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ONTRACK



WHAT IMPACT Would A New American President Have on Canada?

AFGHANISTAN:

A Human Resources Challenge for Health Services Branch

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM – Pakistan's Experience

CHARLIE WILSON'S WAR: Imperium manqué





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THE COVER LA COUVERTURE

Prime Minister Stephen Harper addressing the CDAI seminar February 2008.

PHOTO: SAM GARCIA

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

This Spring edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current significance in the areas of, among others, Afghanistan, Canada-U.S. relations, Pakistan, Iraq, the Canadian Forces, and 'Charlie Wilson's War'. I write this coming off the most successful seminar the CDA Institute has held to date.

Our 24th Annual Seminar was held on the 21st of February. Its theme, 'Canada's National Security Interests in a Changing World', was a timely one, given the ongoing debate surrounding Canada's role in international security. The Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar was held, was filled to capacity. There was significant media interest in the seminar, in which simultaneous interpretation was provided. I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received.

The highlight of the seminar was the keynote address by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada. This is the first time that the Prime Minister of Canada has addressed the CDA Institute and the first time since 1978 when he addressed the Conference of Defence Associations. The seminar was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, ambassadors, military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College of Canada and from Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, and members of the Canadian public. The day was filled with speakers from across Canada and from Pakistan and the United States.

Electronic copies of the addresses that were delivered at the seminar are available at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm>.

The seminar was held in conjunction with the 71st annual general meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA). The AGM began with a meeting of the CDA Council on Wednesday, 20 February, and carried on with the general meeting on Friday, 22 February. Addresses included those of Mr. Laurie Hawn, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence; General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff; Admiral William Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central Command; General Raymond Henault, Chair of the Military Committee, NATO; Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff; Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff; Brigadier-General Gary O'Brien, Director General Land Reserve; and Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, Chief of the Air Staff. During Mr. Hawn's address he presented a video that the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of



Colonel (Ret)
Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

Le numéro du printemps de *ON TRACK* contient des articles d'une grande actualité dans les domaines, entre autres, de l'Afghanistan, des relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis, du Pakistan, de l'Iraq, des Forces canadiennes et de la « Guerre de Charlie Wilson ». J'écris ces lignes au sortir du séminaire le plus réussi que l'Institut de la CAD ait tenu jusqu'à maintenant.

Notre 24^e séminaire annuel s'est tenu le 21 février. Son thème, « Les intérêts de sécurité nationale du Canada dans un monde en changement », ne pouvait mieux tomber, étant donné le débat en cours qui entoure le rôle du Canada dans la sécurité internationale. La salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, dans laquelle se tenait le séminaire, était remplie à capacité. Les médias se sont beaucoup intéressés au séminaire, pour lequel l'interprétation simultanée était fournie. J'ai le plaisir de noter que les réactions que nous avons reçues ont été très positives.

Le point saillant du séminaire a été l'allocution principale prononcée par le très honorable Stephen Harper, premier ministre du Canada. C'était la première fois que le premier ministre du Canada s'adressait à l'Institut de la CAD depuis 1978, alors qu'il avait pris la parole à la Conférence des associations de la défense. Assistaient au séminaire des membres des Forces canadiennes, des ambassadeurs, des attachés militaires, des élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, ainsi que des membres du public canadien. La journée a été remplie de conférenciers de tous les coins du Canada, du Pakistan et des États-Unis.

On peut se procurer des copies électroniques des allocutions prononcées lors du séminaire à l'adresse <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/defenceseminars.htm>.

Le séminaire a été tenu de concert avec la 71^e assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD). L'AGA a commencé par une réunion du conseil d'administration de la CAD, le mercredi 20 février, et s'est poursuivie avec l'assemblée générale annuelle, le vendredi 22. On a entendu M. Laurie Hawn, secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de la Défense nationale, le Général Rick Hillier, chef d'état-major de la Défense, l'Amiral William Fallon, commandant du U.S. Central Command, le Général Raymond Henault, président du Comité militaire de l'O.T.A.N., le Vice-Amiral Drew Robertson, chef

National Defence, recorded a few days prior to the seminar. Minister MacKay was out of country at the time that the seminar was held.

Both the annual seminar and the annual general meeting were truly successful, reflecting the public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and national defence. Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald presents for the readers of *ON TRACK* a summary of the proceedings.

The presence of so many speakers from around the world was made possible through the generous financial support of General Dynamics, Pratt & Whitney Canada, Boeing, Bombardier, Queen's University, the Department of National Defence, NATO, and Canadian Heritage. Following the conclusion of the seminar was a reception, graciously hosted by General Dynamics.

We are pleased to begin the 13th year of publication of the CDA Institute's *ON TRACK*. The journal is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada, with the presentation of excellent articles by experts in those fields.

The emergence of Asia as a major trading bloc began decades ago, with the appearance of 'miracle economies' in Japan and South Korea. More recently we have witnessed explosive economic growth in China and India, and can foresee that other Asian nations have at least the potential to follow the pattern. The CDA Institute's Vimy Paper 3, *Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security*, soon to be published, presents a compelling picture of the region and what we as Canadians should be doing to ensure a productive and secure relationship with our neighbours to the west.

Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security was edited by Colonel (Ret'd) MacDonald, the CDA Institute's Senior Defence Analyst. Contributing authors were Paul Chapin, Brian Job, Larry Black, Jim Boutillier, Seth Cropsey, John Blaxland, Roger Girouard, and Ken Summers. Vimy Paper 3 will soon be published.

We have included an introduction to *Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security* in this edition of *ON TRACK*. The link to the full text of Vimy Paper 3 (when published) will be found at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDAI_menu.htm.

Dwight Mason notes, in "Canada and the New American Administration – an Opportunity", that a new administration coming to power in Washington, following the U.S. federal election this autumn, presents an opportunity for Canada to shape Canada-U.S. relations. Mr. Mason writes that in the fundamental context of the Canadian-U.S. relationship there is a shared common geographic, economic, environmental, security, and defence

d'état-major de la Force maritime, le Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre, le Brigadier-général Gary O'Brien, Directeur Général – Réserve terrestre et le Lieutenant-Général Angus Watt, chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne. Pendant son allocution, M. Hawn a présenté une vidéo de l'honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, enregistrée quelques jours avant le séminaire. Le Ministre MacKay était à l'étranger au moment où le séminaire avait lieu.

Le séminaire annuel et l'assemblée générale annuelle ont tous deux connu un grand succès, reflet de l'intérêt accru du public envers le rôle du Canada dans la sécurité internationale et la défense nationale. Le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald présente aux lecteurs de *ON TRACK* un sommaire des actes de ces réunions.

La présence d'un si grand nombre de conférenciers provenant de tous les coins du globe a été rendue possible grâce au généreux appui financier de General Dynamics, de Pratt & Whitney Canada, de Boeing, de Bombardier, de l'Université Queen's, du Ministère de la Défense nationale et de Patrimoine canadien. Suite à la conclusion du séminaire, une réception a été gracieusement commanditée par General Dynamics.

Nous sommes heureux d'entreprendre la 13e année de publication du journal *ON TRACK* de l'Institut de la CAD. Le journal est un véhicule important grâce auquel l'Institut contribue de la valeur à la discussion sur les questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la présentation d'excellents articles rédigés par des experts de ces domaines.

L'émergence de l'Asie comme bloc d'échanges commerciaux a commencé il y a des décennies, avec l'apparition des « économies miracles » au Japon et en Corée du Sud. Plus récemment, nous avons été témoins d'une croissance explosive en Chine et en Inde, et nous pouvons prévoir que d'autres nations asiatiques ont au moins le potentiel de suivre ce modèle. Le « Vimy Paper 3 », intitulé *les Canadiens et la sécurité en Asie-Pacifique*, que l'Institut de la CAD s'apprête à publier, présente une image convaincante de la région et de ce que nous, comme Canadiens, devrions faire pour nous assurer d'une relation productive et sûre avec nos voisins de l'ouest.

Les Canadiens et la sécurité en Asie-Pacifique a été placé sous la direction rédactionnelle du Colonel (ret.) MacDonald, analyste principal de la défense de l'Institut de la CAD. Les auteurs participants sont Paul Chapin, Brian Job, Larry Black, Jim Boutillier, Seth Cropsey, John Blaxland, Roger Girouard, et Ken Summers. Le Vimy Paper 3 paraîtra sous peu.

La présente édition de *ON TRACK* comprend une introduction à *les Canadiens et la sécurité en Asie-Pacifique*. Le lien vers le texte



The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada speaking at the 24th Annual CDA Institute Seminar. It was the first time that the Prime Minister of Canada has addressed the CDA Institute.

Le point saillant du 24^e Séminaire de l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense a été l'allocution principale prononcée par le très honorable Stephen Harper, premier ministre du Canada. C'était la première fois que le premier ministre du Canada s'adressait à l'Institut de la CAD.

PHOTO: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (RET'D) GORD METCALFE

space. Mr. Mason is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Louis Delvoie writes in "Canada's International Security Policy: Afghanistan Is Not Forever" that Canada had made, and continues to make, a heavy investment of military, diplomatic and development resources in Afghanistan. He believes that Afghanistan should not be allowed to crowd off the agenda a host of other issues, and provides us with a list of challenges to Canada's interests in the 21st century. Monsieur Delvoie is Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.

complet du Vimy Paper 3 (après sa parution) se trouvera à l'adresse http://www.cda-cdai.ca/CDAI_menu.htm.

Dans l'article *Canada and the New American Administration – an Opportunity*, Dwight Mason note que l'arrivée au pouvoir d'une nouvelle administration à Washington, suite aux élections fédérales américaines de l'automne, présente une opportunité pour le Canada de donner forme aux relations Canado-américaines. M. Mason écrit que, dans le contexte fondamental de la relation entre le Canada et les États-Unis, on partage un espace commun au niveau de la géographie, de l'économie, de l'environnement, de la sécurité et de la défense. M. Mason est "senior associate" au Center for Strategic and International Studies de Washington.

Louis Delvoie écrit, dans *Canada's International Security Policy: Afghanistan Is Not Forever*, que le Canada a fait, et continue à faire, en Afghanistan de lourds investissements en matière de ressources militaires, de diplomatie et de développement. Il croit qu'on ne devrait pas permettre à l'Afghanistan d'occuper tout l'agenda au détriment d'une pléiade d'autres enjeux et il nous donne une liste des défis qui attendent le Canada au 21^e siècle. M. Delvoie est agrégé supérieur de recherches au Centre pour les relations internationales de l'Université Queen's.

Maintenant que le rapport Manley a été publié et que la Chambre des Communes a voté pour prolonger la participation du Canada à la force d'assistance en matière de sécurité de l'Afghanistan, il est opportun d'identifier les vrais besoins de troupes de l'Afghanistan et l'implication que ce besoin peut avoir sur nos chefs militaires et politiques. Le Major-Général (ret.) Terry Liston examine, dans *Afghanistan: How Much Is Enough?*, la relation entre la mission et les niveaux de troupes qui sont nécessaires pour réussir dans la poursuite de cette mission. Le Major-Général (ret.) Liston a commandé le 5^e GBMC à Valcartier, il a servi sur des missions de l'O.N.U. et il a été Chef de la planification opérationnelle et du développement des forces des Forces canadiennes.

Le Canada a assumé le commandement de l'hôpital de rôle 3 au terrain d'aviation de Kandahar (KAF – Kandahar Airfield). Cet hôpital de l'O.T.A.N. est responsable des soins médicaux pluridisciplinaires pour les membres de l'Armée nationale afghane et de la Police nationale afghane blessés lors des opérations de combat. Il offre également des services médicaux et chirurgicaux d'urgence aux personnes de service de la coalition dans le Commandement régional du Sud. En réponse au besoin d'augmenter les ressources médicales des Forces canadiennes, des spécialistes médicaux, infirmiers et chirurgicaux civils ont commencé à faire leur apparition dans les calendriers de rotation des déploiements au début de 2007. C'est dans le cadre de cette entreprise que le Dr David Puskas fut déployé au KAF en

Now that the Manley report has been released, and the House of Commons has voted to extend Canada's participation in the Afghan security assistance force, it is timely to identify Afghanistan's real troop requirement, and the implications for our military and political leaders. Major-General (Ret'd) Terry Liston examines, in "Afghanistan: How Much Is Enough?", the relationship between the mission and the troop levels that are required to carry out that mission successfully. Major-General (Ret'd) Liston commanded the 5^e GBMC in Valcartier, served on UN missions, and was Chief of Operational Planning and Force Development of the Canadian Forces.

Canada has assumed command of the Role 3 hospital at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). This NATO asset is responsible for definitive medical care for Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police members injured in combat operations. It also provides emergency medical and surgical services to coalition service-persons operating in Regional Command South. In response to the need to augment the medical resources of the Canadian Forces, civilian medical, nursing and surgical specialists began to enter the deployment rotation schedules in early 2007. It was as part of that endeavour that Dr. David Puskas deployed to KAF during July and August 2007. We are very pleased to include Dr. Puskas's report, "Afghanistan: A Human Resources Challenge for Health Services Branch", for our readers. In his report Dr. Puskas provides some interesting options to address the "green hole" in the chain of command. He is Associate Professor and Program Director Orthopedic Surgery, Northern Ontario School of Medicine; Chief of Orthopedics, Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Centre; and Medical Director, Lake Superior Centre for Regenerative Medicine.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Talat Masood has written, in "International Terrorism – Pakistan's Experience", that the Taliban and other militant groups from Afghanistan cross-over into Pakistan's tribal belt, taking advantage of their historical, cultural, tribal, and religious links. As a consequence most of the tribes in the border belt are radicalized and, in the last two years, a synergy has developed between al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Masood provides us with a brief history that has led to the current state of affairs and offers a common vision for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Masood was a member of Panel II, "Afghanistan: Challenges Ahead", at the CDA Institute's seminar this year.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stephan Mariano, US Army, writes in "On Track in Iraq: Building and Professionalizing the Iraqi Security Forces" that Iraqi forces have grown massively since their controversial disbandment in 2003. He outlines for us the objectives of the coalition organization charged with building capacity of the Iraqi Security Ministries and developing the Iraqi Security Force

juillet et août 2007. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure le rapport du Dr Puskas, intitulé Afghanistan: A Human Resources Challenge for Health Services Branch, à l'intention de nos lecteurs. Dans son rapport, le Dr Puskas offre quelques options intéressantes pour fermer le "trou vert" dans la chaîne de commandement. Il est professeur agrégé et directeur du programme de chirurgie orthopédique de l'École de médecine du Nord de l'Ontario, chef de l'Orthopédie du Centre régional des sciences de la santé de Thunder Bay et directeur médical du Centre de médecine régénérative du Lac-Supérieur.

Le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Talat Masood a écrit, dans International Terrorism – Pakistan's Experience, que les Talibans et autres groupes de militants provenant d'Afghanistan passent par la ceinture tribale du Pakistan en tirant avantage de leurs liens historiques, culturels, tribaux et religieux. En conséquence, la plupart des tribus présentes dans la ceinture frontalière sont radicalisées et, au cours des deux dernières années, une synergie s'est développée entre al-Qaïda et les Talibans afghans et pakistanais. Le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Masood nous donne une brève histoire qui a mené à l'état actuel des choses et nous offre une vision commune en ce qui a trait au Pakistan et à l'Afghanistan. Il a été membre du Panel II, « L'Afghanistan : les défis de l'avenir », lors du séminaire de cette année de l'Institut de la CAD.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Stephan Mariano, de la US Army, écrit, dans On Track in Iraq: Building and Professionalizing the Iraqi Security Forces, que les forces iraqiennes ont connu une croissance massive depuis leur démantèlement controversé, en 2003. Il nous décrit les objectifs de l'organisation de coalition chargée de bâtir la capacité des ministères iraqiens de la sécurité et de développer la Force iraqienne de sécurité (ISF – Iraqi Security Force), qui sont : s'assurer que la génération de la force reste sur la bonne voie, augmenter le niveau d'indépendance opérationnelle de l'ISF, améliorer la performance du ministère iraqien de la sécurité et renforcer le professionnalisme.

Dans Ethics in Counterinsurgency, le Capitaine Nils French concentre son attention sur deux systèmes d'éthique, l'un universel et bien défini, l'autre particulier au Canada et moins clairement défini, et il allègue que l'éthique et la contre-insurrection vont la main dans la main. Le Capitaine French est l'instructeur canadien du programme d'échange à la US Army Engineer School, à Fort Leonard (Missouri). Les lecteurs se rappelleront peut-être des discussions précédentes sur un sujet connexe, l'attrition, qui ont été publiées dans ON TRACK (Automne 2004, Vol 9, No 3; et Hiver 2004, Vol 9, No 4).

Le Major-Général Daniel Gosselin a prononcé une des deux allocutions principales lors du 10^e symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés de l'Institut de la CAD, en octobre dernier. Ses remarques

(ISF), which are: ensuring force generation remains on track, increasing the level of ISF operational independence, improving Iraqi security ministry performance, and strengthening professionalism.

Captain Nils French focuses, in "Ethics in Counterinsurgency", on two systems of ethics: one universal and well-defined, the other specific to Canada and less-clearly defined, and argues that ethics and counterinsurgency go hand in hand. Captain French is the Canadian Exchange Instructor to the US Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Readers may recall earlier discussions on a related topic, attrition, that were published in *ON TRACK* (Autumn 2004, Vol 9, No 3; and Winter 2004, Vol 9, No 4).

Major-General Daniel Gosselin delivered one of the two keynote addresses at the CDA Institute's 10th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, last October. His remarks centered on the transformation of the Canadian Forces and noted that the change environment the CF is facing is without precedent and that key decisions taken now will shape the CF for years to come. We are pleased to include an abridged version of Major-General Gosselin's remarks in this edition of *ON TRACK*. He is Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy.

David Jones writes, in "Generalizations about Generals", that members of the Canadian Forces and the United States military operate under carefully constructed regulations that firmly guide what they can say and in what capacity they can say it. He notes that General Hillier's critics damn him with faint praise or just damn him for interfering in domestic politics. David Jones is a retired U.S. senior Foreign Service officer.

Dr. J.L. Granatstein was honoured at the fall convocation of the Royal Military College of Canada, on 16 November 2007, when he received an Honorary Doctorate of Military Science. We are very pleased to include his convocation address in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

Eric Morse examines the activities of an American Congressman, Charlie Wilson, while he reflects on the consequences to the Roman Republic of the First Triumvirate of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus, in "Charlie Wilson's War: Imperium manqué". Some of the details of Charlie Wilson's activities are detailed in "Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001", by Steve Coll.

This edition of *ON TRACK* concludes with a review by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald of the book, "Accrual Accounting and Budgeting in Defence", by Lieutenant-Colonel Ross Fetterly and Major Richard Groves. This book is of primary utility to those working in the analysis of defence budgets, particularly in the capital

ont porté sur la transformation des Forces canadiennes et ont noté que l'environnement de changement auquel les FC font face est sans précédent et que les décisions importantes qui sont prises maintenant vont donner forme aux FC pour des années à venir. Il nous fait plaisir d'inclure une version abrégée des remarques du Major-Général Gosselin dans la présente édition de *ON TRACK*. Il est commandant de l'Académie canadienne de la Défense.

Dans l'article *Generalizations about Generals*, David Jones écrit que les membres des Forces canadiennes et les militaires des États-Unis opèrent selon des réglementations construites avec soin, qui guident de façon stricte ce qu'ils peuvent dire et à quel titre ils peuvent le dire. Il note que les critiques du Général Hillier l'accablent de louanges tièdes ou tout simplement lui reprochent d'interférer dans la politique intérieure. David Jones est un agent sénior à la retraite du Service extérieur des États-Unis.

M. J.L. Granatstein a été honoré lors de la collation des grades de l'automne du Collège militaire Royal du Canada, le 16 novembre 2007, alors qu'il a reçu un doctorat honorifique ès sciences militaires. Il nous fait grand plaisir d'inclure son allocution de circonstance dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Eric Morse examine les activités d'un Congressman américain, Charlie Wilson, tout en réfléchissant sur les conséquences du premier Triumvirat de César, Pompée et Crassus sur la République romaine ; c'est l'objet de *Charlie Wilson's War: "Imperium manqué"*. Certains des détails des activités de Charlie Wilson sont détaillées dans l'ouvrage de Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*.

Ce numéro de *ON TRACK* se conclut sur un examen, par le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald, du livre *Accrual Accounting and Budgeting in Defence*, du Lieutenant-Colonel Ross Fetterly et du Major Richard Groves. Ce livre est de première utilité pour ceux qui travaillent dans l'analyse des budgets de la défense, particulièrement dans le domaine du renouvellement des immobilisations. Le Colonel (ret.) MacDonald note que le livre comprend un certain nombre de tableaux qui donnent des sommaires des portefeuilles d'immobilisations actuels. Il inclut deux tableaux dans sa présentation afin d'illustrer son propos.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD et la Conférence des associations de la défense ont été et seront impliqués dans diverses initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des questions de sécurité et de défense du Canada.

J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que le conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD a tenu sa troisième assemblée annuelle à la

renewal field. Colonel (Ret'd) MacDonald notes that the book includes a number of tables which provide summaries of existing capital holdings. He includes two tables in his review to illustrate his point.

In addition to producing ON TRACK, the CDA Institute and Conference of Defence Associations have been and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence issues:

I am pleased to report that the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute held their third annual meeting following the annual seminar. The meeting was productive, during which the way ahead for the Institute was discussed in detail. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Bill Carr, Mr. Pete Fisher, and the Honourable Roy Maclaren have retired from the Board of Directors. We wish to offer them our sincere thanks for the contribution of their counsel to the CDA Institute. The members of the Board represent a cross-section of outstanding Canadians. At the same meeting the Board of Directors unanimously approved the appointment of Dr. John Scott Cowan, Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada, as President of the CDA Institute and Chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors, succeeding General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, who held these posts for the past three years.

On the evening of 22 February the Army Officers' Mess was the scene for CDA's annual mess dinner. The dinner represented the largest gathering of supporters of CDA, including many who attended the annual seminar and AGM. It was our privilege to say thank you to General (Ret'd) Manson for his three years of inspired leadership as President of the CDA Institute. During the evening he was honoured with the presentation by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, CDA Chairman, of a magnificent sculpture, "The Crewman".

Along with General (Ret'd) Manson, guests of the CDA included Mr. Laurie Hawn, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence; General (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers, former Chief of the Defence Staff (1980-1983); General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain, former CDS (1989-1993 and 1994-1995); General Raymond Henault, former Chief of the Defence Staff (2001-2004); General Rick Hillier; Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Talat Masood, former Secretary for Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence, Pakistan; and Colonel, the Honourable John Fraser, former Speaker of the House of Commons.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with the large number of excellent submissions that were received by the Vimy

suite du séminaire annuel. La réunion a été productive ; on y a discuté en détail de l'avenir de l'Institut. Le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Bill Carr, M. Pete Fisher et l'honorable Roy Maclaren se sont retirés du conseil d'administration. Nous voulons leur offrir nos remerciements les plus sincères pour leur contribution et les avis dont a pu bénéficier l'Institut de la CAD. Les membres du conseil représentent un échantillonnage complet des Canadiens exceptionnels. À cette même réunion, le conseil a approuvé à l'unanimité la nomination de M. John Scott Cowan, principal du Collège militaire royal du Canada, comme président de l'Institut de la CAD et du conseil d'administration de l'Institut, succédant au Général (ret.) Paul Manson, qui a occupé ce poste pendant les trois dernières années.

Dans la soirée du 22 février, le Mess des officiers de l'Armée a été la scène du dîner régimentaire annuel de la CAD. Le dîner représentait une grande réunion de supporters de la CAD, y compris un grand nombre de ceux qui avaient assisté au séminaire et à l'AGA. Nous avons eu le privilège de dire merci au Général (ret.) Manson pour ses trois ans de leadership inspiré à la présidence de l'Institut de la CAD. Pendant la soirée, il a été honoré par la présentation par le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Richard Evraire, président de la CAD, d'une magnifique sculpture "The Crewman."

En plus du Général (ret.) Manson, nous avons comme invités de la CAD M. Laurie Hawn, député, secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de la Défense nationale, le Général (ret.) Ramsey Withers, ancien chef d'état-major de la Défense (1980-1983), le Général (ret.) John de Chastelain, ancien CEMD (1989-1993 et 1994-1995), le Général Raymond Henault, ancien chef d'état-major de la Défense (2001-2004), le Général Rick Hillier, le Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Talat Masood, ancien secrétaire à la production de la Défense du ministère de la Défense du Pakistan, et le Colonel, l'honorable John Fraser, ancien président de la Chambre des Communes.

Une des activités majeures du calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un succès retentissant, avec la grande quantité d'excellentes candidatures qui ont été reçues par le comité de sélection du prix Vimy qui a eu comme point culminant la présentation du prix au Général Raymond Henault par Son Excellence la très honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure générale du Canada et patronne de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

La présentation du prix Vimy de cette année aura lieu le vendredi 14 novembre au cours d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui

Award Selection Committee, and culminating with the presentation of the Award to General Raymond Henault by Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada and Patron of the Conference of Defence Associations.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on Friday, 14 November at a gala reception and dinner, which will be held, by popular demand, at the Canadian War Museum. The Governor General has, once again, been invited to present the Award to this year's recipient. To make the Award truly meaningful the CDA Institute needs your nominations. CDA member associations, as well as private individuals, are encouraged to submit nominations to the Vimy Award Selection Committee. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this publication.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Award Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2007 was Mr. Matthew Fisher. This prestigious award, sponsored by CDA in association with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented to a Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the general public of Canada's defence and security issues. The Award will be accompanied by a \$2,500 cash prize. The notice of the call for nominations appears elsewhere in *ON TRACK*.

From time to time the Canadian Forces sponsors brief visits to the troops in Afghanistan for various interested parties. I am very fortunate to have completed just recently my second visit with our troops in the Afghan theatre. I am pleased to report that NATO's mission, on behalf of the United Nations, to bring peace and stability to the people of Afghanistan is succeeding with thanks, in no small part, to the human and materiel resources that Canada is providing. I was accompanied on the visit by some colleagues who will provide us, in the next edition of *ON TRACK*, with their observations of the mission.

During the visit we met with, among others, the Commander of JTF-Afghanistan BGen Guy LaRoche, Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan Arif Lalani, Commander ISAF General Dan McNeill, and top Afghan officials such as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Zia and Minister of Defence Wardak. Our group also visited a forward operating base at Ma'sum Ghar and the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar; they met with LCol Dana Woodworth, Commander of the KPRT; and Col JF Riffou, Commander of Canada's Operational Mentor and Liaison Team. We also visited Colonel Serge Labbé, head of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan, in Kabul. Our group came to the conclusion that the mission is not failing, although it could be accelerated if more resources were provided.

seront tenus, à la demande générale, au Musée canadien de la guerre. La gouverneure générale a été, encore cette fois-ci, invitée à présenter le prix au récipiendaire de cette année. Pour que le prix ait tout son sens, l'Institut de la CAD a besoin de vos mises en candidature. Les associations membres de la CAD, ainsi que des individus privés, sont encouragés à soumettre des candidatures au comité de sélection du prix Vimy. Consultez l'avis de mise en nomination qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro.

Le prix Ross Munro pour les médias sera également présenté lors du dîner du prix Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix pour 2007 était M. Matthew Fisher. Ce prestigieux prix, commandité par la CAD, de concert avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, sera présenté à un ou une journaliste canadien/ne qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le grand public des enjeux de défense et de sécurité du Canada. Le prix sera accompagné d'un prix en argent de 2 500 \$. L'avis de mise en nomination paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

De temps à autre, les Forces canadiennes commanditent de brèves visites aux troupes situées en Afghanistan par divers groupes intéressés. Je suis très chanceux d'avoir complété très récemment ma deuxième visite de nos troupes sur le théâtre afghan. J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que la mission de l'O.T.A.N., au nom des Nations Unies, qui vise à apporter la paix et la stabilité au peuple de l'Afghanistan, réussit en grande partie grâce aux ressources humaines et matérielles fournies par le Canada. J'étais accompagné dans cette visite de quelques collègues qui vous donneront, dans le prochain numéro de *ON TRACK*, un compte rendu de leurs observations de la mission.

Pendant la visite, j'ai rencontré, parmi d'autres, le commandant de la FOI-Afghanistan, le B-Général Guy LaRoche, l'ambassadeur de l'Afghanistan au Canada, Arif Lalani, le commandant de la FIAS, le Général Dan McNeill, ainsi que de hauts dirigeants afghans, comme le ministre de la réhabilitation rurale et du développement, M. Zia, et le ministre de la défense, M. Wardak. Notre groupe a également visité une base d'opération avancée à Ma'sum Gar et l'équipe provinciale de reconstruction à Kandahar ; il a rencontré le L-Col Dana Woodworth, le commandant du KPRT, et le Colonel JF Riffou, commandant de l'équipe opérationnelle de mentors et de liaison du Canada. Nous avons également visité le Colonel Serge Labbé, chef de l'Équipe consultative stratégique – Afghanistan, à Kaboul. Notre groupe est arrivé à la conclusion que la mission dénote des progrès marqués, bien qu'elle pourrait être accélérée si on lui fournissait plus de ressources.

Il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés des grands enjeux des opérations militaires

There still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of domestic and international military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the CF, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute by which we are able to carry out our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one (and recruit a friend or colleague). Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available online at <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>. ♦

Thank you.

intérieures et internationales, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et du déficit continu dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins à long terme de notre pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD va cependant continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité de ce pays.

En terminant, je veux remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, ce qui nous permet de réaliser notre mission. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais de le devenir (et de recruter un/e ami/e ou un/e collègue). Le formulaire de donateurs est imprimé sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut se le procurer en ligne à l'adresse <http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm>. ♦

Merci.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute) provides public information services on national security and defence issues by conducting studies, seminars and symposia, and publishing their results in print. The CDA Institute is a charitable and non-partisan organization whose ability to prosecute its mandate depends on private donations.

The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.

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du

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LE 21 FÉVRIER 2008

24TH ANNUAL CDA INSTITUTE SEMINAR & 71ST CDA ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

21-22 February 2008, Ottawa

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

The 24th CDA Institute Annual Seminar attracted a total audience of approximately 500—the largest attendance in recent memory. In part this was driven by the fact that the speaker list included the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada. The last time that a serving Prime Minister had addressed the CDA and/or the CDA Institute was in 1978 when the Rt. Hon. Pierre Trudeau was Prime Minister.

Interestingly both occasions marked the beginning of a period of expanding defence budgets and substantial major capital equipment procurement. Prime Minister Trudeau authorized an annual real (i.e. on top of inflation) growth rate of 3% in the defence budget, and while we no longer have a copy of his speech at the time we speculate that it would likely have dwelt on the significant defence budget increases to be made in that and following years.

Prime Minister Harper, in a speech which displayed strong support for the defence department and its people, spoke of Canada's increasing role in the global landscape and of the importance of the Canadian Forces (CF) commitment to Afghanistan and elsewhere as a vital element in achieving that role. He also took the opportunity to remind us of the significant increases in the defence budget promised, and delivered, by his government and announced a further increase in the amount intended as partial compensation for inflation, increasing it from 1.5% to 2% annually.

The following day Defence Minister Peter McKay, speaking in a pre-recorded video address, reiterated the government's promise of expanded defence budgets and new capital equipment programmes, noting in passing that two of the new C-17s had already been delivered and were in service supplying long range strategic lift for our forces in Afghanistan. He was followed by his Parliamentary Secretary, Laurie Hawn, who also paid tribute to the successes of the CF in Afghanistan as well as to the deepening contribution of the reserve forces to the maintenance of the Afghanistan mission.

The CDA Institute Seminar itself contained three panels. The first, chaired by Mel Cappe, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, was devoted to an analysis of the Afghanistan operation in terms of the "Whole of Government" concept; the second

panel looked forward to the future challenges in Afghanistan; and the third examined other contemporary security concerns.

The three members of the first panel, David Maloney, Deputy Minister, the Afghanistan Task Force, LGen Michel Gauthier, Commander Expeditionary Command, and Stephen Wallace, Vice President CIDA, Afghanistan Task Force, agreed that the Report of the Manley Commission has provided a blueprint for the further development of the Afghanistan mission.

The luncheon speaker, Thomas d'Aquino, Chief Executive and President of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, noted that a recent report of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, offered a very sobering assessment of global risks which concluded that geopolitical, economic and environmental risks in most of the categories measured were trending upwards. He held that the message was clear. Canada cannot isolate itself from severely negative outcomes that may arise in the geopolitical, environmental and global economic domains.

Mr. D'Aquino noted that in the past two and one half decades that the Canadian Council of Chief Executives has studied Canada's defence needs, their conclusion was always the same: our armed forces are too small in size, they are underfunded and under-equipped, and that the funding, the equipment and the training of our armed forces is of critical importance.

The second panel, chaired by Ian MacDonald of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, included Nigel Fisher of UNICEF Canada, LGen (Ret'd) Talat Masood of the Pakistani Army, and Professor Thomas Johnson of the US Naval Postgraduate School. The speakers agreed with the first panel that much has been accomplished in Afghanistan, but that massive problems remain.

Some of the central government ministries, especially those dealing with development, are making effective progress but the central government is still dependent on external donors for the majority of its budget; the international donor community is itself badly coordinated and focused on short term aid horizons. Donor management of programmes is not always coordinated with Afghan government priorities. The inadequacy of the central government's finances makes it very difficult to generate funds to support government

agencies at the provincial and especially at the district level. Indeed, there is a real case to be made for the development of “District Reconstruction Teams”.

The insurgency is divided internally, which makes the idea of negotiating with the Taliban problematic at a practical level. There are increasing links to international jihadists whose primary aim is the removal of foreign forces as a first step in the restoration of their power.

Narcotics, crime, leftover warlords, and police corruption are huge problem areas which cannot be solved easily or within a short timeframe.

Events in Pakistan, which is still host to 5 million Afghan refugees, continue to be problematic. While the recent Pakistan elections offer some encouragement with the defeat of President Musharraf’s widely disliked party, and especially the defeat of the religious parties in the North-West Frontier province, the existence of Pakistan insurgent forces supported financially by Middle-East funds and drug trade profits, as well as popular dislike for the “Global War on Terror,” continues to make Pakistan a highly unstable factor.

The third panel, chaired by Christopher Westdal, former Canadian Ambassador to Russia, included John Scott Cowan of RMC, Joseph Cirincione of the Center for American Progress, and Piotr Dutkiewicz of Carleton University. The panel looked at parallels between the War on Terror and the earlier War on Piracy, nuclear non-proliferation, and the position of Russia.

Joseph Cirincione noted four problematic areas: the possibility of nuclear terrorism; the fact that the US and Russia still hold massive arsenals of nuclear weapons amounting to some 25,000 warheads; the prospect of new states (Iran, North Korea) acquiring nuclear weapons, and the complete breakdown of the International Non-Proliferation Regime. He condemned the abandonment of the NPR by the current US administration as a “disastrous” policy development.

Piotr Dutkiewicz rejected the “New Western Consensus” that Russia is aggressive and corrupt, arguing that Russia is neither a military nor an economic threat to the West, but rather a state whose primary focus is necessarily internal. Russia feels itself threatened by proposed NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, by developments in Kosovo, by the US missile deployment in Poland, and a possible push for the further division of Russia.

John Cowan drew a parallel between the rise and decline of piracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the rise (and

potential decline) of terrorism in the twentieth century.

The second day of the conference, the annual meeting of the CDA itself, began with the presentations by the Minister and Parliamentary Secretary already alluded to, and was followed by what we have learned in retrospect was the final address of General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, to the CDA. In a vary upbeat address he reminded us of the overwhelming public support for the CF and for military families being expressed by the members of the Canadian public, of the success in starting to deal with the process of re-equipping the CF, of the response of Canadians to the recruiting drives to re-invigorate the human resources of the Forces. Finally, he pointedly addressed the political elites of the country by posing the question whether it was really too much to ask of parliamentarians that, having debated the issue in the House on many occasions and finally passed a motion to extend the mission in Afghanistan, they support the Canadian Forces deployed in that mission—a question which received massive applause from the audience.

Admiral William Fallon, Commander of US Central Command, began with an assessment of developments in Iraq, noting that the security situation in that country, though still troublesome, had markedly improved, and that the Iraqi security forces were growing in numbers and quality. He had a similar assessment for Afghanistan, pointing to the ongoing progress in infrastructure building and economic development paralleling the growing strength and quality of the Afghan National Army, and added that Afghanistan/Pakistan cooperation was improving. Finally he expressed his delight with the recovery of the Canadian Forces and its battlefield performance in Afghanistan as a clear indication of its restoration.

Canadian General Ray Henault, Chair of the Military Committee of NATO, noted that Afghanistan and Kosovo were the main priorities for NATO, and that NATO transformation was addressing the need to increase its expeditionary capabilities. He cited NATO’s success in mounting multi-national operations with the Afghanistan mission involving 39 nations, including non-NATO states. He emphasized the role of NATO forces in the training and development of the Afghan National Army, commenting that the work of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams were a top priority for force generation for the ANA.

This was followed by two panels providing an assessment of where the CF was in terms of both the impact of the Afghanistan mission and of CF Transformation. What was particularly striking in these panels was the recognition of the vastly changed roles and employment of the CF Reserves.

Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Michel Maisonneuve, the newly

appointed Academic Director of Collège Militaire Royale de St. Jean, began the development of this theme with the blunt statement that the CF cannot operate without its Reserves and that, therefore, the Regular and Reserve elements of the CF must be mutually supportive. BGen Gary O'Brien, Director General Land Reserve followed up by pointing out that 20% of the Afghanistan mission strength is Reserve (and 25% of the land forces deployed). What was particularly striking was the statement that over 10% of the Reserves are now combat veterans and by 2009 that percentage will have risen to almost 20%.

Lieutenant-General Andy Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff, declared that the Regular/Reserve relationship is now closer than it ever has been, a fact that is driven by the outstanding performance of the Reserves deployed to the Afghanistan mission and the increased rate of component transfer from the Reserves to the Regular Army. He then moved on to describe a number of the elements of Army Transformation noting that new tasks had been assigned to the Army including the training of the Afghan National Army, and at home the assignment of the Canadian Rangers to command of the Army. He noted that the Afghan experience was driving new doctrine and new structures in the now completely digital Army and shaping the new capabilities and new equipment needed to implement the new doctrines.

Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Naval Staff, pointed out the importance of the CF's global naval capability, and our ability to both put a ship in NATO Standing Force Atlantic and to be able to have a Canadian frigate operate as a member of a US

Battle Group. However, such global capabilities, with their important impact upon Canada's international standing, remain dependent upon an effective capabilities "new ship" building programme. Here, while the Navy is to receive new Joint Support Ships to replace the aged AORs, new Arctic Patrol Ships, and mid-life refits for the Patrol frigates, there remains the problem of the replacements for the Destroyers which are at the end of their service life.

Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, Chief of the Air Staff, noted the success in achieving a high level of land/air integration in Afghanistan, as well as an increasing level of "fast air"/"rotary" cooperation. He noted a number of other developments driven by the Afghanistan experience such as the fact that one of the most useful attributes of UAVs is the deterrence effect of the sound of their engines, particularly at night, on insurgent operations. He also noted the importance of Precision Guided Munitions in avoiding "collateral damage," and the emerging doctrine development of the use of air power in counter-insurgency operations, and a newly emerging concept of air CIMIC. He also bluntly defended the medium helicopter acquisition process, noting that the specification determination process was not "gold plating" but rather the determination of requirements over the entire service life of the new machines, including operations in other areas than simply Afghanistan.

Both the CDA Institute's 24th annual seminar and the Conference of Defence Associations' annual general meeting were truly successful, reflecting the public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and in national defence. ♦

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JEUDI, LE 21 FÉVRIER 2008

GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT GENERALS

by David Jones

Now that Canadians have what ostensibly they have desired – a military figure who will tell truth to power – they are suffering the consequences of getting what they wished for. Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier is anything but reticent. His problem is that telling truth to power makes officials (essentially those not in power) uncomfortable. Hillier's critics damn him either with faint praise (he improved Canadian Forces morale; fought for better equipment, etc.) or just damn him for interfering in domestic politics.

As a retired diplomat, I am hardly insensitive to the issue of civilian control over the military. Throughout much of the world, national armed forces exercise direct or indirect control over civilian life, and have done so throughout history, regardless of whether generals have put on mufti while running sham elections endorsing their reigns. Canada and the United States are all but unique in our axiomatic expectation that men with guns will accept the authority of men with pens.

Members of the Canadian Forces and the United States military operate under carefully constructed regulations that firmly guide what they can say and in what capacity they can say it, while preserving their Charter and Constitutionally protected right of free speech.

But frankly, as a south-of-the-border observer who was present at the Conference of Defense Associations annual general meeting on February 22 when Hillier spoke, it is very hard to see where he crossed any political lines. The text of Hillier's speech indicates that he outlined some clear realities.

First, he noted several recent and dramatic acts of terrorism in the Kandahar area. He did not connect them with the political debate in Canada, but said that he could not deny the possibility. That appears to be an unremarkable observation.

Second, he suggested that the Taliban was aware of the extended debate over Canada's mission in Afghanistan and might seek to influence it. Surely, anyone out of elementary school appreciates that global communication means extended knowledge, and Canadian ambivalence toward their role in Afghanistan is hardly a secret. And equally obviously, just as Canadians seek to "win hearts and minds" in Kandahar, the Taliban seeks to dissuade Canadians from a continued commitment. That is a basic tenet of Propaganda 101.

Third, he sought clear and prompt guidance on Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Mr Diithers is not an object of veneration in any military structure.

Finally, he hoped for a resolution of parliamentary support for the Canadian Forces. Again, it is hard to see malicious intent in such a request. Regardless of whether you oppose any military presence anywhere and/or believe the best way to support Canadian Forces is to quarter them safely in homeland garrisons, these men and women are Canadian citizens attempting to execute the will of the people and their elected leaders to the best of their abilities. Saying "atta-boy" is not a policy endorsement.

While Hillier noted the reality that without security there can be no development, he also emphasized the reverse of the coin: without development there can be no sustained security. It is also useful to note that he repeatedly emphasized the Canadian Forces' willingness to do any task directed by Parliament to the best of their abilities; there was no implicit or explicit challenge to civilian control.

There has been an intimation in the commentary about General Hillier throughout his service as CDS that he is too much of an arguably good thing: a military leader rather than a bureaucrat in uniform. The judgment that he is "a soldier's soldier" and that "the troops love him" has an undertone of implicit distaste, as if military leadership in the 21st century should be supplied by computer specialists programming robots for combat missions. Thus the suggestion that Hillier should take off his uniform and compete in the political arena if he wishes to advance what his critics interpret as political causes.

As Hillier strongly implied at the end of his CDA address that he was ending his term as CDS, Canadians may have an opportunity to see another facet of his character. Historically, in contrast to the United States, Canadians have had little interest in transmuting their senior military figures into elected political roles. But were General Hillier in the US armed forces, he would have a clear option for a political career. ♦

David Jones is a former intelligence officer for the United States Army, former analyst for the bureau of intelligence at the (U.S.) Department of State, now a retired U.S. senior Foreign Service officer. Mr. Jones also served as a political minister counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa.

VIMY PAPER 2008

CANADIANS AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

The CDA Institute's Vimy Paper for 2008, titled *Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security*, and edited by Brian MacDonald, is now "In Press." Who better to describe its contents than the distinguished set of chapter authors who have uniquely contributed to its success and have each provided the chapter abstracts which follow.

Paul Chapin, Vice President (Programs) at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, argues that there is a new security context to which Canadian public policy has not yet fully adjusted. It features old problems not settled by the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new global conflict as complex and potentially lethal as the Cold War, and a witches' brew of failed states, gangster regimes and black marketers in weapons of mass destruction. As is the case of other democratic states, Canada needs both a "home game" to protect itself within North America and an "away game" to contain and eventually dispose of the threats emanating from other continents. There has been progress on both, but not enough. After a decade of policy contrary to self-interest and the atrophy of Canada's international assets, the Martin government sought to re-root Canadian strategic policy in Canada's national interests. But old political habits and a recalcitrant bureaucracy combined to defeat the effort. The Harper government better understands the impact external developments have on Canada's national interests and is more determined to exercise international leadership on issues that matter for Canadians. The government may not have issued a comprehensive statement of its international policy, but its pronouncements leave no doubt as to the direction of its strategic policy

Christian Constantin, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of British Columbia, and Brian Job, Director of the Liu Centre at UBC, report that China's strategic vision in the new millennium aims at achieving three objectives: safeguarding a peaceful international environment conducive to its domestic economic development, ensuring the protection of its sovereignty (including its reunification with Taiwan), and playing a 'responsible' role at the great powers' table. These goals do not amount to a "Grand Strategy" designed to upset the international order. Yet, China's economic and military



**Colonel (Ret'd)
Brian MacDonald**

rise has been viewed with concern. We argue that this suspicion comes from an understanding of international relations based on capabilities and on the "Power Transition Theory" which may lead to dangerous self-fulfilling prophecies.

J.L. (Larry) Black, director of the Centre for Research on Canadian-Russian Relations (CRCR) at Georgian College of Laurentian University, states that Russia's diplomatic and economic relationships with individual European and North American countries, as well as with institutions such as the EU and NATO, have reached a certain impasse. Moscow has had much greater success with Central Asian, Southeast Asian, and Asian countries. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (ShCO) and associated bodies, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurEC) are the leading lights of a renewed pattern of Russian integration eastward. The six-member ShCO is especially important because it includes China as co-leader, and welcomes Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia as official observers. Member-states are discussing seriously the formation of an Energy Club and a customs union. They adopt common positions on international affairs and have created joint anti-terrorist mechanisms. In the last six months of 2007, existing collective security infrastructures and militarizing agencies have been enhanced. So as not to be taken by surprise, we need to take heed of these developments.

Dr. James Boutillier, the Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor at Canada's Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, believes that we are currently in the midst of what is, arguably, the most dynamic maritime era in living memory. By virtually any metric – shipbuilding tempo, energy flows, megaport development, container traffic, trans-oceanic commerce, the growth of navies, the creation of coast guards and the likelihood of piracy or terrorism – this is a period sans pareille, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Both India and China, reliant on export-driven economies, have reoriented their national axes toward the sea. Both nations are building up their naval power and the United States Navy (USN), concerned about the dramatic growth of the Chinese navy, has repositioned the bulk of its carrier and submarine assets into the Pacific. At the same

time, the USN has sought to enlist the support of like-minded navies – in keeping with the 1,000-ship navy concept – and to build a navy-to-navy relationship with the Indian Navy (IN); a move buttressed by closer relations between the IN and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force. These tectonic shifts in naval power and the problem of reconciling national foreign policy objectives with operational priorities constitute a series of significant challenges for the Canadian Navy operating in the Pacific.

Seth Cropsey, who was Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, argues that US foreign policy objectives in Asia are to prevent the rise of a hegemonic power that can challenge the U.S. militarily, or exercise political dominance in a region that is home to half the earth's population. US concern about China's rapidly growing economy—and America's relationship with it—is understandable. There is today no other single state which is more important to the future of U.S. international relations than China. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is in the midst of a modernization program that will extend its blue water and amphibious capabilities and substantially complicate the U.S. Navy's ability to conduct operations in portions of the western Pacific. U.S. actions and words aimed at China need to become more straightforward and assertive if U.S. policy is to succeed in its declared objective of bringing China into an international system based on respect for human rights, support for peace, free markets, non-proliferation, and the recognition of sovereignty. Above all, U.S. policy must keep forward-based military forces visible and powerful in the region.

Colonel John C. Blaxland, Ph.D., a serving officer in the Australian Army, notes that Canada and Australia are working more closely together on operations than they have since the Korean War. Their low-profile but substantial ties have drawn them, in parallel, to work alongside the United States and other like-minded coalition partners. The three services of the Canadian Forces and of the Australian Defence Force have a remarkable range of similarities that merit ongoing cross examination and collaboration. As Canada considers its role in the Asia-Pacific, there is no country more worthwhile considering closely than Australia.

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Roger Girouard whose last appointment was that of Commander Joint Task Force Pacific and Maritime Forces Pacific, presents an overview of Joint Task Force (Pacific) and the

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challenges facing Canada's western domain. He sets the scene by providing a succinct yet comprehensive review of Indo-Pacific economic, demographic and security issues at play on Canada's doorstep. He then turn to the creation of CANADA COMMAND and Joint Task Force (Pacific) by first offering commentary on the force mix in place when these two elements were stood up, considers the gaps in domestic security and disaster management which exist in the Province of British Columbia, and concludes by offering recommendations for future force development.

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers, who was Commander CF Middle East during the 1990 Gulf War, concludes that the 21st Century will bring global economic and security challenges to Canada, but none will be more complex than those of the Asia-Pacific region, which will be defined increasingly by the regional powers, and particularly by China and India. These regional challenges may range from natural disasters, to national conflicts over resources, to failed/failing states, and to economic competitions that potentially involve the region's ever-expanding militaries. Canada must look west across the Pacific to meet these challenges. Recent government policy indicates a greater willingness to intervene to defuse and stabilize tensions and conflicts with responses ranging from strong diplomatic initiatives, to disaster assistance, to military interdiction by stability, peace support, or even intervention operations. However, the Canadian government's crisis response track record has been marginal at best, suffering from tardy decision-making and an inability to deliver a timely and effective response. Two changes are required. First, the government must establish a "whole of government" crisis response organization to follow developing situations, keep officials briefed, know departmental capabilities, and plan prudent and timely responses. Second, the government must become capable of implementing responses by acquiring the Standing Contingency Task Force capabilities outlined and approved in Canada's International Policy Statement for Defence.

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, formerly Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada, and most recently President of the CDA Institute provides the conclusions of the book. ♦

To obtain a copy of Vimy Paper 3, please contact the CDA Institute by email at projectofficer@cda-cda.ca or phone (613) 236-9903.

CANADA AND THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION

– AN OPPORTUNITY

by Dwight Mason

The US federal election in fall 2008 will bring a new administration to power in Washington in early 2009. This is an opportunity for Canada to shape US-Canada relations, one that does not come often.

Situation facing the new Administration

While there is uncertainty about the identity of the next Administration and Congressional majorities, there is little uncertainty about the situation they will face. Conflict in the Middle East, failed and failing states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and fragile foreign relations constitute some of the international challenges, while more domestic considerations include illegal immigration, health care, the economy and financial system, and the environment.

A Democrat Administration would probably seek to adopt more rational fiscal policies than a Republican one and in particular would seek to prevent the Bush Administration's tax policies from becoming permanent. It would take environmental issues seriously, propose an immigration policy that would tighten the borders and provide some route to citizenship for illegal aliens now in the US. It would seek to terminate the war in Iraq and to shift focus to Afghanistan and Pakistan as the real centres of the war on terrorism. It would probably adopt a slower and more critical approach to further expansion of global free trade. At present both Democrat candidates are also promising to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

A Republican Administration probably would try to continue the fiscal policies of the Bush Administration, including promising not to increase taxes and making the tax cuts permanent. It would also seek to toughen immigration policies and their enforcement, strengthen border controls including more fencing, while possibly establishing a route to citizenship for some illegal aliens. Finally, it would make some accommodations in the environmental arena and try to prevail in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeing radical Islamic extremism as "the transcendent threat of the 21st century."¹

Despite its wishes and priorities, any new Administration will find its foreign and domestic policies constrained and perhaps driven by events at home and abroad. A new Administration of either party would probably be receptive to and indeed encourage multilateral approaches to international problems when possible, always being prepared in the end to act unilaterally to defend the

vital interests of the country. One consequence of such a policy is likely to be US pressure for serious, effective multilateral action including equitable burden sharing.

What about Canada?

What does this mean for Canada? First, Canada is not a feature of the American election. No one is campaigning about softwood lumber and other alleged Canadian subsidies. No one is campaigning about Canadian Arctic policy, despite regular Canadian statements on this subject, or the several maritime boundary disputes. Canadian immigration and refugee policy is not attracting attention. However, both Democrat candidates have introduced the notion of renegotiating NAFTA. Therefore it is possible that aspects of the US relationship with Canada and Mexico could become election issues if the Democrat candidates pursue and emphasize this idea.

Nevertheless, the policies of a new Administration in Washington will affect Canada. At a minimum Canada will want to ensure that these policies take Canadian interests into account. Ideally it would want to shape them to protect and advance those interests.

From the substance of the campaign so far, it would appear that issues such as the economy and fiscal policy, immigration and the border, homeland security and terrorism, and environmental degradation are important and may increase in importance. All these issues affect Canada directly. The policies of a Democrat Administration would seem to be preferable to those of a Republican one from a Canadian perspective, with the exception of the matter of NAFTA renegotiation. However, the actual differences in practice may not be as large as Canadians may anticipate, and they may sometimes be more of tone than substance. In the end, the US will conduct its domestic and foreign policies to protect and to promote what it believes to be in the American interest. For example, the next Administration is unlikely to significantly relax border management policies with respect to the identification of persons; in fact, it may ultimately strengthen them.

US policy toward Canada

The fundamental context of the US-Canadian relationship is that we share a common geographic, economic, environmental, security, and defense space. The basic trend in North America is toward broader and deeper integration. We have a shared responsibility for managing these spaces and this trend. Given these circumstances,

one might expect that there would be an organized and coherent perspective in Washington on its relationship with Canada. However, there is not, and on reflection this is not surprising: a large and complex relationship necessarily involves many actors.

Nevertheless, there are a few principles which inform and underlie US policy toward Canada: Canada should remain united and prosperous; the security and defence of North America requires the cooperation of both countries; the North American economy is best understood as a single unit; and the two countries share a traditional and informal commitment to a problem-solving approach to matters of dispute.

Beyond these general principles there is frequently the application to Canada of numerous functional policies by nearly all US departments and agencies, influenced by individual states, non-governmental organizations, special interest groups, and Congress. This is because of the impact on US domestic interests of many aspects of American relations with Canada. The closer and more integrated the relationship becomes, the more attention it will get from domestic American (and Canadian) interests, and the more difficult it will be to manage. Thus much of US policy toward Canada can be described as fragmented, derivative and a function of the priorities of agencies and groups focused on particular issues. None of this is going to change as a result of the elections.

New Administration: A problem or opportunity for Canada?

Canada will face a new Administration which will be more competent and responsible than the present one. It will be well disposed towards, but not too well informed about or focused on, US-Canadian affairs.

Canada can see this either as a problem or an opportunity. If Canada chooses to wait and see what policies the Administration adopts toward Canada, then it will likely come to see the Administration as a problem. This is true because the Administration, if left to itself, is not likely to pay much attention to Canadian affairs because they are not a source of trouble compared to other matters. On the other hand, if Canada chooses to see the advent of a new and friendly Administration as offering an opportunity to shape the relationship, it could have a considerable impact by expressing clearly at the highest levels how it would like the relationship to evolve.

If Canada should decide on the latter, the next question is, what might Canada want to accomplish?

In thinking about this question, one has to consider the context. As noted above, the US and Canada share a common space which is becoming increasingly integrated, in significant part as the result

of non-governmental decisions and actions. Thus whatever Canada might propose should address how this increasingly deep and broad integration in North America should be understood and managed. This is especially true if the new Administration actually does insist on renegotiating NAFTA.

A Canadian grand North American policy?

In the last several years considerable thought has been given in Canada to the subject of a grand North American policy. The best list and description of these ideas was set out by Ambassador John Noble in 2004.ⁱⁱ The ideas he lists range from various kinds of continental perimeters to economic-security agreements. It is an impressive catalogue.

The clearest statement of these ideas in their broadest sense is expressed in the Canadian Council of Chief Executives' (CCCE) call for a new grand North American strategy in 2003. The Council said, "issues of trade and investment are now inextricably intertwined with those of defence and security." The CCCE's North American Security and Prosperity Initiative of January 2003 proposed a strategy with five major elements: reinventing borders, maximizing regulatory efficiencies, negotiation of a comprehensive resource security pact, reinvigorating the North American defence alliance, and creating a new institutional framework.ⁱⁱⁱ

Ambassador Allan Gotlieb made a similar suggestion in 2004, writing that the "national interest requires a grand strategy ...whether in the form of a common market, a customs union... greater economic integration should be accompanied by a common security perimeter."^{iv} Danielle Goldfarb,^v Bill Dymond and Michael Hart,^{vi} Wendy Dobson,^{vii} and Alexander Moens^{viii} all make similar points, particularly with respect to the need for new rules to govern further economic integration, although Moens also emphasizes defense.

John Noble sums this up well, writing, "[a] new arrangement for economic security with the United States is required. It needs to be as comprehensive as possible and it needs to be ambitious and of sufficient weight to catch attention in Washington. It will probably involve creation of a strengthened economic perimeter around Canada and the United States, going beyond free trade to a common external tariff basis at this time, but the possibility of Mexico participating at a later time should not be excluded."^{ix}

In the defense area, there has also been considerable discussion on how to manage North American defense in the post-9/11 world. Much of this was written in the context of the most recent renewal of the NORAD Agreement in 2006. Some argued that NORAD's missions should be expanded from air defense and space warning to the other environments of land and sea on the grounds that NORAD had been very successful and that expanded

cooperation was necessary in the light of the new post-9/11 situation.^x

The most important recent intellectual effort in this area was the work of the Bi-National Planning Group, which submitted its final report in March 2006. They found that “an overarching vision for continental defense and security organizations is missing” and recommended that the two governments provide an agreed “Canada-United States vision to provide direction and authority for enhanced coordination and cooperation among our political, defense and security organizations” by means of a “Comprehensive Defense and Security Agreement with a continental approach to CANUS defense and security.”^{xi}

The two governments did not accept these recommendations. Nevertheless, they are well thought out and deserve further consideration. Indeed some limited consideration is being given to this general subject in the current Tri-Command [NORAD, CANCOM and NORTHCOM] Study.

Nevertheless what is happening at present in the US-Canadian continental defense relationship is a retreat from the bi-national approach of NORAD to a bi-national one. This is apparently happening without high-level political review in either country. As Jim Fergusson recently wrote, the defense “relationship has been changing over time with implications for bi-national defence coop-

The question for Canadian policy is what kind of defense relationship it wants with the US, and does it want that matter left to officials and military officers.

eration and Canadian defence policy below the political radar screen.”^{xii} The cost to Canada in terms of policy influence and access may be considerable. As one Canadian observer put it, “[the] struggle . . . is for nothing less than our nation’s role in the security of our homeland.”^{xiii}

The question for Canadian policy is what kind of defense relationship it wants with the US, and does it want that matter left to officials and military officers. Quoting Jim Fergusson again, “Canadian policy makers need to recognize the process underway and closely evaluate exactly what type of aerospace defense relationship is in Canada’s interest in the future.”^{xiv}

Deciding what Canada should do about these issues is hard both substantively and politically. However, Canada’s relationship to the US is important to Canada, so such a Canadian effort would be worthwhile. ♣

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CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: AFGHANISTAN IS NOT FOREVER

by Louis Delvoie

Every September of every year the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meets in New York. The first few weeks of each of these sessions are devoted to what is known as the "general debate." This is an opportunity for the foreign ministers of all of the member states to reflect on the state of the world and to outline their countries' policies on a wide range of issues of importance to them.

On October 2, 2007 Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier delivered the latest Canadian statement in the UNGA general debate. It was remarkable in several respects. Running to less than three pages, it was probably the shortest such Canadian statement on record. But it was not only very brief, it was also very thin in terms of substance. Half of the speech was focused on Afghanistan. The rest consisted of a few pious platitudes and passing references to Haiti, Burma and Sudan. And that was it.

What was primarily remarkable about Minister Bernier's speech was not what he said, but what he did not say. No mention whatsoever of Canada's relations with the United States, the European Union or emerging economic powers such as China and India. No reference to major zones of conflict such as the Balkans, Palestine or the Persian Gulf. Nary a word about nuclear weapons proliferation or climate change. And he did not even see fit to say anything about the Arctic or Latin America, both of which have been identified by Prime Minister Harper as policy priorities for the current Canadian government.

Unfortunately Minister Bernier's statement to the UNGA is not a one-off. It is symptomatic and indicative of an almost total pre-occupation with Afghanistan on the part of those responsible for formulating Canada's foreign and international security policies. That Afghanistan should be high on the list of priorities of Canadian policy-makers is undeniable. It is a theatre of the highest importance in efforts to combat international terrorism. And Canada has made and is making a heavy investment of military, diplomatic and development resources in that country. That said, Afghanistan should not be allowed to crowd off the agenda a host of other issues, some more enduring and some more important to Canada's long term interests than Afghanistan will ever be.

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Beyond the current focus on terrorism and Afghanistan, those responsible for Canada's international security policy should be paying due attention to a variety of real or potential challenges to Canada's interests in the 21st century. Ranging from the conventional to the unconventional these include:

- inter-state conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East;
- ethno-religious conflicts and civil wars in Europe and Asia;
- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;
- the international narcotics traffic and organized crime;
- mass illegal migration;
- cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism and cyber-war;
- competition for supremacy in outer space.

These are all challenges which will be with us long after Canada has withdrawn from Afghanistan, whether under happy or unhappy circumstances.✦

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AFGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

by Major-General Terry Liston (Ret'd)

Prodded by Canada's demands, NATO's Bucharest summit in April 2008 produced a firm commitment to deploy an additional French battalion to Afghanistan's security assistance force, giving the lead to others who may increase both their presence as well the flexibility of employment of their contingents. There is a clear consensus that more troops are needed, as ISAF hikes its stated requirement to three additional brigades. It is therefore timely to identify Afghanistan's real troop requirement and the implications for our military and political leaders.

Resources to fit the mission?

One approach is to have the mission determine the number of troops. The objectives in Afghanistan are multiple, ranging from retribution and counterterrorism to the virtual re-engineering of Afghan society into an oasis of secular Western democracy and freedom. The essential military problem is that an insurgency is raging. The focus of operations is therefore not on the enemy and territory, but rather on the "people" that have to be both "wooded" and, above all, protected. It is a struggle "for hearts and minds".

US doctrine recognizes that the key to any counterinsurgency (COIN) effort is establishing security for the civilian population. General Craddock (SACEUR) insisted that "the key - is to be able to have a continuous presence - control an area - stabilize it, then you can build - Where there is a government or ISAF presence, the Taliban are not going to prevail." Lt Gen Sir David Richards, the previous ISAF commander, said that NATO can take ground, but, lacking troops to hold it, the Taliban come back and soldiers' lives would have been lost for nothing.


How much is enough? In 1995, James Quinlivan, a RAND mathematician, published a study that influenced the new US COIN manual. FM 3-24 recommends using a "troop density" ratio of security forces, including host-nation military and police, to inhabitants. It says: "Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents - Twenty counterinsurgents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations."

Therefore, in Afghanistan, the real requirement is for a minimum of 640,000 security personnel. Even General McNeil, the ISAF commander, has repeatedly conceded that he would need "well over 400,000" for the country.

Even a most generous assessment of existing forces in Afghanistan totals only 208,250 security personnel, 32.5% of the real requirement. These consist of about 56,250 international troops and 152,000 Afghan security personnel. Were we to use more realistic assumptions, this figure would drop to 20% - 25% of the requirement. In comparison, Iraq, a smaller and less populous country, exceeds the required minimum force level for even Afghanistan, with over 700,000 security forces, of which 162,000 are international, mostly American. This number does not even include the allied Sunni militias.

General McNeill's reaction is to put the onus on the Afghan forces: "What I think we need, more than huge numbers of international forces, is effective capacity in the Afghan national army and in the Afghan national police." Indeed, some are now suggesting that NATO could declare 'victory' and leave, when the Afghan forces are able to hold, unassisted, their national capital and other large population centres. However, even if the ANA were to grow to 200,000 men (as the Afghan Defence Minister is now suggesting) and the ANP were to approach 100,000 (as a NATO analysis suggests), the total Afghan security forces would still represent less than half of the true security requirement. Unless the ANA, ANP and private security guards reach a level close to 600,000, which is twice the size of the most audacious dreams of the Afghan military leadership, their forces will be inadequate.

The impact of this lack of manpower is evident. The most recent US intelligence assessment reveals that only 30% of the country is controlled by the Karzai government. Some of the rest is run by the Taliban (10%), while most of the country (60%) is "under the influence" of local tribes. It was indeed predictable that government and international forces, with less than one-third of the needed strength, would control less than one-third of the country.



Mission to fit the resources?

So what can we do? Admittedly, the first reaction of resource-poor planners is to juggle their troop lists to accomplish the assigned missions in phases, over an extended time-frame. However, in COIN operations such as in Afghanistan security forces must remain so as to ensure the continued security of areas they have cleared. As for NATO troops, only two of the 24 European members of NATO have provided manoeuvre units to ISAF in its combat role in the south. Juggling inadequate troop lists will not accomplish the mission.

The mission must therefore be adjusted to fit the resources. An approach put forward by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown seeks a shift in strategy that would favour "hard-headed realism" working "with the grain of Afghan tradition", "where local volunteers are recruited to defend homes and families modelled on traditional Afghan 'arbakai'." The support of tribal militias has already been implemented in the US sector of eastern Afghanistan and in Iraq's Anbar province. However, the downside of reinforcing tribal militias is that "these deals with the lesser devils – will (strengthen) sectarian warlords." Much effort has already gone into disarming these warlords and militias and into creating a non-sectarian national police force and army.

An even more audacious policy adjustment is suggested by those who favour restricting the mission strictly to counterterrorism and securing the border, "as it was before NATO arrived in the South", using a light footprint based on "intelligence – and on special forces operations." However, it is felt that in Iraq this approach did not "secure the population from terrorist attacks (and) led to consistent increases in terrorist violence". Success only came with the large influx of US conventional forces, willing and able to protect the population, "something that special forces and long-range missiles alone can't do."

The most far-reaching policy-adjustment option is national reconciliation, requiring the negotiation of a political end-state with the insurgents. "Reconciliation" is found in virtually all international mandates for Afghanistan. Negotiations are favoured by a majority of the Afghan population and the Afghan Upper House, and are supported by President Karzai. Even the Taliban are in heated internal discussion. In Europe, the UK, among others, has voiced its belief in negotiations. In Canada, among the credible supporters are the Senlis Council and Gordon Smith, former ambassador to NATO and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Smith argues that the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily or eliminated as a

"political entity", and certainly not with the small increase in forces currently envisaged. The Taliban's wide constituency has legitimate concerns that must be addressed, he says. The Afghan head of the Human Rights Commission in Kandahar made a telling point: "the Taliban were a part of this country – they must be brought back for there to be peace."

The main obstacle has been the United States' view that it "does not negotiate with terrorists". The policy of Canada's government and official opposition on reconciliation follows that of the US.

Conclusion

We have seen that Afghanistan's security forces are less than one-third of the real requirement, and it seems evident that this gap will not be reduced. Accordingly, the Karzai government, with international support, controls only one-third of the country. Although these enclaves of control can be held against insurgents, current troop levels will not permit much further expansion. Consequently the war will continue indefinitely with no resolution. This is neither a desirable nor responsible goal.

The implication is clear: military leaders must demand a coherent set of policies and resources from their governments and from the international organizations that have blessed the Afghan mission. Lacking 400,000 more international and Afghan security forces, the current mission to impose drastic societal transformation on a population the size of Canada's must be significantly reformulated.

Our political masters must then give missions that are *doable* with the troops they provide. These mandates could be limited to border control and counterterrorism, using only a *light footprint* of special forces and air strikes. 'Success' could simply be the creation of a nucleus of effective Afghan forces, holding the main population centres. Alternatively, governments could agree to allow tribal groups to re-establish their own governance and security, accepting as a lesser evil the rebirth of *tribal militias*. Finally, our political leaders could consider *reconciliation* and a negotiated peace with the insurgents. Whatever strategic objective is selected, it must be coherent with the real provision of a sufficient level of security forces and, in parallel, the necessary development funds.♦

Major-General (Ret'd) Terry Liston, of the Royal 22^e Régiment, commanded the 5^e GBMC in Valcartier, served on UN missions and was Chief of Operational Planning and Force Development of the Canadian Forces.

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AFGHANISTAN: A HUMAN RESOURCES CHALLENGE FOR HEALTH SERVICES BRANCH

by Dr. David A. Puskas

Canadian military involvement in the war in Afghanistan has challenged our country in many diverse ways. For its citizenry it has been difficult to shed our lovingly held self-image as peacekeepers and to re-adopt a more historic role as peacemaker and liberator. The sight of flag-draped caskets at ramp ceremonies in Kandahar and deplaning at Trenton have stressed our national resolve and created political opportunity for those who oppose any use of force by Canadian personnel. The duration, complexity and operational tempo of the conflict have also stretched Canadian military human resources, with many families deploying more than once since the outbreak of hostilities.

As part of this multifaceted mission Canada has assumed the command of the Role 3 hospital at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). This NATO asset is responsible for definitive medical care for Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police members injured in combat operations. It also provides emergency medical and surgical services to coalition servicemen operating in Regional Command South. For coalition personnel the hospital provides definitive care only if the condition or injury is one that will allow the service member to return to duty in theater. If, however, the condition is such that return to duty in theater is unlikely then stabilizing care is given and transport is affected to national assets outside of the theater of

operations. For Canadians wounded in action requiring transport from theater, the next level of care is provided in Landstuhl, Germany. When stabilized, Canadians are then repatriated to civilian medical facilities close to their home unit or where the required specialized care is available.

The Role 3 in Kandahar is a multinational unit. The majority of personnel are Canadian; however significant contributions are made by American, Dutch, Danish, British, and Australian personnel. The hospital has 28 in-patient beds, a four-bed intensive care unit, and is continuously growing. Medical and nursing specialists are augmented by military Physician Assistants (PA) and Nurse Practitioners (NP). There are two surgical teams consisting of an anesthesiologist, general surgeon, and orthopedic surgeon. Maxillofacial surgery and neurosurgical services are shared by Canada and Britain. Only recently has neurosurgery been continuously available on-site at KAF.

The intensity and complexity of the surgical case load has mandated the majority of medical specialists, excluding the maxillofacial surgeons, deploying for 8-10 week rotations. This has produced a very high burn through rate in the military medical personnel from every one of the contributing countries. This has been especially true for Canada since we have provided more than 50% of all of the medical staff at the Role 3 since we took command in 2006.

Many NATO countries have moved away from maintaining large military hospitals since the end of the Cold War. Canada's last full-service military hospital closed at the end of the 1990's, leaving Canadian military medical specialists to care for Canada's armed service members in civilian hospitals. During this period of transition, fewer physicians of all types chose to practice within the military health services, leaving the armed forces severely under-doctored in virtually every subspecialty. Orthopedic surgery, general surgery and maxillofacial surgery fared especially poorly.

The coincidence of these challenges has led to a human resources crisis in deployable medical services.

At the same time as the dissemination of military medical specialists to civilian home hospitals has increased intercollegial separation within the military, it has also closed the gap between civilian and military physicians. The acknowledgement that many military specialists now have practices that more closely resemble busy civilian practices than classic military ones has permitted the military medical command structure to consider civilian medical specialists a good fit to augment our forces at KAF.

In response to this obvious need, civilian medical, nursing and surgical specialists began to enter the deployment rotation schedules in

Whether a surgeon is treating severely traumatized civilians in Canada or war injured at KAF, the principles of clinical practice are identical. This makes clinical cooperation easy.

early 2007. To date, civilian radiologists, orthopedic surgeons, general surgeons, vascular surgeons, maxillofacial surgeons, intensive care specialists, psychiatrists, critical care nurses, and operating room nurses have helped our armed forces meet our shared mission objectives with a significant degree of success. It was as part of this endeavor that I deployed to KAF during July and August 2007.

The footprint of the civilian specialist at KAF varies from rotation to rotation. From early July to mid-August 2007 four of five surgeons at the Role 3 were civilian. While it probably is not surprising to anyone that cordiality prevailed, many would be intrigued to realize how easy a fit this group was within the complex human resources infrastructure of the Role 3. The potential clash of cultures was tempered by the compelling nature of the trauma load and the clear clinical interdependence of every practitioner. Very quickly we gelled to the point where Col Arie Van der Krans (Orthopedic Surgeon, Royal Dutch Air Force) dubbed the group the "A-Team" - not to hearken back to the television series of the 1980's, but rather to highlight our unity of purpose.

The success of the embedding of civilian practitioners in a military hospital in a war zone is at least substantially due to the obvious similarity of professional responsibility of civilian and military surgeons and physicians. Whether a surgeon is treating severely traumatized civilians in Canada or war injured at KAF, the principles of clinical practice are identical. This makes clinical cooperation easy. In part it is also the compelling and diverse nature of the trauma treated at KAF that makes this "odd couple" relationship work so well. When a surgeon is forced by the availability of human resources and clinical volume to work far outside his normal practice envelope, help, any help, whether wearing a uniform or a Hula shirt, is welcome.

It is unlikely in the near future that the Canadian military will have its complement of full time specialist physicians. Civilian specialists take at least 11 years to train. This "time to train" is even longer within the military because of the trend for military specialists to enroll during medical school, complete a period of family practice residency, employment of several years as a General Duty

Medical Officer, and then to enroll in a specialty residency complete with post residency fellowship programs. While a concerted recruitment drive targeting trained specialists who are qualified might partially address the human resources shortfall, it is unlikely to be completely successful. Even with generous signing bonuses for both GDMO's and specialists the military remains poorly doctored.

Certainly there exists a pool of civilian specialists who would welcome the chance to serve their country's military in other than a regular force capacity. This has been proven by the number of civilians that have already deployed to KAF. Though clinically skilled and surgically experienced, civilians are clearly inexperienced in things military. As such, civilian specialists cannot fully participate in the administration and organization of the military hospital during their deployment. Unavoidably they leave a "green hole" in the chain of command. Perhaps, therefore, it would be better if those same specialists could have been enrolled within the primary reserve force and deployed on a tactical advisory visit (TAV) instead of a civilian contract. This would make the Role 3 at KAF "greener" and provide a greater pool of medical personnel for any future hospital deployment that the Government of Canada might request. The barriers to this are significant, but less so, in my impression, than the recruitment of a full complement of regular force specialists.

A change in the manner in which reservist specialists are remunerated could enable more specialists to contribute their time and skill to foreign deployments. Unlike regular force specialists, civilians have a cost of overhead that equates to between 25% and 40% of their gross income. At present a busy reservist specialist who either trains within Canada or deploys on a TAV accepts an approximate 50% to 75% drop in income during his time of service.

This is in contradistinction to nursing reservists and regular force personnel who receive a premium in their income when they deploy. All physicians are used to performing under remunerated community service as part of their vocation. As part of a recruitment strategy, however, it is probably ill-advised to try to sell a voluntary decrease in income to prospective military specialists. Perhaps a more reasonable way of addressing this would be to individualize incomes for reservist specialists, making courses and deployments income neutral. Accurate income assessments would be relatively simple based on the fact that the majority of specialists are remunerated through a provincial health care plan. While this would increase the cost to train and deploy reservist surgeons it is likely to greatly increase the number of specialists willing to add part-time military service to their practice spectrum. Instead of civilian surgeons returning from deployment and disappearing back into their civilian practices, this model would increase the number of military specialists with operational experience and therefore increase the capacity of our Health Services Branch to entertain other overseas or domestic deployments.

I am certain that this is a challenging concept institutionally, but probably no more challenging than the idea of deploying civilian specialists to Afghanistan. As a surgical educator I am closely in touch with surgical residents trying to decide where and how they want to practice. It is my belief that without some kind of parity in income, few new surgeons will opt to include full- or part-time military service in their career plans. ♦

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - PAKISTAN'S EXPERIENCE

by Talat Masood

Root causes

The roots of international terrorism and Islamic militancy were sown in the 1980s when Pakistan became a key ally of the United States to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. General Zia ul Haq, an authoritarian military leader who had captured power in 1977, tried to legitimize his regime by making Pakistan a front-line ally against Soviet expansionism. At the domestic level Zia strengthened Pakistan's conservative religious forces that later

greatly influenced Pakistan's policies on Afghanistan and Kashmir. The United States was the prime mover in creating a very large Islamic militant force in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight and support the insurgency in Afghanistan and to act as a bastion against the atheist creed of communism. It was during this period that a large number of seminaries (madrassas) were set up in Pakistan in which Pakistani and Afghan refugees were taught a highly conservative and aggressive ideology that has since backfired. Pakistan also

played host to millions of Afghan refugees, and most of them continue to stay, with adverse consequences for Pakistan's economy, politics, demography, and social fabric.

The abandonment of Afghanistan by the US and western countries after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the late 1980s led to instability and civil war. This had a major fallout on Pakistan's tribal belt and the adjoining North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Moreover, Pakistan's support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 laid the seeds for the rise of an indigenous Taliban in the western regions of Pakistan. The post 9/11 invasion of Afghanistan by the US has placed a great burden on Pakistan, in terms of dislocation and devastation across the Pakistan-Afghanistan divide. The influx of Afghan refugees consisted of a sizeable number of Taliban and members of al-Qaeda, accelerating the process of Talibanization in areas adjacent to the Afghan border. Several Afghan Taliban groups retreated into Pakistan; Pashtun tribal affinity helped them to settle in the tribal belt and in parts of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Neglect of the tribal belt and a weakening of the traditional tribal structures left a vacuum that was filled by militant and obscurantist forces.

Current US and NATO counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan have had a spillover effect on Pakistan. Taliban and other militant groups cross over into Pakistan's tribal belt, taking advantage of their historical, cultural, tribal, and religious linkages. Pakistan has deployed nearly 100,000 troops on its western border and lost over 1,200 servicemen and several hundred injured fighting since the start of the insurgency in 2004. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is nearly 2500 km and is porous. As the normal traffic on any day is 10,000 to 20,000 persons (that too without any visas), it is impossible to control radical elements sneaking in and out.

As a consequence most of the tribes in the border belt, especially in South Waziristan, are radicalized. About 40 small groups in the tribal areas have recently formed an alliance and call themselves "Tehrik Taliban". The current leader of this alliance is Baithullah Mehsud and boasts a following of about 30,000 and dozens of highly motivated suicide bombers. Militant groups in Pakistan, like their counterparts in Afghanistan, receive external support and financial assistance from many sympathizers around the globe, especially from the Middle East. The drug mafia and criminal economy of the region is also supportive of the Taliban. Apart from the huge stockpile of weapons left behind from decades of conflict, access to these financial resources allows the Taliban to buy a range of lethal weapons from the thriving regional black market. In addition, in the last two years a synergy has developed between al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban that makes the threat more serious.

Counter-measures

Pakistan's experience has been that a military response to a growing militancy is not sufficient. A comprehensive policy that combines political, economic, ideological, media, military, and intelligence measures is required. Disrupting Taliban networks through better human intelligence and surveillance is critical. It is important that sources of financial support are tracked and their doctrines and tactics effectively countered. Of course, there are no set performance standards by which success or failure in the war on terror can be measured, apart from tracking casualties or witnessing progress in governance and development.

Militants are using computers and information technologies to their great advantage. Their intelligence is becoming sophisticated, enabling them to hit military targets with precision. Taking a cue from the success of asymmetric warfare in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the new generation of Pakistani Taliban is employing similar tactics in the tribal belt and in settled areas. In 2007, Pakistan experienced more suicide bombs, kidnappings and casualties than in the previous five years. Insurgents have become bolder and have been attacking military posts and bases; when confronted with a major military response, they have withdrawn, as is typical of guerilla tactics. In any case, they do not have to win: maintaining a certain tempo of insurgency is enough to keep the security forces unbalanced and the population in a state of fear and despondency.

There is a need for greater clarity in understanding and defining the nature of the "war on terror". Pakistan's government has been vacillating between tough military action and peace deals that were more pacification than meaningful and verifiable peace agreements. Counter-insurgency strategy should ensure that there is minimal collateral fallout. In the past, during counter-insurgency operations in the tribal belt and other places loss of innocent lives and displacement of hundreds of people created extreme ill will, bringing new recruits into the militant fold.

However, since General Ashfaq Kayani's takeover as army chief there has been a greater focus on professionalism and counter-insurgency operations have been more effective. Like other major armies, Pakistan's army has primarily focused on conventional warfare. However, it is currently in the process of evolving its doctrines, tactics, strategy, and procedures for facing the new threat of asymmetrical warfare.

Democratic governance an effective tool

Pakistan needs to step up its efforts at nation-building as this is a key element in combating conflict. Democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels of communication for participation in policy making, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fuelled the rise of extremism and terrorism.

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Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or téléphone (613) 236 9903.

Hopefully, Pakistan's new political government will try to address the innumerable social and economic problems faced by the people and create an environment where the people are given justice and security at the local level. Poor governance, lack of employment opportunities, high levels of corruption, and prolonged military rule have resulted in growing support for militants.

Promoting democracy and distancing itself from politics has also become a clear imperative for the military. Pakistan has experienced military rule that alienates and sharpens the civil-military divide. Indeed, no war, external or internal, can be won without the support of the people.

A common vision for Pakistan and Afghanistan

The stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan are mutually dependent. While both countries have taken positive steps to improve their relationship, a lot more has to be done to improve coordination and cooperation in intelligence-sharing and security operations. A common vision is required.

For the Taliban, the US presence in Afghanistan motivates them to rise against the occupying power and promote their independence, combining the forces of Pashtun nationalism with fanatic religious forces. To counter this, it is crucial that Pakistan and Afghanistan rely essentially on their indigenous strengths. The two countries should be responsible for engaging in military operations, providing security and undertaking development work. The holding of joint Pakistani-Afghan jirgas to mobilize public opinion and formulate unified policies could be another step towards self reliance.

Challenges ahead for the US and NATO

NATO's role in Afghanistan remains an enigma. On the one hand there is a genuine desire on the part of European governments to reinforce the US' military's efforts by their presence and participation in Afghanistan's nation-building efforts. On the other, there is domestic pressure to withdraw and a feeling of despair that defeat is inevitable. The international community should assist in creating a favorable security environment, display greater commitment in strengthening institutions, and assist Afghanistan in nation-building. International assistance should aim at building or strengthening national capacity for internal development and should be built around indigenous strategies. It is the Pakistanis and Afghans who should be in the driver's seat.

Terrorism has many dimensions and its roots are deeply embedded within society and the nation. Pakistan's greatest challenge is to develop a comprehensive approach in which selective application of military power combined with political dialogue, economic development and social cohesion can bring success in the fight against terror. This approach must have the full support of the people and the international community. ♦

Lt. General Talat Masood served in the Pakistani Army for 39 years, retiring in 1990 as Secretary for Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence. Since retirement, he has been closely associated with think-tanks and universities regionally and globally, working to promote peace and stability in the region. He is currently a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC and associate of Bradford University.

ON TRACK IN IRAQ:

BUILDING AND PROFESSIONALIZING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCE

by LTC Stephen Mariano, US Army

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect those of the United States Army or Department of Defense – *ed.*

Iraqi forces have grown massively since their controversial disbandment in 2003. The US-led Coalition has obviously been a key factor in that growth, but the Iraqis are increasingly accepting responsibility for their own security. The Coalition has gradually shifted its emphasis from "doing" security for the Iraqis to "assisting" Iraqis build capacity in their security ministries. Building the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is not, however, an either/or proposition. Emphasizing four objectives and six key force generation functions

has proved a useful way of building capacity, which will be expanded upon later.

The Iraq Army grew by approximately 60,000 soldiers in 2007. The Iraqi police forces, which include local police, border police and the gendarme-like National Police, collectively grew by close to the same number, resulting in an overall growth of 100,000 security personnel. These numbers do not account for approximately

90,000 concerned local citizens or “Sons-of-Iraq,” who have volunteered to help restore order in their communities. The surge of ISF is nearly unfathomable; even mature management processes in developed countries would have a difficult time recruiting, training, equipping, basing, and employing a force of this magnitude. The Government of Iraq (GoI) is doing just that, albeit with a significant amount of Coalition assistance.

The ISF are comprised of members of the armed forces who work for the Ministry of Defense (MoD) as well as various police components that fall under the control of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). While not uniform in their rate of growth, nearly all have demonstrated progress in qualitative and quantitative terms. Unfortunately, most still suffer from critical capability gaps, including a sustainable logistics system and combat enablers like intelligence and explosive ordnance disposal systems. In the meantime, Iraqi combat forces have surged well past the number of Coalition Forces in the fight and require continued support in critical combat and service support areas.

The coalition organization charged with building the capacity of the Iraqi security ministries and developing the ISF is called the Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). The command enjoys a mixture of attributes: active and reserve, military and police, government civil service and civilian contractor. Three American generals have led the organization: General David Petraeus was the first commander in 2004, General Martin Dempsey was the second, and since June 2007 General Jim Dubik has occupied the role. The organization includes general officers and senior civilians from Australia, Denmark and the United Kingdom, as well as lower-ranking officers from Albania, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. Together, these nations have distilled a complicated mission down to a few specific objectives.

Objectives

The political, military and economic conditions in Iraq have changed between 2004 and 2008. Each commander established objectives appropriate to the environment. For 2008, MNSTC-I has given itself four major objectives: ensuring force generation remains on track, increasing the level of ISF operational independence, improving Iraqi security ministry performance, and strengthening professionalism.

1) Ensuring programmed force generation remains on track. Obtaining and applying human and financial resources remains the essential ingredient in ISF growth. Iraqi units have grown in number and strength but more are needed. These forces need to be generated within proscribed timelines or the counterinsurgency fight may be lost. This effort means not only completing the buildup of combat forces but also finishing the generation of programmed logistics and maintenance capabilities.

2) Increasing the level of ISF operational independence.

MNSTC-I efforts to train and equip individual soldiers, police, leaders, and logisticians are complemented by Multinational Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) efforts to increase unit operational readiness levels. Part of this effort is ensuring that sufficient combat enablers – engineer and fire support as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities – are in place. Policemen on the streets in Baghdad, Basra and Babil not only need uniforms, weapons, and radios, but also police stations, squad cars and regular paychecks.

3) Improving Iraqi security ministry performance.

Many of Iraq’s civil servants and competent military officers fled Iraq during or after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. It will take years to establish a functioning bureaucracy and it may take as much as a generation to restore any semblance of a professional civil service that is transparent, responsive and effective. Fielded forces and police on the streets may be the face of the security enterprise, but staff officers and civil servants working at national and regional-level headquarters provide the necessary backroom competencies that allow for large and complex security organizations that are not only able to fight and win wars, but will also be able to consolidate security gains and maintain a fragile peace.

4) Strengthening professionalism and reducing unacceptable sectarian behavior.

Re-establishing the military and civil service as esteemed professions is a daunting task. Years of Saddam’s authoritarian rule had a stifling effect on ideas about national service while the recent era of rampant sectarianism created a lawless, ‘Wild West’ atmosphere, particularly in the MoI and its police forces. The Independent Commission’s Report to Congress last summer even suggested that the National Police force be disbanded. The tide may be turning, however, and efforts are underway to understand professionalism within the Iraqi context, to decrease acts of malign sectarian behavior and reduce wanton corruption. Both ministries have launched inspector general-type investigations to ensure that rule-of-law standards are well-known and enforced. Last year, the MoI relieved dozens of police commanders for unprofessional behavior and this year, the MoD Center for Military Values, Professional Leadership and Development is working to inculcate principles like discipline, honesty and service to the nation into professional military education and training programs.

Two Bangs for One Buck

MNSTC-I is charged with both the generation and replenishment of forces that will allow the Iraqis to take the lead in counterinsurgency operations and simultaneously improving the performance of the two Iraqi security ministries. Getting “two bangs for one buck” is an effective way to stand-up a capable ISF and to establish functional non-sectarian bureaucracies. This method of building ISF

capability is akin to B.H. Liddell-Hart's "indirect approach" to the objective. To paraphrase the controversial British historian/strategist, sometimes the best way to accomplish the mission is not to aim directly toward it.

The Gol has a partial force management system that needs maturing and repair. The ministries have demonstrated that they can each generate forces; however, the current challenges are developing repeatable processes, synchronizing functions, and integrating across ministries. The Gol is learning to identify and validate strategic requirements and translate those requirements into operational plans and programs. This process is helping the Gol achieve self-sufficiency rather than remaining dependent on the Coalition. The Gol has shown its new-found ability to deploy troops to Diyala, Ninewa and Basra in support of on-going operations.

MNSTC-1 identified six force management functions on which to focus its advisory effort and help the Gol improve its ability to protect the population: acquisition, training, leader development, resource management, sustainment, and force management. These functions are extracted from US Army doctrine but are used by militaries throughout the world and have universal application. They have been successful components of America's security cooperation activities in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America, and the Middle East. Other functions like distribution and separation are important too, but will become a higher priority for the ministries as overall institutional capability matures. While the functions do not happen in sequence, their successful accomplishment requires synchronization in both time and space.

1) Acquisition. This function pertains to both personnel and equipment. The goal is not only to recruit sufficient personnel to meet the needs of ISF expansion and replenishment but also to ensure that recruitment plans and processes are more responsive to changing conditions and the shifting nature of the threat (e.g. al Qaida in Iraq, Shi'a militias, foreign terrorists and facilitators); institutions should also be prepared to surge recruiting to exploit local successes and respond to the so-called "tribal awakenings." On the material side, security organizations should decrease reliance on contracted assistance and increase their organic material acquisition processes. Corruption is endemic to the Iraqi acquisition processes and use of the US Foreign Military Sales program provides an opportunity to conduct transparent transactions.

2) Training. Training refers to turning civilians into soldiers, police or civil servants. The MoD and MoI training bases are operating at or near capacity, and the rapid expansion of the ISF has resulted in a backlog of soldiers and police that have to complete the full training program. All police, for example, require 400 hours of basic recruit training before joining the force, but a vast number have only completed a temporary 80 hour program of

instruction. Reducing the training time has put more police on the street and helped protect the Iraqi population in the short term. In the long-run, however, improving the quality of the force will require getting all policemen through the complete course.

3) Leader Development. To paraphrase an old military adage, 'training teaches you what to think, education teaches you how to think.' And so it is with leader development. Once individuals are brought into a security institution, the organization has a responsibility to create a program that selects candidates for positions of increased responsibility, educates them, and promotes them. Development also means increasing the density of leaders in existing units through alternative means (e.g. officer candidate school, leader recalls) and providing extended education opportunities (e.g. literacy lessons or advanced skills courses).

4) Resource Management. Acquiring material and personnel, getting people trained and educated to the appropriate standards, and establishing sustainment processes requires a robust resource management program. Iraq has not enjoyed the benefits of established budget processes but the certainty of such cycles is especially relevant in an environment of fiscal uncertainty. The US partially offsets fiscal inconsistency by committing approximately \$2bn (US) each year to the Iraqi Security Force Fund. With oil prices rising and the slow but steady return of export capacity, Gol revenues will soon be able to pay all costs associated with training and equipping the ISF. The MoI and MoD are now attempting to extend programming efforts beyond the current year and have improved their inter-ministry coordination with, for example, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Oil.

5) Sustainment. If the Iraqi security ministries want to achieve a modicum of security self-management, they will need to improve their current sustainment processes and procedures. Sustainment means analyzing life-cycle costs for equipment and ensuring career paths for aspiring professionals. Acquisition programs that incorporate modern military capabilities into the army and police, for example, are likely to professionalize the ISF but are likely to have expensive sustainment price-tags. If oil revenues continue to flow, Iraq can afford the costs of these improvements; however, viable sustainment plans will still be needed. Similarly, troop bases and police stations not only need to be built, but the people living on those bases will also depend on the ministries to maintain the facilities and pay the electric bills.

6) Force Management. Perhaps the most important idea in building the Iraqi security enterprise is having competent leaders integrate the above functions. Force management means identifying strategic requirements, exploring concepts that can fulfill those requirements, and then matching ambitions with available resources. Adequate force management allows ministry officials to

synchronize near-term processes and align them with long-term objectives.

Operational Independence and Transition

What makes the MNSTC-I mission so difficult is that success of the six functions is largely defined by the outputs of the Iraqi security ministries rather than by direct Coalition action. Coalition advisors can teach, coach and mentor Iraqi ministers and generals, but ultimately the decision to commit resources is a sovereign Iraqi choice.

Furthermore, while the “face” of the security enterprise is a highly-decorated member of the ISF, the six functions listed above are largely performed by faceless bureaucrats and nameless staff officers. Developing a functioning security apparatus requires military and civilian advisors, each with the requisite knowledge and experience to help build a strategic enterprise that produces a tactical product. Finding qualified personnel with this type of experience has been a challenge for the MNSTC-I team. The persuasive powers of advisors are constantly challenged by political, cultural, sectarian, and linguistic obstacles. Nonetheless, MNSTC-I is successfully using an indirect approach to transition responsibility for security from Coalition forces to the ISF by generating forces and developing these back room processes.

MNSTC-I efforts in 2008 are focused on setting the conditions for transition and increasing ISF operational independence to allow the ISF to operate with reduced Coalition support. Security

self-reliance will be achieved when ISF are able to conduct operations, sustain and regenerate themselves, are led by competent leaders, manned with personnel committed to the GoI, and are supported by institutions with the functional capacity to manage the force, build the future force, and ensure compliance with the rule of law. Insufficient resources and premature transition of security responsibilities will jeopardize the entire enterprise, leaving the ISF unprotected and susceptible to kinetic and sectarian threats. Conditions for the full transfer of security responsibility will dictate the rate and nature of the transition.

Finally, MNSTC-I ministerial-level training teams are poised to enhance and develop institutional capacity and extend that success throughout the Iraqi security enterprise. This is in comparison to previous efforts that focused on producing capable ISF soldiers at the expense of developing sustainable business processes.

The Government of Iraq is working hard to improve its ability to protect the Iraqi population and increase the operational independence of its security forces. The Coalition is also helping the security ministries improve their institutional performance, and hopes to have Iraqis largely managing their own security affairs by 2009. The Coalition commitment to bring stability to Iraq and the region has shown positive results, but threats to Iraqi security have proven both resilient and adaptive. ♦

Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Mariano, US Army, is an officer with the Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq.

ETHICS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

by Captain Nils N. French

This article is adapted from both a paper on the topic and an address Captain French delivered at the 10th Annual CDAI Graduate Student Symposium this past October. The presentation received 2nd prize - ed.

In its simplest form, the term “ethics” refers to a system of moral principles that help differentiate between right and wrong. Several systems exist, each with a specific set of principles. This discussion will focus on two: one universal and well-defined, the other specific to Canada and less-clearly defined. The first is the United Nations International Bill of Human Rights. The second, elements of public opinion – a nation’s feel for right and wrong.

Both of these ethical standards can be applied to counterinsurgency with an interesting result: the realization that ethics and

counterinsurgency are closely tied. This is, however, seldom realized, and understandably so. Governments and their security forces must face insurgents who rarely follow what one would consider ethical principles, resources are limited, and the lives of soldiers are at stake. Acting ethically at all times can be seen as too difficult, too cumbersome, too administratively demanding, or even counterproductive. But this view is wrong; ethics and counterinsurgency actually go hand in hand.

Starting with an application of the well-defined standard of ethics,

the UN's International Bill of Human Rights, we find our first pieces of evidence. All of the rights are granted equally and inalienably to all members of the human family. With respect to counterinsurgency, they can be applied to in-theatre actions.

First, the right to protection against torture and inhumane punishment and the right to humane treatment when detained can be considered. In theatre, a counterinsurgent may violate these two rights in the belief that torture will yield actionable intelligence. Violation may also come as a result of sentiments of revenge and frustration-aggression at lower levels. The possible result is that insurgents become too scared to surrender, the troops themselves are degraded, and the local populous cannot help but adopt a negative impression of the government that the counterinsurgents are supposedly there to support. Taking these effects further, counterinsurgents will have then created a situation where they must fight every last insurgent to the death (also known as the attrition approach), where troops have been negatively affected, and where legitimacy in the eyes of the population has been scarred. Counterinsurgents must remove any idea that they can or have to be unethical because the insurgents are. The insurgents may very well be brutal, but this gives a counterinsurgent no license to be brutal in return.

Next to be evaluated are the rights to protection against arbitrary arrest and detention and the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial judiciary. Insurgents should be treated as criminals: it strips them of their legitimacy. All detainees should be fairly tried: it prevents the punishment of innocents and gives legitimacy to the government and counterinsurgents. Counterinsurgents must remember that nobody they arrest and detain is alone in the world. Each detainee has a large network of friends and family that will carefully watch the process that follows (if that process is overt) and form their opinions of the government and counterinsurgents accordingly. If the process is covert, the effect is detrimental as the network of family and friends will, in the absence of information to the contrary, assume the very worst.

Lastly, from the UN's Bill of Rights, there exists the right to protection of family and home, and the right of access to legal remedies for violations of rights. In part, this can be seen as a requirement to keep collateral damage to an absolute minimum, and in the event that it occurs, counterinsurgents must provide access to immediate and fair compensation as a remedy for damages. The greatest penalty for violation is that of alienating the population, as is well understood.

Such respect for human rights presents interesting possibilities. What if insurgents, promised good treatment and trusting such promises, willingly surrendered and then provided information on their former cohorts to receive amnesty in return? What if

Violation may also come as a result of sentiments of revenge and frustration-aggression at lower levels. The possible result is that insurgents become too scared to surrender, the troops themselves are degraded, and the local populous cannot help but adopt a negative impression of the government...

counterinsurgents took every opportunity to bring detainees to justice and did so promptly, with complete fairness and in the public eye? What if counterinsurgents looked at compensation for collateral damage as an opportunity to go over and above the expectations of those that have been wronged, while setting the situation right faster than they would have expected and turning a negative into a positive?

Elements of public opinion, which present a less-clearly defined standard of ethics, must be addressed as well. Here we enter the moral aspect of conflict. The moral aspect of conflict is a critical element in any democracy's strategy, counterinsurgency or otherwise, and is an aspect that is closely linked to public opinion; indeed, public opinion is the will to fight.

To add further emphasis, the moral aspect is much more critical when the mission itself is justified, either wholly or in part, on moral grounds. Always valid, but especially true in such cases, public opinion sets an ethical standard that must be adhered to.

The late John Boyd, one of the greatest strategic minds of our time, wrote of the importance of the moral aspect of conflict in his work. He noted that moral isolation occurs when one fails to abide by codes of conduct or standards of behavior. He believed that one could be defeated if the interacting bonds that permit existence as an organic whole are severed, destroying those connections that one depends upon, collapsing the will to resist.

Boyd refers to the organic whole: this is the combination of all the elements of national power combined with national will. It is at the intersection of these where accusations, investigations, incidents, accidents, the "unfortunate shooting" and bombing of civilians, mistrust, secrecy, and contradictions build, with media amplification, the perception that what is being done is not in line with the moral principles or ethics of the public, the nation's feel for right and wrong.

During a democracy's effort at counter-insurgency, if the connection between public opinion at home and the mission abroad is

severed, the mission cannot be sustained. Public opinion is not a simple matter of casualty count; ethics, or the perception of ethics, however nuanced, are heavily involved.

Combining the two standards, it is realized that for a counter-insurgent to achieve objectives effectively, the human rights of all parties must be respected in theater. To maintain the continued support from home that allows the mission to continue, the ethical standard set by public opinion has to be adhered to as well. Ethics in counterinsurgency is not ethics for ethics' sake. Military commanders that take care to respect ethical standards are effective commanders, not weak or timid. Those that disregard

such standards, claiming necessity or practicality or efficiency, have no valid claim.

In closing, balancing and applying all of the above will not be easy by any measure; there will be many complications to navigate through. However, if the general approach is to adhere to ethical standards, the counterinsurgent will be much more effective. ♦

Captain Nils N. French is the Canadian Exchange Instructor to the US Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is currently working on a Master's in Unconventional Warfare from American Military University.

NAVIGATING THE PERFECT WAVE:

THE CANADIAN MILITARY FACING ITS MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN 50 YEARS

by Major-General Daniel Gosselin

This text is an abridged and amended version of remarks given to the 10th graduate symposium of the Conference of Defence Association Institute on 26 October 2007, where the theme of the conference was "Canada's Security Interests: The Lessons of History." This essay contains facts and opinions that the author alone considered appropriate and correct, and do not necessarily reflect the policy or opinion of the Department of National Defence - ed.

The conflict in Afghanistan is entering its seventh year, and the Canadian Forces (CF) are in the middle of it. Daily events on the ground, in and around Kandahar, are receiving constant national coverage.

At the same time, the CF are facing unprecedented change, on a scale unseen in nearly 50 years. Except for a few military analysts, few people outside the military are really taking notice. I believe the changed environment we are facing is without precedent for the Forces, and the key decisions we are taking now will shape the CF for years to come.

Three fundamental "waves" are driving this change, creating a "perfect wave" that the CF must navigate through. I use the "perfect wave" analogy to highlight the convergence of conditions created by three important change initiatives that are affecting the CF concurrently: (1) the CF Transformation launched by General Hillier in early 2005; (2) the decision to increase the strength of the CF; and (3) the government decision in 2005 to deploy Canadian troops into a combat role in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The CF Transformation

On 4 February 2005, General Hillier assumed command of the CF. Within days, and with government support, he launched the CF Transformation, outlining a new vision for the Canadian military. An important defence budget increase just three weeks after the appointment of the CDS gave the CF Transformation added impetus and credibility. Shortly after, the government released a new defence policy, advocating a prominent role for Canada's military within Canada's international policy and providing the foundation for change that the CF leadership was seeking. The bold CF vision aimed at fundamentally reorienting and restructuring the functions of the CF and its command and control to better meet emerging security demands at home and abroad.

In my view, there are two truly dominant ideas that underpin this Transformation. The first one seeks to transform the Forces to better deal with "the snakes," the term the CDS employed to refer to the potential non-state enemies we may face in the new security environment, instead of "the bear," representing the more conventional armed forces of the Cold War. In practical terms, this means

transforming the CF into a force with “substantial capabilities” to be able to respond to the challenges of failed and failing states.i The 2005 CF vision is now nearly three years old, and is being harmonized with the agenda and priorities of the new government (a new defence policy is expected soon). Even without the benefit of a new defence policy, several major new crown projects were announced in the past two years, and the acquisition of these modern capabilities will definitely shape the CF for years to come.

The second dominant idea, seldom discussed, is the progressive removal of the bureaucratic shackles that constrained the CF from becoming more operational, that is, moving away from a management culture inside the CF and DND to one that places operations primacy at the centre of all decisions. This management and bureaucratic way of thinking was inherited from the changes that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Many dominant ideas that constituted the pillars of the integration of the services, and eventually unification, set a pattern for further centralization at NDHQ, and influenced the continued bureaucratization of defence in the 1970s and 1980s. In many ways, several recent initiatives in the CF reverse decisions made by Minister Paul Hellyer in the mid-1960s, whose policies of integration and unification were focused almost exclusively on administrative centralization and efficiency.ii

The core of the current CF Transformation is operational effectiveness. The CDS created new operational commands to increase responsiveness and to emphasize CF operations. Major command and control changes have been put in place – especially with the new operational commands created in February 2006 and the Strategic Joint Staff. The formation of the Military Personnel Command is also another important constituent underlying this transformation. The command changes are strengthening the concept of “unified” commanders, that is, a commander with a joint staff with the authority to direct and coordinate operations with forces and capabilities generated from the three environments and other formations.

The CF is being unified operationally, not bureaucratically or administratively. “Jointness,” which had become an organizational concept for the CF, is being relegated to its true meaning of “joint effects” in operations. Finally, slowly but surely, the shadow of Minister Hellyer is fading.

The CDS and members of Armed Forces Council are now progressively addressing the next spirals of the Transformation, including modernizing personnel policies and reviewing areas such as training delivery, the professional development of officers and non-commissioned members, and personnel support, to name a few.

The Force Expansion

The CF Transformation, an ambitious initiative in its own right, is not taking place in a void. While Minister Hellyer’s restructuring took place in a period of reduction of CF personnel, the present transformation is taking place in a period of growth on a scale not seen since the 1950s, thereby adding significantly to the transformation challenges but also providing unique opportunities.iii

Toward the end of the 1990s, the strength of the CF hit a low of about 57,000 regular force members (Reg F). With Budget 2006, the new Conservative government announced increases of 13,000 Reg F and 10,000 reservists, for a projected end state of 75,000 Reg F members. However, to be able to sustain operational commitments and to prepare for Olympics 2010, the expansion has been re-profiled to 68,000 Reg F members, for now.iv Still, this represents a very important increase from the low of the late 1990s, especially when one considers the strength of our economy. The projected growth of the CF is the most significant since the Korean War and the early 1950s.

This rapid force expansion, coupled with the CDS Transformation, is putting to test our recruiting and training systems, which had been operating at reduced capacity for nearly twenty years. For instance, the CF Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS) in St-Jean has more than doubled its permanent establishment in three years, and the school had to change the way it conducts its courses because of the high throughput of students and the increased emphasis on individual survivability and force protection. In November, at CFLRS, there were 32 platoons of recruits and officer cadets, with nearly 2,000 students in-house (as compared to just over 1,000 persons a year in the 1990s). But it is not only the Recruit School that is affected. More recruits also mean more students attending all CF schools, which has forced us to look at innovative solutions to minimize waiting times for students between courses and ways to accelerate the basic qualification training of new personnel.

The Afghanistan Campaign

While CF Transformation and Force Expansion are important, the most determinant element affecting the CF is without doubt the Afghanistan Campaign, and more particularly our combat engagement in the Kandahar region. The Afghanistan Campaign represents Canada’s most important and intense army engagement since the Korean War.

In Korea, more than 22,000 served with the Commonwealth Division, and we suffered important losses.v In Afghanistan, at the end of February 2009, over 22,000 CF volunteer members will have served in the campaign. To date we have lost over 80 soldiers and one diplomat, with most killed in combat-related activities.vi Even with the increased protection soldiers have, more than

250 have received medical treatment for wounds attributable to combat.vii

Our participation in the war in Afghanistan is justifying the need to introduce many changes within the CF and to accelerate others that were not getting any traction because of bureaucracy or low funding. A war like this drives an organization like National Defence to redefine its priorities. One of the more visible aspects has been the army equipment acquisitions of the past year to better support the campaign. The lessons from Operation Medusa, a major offensive operation that Canada led in September 2006 to rout out Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan, have forced a rethink of the 2003 decision to eliminate the main battle tanks from our inventory. Canada is now leasing twenty tanks and will procure 100 more modern ones. Better armoured vehicles have been acquired, such as the South African mine-protected vehicle Nyala.

The army has accelerated the development of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright to provide highly realistic combined arms combat training up to the battle group level and changed the pre-deployment training to increase the survival and individual protection components. This greater operational focus has affected nearly all training courses, including the basic recruit courses and other officer and NCM training. In some cases the changes instituted are the most significant since the 1960s.

Many of the CF's personnel policies are being completely revamped, more accurately modernized for a military at war. The war in Afghanistan has triggered a review of many financial benefits, from non-taxable income to risk pay and funeral entitlements, to name a few. The process for individual honours and awards is also being accelerated, with the assistance of Government House. The debate in the House of Commons and in the national newspapers about the funeral benefit entitlements for families of CF members who died on active duty is one clear indicator of the high expectations from the home front that the country will look after its sons and daughters when they are serving the nation overseas. The desire by Canadians and the government to support our troops overseas and their families at home is a great stimulus for change.

In short, the war in Afghanistan is doing what wars tend to do to military organizations: shake them to their core, re-focus the priorities of the organization toward operational primacy, and help remove bureaucratic cobwebs.

The Perfect Wave

National Defence and the CF are very large organizations, and it should not be surprising to discover that the management of the changes taking place is implemented compartmentally. As a result I believe we fail to realise the magnitude of the changes taking place within the institution.

Early in 2005, the CDS established six key principles to guide decision-making within CF Transformation, providing greater attention to operations primacy. Three years later, it is clear that the CF culture is slowly changing to one focused more on operations. The creation of the new operational commands, a command-centric approach to decision-making, and the war in Afghanistan are providing the underlying conditions for this change of culture. We are also seeing it with our civilian counterparts in the department like never before. While it remains to be seen how fundamental and how deep this culture change will be, there can be no doubt that the direct participation of over 20,000 CF members in the conflict in Southwest Asia, and the indirect but essential support of thousands more in Canada, will definitely change the identity of the CF of tomorrow. In addition, operational capability choices that are being made today will influence decisions for future CF participation abroad.

The current period presents us with several challenges, for sure, but there are opportunities that our predecessors would only have wished for in the mid-1990s. I am convinced that the magnitude of the change underway is on a scale we may not see for another decade, perhaps a generation. It is up to us to ensure that this wave does not turn into a "perfect storm." We can truly shape the CF for the next 10 to 20 years. ♦

Major-General Daniel Gosselin is Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy. He is a PhD candidate in military history at Queen's University, completing his thesis on the topic of command at the strategic and operational levels of war.

i Canada, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* (Ottawa, 2005), p. 11.

ii The reader should consult an earlier article on this theme which appeared in *On Track*. Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier," vol. 10, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 18-20.

iii National Defence, *Canadian Forces Recruiting: Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War in Talent* (Ottawa, 2007), 1.

iv In 2005, the Liberal government announced increases of 5,000 Reg F members and 3,000 reservists. The Primary Reserve is established at 26,000 versus 35,000. Source: Canada, National Defence, *Performance Report for the Period ending March 31, 2007* (Ottawa, Public Work and Government Services Canada, 2007), 13-14.

- v Department of National Defence, Army Historical Section, *Canada's Army in Korea: A Short Official Account* (Ottawa, Queen's Printers, 1956), pp. 94-99. Canada suffered 516 deaths, 312 in combat-related activities and over 1,500 casualties.
- vi As of 26 March 2008.
- vii *Globe and Mail*, 8 February 2008. No doubt that the high quality of medical care provided and the speed at which this care is provided on the ground is saving many lives.

CONVOCATION ADDRESS

J.L. Granatstein was honoured at the fall convocation of the Royal Military College of Canada, in Kingston on 16 November 2007, when he received an Honorary Doctor of Military Science degree at the fall convocation ceremony that was held at the Royal Military College of Canada, in Kingston, on 16 November 2007. His address follows- ed.

Chancellor and Minister Mackay, Commandant Gen Lawson, Principal Dr Cowan, Dr Urquhart, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, and most important, graduands.

I listened to the citation with awe (and I wonder how John could possibly have learned some of those stories). My mother would have believed that the fine words were absolutely true, every word, but my wife, correctly of course, would know that almost all the praise was simply not credible. She is right, but I am grateful nonetheless and thank the Principal and Senate of the College for this honorary degree.

It is 50 yrs since my class entered RMC, and the world was a very different place in those days. But RMC mattered then and it matters now. I owe RMC a great deal, and such success as I have had, I attribute to my time here. I was a feckless teenager when I signed on and a very organized Type A personality when I graduated.

Now I don't want this address to be the maunderings of a senile member of the Old Brigade, so enough on what RMC did for me. Let me instead talk about what you graduates should do for our country.

Nous possédons peu d'institutions nationales au Canada, très peu. We have very few national institutions that bring together French- and English-speaking and multicultural Canadians from all regions. Les exceptions sont les institutions fédérales et les Forces canadiennes, qui inspirent le respect. Le fait que le CMR soit une institution nationale, bilingue, et multiculturel qui réunit de jeunes Canadiens lui confère une importance considérable sur le plan national.



J.L. Granatstein

Those who pass thru RMC are—or should be—educated about the military and its role in Canada. I believe this is done better now than it used to be, but I am not wholly convinced that the lessons stick. Distressingly few ex-cadets out of the CF worry about Canada's military weaknesses and even fewer seem to be willing to try to do anything to remedy them. The Conference of Defence Associations, led by ex-cadets Gen Paul Manson, LGen Richard Evraire, and Col Alain Pellerin, are the exceptions that prove the rule.

They are not noticeably different than our media or our Members of Parliament. No one reading the commentary from columnists on defence issues can do anything other than shake a head in wonderment. No one listening to M.P.s speak can escape puzzlement. Few parliamentarians have any defence expertise; few Ministers of National Defence, however willing they are, serve in their portfolios long enough to master the issues—I hope this Minister will be different—even though DND spends more than \$17 billion a year.

This lack of an informed, concerned public, this shortage of well-educated parliamentarians, should be a matter of concern. Canada has no overt threats to our security at hand or on the short-term horizon. But we are at war in Afghanistan and there are dangers out there ranging from Islamic fundamentalism to rising (and declining) superpowers and natural disasters. We need preparation and planning to deal effectively with such present and future strategic crises.

On one level, the lack of interest and preparation is curious. We tend to think of ourselves as an unmilitary people, and yet defence

issues have played major roles in our political life. Think of conscription in the two world wars, an issue that tore the nation apart in the midst of great conflicts. More recently, think of the nuclear crisis of 1962-63 that destroyed a government, the debates over the unification of the Canadian Forces in 1966-68 that ended political and military careers, the furor over Somalia in the mid-1990s that led to the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, the unresolved debate over Ballistic Missile Defence and, still on-going, the controversies surrounding Canada's combat role in Afghanistan.

Les questions liées à la défense sont nombreuses, mais elles semblent exister presque dans un vacuum, suscitant des débats entre personnes mal informées et sans instruction. Pourquoi? Parce que, selon moi, les Canadiens ne comprennent pas que la défense découle directement de nos intérêts nationaux et naît de la nécessité de protéger les plus importants d'entre eux. Those National Interests are the security of our people and territory, our unity, our economic well-being, and the spread of democracy and freedom across the world. Mais les Canadiens en parlent rarement, un peu comme si nous étions le seul État à n'avoir aucun intérêt, seulement des valeurs de philanthropie.

I was in Australia two years ago and met with many military officers. I was interested to discover that matters are very different there. In Canberra, the government and the Opposition agree on the outlines of defence policy, the defence budget, and the major equipment purchases needed. They share a concept of the National Interest, their minds sharpened by the simple fact that the United States, their ally, is far away, and 220 million Indonesians are very close. This practice seems like good sense to me, something that should be replicable in Ottawa, but such cooperation between our political leaders regrettably seems inconceivable.

Why? Part of the answer is our anti-Americanism which is at one of its historic peaks these days. In my view, anti-Americanism played up for partisan political purposes by three of our political parties in Ottawa has helped to stop us from thinking rationally about defence.

Another part of the answer is Quebec's attitude to the military and to overseas commitments. Many in Quebec, including the BQ and PQ party leaders, call themselves pacifists and turn their backs on the military. This has always puzzled me. An independent pacifist

In Canberra (Australia), the government and the Opposition agree on the outlines of defence policy, the defence budget, and the major equipment purchases needed.

They share a concept of the National Interest.

Quebec, if it should ever come to be, stuck in the middle of Canada and perched on the northern border of the US would de facto turn its defence over to its neighbours. How then could it be sovereign? How could separatists be so unaware of the implications of their policy pronouncements? To me, Quebec's National Interests are the same as Canada's, and Canada's National Interests most definitely

include Quebec. That a Voodoo battle group is today fighting to advance democracy and freedom in Kandahar is, to me, proof enough of our shared national interests.

The answer to anti-Americanism and to pacifism is education. We need more journalists who know something of defence, and I am very pleased that the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute with which I am associated offers summer familiarization courses at CFB Edmonton and at Valcartier for young anglophone and francophone journalists. Over time that will help. The Afghan War, of course, is giving journalists a crash course in the military, and the increasingly high quality of reportage is very noticeable. Indeed, I would suggest that public support for the military is as strong as it is today because of the stories that are being reported back to Canada. They are not all good news stories, but they show Canadian soldiers doing their difficult, dangerous jobs with courage and skill.

Still, we have a long way to go before Canadians understand those who defend them or even why National Interests must be defended. That educational mission is, I believe, one of the tasks of those who graduate from RMC. In a nation with so few national institutions, a duty falls to those who have had the privilege of being educated and trained here. A duty to serve, yes, but also the duty to participate in the public debates after they have left the Canadian Forces. The need for informed opinion is very great in Canada. Who better to provide it than those who have served their country? Than those who have studied its interests and its needs?

If I have a message to you in the military who graduate today, it is this: serve your nation in the Canadian Forces and then, after you take your leave, continue to serve your country by taking an active part in the on-going debate on defence. That is your duty. Do it with truth and, as you will surely discover, it will take some valour to persist in the face of public disinterest. But persist we must. The stakes are very high for Canada, the task very important. If we RMC graduates don't speak out for the Canadian Forces and for our National Interests, who will? ♣

CHARLIE WILSON'S WAR: IMPERIUM MANQUÉ

by Eric Morse

Apparently, nobody knows what to make of *Charlie Wilson's War*. Certainly, responsible commentators do not like talking about it. The movie, which actually manages to get some laughs out of the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979–1988 (what's not to love about a Congressman who calls his press secretary Jailbait and shoots down Soviet helicopters with his own hands?) drew a great response at the box office. The book, by the late CBS foreign affairs reporter George Crile, has been out since 2003.

However, the momentous events that are described in both are nowhere close to being on the radar screen of punditry. The reason seems to be that the whole affair is simply so off-the-wall that serious commentators are uncomfortable with it. Crile sums up the problem nicely by quoting cameraman Peter Henning, a member of the 60 Minutes team in Afghanistan in 1988, advising the producer: "I've never seen anything like this before. You could turn Charlie Wilson into the biggest hero you ever heard of – or a complete clown. It's your choice."

Analysts are uncomfortable with choices like that. Clearly, even a cameraman on a mainstream TV show was uncomfortable with it. Yet these things happened, as the bards would say, and it raises some disturbing questions about the way things get done in Washington, DC.

For those not already in the know, book and movie tell the entirely improbable tale of how in the mid-1980s, a low-profile, hard-drinking, womanizing Democrat Congressman from Texas named Charlie Wilson became mesmerized by the fate of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the Soviet invasion that put them there. He was then introduced by a right-wing Houston socialite to Pakistan's then-dictator Zia ul-Haq. He then proceeded to use his memberships on key House committees, his ability to make friends with anybody at all, and (amazingly) his close relationships with the Israel lobby to leverage an escalation of covert US assistance to the Afghan mujahideen from essentially nothing to around \$1 billion (including advanced Stinger anti-aircraft missiles) between 1985 and 1988. In the process he co-opted whole sections and levels of the CIA and generally flouted official US foreign and defence policy along the way.

What might be worse in these days of 'gotcha' politics and journalism, he does not appear to have broken a single law in the

process, and he did not get rich off it. In fact, according to Crile he came out of it poorer than when he went in.

Aside from the fact that the book is one heck of a good read, the material is admittedly hard to get for a responsible analyst. Although Crile (who knew Wilson towards the end) has done an admirable job of referencing his sources, a lot of the material is inherently unverifiable, especially since too many of the primary sources are now dead. In comparison, the Iran-Contra operation, whose notoriety is said to have masked Wilson's own doings, was at least semi-official and therefore left something of a paper trail. Charlie's IOU calls and Appropriations Committee arm-twisting did not. They are the common stuff of backroom politics, but usually dealt with sharing out the pork, not fighting a major covert war.



Philip Seymour Hoffman, Tom Hanks and Julia Roberts
from the movie **Charlie Wilson's War**

The whole thing defies rational analysis as most analysts understand it. That a Congressman basically used the standard-issue political toolbox to take over covert war policy is practically unthinkable. But if even only a third of the goings-on described by Crile happened more or less as he tells it, what we are left with is a shot below the waterline of the whole US system of government.

It is one thing to assert, as many do these days, that an Administration has gone rogue. If true, at least the White House is constitutionally-empowered and can eventually be held to account for its policies. But how do you hold Charlie Wilson accountable when he did not do anything illegal? He just exercised free enterprise in policy-making, and that is something that cannot be called to account in law or explained away in structural terms. It is so American, it is un-American. In fact, it has basically

not been heard of in a major international actor since the Roman Republic.

Since 9/11, a minor industry has grown up drawing alleged comparisons between the Roman and American 'Empires'. The parallels tend to be specious and based on an inaccurate understanding of Roman and/or American history. Much of what is commonly understood about the way Rome worked politically is derived from a too-legalistic interpretation inherited from 19th century German scholarship. Modern interpretation ascribes much more to political convention of the day than to constitutional legalities – which is worth remembering in this context because much of the actual power of individual US legislators is likewise based in convention, not the Constitution.

Free-enterprise foreign policy
does not work, and
any system of governance
that allows it
is going to find itself in trouble.

History is not obliging enough to repeat itself literally, although human behaviour has a depressing tendency to. But the Charlie Wilson escapade brings the late Roman Republic very strongly to mind and offers a warning: Free-enterprise foreign policy does not work, and any system of governance that allows it is going to find itself in trouble. (We will firmly leave aside the question of whether non-free-enterprise foreign policy works any better; at least it has the advantage that someone is accountable for it.)

Roman constitutional convention allowed by default this sort of foreign policy freewheeling by individual legislators. So, apparently, does American convention, though it is not supposed to. In Rome you had to be a Senator before you could aspire to any military input at all, and if you were one it was expected that at some point you would hold broad independent command authority (imperium). In modern America of course, you can not be both at the same time. This is supposed to prevent the Julius Caesars and the Charlie Wilsons from happening. Given that Roman institutions were evolved for a city-state that happened to grow, they had some excuse at the time. The Americans, who consciously modeled

their governance system on what they thought was the Roman experience, have rather less of one.

The Roman Republic lost effective control of its own foreign policy for only about eighty years before everything fell apart, but it happened just when Rome had become a new superpower, and this was critical to the fall of the Republic. The leadership generation of Scipio Africanus that defeated Hannibal of Carthage around 200BC had not been a problem. They were sent out with their mandates from the legislature and exercised them responsibly within conventionally-accepted bounds; being engaged in a death-struggle is a remarkable disincentive to adventurism.

Two generations later, there was a problem, coincident with the growth of Roman power. The same sort of mandate as Scipio had held was now being routinely abused to acquire (and plunder) new territories without so much as a by-your-leave from the Senate. Soldiers, who might or might not have been legally recruited in the first place, had to be compensated by any available means. The First Triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, which finally tore apart the Republic, was originally formed to do political battle on this point with the Senate 'Appropriations Committee' of the time.

One feels that Charlie would have been right at home in that free-wheeling era of politics. But there are implications from his and the Roman experiences. It is worth remembering that Caesar, Pompey and Crassus had no intention of destroying the Republic, and Augustus' political genius lay in allowing everybody to pretend that they had not. Augustus also sat down hard on people with any ideas about free-lance foreign policy.

Charlie Wilson, the Congressman from Texas, did what he did almost naïvely, possibly with hubris but apparently without a hidden agenda, and he is said to have acknowledged the unintended consequences of his actions up to and including the 9/11 attacks. But the envelope has been pushed for the next generation of smart operators whose agendas are not knowable in advance. Another disturbing similarity now is that there is no need to annex portions of the State apparatus, as Charlie did: there are plenty of private contractors to be had, thousands in Iraq alone.

That road was Caesar's, and it led past the Ides of March to authoritarianism. ♣

Eric Morse is a former officer of the Canadian Foreign Service, and Director of Communications of the Royal Canadian Military Institute.

BOOK REVIEW

ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING AND BUDGETING IN DEFENCE BY LCOL ROSS FETTERLY AND MAJOR RICHARD GROVES

Reviewed by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

Introduction

This short, but important, book (86 pages) follows the pattern of the previous Claxton Papers published by the well-regarded Defence Management Studies Programme of Queen's University in providing a concise treatment of a contemporary defence policy or management issue. It will be of primary utility to those working in the analysis of defence budgets, particularly in the capital renewal field. It will also be of use to defence analysts who are not trained in accounting, but who need to know more about the mechanics of understanding the Canadian Defence Budget.

The book is divided into four major sections. The first is an overview chapter which introduces the subject of budgeting in the federal government, demonstrates that the Defence Department is the major federal capital asset holder in both capital equipment as well as real property, and introduces the Defence Capital Programme.

The second chapter moves to the subject of accrual accounting itself and the transition taking place in the Canadian federal sphere from the previously used "Cash based" accounting system to the new "Accrual based" system, and then explains its application to the Department of National Defence. The concept has been viewed as a real eye-glazer by many defence stakeholders (LGen Andy Leslie calls it "Cruel Accounting!"), but should be readily understood by anyone who has successfully passed Grade 9 bookkeeping and knows what "Balance Sheets" and "Income Statements" are.

The third section deals with the application of Accrual Accounting in practice and then moves into the related area of Accrual Budgeting as a forward-looking financial management tool, which provides some very distinct practical advantages to the management of the defence capital renewal programme.

The short fourth chapter provides a summary of the subject and the attached Appendix provides several examples of how the process would work with a few nominal examples.

A hidden advantage of the book is its inclusion of a number of tables which provide summary details of the existing capital

holdings, which are not always easy to find unless one is deeply experienced in sifting through the entrails of the Defence Budget documents. Indeed, the reviewer was pleased to find some numbers in the book which he had not seen elsewhere.

Bricks and Mortar

Among these additional numbers provided is the fact that as of March 31, 2007 the historical cost of DND's capital asset base amounted to \$51 billion, divided among the areas shown in the following table:

CATEGORY	VALUE BN	SUMMARY BN
Ships, aircraft, vehicles		
Ships & boats	\$12.743	
Aircraft	\$12.296	
Military Vehicles	\$1.334	
Non-military Vehicles	\$0.555	
Other vehicles	\$0.160	
Total		\$72.089
Machinery & equipment		\$10.993
Land, buildings, works		\$7.332
Work in progress		\$4.373
Leased tangible capital assets		\$1.265
Leasehold improvements		\$0.015
Total		\$51.007

While we have been focused on the age of our equipment fleets the reality is that our bricks and mortar share that problem as the following table, which shows the period when the realty assets were acquired.

PERIOD	SHARE OF TOTAL
Pre-1920 Boer War and WWI	5%
1920-1945 WWII	18%
1946-1959 Korean War/Early Cold War	33%
1960-1989 Middle/Late/Cold War	25%
1990-2001 Post Cold War	19%

The standard Treasury Board facility life cycle is 50 years, and 56% of our realty assets are beyond that age point—which introduces another, internal competitor for a share of the limited capital budget. Moreover, the cost of replacement is made worse by the inflation in building costs that have taken place over the life of these assets represents a serious problem to defence planners.

The Capital Share of the Defence Budget

The capital share of the defence budget has varied widely over the years. It has invariably been the first thing to be cut when the total defence budget was cut, and has struggled to gain when the defence budget managed to grow. It hit a low of 9% of the total budget in FY1972/3, rose again to 29% in FY 1984/85, dropped to 15% in FY2003/4, and has recovered to 21% in FY 2007/8. Consequently, the defence capital programme has been unable to keep up with the normal aging of the DND capital base, and the “rustout” of the forces that so many critics have pointed to has been the result.

Under “Cash Based” accounting and budgeting, when a new piece of kit is bought, it is 100% “expensed” in the year of purchase, even though it may have a 25-year service life expectancy. In the traditional government “Cash Based” accounting treatment the equipment has been effectively deemed to have been 100% “used up” in the first year of its existence. In the civilian world the accountants take a different approach, recognizing that the piece of kit is used up over its predictable service life, and they calculate an annual “depreciation” or “amortization” charge” which is charged to the company’s income statement each year. The piece

of kit is shown on the company’s “Balance Sheet” along with all the other assets, including financial and realty assets, until its has been completely “used up.” Its value will be reduced each year by the amount of the “amortization” charge.

The government is still paying out cash, of course, at the front end of the project rather than evenly over its amortized life. This has led to a new term in government Capital Budgeting, termed “Investment Cash.” This refers to the “Cash” which is paid up-front, and which is greater than the amortization booked over the same period. Civilians who took Bookkeeping in Grade 9 also know of the civilian “Cash Flow Statement,” which tracks the sources and uses of cash as the third key component of the civilian Financial Statements.

It is this adoption of Accrual Accounting and Budgeting which has allowed the series of major capital equipment acquisitions which have been launched since 2006—the strategic airlifters, the tactical airlifters, the medium or heavy lift helicopters, the medium truck fleet, the tank replacement, the joint support ships, the frigate modernization, and the Arctic offshore patrol ships—all of which together amount to around 17 billion dollars.

There is a great deal more technical material, in this short but very useful and readable book that is, perhaps, of more specialist interest, but even the “hard parts” are readily accessible to the general reader because of the economy and lucidity of the authors’ prose.

Highly recommended.♣

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THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nominations are invited for the 2008 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, and Matthew Fisher.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2008, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 14 November 2008, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held in the LeBreton Galley of the Canadian War Museum. Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor-General of Canada, has been invited to attend as the guest of honour.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, email pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.



Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2008.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, et Matthew Fisher.

Toute personne peut nommer un journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux lettres de soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des écrits du journaliste. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2008, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
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Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 14 novembre 2008, à un dîner qui aura lieu dans la galerie LeBreton au Musée canadien de la guerre. Son Excellence la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, Gouverneure générale du Canada, a été invitée.

Pour de plus informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

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