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ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

Winter / Hiver 2007 Volume 12, Number 3

- Costs of Afghanistan
- Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy
- La politique de défense du Canada: Une question d'unité nationale?
- The Profession of Arms: A Unique Calling

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) provides public information services on national security and defence issues by conducting studies, seminars and symposia, and publishing their results in print. CDAI is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose ability to prosecute its mandate depends on private donations.

The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDAI.

L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense (ICAD) fournit les services d'information publiques au sujet des questions de la sécurité et de la défense. Il remplit cette tâche par des études, des séminaires, et des symposia et en publiant les résultats. L'ICAD est un organisme caritatif et non partisan dont la capacité à s'acquitter de son mandat dépend de dons privés.

Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'ICAD.

Cover Photo: *Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada and Patron of the Conference of Defence Associations, presented the Vimy Award to General Raymond Henault, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO. The presentation was made at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum on 16 November.*

DND Photo by Sergeant Kevin MacAulay

Photo de la page couverture : *Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure générale du Canada et présidente d'honneur de la Conférence des associations de la défense, a présenté le prix Vimy au Général Raymond Henault, président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN. La présentation a eu lieu lors du dîner gala tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre le 16 novembre.*

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin

We are pleased to feature in this edition of *ON TRACK* articles that are reflective of global events that are challenging Canada and the Canadian Forces, and that can have an influence on the federal government's foreign and defence policies.

With the Prime Minister's recent announcement of the appointment of the Honourable John Manley as Chairman of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, we are pleased to publish William Spotton's article 'Never a Fireproof House'. Mr. Spotton reminds us that, contrary to Senator Dandurand's complacent metaphor, there are no fireproof houses. Mr. Spotton has been involved in politics since 1988.

In response to the government's creation of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) has submitted its view of the appropriateness of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The submission includes: the strategic centrality of Kandahar City and Kandahar Province, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) development concept for the Afghan National Army (ANA), assessing the operational readiness of the ANA, the ANA's funding dilemma, the Afghanistan compact, ISAF mission effectiveness criteria, and assessing the success of the ISAF operation. The full submission can be read at http://cda-cdai.ca/Policy_Statements/IndepPanelAfghanistanNov2007.pdf .

David Perry writes that Canada's contribution to the campaign against international terrorism has not been examined by the government or academics, in "At What Price Freedom? What the War in Afghanistan is Costing the Canadian Forces". Mr. Perry provides us with an in-depth analysis of the costs associated with Canada's military mission in Afghanistan. Mr. Perry is a Research Associate and Assistant Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.

Numerous critics, including the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), have bemoaned the fact that Canada does not have sufficient resources required to implement its foreign policy. The notion that present or future Canadian governments will make the

MESSAGE DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin

Dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*, nous sommes heureux de présenter des articles qui reflètent les événements mondiaux qui présentent un défi pour le Canada et les Forces canadiennes et qui peuvent avoir une influence sur les politiques du gouvernement fédéral en matière d'affaires étrangères et de défense.

Avec la récente annonce, par le premier ministre, de la nomination de l'honorable John Manley à la présidence du Groupe consultatif indépendant sur l'avenir de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan, nous sommes heureux de publier l'article William Spotton, qui a pour titre 'Never a Fireproof House'. M. Spotton nous rappelle qu'il n'existe pas de maison à l'épreuve du feu, contrairement à la métaphore complaisante du Sénateur Dandurand. M. Spotton s'occupe de politique depuis 1988.

En réponse à la création du Groupe consultatif indépendant sur l'avenir de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan par le gouvernement, la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) a présenté son point de vue sur l'à-propos de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan. Les points traités dans cette présentation sont : la centralité stratégique de la ville et de la province de Kandahar, le concept de développement de la Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (FIAS) pour l'Armée nationale de l'Afghanistan (ANA), l'évaluation de l'état de préparation opérationnelle et l'ANA, le dilemme du financement de l'ANA, le Pacte pour l'Afghanistan, les critères d'efficacité de la mission de la FIAS, et l'évaluation du succès de l'opération de la FIAS. On peut consulter la présentation complète à l'adresse http://cda-cdai.ca/Policy_Statements/IndepPanelAfghanistanNov2007.pdf .

Dans «At What Price Freedom ? What the War in Afghanistan is Costing the Canadian Forces», David Perry écrit que la contribution du Canada à la campagne contre le terrorisme international n'a pas été examinée par le gouvernement ou les universitaires. M. Perry nous offre une analyse approfondie des coûts associés à la mission militaire du Canada en Afghanistan. M. Perry est associé de recherche et directeur adjoint du Centre d'études sur la politique étrangère de l'Université de Dalhousie.

De nombreux critiques, dont l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD), ont déploré le fait que le Canada n'ait pas les ressources suffisantes pour mettre en oeuvre sa politique étrangère. L'idée que les gouvernements canadiens, présent et futurs, vont faire

investments required to sustain their ambitious foreign policies finds little support in the historical record of the past 40 years or so. While there is a case to be made for encouraging the Canadian government to increase the financial and human resources it devotes to sustaining and implementing its foreign policy, Monsieur Louis Delvoie writes in "Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy: Concentration and Disengagement" that there is also a case to be made for making a more focused and intelligent use of limited resources. Monsieur Delvoie is Senior Fellow at the Centre for International relations at Queen's University.

Suicide bombings are a daily fact of life in the war-torn state of Sri Lanka, with no end in sight for the long-running war between the Sri Lankan military and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. A former intern of the CDA Institute, Mr. Matthew Gillard, has provided us with a rare glimpse of the war which has killed and displaced thousands of civilians, in "Sri Lanka's War: No End in Sight". Mr. Gillard is a recent information officer for a human rights organization in Sri Lanka.

Since Confederation, national unity has frequently been seriously challenged, often as a consequence of federal government decisions to deploy Canadian military personnel abroad to operational theatres. Fortunately, not one challenge to national unity has resulted in the break up of the country, but the federal government's task of developing and executing defence policies that enjoy widespread approval from the general population and from increasingly vocal regional and ethnic interest groups is becoming more and more difficult. "La politique de défense du Canada: Une question d'unité nationale?", by Lieutenant-général (Ret) Evraire, Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, is an abridged version of an address he gave at the seminar, *Québec Society Facing the Challenges of Defending Canada*, that was held at the Univeristé du Québec à Montréal, 5-6 October. The full text of Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Evraire's address can be read at http://cda-cdai.ca/CDA_Commentary/LgenEvraireUQAM.pdf.

Last August, the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) forwarded a position paper, "The Need for a Defence Strategy" that was prepared by one of the CDA's member associations, the Air Force Association of Canada, to the Minister of National Defence. In response, the Honourable Peter MacKay wrote that he is currently working with Cabinet colleagues, and with officials from DND and the Canadian Forces, to determine the next steps

les investissements nécessaires pour soutenir leurs ambitieuses politiques étrangères trouve peu d'appuis dans le dossier documentaire des quelque 40 dernières années. Si on peut établir le bien fondé de l'encouragement que trouverait le gouvernement canadien à augmenter les ressources financières et humaines qu'il consacre au soutien et à la mise en oeuvre de sa politique étrangère, M. Louis Delvoie écrit, dans son article «Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy: Concentration and Disengagement», qu'on peut tout aussi bien défendre un usage plus focalisé et plus intelligent de nos ressources limitées. M. Delvoie est agrégé supérieur de recherches au Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's.

Les attentats-suicide à la bombe sont un fait concret de la vie quotidienne dans l'État du Sri Lanka en proie à la guerre, où il est impossible de prévoir la fin de cette longue guerre entre l'armée sri-lankaise et les Tigres de la libération de Tamil Eelam. Dans son article «Sri Lanka's War: No End in Sight», M. Matthew Gillard, ancien stagiaire de l'Institut de la CAD, nous offre un rare aperçu de la guerre qui a tué et déplacé des milliers de civils. M. Gillard est un agent d'information récemment en poste pour un organisme de droits de la personne au Sri Lanka.

Depuis la Confédération, l'unité nationale a fréquemment connu des défis graves, souvent comme conséquence de décisions du gouvernement fédéral de déployer du personnel militaire canadien à l'étranger sur des théâtres opérationnels. Heureusement, aucun de ces défis à l'unité nationale n'a amené la rupture du pays, mais la tâche du gouvernement fédéral, qui consiste à élaborer et à exécuter des politiques de défense qui jouissent de l'approbation générale de la population et de groupes d'intérêt régionaux et ethniques qui se font de plus en plus entendre, devient de plus en plus difficile. Le texte de l'article «La politique de défense du Canada : Une question d'unité nationale?», du Lieutenant-général (ret.) Evraire, président de la Conférence des associations de la défense, est une version condensée d'une allocution prononcée au colloque sur *La société québécoise face aux enjeux de défense du Canada*, qui s'est tenu à l'Université du Québec à Montréal, les 5 et 6 octobre. On peut lire le texte complet de l'allocution du Lieutenant-général (ret.) Evraire à l'adresse http://cda-cdai.ca/CDA_Commentary/LgenEvraireUQAM.pdf.

Au mois d'août dernier, la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) a fait parvenir au ministre de la Défense nationale un exposé de principes intitulé «The Need for a Defence Strategy», préparé par l'Association de la Force aérienne du Canada, une des associations membres de la CAD. Dans sa réponse, l'honorable Peter MacKay disait qu'il travaillait présentement avec ses collègues du cabinet et avec des dirigeants du MDN

Previous recipients of the Vimy Award with Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada and Patron of the Conference of Defence Associations; and General Raymond R. Henault, this year's recipient of the Vimy Award. L – R: Vice-Admiral Larry Murray (1998), Brigadier-General David A. Fraser (2006), Major-General Lewis MacKenzie (1993), General Henault (2007), the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, General John de Chastelain (1992), Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile (1999), General Paul Manson (2003), and Lieutenant-General the Honourable Roméo Dallaire (1995).

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Dinstinction honorifique Vimy avec Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure générale du Canada et présidente d'honneur de la Conférence des associations de la défense; et le Général Raymond R. Henault, le récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique pour cette anée. G – D: le Vice-amiral Larry Murray (1998), le Brigadier-général David A. Fraser (2006), le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie (1993), le Général Henault (2007), la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, le Général John de Chastelain (1992), le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile (1999), le Général Paul Manson (2003),et le Lieutenant-général l'Honorable Roméo Dallaire (1995).

for the Canada First Defence Strategy, including the possibility of releasing a public document outlining the government's defence policy and priorities for the future. The position paper in included in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

Members of the Royal United Services Institute, Vancouver Island, met recently to discuss the question of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as it relates to Canadian Forces (CF) members. The result of these discussions was a paper which the participants felt might assist the CF in dealing with some of the questions arising from the CF's combat taskings. The study's authors noted that the outcomes of successful individual and unit training schedules / routines are many, but in relation to unit cohesion the

et des Forces canadiennes pour déterminer les prochaines étapes d'une stratégie de défense axée sur « Le Canada d'abord », y compris la possibilité de publier un document destiné au public, qui décrirait la politique de défense du gouvernement et ses priorités pour l'avenir. Cet exposé de principes paraît dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Les membres du Royal United Services Institute, Vancouver Island, se sont récemment réunis pour discuter de la questions du syndrome de stress post-traumatique en ce qu'il a trait aux membres des Forces canadiennes (FC). Le résultat de ces discussions a donné un document qui pourrait, selon les participants, aider les FC à traiter de certaines des questions découlant des missions de combat des FC. Les auteurs de l'étude ont noté que les résultats des calendriers/routines d'entraînement d'individus

most important outcome is the trust developed between all members of the team. The paper, "Increasing Combat Capability by Reducing the Effects of Combat Stressors", was forwarded to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and is included in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

The Winter 2007 (Vol 11, No 4) edition of *ON TRACK* contained an article by Dr J.S. Cowan: "The Profession of Arms: What makes it a profession, and how may those criteria evolve?" The article focused on how the profession of arms met the same standard tests which would apply to other professions. In this edition we are pleased to include the article "The Profession of Arms: A Unique Calling", co-authored by Dr. John Scott Cowan and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Michel Maisonneuve. The authors point out that the contract of unlimited liability does not in and of itself make the profession of arms a profession, but it certainly makes it unique. Dr. Cowan is Principal, Royal Military College of Canada; and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Maisonneuve is the former Chief of Staff, NATO Transformation, Norfolk, VA. Both are Members of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

In "Thinking About the Past, Present and future of NORAD", Dr. Jim Fergusson notes the declining functional utility of NORAD and details the circumstances that have contributed to the changes in its working agreement between Canada and the United States. He concludes with an assessment of the direction towards which NORAD appears to be headed. Dr. Fergusson is the Director for the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba.

The declaration of operational capability for the newly established Canadian Special Operations Regiment has received much public attention. Major Eric Dion has written, in "*e*-Operations", that there is a price to be paid to preserve and protect our Canadian standard of life, and proposes that the Canadian Forces becomes special operations capable. Major Dion is on the staff of the Land Forces' Québec Area and Joint Task Force (East) Headquarters.

I am pleased to report that the 10th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, *Canada's Security Interests – The Lessons of History*, was probably the most successful we have held. The Symposium was presented by the CDA Institute, in collaboration with Queen's University and the War Studies programme of the Royal Military College of Canada, which also provided financial assistance along

et d'unités qui ont réussi sont nombreux, mais que, par rapport à la cohésion de l'unité, le résultat le plus important est la confiance mutuelle développée entre tous les membres de l'équipe. On a fait parvenir le document, intitulé «Increasing Combat Capability by Reducing the Effects of Combat Stressors», au chef de l'état-major de la Défense et il paraît ici dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Le numéro d'hiver 2007 (Vol 11, No 4) de *ON TRACK* contenait un article signé de M. J.S. Cowan (Ph.D.) : «The Profession of Arms: What makes it a profession, and how may those criteria evolve?» Cet article portait sur la façon dont le métier des armes répond aux mêmes tests standardisés qui s'appliqueraient aux autres professions. Dans le présent numéro, nous avons le plaisir d'inclure l'article intitulé «The Profession of Arms: A Unique Calling», travail conjoint de M. John Scott Cowan (Ph.D.) et du Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Michel Maisonneuve. Les auteurs soulignent que le contrat de responsabilité illimitée ne fait pas, en lui-même et de par lui-même, de la profession des armes une profession, mais qu'il confère à celle-ci un caractère certainement unique. M. Cowan est principal du Collège militaire royal du Canada, et le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Maisonneuve est l'ancien chef de l'État-major, OTAN Transformation, Norfolk, VA. Ils sont tous les deux membres du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Dans son article «Thinking About the Past, Present and Future of NORAD», M. Jim Fergusson (Ph.D.) note l'utilité fonctionnelle décroissante du NORAD et détaille les circonstances qui ont contribué aux changements dans son accord de fait entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Il conclut avec une évaluation de la direction que NORAD semble avoir prise. M. Fergusson est directeur du Centre for Defence and Security Studies et professeur adjoint au département d'études politiques de l'Université du Manitoba.

La déclaration de capacité opérationnelle pour le Régiment d'opérations spéciales du Canada (ROSC) nouvellement mis sur pied a reçu beaucoup d'attention de la part du public. Le Major Eric Dion a écrit, dans l'article «*e*-Operations», qu'il y a un prix à payer pour préserver et protéger notre niveau de vie canadien, et il propose que les Forces canadiennes deviennent capables d'opérations spéciales. Le Major Dion fait partie du personnel du Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre et du Quartier général (Est) de la Force opérationnelle interarmées.

J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que le 10e symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, qui avait pour thème *Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité – les leçons de l'histoire*, a été probablement celui qui a eu le plus de succès de tous les temps. Le symposium a été présenté par l'Institut de la CAD en collaboration avec l'Université Queen's et le programme d'Études sur la guerre du Col-

with the financial support of the Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Special Project Fund, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Mr. David Scott & Ms. Kay Tieman, Senator Hugh Segal, and General Dynamics. Mr. Arnav Manchanda, the CDA Institute Intern, was the principal organizer of the Symposium, and has provided us with a report on the proceedings.

One of the highlights of the 10th Graduate Student Symposium was the keynote address delivered by noted eminent military historian, Jack Granatstein, titled "Lessons of History: Canada and the Cold War". Dr. Granatstein outlined the changes in defence and foreign affairs policies that were brought about by Canada's prime ministers throughout the period of the Cold War. Dr. Granatstein is a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors, and a valued contributor to *ON TRACK*. The full text of Dr. Granatstein's address can be found at http://cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2007/Granatstein-lessonsofhistoryKEYNOTE.pdf.

We are pleased to include, once more, a book review for our readers that has been provided by Jack Granatstein. The book, Outside the Wire: The War in Afghanistan in the Words of Its Participants, was edited by Kevin Patterson and Jane Warren and brings together a variety of accounts by regular and reserve soldiers, doctors, and representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations, with some commentary by family members. Reading Dr. Granatstein's review one is encouraged to go out and read this compelling chronicle of the thoughts of those whose lives have been directly affected by the current operation in Afghanistan.

A second book review, written by Arnav Manchanda, appears in this edition. The latest book from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space, edited by Sarah Jane Meharg, examines the sometimes conflicting relationship of humanitarian aid with military operations. Mr. Manchanda is the Department of National Defence's Security and Defence Forum intern with the CDAI for the year 2007-2008.

A third book review, written by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, concludes this edition. Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs: Canada, the USA and the Dynamics of State, Industry and Culture, co-authored by David Jones and David Kilgour, provides an examination of the sometimes conflicting Canadian-American relations.

In addition to producing ON TRACK, the CDAI and Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) has been

lège militaire royal du Canada, qui a également contribué une aide financière, avec l'appui financier du Fonds des projets spéciaux du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du ministère de la Défense nationale, le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, de M. David Scott & Kay Tieman, du Sénateur Hugh Segal et de General Dynamics. M. Arnav Manchanda, stagiaire de l'Institut de la CAD, fut le principal organisateur du symposium et il nous a fourni un rapport des délibérations.

Un des points culminants du 10e Symposium des étudiants diplômés a été le discours liminaire prononcé par l'éminent historien militaire Jack Granatstein (Ph.D.), qui portait sur «Les leçons de l'histoire : le Canada et la Guerre froide». M. Granatstein a souligné les changements dans les politiques de défense et d'affaires étrangères qui ont été amenés par les premiers ministres du Canada tout au long de la période de la Guerre froide. M. Granatstein est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD et un précieux collaborateur de *ON TRACK*. Le texte complet de l'allocution de M. Granatstein se trouve à l'adresse http://cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2007/Granatstein-lessonsofhistoryKEYNOTE.pdf.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure, une fois de plus, une critique de livres, par Jack Granatstein, à l'intention de nos lecteurs. Le livre, Outside the Wire: The War in Afghanistan in the Words of Its Participants, sous la direction rédactionnelle de Kevin Patterson et Jane Warren, réunit une variété de comptes rendus par des soldats réguliers et réservistes, des médecins et de représentants d'organismes non gouvernementaux, ainsi que quelques commentaires de membres de familles. En lisant la critique de M. Granatstein, on est encouragé à aller lire cette chronique convaincante des pensées de ceux dont les vies ont été directement affectées par l'opération présente en Afghanistan.

Une deuxième critique, due à Arnav Manchanda, paraît dans le présent numéro. Le dernier livre du Centre Pearson pour le maintien de la paix, Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space, avec Sarah Jane Meharg à la rédaction, examine la relation parfois conflictuelle de l'aide humanitaire et des opérations militaires. M. Manchanda est le stagiaire du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du ministère de la Défense nationale auprès de l'ICAD pour l'année 2007-2008.

Une troisième critique, écrite par le Général (Ret) Paul Manson, termine ce présent numéro. Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs: Canada, the USA and the Dynamics of State, Industry and Culture, écrit par David Jones and David Kilgour, et fourni un examen des relations parfois conflictuelles entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'ICAD et la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) ont par-

and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence interests:

- The CDAI was honoured when Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada and Patron of the Conference of Defence Associations, presented the Vimy Award to General Raymond R. Henault, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO. The presentation was made at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum on 16 November. Amongst those in attendance were many of Canada's corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of the CDAI to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The dinner was held at the Canadian War Museum in recognition of the 90th anniversary year of the Battle at Vimy Ridge after which the Vimy Award was named. The evening was dignified by the presence of the Queen's representative in Canada and with the presence of a large contingent of the Officer Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada, the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada; the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence; previous recipients of the Vimy Award, members of our Armed Forces, and distinguished guests. The occasion was filled with colour and ceremony, generously provided by the noted Canadian tenor, John McDermott, the Regimental Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards, the Regimental Pipes and Drums of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the Brass Quintet of the Central Band of the Canadian Forces, and the Canadian Forces String Ensemble.

The valuable support of our corporate sponsors and of the member Associations, together with Associate Associations, contributed to a very significant event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors can be read elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

- Included with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award to Mr. Matthew Fisher, of the National Post, by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Bob Millar, President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated by CDA in collaboration with the CDFAI. The purpose of the award is to recognize annually one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of Canada's defence and security issues.

ticipé et participeront à de nombreuses initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité et de défense :

- L'ICAD a été honoré quand Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure générale du Canada et présidente d'honneur de la Conférence des associations de la défense, a présenté la distinction honorifique Vimy au Général Raymond R. Henault, président du comité militaire de l'OTAN. La cérémonie a eu lieu lors d'un dîner gala tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre le 16 novembre. Parmi les personnes présentes, on remarquait plusieurs des chefs d'entreprises du Canada qui appuient les buts de l'ICAD, de sensibiliser le public aux contributions importantes et exceptionnelles d'un Canadien à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Le dîner a été tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre en reconnaissance du 90e anniversaire de la bataille de la crête de Vimy, d'où la distinction honorifique Vimy tient son nom. La soirée a été relevée par la présence de la représentante de la Reine au Canada et d'un fort contingent d'élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada, de la très honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, de l'honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, d'anciens récipiendaires du prix Vimy, de membres de nos Forces armées et de distingués invités. L'occasion a été remplie de couleur et de cérémonie, généreusement offertes par le ténor canadien bien connu John McDermott, la Musique régimentaire des Governor General's Foot Guards, les Regimental Pipes and Drums of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, le Quintette de cuivres de la Musique centrale des Forces canadiennes et l'Ensemble à cordes des Forces canadiennes.

Le précieux appui de nos sociétés commanditaires et des membres des Associations, ainsi que des Associations associées, a contribué à un événement très important qui a été apprécié de tous ceux qui étaient présents. Les remerciements adressés par notre public à nos sociétés commanditaires apparaissent par ailleurs dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

- Dans le cadre du dîner de remise de la distinction honorifique Vimy, il y a eu la présentation du Ross Munro Media Award à M. Matthew Fisher, du National Post, par le Brigadier-Général (ret.) Bob Millar, président du Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Le Prix média Ross Munro a été mis sur pied par la CAD de concert avec le CDFAI. Le prix a pour but de reconnaître chaque année un/e journaliste canadien/ne qui a fait une contribution exceptionnelle aux enjeux de défense et de sécurité du Canada.

• The CDA Institute will present its 24th annual seminar, *Canada's National Security Interests in a Changing World*, on Thursday, 21 February, at the Fairmont Château Laurier, in Ottawa. The CDA Institute's annual seminar is Canada's most important platform from which defence and security issues are explored. The theme of the seminar is timely, given changes that have been brought about by recent events, in particular, the creation of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. The Right Honourable Stephen Harper has been invited to deliver the keynote address.

Those attending the seminar are also invited to attend the 71st CDA Annual General Meeting, whose subtheme, *Afghanistan and Beyond – the Impact of Canada's Regular and Reserve Forces*, will be held on Friday, 22 February. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Laurie Hawn, will address the meeting. We are very pleased that General Rick Hillier will deliver the keynote address. A special address will be given by General Ray Henault.

It was gratifying to see the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier filled to capacity, last February, for the 23rd Annual Seminar and for the 70th AGM. Based on that experience I would recommend that our supporters register soon to avoid disappointment by visiting our web site at http://cda-cdai.ca/.

There still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the CF, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute by which we are able to carry out our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available on line at http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm.

Thank you. ◙

• L'Institut de la CAD présentera son 24e séminaire annuel, placé sous le thème *Les intérêts de sécurité nationale du Canada dans un monde en changement*, le jeudi 21 février, à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier, à Ottawa. Le séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD est la plateforme la plus importante du Canada où sont explorés les enjeux de la défense et de la sécurité. Le thème du séminaire arrive à point nommé, étant donné les changements qui ont été amenés par les événements récents, en particulier, la création du Groupe consultatif indépendant sur l'avenir de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan. Le très honorable Stephen Harper a été invité à prononcer le discours liminaire.

Les personnes qui assisteront au séminaire sont également invitées à la 71e assemblée générale annuelle de la CAD, qui aura pour sous-thème *L'Afghanistan et au-delà – l'impact des Forces régulières et les forces de réserve du Canada* et qui se tiendra le vendredi 22 février. Le secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Laurie Hawn, s'adressera à la réunion. Nous sommes très heureux de ce que le Général Rick Hillier prononcera le discours liminaire. Une allocution spéciale sera prononcée par le Général Ray Henault.

Il faisait bon voir la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier remplie à pleine capacité, en février dernier, pour le 23e séminaire annuel et la 70e A.G.A. Sur la base de cette expérience, je recommanderais à nos fervents supporters de s'inscrire tôt pour éviter une déception, en visitant notre site Web à http://cda-cdai.ca/.

Il existe encore, dans la société canadienne, des éléments qui sont mal informés des grands enjeux des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et du défi continuel dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins de longue date de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD va cependant continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse révélatrice des évènements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité de ce pays.

En terminant, je veux remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patron, compagnon et officier, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, grâce auquel nous sommes en mesure de poursuivre notre mandat. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà donateur de l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais de le devenir et de recruter un/e ami/e. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut les trouver en ligne à l'adresse http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm.

Merci. ◙

At What Price Freedom?
What the War in Afghanistan is Costing the Canadian Forces

by David Perry

As we await the recommendations of the Prime Minister's blue ribbon panel on the future of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, much remains unanswered about the conduct of the war to date. Chief among these unanswered questions is how much the war will cost Canadian taxpayers and the military particularly. While the financial costs of the war have primarily been of concern to its opponents, the financial implications of our involvement in Afghanistan should also be of interest to those supportive of the ongoing transformation of the Canadian Forces.

Just as the Canadian military is beginning to benefit from substantial new funding, this brief analysis argues that much of the money has been redirected to support Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan. With the government committed to the current operation for another full year, and the Speech from the Throne indicating that some involvement through 2011 is likely, before we discuss the future of the mission, what we need to know is what it has already cost, and from where the money is coming.

Canada's contribution to the campaign against international terrorism has not been examined by the government or academics. Three fundamental questions remain unanswered: What will the current mission cost? How is it being funded? What can we expect in the future?

The Department of National Defence tabulates the expenses incurred by an operation as both "full DND Costs" and "incremental DND costs." The former represents the aggregate total of all expenses incurred by the department in conducting an operation. In an effort to better represent the 'real' financial impact of an operation, DND also calculates an incremental cost by subtracting certain costs such as salaries and equipment depreciation and attrition from the full costs. The incremental costs are therefore a subset of the full costs meant to reflect what an operation costs the government over and above what it would cost to keep the same forces at home in Canada. In other words, incremental costs are the 'net' financial burden.

This information, as published in DND's Reports on Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Reports, reveals that by March of 2008, the total cost of all Canadian military operations in Afghanistan will be $3.5B in incremental costs, and $7.7B in full costs. These totals are relatively easy to calculate through simple addition, and these figures include all the operations since 2001 that have taken place in Afghanistan, or as part of Canada's participation in the War on Terror (Operations *Accius, Altair, Apollo, Archer, Argus, Athena,* and *Foundation*). As DND's budget was around $11B just prior to 9/11, either the full or incremental costs represent a substantial financial burden to the Canadian military.

Operations in Afghanistan in FY 2006-2007, the most recent year for which final data is available, cost 814M in incremental costs, and accounted for over 5% of all DND spending. Preliminary estimates indicate that FY 2007-2008 will see roughly the same percentage of spending devoted to the war, with the current year's incremental costs approximating $1B, and defence spending for the year estimated to be $18.4B. To put this in comparison, CF operations in the Balkans as a percentage of total defence spending peaked at just over 3%. The cost of operations in Afghanistan is therefore significant in both *absolute* and *relative* terms.

While determining what the mission in Afghanistan has cost is relatively easy, calculating how it has been funded is more difficult, and arguably more important. If financial planners are not accounting for the significant incremental costs incurred in Afghanistan by adjusting the defence budget, the war will take funding away from other priorities. In examining a combination of Department of Finance and Treasury Board documents, we can see that through March 2006, operations in Afghanistan received visible funding through either budget allocations or the Supplementary Estimates, with the exception of approximately $200M of the overall $1.8B incremental cost of operations. ('Visible' funding is meant to signify an allocation of money directly attributable to operations in Afghanistan, for example, the Supplementary Estimates A, 2007-2008 allocates $341M as "Funding for Canada's military mission in Afghanistan").

With the deployment of the Battlegroup to Kandahar, however, in FY 2006-2007, the story is not quite

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the same, as about $600M of the incremental cost of operations that year lacks visible funding. While DND has been the recipient of spending promises amounting to over $18B from the Martin and Harper governments, most of this funding has yet to arrive. In fact, the net increase for FY 2006-2007 was only about $600M according to an analysis by the Conference of Defence Associations. Thus, barring an alternative explanation, it would seem that most of last year's budget increase was redirected away from other priorities to fund the war.

Looking at the current Fiscal Year 2007/2008, it seems likely at this point that the Afghan mission (initially estimated to cost $850M this year) will have substantially eaten into the combined budget increases of $1.9B. Currently, there is visible funding in the form of $341M in this year's Supplementary Estimates A. However, while some of this total will likely provide new funding for operations, we can expect a significant portion to account for changes made to the mission after the initial estimates were published in March. Although DND does not provide a breakdown, we could estimate that the deployment of the new counter-IED equipment and the extended deployment of Leopard tanks in Kandahar might cost about $150M for the rest of this year, bringing the overall incremental cost of this year's operations to a even $1B. By this calculation, about $200M of the amount allocated for the mission in the 2007/2008 Supplementary Estimates will provide new funding, leaving about $800M of the cost of operations this year without visible funding. This would mean that a little under half of the planned budget increases for this year has been redirected into war funding. By March 31, 2008 therefore, we can estimate that operations in Afghanistan since April 2006 will have eaten into other defence priorities to the tune of $1.4B.

How is this possible? The recent book *The Unexpected War* by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang may offer some explanation. The authors refer to initial unease on the part of the Finance Department and Privy Council Office about the cost of the 'full package option' that the Canadian Forces deployed to Kandahar and state that Prime Minister Martin was specifically uneasy about the cost of deploying the multinational headquarters. Stein and Lang describe General Hillier as having been adamant about the value of deploying this headquarters component, however, and claim that he would not take no for an answer. As they write, "The Prime Minister's only objection was cost, so Hillier decided that the Canadian Forces would find a way to fit the headquarters assignment within the funding envelope that the Finance Ministry was offering." Apparently over the objection of some of the CDS' staff, who doubted the military's ability to make it work financially, Hillier described the initiative as too important to be hampered by financial considerations. If this is true, it would seem that the Canadian Forces renowned "can do" spirit and desire for mission success may have ultimately taken precedence over budgetary concerns.

Furthermore, while other reports have not done so, a reasonable estimate can be made for the total incremental cost of Afghan operations through the end of the current mission in February 2009. To conservatively estimate a final year of operations in FY 2008/2009, we can assume that the cost for the third year of the mission will split the difference between the estimates for the first two. This would predict approximately $825M in incremental costs for FY 2008/2009, assuming operations end in February 2009, and that the composition of the military contribution remains roughly the same. Furthermore, based on data from Operation *Apollo* in Kabul, we can also conservatively estimate that it will cost at least $200M to return the vehicles and equipment currently deployed in theatre to proper working form if the kit returns to Canada after February 2009. By adding the cost of the mission to-date to these estimates for the future, we can see that if Canada's military operations in Afghanistan end completely in February 2009, the incremental cost of all operations in the country will be $4.5B. Of this overall total, operations in Kandahar province will cost roughly $3B. Both of these predictions are made on the assumption that the mission will end completely in February 2009 and that no changes will be made to the composition of the CF contingent in the country. As neither one of these scenarios seems very likely, in all likelihood, Canadian military operations in Afghanistan will cost substantially more than $4.5B.

Beyond the immediate financial impact of operations, signs are already emerging of the toll the mission is taking on the soldiers fighting, the equipment being used, and the military bureaucracy managing the war. Aside from the sacrifices of the 74 Canadians who have lost their lives in Afghanistan and more than 250 that have been injured, it is becoming clear that Canadian veterans will probably face a host of problems related to their service in Afghanistan far into the future. A recent Canadian Press report claims up to 28% of Canadians who have served in Afghanistan may experience mental health problems including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Assuming that a minimum of 15,000 troops will have served in Kandahar by February 2009, this would mean up to 4,200 veterans may need help. Caring for these returning soldiers will be a challenge for the Canadian Forces.

Also problematic is the impact that operations in Afghanistan will have on equipment. Between the Air Force re-supply flights and Army operations, the Canadian Forces equipment is being used in theatre at a rate far higher than the peacetime operational tempo upon which

equipment life cycles are based. When compounded by the impact of force protection measures, such as "up-armouring" and constant driving at high speeds, the equipment is simply being used 'harder' than it was originally designed for. Most Air Force and Navy equipment, exclusive of recently announced purchases, will need replacing within 10 years. The Army will need to re-capitalize faster than originally anticipated. The war in Afghanistan is certainly helping the Army make its case with at least $380M worth of unexpected or accelerated army procurement, plus the controversial $1.3B tank acquisition.

Finally, the war is proving to be a huge drain on the military bureaucracy. Force expansion has been severely curtailed because many of the available trainers are deployed overseas. Similarly, a recently commissioned report indicated that Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command is vastly overworked while Canada Command is being under-resourced.

Whatever decision the government of the day ultimately makes regarding Canada's future involvement in Afghanistan, we need to ask what the costs will be, both in the short and long terms. Afghanistan may be today's mission, but its effects will be felt for years to come. If sacrificing other defence priorities is required to properly fund operations in Kandahar, this should be acknowledged by the government and become part of any future debate.

Incremental DND Cost ($M)

Fiscal Year	Apollo	Athena	Archer	Altair	Accius	Foundation	Argus	**Year's Total**
2009-2010		200						**200**
2008-2009		824.5				0.5	1	**826**
2007-2008		846	1.5			0.5	1	**849**
2006-2007		535	268	11		0.7	1	**815.7**
2005-2006	9.4	87.5	314.2	10.5		0.5		**422.1**
2004-2005	17.4	297		6.9	0.1	0.4		**321.8**
2003-2004	163	430		7.5	0.1	0.3		**600.9**
2002-2003	233.5				0.1			**233.6**
2001-2002	216							**216**
				Total Cost of All Operations				**4483.1**

Source, RPP for 07-08
DPR for 01-02 to 06-07
08-09 and 09-10 my estimates

Figures in Blue represent operations since the mission switched to Kandahar ◙

Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy: Concentration and Disengagement

by Louis A. Delvoie

In recent years, numerous commentators have bemoaned the fact that Canada does not have the resources required to implement its foreign policy. They usually point to the cutbacks which were effected in the 1990's to the monies available for diplomacy, defence and development, and usually call for significant increases in the budgets for all three in this new era of federal surpluses. These themes have appeared in books and articles by journalists and academics, and in the positions advanced by organizations as varied as the Conference of Defence

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Un legs à l'Institut de la CAD est une des façons les plus simples de faire un don planifié. Il vous permet de prendre des décisions réfléchies concernant votre famille, vos êtres chers et des organismes que vous avez appuyés tout au long de votre vie.

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Associations or the North-South Institute. These calls for more resources are all valid and should be heeded by the Canadian government. But they tend to beg a larger question: will Canada ever have the resources required to effectively carry out its foreign policy, as that policy is now conceived? Put another way, is the problem too few resources or too much foreign policy?

The notion that present or future Canadian governments will make the investments required to sustain their ambitious declaratory foreign policies finds little support in the historical record of the last 40 or so years. Canada's diplomatic representation abroad has always suffered by comparison with that of its major competitors of the industrialized world, whether in terms of numbers of missions or numbers of personnel deployed. As for the monies available for public diplomacy (media, cultural, academic) they have traditionally been a minute fraction of those expended by those same competitors. In the realm

of defence, it might be expected that a modern industrialized country like Canada with a population of 30 million might have armed forces and defence budgets roughly half the size of countries of 60 million such as France or Great Britain, or twice the size of a country of 15 million such as the Netherlands. The simple fact is that Canada has never come anywhere close to those levels. Finally, in good years or bad, under Liberal or Conservative governments, Canada has never achieved the oft-proclaimed target of devoting 0.7 per cent of GDP to development assistance.

The relative paucity of resources devoted by Canadian governments to the instruments of foreign policy is often blamed on the short-sightedness or lack of international awareness of those governments. These criticisms have some validity, but here again they beg a broader question: are significantly increased resources readily or realistically available? The answer to this question has to take into account the fact that Canada is domestically an extremely expensive country to govern and to operate.

A combination of the country's demography, geography and climate make this an inescapable and enduring reality. A few examples will serve to illustrate the point. With a population of only 30 million people, Canada must (a) maintain 8000 kilometres of trans-continental rail lines and highways, (b) build and operate dozens of airfields for miniscule communities in remote regions, (c) expend billions of dollars on snow clearance every winter and road restoration every spring, and (d) finance fourteen separate governments and legislatures at federal, provincial and territorial levels.

Given these and a host of similar realities, it is in no ways astonishing that Canada has proportionately fewer resources to dedicate to its foreign policy than much smaller, but much more densely populated, countries such as France, Great Britain or the Netherlands.

In order to avoid perpetuating the rhetoric-resources gap which has undermined the effectiveness of Canadian foreign policy (a problem neatly encapsulated by Professor Denis Stairs in the felicitous phrase "speak loudly and carry a bent twig"), the time has perhaps come to look at the problem in fairly simple and basic terms and to adjust policy to the size of the purse.

The first question to be addressed in such a reexamination is: what is foreign policy all about? The *Dictionary of International Relations* defines foreign policy as, "A strategy or planned course of action developed by the decision makers of a state vis-à-vis other states or international entities aimed at achieving specific goals in terms of national interest." The key term in this definition for present purposes is "interest". While what constitutes the national interest may be highly debatable and open to a variety of interpretations, the same is not true of foreign policy interests in the plural. These can be examined, assessed and analyzed with a reasonable degree of precision under discrete headings: political, security, economic and social. If this is done reasonably and dispassionately, it may provide a guide as to where and when Canada should deploy its scarce resources, i.e. facilitate the process of establishing priorities.

A first cut at such an exercise might involve assessing the level and extent of Canada's interests in various geographic regions of the world. This would in all likelihood produce the following rankings in order of importance: (1) North America (2) Europe (3) Asia/Pacific (4) North Africa/Middle East (5) Central/South America and (6) Sub-Saharan Africa. While some might dispute the relative positions of numbers 2 and 3 or numbers 4 and 5, few would be likely to quarrel with the first and last place rankings. And in this may be a starting point in determining where Canada should concentrate its resources, and where it could usefully withdraw them with a view to their redistribution to areas of higher priority.

The Sub-Saharan African region, which consists of 45 countries, is one in which Canada has few, if any, significant interests in any major category.

(a) *Political*: Canada has no long standing or close historical relations with any of the countries or governments of the region. For Canada, none could be deemed "like minded" in the sense that this term is applied to the Scandinavian or Benelux countries. And none exercises any real influence in the multilateral institutions which are of greatest interest to Canada, e.g. G-8, NATO, OECD, WTO, UNSC.

(b) *Security*: Canada has no defence alliances or standing security arrangements with any of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. And none of them pose any threat to the security of Canada, since none of them possess any power projection capabilities.

(c) *Economic*: Canada's economic ties to any or all of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are at best marginal. In 2006 the value of Canada's total two-way trade with all 45 countries amounted to $4.2 billion. This is essentially equal to the value of its two way trade with two of Europe's smaller countries: Belgium at $4.1 billion and the Netherlands at $4.3 billion. The figures for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are, if anything, even less impressive. The value of Canada's FDI in all of Africa in 2005 stood at $3.0 billion, whereas for purposes of comparison its FDI in Ireland stood at $19.4 billion and in the Netherlands at $9.9 billion. And the total value of all African FDI in Canada was only $490 million, less than that of Barbados at $584 million. (All figures drawn from Statistics Canada publications)

(d) *Social*: Sub-Saharan Africa has never been a significant source of immigrants for Canada, and African communities in Canada are miniscule when compared to those of European or Asian origin. And the region is not a major destination for Canadian tourists nor a noticeable source of tourists visiting Canada.

Despite the relative paucity of Canada's identifiable interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Canadian government has made fairly heavy investments of resources in the region. It maintains more than 20 embassies, high commissions and offices there. In the last 15 years, the Canadian Forces have deployed personnel to peacekeeping operations in eight regional countries – Namibia, Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Most important, however, is the extent to which the Canadian government has concentrated its development assistance programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. This has been a long enduring and continuing phenomenon. Thus the CIDA Report on Plans and Priorities for 2007-2008 indicates that the Agency intends to spend $799 million dollars in the region in that year. This compares with planned expenditures of $411 million for Asia and of $238 million for the Americas.

Reorienting Canada's diplomatic, defence and development resources away from Sub-Saharan Africa toward areas where Canada has far more extensive and substantial interests would contribute toward making the country's foreign policy more effective and more coherent. Such a re-orientation would not involve any abandonment of Canada's basic security and development goals. There are as many vexing conflicts on the Eurasian land mass as there are in Africa, and indeed ones which pose far more direct threats to Canada's security interests.

Concentrating rather than dispersing Canada's military resources would seem eminently sensible. Similarly, if the primary objective of Canada's development policy is poverty alleviation in Third World countries, it is worth noting that according to World Bank figures there are still far more people living on less than one dollar a day in Asia than there are in Africa (roughly 600 million versus 300 million). Diverting development aid from Africa to Asia would thus represent no renunciation of Canadian ideals. And Canada would not necessarily have to withdraw completely from Sub-Saharan African affairs.

The government might well decide that there would be merit in maintaining a diplomatic presence in one or two of the region's more important countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. It could also continue to provide humanitarian and emergency assistance in combating the human suffering engendered by disease, drought and civil wars, while concentrating its economic and social development assistance elsewhere.

A similar interest-based assessment might usefully be brought to bear in relation to Canada's representation in other countries and to its membership in a number of multilateral organizations. While there is certainly a case to be made for encouraging the Canadian government to increase the financial and human resources it devotes to sustaining and implementing its foreign policy, there is also a case to be made for making a more focused and intelligent use of existing resources. ◙

Sri Lanka's War: No End in Sight

by Matthew Gillard



In 2002, Sri Lanka signed a ceasefire with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a deadly terrorist organization that fights to establish an independent state for Tamils in the north and east of the country. The shaky truce brought high hopes for a peaceful political resolution of the civil war in this small island state of 20.7 million people. However, both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have become disillusioned with the prospects of peace. Full-scale war has returned to the island. Although the military has had some success against the LTTE, the organization remains a highly dangerous fighting force. Sri Lanka's bloody conflict will continue, with civilians suffering most of all.

Matthew Gillard recently completed a period of service as an information officer for a human rights organization in Sri Lanka. He is a former CDAI intern.

The Ethnic Problem

Most analysts argue that the root of Sri Lanka's problems lie in ethnicity. Seventy-four percent of Sri Lankans are Sinhalese and 18 percent are Tamil. Since becoming an independent country in 1948, successive Sri Lankan governments, dominated by Sinhalese political parties, have pursued policies that discriminate against the

Tamil minority. Marginalization of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka has continually fuelled support for the LTTE.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

In 1983, the LTTE began to rapidly gain support following a pogrom that killed as many as 1,000 Tamils.[1] Since then, the LTTE has become a formidable force. The organization consists of 8,000 to 11,000 armed cadres, including a naval component of a few thousand sailors.[2]

For years, the LTTE has occupied large patches of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Its naval wing has proved effective in smuggling arms and supplies, as well as in engaging the Sri Lankan navy. The LTTE has also caused considerable destruction with its highly dedicated suicide bombers and explosive-laden suicide boats.[3] Besides causing thousands of civilian casualties over the years, the LTTE has been responsible for assassinating numerous VIPs, including a former Prime Minister of India and a Sri Lankan president.[4]

The LTTE maintains that it is the sole legitimate representative of the Tamil people. Tamils who dare to say otherwise are harassed, threatened, abducted, and killed. This has greatly limited the public space available to Tamil moderates to challenge the LTTE. As a result, the LTTE is often viewed as the sole voice of the Tamil people within Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora.

The Sri Lankan Military

The LTTE is opposed by the Sri Lankan military. Sri Lanka has an army, navy, air force, and anti-guerilla paramilitary force consisting of over 95,000 soldiers.[5] The military is relatively well trained. Nonetheless, the military has caused more problems than it has solved.

The Sri Lankan military is largely a creature of the late 1980s. From 1987 to 1990, the armed forces fought a deadly war with the LTTE in the north and Sinhalese nationalists in the south. During this period, the military learned brutality. It began to wage a "dirty war" of torture, assassination, kidnapping, and summary execution to silence suspected rebel supporters and human rights activists.[6] At the same time, the military started to terrorize the civilian population and extort money for profit. The military has continued to employ these techniques, particularly against Tamils. The LTTE has also used these methods against civilians in territory it controls, perhaps even more than the military.

The Resumption of War

After the ceasefire was signed in 2002, the dirty war did not end. Both the military and LTTE continue to torture, assassinate, kidnap, extort, and execute. The ceasefire nonetheless ended full-scale armed conflict between the military and LTTE. Unfortunately, the ceasefire was temporary.

After several years of sporadic peace negotiations and steadily worsening relations between the government and LTTE, the ceasefire agreement broke down. In late July 2006, the LTTE turned off water from a sluice gate in the east.[7] On August 5, the military retaliated with aerial bombardment.[8] Although the government and the LTTE have not renounced the ceasefire, both parties essentially returned to all-out war in August 2006.

The Military Reclaims the East

In the past several months of war, the military has done what it had failed to do for years: systematically and efficiently reclaim territory from the LTTE.[9] On July 11, 2007, the military finally succeeded in taking Baron's Rock, the last patch of LTTE territory in the east.

The military victory is significant. Some of the territory reclaimed by the military had been under LTTE control for more than ten years. The LTTE nonetheless remains a potent fighting force. Holding territory is beneficial for insurgencies, but not required. The LTTE excels at hit-and-run attacks.

The military's success in the east is largely due to the Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), also known as the "Karuna faction" because of its leader, "Colonel" Karuna Amman. Amman was formally a senior military commander in the LTTE. For reasons that are still unclear, he split from the LTTE in March 2004 along with a large number of LTTE cadres. Since then, Amman has helped the government conduct military operations in the east.

The Karuna faction is believed to have a total of 1200 cadres.[10] One estimate suggests that 800 cadres are in the east and the other 400 are in the north.[11] The Karuna faction remains active in the east and recruits child soldiers with the tacit support of the military.[12]

A New Aerial Threat

In the midst of suffering losses in the east, the LTTE decided to test its new weapon on March 26, 2007. A pair of Czech Zlin Z-143 aircraft took off from somewhere within LTTE territory in the north and bombed the Katunayake military airport near Colombo, the capital. The overall degree of damage is unclear (both sides tend to inflate enemy casualties and lie about their own). At the very least, three air force personnel were killed, approximately 20 were injured, two helicopters were badly damaged, and some aircraft were lightly damaged.[13]

The LTTE has used its Z-143 aircraft on two other occasions. On April 24, two Z-143s bombed the Palaly military base in the Jaffna peninsula (located at the northern tip of Sri Lanka). On April 29, a pair of Z-143s attacked two oil depots near Colombo. It is hard to determine the full extent of the damage caused in the attacks. However, it is clear that one of the depots sustained at least $700,000 US worth of damage.[14]

The ability of the Z-143s to attack targets shows that the Sri Lankan military has had great difficulty tracking and destroying the aircraft. This is not entirely surprising, since Z-143s fly low to the ground, below the Sri Lankan radar cover.[15] That being said, there have been no LTTE aerial attacks since April. It is not known whether this is a result of government efforts to improve anti-aircraft capability or because the LTTE are merely waiting for a perfect opportunity to strike.

Besides allowing the LTTE to inflict damage on otherwise hard to reach government installations, the Z-143s have probably boosted morale among LTTE cadres, who are undoubtedly reeling from the loss of territory in the east and are vulnerable to bombardment from the Sri Lankan air force.

The Sri Lankan air force has been a tremendous thorn into the side of the LTTE. The LTTE ran out of anti-aircraft missiles (except for a handful used to protect the LTTE leader) in 2001 and appears to have been unable to acquire more.[16] As a result, fixed LTTE installations are highly vulnerable to aerial attack. This situation could change – there is at least one recent case of an LTTE raid to capture newly installed anti-aircraft guns from the military.[17]

Civilians: Caught in the Crossfire

The resumption of the war has profoundly affected civilians. Since December 2005, at least 5000 people have been killed in Sri Lanka.[18]

The military has a history of using indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks to accomplish military objectives. The armed forces have also been accused of conducting several atrocities in conflict areas, including the summary executions in August 2006 of 17 aid workers employed by Action Contre la Faim, a humanitarian organization. While the government frequently conducts inquiries into violations of international law, the investigations rarely lead to arrests or even convictions.

For its part, the LTTE has stepped up its terror campaign against civilians. Remotely detonated claymore mines periodically target buses and other soft targets. Suicide bombers continue to target VIPs, such as Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (and the brother of Sri Lanka's president), who was miraculously unharmed during an LTTE assassination attempt on December 1, 2006. The LTTE also recruits child soldiers and intentionally positions its forces close to civilian areas.

The number of civilians displaced by the conflict has increased markedly since the resumption of war. Fighting has uprooted tens of thousands of people from their homes in the north and east. Thousands of others have retreated to southern India. Several humanitarian organizations have accused the government of mistreating internally displaced persons and forcing them to return home without their consent.[19]

The media has also been adversely affected by the resumption of the war. Both the government and LTTE have threatened and arrested journalists critical of the armed conflict. Several journalists have also been murdered. Tamil media has born the brunt of the assault, although Sinhalese media has not been spared. The onslaught against the media has noticeably decreased the public space available to speak freely.

One commentator has said that the dramatic increase in coercion and violence has created a climate of fear not seen since the Sinhalese and Tamil uprisings of 1987-1990.[20]

The War: Next Steps

Now that the military has successfully captured all LTTE territory in the east, it will start shifting more attention to the north. The battle for the north will undoubtedly be bloody – the LTTE has its headquarters in the north and will not want to loose its last remaining patch of territory in Sri Lanka.

Judging from the advance into the east, the military will rely heavily an air and artillery strikes to soften up LTTE positions in the north. The LTTE will attempt to slow any offensive with artillery, mines, and booby traps. At the same time, the LTTE will carry out terrorist attacks throughout the country to show that it remains a viable fighting force.

In the east, the LTTE will attempt to tie down as many of the military's assets as possible. The LTTE will carry out hit-and-run guerilla attacks on the Sri Lankan military and its partner, the Karuna faction. Disrupting development work, targeting government assets, and killing civilians are also possibilities.

Conclusion

The war in Sri Lanka continues in full force and shows no signs of stopping. Although the LTTE has suffered serious setbacks in the east, a military solution to the conflict does not seem likely anytime soon. The military will attempt to weaken the LTTE in the north while

the LTTE will accelerate its terror campaign and wage a guerilla war in the east. Both sides will continue to torture, assassinate, kidnap, extort, and execute civilians. Expect a large number of dead, wounded, and mentally scarred victims.

(Endnotes)

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4 Rajiv Gandhi, a former Indian prime minister, was assassinated in 1991. Ranasinghe Premadasa was killed in 1993 while serving as President of Sri Lanka.

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18 The figure is from Sri Lanka's Ministry of Defence. See "Sri Lanka Sinks Into Lawlessness," *Channel News Asia* (May 22, 2007). Available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/277611/1/.html

19 For example, see "Sri Lanka: Civilians Who Fled Fighting are Forced to Return," *Human Rights Watch* (March 16, 2007). Available from http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/16/slanka15497.htm

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THÈME no. 3

Comment les préoccupations d'unité nationale façonnent-elles la politique étrangère et la politique de défense?

La politique de défense du Canada: Une question d'unité nationale?

par Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire

Introduction

Mesdames et Messieurs, j'aimerais vous faire part de quelques-unes de mes réflexions sur l'analyse que j'ai initiée récemment sur la nature du lien que je crois a toujours existé entre les politiques de défense du Canada et la question d'unité nationale. Or, ce lien non seulement met en lumière plusieurs concepts – ceux de 'nation', 'état', 'unité nationale', parmi d'autres – que je me dois de définir afin d'assurer la compréhension de mes propos, ce lien se trouve au cœur d'un débat qui se déroule actuellement au Québec et ailleurs au Canada sur la question des déploiements militaires à l'étranger. Les commentaires suivants, donc, serviront à expliquer les bases sur lesquelles je me suis appuyé dans mon analyse de ce sujet de l'heure. Permettez-moi une entrée en matière!

La question d'unité nationale a été au centre de la politique canadienne depuis la Confédération, jouant un rôle primordial dans les discussions mêmes qui se sont soldées en l'adoption de l'Acte de l'Amérique du Nord britannique : la colonie francophone catholique du Bas Canada (le Québec de l'époque) voulant obtenir du système fédératif, sa langue, son système de droit civil, sa religion et son système d'éducation; les citoyens du Haut Canada, craignant une domination francophone de leurs institutions politiques et sociales; et les colonies atlantiques, elles, craignant d'être absorbées par le Haut ou le Bas Canada dans lesquelles elles ne se reconnaissent pas.[1] Quel début harmonieux!

Dans l'espace qui m'est accordé, je ne pourrai examiner que quelques-unes des décisions du gouvernement du Canada à déployer des militaires à l'étranger. J'aborderai cet examen dans le cadre de trois périodes de notre histoire que je caractériserai, très généralement, je l'admets, selon l'intérêt qu'ont porté les Québécois sur ces déploiements, et en qualifiant ces déploiements comme ayant eu une incidence positive ou négative sur l'unité nationale et/ou sur la capacité du gouvernement à s'attirer la faveur de l'électorat québécois. Les trois périodes sont:

- 1867 à 1947 (que j'ai caractérisé 'période de contestation');
- 1947 à 1989 (période de relativement 'peu d'intérêt'); et
- 1989 à aujourd'hui (période de 'renouveau de contestation').

Définitions

Je vous propose deux définitions seulement:

Nation: Dans mon analyse, la nation c'est le Canada.

Unité nationale : J'ai choisi comme définition 'd'unité

Le Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire est président de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Il cumule quatorze (14) années de service à l'OTAN, incluant plus de quatre (4) années dans le poste de Représentant militaire du Canada auprès du Comité militaire en session permanente, à Bruxelles, Belgique. Après plus de quarante-deux (42) années de service militaire, il prend sa retraite en 1997.

nationale' l'état de cohésion des citoyens de la nation; cohésion qui est façonnée avec l'aide et qui découle d'un système, d'une structure et d'un processus décisionnel collectif considérés, par les divers groupes et régions du pays, comme légitime[2]. Un manque de cohésion par rapport à un déploiement militaire quelconque à l'étranger pourrait, par exemple, se solder en une menace à l'existence du Canada ou à son éclatement; à la défaite du gouvernement; en l'abandon en masse d'un parti politique; en un rejet populaire sous forme de désobéissance civile offensive ou passive, manques de cohésion, donc, qui pourraient avoir un impact négatif sur la gouvernance interne de la nation ou sur le rôle que le Canada aimerait jouer sur la scène internationale.

Pour en terminer avec mon entrée en matière, j'ajoute qu'en poursuivant mes recherches et mon analyse, je suis conscient de l'importance de pouvoir préciser qui sont ces personnages qui ont exprimé l'opinion canadienne française d'époque et l'opinion québécoise d'aujourd'hui. S'agissait-il du gouvernement provincial, d'un parti politique de la Province, d'un ministre fédéral québécois, d'un élément de la population québécoise, d'une tranche de la population via un sondage, etc., et qui, ailleurs au pays, partageait cette opinion. Cela pourrait faire éclater des mythes qui n'ont eu rien à voir avec la promotion de l'unité nationale.

Examinons, très brièvement, les déploiements militaires à l'étranger au cours de cette première des trois périodes d'histoire du Canada – 1867 à 1945 (période de contestation).

1867 à 1947

Dans les années qui précèdent la Première Guerre Mondiale, le Canada s'affirme de plus en plus en tant que nation et prend sa place sur la scène internationale en s'affranchissant de son héritage colonial. La crise au Soudan, de 1884-85, et la Guerre des Boers illustrent ce point.

Le Soudan

Les faits:

- En 1884, la Grande-Bretagne recrute et paie les frais d'environ 400 'Voyageurs' canadiens pour qu'ils se joignent à lord Wolseley afin de rescaper le général Charles Gordon et ses troupes encerclés à Khartoum, capitale du Soudan, par des insurgés;
- Une demande est faite pour l'envoi d'un deuxième contingent de Canadiens;
- Le général Gordon est tué, et le Premier ministre Sir John A. Macdonald répond à la demande en déclarant: « Pourquoi devrions-nous gaspiller de l'argent et des hommes dans cette affaire lamentable? Maintenant que Gordon est mort, le motif de l'aide au secours de notre compatriote a disparu avec lui. Nous sacrifierions alors nos hommes et nous gaspillerions notre argent pour sortir [le premier ministre britannique W.E.] Gladstone et compagnie du trou dans lequel ils se sont mis eux-mêmes par leur propre imbécillité [sic]. »

Commentaire

- Le déploiement initial de 400 'Voyageurs' canadiens est le premier déploiement militaire (para militaire, en réalité) à l'étranger, entrepris par le Canada;
- Les Canadiens français, très majoritairement anti-impérialistes (comme le sont plusieurs autres Canadiens) s'y opposent, tandis que bon nombre de Canadiens anglais (principalement de souche britanniques) le souhaitent;
- Le parlement majoritaire de Macdonald refuse d'accéder à ce deuxième déploiement;
- L'unité nationale est peu atteinte par cette controverse entre le Canada et le Royaume-Uni;
- On peut se demander si la décision de Macdonald et de son gouvernement avait pour but d'attirer la faveur de l'électorat québécois? L'hypothèse est peu probable, puisque Macdonald et les deux partis qu'il dirigeait risquaient, par cette décision, d'aliéner l'électorat de la majorité des autres provinces desquelles ils avaient reçu, en 1882, un plus fort pourcentage du vote populaire qu'au Québec.

Il est plus probable que Mackenzie, dans son refus d'un deuxième déploiement, y voyait une occasion d'affirmer son désir à l'indépendance pour le Canada.

La Guerre des Boers

Les faits:

- En 1899, la Grande-Bretagne s'est trouvée mêlée à la Guerre des Boers contre les Afrikaners en Afrique du Sud;
- L'opinion canadienne anglaise souhaitait jouer un rôle au sein de l'empire; souhait pas du tout partagé par les Canadiens français;
- Le cabinet de Sir Wilfrid Laurier est profondément

divisé sur la question d'un déploiement militaire en Afrique du sud;
- Laurier convainc en affirmant que:
  - ✓ La Grande-Bretagne assumerait les coûts;
  - ✓ Un précédent ne serait créé;
- Le Canada déploie 1000 militaires en Afrique du sud.
- Henri Bourassa, le dirigeant des nationalistes canadiens français les plus extrémistes du Parti libéral, démissionne.

Commentaire:

- Un lien très étroit est établi entre l'unité nationale et ce déploiement militaire à l'étranger;
- La démission de Bourassa attire l'attention sur le problème croissant de l'unité nationale qui, quelques 14 ans plus tard, éclate en une crise; celle de la conscription de la Première Guerre mondiale;
- Néanmoins, malgré la grogne générale au Québec entourant cette décision, Laurier obtint une plus forte majorité et un plus grand pourcentage des voix québécoises à l'élection de 1900 qu'il ne l'avait fait en 1896; et
- L'unité nationale est ébranlée mais maintenue.

La Première Guerre mondiale

Les faits:

- En tant que membre de l'empire britannique, le Canada est devenu pays belligérant le 14 août 1914 le jour où la Grande-Bretagne a déclaré la guerre contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, l'Allemagne, la Bulgarie et l'Empire ottoman. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, chef de l'opposition, appuya le gouvernement de Sir Robert Borden, face à ce qui était perçu comme une menace sérieuse à la Grande-Bretagne elle-même. Henri Bourassa partageait également cet avis, dans la mesure où l'appui canadien français en faveur de la guerre était fondé sur la promesse qu'il n'y aurait pas de conscription. Après un déploiement initial, le 3 octobre 1914, de quelque 31 000 volontaires, dont plusieurs étaient de récents immigrants venant de Grande-Bretagne, la taille autorisée du contingent canadien a été portée à 250 000 en octobre 1915, puis à 500 000 en janvier 1916;
- À l'été 1917, la guerre tournait mal et le flux des volontaires n'arriverait pas à combler le nombre croissant de pertes;
- À la suite d'une tentative ratée non partisane d'imposer le service militaire obligatoire en essayant de créer un gouvernement de coalition avec sir Wilfrid Laurier, le premier ministre Borden est parvenu à diviser le Parti libéral et à former un gouvernement de coalition formant une union avec les Libéraux en faveur de la conscription, et les Conservateurs;
- Le 29 août 1917, malgré un sentiment anti-conscription qui s'était, dans une certaine mesure, propagé dans bon nombre de régions du Canada anglais, la conscription a pris force de loi au sein d'un Canada qui était farouchement divisé;
- En décembre 1917, le parti Unioniste de Robert Borden sort vainqueur de l'élection dite la plus amère de l'histoire du Canada.;
- Laurier, lui, chef de l'opposition, était inquiet que la province de Québec abandonnerait les Libéraux, et peut-être le pays également, s'il avait choisi de se joindre à la coalition de Borden;
- Le Parti libéral se déchire sur la question, comme on le sait.

Commentaire

- La décision du Gouvernement en faveur de la conscription a suscité une crise d'unité nationale;
- À l'élection de décembre 1917, le pays est divisé sur les lignes linguistiques. Borden reçoit une écrasante majorité, écopant de 153 sièges aux 82 des Libéraux dont 62 sont au Québec;
- Cette crise a laissé des cicatrices sur les relations entre les canadiens français et les canadiens anglais qui ne sont pas complètement disparues aujourd'hui;
- Force est de constater, toutefois, que le Québec n'a pas, à long terme, abandonné le Parti libéral (lui octroyant une majorité, en 1921, sous Mackenzie King); non plus est-ce que le Québec a abandonné le Canada.

La Deuxième guerre mondiale

Les faits :

- En 1939, suite à de fortes représentations auprès de MacKenzie King de l'opinion de la majorité des Québécois, le gouvernement du Canada déclare que les conscrits seraient employés à la seule défense du territoire, et non outre-mer;

(*voir p. 22*)

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- En 1944, suite à d'énormes pressions de la part des Alliés et de bon nombre de parlementaires, militaires et citoyens canadiens, le gouvernement King choisi de ne pas honorer cette promesse faite à Ernest Lapointe et aux Québécois et donne force de loi au déploiement des conscrits outre-mer.

Commentaire

- La crise de la conscription de la Deuxième guerre mondiale confirme que pendant les 75 ans qui ont suivi la Confédération (cette première période que j'ai caractérisée période de contestation), le Québec a joué un rôle très important dans la question des déploiements militaires à l'étranger;
- Que l'unité nationale a été en cause à chaque déploiement;
- Que le déploiement outre-mer des conscrits pendant la Deuxième guerre mondiale a entraîné une sérieuse menace à l'unité nationale; et que
- Cette menace s'est fort heureusement et rapidement (mais pas complètement) dissipée à la lumière de la victoire alliée.

Passons maintenant à la deuxième période – 1947 à 1989

La période de l'après-guerre

Il est, selon moi, raisonnable d'affirmer qu'à partir de la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et jusqu'à la fin de la guerre froide en 1989, les Québécois étaient essentiellement d'accord avec le reste du Canada à l'égard des grandes questions du jour en matière de déploiements militaires à l'étranger, soit de l'Organisation des Nations unies et de l'OTAN pendant la guerre froide; en Corée, de 1950 à 1953; et à Suez en 1956. Examinons cette affirmation de plus près.

En 1948, après sa participation à la fondation de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et son élection au poste de premier ministre, St. Laurent et son gouvernement ont tiré profit du prestige dont jouissait le Canada auprès des autres nations pour participer plus activement aux affaires internationales et aux organismes internationaux dans l'espoir de contribuer à un ordre mondial plus pacifique. Le trouble créé par la crise de la conscription s'était calmé et le sentiment anti-impérialiste du Québec avait été remplacé par un intérêt pour la situation économique de la province, notamment le besoin de se libérer du contrôle exercé par l'élite (dont le clergé), d'arracher au Canada anglais et aux États-Unis un contrôle accru de sa propre économie. Du même coup, la province voulait obtenir un niveau accru d'autodétermination qui, malgré les efforts déployés par le premier ministre québécois Jean Lesage visant à négocier une meilleure entente avec le gouvernement fédéral, a bientôt été éclipsé par diverses formes de « séparatisme » qui ont surgi après la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale (un événement heureux) , celui-ci, qui, paradoxalement, a inauguré une période d'agitation constitutionnelle et sociale considérable, tant dans la « belle province » que dans le reste du Canada.

Suivirent plusieurs événements politiques et constitutionnels à l'échelle nationale (le référendum raté sur l'indépendance du Québec, en 1980; le rapatriement, en 1982, de la Constitution canadienne que le Québec a refusé de ratifier; l'échec, en 1990, de l'accord du lac Meech et, en 1992, de celui de Charlottetown; puis l'échec du référendum sur l'indépendance du Québec, en 1995), événements qui ébranlèrent sévèrement l'unité nationale et les relations entre le Québec et le reste du Canada.

Opposés aux dépenses consacrées à la défense et aux déploiements militaires outre-mer qui n'étaient pas directement liés à leurs intérêts, les Québécois se sont quand même peu intéressés à la participation du Canada au sein de l'OTAN pendant la Guerre froide, à sa participation limitée à la guerre sanctionnée par l'ONU dans le golfe Persique (de janvier à avril 1991), et à sa présence, sous la direction de l'OTAN, dans l'ancienne Yougoslavie au cours des années 90, nonobstant le déploiement, dans cette région, et pendant des années, de plusieurs membres du Royal 22e Régiment. Les choses allaient bientôt changer. Que s'est-il passé?

1989 à aujourd'hui

Le 11 septembre 2001

Heureux des diminutions des crédits accordés au Forces armées canadiennes pendant la décennie qui suivit la fin de la Guerre froide, les Québécois et la majorité de leurs compatriotes canadiens ont subi un choc, comme ce fut le cas à travers le monde, lors des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 contre les États-unis. La participation du Canada à une offensive militaire en Afghanistan, fin 2001 – début 2002, menée par les États-Unis et sanctionnée par l'ONU, et la décision des États-Unis d'envahir l'Iraq en 2003, ont ramené les Québécois sur la scène des déploiements militaires à l'étranger. Ils se sont opposés à l'invasion de l'Iraq et aux dépenses militaires accrues rendues nécessaires en partie par les frais connexes au déploiement des Forces canadiennes en Afghanistan et contre ce qui leur semblait, à bon nombre d'entre eux et à bien d'autres, comme l'appui inopportun du Canada de la politique étrangère peu judicieuse de l'administration Bush, tant en Iraq qu'en Afghanistan.

Les élections provinciales au Québec – 2004

Suite à la parution d'un sondage, mené en 2003, indiquant que la guerre en Iraq pourrait favoriser le Parti québécois et donc nuire à la campagne électorale du Parti libéral du Québec dans le cadre des élections provinciales, le premier ministre Jean Chrétien annonça que le Canada ne participerait pas à une invasion américaine de l'Iraq. En 2004, le gouvernement de Paul Martin annonce qu'il n'appuierait pas le développement d'un système Américain de défense antimissile. Ces deux annonces ont mené à l'hypothèse, dans les médias, que ces décisions du gouvernement fédéral reposaient sur les sentiments pacifistes et anti-militarisation de l'espace… qui prédominaient au Québec (et chez bien d'autres Canadiens à l'extérieur de cette province, il faut ajouter).

Le Québec avait-t-il réussi une fois de plus à influencer le cours des décisions concernant les déploiements militaires à l'étranger? Le gouvernement fédéral voulait-il améliorer les chances du Parti libéral provincial aux élections? Le motif principal du gouvernement fédéral était-t-il de préserver l'unité nationale à un moment où, une fois de plus, un parti « séparatiste », le Parti québécois, pourrait gagner les élections et organiser un autre référendum sur la séparation ? L'unité nationale était-elle en jeu? Le cas échéant, entravait-elle la capacité du Canada à assumer un rôle plus significatif dans le monde?

L'Afghanistan

Inutile de me prononcer sur la question du déploiement militaire en Afghanistan…sujet d'actualité que le lecteur connaît bien. Un lien existe-t-il entre ce déploiement et l'unité nationale? Poser cette question c'est d'y répondre!

Conclusion

Depuis la Confédération, l'unité nationale a été plusieurs fois sérieusement remise en question, faute, en partie, de questions de déploiements militaires à l'étranger qui ont prêté à controverse. Heureusement, pas une seule de ces menaces à l'unité nationale n'a entraîné la scission du pays, mais il semble que cette tâche de Salomon, qui est celle du gouvernement fédéral et qui vise à réaliser un niveau clair d'unité dans le domaine des politiques étrangères et de défense, s'avère de plus en plus ardue, compte tenu du nombre grandissant de groupes régionaux, ethniques et autres dont les voix se font de plus en plus fortes. Il me paraît essentiel de débattre plus fréquemment et de façon franche et ouverte, à la Chambre des communes, de ces questions pouvant diviser l'opinion nationale et toucher le difficile et précieux équilibre d'unité nationale.

Dans les années '40, il existait deux groupes qui se faisaient entendre sur les questions de déploiements militaires à l'étranger: les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais. Et plus souvent qu'autrement, à deux exemples près, la résolution de ces questions a favorisé l'opinion majoritaire québécoise. Aujourd'hui, après des dizaines d'années de mise en œuvre de politique d'immigration généreuse et libérale, la naissance d'un grand nombre de groupes régionaux et autres groupes d'intérêt, et les efforts menés par les gouvernements fédéraux successifs à promouvoir la participation d'éléments autrement privés de représentation au processus de formulation des politiques fédérales, la tâche qui consiste à réaliser « l'unité » en politique fédérale de toute sorte est devenue de plus en plus ardue. Cette situation évoque le spectre de l'ethnicité comme élément de conditionnement de la formulation des politiques étrangères et de défense, et elle a mené à un manque « d'unité » sur certaines questions de déploiements militaires à l'étranger. Il suffit d'observer les pressions exercées sur le gouvernement par la communauté haïtienne du Canada il y a quelques années pour qu'il intervienne dans ce pays (une intervention du reste louable); les récentes réactions de certains Canadiens aux commentaires initiaux du premier ministre Harper sur le bombardement de Cana, lors du conflit l'an dernier entre Israël et Hezbollah au Liban; et la réaction de plusieurs canadiens et canadiennes à l'évacuation des ressortissants canadiens bloqués au Liban pendant cette guerre en 2006.

Le principe d'unité nationale est un élément de conditionnement dans la formulation des déploiements militaires à l'étranger depuis la Confédération. Le sera-t-il à l'avenir ? Sans aucun doute informés comme ils le sont du passé de notre pays, les chefs politiques d'aujourd'hui qui désirent que le Canada assume un rôle important dans les affaires mondiales se souviendront sans doute de l'avertissement lancé par Louis St. Laurent lors de la conférence Gray de 1947 à l'égard du principe d'« unité ». Je cite : « Le rôle de notre pays dans les affaires du monde ne sera grand que dans la mesure où nous maintiendrons ce principe, car un Canada désuni sera un Canada impuissant »[3].

1 Notes sur la Constitution, *Gouvernement du Canada*, Ottawa, Ministère des Approvisionnements et Services, 1983.

2 C. E. S. Franks. *Parliament, Intergovernmental Relations and National Unity*. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Working Papers, 1999 (2)), p.6.

3 L. St. Laurent, *The Inaugural Gray Lecture*, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1947, p. ◙

Issue: The Need for a Defence Strategy

Background

- For more than a decade, the only formal policy available was the 1994 White Paper, and it became seriously dated in a post 9/11 world. Since the release of the Liberal Defence Policy Statement in April 2005, there have been high expectations of aggressive implementation of new defence capabilities. Promises by the Conservatives have fuelled this anticipation. The announcements made in June 2006, constituting some $17 billion in defence spending, represents a huge investment in equipment and support activity over a long period. Delivery of strategic airlift aircraft has begun and a contract for tactical airlift should be let this Fall. Recent announcements have confirmed the Government's commitment to upgrade and sustain the navy's twelve frigates and to acquire new ice-capable ships to project sovereignty in Canada's North.

- However, while progress is being made on a number of fronts, the Government still lacks an approved defence policy statement or capability plan. The so-called "Canada First Defence Strategy", referred to in budget information and other documentation related to new Canadian Forces capabilities, is very general and can really only be the genesis of a more complete strategy. Specific capability elements continue to be espoused by the Government but there is no existing defence program foundation upon which procurements can be based and then accounted for during implementation.

- Meanwhile, the Department of National Defence does not have the funding necessary to do everything that has been identified. Moreover, it is experiencing difficulty in advancing projects for approval, given the uncertainty about whether they are affordable within an overall plan. Even previously-endorsed spending, for which continuing support is needed, is being questioned in some instances and has caused considerable disruption to the delivery of planned capabilities. For example, the continued upgrading of the Aurora maritime patrol fleet is in question due to the cost for maintenance of the wing structure of the aircraft.

CDA Position

- The criteria for making decisions on what should be included in an affordable plan, and what priority each capability should enjoy, is dependent on the Government's defence policy. A clear statement of the priorities is critical to the ability of Defence to execute the Government's will in allocating resources. The lack of such a policy statement, as is now the case, forces military planners to apply whatever guidance is available. The policy statement from the previous Government, along with favoured projects which have been made known through announcements and specific approvals, is helpful but is insufficient foundation to properly execute defence procurement decisions.

- Ultimately procurement is about what is acquired in response to capability deficiencies -- and military procurement is complex. The scope of complexity begs for the formulation of a comprehensive investment plan. Available funding should be parceled out for a reasonable period – 12 to 15 years – in order to discipline the sequence of equipment acquisition. This effort is an exercise in compromise. It forces the delay of some projects, elongation of the cash phasing in some cases, and the outright cancellation in others. This rigorous approach is essential to a thorough, balanced assessment of the myriad of options available.

- Overall, a constrained environment demands a consistent, identifiable 'top-down' system where requirements are established based on corporately recognized priorities. It is important for DND to maintain a strict strategic integrity in identifying requirements. When approval to spend resources to meet a requirement is sought, DND must be able to demonstrate how such action will contribute to overall military capability, and to defend the proposed scope and priority of the proposal.

This should be vetted through a rigorous interdepartmental process to ensure thorough consideration. This confirms that a capability fits into the overall strategic plan appropriately and that value is being realized from the investment proposed. And, primordially, the plan must conform to the demands of government policy.

- Accordingly, the Government needs to address this long term deficiency and confirm its defence policy formally by issuing a statement of defence objectives and their relative priority. While policy is often devoid of specific details, there are some areas where it would be useful to define the scope of capabilities, such as the ability to deploy x number of battalions/aircraft/ships in y days to region z.

- It is incumbent on the Minister, supported by the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister, to ensure that the resources available are allocated as effectively and efficiently to the capabilities needed. The fulfillment of capabilities must be prioritized and projected so the capital and sustainment expenditures can be phased and folded together within the limitations of the budget.

- To effect this, DND needs a capability investment plan which allocates future resources appropriately to meet the Government's defence objectives. Difficult choices must be made but, at the end of the day, the eventual affordability of all elements of each capability[1] must be confirmed. Unmanageable shortages beg resolution by seeking additional resources (such as an increase in the defence budget) or some relaxation of expectations (a refinement of the Government's policy or relative priorities).

- The development and acceptance of an investment plan would enable the Government to proactively approve larger investments so as to ensure that they can be implemented in the time frame envisaged and without unnecessary process.

Messages

- The Government needs to enunciate a viable defence strategy. The CF will continue to have difficulty in addressing capability deficiencies effectively and efficiently until it can secure the approval of an affordable investment plan.

- Such a plan must necessarily reflect the defence policy of the Government and the relative priorities it sets for capability development.

- Where resources allocated to Defence are inadequate to provide for the capabilities desired, the gap must be addressed by increasing the defence budget or reducing the expectations of the Government.

Footnote:

[1] It should be clearly understood about what it meant by a capability. Too often the assumption is made that the purchase and delivery of capital equipment constitutes a new capability, when in fact it is usually only the first step, and often not even the most expensive portion. To provide a complete, balanced capability, personnel must be available and they need to be properly trained and supervised. Operating concepts need to be put in place and access to robust command and control must be assured. Infrastructure – both buildings and information technology – must be included. Also, it is critical to ensure that the necessary support services for spares, maintenance, repair and overhaul are provided for the long term. In short, capabilities must be complete to be useful.

(*This position paper was originally prepared by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George MacDonald in his capacity as Honourary National President of the Air Force Association of Canada (AFAC), which is a member of the Conference of Defence Associations, and as Chairman of AFAC's Aviation Affairs Committee. He can be contacted at gmacdonald@cfncon.com . - ed)* ◙

INCREASING COMBAT CAPABILITY BY REDUCING THE EFFECTS OF COMBAT STRESSORS

by Colonel (Ret'd) John C. Eggenberger

"A soldier should not meet in battle, for the first time, things which set him at unease or afraid". Anonymous

Background

Recently, under the guidance of Dr. John C. Eggenberger, Col. (Ret.), some members of Royal United Services Institute, Vancouver Island, assisted by some highly qualified non-members met to discuss the question of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as it relates to Canadian Forces members exposed to combat situations. The result of those discussions was a thought paper which the participants felt might assist the Canadian Forces in dealing with some of the questions arising from the CF's current and future combat taskings.

The paper was forwarded to the Chief of Defence Staff. The paper appears to have been received in the spirit in which it was written and in due course Dr. Eggenberger received the following reply from the office of the CDS: *Thank you for your correspondence of 26 February 2007 to General R.J. Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, in which you included a research thought paper, endorsed by the Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island (RUSI VI), entitled "Increasing Combat Capability by Reducing the Effects of Combat Stressors".*

Reducing the effects of combat- and deployment-related stress is an issue that is of great importance to General Hillier and the Canadian Forces. The time you dedicated to researching this subject, to improve the well-being of our men and women in uniform, is greatly appreciated. Your research thought paper was forwarded to the Chief Military Personnel, who is responsible for Health Services, for review and consideration.

On behalf of General Hillier, I wish to thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the Canadian Forces.

Introduction

Combat capability is measured in a variety of ways; one measure is the proportion of personnel unavailable for combat duty as a result of inappropriate Combat Operations Stress Reaction (COSR), a term coined by the US Marines.[1] If not redressed, COSR can migrate to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and the soldier is lost to combat operations. Apparent from several US Army sources is the loss of a considerable number of physically able personnel from combat operations as a result of COSR[2]. Canadian Forces soldiers will be similarly impacted. It is the aim of this work to determine, through a program of personnel applied research, the influence that training (individual and team) as related to unit cohesion has upon adding to the soldiers' repertoire of coping behaviors and strategies which attenuate the adverse effects of COSR. By so doing, the study would suggest the introduction of ways and means to improve cohesion thereby reducing the effect of combat stressors upon combat capability.

Fundamental to this thought paper is the Personnel Applied Research method, as used in military settings.



Personnel Applied Research Program

Parallel research flows would illuminate a comparison of responses to combat stressors by persons embraced by strongly cohesive groupings, and those persons that are not. Further, these stand alone research projects

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would be guided in their application by research protocols as described in "Guidelines for Writing a Social/Behavioral Research Protocol".[3]

Clearly, effective personnel applied research must measure all variables in "operational conditions", not "laboratory conditions".[4] Depending on the outcomes of these research findings, modifications to the preparation and training of combat troops will be reviewed and changed by Command authority as necessary.

While losing a Private to PTSD in battle is tragic, it is worse to lose a Commander in similar fashion during battle – or afterwards. Losing a Commander to PTSD can have adverse consequences beyond measure. But of much more consequence in this respect, is the loss of mental competence suffered by all soldiers as a result of stressor impact that is not prepared for – as reported in a 2006 RAND study[5].

> "*...Stress can have several effects on individual functioning relevant to the military, including perceptual narrowing (paying attention to fewer sensory cues or stimuli that could contribute to behaviors or decisions), reduced attention to important stimuli or cues, altered or abbreviated decision making processes, and increased task completion time (Easterbrook, 1959; Janis and Mann, 1977; Friedman, 1981; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; Idzikowski and Baddeley, 1983). Stress can affect group performance by reducing communication between members, contributing to a concentration of power in the leadership ranks, and leading to poor group decision making (Driskell, Carson, and Moskal, 1988; Janis and Mann, 1977; Bowers, Weaver, and Morgan, 1996). ...*"

Fundamental to this program of research is the determination of ways and means of measuring cohesiveness in military units. One appealing method is to start with an identification of a unit's ethos[6], which is a term that embraces the concept of unit cohesion, considered by strong and recognized professional authority to be fundamental to success in combat.

The first use of the term ethos in Canadian Army matters was in the Citadelle Document, 1981 as reported in "Understanding the Canadian Army Ethos"[7]. Part of the concept of ethos, with respect to values and beliefs, was impressively published by the Canadian Forces in Duty With Honour[6]. But it was not until the summer of 2004 that a more complete understanding of the term ethos was made[7]. Presented was the notion that this more complete understanding called for the linked connection of training routines and predispositions as related to operational practices to the generation of values and sentiments. Thence gaining the understanding of the corollary that, once embraced, embedded values and sentiments will in turn elicit predictable patterns of habits and predispositions. However, fundamental to unit cohesion is leadership. Leaders ensure that an individual soldier's tasking is connected to appropriate habits and predispositions, and that the interdependent taskings enacted by the unit's members result in trust with each other's competence.

The outcomes of successful individual and unit training schedules/routines are many, but in relation to unit cohesion the most important outcome is the trust developed between all members of the team. Trust between all members of the team such that each member is confident that the others will do their job regardless of the consequences.

Collaterally with trust is the phenomenon of loyalty. "*...Principally, the habitual obedience of each soldier to the direction of properly established authority is the essential foundation of Army combat effectiveness. The quick and accurate reaction of soldiers to the word of Command is instilled through the incessant and repetitive practice of battle drills and routines. This disciplined training assures that the fundamental links of loyalty between the leader and the led are always visible; and this training also ensures that the led generate and maintain a mutual confidence among each other and towards their leader. Army discipline serves to win battles and save soldiers' lives and must never be allowed to lapse, else the Regiment is at peril*[7]*..."*.

The most effective measures of military cohesion, considered in this thought paper, are likely to be:

Trust – lateral and vertical,
Loyalty – lateral and vertical,
Leadership – at all levels.

Of all the variables to be measured, leadership is the most difficult to come to grips with. There are literally thousands of leadership models, each claiming to be the "silver bullet". The only counsel that this thought paper offers in this regard is that it would *not* be a "good thing" to tie measures of leadership to one theory or another. The research teams will have a dandy time sorting out this aspect of the research program.

While the ingredients of successful leadership have been much investigated, sooner or later three fundamental leadership nuggets arise. These are cited, next page:

(from Peter Green)

Military leadership in relation to combat cohesion.

> *A press visit to a Guards Battalion in the UK. After being shown around by the RSM one of the reporters noted he hadn't seen any officers and where were they. The RSM's answer "Sir, when the time comes to die, they will be here".*
>
> *The Rifle Brigade, who had had fought so well at Dunkirk, when told by their Commander that they would be rear guard and would likely have to surrender at some moment, accepted their fate with equanimity. Their Commanding Officer saying they would be amongst friends!*
>
> *From the Peninsula war, where one company was delegated to be the vanguard during one of Wellington's forays into Spain. The company commander's address to his troops was very simple: " Men, the Army will follow our Battalion, the Battalion will follow our Company, and you will follow me".*

Now, as in millennia past, combat personnel will not enter action unless substantial levels of cohesion, which calls for leadership, trust and loyalty, have been established before combat. The fundamental measure of leadership in this instance is whether or not soldiers willingly enter combat with their leaders. We here additionally wish to know to what extent such unit cohesion can or will enable soldiers to develop better coping strategies to reduce the impact of combat stressors.

A fully developed program of Personnel Applied Research led by a combat experienced senior officer could lead to critical information that increases combat capability, and at the same time reduces adverse reaction to the stress of combat operations.

The three documents cited in the introduction can be read at http://www.rusiviccda.org/>

(Endnotes)

[1] **Combat/Operational Stress Reaction (COSR):** is the term used to describe the physiological, behavioral and psychosocial reactions experienced before, during, or after combat or due to increased operational tempo during any phase of *(combat)* operations or deployment. *(The term "combat stressor" is used to describe the combat event that causes COSR)*

Traumatic Events: are events outside the normal experience of people that pose actual or perceived threats of injury or exposure to death that can overwhelm both an individual's and organization's coping resources.

[2] Personnel Stabilization and Cohesion: A Summary of Key Literature Findings, United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Lincia Ruth 2004 http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:ZPU3lbqhAkkJ:www.hqda.army.mil/ari/pdf/RN%25202004-04.pdf+Measurement+of+cohesion+in+military+groups&hl=en&gl=ca&ct=clnk&cd=9

[3] Guidelines for Writing a Social/Behavioural Research Protocol, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Jan 2006. http://www.dfhcc.harvard.edu/fileadmin/DFHCC_Admin/Clinical_Trials/OPRS/uploads/investigator_resources/Soc-Beh_Protocol_Document_Guidelines__4-03_.pdf

[4] Inference drawn from Colonel Commandant Discussion Session, Presentation to PSO Conference, 2005, Ernst B. Beno, OMM, CD, MPA, BBA, CHRP, BGen (Ret), http://www.psel.org/files05.htm (slides 13, 14,15.)

[5] How Deployments Affect Service Members, Rand Corp, 2006. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG432.pdf

[6] Duty With Honour, Queens Printer 2003. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/somalia/vol2/V2C19_e.asp

[7] The Citadelle Document, in "Understanding The Canadian Army Ethos, http://www.rusiviccda.org/opinion/opin-10.html ◙

The Profession of Arms: A Unique Calling

by Dr John Scott Cowan and Lieutenant-général (ret) J.O.Michel Maisonneuve

The Winter 2006 (Vol 11, No 4) edition of "*ON TRACK*" contained an article by Dr J.S. Cowan: "The Profession of Arms: What makes it a profession, and how may those criteria evolve?" The article was intended to be only half the story, in that the objective was to prove to doubters that the profession of arms is a true profession. To that end, the article focused on how the profession of arms met (and even exceeded) the same standard tests which would apply to other professions. It showed this using three specific criteria: the requirement for self-

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regulation of the profession; the need for the profession to possess a relevant, definable and substantial body of higher knowledge; and the need for the profession to serve a higher public purpose.

In examining these three aspects, it is apparent that there are differing levels at which all professions meet each criterion. As pointed out, the military profession takes self-regulation to a detailed and explicit level, and indeed self-regulation will continue to transform as operations demand (witness on-the-fly evaluation of troops and tactics in Afghanistan as the threat evolves). Similarly, no other profession places as much emphasis on continuous learning at all rank levels. Finally, the military's "higher purpose" is unquestionable and is discussed further below.

Once the case is made for it being a profession, the next important step is to show that the profession of arms is *a profession unlike any other*. This is the other half of the story which we will examine in this follow-on article.

First, let us review further this notion of a *higher public purpose*. All professions have a higher public purpose, but not all higher public purposes are equal. One could argue that there is a hierarchy of these higher public purposes. In that hierarchy, the security of the citizenry, the integrity of the territory and sovereignty of the State and the protection of its interests would logically trump most other higher public purposes. It is the profession of arms which is ultimately responsible for securing all these public goods, and thus the case could be made that it is the profession which enables most of the other professions to exist, or at least to exist in more than rudimentary form. Without the profession of arms, and hence without the above mentioned public goods, there is no rule of law within which the lawyers can work, the conditions do not allow for the making of elaborate infrastructure which would employ the talents of engineers, and the resources and infrastructure needed to provide effective settings in which health care can be provided are absent. Indeed, absent the profession of arms, only the clergy could function more or less unimpeded (and they would be very busy indeed!).

Another way of looking at this same notion of a hierarchy of higher public purposes is to observe that, for most professions, the services provided are directed at a portion of the citizenry at any given time (often a small portion). For the profession of arms, the protection is to everyone, all the time.

Secondly, most professions have some aspect of a *duty of care*, and it can be quite central to the profession. The Hippocratic Oath of the medical profession (and the regulatory bodies employed to ensure it is upheld) exemplifies one aspect, and all professions have an expectation and obligation of the exercise of due care in carrying out professional duties. However, for the profession of arms, there is a unique aspect of the duty of care, and that is the duty of care for those over whom we have authority. It is the only profession in which the members of the profession have a nearly absolute obligation to look after the well-being of the other members of the profession. In some respects, this is the quid pro quo for the contract of unlimited liability *within* the profession, but the duty of care for those entrusted to members of the profession extends far beyond the narrower issues of bodily harm. And it is this emphasis on the collectivity, creating obligations normally seen otherwise only in families, which members of other professions would not share (or only to a very minor degree). Arguably, the collective nature of the profession arises in part because the profession is practiced collectively (which most others are not), but nonetheless, the extreme nature of the duty of care is so powerful as to perhaps create a separate and additional higher public purpose for the profession.

Thirdly, the contract of *unlimited liability* does not in and of itself make the profession of arms a profession, but it certainly makes it unique. It is not well understood by the broader society, who will often remark that other jobs are dangerous too. Largely, they fail to appreciate the difference between a job which has danger, and a job where a person may be required to undertake a task which has a very high probability (or even a near certainty) of injuring or killing that person. The public do not quite understand that even police and firefighters cannot be given orders to carry out tasks which have a high probability of such grave harm. Indeed, huge criticism and subsequent disgrace would attend any police or fire official who tried to give such an order.

But within the profession of arms, this possibility is not only there, it is the central glue of the profession. The contract of unlimited liability not only implies that one may need to die in the line of duty, but also that another member of the profession must give the instructions which establish that duty. The decision to send other members of the profession into situations not just of possible harm but indeed probable harm is one which is so grave that it imposes a uniquely high requirement for professionalism on the part of the person making that decision. Members of the profession of arms are expected to make life and death decisions for other members of the profession. To do that properly, taking into consideration all other possibilities, in the face of intense time pressures, lack of data, and all of the usual features attending fog and friction, demands professionalism of an order that other professions can barely imagine.

Finally, it is useful to consider the relationship of profession of arms to that of the society it serves, viewed

from the perspective of the broader society. In our view there is a moral contract created between the citizenry and those within the profession of arms. Many of these aspects have been examined previously by pundits, professionals, and even Senate committees. The postulate has been well articulated by the CDA as:

> The *unlimited liability* of the soldier, sailor or airman must...be matched by an unlimited responsibility on the part of the Government to ensure members of the CF, if put in harm's way, have the right tools, in terms of equipment and highly trained personnel, to carry out the mission as directed by the Canadian political authority.[1]

In this case, the moral contract is meant to be implemented by the Government on behalf of the citizenry. One reason the "decade of darkness" of the Canadian Forces existed was perhaps because the Government did not uphold its end of the moral contract, and this because the citizenry did not hold the Government to it. The current Government's efforts to improve the state of the Canadian Forces has rebalanced that moral contract to a certain extent, but more can and should be done.

The requirement that members of the profession of arms may be called upon to place themselves and other members in harm's way, reinforces the importance of the moral contract. The citizenry expects members of the profession of arms to "stand on that wall" on their behalf, and this comes through even in popular culture as portrayed in film. As Col Jessup said in "A Few Good Men":

> Son, we live in a world that has walls, and those walls have to be guarded by men with guns... you want me on that wall, you need me on that wall. ...[2]

In return, those "on the wall" should receive the needed tools from the citizenry to do the job. The profession of arms is indeed the last resort of the Government or of the citizens. Once the military is called out to do the Government's bidding, there is no other tool available in the inventory to deal with emergencies. Gen John De Chastelain, while he was CDS, was asked by reporters what would happen if the military was unsuccessful when it was called out in support of the civil authorities during the Oka crisis of 1990. His pointed response was that of course we would be successful, because there is no other resort after the military is called out. This aspect of the profession of arms being a nation's tool of last resort places a responsibility upon the citizenry to ensure it has the necessary resources to deal with any crisis.

By any measure, the profession of arms is indeed a profession. But the overwhelming aspects of its higher public purpose, its duty of care, and the unlimited liability to which members of the profession are held make it a truly unique profession. This uniqueness requires special treatment by the citizens of the country and sets up a moral contract between the citizens and members of the profession.

[1] CDA letter to the Editor National Post, 25 May 2000

[2] http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257/quotes; from the movie "A Few Good Men" (1992) ◙

e-Operations

by Major Eric Dion

(*This article,* e-*Operations, represents the personal views and perspectives of the author - ed.*)

The recent declaration of operational capability for the newly established Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) has received much public attention. Most media emphasized the secretive and special nature of these so-called "terrorist hunters" and "elite warriors". Others expressed outrage that Canada, a peaceful country, would resort to such tactics, or that Canadian tax dollars could somehow afford to pay for this new "sexy" toy. From a strategist's perspective, however, none of these views encompass the fundamental shift that has occurred in the conduct of war.

The types of *e*-Operations envisaged for the CSOR are the types of operations most likely required in the battle realms of the near and foreseeable future. War by its nature is a state of chaos induced or influenced by all of its protagonists. To try and sell war, combat oper-

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ations or any military intervention on the basis that chaos is not a part of the equation is telling a lie to our citizens. The conduct of the war on terror has shifted from conventional to unconventional means with a view to better adapting to the reality of terror networks.

In unconventional warfare, the key is the antagonist's ability to adapt in order to seize the initiative and exploit all opportunities. This understanding is not limited to the physical domain and is generally more applicable to metaphysical ones. Indeed, "unconventional" applies as much to ideas (antinomy), information (ambiguity), time (asynchrony), and society (anarchy) as it does to physics (asymmetry). The fundamental shift is that today's antagonists know no restrictions in terms of their knowledge, imagination and strategic capabilities, a combination that can be literally explosive. Unlike the militaries of most democracies, unrestricted antagonists have brought the conduct of war into its fourth generation, where there are no restrictions imposed upon them; hence, the necessity for unconventional warfare.

In other words, unrestricted warfare is not about *them* as much as it is about *us*. Where do we, as citizens of a democratic state of law, draw the line as to what constitutes "reasonable means" to out-smart our unrestricted antagonists? Do we even know who they are and what they can and might do? And right there, in the public eye, stands the new CSOR. Is this the type of military tool, the type of tactics, the type of 'troops with toys' that we need? To answer this question for the public, there is more to the type of *e*-Operations envisaged for the CSOR than the sexy and secretive Hollywood-savvy attention given to this by our media. These *e*-Operations are those of the foreseeable future, for the next ten to twenty years.

Our current military posture is anchored by two crucial organisational inertias: the so-called victory of the West over the East and the bureaucratic puzzle of checks and balances of our governments. Since we won the Cold War with a conventional military posture rehearsed day after day, conventional strategists would convince you that it must be part of the forthcoming solution to war. The fallacy of this argument, however, is that the Cold War was won *cold* and not through the military means of the time. In fact, it was the economic failure of the Soviet Union that characterized the end of the Cold war, which by default translated into victory for the West. I would argue that over time we have not won the Cold War and might have lost more than we think. Part of this is certainly the strategic culture that has gone astray since then.

Strategic culture is central to understanding national security and sovereignty interests. Simply, it is strategic culture that sets the conditions in which our democratically-elected governments pass laws and take decisions in our collective national interests, rather than in their political interests of self-preservation and power. It is within a strategic culture that national leaders emerge with the guts and wherewithal to make tough decisions and use their political acumen to sell it to citizens. And it is within a strategic culture that citizens intuitively understand and trust in their government to take these decisions on their behalf, happy to know that someone is taking care of the business of preserving and protecting the nation. In the absence of a perceivable threat after the Cold War, we had no use for strategic culture.

Mainstream culture thus became business. Wars

Cpl Randy Payne, a military policemen, was KIA in Afghanistan, while carrying-out Close Personal Protection duties, a specialised task assigned to CF MPs. More and more traditionally specialised tasks are now carried out by regular forces, such as operational mentors.

DND Photo / Photo MDN

became those of money, of hostile takeovers and other manoeuvres. Globalisation and technology were the solution to our problems. However, history tells us that both phenomena have actually exacerbated our global challenges, not the least of which are new and emerging threats to global stability and security. Can we afford not to have a strategic culture on which to base these tough calls?

Luckily, strategic thought, pragmatism and common sense somehow all survived in the absence of a perceived threat, paradoxically thanks to the business wars of the 90s. Despite our belief that warfare as we knew it was gone, war was taken to the business markets. It is the preserved strategic taught, skills and wit, mostly of our business leaders, which will prove a determining factor in setting the new strategic culture for this global war.

Would any serious company even hesitate before employing all possible tools, tactics and techniques legally available to them to win the war for talent and market? Would any decent company accept the level of bureaucratic checks and balances only known to modern governments? Would any serious competitor stay sitting idle to give you time to sort yourself out?

Unconventional warfare is the modus operandi for the foreseeable future for conducting *e*-Operations. *e*-Operators are the means of choice for taking the fight to the enemy in uncharted territory. They would employ the legal tools, tactics and techniques for operating in contemporary operating environments, and would be strategically efficient, unrestricted by checks and balances, adaptive, operationally focused and tactically decisive. This is the democratic price to pay to preserve and protect our Canadian standard of life. In fact, strategically, the Canadian Force ought to become Special Operations Capable, on the road to integration to become a single Marine Corps.

Until the advent of a new hegemonic power, special operations have become the reality and norm of modern war. I support the view that we do not need one CSOR for Canadians. We need twelve infantry based task forces that are special operations capable. Ask the Commander of Task Force 3-06, who has adopted in his mission statement that his unit will conduct counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar to win local hearts and minds. However, this should not imply that we will fight the dirty war dirty. Democratic rule of law and human rights must prevail, as it is these the foundations of our Nation, unlike the unrestricted antagonists we are fighting. To win the strategic war, seizing and retaining the moral high ground is essential; we are not seizing territory, but rather winning hearts and minds.

This is about strategic culture, collective pragmatism and our sense of nationhood. New tools are needed, not because they are "cool" but because they make strategic sense. Somehow, Canada must mature as a nation and realize the high price to pay for peace. Our strategists need to be making the tough calls that will create this special operations capability. ◙

Notes on the CDAI's 10th Annual Graduate Student Symposium

by Arnav Manchanda

The CDA Institute held its 10th annual graduate student symposium at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Kingston, Ontario, on 26-27 October 2007. Events took place in a new venue this year – Currie Hall – which proved to be the perfect setting for two days of stimulating discussion about various topics related to Canadian defence and security. The symposium, as in recent years, was a great success, attracting 33 presenters, 2 keynote speakers, and more than 85 attendees. In addition to the academic proceedings, attendees were treated to lunch on both days and dinner on the first night at RMC.

Presenters were divided into ten panels:

1) Historical perspectives on Canadian defence policy
2) A new warfare?
3) Canada in Afghanistan: theoretical perspectives
4) Civilians, civilianization and the home front
5) Aspects of counter-insurgency
6) Terror and counter-terror
7) Critical perspectives
8) Afghanistan and Canadian policies
9) Old threats with new teeth
10) Canadian defence policy: allies and opportunities

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From L to R: General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, 3rd prize winner Frederic Labarre, 2nd prize winner Captain Nils French, 1st prize winner Doug Munroe, Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire

Runners-up: from L to R: Dave Perry, Anita Singh, Edward Ansah Akuffo, Clayton Dennison, Justin Massie, with Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire.

The two keynote speakers were Jack Granatstein, who spoke on Canada and the Cold War, and Major-général Daniel Gosselin, Commandant of the Canadian Defence Academy, who spoke on the transformative pressures on the Canadian Forces today.

Presenters came from 13 institutions. They were:

University of Calgary – Second-Lieutenant Christian Mattern, Doug Munroe, Julian Dawson, Teale Phelps Bondaroff, Wilfrid Greaves, Clayton Dennison

Queen's University – Matthew Trudgen, Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Kilford, Justin Massie, Andrew Quinlan

Royal Military College – Chad Kohalyk, Scott Davy, Lawren Guldemond, Frederic Labarre

Université du Québec à Montréal – Jérémie Cornut, Brahim Saidy, Mathieu Barsalou

Carleton University – Lieutenant Jon Baker, Bonnie Butlin, Dragos Popa

University of Alberta – Matthew Gordner, Edward Ansah Akuffo

Dalhousie University – Anita Singh, Dave Perry

University of Ottawa. – Modeste Mba Talla, Adam Gough

Université Laval – Richard Garon, Kathia Legaré

Université de Montréal – Mirko Palmesi, Afshin Hojati

Concordia University – Amanda-Jean Caouette

American Military University – Captain Nils French

McMaster University – Mark Williams

The top 3 presenters were Doug Munroe of the University of Calgary, Captain Nils French of the American Military University, and Frederic Labarre of the Royal Military College. The runners-up were Dave Perry and Anita Singh of Dalhousie University, Justin Massie of Queen's University, Clayton Dennison of the University of Calgary, and Edward Ansah Akuffo of the University of Alberta.

Overall, attendees at the symposium were very pleased with the symposium, commenting favourably on its intellectual value and excellent organization.

Presentations, photos and prize winners can be found on our website, available online at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2007/presentations_07.htm .

Please keep your calendars free for next year's event, which is tentatively scheduled for 31st October and 1st November 2008. ◙

Keynote Address

Lessons of History: Canada and the Cold War

by J.L. Granatstein

This article is adapted from a keynote address given by the author at the CDAI's 10th annual graduate student symposium on 26 October 2007, at the Royal Military College, Kingston – ed.

I have always believed that there are no lessons of history except one: that there are none. Each era is different, each crisis different, each of the personalities involved different, and those differences make applying "lessons" to a later crisis wrong and even dangerous. Talking with enemies is not always a "Munich," and Nasser, Ho Chi Minh and Saddam were not Hitler reincarnated, to cite only a few misapplications of historical lessons. Still, we look back and try to draw conclusions. I will do the same, proving that historians do not heed their own warnings. So, what can we say about Canada's role in the Cold War?

First, our major aim was to contain the Soviet Union. After 1945 the USSR was on the Elbe and its control over its conquered/liberated territories in Eastern Europe was being consolidated. That was bad enough; but what worried Canadians most was that the USSR was putting pressure on the states that bordered it. Given that 100,000 Canadians had died in freeing Western Europe in two great wars, given that a free Western Europe was a Canadian national interest, this was not something we could accept.

At the same time, however, Canada had its own concerns. It worried about the United States and its role in North America. Canada worried about being pushed into expensive defence operations by a fearful US, and it worried about always being the smaller, younger brother in the bilateral relationship. At the same time, Ottawa was concerned that the US, especially the Republican-controlled Congress, was isolationist and might be unwilling to do what was necessary to keep Western Europe free. In other words, Canada wanted to contain the US but simultaneously keep it involved.

The North Atlantic Treaty and NATO provided an opportunity to arrange matters on a longer-term basis. Canada was an enthusiast for the new alliance for strategic reasons, to protect its national interests, and because it was right.

It is worth noting that it was Prime Minister Louis St Laurent who took Canada into NATO and, a year later, into the Korean War. His government boosted defence spending and the size of the military dramatically. St Laurent was a francophone, and he was operating in the face of history. The conscription crises of 1917, 1942, and 1944 had occurred just a moment before in historical time. No one believed that Québec would tolerate a peacetime defence alliance or participation in Korea. St Laurent went into his home province and spoke of Canadian national interests and of the threat posed by Communist expansionism. He paid no political price for his actions, winning the 1949, 1953, and 1957 elections in Québec by huge majorities. St Laurent was a leader, a prime minister who understood where Canada's interests lay.

Then the costs of defence began to grate on those Canadians who wanted more social programmes. Others worried about the US and its increasing influence in Canada in the 1950s – its investments, its DEW line, its policies in the world – and believed that the Liberals were continentalist. Had not Lester Pearson, St Laurent's foreign minister, sided with the US against the UK during the 1956 Suez Crisis, and won the Nobel Peace Prize for it? Anti-Americanism, always endemic in the body politic, propelled John Diefenbaker into power, and although Diefenbaker was a Cold Warrior who believed in NATO and the necessity of confronting the USSR, he feared the US more.

The Chief had to face serious defence decisions and bungled most of them. He cancelled the Arrow; he took Bomarc missiles but then he balked at accepting their warheads. In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, acting out of pique at President John F Kennedy and in response to growing anti-nuclear sentiment, he refused to put the military on alert during the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War. His defence minister and his navy commanders acted on their own to go to alert status, but that did not help Diefenbaker with the Americans, who wanted him out of power. They got their way when Diefenbaker lost a vote of confidence in Parliament.

Historian J.L. Granatstein is the author of Whose War Is It? He was Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century and Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum. He is also a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

In retrospect, we can see that the Diefenbaker regime marked the beginning of the end of Canadians' enthusiastic acceptance of their role in the Cold War. Never again would defence spending reach as great a share of the budget as in the mid-1950s. Never again would there be anything but reluctance in dealing with the US or NATO.

The new Prime Minister in 1963, Lester Pearson, accepted the Bomarc warheads, and everyone expected continental harmony to reign anew. But soon Lyndon Johnson was in office, and the Vietnam War began getting messier. Pearson called on the US to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in a speech in Philadelphia in March 1965, a futile gesture that earned him Johnson's contempt. "Here are the loyal Germans, always with us when it matters," Johnson told a gathering of diplomats in Washington. "And then there are the Canadians."

Soon Canadian nationalism reached its peak when the charismatic Pierre Trudeau succeeded Pearson in the spring of 1968. Trudeau was skeptical of nationalism in all its forms. He was a new man, the fluently bilingual quintessential Canadian, or so many thought. In fact, Trudeau was typically francophone in his attitude to the military, to NATO, and to the Cold War. He was no isolationist, but he was not one to believe in the military or to want to take on the difficult global tasks that kept the peace. He became the key figure in weakening the country's support for the Cold War.

What Trudeau wanted was an end to Canada's nuclear role, to get Canadian troops out of Europe, and to focus the Canadian public and policymakers on domestic concerns such as Québec. His efforts at reducing Canada's NATO role came close to tearing his Cabinet apart in 1969. His government announced a re-ordering of defence priorities, with NATO ranked third behind the protection of national sovereignty and North American defence, and just ahead of peacekeeping. Canada subsequently halved its NATO forces in Europe and announced a phase-out of nuclear weapons. A man who had little regard for the military, Trudeau also cut the Canadian Forces' strength by 20 percent to 80,000 and froze the defence budget.

Trudeau epitomized the growing feeling in Canada that the Cold War had lasted too long and had distorted priorities. For two decades, said Trudeau, "Canada's foreign policy was largely its policy in NATO, through NATO." That was no longer good enough. His government recognized Communist China in 1970 and signed a Protocol on Consultations with Moscow without consulting his cabinet. He visited Havana in 1973 and shouted "Viva Castro" to end one speech, gratifying one despot; he toured Beijing and expounded on the wonderful system Mao had given his people, pleasing another.

The period of détente and the cooling of hostility between the West and the Communist world that Trudeau perhaps had some small part in fostering came to its end with the invasion of Afghanistan, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, and the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner in 1983. Trudeau's response, his time in power coming to a close, was to launch a quixotic peace mission that saw him travel the globe urging the nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals. The Reagan administration distrusted Trudeau and his efforts, and one official at the embassy in Washington said the Americans "hated" Trudeau's rhetoric that Canada was a good peacemaker, morally equidistant from the "naughty boys" with nuclear weapons. "A leftist high on pot," one senior administration official said undiplomatically. Overall, certainly, the peace mission had little effect. When asked about its impact some years later, however, Trudeau said with a characteristic shrug, "Well, there was no war." That at least was so.

Trudeau departed in 1984, the Canadian public cheering him to the echo for his still-born peace mission. There was not much reason to cheer, either for its short-term results or the long-term effects. Arguably, his tenure had almost put paid to Canada's American alliance. The formal alliance ties remained intact, but the sense that there had been a community of interests, and that both nations shared a similar sense of the world and its dangers, was gone.

Matters could still change, however. Soon in charge was Brian Mulroney: smooth, charming, unabashedly pro-American, and desirous of "good relations, super relations" with Washington. Mulroney negotiated a Free Trade Agreement with the US and won an election on the issue in 1988. He also promised to restore the Canadian Forces; huge budget deficits, however, constrained government action, and there were initially cuts instead of increases for the military. Soon, however, the Cold War drew to its end. So too did Canada's commitment to the defence of Western Europe: the Conservatives announced a total withdrawal in 1992. Insofar as NATO was concerned, Canada was committed but scarcely present.

For the last quarter-century of the Cold War, Canada received scant regard from its friends abroad and none from its enemies. Canadians had forgotten that reliability in foreign policy and the ability to deploy force when necessary both mattered. They had even forgotten that the ability to defend their own people and territory is the essential national interest for every nation-state. National interests had always mattered in the past, and they still do. The lessons of history, if there are any, were not learned by Canadians. ◙

NEVER A FIREPROOF HOUSE

by William Spotton

Canada's participation in Afghanistan and by extension in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is consistent with nearly a century of our country's commitment to collective security. Canada has deemed collective security as the best means to reduce the use of organized violence, in short to stop war. Our much ballyhooed peacekeeping endeavours have in fact been endeavours to give effect to collective security.

Peacekeeping is a means to an end: not an end in and of itself. Peacekeeping is meant to enable and to make effective collective security, a specific form of multilateralism. Collective security is a grouping of nations working together to inhibit, and if necessary to stop, the aggressive use of deadly force by a nation or nations or increasingly non-state entities. It is a forum of mutual protection including territory and values. Collective security has been Canada's favoured policy tool to deter armed and organized violence, war, as a unilateral policy tool of governments and non-government players.

Collective security to be effective needs two components. First, there must be the military ability to intervene if there is a conflagration. Second, the willingness to use that ability must be evident, apparent and convincing; otherwise the mere capacity to intervene is mote.

Canada has advocated the general principle of collective security for almost a century now. Out of the mud of World War I rose the hope of the League of Nations. Learning how to make collective security effective has been an ongoing struggle. Canada hoped that the mere existence of the League would give effect to collective security. Or at the very least those great powers of goodwill, namely Great Britain and France, would carry the burden of enforcement if such enforcement was necessary. In 1925 in a speech delivered to a League of Nations meeting in Geneva, Senator Dandurand of the Canadian delegation summed up this view. He admonished the world and sanctimoniously commented that Canada had no need for military armaments as we lived in a "fire proof house".

Of course through the 1920's and 1930's the world learned (but seems to be forgetting now) that institutions by merely existing do not ensure collective security in the absence of political will and military capacity. In the 1930's, Japan, Germany and Italy ran roughshod over the League. The League was manned by supine politicians elected by nations geared for and encouraging wishful thinking. Britain and France became hostage to their irresponsible disarmament of the 1920's. They could not intervene due to that self-inflicted inability to intervene. Then, since they did not choose to intervene, they did not need to have the means to intervene.

Canada was an acquiescent witness to this appeasement and self-fulfilling limpidness. The United States, the unquestioned largest economy and potentially the League's most powerful member, was not a member. The failure of collective security without the military means and political will led directly to World War II. Canada learned during World War II that there are no fire proof houses ,as we were reminded with our American neighbours on September 11, 2001.

Senator Dandurand's complacent, not to say smug, metaphor depicted the will of the Canadian political establishment right up to the fall of France in June 1940. It was not until the fall of France that Canada truly started to gear up both its armed forces and its economy for total war. In 1945, many desired to return to that apocryphal fire proof house. However, the failure of the League of Nations as a mechanism of collective security lay before the more thoughtful of Canada's policy makers.

These Canadian leaders saw the failure of the League of Nations in the ashes of Europe and Asia in 1945. They understood Burke's dictum "evil flourishes when good men do nothing". Canada became integrally involved in post World War II international institution building. The United Nations with the participation of all the great powers was hoped to be more effective than its predecessor the League. NATO was conceived and founded consistent with the collective security protocols of the United Nations.

Canada was firm in its hope that NATO would be more than just another military alliance. Hence the inclusion of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This article speaks of the "development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being." The Istanbul statement of NATO of June 28, 2004 reiterates this sentiment as a principle of shared action for today's NATO.

William Spotton has been involved in politics since 1988. He has had various roles including campaign manager, Parliamentary staff, election observer in Kosovo in 2000 and Mayoralty candidate himself in Port Hope. He and his wife had a mediation firm in Peterborough, Ontario. William is focusing on writing but he is still involved in politics today. He and his family live in Port Hope, Ontario.

At its foundation though, the explicit and immediate goal of NATO was a clear and precise statement to the Soviet Union of Western Europe's intent to defend itself with military force in conjunction with its North American allies, Canada and the United States. The alliance was an explicit statement of collective security principles among nations of shared democratic political principles (with some exceptions along the way). More importantly it was an explicit commitment of the United States to not retreat behind its Atlantic wall. The United States for the first time in its history in peacetime was finally tangling itself in the much feared 'binding alliances' of President George Washington's valedictory speech and shouldering its global responsibilities.

The membership of the United States has ensured that NATO had the military wherewithal to exercise collective security. American membership in NATO gave notice to the world that the United States would intervene and be involved in world affairs within a mutually binding multilateral forum. Likewise, NATO has assured the United States that other western powers would shoulder at least some of the military burden and the political pressure commiserate with the use of such military force. The Korean War along with peacekeeping operations, beginning with the Suez Canal operation, have given proof to the world of American and the other Western powers' willingness to use their military abilities.

After the next American Presidential election and post-Iraq, America will be entrenching on this side of the Atlantic no matter which candidate wins. Each current major candidate advocates some type of withdrawal and re-entrenchment. There will be an Iraq strategic hangover.

For the hope of any future collective security actions America must have confidence in the only effective collective security institution currently existing, NATO. Canada's prosperity is dependent on global trade and security which is best maintained through collective security. Canada needs and has known it needs collective security for almost an hundred years. We need NATO. For NATO to have the ability to enforce collective security, we need America's continuing wholehearted commitment. For that all members, such as Canada, must prove NATO's effectiveness. This we are doing and must continue to do in Afghanistan.

Our soldiers trudge and battle in the hills of Kandahar for those Afghans under their immediate protection. They fight for the Canadian ideal of a world where violence is no longer a policy tool of choice for any state or any other entity but strictly a means of last resort for self-defense.

Through disarmament and nihilistic wishful thinking we failed those ideals in between World War I and World War II. Since the 1960's through the erosion of our military capacity, we have endangered those principles. Today by cutting and running from Afghanistan to some apocryphal fire proof house we would abandon the people of Afghanistan. We would abandon NATO and the ideals of collective security which have been at the foundation of our external policy and indeed our international identity.

Most treacherously we would be abandoning those magnificent men and women who have fought and died on all our behalf and continue to do so to this very day. Their sacrifices have never been in vain. Their mission and their sacrifices honour our nation's history. Their sacrifices and their mission give dignity and nobility to the banalities of our strip malls and of our trite consumerism. Their mission and their sacrifices keep hope alive for a world where good men and good women can and shall act together to ensure evil does not flourish. ◙

Thinking About the Past, Present and Future of NORAD

by Dr. Jim Fergusson

Next year, NORAD celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of its formal establishment. Functionally, the bi-national air defence arrangement had begun actual operation in the previous year prior to the formal exchange of notes between Ottawa and Washington. In 1981, the two parties in renewing the agreement for another five years altered its terms of reference from air to aerospace. Functionally, NORAD had been performing an aerospace mission, consisting of its early warning of a ballistic missile attack and surveillance of space missions for over a decade prior to its formal recognition in the agreement.

These two examples of the functional preceding the formal or political may be repeated with regard to the future of the NORAD arrangement. However, this time the pattern appears to be in reverse. Declining functional demands may, if not already have, alter the nature of the arrangement, even though the formal or political side of the equation remains in place with the indefinite renewal last year. Simply, the functional requirements leading to the

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binational command arrangement may be replaced by a functional bilateral arrangement, even if the formal agreement is not revised. In other words, the relationship has been changing over time with implications for bi-national defence cooperation and Canadian defence policy below the political radar screen.

At the root of this reversed pattern is the relationship between geo-strategic/political considerations and technology. Geography during the first decade of the Cold War, the shared strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union and the technological manifestation of the threat through Soviet long range bombers made military cooperation a functional imperative for both parties. Such cooperation, in turn, was further made possible by the common values held by both nations and common interests of their respective air forces. As such, both nations entered into a binational air defence arrangement; a unique feature for both nations in being the only formal integrated command structure in which Canadian and United States officers essentially commanded each other's forces as assigned for the NORAD tasks and missions.

By the 1960s, ballistic missile technology, as well as the growing significance of space-based assets for early warning began the process of negating the significance of territory for the practice of deterrence and defence. In addition, American ballistic missile defence development efforts with Canadian policy-makers reluctance to commit added to this process. It was slowed by the common threat and common values elements, alongside the rejuvenation of the air breathing threat with the development of cruise missile technology.

With the end of the Cold War, the common threat to both nations essentially disappeared. Canadian policy-makers in the 1990s would agree with US concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology. However, Canadian policy-makers generally did not see this new threat to the same degree and extent as the US. Especially during the late 1990s, the Canadian government instead would express an 'understanding' of American concerns, rather than a shared perception. This 'understanding' in turn centered around continuing American missile defence development efforts.

Missile defence as it began to gain momentum following the 1991 Gulf War held out the promise of maintaining the functional significance of territory. Missiles from potential or future rogue state launch points would track through space over the North and Canada to targets south of the border. The functional value of mid-course interceptors and/or additional tracking, cueing and battle damage assessment radars located in northern or eastern Canada was evident. However, Canadian reluctance usually attributed to domestic politics, to engage and commit left the United States little choice but to develop an architecture that excluded Canada. The most recent manifestation has been the American decision to negotiate an agreement with the Czech Republic and Poland to deploy missile defence radars and interceptors respectively on their territory.

Functionally providing little, if anything relative to the primary threat as seen from Washington, the binational arrangement essentially became anachronistic.

As a result of Canada's missile defence allergy, Canada's territorial significance, already relatively marginal with the disappearance of the air breathing threat, declined further. With it, the Cold War functional military division of labour with Canada providing the location and sharing the funding for the North Warning System (NWS) and the United States providing the space and ground assets for ballistic missile warning and space surveillance missions disappeared. Functionally providing little, if anything relative to the primary threat as seen from Washington, the binational arrangement essentially became anachronistic.

To some degree, 9/11 resurrected on the surface the importance of the air defence binational arrangement. However, even this did not necessarily require a functional binational solution as the Soviet threat. Assurances on the part of both parties to control their air space remain important, But, the need for a functional binational solution is not. Bilateral arrangements can suffice. Of course, at the end of the day, the United States is likely to still prefer a Canadian officer or Canadian engagement in the process of notifying Canadian authorities of a missile attack against North America/Canada. But with Canada contributing nothing to this requirement (unless Canada at a minimum proceeds with its planned commitment to deploy a satellite, Project Sapphire, to contribute to the US space surveillance network), the arrangement is largely a one-sided one. At the end of the day, the net result is the hollowing out of NORAD.

Alongside these considerations is the growing distance between the Canada and the US on military space. The US has neither committed to the weaponization of space, nor invested significantly in developing the technology to do so. Nonetheless, Canada as in the case of missile defence, has placed itself on the sidelines, creating a percep-

tion that the US must act on its own in this regard. Thus, with Canada on the military space sidelines, and having demonstrated little commitment to a military space presence, NORAD cannot engage in space related missions.

The declining functional utility of NORAD, especially from the US side, is further reinforced by evidence of Canada and the US moving somewhat further apart. Numerous irritants existed in the relationship in the 1990s stemming most prominently from land mines, NATO first use, and child soldiers. Perhaps most indicative was the failure, conscious or not, of President Bush to include Canada in his list of close allies immediately following the 9/11 attacks. For many, this drifting apart, despite Canada's commitment to Afghanistan beginning in the winter of 2001/02, was further symbolized by the manner in which Canada managed the Iraq file in 2003.

Whether Canada's subsequent decision to commit militarily to NATO's Afghanistan mission and then a combat role in 2005 was an attempt to recoup after the Iraq decision is open for speculation. Regardless, for many within the government, this combat commitment is seen as central to ensuring close defence, security and overall political relations with the US. In other words, Afghanistan is key to close defence relations, and as part of this, key to ensuring the future of NORAD.

The Afghanistan factor represents a longstanding perspective on Canada-US defence relations. The close cooperative relationship amongst the two defence departments, and the three services serves to insulate difficulties in the high political relationship. This, of course, is likely when functional military requirements dictate close cooperation. But in their absence, one should not expect close cooperation to occur. In other words, what goes on at higher levels or specific areas of defence relations may have no bearing on what goes on in another area.

Unless senior officials reach deep down into specific areas, the dictates of these areas will mostly determine the nature of cooperation. This was the case following the Mulroney 1985 decision not to officially participate in SDI research. Despite close personal relations with the President, and senior US defence officials' reassurances that the decision would not effect close aerospace defence cooperation, Canadians found themselves on the outside of US air and space planning for the defence of North America. To the planners, the Mulroney decision was a no, and this meant Canada was to be excluded on functional grounds.

This then may well be the future for NORAD. Canadian officials seem to be complacent about the future of NORAD informed by the belief in the insulating role of Afghanistan and the indefinite renewal of NORAD. Indicative was the lack of attention paid to the Binational Planning Group's Final Report, which offered a range of options for future cooperation to no real contemplation. Moreover, little consideration was given to the implications of the creation of Canada Command for the future of NORAD.

Regardless, NORAD is changing as functional requirements change alongside technology. The relationship and institution are likely to continue simply for symbolic reasons. However, the actual functional binational command appears to be headed in the direction of obsolescence, especially with Canada on the outside of the two primary aerospace defence missions for North America. Even the early warning mission for missile defence is unlikely to change this, as it becomes redundant from an American perspective.

This is not to suggest that Canada necessarily reverse course on these primary missions just to save the functional relevance of NORAD. But, Canadian policy-makers need to recognize the process underway and closely evaluate exactly what type of aerospace defence relationship is in Canada's interests in the future. This will require at a minimum that officials get beyond the current myopic obsession with Afghanistan, and the unspoken hope that a democrat in the White House will ensure the future relevance of NORAD.

Book Review

Outside the Wire: The War in Afghanistan in the Words of Its Participants

Edited by Kevin Patterson and Jane Warren

Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein

"In Afghanistan, Canada wasn't just another coalition country on camp, we were a dominating force, we stood out amongst coalition countries and by doing that we proved to the world just what kind of military we are, one of the most professional and best trained. Together we made history…."

That is Corporal Gordon Whitton of the First Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, writing of his tour of duty in Afghanistan in 2006. His journal entries are featured in a new book, Outside the Wire, published by Random House in Toronto. The editors of the volume are Kevin Patterson, a former Canadian Forces regular officer and medical doctor who did a six-week contract stint in Kandahar for the Canadian Forces, and Jane Warren, a Toronto freelance editor. Patterson earned more than his fair share of notoriety when an article he published in the American magazine Mother Jones led to his being attacked for breaching the privacy of a Canadian fatal casualty he treated. Complaints by family members led to a Department of National Defence investigation. To me, while understandable, this was overblown, and Patterson's superb article in this book, could—but should not—get him into further difficulty.

Outside the Wire brings together a variety of accounts by regular and reserve soldiers, doctors, and representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations, with some commentary by family members. The story it presents, while hardly one of unambiguous success, does justify Corporal Whitton's comment on the last pages in the book. If the selections chosen by Patterson and Warren are representative, they suggest very strongly that not only are Canadians doing a very good job in Kandahar, but that they are making a difference. No one suggests that the task is easy, no one even hints that it will be quickly accomplished, but virtually everyone believes that the game is worth the candle.

Take Captain Nichola Goddard, the first Canadian woman to be killed in action since the Second World War and the first NATO woman soldier ever to be killed. In a long email she sent home two months before her death from enemy fire, she observed that "The longer that we are in theatre and the more that we actually interact with the Afghan people, the more I feel that we are serving a purpose here." The Afghan Army and Police are "trying to achieve something that we in Canada have long taken for granted. They lay down their lives daily to try to seize something that is so idealistic it is almost impossible to define." The Afghans chose a government that is trying to make their country a better place. "I had never truly appreciated the awesome power of a democratic government before. We are here to assist…."

Goddard admitted that the corruption, violence and poverty of Afghanistan made it easy to poke holes in her idealistic vision but, she added, "we have to start somewhere. With the best of intentions, we have started in Aghanistan. There is nowhere else that I'd rather be right now." It is tough to read her letters without weeping at the loss of such a fine young officer.

Another splendid article is by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hope of the PPCLI who commanded Task Force Orion for the first seven months of 2006. To judge by his biography, Colonel Hope is writing a book on his experiences, and some experiences they were. His soldiers seemed to be obliged to move vast distances in short order, rescuing British outposts under seige, liberating towns taken by the Taliban, and engaging in full-scale battles.

In the process of telling his story of a few days in action, he offers some interesting judgments. Take this one, as he writes about the American soldiers of Devil Company of the 2nd Battalion, Fourth Infantry Regiment, who were under his command: "I was proud of these Devil soldiers. Later, as I reflected upon this, I realized that, at some point in the past decade, we have had a fundamental shift in the culture of the Canadian infantry, making us identify most readily with the American, and not British, soldiers." D Company, he says, was "easy to work with, reliable, and very professional. Perhaps the biggest similarity was that they wanted to fight, unlike the soldiers of other countries who remained very risk-averse…."

That's pretty tough stuff, implicitly criticizing the British and the Dutch, whose soldiers Canadians in Afghanistan dealt with most frequently. Canadian senior officers in off-record discussions have been very critical of the British, astonishing some listeners, and positively scornful of the Dutch who stay close to their fortified camp. But it is a long time since any Canadian officer

had such public praise for the U.S. Army whose leaders, Hope says, "demonstrated decisiveness and tenacity, and [whose] soldiers performed battle drills quickly and with great effect."

Another article by yet another PPCLI officer, Captain Dave McAllister, makes a very different point, one that I have been arguing for a long time. McAllister, the operations officer for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar in early 2006, notes in his weblog, published here, that he had written a letter to the Vancouver Sun trying to make the point that the Canadians fighting and dying in Kandahar were NOT peacekeepers. That should be obvious, he notes, but it's not to many in the media who keep calling the Canadian troops peacekeepers. "This is just plain wrong—peacekeeping is done by the UN, not Canada" and "it bothers me especially because of the emotive image of peacekeepers, and of the idea being put into peoples' heads of Canadian peacekeepers as casualties." The article McAllister was responding to had questioned if Afghanistan was "the best use of our peacekeepers. I may be wrong about this, but I think that people are more likely to support the Canadian mission in Afghanistan—even with casualties—if they know that those involved are soldiers." Canadians need to understand "that this is a war effort" and that there is as yet no peace to keep. A good point, one that needs to be made and re-made.

There are many other good articles in this collection, and there are some startling bits of information. In one piece, a Canadian observation post comes under mortar fire that keeps coming closer, no matter how the soldiers try to move to escape it. Then it dawns on them that a Taliban spotter is using his cellphone to pass the Canadian movements to the mortar crew. This is not an unsophisticated enemy, and that little nugget suggests that the shelling of the forward base being visited by the Minister of National Defence, Peter Mackay, in November 2007 was no accident. The Taliban (and likely their supporters in Canada who pass material to them) read the Canadian media on-line and they know when a VIP is in country. Their local sources can then fix on his movements.

Ian Hope concludes his article with the observation that Canada's aim in Afghanistan is to increase the Afghan government's confidence and to "buy time for the Afghan National Security Forces to grow and develop, and for governance and reconstruction reforms to gain traction. This will take many years," he notes. "We could not be beaten on the battlefield, but could only win if we were prepared to remain here for a considerable time." That surely is the lesson of the Afghanistan War, and it seems to be one that the Canadians who served and serve there understand. Does the Canadian government? Do the Canadian people?

(Historian J.L. Granatstein's most recent book is a revised, expanded edition of Who Killed Canadian History? (Harper Collins, 2007).) ◙

Book Review

Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space

Edited by Sarah Jane Meharg

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

This latest book from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) comes at opportune time in international security affairs. The prevalence of internal conflicts or "wars among the people," and the perception that weak and failed states, terrorism and insurgencies must be dealt with as threats to international peace and security, has led to the intermingling of humanitarian and aid efforts with military operations. What is often touted as the "battle for hearts and minds" necessarily entails a combination of military counter-insurgency with humanitarian aid, development and reconstruction. Reconstruction and stabilization are two sides of the same counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. On the one hand, development cannot occur without security provision, and security provision is undermined in the long term by a lack of development; on the other hand, as insurgents and pro-government forces battle it out for control of territory and populations, humanitarian aid has become politicized and prone to hijacking for political purposes.

"Helping Hands and Loaded Arms" is the result of a workshop held by the PPC in September 2006 on the interface between military and humanitarian affairs. The book – a multi-author effort – attempts to evaluate this phenomenon and provide perspectives and policy solutions to a situation in which it seems the traditional rules and modes of war and humanitarian efforts no longer apply.

While the book does indeed provide a back-

ground to the deterioration of the traditional neutrality, independence and impartiality of humanitarian actors and the lack of a suitable replacement for it, the book does not delve deeply into possible policy solutions. It is of ultimate value as background reading.

The book is divided into three sections. The first section explores legal and common frameworks for assessing this phenomenon; the second offers an academic discussion on navigating the "new identities" of military and humanitarian stakeholders; the third hopes to offer some policy options.

The first section analyzes the legal, political, military and war-fighting changes that make traditional humanitarian notions of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and non-targeting of civilians, difficult. The first two chapters by Christopher Waters and Rupen Das focus on legal and definitional issues, while the third by Mark Fried examines the efforts of the organization Oxfam to adapt to increasingly volatile and insecure environments.

The second part of the book addresses the evolving identities of humanitarian and military stakeholders in an environment where their efforts are becoming intertwined and often at odds with each other. Alan Okros and Willemijn Keizer outline a theory of jurisdictional struggle between humanitarians and military stakeholders. They compare and contrast the mandates of military and humanitarian actors, and note that while military and humanitarian operators can cooperate, this needs to be limited in order to maintain the latter's neutrality, independence and impartiality. In another chapter, Sarah Jane Meharg examines military and humanitarian actors' perceptions of the "other side". These chapters take an explicitly humanitarian bias, warning that the use of humanitarian resources for military objectives has unintended consequences. The chapters suffer from an overabundance of academic theory on identities, although the review of common misperceptions is interesting.

The final section on policy provides the meat of the book. Stephen Mariano examines NATO's ability to succeed in a setting like Afghanistan, where military and humanitarian work is fundamentally linked and co-dependent. Mariano argues that NATO is not yet a "collective security" organization able to meet the challenges posed by today's global security threats. The author writes that NATO has not yet combined civilian and military efforts to deal with new global security threats at the strategic level. His outlook is bleak: he writes that member nations would be unwilling to cede even more of their sovereignty in such areas.

The penultimate chapter by Natalie Mychajlyszyn explores the state of research and theory on civil-military relations. Separating the phenomenon into theatre-level and national decision-making processes, the author applies her framework to the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, contextualizing the Whole-of-Government approach and the efforts of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. She provides a useful research agenda for the future study of civil-military relations.

The final chapter by Christina Schweiss and James Rowe examines the US Department of Defence's new approach to "stabilization operations" and counter-insurgency operations. They write that the "intrusion" of military efforts into humanitarian space – much lamented in the book's first two sections – is inevitable, and that there must be a compromise between the two sides.

While timely, the book suffers from some serious shortcomings. One is the questionable overemphasis and hand-wringing over the "loss" of independent, impartial and neutral humanitarian space. Given that the editor's introduction begins with the decisive, "Humanitarian space no longer exists," it is questionable to devote a large chunk of such a book to criticizing this loss without offering any credible solutions. Some of the chapters are dominated by overly academic and long-winded theoretical introductions; some overviews are redundant while others are useful to our understanding. The volume could have used judicious editing.

The volume makes some attempt at incorporating a military viewpoint to the phenomenon, especially in the chapters by Mariano and Schweiss/Rowe. However, much of the book explicitly takes a blindly anti-military viewpoint without critically examining such claims. While we are repeatedly given the humanitarian perspective, little is done to explore military viewpoints on this issue.

Furthermore, the book takes as the gospel truth that humanitarian actors have always operated in a neutral, independent and impartial fashion. Humanitarian actors have always had to operate in insecure and volatile environments. A greater examination of past examples of this phenomenon would have been useful, as would have been a critical examination of humanitarian actors' motives and agendas.

Ultimately, the volume is a useful primer for those who have little knowledge of the juxtaposition between humanitarian and military efforts in today's conflicts. The book's lack of concrete proposals for such pressing concerns are either due to an inadequate choice of articles, or reflects more broadly the state of the field.

Edited by Sarah Jane Meharg, Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space. Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007. PP. 231, price not available ◙

Book Review

Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs: Canada, the USA and the Dynamics of State, Industry and Culture

By David T. Jones & David Kilgour

Reviewed by General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson

(*Abridged version of a review published in the* Ottawa Citizen - *ed.*) The physical and cultural closeness of Canada and the United States of America has historically generated a complex symbiosis that often produces friction. David Jones and David Kilgour, in Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs, provide a fascinating and definitive examination of the relationship, as seen from either side of the border. Jones is a former senior American foreign service officer whose diplomatic career included a posting with the US Embassy in Ottawa. Co-author David Kilgour served for many years as an MP from Edmonton in both Liberal and Conservative Parties. He was Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific, and Deputy Speaker of the House.

The uneasy relationship they dissect so thoroughly ranges from trivial differences to matters of great importance. Today it is softwood lumber, mad cow disease, Arctic sovereignty and defence burden-sharing. In past decades the conflict has often centred on trade, free or otherwise. Whatever the issue, there is an underlying touchiness in the relationship that calls for study and understanding on both sides of the border.

Differing approaches sometimes set the two nations on divergent paths. The authors delve into the principal divergences, in such areas as government, resource management, health care, education, religion, culture, gun laws, capital punishment, world roles and defence.

Given the range and number of such dissimilarities, Canadians are easily offended by the oft-heard declaration by Americans that, "Why, you are just like us!" Ultrasensitive about their identity and having a desire not to be seen as clones of their neighbours to the south, they worry about being so close to the world's remaining superpower, which for one reason or another seems to pay little regard to Canada.

Americans, for their part, mistrust what they see as socialist tendencies in Canada, whose citizens have traditionally held rather different views on the role of the state in the daily life of its citizens. Moreover, the US, in the aftermath of 9/11, developed perceptions that its northern neighbour was weak in defending against the emerging terrorist threat to the continental US. The resulting imposition of restrictions on entry into the US has contributed to Canadian uneasiness.

Indeed, it is in the area of international affairs and defence that the relationship is being put to its most difficult test in the early 21st century, and here Jones and Kilgour reveal a degree of unanimity not found in regard to other issues. They both emphasize that the decline of Canada's military, especially in the 1990s, has profoundly limited Canada's ability to project its influence on the international scene. A less well-known but serious decline in Canada's foreign service has likewise affected Canada's international posture and reputation. Although the authors acknowledge Canada's substantial role in Afghanistan, their outlook for a recovery of our defence and diplomacy is thoroughly pessimistic, at least for the shorter term.

Of immense value is the book's detailed historical review of the Canada-US relationship in each of the main areas of intersection between the two nations. This is especially useful in that in each instance the history is presented in turn from the Canadian and then the American perspective.

Two important messages emerge in the course of this book. First, over the years there has been an ebb and flow in the way in which Canadians and Americans get along. In 2007, the relationship is at a low point because of some difficult issues, exacerbated by traditional Canadian smugness towards things American, and habitual American indifference towards their northern neighbour. Secondly, given their different approaches to nationhood, citizens of both countries need to learn more about the neighbour on the other side of that undefended border, which both separates us and binds us together so closely in a relationship that is unmatched in history for its underlying friendship and its responsiveness to intelligent debate rather than armed conflict.

David T. Jones and David Kilgour, Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs: Canada, the USA and the Dynamics of State, Industry and Culture. Mississauga, Ontario, John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd. ◙

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff. He is currently President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute

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