75,000 people on the military payroll – the real need is to have 75,000 people actively engaged in military activity. To do that – to take account of all the drains on manpower – leave, sickness, training, etc. – you need 90,000

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people in the Forces.

Getting that many people in uniform is going to cost a lot more money than the government is currently projecting. Although this government has at least promised to invest more money than did its predecessor, its budget projection for 2011-2012 still works out to about \$20 billion. That's *if* the government cancels the Expenditure Review Committee clawback that applies to all departments and would cost the Department of National Defence \$640 million between 2005 and 2010. If this government is so gung-ho about rehabilitating the armed forces, why hasn't it yet cancelled that clawback? (see pages 35-37 of *The Government's No. 1 Job*).

The truth is that DND needs a budget of \$25-\$35 billion by 2011-2012 (and the higher figure is far more realistic) if the government is going to have the options available to it when push comes to shove and more than one crisis is on the table at the same time. Again, if you think that's wild talk, do the math with us on pages 29-35 of the report.

Canadians spend \$343 apiece on the most important role of any society – defending itself, and advancing its citizens' interests abroad. The Dutch, who aren't exactly known as warmongers, spend \$658. The Australians spend \$648. The British spend \$903. We need to get our military spending to 2 percent of GDP (it has hovered around 1 per cent for decades) to protect our citizens at home and fulfill our military obligations abroad. Otherwise we will remain trapped in our lack of capacity when emergencies arise.

It isn't just money that is needed – our systems need to be fixed. Canada's procurement procedure for military

equipment is mired in bureaucratic molasses. Not only do dozens of extraneous components of the bureaucracy get involved in every purchase, but for all expenditures of \$30 million or more the Minister of National Defence must go to cabinet for approval.

Think about that. By the Committee's count, there should be 49 projects costing more than \$30 million each coming up for approval in the near future. Can you imagine a minister going to cabinet for funding approval virtually every week? Mission impossible – it can't be done. There are too many other things on the cabinet agenda.

The Minister of National Defence's authorization level for projects should be moved to \$500 million. That would reduce the number of projects that need to go to cabinet to ten – a manageable number.

The committee is not asking that the military be exempted from normal bureaucratic control on routine equipment needs, such as photocopiers and paper clips. But we need to streamline the procurement of important military equipment. Equipment needs change quickly. Technology changes quickly. Canada's procurement process is currently so slow that by the time new equipment shows up, it is much further along the line to obsolescence than it should be.

The physical protection of citizens is the No. 1 role of government...

Lives are at stake here. The physical protection of citizens is the No. 1 role of government, and it shouldn't be trapped in routine bureaucratic structures.

Also on the issue of purchasing: Canada should make a point of buying off the shelf. That is supposed to be the preferred option. But too often the Canadian Forces has wasted time and money designing equipment to meet some peculiar "Canadian" need that really doesn't exist.

It goes without saying that politicians like to buy what Canadian companies are selling. But Canada's capacity to defend itself is too important to have purchases skewed for non-military reasons. If the government wants to prop up Canadian companies, by all means do so. But not with scarce military funds, that should be spent on getting the very best equipment in the shortest period of time.

Finally, the military should not be using the scarce funds it has for regional economic development. Bases that are redundant should be closed. It is disappointing to see the new government

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follow in the footsteps of the old government – paving the runway at Goose Bay to purchase votes in the next federal election, locating 650 members of a rapid reaction force (and their families) there for no good reason. Goose Bay has a proud military history. But it has lost its strategic value; in recent years it has been nothing but a drain on resources. The people of Happy Valley deserve the government's support, but it should come in the form of an economic development plan from Industry or Human Resources and Social Development Canada, not a military unit.

If the public thinks Canada's military revival is underway, the public should look more closely. Canadians need to spend more money on their military – quite a bit more money – or they risk getting trapped in chaos they can't deal with in the upcoming decades. They need to tell their politicians to budget today for our real military needs – not the illusion of the military that they need.

UNDERSTANDING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL REALITY

by Major-General (Ret'd) Doug Dempster

The cognitive dissonance between Canada's war-fighting history in two world wars, our post-war blue-beret peace-keeping and post 9/11 complex operations can be increasingly explained in terms that Canadians can see in their daily news-globalisation, energy prices, multi-culturalism, terrorism, and missile launches. We see these realities through the lens of our Canadian values such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law and tolerance, but we also recognise the world as a far rougher neighbourhood than it used to be.

What we often do not understand is that the volatile parts of the world may not desire or aspire to our values, and indeed promote active hatred and intolerance.

In this new environment how can Canada contribute to international peace and security while protecting itself against increasingly real threats? Within what multi-lateral framework should Canada focus its efforts?

Paradoxically, the export of limited amounts of intellectual capital to the developing world has had unforeseen consequences. The green agricultural revolution in the developing world has increased food production and enabled non-linear demographic growth in developing countries. Forecasters are generally in agreement that the population of Europe will still be about 470-500 million in 2050, while the population in the developing world surrounding Europe is expected to rise from its current 500 million to 1.3 billion.

These developing nations face internal security challenges

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when their economies cannot expand at a rate to take up the increasing labour force.

The collapse of the current round of the World Trade Organisation talks, due to disagreements among developed states over agricultural subsidies, is serious, and has reduced the confidence of the developing world in their ultimate ability to achieve the quality of life to which they aspire.

Why are we now seeing so much conflict in Africa, the Middle-East, and South West Asia? Why on the other hand is the Asia-Pacific region, other than North Korea, relatively peaceful and prosperous?

In developing his hierarchy of individual needs, Maslow stated that physiological and security needs had to be met before affective, esteem and self-actualisation needs could be met. So too with states.

African, the Middle East and south western Asia nations have fought bitter state-on-state wars multiple times during the so-called cold war. Each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Iran-Iraq war and the Azeri-Armenia wars built on alleged past injustices and sought to destroy the national existence of an adversary. The various regional wars in Africa in Rwanda, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Namibia and the Congo were classical wars aiming to conquer a neighbour or achieve competitive advantage. The Sierra Leone regional war for example involved five nations and an evil dictator, taking decades to resolve while causing untold misery. The states in these regions have yet to meet their primary security needs, and they will naturally try to continue to do so.

In each of the cases cited the calculus of the opportunity to go to war seemed better than the alternative. Why? First, domestic turbulence and power vacuums tend to draw out strong men who amass totalitarian power. Then, the unstable nature of the leader's power base, be it masses of young men, resource revenues or a fickle great power patron, tend to force an issue ahead of rational weighing of the opportunity cost. Finally, corruption and personal aggrandizement shift the decision-making from the good of the nation to the good of the regime. The democracy, honesty and the rule of law that Canadians cherish are pushed very much into the background when corruption flourishes.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and a nation without a security framework is inherently at greater risk than one with friends and allies.

...it is important to understand that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism is a process with momentum...

The Middle East and South West Asia do not have a regional security framework. The last century saw the disappearance of four empires that had provided a form of security for parts of this region—the Ottoman (1920's), French (1950's), British (1960's), and Soviet (1990's). The loss of these stabilising security frameworks was compensated to a degree by the cold war, with each side having its client states sharing ideology, weapons and training methods. However all this was undone in the 1990's with the demise of the Soviet Union.

In the post-colonial period some Asian states with the technological capacity sought security through nuclear weapons status (Israel, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, and Iran), while others such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt established bilateral security relationships with the United States. Smaller Persian Gulf nations built multi-lateral alliances, however they proved minimally effective in controlling regional wars. Some nations like Afghanistan and Lebanon fragmented and became hosts to terrorist organisations. Other nations with lesser means or ideological hostility took to the classic tool of the weaker party—insurgency or terrorism (Iran, Syria, and non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban). The result was Hamas, the Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, not to mention the Chechens and a number of regional ethnic factions seeking forms of autonomy.

A potential bright spot in this gloom is the nascent African Union that is now beginning to build its core institutions. While it has not succeeded in restoring security in the Sudan, it has nonetheless made the attempt, and there is some potential for an effective continental security framework over the long term.

The G8, UN, NATO and the EU are all working to make the AU a success, both continentally and in troubled nations such as the Congo that recently held national elections.

However all of this is made infinitely more complex by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of symmetry in the petroleum trade and the rise of innovative destructive technologies in small packages. US and allied interventions in the South West Asian region have created its own backlash, including amongst Islamic immigrants now living in developed nations who have joined in planned or actual terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, London, Bali, Toronto and elsewhere.

So how do we characterise this region of instability, the new Islamic extremism? First, it is important to understand that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism is a process with momentum, reinforced by educational institutions such as the madrassas, an active media led by Al Jazeera, a sense of victimization, and oil revenues. Secondly, there is no immediate prospect of an effective security framework for the region, and military expenditures will remain high and conflicts continuous. Third, Iran is the state sponsor of both the Hamas and the Hezbollah terrorist groups, and its government has proposed the destruction of Israel in its public policy. It has a potent missile development program and apparently does not intend to be deterred in its quest to develop nuclear weapons. Confrontation over these vital issues can only be deferred for so long.

How does all this affect Canada? First, the probability of proliferating conflicts is far more likely than increasing stability. Both Iran and North Korea have yet to be deterred by diplomacy. Several African and South West Asian regimes are inherently unstable or based on a narrow power base, and there are various lists of failing states that the development community uses.

For a wealthy trading nation such as Canada set on top of the North American continent, there is really only a single choice—robust expeditionary capabilities that can be quickly integrated with our major allies when our critical interests and values are challenged.

The world has changed much in the past five years. Canadians should not underestimate the toxic mix of jihadist extremism, both Sunni and Shia, fanned by hatred for the American "Great Satan", and effectively subsidised by massive oil revenues from the West, that is now at play. Even relatively stable Arab nations face strong internal dissent. Iraq and Afghanistan each face a long journey towards internal stability, and state-sponsored terrorism against Israel is likely to continue.

Canada has concentrated its defence, diplomatic and developmental efforts into southern Afghanistan to support the elected Afghan government reasserting its sovereignty over its own territory. This NATO operation supported by a UN Security Council resolution is consistent with our values and interests, and has the collective participation of 37 nations. The challenges and risks are considerable, but the moral imperative of rebuilding this deeply distressed society is compelling.

Canadians should recognise that in the coming decades there will be further moments where we will have to step forward along with our friends and allies to help bring stability to these inherently unstable regions. To this end, Canada needs the military and diplomatic means to participate in expeditionary operations while protecting Canadians and Canadian territory from terrorist attack. Recent government announcements of sealift, strategic and tactical airlift, medium-to-heavy helicopters and logistic trucks are entirely relevant to the needs of expeditionary operations, as well as to protecting the second-largest nation in the world.

From a capability perspective, Canada needs to adopt the transformational techniques, equipments and procedures required for complex operations - working with international,

host nation and non-governmental organisations, integration of intelligence and surveillance systems, integration of nation-building projects, cultural sensitivity, on-call precision strike and defence against improvised explosive devices and rockets. We need to work with our allies, including through NATO's Allied Command Transformation, to absorb lessons rapidly, to experiment, to apply new technologies quickly and to train in realistic scenarios.

We need to be active members of the international organisations that offer potential multilateral solutions- the UN, NATO, G8, ABCA and Canada-US bilateral forums being the most critical. Canada as a nation without regional or hegemonic aspirations has a critical role to play in all these organisations.

We live in an unstable world, a world where US hegemony and the historic leadership by the developed world is being challenged by new contenders exploring new power roles via new modes of intervention. We need to understand these new geopolitical circumstances and be prepared for the multiple conflicts that are likely to arise in the coming years. And when Canada's people decide that an intervention is in our vital interest, then we need to concentrate our efforts across the whole of government and achieve the best result our national and military power can deliver.

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE RIGA NATO SUMMIT

by General (Ret'd) Klaus Naumann

Introduction

When I addressed the annual CDAI conference in winter 2006, in Ottawa, (see <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2006/Naumann.pdf>) I presented a rather gloomy assessment of transatlantic cohesion. No dramatic changes have occurred since then, but nevertheless one can note, in this summer, 2006, a growing understanding of the fact that NATO is indeed a unique framework that cannot be renounced by a world that is getting more complex every day.

There is a visible reappraisal of transatlantic cooperation, including areas which were simply no-go-areas just a few months ago. It is possible for NATO to discuss issues such as

Iran. The more recent events in Israel and Lebanon suggest that those American unilateralists, who erroneously believe that the US does not need allies, might today accept that the US needs an alliance. In Europe, a similar change can be noted. Of course, there is still one nation that believes NATO should remain focused primarily on collective defence, but even this nation is beginning to understand that there is no chance at all that a majority of European nations will accept the idea of turning Europe into a counterweight to the US. In short, as one scholar put it recently, as the US has been humbled by Iraq, and Europe by the failure of its constitutional treaty, moderation is the order of the day.

This is the background against which one has to look at the forthcoming, November 2006, NATO Summit in Riga. It will

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neither be a truly transformational summit, as Madrid 1997 and Prague 2002 were; nor a ceremonial and commemorative one of the sort represented by the 1999 Washington Summit. Rather, it will be characterized as a summit that was placed on the international agenda before the political leaders had agreed on the issues to be discussed. It will be a summit that will take stock of NATO's transformation from a regional euro-centric defensive alliance to an international security organisation that is increasingly acting far beyond the NATO Treaty Area (NTA). This means that operational issues such as military transformation, the EU-NATO relationship and other forms of partnerships may dominate the agenda. What is to be expected in these areas? What will the Riga Summit mean for the future of NATO?

Military Transformation will be the centrepiece in Riga

Doubts as to whether NATO could be used in today's conflicts linger unresolved. NATO is still considerably short of the number and type of forces it needs today: forces that are capable of fighting "wars amongst the people", as Sir Rupert Smith puts it; forces that reach further, strike faster and can take on the full range of NATO's missions. Moreover, NATO still has to go an extra mile to adapt its political machinery.

The political guidance for the transformation process will be the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), a document that is to be published at the Riga Conference. This document is not meant to replace the 1999 Strategic Concept; it is a steering instrument to coordinate the activities of the various planning committees. The task of writing a new strategic concept remains. Possibly NATO's 60th anniversary in 2009 is an appropriate target date for its publication, as the German Chancellor suggested. If this were the view of NATO nations, then the Riga Summit should issue the mandate to do so.

What Riga could achieve as well is to agree on improvements in NATO's ability to meet the operational requirements the alliance is confronted with.

NATO is, at this point in time, an alliance that performs well in its ongoing peace support operations; an alliance that has begun slowly to transform a small percentage of its military forces; but an alliance that pretends to transform its political structures as well. It can however point with pride to the NATO Response Force (NRF), the only fully operational multinational force in the world capable of operations across the full spectrum from humanitarian assistance to high intensity conflict.

This is the first major step in NATO's military transformation, although the political decision regarding the financing of the

NRF's employment is still missing. Looking at NATO's overall military capabilities, however, it can be seen that the Alliance remains primarily focused on and prepared to respond, in the short to medium term, to a threat that is unlikely to return; a threat that calls for a collective response in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

This is no longer the reality NATO and its member nations have to cope with. The reality is properly described in the Bi-SCs Strategic Vision paper:

"With the requirement to meet the threats from where they may come, the Alliance will operate in a wider strategic environment that is influenced by several key factors and drivers for change. Foremost among them are: globalisation, the increasing sophistication of asymmetric warfare, the effects of changing demography and environment, failing states, radical ideologies and unresolved conflicts. These factors are liable to lead to shocks to Alliance security interests over the next 15 years, particularly as tensions, crises and conflicts will occur with little warning."

Consequently the future mission of NATO's military forces could contain the following:

- NATO must transform into a preventive alliance in order to prevent crises and armed conflicts;
- NATO must focus its efforts on the global war against terrorism by preparing itself to meet the threat where it emerges, by armed intervention, if necessary;
- NATO must protect its member nations' citizens and their critical Infrastructure;
- NATO must defend against WMD and be prepared for consequence Management;
- NATO must be prepared to conduct and sustain stability and security reconstruction operations; and
- NATO should be prepared to provide energy security, i.e. ensure free access to energy sources and energy supply facilities, and defend against cyber attacks.

These are new missions for NATO forces, but the force structures do not correspond.

The other major change is that NATO is no longer tied to the NTA. One has to remember that NATO took the decision, at the 2002 Prague Summit, to act where necessary; where its members' security is at risk. NATO thus became a de facto global alliance (not a global policeman) whose capabilities are currently inadequate to the task. These changes and the

inadequate capabilities of the alliance mean that transformation must go on and, over time, encompass all NATO forces.

Transformation (and this is the major difference as compared to previous reforms) will increasingly be a process in which it might be difficult to define the end-state. Most nations are, at this point in time, at the beginning of a transformation which focuses primarily on information dominance. The next revolution in military affairs (RMA) may soon be about to knock at our doors, however. If NATO nations wait any longer to modernise their inventories, they might soon face a double gap: a modernisation and capabilities gap which might, rather sooner than later, develop into a gap in conceptual thinking. The sad reality is that many if not most nations still seem to invest in fighting yesterday's battles and therefore run the risk of missing the train of a truly rapid technological development.

In my view, NATO should, at the 2006 Riga Summit, invite its member nations to agree on a framework for its defence capacity and on specifics for military transformation aimed at building the "roof" for an NRF that could become a true 21st century expeditionary force. To this end, and as a first step, the NRF should be provided with urgently required assets that would rid this force of its current state of relative operational blindness and deafness.

Therefore, and taking into account that increases in defence spending are not too likely, I envisage some multi-nationally manned but NATO owned and operated assets for the NRF in the enabling forces and force multiplier category.

The next RMA is due to begin around 2020

Any decision to acquire such capabilities has to depart from where technology stands today and has to take into account where technology might be in the year 2020.

Today technology permits to detect, locate and identify any object bigger than one cubic meter, day or night, seven days a week, and 24 hours a day, in an area of 360 x 360 km, with an accuracy of one meter or so; to transmit that data within seconds to a fire control centre; and to hit that target with pinpoint accuracy using stand-off Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) from a distance of two to three thousand kilometres. Such capabilities, currently available in the US at this time, will see further and relatively rapid improvements in the years to come.

The next RMA is due to begin around 2020. It will, in addition to the progress which we will see in information and sensor

technologies, be based on nano- and bio- technologies, on robotics and on new propulsion technologies.

NATO and its nations must therefore quickly decide which types and mix of instruments they will need in order to prevail in tomorrow's conflicts which, in addition, might themselves be characterised by a shift of strategic paradigms which could well be the product of the next RMA. Such a shift, should it occur, will no longer put the main emphasis of military operations on destroying an opponent's capabilities, but on paralyzing them and thereby preventing their use. "Shock and awe" might then be achievable; possibly also in "wars amongst the people", such as the 2006 Lebanon campaign of the Israeli Armed forces.

Defining a framework for NATO's military capabilities that is based on today's technology but leaves the door open for future developments therefore requires focusing upon three functional areas:

- C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).
- Effective engagement
- Focused logistics.

These areas constitute the three pillars of force planning. All modern armed forces should be organised along these lines, be they integrated in alliances or be they national armed forces.

C4ISR will be the key to success in any future operation, be it intervention or PSO. Situation awareness and information dominance will be crucial in saving lives and reducing collateral damage. Situation awareness is much more important than any weaponry. Superior situation awareness produces increased mission effectiveness and it saves lives, in military and police operations as well as in all types of aid and relief operations.

NATO will need a C4ISR architecture which will link information management, fusion and data collecting sensors. In the sensor arena, NATO owned and operated systems and national capabilities ranging from space based platforms to tactical UAVs are needed.

With a view to creating an adequate C4ISR architecture, the Riga Summit must, as a minimum, decide to create a NATO owned and operated Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS). Following the most successful model of the NATO AWACS Component Force, NATO should, as a first step, establish a multi-nationally manned, commonly financed and operated Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) Component force composed of a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft.

This is the minimum decision the Riga Summit should take, but it must not be the only decision. It must also establish multi-national air and sea transport component forces as well as introduce multi-national logistics. It might be asking for too much if one invited the Summit to agree on some planning guidelines for the effective engagement component of future NATO forces.

I am very much in favour of the ideas put forward by a team of the United States National Defense University (NDU) which proposed an integrated, five-tiered defence pyramid of forces, capabilities and assets consisting of a NATO Special Operations Force (NSOF), the NATO Response Force (NRF), a NATO High Readiness Force (HRF), a NATO Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force (NSRF) and , at the bottom of the pyramid all the assets needed for helping foreign militaries and other security institutions modernise, democratise and improve their performance. One could call this element the NATO Defence and Security Sector Development Component (NDSSDC).

This capabilities' pyramid covers the effective engagement element of the three pillars which I mentioned a minute ago. This idea of the three pillars and the capabilities' pyramid for the central pillar, effective engagement, renders itself for application in the force planning processes of organisations such as NATO or the EU and of nations including the US. It could be widened if one identified pyramids for the two other pillars as well, for C4ISR and for focused logistics. To use such a generic force planning model might help to achieve a much higher degree of interoperability than today's force planning procedures would ever produce. At the same time such an approach would improve NATO's ability to respond quickly and to sustain the effort thereafter.

Taking such a line in the development of its military NATO would assure its member nations as well as the partners that their security is properly protected; dissuade opponents from engaging in a military competition they cannot win; restore deterrence; and signal to the world that NATO will defeat any enemy should conflict prevention fail. It seems to me that it might be too early to expect such guidance from the Riga Summit, but one should at least ask for general guidance to modernise NATO's Force Planning.

Concluding Remarks

The Riga Summit needs to provide a new impetus for much more transformation than currently envisaged, but first and foremost it needs decisions on feasible and affordable actions to be taken immediately. It must produce commitments on further transformation which can be implemented before the next summit. Thus Riga should signal the political will to make transformation happen and to return to a NATO which is the option of choice for all NATO members. I therefore desperately hope that our nations' leaders will have the courage to give such a signal which might prove to the world that, despite unresolved transatlantic issues, the will of the twenty six members to stand together will prevail; and that there exist the resolve to arrive at commonly agreed answers and the determination to face, together, the challenges of a world in turmoil.

Riga should signal to the world that Non-US allies and the US see each other as indispensable partners of a truly indispensable alliance, NATO; a signal of hope for many of those who fall victim to crisis and war.

A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan

by Colonel Mike Capstick, OMM, CD

In June 2005 I was tasked by the Chief of Defence Staff to set-up and deploy a "Strategic Advisory Team" to Afghanistan to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In his usual "mission command" style, General Hillier told me to get to Kabul, conduct the doctrinal mission reconnaissance

and speak with the Canadian Ambassador to determine the needs. The team would consist of around a dozen people and we would work for the Government. A unique mission - to say the least!

An initiative of General Hillier, based on his International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) experience, the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan (SAT-A) is a group of strategic planners that has been assigned to the Afghan Presidency to assist in the development of the kind of plans necessary to

In July 2004 Colonel Mike Capstick was appointed Director Land Reserves Management at national Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. He commanded the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan from August 2005 until August 2006.

achieve the nation's objectives. During his tenure in command of ISAF, General Hillier identified that Afghanistan had visionary leadership but that, at the same time, the machinery of government and the human capacity of the civil service had been decimated by three decades of conflict. To partially fill this critical gap, he provided military planners to the Afghan Minister of Finance to assist in the development of a both a long-term framework for development and the first post-Taliban national budget. This highly successful experiment was dropped by his more conventional successors in command and only rejuvenated after the now CDS visited Afghanistan and President Karzai in the Spring of 2005. During that visit, General Hillier committed to provide a small team for a year.

Despite the short mounting phase, the first team members arrived in Kabul in mid-August and we began the process of establishing ourselves in two houses and an office near the Canadian Embassy in the Wazir Akbar Khan district. By early September the entire team was in theatre and we began working with the Government by mid-month. This could only be accomplished because of the teamwork and cooperation of staffs at NDHQ, Task Force Afghanistan and the team itself. The team is an Afghan-Canadian bi-lateral arrangement that does not come under the command of either ISAF or the US led coalition. As a result, it had to be designed to sustain itself outside of the traditional camp environment.

When we left Canada we still had no firm idea as to where we would be employed or which Afghan agencies we would work with. The Ambassador of the day, Chris Alexander and the Head of Aid, Nipa Banerjee essentially "shopped" me around town and together we identified the office developing Afghanistan's National Development Strategy as the main effort. This resulted in the Senior Economic Advisor to the President becoming our main point of contact within the Government and that after close consultation with both the Canadian Ambassador and Head of Aid, our operational focus would be squarely in the development and governance realms.

Our basic concept of operations is to embed planners with Afghan staff with a view to passing on our basic military staff planning skills. The team made an important contribution to the 2006 London Conference on the Future of Afghanistan by assisting the Afghan led team charged with the development of a comprehensive five-year strategy that covers every aspect of the reconstruction effort. To be clear, we are the "mechanics" who help put together the substantive ideas of the Afghan leadership and the international experts. We used the same

approach to assist with the strategy for Public Administrative Reform and with the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development. In addition, the team's integral strategic communications specialist helped develop communications strategies for all of these activities.

Although the team does include a senior Defence Scientist as our analyst and a capacity development expert contracted by CIDA, it is essentially staffed by the Canadian Forces. Some have questioned the legitimacy of using military planners in this role, and there have been suggestions that other agencies would be better suited to the task. Although this concern is understandable, there are practical advantages to using the CF as the basis of the SAT. In addition to the obvious education, training and experience in disciplined and rigorous strategic planning techniques that military officers bring to the table, the CF is really the only arm of the Canadian government that can quickly and continually generate the requisite numbers of people with the training and will to work in an austere and, at times, unstable environment. Most importantly, the SAT-A initiative is explicit recognition that the character of armed conflict has undergone a major transformation since the end of the Cold War and that traditional concepts for the use of armed force are insufficient to establish a lasting peace.

The team includes both military and civilian personnel. The CF members on this rotation were a mix of Regulars and Reservists from all three components. The planning team members brought a very wide range of training, education and experience to the operation and quickly demonstrated the intellectual agility and adaptability demanded by today's operations. Our austere support staff of three NCOs also demonstrated a remarkable range and depth of talent and kept things going without a great deal of "life support" from Kandahar.

The SAT-A mandate has been renewed for at least one more year and as this article is being written the team is in the midst of rotation preparations. Over the course of the year team members gained valuable strategic level insights into the situation in Afghanistan (described in another article for On Track), and a far deeper understanding of the international effort. Most importantly, SAT-A accomplished its mission and helped establish the conditions for the success of follow-on rotations. Personally satisfying and professionally rewarding, this mission clearly demonstrates that the CF can play a vital role in "winning the peace" as well as its primary mission of "winning the battle."



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After a Year in Kabul: Strategic Reflections

by Colonel M.D. Capstick, OMM, CD

“...the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.”

Thucydides: The Melian Debate

There are few places in the world where this cynical version of political realism applies more than Afghanistan. Invaded by outsiders, seized by religious extremists, forgotten by the international community and victimized by criminals and warlords, the people of Afghanistan have suffered “...what they must” for far too long.

After a year in Kabul working directly with the Government of this still struggling state, it’s appropriate to provide Canadians with some insights into the overall situation from a strategic perspective. Clearly it is impossible to discuss all of the nuance and complexity that characterizes the current situation. Accordingly, these “strategic reflections” below will focus on national issues and will, hopefully, clarify some of the myths and misperceptions that are part of Canada’s national discourse on Afghanistan.

The security situation in the south, particularly in Kandahar Province, receives the vast majority of Canadian media attention and most of that attention is focused on the fighting. This is understandable, as over 2000 Canadian troops have been fighting intense battles against determined insurgents. I personally think that the fighting spirit, prowess, courage and combat effectiveness of the Canadians in Kandahar has surprised more than one of our major Allies. After TF ORION counterattacked besieging Taliban forces at Sangin, I doubt that any member of 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment would agree with the assertion made by a British general, less than a decade ago, that Canada’s Army had relinquished any claim on being called a “real army”!

As tremendous as the performance of our troops in Kandahar has been – and it’s a story that needs to be told, it really is not the whole story. If the Canadian public and policy makers form their perceptions of Afghanistan based on the situation in Kandahar, they are, in effect, looking at Afghanistan “through a straw.” The reality is much more complex and there are more reasons for cautious optimism than there are for gloom.

In four years Afghans have agreed to a constitution, they have conducted and voted in two very successful elections and, for the first time in three decades, there is a parliament in Kabul. These are remarkable achievements by any standard and, even

in the face of seemingly intractable problems, they provide a foundation on which the future state can be built. With the exception of a half dozen provinces, the country is stable enough for development and reconstruction to begin and, more importantly, the people have demonstrated the will to take control of their own futures at the village and community level.

Without a doubt, major problems persist – insurgency, opium, criminality, corruption and, most importantly, grinding and endemic poverty.

These issues represent a major challenge to the legitimacy of the Government in Kabul, and have the potential to push the country into another round of conflict. Only a coordinated, sustained and substantial effort by the international community, in full partnership with the people and Government of Afghanistan, can begin to address them. Determined to make this effort, the Government of Afghanistan, in partnership with the international community, is ready to take the next steps. These next steps are described in the *Afghanistan Compact* that was presented in London in early 2006 and endorsed by a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution on 15 February. The plan to accomplish the goals of the *Compact, Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS)* provides, for the first time, a common language and strategic framework to guide the joint Afghan-International effort. It also seeks to address every one of the crucial problems that threaten the stability of this fragile state.

Until the London Conference the international effort in Afghanistan was often characterized as uncoordinated, ill disciplined and incoherent. Two international security forces, one under NATO command and the other American, were using very different operational approaches. Major donors and some international institutions conducted large-scale aid and development projects but there was no commonly agreed strategic plan to ensure effectiveness. Embassies often provided the nascent Government with contradictory advice. Widely diverging approaches to the issue of poppy eradication is a good example of nations advising Afghans based on domestic interests and constituencies instead of the imperatives of Afghan development.

The Bonn Process, which ended with the 2005 Parliamentary election, was successful in establishing the Afghan national political framework but there was no overarching strategy that linked the Security, Governance and Economic Development “lines of operation.” In short, for four years the international effort in Afghanistan was, for the most part, *ad-hoc* with no way of measuring its effectiveness.

Despite this lack of a cohesive approach to state-building significant progress has been made. Major highways have been constructed, hundreds of schools have been built and the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development has established grassroots Community Development Councils in 12,000 villages to work on the kind of small local projects that

have a direct impact on the day-to-day lives of the rural poor. Over five million children, almost 40% of them are girls, have returned to school. The list of development accomplishments is far too extensive to be repeated; suffice it so say, significant progress has been made in the past four years and the tempo is increasing in most of the country.

Together, the *Afghanistan Compact* and *ANDS* represent the strategic framework that was, for so long, absent. A Joint (Afghan-International) Coordination and Monitoring Board, with Cabinet and Ambassadorial level representation, will oversee its implementation. Unfortunately, it has taken several months to activate this governance mechanism – time that Afghanistan can ill-afford.



“The guns! Thank God the Guns!” Rudyard Kipling

Photo courtesy of Chief Warrant Officer (Master Gunner) Mike MacDonald, Multi-National Brigade (South) Command Sergeant Major, Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

In short, development without security is impossible, and those that argue that the presence of international military forces impedes development are, at best, naïve.

The future of Afghanistan remains contested and the Afghan people are becoming increasingly impatient with both the security situation and unmet promises. The result is a very fragile national consensus that, under the stress of a few tragic events, is likely to collapse. It is, therefore, imperative that all actors, the Afghan Government, international security forces, nations, international institutions and non-governmental organizations, align their actions with these two vital strategic documents and that the promises are transformed into outcomes that improve peoples' lives. The alternative is failure, a prospect that is almost too grim to contemplate.

In addition to a cohesive and disciplined strategic plan, the prerequisite for success is security.

A number of commentators and critics in Canada clearly misunderstand the objectives of the "whole of government" mission in Afghanistan. They have erroneously concluded that operations in Kandahar represent a shift in strategy away from nation building towards a purely military counter-insurgency role. This conclusion can only result from a fundamentally flawed understanding of the insurgency itself.

The Taliban led terror campaign in the south and east is not a classical anti-colonial struggle, nor is it a simple battle of competing political ideologies. It is, instead, a battle between the forces of regression and the advocates of modernity.

The Taliban's objective is not mere territorial control or political power – it is control of the population and the re-establishment of the perverse feudal theocracy that ruled until late 2001. Alliances of convenience between the Taliban and the opium "mafias" have been formed with one simple objective – deny the extension of Government authority, an authority that threatens their unfettered ability to make huge amounts of money on the backs of some of the world's poorest farmers. To that end, they seek to erode the population's confidence in the Government and the international community by attacking vulnerable development projects and those working on them. In short, development without security is impossible, and those that argue that the presence of international military forces impedes development are, at best, naïve.

Two elections and extensive social science research provide ample evidence that the majority of Afghans categorically reject the insurgents' world-view. Recognizing the true nature of the insurgency, the UN Security Council endorsement of the *Compact* (including the Security Pillar) represents explicit approval of both the ongoing American-led counter-insurgency operations and the ISAF transition concept. In short, the international community has deliberately chosen to support the Afghan Government and eliminated any question of neutrality in respect to the battle that continues to put the future of the country in jeopardy. This is a serious commitment that is viewed very seriously by the Afghan population and it must now be adequately resourced.

The central issue in respect to the perceived lack of progress in Afghanistan is not insurgency, nor is it opium, corruption or the weakness of the Government. Although these are huge impediments to progress, the central issue is the parsimony of the international community. In the early days of the Bosnian intervention the *per capita* aid expenditure was \$649 USD while in Afghanistan, left in a far worse post-conflict situation, it is \$57 USD *per capita*. At the same time, troop levels in Afghanistan – a larger landmass than Bosnia, with a far more complex security problem – are only about one-third of those in Bosnia immediately after the Dayton Accord was implemented. These resources are clearly inadequate.

The biggest lesson of the past four years should be that state-building, especially in a totally ravaged society, cannot be successful "on the cheap." To meet the objectives of the *Compact*, the international community needs to underwrite the agreement with substantially more money. In addition, more security forces, both international and Afghan, are urgently needed to provide the population with the basic security that we view as a basic human right.

The Afghanistan state-building project must be guided by the high level strategy (*The Compact*) and be adequately resourced. Until this happens, the fate of the country will remain in the balance.

Canada made a strategic commitment to the people of Afghanistan in late 2001. That commitment was reiterated and renewed at the 2006 London Conference when Canada pledged itself to the *Compact* and again when the UN Security Council explicitly endorsed the partnership between the international community and Afghanistan. If this partnership fails, the strong will continue to "exact what they can" and the weak will be forced "to grant what they must." This is a power relationship that every Canadian should find intolerable.

THE RECIPIENT OF THE VIMY AWARD

The Vimy Award is presented annually to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values. The Vimy Award Selection Committee has selected Brigadier-General David A. Fraser, OMM, MSM, CD, as this year's recipient of the award.

Brigadier-General Fraser is an honourable Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career in the Canadian Forces and in a very challenging and high-profile international position in Afghanistan. The Vimy Award will be presented at a formal dinner that will be held in the grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau, Québec, 17 November 2005, beginning at 6:00 PM.



The Vimy Award / La Distinction honorifique Vimy

LE RÉCIPIENDAIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

La Distinction honorifique Vimy est présentée chaque année à un canadien ou une canadienne ayant fait une contribution exceptionnelle à la sécurité du Canada et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le comité de sélection du Récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy a, cette année, choisi le brigadier-général David A. Fraser, OMM, MSM, CD, comme récipiendaire de la distinction Vimy.

Le brigadier-général Fraser, est un canadien honorable qui a démontré des normes les plus élevés de

leadership tout au long de sa carrière dans les Forces canadienne et a rempli un poste international de prestige comportant de nombreux défis en Afghanistan. La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 17 novembre 2006, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu dans la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau Québec, débutant à 18 h.

Realpolitik Extraordinaire: Hans Island and Canadian Diplomacy with Muscle

by Kyle D. Christensen

Over the years, and as recently as summer 2005, Canada and Denmark found themselves revisiting a dispute over Hans Island. Hans Island is a tiny uninhabited rock island located in the Kennedy Channel between Elsmere Island and Greenland. While this dispute stretches back to the early 1970s, it highlights what has become a familiar refrain concerning this issue. Ottawa and Copenhagen perpetually negotiate with each other over the island without seeking a settlement to the dispute.

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Interestingly, this approach could work out in Canada's favour if it becomes more robust and dynamic in its dealings with Denmark.

The Background

The 2005 dispute was touched off by two events, the decision of Canada's Defence Minister to visit Hans Island, and Canadian soldiers hoisting a flag on it. In response, the Danish Ambassador to Canada published a letter in the *Ottawa Citizen* asserting Denmark's sovereignty over the island and threatened to send the Danish patrol vessel HDMS *Tulugag* to the island. After several diplomatic exchanges, it was agreed

that each country's Foreign Affairs Ministers would meet in New York to discuss the issue.

At the meeting, the Ministers released a joint statement affirming both countries' interest in seeking a negotiated settlement to the dispute. This statement included an understanding to inform each other of activities pertaining to the island, that activities relating to the island be carried out in a low key and restrained matter, and that both countries meet in the future to again discuss ways to resolve the matter.

While the joint statement was ambiguous and appeared to accomplish little, it continues a tradition of agreeing to disagree on the issue while circumventing an actual resolution to the dispute in favour of prolonged negotiations. This default position developed in the early 1970s when Canada and Denmark negotiated the maritime boundary between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. During these negotiations, Ottawa claimed that Hans Island was part of Canadian territory because a British explorer discovered it, and Britain passed on its rights to the Arctic to Canada in 1888, which ostensibly included Hans Island. Denmark, however, claimed that Hans Island was a part of Danish territory because the United States relinquished all claims to Greenland in 1916, in exchange for what are now the Virgin Islands. Copenhagen also feels that its case is strong because the Permanent Court of International Justice declared Greenland a part of the Kingdom of Denmark in 1933, and Hans Island is part of the same geological formation as Greenland.

Although the treaty that defined the separation between Greenland and Ellesmere Island was eventually signed in 1973, no boundary was drawn over or around the island. At that time, a decision was made to end the dividing line just short of Hans Island and to resume it on the other side. Both governments chose to overlook this issue and declared their willingness to resume negotiations later. This approach has worked out in Ottawa's favour because Denmark has not officially challenged Canada's claim in international court. Nevertheless, Ottawa must take a more dynamic approach to its negotiations with Denmark in order to preserve the status quo of Hans Island. In addition, it must possess the capability to enforce any settlement that is made, if one is made.

What is at Stake?

When Canada's claim to Hans Island is challenged by Denmark, two issues are usually considered to be at stake. The first concerns economic possibilities that may surround the island in the future, and the other concerns the impact on Canada's other disputes in the North should it lose the Hans Island claim. While the island is remote and inhospitable, it is anticipated that global warming will make it more accessible.

As this occurs, the potential for economic development and exploitation on or around Hans Island may increase. Various resources in the region could include minerals, diamonds, and even fish stocks. The most important resource to exploit, however, would be oil and/or gas discoveries. Depending on where the boundary line is drawn around Hans Island, it could affect access to these resources. The problem is that, as of yet, no significant oil, gas, or mineral discoveries have been found on or near Hans Island.

Regarding Canada's other disputes in the North, it is generally held that a dangerous precedent would be set if Hans Island is not resolved in Canada's favour. If Denmark wins this case, or Canada's response is viewed as weak, others may become emboldened to press their claims and take advantage of Ottawa's perceived inability to protect its interests in the North. This may include the Alaska/Yukon maritime boundary between the US and Canada, and the status of the Northwest Passage. In this case, Hans Island itself is less significant than the impact of losing the case in international court. Therefore, some argue that Canada needs a long-term policy with adequate funding to enhance its capabilities and strengthen its presence in the North to prevent this precedent from being set.

Short of unconditionally surrendering the island, the best possible outcome to this dispute is the one that already exists...

Although the aforementioned issues are important, Canada is better served by taking a dynamic and robust approach to its negotiations with Denmark to preserve the status quo of Hans Island. The compromise developed by Canada and Denmark in the early 1970s has to date been ideal. It has been more than 30 years and there has neither been a resolution to the dispute nor a challenge in international court. Short of unconditionally surrendering the island, the best possible outcome to this dispute is the one that already exists, a string of diplomatic negotiations where both parties can declare success without actually challenging the claim.

This line of reasoning is problematic for some to accept. Some will argue that this is tantamount to a policy of inaction. One criticism will undoubtedly be: "Do nothing until Canada loses the island." Nothing could be further from the truth, as this strategy requires a nuanced coordinated approach by Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Coast Guard, RCMP, and other government departments.

Not only will this strategy require a nuanced relationship between several government departments, it will require a mix of capabilities including the ability to maintain a presence

in the North, conduct law enforcement in the North, and project general-purpose, combat capable forces into the North. Because Canada and Denmark do not agree on the details of the negotiated settlement, it allows them to negotiate for the foreseeable future. This will require a mix of capabilities that will give Canada's diplomatic initiative credibility. Choreographing this initiative will be difficult, and is certainly not a policy of doing nothing. The result will be the ability of the Government of Canada to negotiate indefinitely, which may eventually result in common objectives both sides can agree to. If that suits Canada's interests, it may necessitate putting pressure on Denmark to seek a settlement to the dispute.

For example, when Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger used diplomacy to extract the US from the Vietnam War, it was clear that these negotiations were closely choreographed with American military operations in Indochina. Short of unconditionally withdrawing from Vietnam, Kissinger used the military lever of power to gain time that would establish common objectives both sides could agree to. He then used the military lever to pressure Hanoi to seek a settlement. By using both the diplomatic and the military instruments of power, Kissinger was able to negotiate America's extraction from Vietnam on terms that were better than if these instruments were used in isolation.

Kissinger also left the settlement sufficiently ambiguous so that North Vietnam and South Vietnam could negotiate its details indefinitely once the Paris Peace Accords were signed. In the end though, the settlement failed not because the US was tricked or lost Vietnam, but rather because it did not enforce the product of its own negotiations. In other words, the results of negotiations were left to stand on their own without credible military backing. For Canada, choreographing sustained diplomatic and military initiatives in the North will allow it to pursue negotiations indefinitely, but if resolved, to enforce them sufficiently.

As far as the Canadian Forces (CF) are concerned, it needs to enhance its capabilities to ensure negotiations over Hans Island continue, or until such a time that Ottawa wishes to place pressure on Denmark. The CF must therefore demonstrate the ability to deploy to the North, conduct sea control and sea denial exercises, and control access points, entrances, and chokepoints. The ability to seize a strategic chokepoint or access point in the North and sustain it until any threat is neutralized makes a tangible contribution to Canadian security and enforcement of national will. It provides the Government of Canada with a visible and committed response, and most importantly, it provides Ottawa with diplomatic credibility.

It also highlights the law enforcement element in the North. This course of action sends a clear message of what the Government of Canada can do in the North. The Government can choose to do nothing, or it may choose to confront the issue. No matter what, however, the message is clear, Ottawa is in the driver's seat because the CF, Coast Guard, or RCMP has the ability to defend Canada's interests and enforce Ottawa's diplomatic negotiations. In the future, Canada will monitor the North and choose to respond to events whenever and however it likes. It will be quick, decisive, and unmistakably Canadian. The implication for Denmark is that challenging Canada's claim in the North will be unsuccessful because Ottawa controls those events.

Conclusion

At the outset, it was highlighted that a formula of perpetually negotiating with the Danes over Hans Island without seeking a resolution to the dispute has worked in Canada's favour. What is required is not a solution to the dispute, but a continuation of negotiations with added influence so that Canada can preserve the status quo. This course of action requires negotiating not from necessity or weakness, but rather from strength and control. The longer that Canada can control the prolongation of this dispute without a resolution the better off Canada will be to set the conditions for it to be concluded in its favour.

At this time, given Canada's less than perfect capabilities in the North – which are central to negotiations – it would be in Canada's strategic interest to maintain the status quo regarding Hans Island unless it knows beyond a reasonable doubt that the dispute can be decided in its favour. At that time, Canada can then bring pressure to bear on Denmark to finalize the resolution. In the final analysis, Canada's diplomatic initiative will require credible military backing to be effective.

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The opinions and conclusions contained in this analysis are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Directorate of Maritime Strategy, the Maritime Staff, National Defence Headquarters, or the Government of Canada.

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CF Manned Strategic Capability

by Colonel (Ret'd) Terry E. Chester

Recent announcements of projected equipment acquisitions and plans for the CF are most welcomed, and will enable valuable increased mobility. There are other areas, however, where looming deficiencies in our future defence capabilities must be addressed. Our decreasing abilities to survey and protect our coastline and littoral waters, ocean approaches and northern regions from incursion by surface and subsurface threats, foreign fishing fleets and drug smugglers alike, need attention. Recent visits to the North by the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister have signalled the Government's intention to deal with this issue more aggressively.

Time and distance requirements have long dictated that these surveillance tasks can be most efficiently carried out from the air. Our once robust fleets of long and short-range patrol aircraft, purchased in the '60s and '70s, carried out those duties with dispatch. However, all that remains of those fleets are the 18 CP 140 Auroras, with 13 based at Greenwood in Nova Scotia and five at Comox on Vancouver Island, purchased in the early eighties. These Long Range Patrol Aircraft have been conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Fisheries and pollution surveillance, covert drug ops and general surveillance duties over the ocean approaches and land mass of this Nation, but much of their capability has become diminished and outdated like other elements of the CF inventory. Fortunately, these aircraft are currently undergoing a major upgrade program to their internal avionics through the Aurora Incremental Modernization Program (AIMP), but they are also in need of critical

airframe repairs, upgrades and maintenance work if they are to keep flying for the next twenty years.

The end of the Cold War and the virtual cessation of Soviet submarine activities off our three coasts, combined with a concomitant reduction in resources to the CF as a whole, influenced decision-makers to assign lower priorities to the Maritime Patrol fleet. Flying rates declined, squadrons were retired and maintenance and supply priorities re-assigned. Ironically, the AIMP itself led to a reduction in fleet availability, and, as a result unique skills have atrophied, such as ASW, an area where Canada was previously renowned. Diminishing supply lines and re-ordered priorities meant an inexorable slip towards marginal serviceability rates, which lead to training and re-generation difficulties. There continues to be a high demand for CP 140 services from CF and Other Government Departments (OGDs), but with aircraft availability hovering in the 20 to 25% range on a daily basis, it is very seldom that all requests can be fulfilled.

The Aurora Service Life Extension Program (ASLEP) was initiated to address, amongst other things, the structural upgrades needed to extend the life of the airframe to as long as 2025. Given the high investment in the avionics of the aircraft, it is only logical to ensure that the aircraft itself has sufficient structural life to exploit the new systems. However, decisions on potential funding for the ASLEP indicate that perhaps only 10 to 12 of the fleet of 18 CP 140s may receive this major airframe overhaul. A recent decision to delay approval of the ASLEP until this autumn reinforces the lack of urgency felt for this project. This could have a disastrous effect on the CP140's ability to conduct not just her assigned roles and tasks offshore and within the CANADA Command region but also her significant roles with our allies and partners.

Reducing the fleet size would draw numbers below the critical mass needed to operate off both coasts, and even marginal

Colonel (Ret'd) Terry Chester retired from the Regular Forces in 2001, serving his last tour as the Operations Wing Commander on the NATO E3 AWACs aircraft in Geilenkirchen, Germany. His 37 year career was spent primarily flying and instructing on Maritime Patrol aircraft on both coasts of Canada, as well as a number of headquarters and staff positions in Ottawa and Winnipeg. He remains engaged in Air Force activities through the Reserves and the Air Force Association in Comox, BC. Colonel Chester is Honourary President of the Pacific Group, Air Force Association of Canada. He can be reached at tchester@shaw.ca.

economies of scale would be difficult to achieve. Abandoning the West coast, for example, to ensure a working fleet remained in the East, would be illogical and inconsistent with the need to provide security of all of our borders. This is particularly germane given Canada's renewed attention to Pacific Rim Nations as an ever-increasing area of economic activity. Reductions of the fleet would also put at risk the Governments' re-emphasised requirement to patrol and survey our Northern regions, or have aircraft available for deployment abroad. Additionally, as border security tightens, drug smugglers are once again resorting to using secluded harbours as a way of getting drugs in and out of Canada. The CP 140 is the only aircraft in our inventory that can conduct littoral surveillance operations to support counter-drug operations in these areas.

Perhaps even more importantly, the updated aircraft will have significant C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities needed for a variety of future missions. The Aurora will have modern capabilities to perform surveillance over land or water, command and control, and other demanding missions, in addition to its traditional anti-submarine capability. But even more, these enhanced capabilities will be invaluable in the conduct of many varied operations - at home and abroad - within the newly formed joint operational commands. The value of the Aurora as a C4ISR asset as a force enabler should not be underestimated - it can truly fulfil a number of critical functions that are needed to gather intelligence, facilitate communications, provide situational awareness, and execute command direction.

Departmental plans and projections indicate that UAVs and satellites can cost-effectively accomplish many of these surveillance requirements; accordingly the requirement for manned aircraft will be diminished once these are in place. UAVs and satellites are effective force multipliers, no question, but they are unlikely to ever be able to perform the

full range of surveillance operations required in a land mass as large as Canada's. There is simply no substitute in a small force for on-the-spot judgement, tactical decision-making and information gathering. Our Government's recent emphasis on re-asserting our sovereignty in the Northern Passage requires a manned presence to assert ownership. Armed icebreakers and Northern ports are a long term undertaking and will involve a very significant funding commitment by the Government to implement. The CP 140, with its Northern Patrols (NORPATS), along with our Ranger Force, has been our principal legal claim to sovereignty over those regions, a claim which is currently being openly questioned by others. If we are serious about the North, we require a robust and effective way of asserting and ensuring our sovereignty for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

The Aurora maritime patrol aircraft represents a critical strategic capability that will continue to be needed on deployed operations, for domestic coastal surveillance, and for Northern operations. While unmanned surveillance platforms may continue to evolve as important capabilities, they cannot offer the flexibility and on-scene presence that a manned aircraft can. Moreover the updated Aurora can provide important command and control capabilities not available otherwise.

A significant investment is being made to modernize the Aurora avionics systems. It is logical and economically sound to ensure that the airframe is appropriately upgraded and maintained so as to fully exploit the resources invested in this important capability. It therefore makes sense to upgrade the avionics and structure of the entire fleet of 18 aircraft. Undue delay or compromise of the accompanying project for structural sustainment will have a disastrous effect on the CP140's ability to conduct its assigned roles and tasks domestically and with our allies and partners. The ASLEP situation demands urgent attention and should be fully funded, proceed as soon as possible and be implemented on all aircraft.

Anti-Ballistic Missiles as Antisatellite Weapons: Implications for Canada

by Matthew Gillard

The Canadian anti-ballistic missile (ABM) debate has been long and interesting. Both the potential value of ABMs and the prospect of further Canadian participation in the American national ABM system have been discussed. However, the debate has largely overlooked the inherent antisatellite (ASAT)

capability of terrestrial and space-based ABMs. Increased global ABM deployment could facilitate an ASAT arms race, harming Canadian interests in space.



Unfortunately, Canada has few options for dealing with this dilemma. The end result could be a declining space security environment for satellites and ultimately for Canada.

ABMs as ASATs

The ASAT capability of ABMs is a result of the technological link between ABMs and ASATs. ABM and ASAT technology is very similar, ensuring that ABM systems intended to destroy missiles in space could also target satellites.

For ABMs to home in on ballistic missiles, the missiles must be tracked, since most or all a missile's flight path occurs outside of orbit. In contrast, satellite flight paths are easier to predict, given that satellites travel along given orbital trajectories. This makes it much easier to destroy satellites than ballistic missiles.

Historical examples attest to the inherent ASAT capability of ABM systems. In 1969, John Foster, US Director of Defense Research and Engineering, stated that the US Safeguard ground-based ABM system could attack ASATs. Throughout the 1980s, the US Defense Intelligence Agency noted that the Soviet Union's ABM field surrounding Moscow could destroy satellites. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan ordered evaluation of the potential for development of advanced ASATs based on ABM technologies.

Several modern-day ABM systems also have ASAT capability. Most notably, the cornerstone of the US national ABM program, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, is estimated to be able to destroy a large number of satellites in low earth orbit (about 80 to 1,700 kilometers from the surface of the earth). About 47 percent of all satellites are in low earth orbit.

Space-based ABMs as ASATs

Space-based ABMs have never been deployed. If they are deployed, they may have a more effective ASAT capability than terrestrial (land based, sea-launched, and air-launched) ABMs. Since space-based systems are already in space, they are closer to satellite targets than terrestrial ABMs. This could allow them to strike satellite targets very quickly, increasing the possibility of a successful surprise attack.

Space-based ABMs could also have an extremely high range. Space-based ABMs in orbits close to earth travel at about 8

kilometers per second. Combining this speed with force produced by an ABM interceptor rocket could allow a space-based ABM to reach geosynchronous and semisynchronous orbits.

Both of these orbits are extremely valuable. Forty-two percent of all active satellites are in geosynchronous orbit (about 35,700 kilometers from the earth). Semisynchronous orbit (roughly 20,000 kilometers from the earth) is used by US Global Positioning System (GPS) and Russian Glonass (the Russian satellite navigation system) satellites. To the best of my knowledge, no currently deployed ABM system is capable of reaching these high orbits.

Significant problems must be addressed before it will be possible to launch and sustain large numbers of space-based ABMs. Small numbers of space-based ABMs may nonetheless be launched to supplement terrestrial systems. Prototype space-based ABMs could be deployed for testing purposes before any fully developed space ABMs were launched. While the prototypes may not be able to reliably intercept ABMs, they would likely be able to perform the much easier task of destroying satellites. ABM tests would also yield information concerning the inherent ASAT capability of space-based ABMs, potentially allowing the testing state to improve satellite attack capability.

The ABM Paradox

The ASAT capability of ABMs results in an ABM paradox. Although ABM systems are designed to increase security by defending against ballistic missiles, they could decrease security for states depending heavily on satellites.

Satellites currently face few threats. No country appears to have deployed a dedicated ASAT system, with the possible exception of Russia, which may still have a few Cold-War era ASATs. ABM systems have also never been used against satellites. However, the space threat environment will likely become more dangerous as systems capable of destroying satellites (like ABMs) are increasingly deployed.

States continually analyse the actions of real or perceived competitors. If a state believes that actions of other states threaten its own security, it will react. Since ABMs can function as ASATs, a state observing robust ABM deployment from rival states could decide that its satellites were less secure. To deter attacks on their own satellites, the state could then deploy dedicated ASATs or prepare to use ABMs in an ASAT role. If other countries reciprocated in kind, a continuous action-reaction anti-satellite deployment cycle could take place. This would be an ASAT arms race. Deployment of space-

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based ABMs could contribute to the development of an ASAT race given their potential high attack speed and long range.

Effects of an ASAT Arms Race on Canadian Interests in Space

Canada has three main interests in space. The first interest is protecting satellites Canada uses for military purposes. While Canada has no dedicated military satellites, it rents commercial satellites to provide military capabilities when needed. The Canadian Forces also uses the American GPS system to assist in navigation. An ASAT arms race could endanger satellites used by Canada, making our country less secure.

The second interest is preserving American military preponderance. American military might greatly benefits Canada. Shared borders and similar values help ensure that Canada and the US are natural allies when confronted with significant military threats. Satellites help protect American military strength. The US depends on satellites more than any other country; they have 188 military satellites while the rest of the world has 103. The American military is also a heavy user of commercial communications satellites. American reliance on satellites ensures that an ASAT arms race could harm American military preponderance.

The third interest is limiting unnecessary arms races. Arms races are expensive and can aggravate interstate tension, making the world less secure.

Managing the ABM Paradox

There are two possible strategies that states could employ to deal with the ABM paradox: deterrence or the pursuit of robust arms control measures. The first strategy attempts to prevent states from developing and deploying ASAT systems by developing and deploying a robust ASAT capability. This approach could entail deployment of dedicated ASAT systems. It could also involve publicly declaring that ABMs would be used in an ASAT role if necessary.

The second strategy requires limiting ABM deployment. There is no other way of reducing the possibility that an ABM will be used as an ASAT. Unfortunately, limiting ABM deployment reduces potential for an ABM to intercept ballistic missiles.

This dilemma is adequately conveyed by the US-Russia 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) and 1974 Protocol. The ABMT and Protocol state that the US and Russia could each deploy strategic land-based interceptors in one (and only one) location. The US and Russia could deploy a maximum of 100 interceptors in their respective ABM basing locations. While

not the specific intent of the ABMT, this reduced the number of strategic ABMs that could attack satellites. However, placing severe limits on the number of ABM interceptors also limited the potential to shoot down incoming missiles.

The ABMT also prohibited development, testing, and deployment of all mobile (sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile-land based) strategic ABMs. By prohibiting mobile ABMs, the ABMT ensured that ABMs would only be able to attack satellites within range of the US and Russian ABM basing areas. Moving strategic ABM interceptors to attack satellites beyond range of the basing zones was not permissible under the treaty. Of course, moving interceptors closer to the ballistic missile launch sites was also taboo. This is particularly significant, since ballistic missiles can launch extremely effective countermeasures early in flight. Destroying ballistic missiles before they release countermeasures would be highly beneficial for the ABM mission, but necessitates placing ABM interceptors close to missile launch areas.

In December 2001, President George Bush provided formal notification of withdrawal from the ABMT, effectively killing the Treaty. The Bush administration believed that the existence of the ABMT would affect prospects for creating an effective ABM system.

The US and the ABM Paradox

American decisions are particularly important in determining how the ABM paradox is managed. The US currently appears more interested in testing, developing, and deploying missile defence systems than potential rivals.

A strategy of deterrence would not work for the US. Given its high dependence on satellites, other countries would gain relatively more by deploying systems to target US satellites. A strategy of American ASAT deterrence is thus likely to aggravate tensions and promote an ASAT arms race, ultimately making the US and Canada less secure. Unfortunately, limiting ABM deployment, while not increasing the possibility of an ASAT arms race, is also problematic.

Given the recent death of the ABMT and heightened concern about ballistic missile attacks on the US after 9/11, it is unlikely that the US will agree to another treaty that severely limits ABM deployment. A more likely option for the US is refraining from deploying space-based ABMs. While the US Missile Defense Agency is continuing to push for plans to deploy space-based prototype ABM interceptors in 2012 and a space-based ABM defence constellation in 2016, there is significant opposition to space-based weapons (including space-based ABM systems) within the US Congress. This opposition will likely delay or even prevent the launch of American space-based ABMs.

What Should Canada Do?

Canada has few options for dealing with the ABM paradox. Even if it wanted to, it is highly unlikely that Canada will be able to limit deployment of American ABM interceptors, since the US has placed a high premium on deploying missile defences. The only option Canada seems to have is focusing on space confidence building

initiatives (such as calling for increased international sharing of space object tracking data). Confidence building activities may help increase trust and prevent the ABM paradox from producing an ASAT arms race. Nevertheless, without concrete measures to ensure that ABMs will not target satellites, confidence building measures will probably not prevent an ASAT arms race. The satellite security environment could therefore deteriorate in the coming years, much to Canada's detriment.

A Debt Owed to the Traditions of North America's Aboriginal Peoples

by Dr. John Scott Cowan



I've come to the conclusion that the evolution of key elements of the ethos of the Canadian Armed Forces owes a substantial debt to the traditions of North America's aboriginal peoples.

In the 19th century, the symbols, structures and ethos of the Canadian Army had their roots in the British military values and traditions of the day. However, there has been a huge evolution of the values and ethos over time, sometimes during conflict, but a great deal of the change occurring just in aligning the values and ethos with the moving target of values and attitudes in Canadian Society as a whole.

But when it comes to the modern principles underlying the law of armed conflict, and the ethical practices which today would be an absolute requirement for a Canadian officer or NCM, most Canadians are blissfully unaware that North America's First Nations were a couple of centuries in the lead on these matters.

How did I come to this working hypothesis that the First Nations way of war in the early 19th century had important similarities to ours today?

While preparing for a convocation address, I read the autobiography of one of the greatest North American military

leaders of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a man who was a soldier for 51 years, and who seemed almost to have a late twentieth century eye when observing the ethos of two centuries ago. His name was MA-KA-TAI-ME-SHE-KIA-KIAK, which in the Sauk language means Black Sparrow Hawk, but we know him today as Black Hawk. He was the only enemy of the United States after which the US has ever named a major weapons system, the Black Hawk helicopter. Interestingly, a division of the U.S. army and a professional hockey team also adopted his name.

Black Hawk was born in 1767, and lived till 1838. Before his birth the Sauk nation to which he belonged had gradually migrated over more than a century from south of Montreal to Michigan and thence gradually further south to the vicinity of present day Rock Island, Illinois, though at the time of his birth it was named Saukenuk. This migration had been partly due to the pressures of French and British settlement. Saginaw Bay, in Lake Michigan is also named after his people.

He and others believed that his great-grandfather, Thunder (or Nanamakee in the Sauk language) had been a key founder of the nation. The Sauk language is an Algonquian language and the Sauk had the closest of relations with another small nation of that language group, the Musquaquee or Fox nation, so as the most prominent military leader of the two allied nations, Black Hawk often led men from both nations. His military life began at 14, and from his later teens onward he was a military leader. While the armed units he led were often not large, they were frequently in the hundreds, and from time to time exceeded a thousand men under arms, which in the late 18th and early 19th century in the region of the Great Lakes or Mississippi watershed was a large force.

His military ideas were not atypical of his generation, but what was atypical was that he set them down and had them published in 1833, the year after the Black Hawk War. How he came to

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do so was interesting. Black Hawk didn't think what he was doing in 1832 was a war, and indeed he and modern historians would agree that it was a migration. But the US took it as a war, and defeated him with an army of more than 4000, which included in its number, curiously, Abraham Lincoln, Jefferson Davis, and Zachary Taylor. Despite his defeat, his crossing of the Mississippi at Bad Axe is still viewed as one of the most perfectly planned military manoeuvres of all time.

After Black Hawk's defeat Jefferson Davis was appointed to escort him to Fort Monroe, but because of significant sympathy for Black Hawk, it was decided not to imprison him, but to send him on a tour of major cities of the US, so he could see how many Americans there really were, and might see the wisdom in ceasing to make war on them. But the trip backfired.

Black Hawk was accompanied by his eldest son, Nasheaskuk (Whirling Thunder) and his translator, Antoine LeClair, and when he spoke in those cities he drew increasingly large and sympathetic crowds. His son was evidently thought to be so handsome that large numbers of young women also tried to attend, a sort of early type of stage groupie. By the time he reached New York he was drawing larger crowds than President Andrew Jackson, so he was sent home.

Having discovered that his words had at least as big an impact as his weapons, he decided to fight the next round on paper. Interestingly, he dedicated his autobiography to Brigadier General Henry Atkinson, who had defeated him, and in the dedication, couched in the form of a letter, he recalls his good treatment by Atkinson, and expresses his confidence that Atkinson will vouch for those facts in Black Hawk's narrative which are of the events of which Atkinson would have knowledge. He overtly draws Atkinson into what Black Hawk calls "the vindication of my character from misrepresentation". This shows that even by October 1833 Black Hawk fully appreciated that he had generated considerable sympathy and perhaps support from amongst former opponents.

Black Hawk was never a political leader, and carefully describes a separation of political from military decision making, even on the battlefield, that we would certainly recognise as modern practice, but was exactly the opposite of how the British were operating in Canada.

Black Hawk was an ally of Britain through much of his life; he fought in the War of 1812 around western Lake Erie with British forces commanded by Henry Proctor, and he grew to dislike the way the British and Americans made war. Writing in 1833, he recalled his reaction to Proctor's blunders attacking Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson, which caused Black Hawk to decide to lead his troops home.

Interestingly, his criticisms of Proctor aligned closely with the findings in Proctor's court marshal, which required the reasons for his discharge to be read out to every regiment in the British Army. But it wasn't just Proctor's mistakes, grave as they were, and which later led to the death of Tecumseh. Black Hawk didn't think that the contemporary European way of war met any reasonable test for duty of care by officers or for ethics.

Black Hawk...detested the lack of concern that British and American officers showed for their men.

Remembering his visit to a friend's village on his way home from the War in 1813, Black Hawk retold what he had said even then:

"After eating, I gave an account of what I had seen and done. I explained to them the manner the British and the Americans fought. Instead of stealing upon each other, and taking every advantage *to kill the enemy and save their own people*, as we do, (which, with us is considered good policy in a war chief,) they march out, in open daylight, and *fight*, regardless of the numbers of warriors they may lose! After the battle is over, they retire to feast, and drink wine, as if nothing had happened; after which, they make a *statement in writing*, of what they have done – *each party claiming the victory!* And neither giving an account of half the number that have been killed on their own side. They all fought like braves, but would not do to *lead a war party* with us. Our maxim is, "*to kill the enemy, and save our own men.*" Those chiefs would do to *paddle* a canoe but not to *steer* it. The Americans shoot better than the British, but their soldiers are not so well clothed or provided for."

The last sentence is really a separate observation distinct from his main criticism. Black Hawk knew that the tradition of gun ownership and use by Americans made them more practiced marksmen than the British, but that the American logistics system of 1812 was markedly inferior to that of the British.

Black Hawk had always commanded forces which included many of his relatives, and he detested the lack of concern that British and American officers showed for their men. His views on avoidance of unnecessary casualties, on close attention to the needs of troops, and on minimizing distinctions in comforts in the field between officers and men were at clear variance with British and American practice.

Black Hawk abhorred the mixing of alcohol with military operations, and also thought that the reports being made to

higher headquarters were self-serving fiction. Black Hawk was enraged when other Indian allies mistreated American prisoners of war, and he forced them to stop, which BGen Procter had not done.

Writing about his experiences against the Americans during the Black Hawk War of 1832, he is critical of the American failure to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, the failure to honour flags of truce, and the failure to negotiate truthfully for cessation of hostilities.

Today, 168 years after Black Hawk's death, and 193 years after the battles on the Detroit frontier, the views we now hold of everything from rules of engagement to duty of care are much closer to those of Black Hawk than to those of the

European or American generals of his era.

This is not completely surprising, since modern Canadian views on many social or ethical issues stem from our present egalitarian and cooperative model of society which would have been familiar to Black Hawk but shocking and radical to his British contemporaries.

Which raises, of course, the broader question of the origin of the differences between European societies and Canada or the United States. North American society is clearly less rigid and less class-ridden than in Europe. It has been popular to attribute this to geography, the process of settlement and the diversity of immigration, but it seems just as reasonable to attribute it to the folks who were here first.

Book Review

We Lead, Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918

Kenneth Radley

Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein

This book, though it began as a Carleton University PhD dissertation, could only have been written by an army officer. Kenneth Radley served in the Queen's Own Rifles, and he is steeped in the military. His book, available from Vanwell Publishing Limited in St Catharines, ON, for \$49.95, is, incredibly enough, the first published history of a Canadian division in either of the two world wars. There are scores of battalion histories, there is Terry Copp's study of the 5th Brigade in the Second World War, and there are a few dozen military biographies and autobiographies of commanders and soldiers. Inexplicably, however, no Canadian has studied the major fighting formation, the division, before Radley. Nor has anyone written histories of the I or II Canadian Corps or First Canadian Army in the Second World War, though Major Doug Delaney is in the midst of writing about corps commanders. The 1st Canadian Division, the Old Red Patch of the Great War, is the obvious place to begin filling in these huge gaps in Canada's military history.

Radley approaches his story like the soldier he is. The organization is clear and focused, the careful research marshaled. The author's method is to look at command, the staff, and training, each of which gets two chapters. There is an introductory chapter to get the division from Valcartier to the front in 1915, and there is a chapter to put it all together and to demonstrate how the 1st Division's leadership, staff work, and training made it the heart of the Canadian Corps' success in The Hundred Days.

What we do not get is a chronological history of the division in action. This is a problem, not least because there is always much repetition built into a thematic approach. Vimy Ridge and Hill 70, for example, are both treated twice, a drawback that a chronological organization should have prevented. Nonetheless, Radley's organization does put the reader's attention on what made his division and, indeed, the Canadian Corps, so effective: good leadership, first rate staff work, and training, training, and training.

Radley is not one to make the mistake of arguing that the Canadian Corps was unique in the British Expeditionary Force. He notes properly that the division and corps were small parts in a vast British machine and, while the Canadians developed their own esprit de corps and tactical approach to

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battle, the British influence remained very strong. The first division commander and the first two Canadian Corps commanders were British, and a high percentage of the staff officers throughout most of the war were also Imperials. It had to be thus—at the beginning of the war, Canada had no officer fit to command a division and there were all of nine Canadian officers who had attended the British Army’s Staff College. Without the British, Canada’s 1st Division and the Canadian Corps would have remained an ill-disciplined mob far longer than they did.

Radley’s judgments on individual battalion, brigade and division commanders are sharp, and his appraisals of staff officers are first-rate. He is an admirer of Sir Arthur Currie who took over the Old Red Patch when General E.A.H. Alderson, its first GOC, was given the newly-established Corps. He has made very good use of Currie’s correspondence, and he makes it clear that Currie kept his sharp eye on everyone and everything. At the end of 1915, to cite just one example, Currie was fed up with the state of training of artillery reinforcements.

“We have to fight these men,” he wrote to Major-General J.W. Carson, Militia minister Sam Hughes’ representative in England, “and the least the chaps who have the soft jobs at Shorncliffe can do is train them....Unless they are prepared to do this, they should be kicked out of the Canadian Service. They are as much slackers as the man who doesn’t join at all. In fact some are worse because they spoil good men. “Of course, the man Currie was pointing the figure at was Carson, a know-nothing political crony of Hughes who was one of the main impediments standing in the way of Canadian military efficiency.

The extraordinary fact is that, starting from effectively zero and learning on the job, the Canadian Expeditionary Force produced large numbers of good, battle-experienced COs and GOCs.

Radley is very good in his treatment of leadership. He points out how the British and Canadians set up schools to teach every subject, include a Commanding Officers Course, and he talks knowledgeably about how a good CO could make all the difference to an infantry battalion. Discipline, efficiency, and happiness all depended on the man at the top.

“In a happy unit,” Radley writes, “juniors did not fear their seniors,” but that did not mean slackness. “The relaxed manner had of necessity to be accompanied by the strictest attention to detail if things were to be kept up to the mark. The unit with a personable and competent CO did its job happily and well, while the unit with a competent but miserable CO was an

efficient, but unhappy one....The unit suffering under the mediocre or just plain bad CO, who lacked the personality to help carry command off and perhaps was labouring under the severe disadvantage of having replaced a good CO and not being able to fill his boots, was doubly cursed in that it was inefficient and unhappy.” The extraordinary fact is that, starting from effectively zero and learning on the job, the Canadian Expeditionary Force produced large numbers of good, battle-experienced COs and GOCs.

Radley’s organizational emphasis focuses on the officers, but he does not omit the poor bloody infantry. He notes that if Private Bloggs of the 1st Division had gone into the line in February 1915 and served with his unit until the Armistice, he would have passed 1363 days in all on the Continent of which 347 would have been in the trenches, 295 in brigade support or reserve, 598 days in division or corps reserve, and 123 days in Army or GHQ reserve. Few soldiers, literally only a handful, survived those 347 days at the front and those 295 days in brigade reserve, very close behind the line. Casualties drained units, raw reinforcements filling up the ranks but not bringing any battlefield wisdom with them. Eventually, Radley writes, “even the finest of formations reached a point where efficiency began to decline. If you keep squeezing an orange soon all the juice is gone.”

Officers squeezed the orange too. They naturally wanted to keep their men busy on the old principle that idle hands create trouble. In the line, this was not a big problem. When units went into reserve for a “rest”, it was usually for a combined regimen of training and sport, other ranks getting very little leave. Occasionally, to liven up army life, there were competitions, including platoon competitions in January 1918 that pitted teams from each battalion of the First Division against each other in a simulated open warfare setting. The prize was two weeks leave in Paris for all 29 members of the winning platoon from the 2nd Battalion, a prize well worth the effort.

Officers received more leave than ORs, but then they carried more responsibility and frequently burned out, not least battalion Commanding Officers. General Currie wrote in March 1918 that “Every day the pressing need for suitable and honourable employment for war torn Commanding Officers from the front becomes more apparent.” Even exemplary COs, Currie had observed, “will in a short time become so war worn as to become inefficient,” and it would be “unjust and cruel to adversely report upon these Officers.”

Radley’s focus is broad. He talks knowledgeably about how battalion and platoon organization changed over the course of the Great War, the tussle between generalists and specialists never-ending. Bombers were thought for a time to be the key to success in the attack, but sometimes, he says, soldiers

became so enamoured of the grenade that they forgot they had a rifle. One officer complained that grenades were tossed at enemy soldiers 300 yards away when they could have been simply shot. COs wanted their bombing officers under their thumb, and they wanted to control the specialist machine gunners too. Perhaps there was too much to control-the 1st Division went overseas in 1914 with four machine guns; by the end of the war, it had some five hundred.

War had changed between 1914 and 1918, Canadians had changed, and the Old Red Patch, though few of its originals

were still with it by November 1918, had played a glorious part in winning the victory.

We Lead, Others Follow is a good book. The research is thorough but not all-inclusive, and the prose is a bit old fashioned, often suggesting *The Boy's Own Annuals* on which Radley must have been raised. Still, his understanding of the military and how it works-or doesn't-makes this a volume that is essential for everyone interested in Canada's Great War. There are useful current lessons here too.

Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement

Foreword by Dr. Douglas Bland

Alan Williams, former Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) at National Defence Headquarters, is the author of the book, Re-inventing Defence Procurement in Canada, which was released on 5 October. We are pleased to reprint the foreword to Mr. Williams' book by Dr. Bland. -ed.

The Defence-Procurement Question

The challenge posed to Alan Williams was straightforward: "If the prime minister asked you to rebuild the Canadian Forces in five years, how would you reinvent the defence-procurement system to do this?" The question does not ask for a review and amendment of past difficulties. Rather, it asks for an action plan unencumbered by present bureaucratic assumptions, interests, and procedural expectations to meet a specific and urgent national requirement - a plan to re-equip a transforming armed force faced with the imminent collapse of major military capabilities.

Reinventing defence procurement requires a clear understanding of the procurement problem and a comprehensive picture of the current process to separate out those elements that will serve the new model and those that can be safely discarded. Alan Williams begins by slaying procurement dragons which have rested too easily and far too long in studies, reports, and public commentary. He replaces these with facts drawn from experience, along with his insights into the process gained in the Department of Public Works and Government Services and in the Department of National Defence. He held the appointment of assistant deputy minister (Materiel) in DND from August 1999 to April 2005 and was responsible for the management of the defence-procurement

policy across the department and the Canadian Forces.

Numerous studies have attempted to describe Canada's "defence-procurement problem." They invariably conclude that, inter alia, the process is slow, overburdened by non-defence considerations, overly bureaucratic, and shot through with political interference. Most of these definitions describe second-order difficulties or myths. Studies based on these confusions, -therefore, usually offer recommendations that avoid the core difficulty and others that address supposed problems that are only popular misunderstandings. What they mostly miss is the obstinate irony that inhibits defence-procurement reform in Canada.

Canadian defence procurement cannot be fixed because it is complicated, but it is complicated only because of the unnecessary bureaucratic complexity that manages the process day-by-day. Fixing the problem "removing unnecessary complexity" requires the removal of some players and interests from the process in whole or in part and the elimination of rules and procedures that sustain the complexity. But, ironically, deciding to act on this imperative is too complicated for a "bureaucratic muddle" of many players and interests involved merely to protect a tangle of rules and procedures meant only to provide a purpose for the inclusion of these players and interests in the system.

Thus, when faced with demands and even evident need to reform the system, the complexity can only offer patchwork proposals that safeguard the status quo but avoid the overriding problem. At the end of most attempts at reform, the system becomes more complex as new rules are introduced to solve invented problems created by the unnecessary complexity in

the first place. In this bureaucratic vortex of layered complexity effective reform is thwarted by the dysfunctional characteristics inherent in the process, which tend to direct otherwise inventive key participants away from “getting it right” toward decisions meant to reinforce the complexity, the problem, itself.

The present policy framework

The system cannot be understood nor reformed without a comprehensive understanding of the statutes, laws, regulations, and rules that underlie policies and decisions. The individual components of this legal framework are not immutable, but they cannot be assumed away by ministers or reformers. Moreover, acts of parliament and regulations governing the procurement system define who in government and in the departments and agencies is responsible and accountable for what and therefore give rise also to much of the complexity in the system.

These same laws and regulations provide several courts, legal mechanisms, and other avenues through which players in the system and especially aggrieved bidders on defence contracts can challenge decisions and outcomes. This book provides an understandable description of the legal framework. It plainly illustrates the laws and regulations that ought to be amended if defence procurement in Canada is to be effectively reinvented.

The following chapters build on this legal framework and examine and explain several critical components of the procurement process. Understanding the details of the process is an obvious, but often overlooked, criterion for advocates of reform. As Alan Williams explains, an effective system must be built on two prerequisites: strength in strategic planning and budgeting/costing. Through explanations and examples, he illustrates where the lack of these prerequisites have hindered some defence-procurement decisions and argues for comprehensive reforms in both areas.

Some Members of Parliament and critics of defence-spending programs argue that “industrial development and regional industrial benefits policies” are an unnecessary and expensive burden on the defence-procurement system. According to these arguments, such policies place unreasonable limits on the acquisition of defence capabilities. Nevertheless, industrial benefits policies will remain an inevitable part of any procurement system because these large expenditures significantly affect government operations and the lives of many Canadians.

For example, typically, 53 percent of federal government

acquisition dollars are devoted to defence outputs; in the past three years, 52 percent (\$10.3 billion) of all government contracts in excess of \$100 million were for defence materiel; and 56 percent of the total asset base of the federal government is held by the Department of National Defence. Many communities across Canada are economically dependent on their close association with the Canadian Forces. Several Canadian industries, which directly or indirectly produce defence-related materiel, have a significant stake in how the defence-procurement process evolves. Reinventing the process, therefore, must pay attention to how defence industries and benefits policies are developed and must find ways to measure their effectiveness against well-defined goals.

The complexity that is the Canadian defence-procurement system is, in Alan Williams’ words, “a bureaucratic muddle,” characterized by a lack of accountability at all levels. No one minister is responsible for procurement decisions nor accountable for procurement results. Instead, depending on the circumstances and stages of a program, several ministers and their departments have responsibilities which allow them to move a project forward or to stop it in its tracks. The muddle is also evident, as Williams explains, in the “flurry of statutes, regulatory processes, and reporting procedures” demanded by the central agencies. Where many are in command, no one is in command.

Parliament, charged with overseeing defence affairs and the public purse, is arguably a non-entity in the defence-procurement process. Neither the Senate of Canada nor the House of Commons have the means to adequately assess Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces strategic plans or their budgets and costing estimates and expenditures. Neither do they have adequate means to determine credibly whether the results produced by the system meet national defence needs or expected outcomes. The Senate has demonstrated an advantage over the House in these matters simply because interested Senators serve long enough to become well acquainted with the history of projects and the tactics that players might use to advance or obscure their decisions. Yet, Canadians should worry when such a significant and expensive government-wide activity escapes serious review in Parliament.

In June 2006, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper began an ambitious military acquisition program as part of a wide-ranging policy to rebuild the Canadian Forces. Some argue that the crisis of collapsing capabilities is passing and that the defence-procurement problem can be stowed away below deck. But even as we cheer the government’s bold initiatives, we need to recognize it as an example of an aspect of the

problem, not its resolution.

In 1993/94, the Chrétien government arbitrarily cancelled a contract to acquire maritime helicopters for the Canadian Forces and arbitrarily held to this position for ten years. The decision cost taxpayers a great deal of money, substantially reduced naval capabilities, and endangered the lives of members of the Canadian Forces - a clear case of negative arbitrariness.

Harper's decisions in 2006, though welcomed and necessary in the circumstances, were as arbitrary as Chrétien's - a clear case of positive arbitrariness. The system has not been changed, it is merely pointed in a different direction. The race today is, as always, between reform and the bureaucrats' preferences for business as usual and incrementalism to safeguard all interests, the process that led to today's aggravated, unnecessary complexity.

The action plan

What Canada and the Canadian Forces need is a predictable defence-management system that joins strategic analysis to statements of defence requirements to efficient procurement, which in concert produce appropriate military capabilities. The system in its entirety ought to sustain the Canadian Forces by flowing force development and the resultant future force into the engaged present force. Arbitrariness, no matter its cause, meets none of these criteria. The patchwork system of 2006 cannot be patched yet again. Nor can it be expected, through the intervention of some invisible hand, to produce outcomes appropriate to the demands of the 21st-Century armed forces and their transforming missions.

Canada cannot afford to merely tinker inexpertly with the old machine, but must invent a new one suited to the times of the so-called revolution-in-military affairs, the rapid, continuous transformation of armed forces, and the realities of "technical rust-out," among other modern factors that characterize 21st-Century warfare and defence and security affairs.

This work is not just a statement of what ought to be done, but rather it is a detailed explanation of how Canada can create an effective, efficient, and accountable defence-procurement system based in law and accessible to parliamentary scrutiny. It directly attacks the bureaucratic muddle and the lack of accountability inherent in the present system. The key recommendation, to create defence procurement Canada under the direction of the minister of National Defence, disentangles the procedural knot that confounds defence procurement today. Other recommendations speak to ways to redraw regulations dealing with force development, contractual procedures, and defence-industrial policies. Alan Williams also provides recommendations to change managerial and departmental policies and procedures to clarify responsibilities and reporting channels.

This study is particularly sensitive to the demand from Members of Parliament for a transparent process that facilitates their duty to hold governments to account in matters of national defence generally and defence procurement particularly. Key recommendations in this respect provide for reforms to House of Commons committees, a summary of strategic questions these committees should pose to ministers and officials, and changes in committee research techniques, all intended to help Members of Parliament (and Senators as well) focus on defence issues that matter.

Undoubtedly, some, possibly many, players in the process will reject some or even all of these recommendations. The challenge we offer to these critics is to bring forward a better, more comprehensive set of recommendations that clarify the true problem, acknowledge the reality of the legal framework, and incorporate bureaucratic and military procedural preferences with Parliament's requirement to oversee the entire process and produce a process that "gets it right."

Ideas, if they are to be carried into action, must be managed by structures for, and compatible with, these ideas. Ossified structures designed for ideas from another time are barriers to new ideas and circumstances and cannot meet this need. Defence procurement today is in want of a structure built on the best principles, norms, and expectations of Canadian public administration, which has in the past accepted and implemented the great ideas that underpin

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