ON TRACK

WINTER / HIVER 2008

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4

The Afghan War: The Pakistani Dimensions

Canada's Air Force: On Course, On Glide Path

Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow

Transition in American Effects Based Doctrine - Should Canada Be Concerned?

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COVER PHOTO: *Corporal Lurette makes up part of the security cordon at the Dand District shura. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le Caporal Lurette, aide à assurer la sécurité du pérmètre de la choura dans le district de Dand .*

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

ON TRACK provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters of importance to the interests of Canada. The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute) publishes credible, informed research as well as opinion which will provide Canadians with insight to the concerns of the defence community.

Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

We are pleased to feature in this edition of *ON TRACK* articles that are reflective of global events that are challenging Canada and the Canadian Forces, and that can have an influence on the federal government's foreign and defence policies. The articles express the views of the authors – and may not necessarily coincide with those of the CDA Institute.

In recent years the Federal Government has committed to increase Canada's investment in her Armed Forces. As the investment continues we are pleased to include in *ON TRACK* '*Canada's Air Force: on course, on glide path*', by Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, the Canadian Forces' Chief of the Air Staff. He provides us with a focus on the strategic vision for the Air Forces and the Challenges of rejuvenating the Air Force.

The Government has also made the commitment to renew the maritime force, over the next 20 years. Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff has outlined in '*Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow*', those plans and the challenges the lay ahead to meet the objectives of renewal.

Ken Bowering, Vice-President Maritime Affairs, The Navy League of Canada, examines the process that has been followed by the navy over the past 60 years in acquiring most of its ships, in '*Putting Procurement Back on Track*'. Mr. Bowering's article is a condensed version of the CDA Institute Sir Arthur Currie Paper, "Military/ Naval Procurement in Canada – A Flawed Process". The Paper is available online at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Currie_Papers/Currie%20Paper%201-08%20Navy%20League.pdf.

Seven years after the first shot was fired in the Global War on Terrorism, Major James Scott Taylor Jr. reminds us that the insurgency in Afghanistan continues.

MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

ON TRACK offre des débats éclairés et dénués de partisanerie sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui ont de l'importance pour les intérêts du Canada. L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD) publie de la recherche crédible et informée ainsi que des opinions qui fourniront aux Canadiens des aperçus sur les préoccupations qui ont cours dans les milieux de la défense.

Dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK* nous sommes heureux de présenter des articles qui se font le reflet des événements mondiaux qui mettent au défi le Canada et les Forces canadiennes, et qui peuvent avoir une influence sur les politiques du gouvernement fédéral en matière d'affaires étrangères et de défense. Ces articles expriment les points de vue de leurs auteurs, lesquels peuvent ne pas nécessairement coïncider avec ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

Ces dernières années, le gouvernement fédéral s'est engagé à accroître l'investissement du Canada dans ses Forces armées. Alors que l'investissement continue, nous avons le plaisir d'inclure dans *ON TRACK* l'article *Canada's Air Force: On course, on glide path*, par le Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne des Forces canadiennes. Il nous donne un gros plan sur la vision stratégique pour la Force aérienne et sur les défis que soulève son rajeunissement.

Le gouvernement a aussi pris l'engagement de renouveler la Force maritime au cours des 20 prochaines années. Dans l'article *Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow*, le Vice-amiral Drew Robertson, chef d'état-major des Forces maritimes examine les plans de réalisation de ces objectifs et les difficultés qui font obstacle à leur réalisation.

Ken Bowering, vice-président aux affaires maritimes de la Ligue navale du Canada, examine, dans *Putting Procurement Back on Track*, le processus qui a été suivi par la marine au cours des 60 dernières années dans l'acquisition de la plupart de ses navires. L'article de M. Bowering est une version condensée du Sir Arthur Currie Paper de l'Institut de la CAD intitulé *Military/Naval Procurement in Canada – A Flawed Process*. L'étude est disponible en ligne à l'adresse http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Currie_Papers/Currie%20Paper%201-08%20Navy%20League.pdf.

Sept ans après que le premier coup de feu ait été tiré dans la guerre planétaire contre le terrorisme, le Major James Scott Taylor Jr. nous rappelle que, en Afghanistan,

In '*The Strategic Importance of Afghanistan*' he provides us with a brief history of the conflict and outlines the importance of achieving stability in that war-torn country. Major Taylor is the Deputy Director of the U.S. Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point.

Colonel Ian Hope presents his thoughts on the command structure in Afghanistan. His article, '*Broken Command in Afghanistan*', provides a serious assessment of the complications in theatre that have arisen from the absence of the principle of unity of command. Colonel Hope is a former Commander of 2 PPCLI Battle Group in Afghanistan, 2006, and is now an instructor at the U.S. Army War College.

There is strong evidence that elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda have found safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of North-Western Pakistan. In '*The Afghan War: The Pakistani Dimensions*', Louis Delvoie examines Pakistan's national interests related to Afghanistan, and of a number of Pakistani political and socio-economic phenomena. Monsieur Delvoie is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, and former Ambassador to Islamabad.

Major-General Dennis Tabbernor, Chief Reserves and Cadets, served as Deputy Commanding General, Afghan National Army Development at Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan from April 2007 to April 2008. Major-General Tabbernor outlines for us its mission, to partner with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to organize, train, equip, advise and mentor the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. In '*Afghanistan – A Personal Perspective*' he provides a very thoughtful perspective of why we are in Afghanistan.

General James Mattis outlined in a 14 August Memorandum that Effects Based Doctrine will no longer be used by (U.S) Joint Forces Command. We present two timely articles that examine the effectiveness of effects-based operations (EBO) in light of the debate now taking place within the military community. The discussion on the applicability of EBO was highlighted at the second annual Joint Warfighting (JW) conference, which took place in June, 2008, in Virginia Beach. Major Bob Near reports, in '*US Joint Warfighting Developments*', that in examining what went wrong in the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of July-August 2006, this has resulted in serious introspection on the part of senior US commanders and doctrine developers. Major Near is on staff at the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre.

le soulèvement se poursuit. Dans son article *The Strategic Importance of Afghanistan* il nous trace une brève histoire du conflit et il souligne l'importance d'atteindre la stabilité dans ce pays déchiré par la guerre. Le Major Taylor est le Directeur adjoint du U.S. Combating Terrorism Centre, de West Point.

Le Colonel Ian Hope présente ses réflexions sur la structure de commandement en Afghanistan. Son article, *Broken Command in Afghanistan*, propose une évaluation des complications en théâtre qui ont surgi de l'absence du principe d'unité de commandement. Le Colonel Hope est un ancien commandant du Groupement tactique PPCLI en Afghanistan, en 2006, et il est maintenant instructeur au U.S. Army War College.

Il est maintenant très évident que des éléments des Talibans et d'al Qaeda ont trouvé une zone sûre dans les régions tribales administrées par le fédéral du Pakistan du Nord-Ouest. Dans l'article *The Afghan War: The Pakistani Dimensions*, Louis Delvoie examine les intérêts nationaux du Pakistan qui ont un rapport avec l'Afghanistan et un certain nombre de phénomènes politiques et socio-économiques pakistanais. Monsieur Delvoie est agrégé supérieur de recherches au Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's et ancien Ambassadeur canadien à Islamabad.

Le Major-Général Dennis Tabbernor, Chef - Réserves et cadets, a servi comme commandant général adjoint, développement de l'Armé nationale afghane, au Commandement de la transition conjointe de la sécurité en Afghanistan d'avril 2007 à avril 2008. Le Major-général Tabbernor décrit pour nous sa mission, qui consiste à faire partenariat avec le gouvernement de l'Afghanistan et la communauté internationale afin d'organiser, d'entraîner, d'équiper, de conseiller et de jouer le rôle de mentor auprès de l'Armée nationale afghane et de la Police nationale afghane. Dans l'article *Afghanistan – A Personal Perspective*, il offre un point de vue très réfléchi de la raison pour laquelle nous sommes en Afghanistan.

Le Général James Mattis a souligné, dans une note du 14 août, que la «doctrine basée sur les effets» ne sera plus utilisée par le (U.S) Joint Forces Command. Nous présentons deux articles qui viennent à point, qui examinent l'efficacité des «effects-based operations (EBO)» à la lumière du débat qui a présentement lieu au sein de la communauté militaire. La discussion sur l'applicabilité des EBO a été soulignée à la deuxième conférence annuelle du Joint Warfighting (JW), qui s'est tenue en juin 2008, à Virginia Beach. Le Major Bob Near rapporte, dans *US Joint Warfighting Developments*, qu'en examinant ce qui a mal tourné dans le conflit Israëlo-Hezbollah de juillet-août 2006, il en est résulté une sérieuse introspection de la part des commandants et des développeurs de doctrine américains de haut

In 'Transition in *American Effects-Based Doctrine – Should Canada be Concerned?*' Ms. Bonnie Butlin examines the issues surrounding EBO and its results in recent campaigns. She notes some of the areas of concern for the Canadian Forces as the U.S. rebalances decades of doctrinal development. Ms. Butlin is a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum (SDF) Intern, employed as the Project Officer with the CDA Institute. General Mattis will present a special address at Conference of Defence Associations' AGM (see below).

Over the past thirty years the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, at the University of Calgary, has grown from a small research programme into a large Centre with a full graduate programme and a network of scholars with the mandate to promote and develop excellence in military, security and defence studies. Co-authors Nancy Pearson Mackie and Andrew Sullivan outline the scope of the work that the Centre undertakes, in '*The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies*'.

I am pleased to report that the 11th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, *Canada's Security Interests*, was an unqualified success. The Symposium was presented by the CDA Institute, in collaboration with Defence Management Studies, of the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, and the War Studies programme of the Royal Military College of Canada, with the financial support of DND's SDF, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Breakout Educational Network, Honourary Captain (N) Hugh D. Segal, Mr. David E. Scott & Ms. K. Tieman, and General Dynamics Canada. Ms. Bonnie Butlin was the principal organizer of the Symposium, and has provided us with a report on the proceedings.

The Symposium featured two keynote speakers: Mr. Mel Cappe, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, who gave a well-received talk, entitled "Defence of Canada – Who Cares?" Senator Hugh Segal was the keynote speaker for the second day, speaking on "NATO and the New Russian Reality: Coming to Terms."

We are pleased, as always, to include a book review by Mr. Arnav Manchanda, currently the Special Events Coordinator with the CDA Institute. In the book, *The Post-American World*, Mr. Manchanda notes that the author, Fareed Zakaria, explores the political and socioeconomic dynamics of a 'post-American' era in

niveau. Le Major Near fait partie du personnel du Centre d'expérimentation des Forces canadiennes.

Dans Transition in *American Effects-Based Doctrine – Should Canada be Concerned?*, Bonnie Butlin examine les enjeux entourant les EBO et leurs résultats dans les dernières campagnes. Elle note quelques-uns des domaines de préoccupations pour les Forces canadiennes, au moment où les États-Unis rééquilibrent des décennies de développement doctrinal. Mme Butlin est stagiaire au Forum sur la sécurité et la défense (FSD) Ministère de la Défense nationale et employée comme agente de projets à l'Institut de la CAD. Le Général Mattis présentera en février une allocution spéciale à l'assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense (voir ci-dessous).

Pendant les trente dernières années, le Centre for Military and Strategic Studies de l'Université de Calgary, a évolué à partir d'un petit programme de recherche pour devenir un grand centre doté d'un programme complet de deuxième cycle et d'un réseau de chercheurs, avec le mandat de promouvoir et développer l'excellence dans les études militaires, de sécurité et de la défense. Dans *The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies*, les co-auteurs, Nancy Pearson Mackie et Andrew Sullivan décrivent la porté du travail que le Centre entreprend.

Je suis heureux de rapporter que le 11e symposium annuel des étudiants gradués, sur le thème *Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité*, a connu un succès incontesté. Le symposium était présenté par l'Institut de la CAD, en collaboration avec le programme Defence Management Studies de la School of Policy Studies de l'Université Queen's, et le programme Études sur la guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada, avec l'appui financier du FSD du MDN, du Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord, du Breakout Educational Network, du Capitaine honoraire (N) Hugh D. Segal, de M. David E. Scott & Mme K. Tieman, et de General Dynamics Canada. Bonnie Butlin a été la principale organisatrice du symposium et nous a fourni un rapport des actes.

Le symposium présentait deux conférenciers invités : M. Mel Cappe, président de l'Institut de recherches sur la politique publique, qui a prononcé une allocution bien reçue intitulée *Defence of Canada – Who Cares*. Le Sénateur Hugh Segal était le conférencier invité pour la deuxième journée ; il a traité du sujet *NATO and the New Russian Reality: Coming to Terms*.

Il nous fait plaisir, comme toujours, d'inclure un compte rendu de livre par Arnav Manchanda, actuellement coordonnateur des événements spéciaux à l'Institut de la CAD. Dans le livre, *The Post-American World*, M. Manchanda note que l'auteur, Fareed Zakaria, explore la dynamique politique et socio-economique

Previous recipients of the Vimy Award, 14 November 2008, at the Canadian War Museum, with the Chief Justice of Canada, the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin: l-r – Dr. J.L. Granatstein (1996), the Right Honourable Joe Clark (first recipient of the Award - 1991), Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. David Bercuson (2004), General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier (2008), the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin who presented the Award to General (Ret'd) Hillier, Brigadier-General David Fraser (2006), General (Ret'd) Paul Manson (2003), Colonel the Honourable John Fraser (2002), General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault (2007), and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Charles H. Belzile (1999).

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Les récipiendaires précédents du prix Vimy, le 14 novembre 2008, au Musée canadien de la guerre avec le Juge en chef du Canada, la très honorable Beverley McLachlin: g-d – J.L. Granatstein (1996), le très honorable Joe Clark (le premier récipiendaire du prix - 1991), le lieutenant-colonel honorifique David Bercuson (2004), le généal (Ret) Rick Hillier (2008), la très honorable Beverley McLachlin qui a remis le prix Vimy au général (Ret) Hillier, le brigadier-général David Fraser (2006), le général (Ret) Paul Manson (2003), le colonel l'honorable John Fraser (2002), le général (Ret) Raymond Henault (2007), et le lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile (1999).

Photo par Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gord Metcalfe

world affairs. We are provided, here, with an insightful review of the strengths and weaknesses of Zakaria's argument.

Anne Frances Cation has provided us a review of *The Way of the World: A story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism*, written by Ron Suskind who, in 1995, received the Pulitzer Prize for Featured Writing. His book is a New York Times Nonfiction Bestseller. Ms Cation's review includes an assessment of the author, including his analysis of the 9/11 Commission. Anne Frances Cation is the Security and Defence Forum Associate at the Canadian International Council.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute has been and will continue to be involved

d'une ère «post-américaine» dans les affaires du monde. Nous avons ici un examen perspicace des forces et des faiblesses de l'argument de Zakaria.

Anne Frances Cation nous a offert un compte rendu du livre *The Way of the World: A story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism*, écrit par Ron Suskind qui, en 1995, a reçu le prix Pulitzer dans la catégorie Featured Writing. Son livre est un brestseller (Nonfiction) du New York Times. Le compte rendu de Mme Cation comprend une évaluation de l'auteur, y compris son analyse de la Commission 9/11. Anne Frances Cation est Associée du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du Conseil international du Canada.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD a été et continue d'être impliqué dans diverses

in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence issues, such as the Vimy Award, as well as the Annual Graduate Student Symposium (as mentioned earlier), the annual seminar, and numerous round table discussions.

- The CDA Institute was honoured when the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, presented the Vimy Award to General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier. The presentation was made at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum on 14 November. Amongst those in attendance were many of Canada's corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of the CDA Institute to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The evening was dignified also by the presence of Mr. Frank McArdle, husband of the Chief Justice of Canada; General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Mrs. Leslie Natynczyk; Mrs. Joyce Hillier; previous recipients of the Vimy Award, including the Right Honourable Joe Clark, the first recipient of the Vimy Award; Officer Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada and Collège militaire royal de Saint Jean; members of our Armed Forces; and many distinguished guests. During a reception for our guests a portrait of General (Ret'd) Hillier by Katherine Taylor was presented to General (Ret'd) Hillier by the artist.

The Vimy Award gala was filled with a lot of colour and ceremony, generously provided by the Regimental Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards, the Regimental Pipes and Drums of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the Spitfire Brass Quintet and the Canadian Forces String Ensemble.

The valuable support of this marvelous evening provided by our generous corporate sponsors and by our Member Associations, together with the Associate Members, contributed to a very significant event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors appears elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

- Included with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award to Monsieur Alec Castonguay, of *Le Devoir* and of *L'Actualité*, by Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. David J. Bercuson, Director of Programs, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The Award was initiated by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the CDFAI. The purpose of the Award is to recognize annually one Canadian journalist who

initiatives entourant la promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des enjeux touchant la sécurité et la défense du Canada, comme le Prix Vimy, ainsi que le symposium annuel des étudiants gradués (tel que mentionné ci-dessus), le séminaire annuel et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

- L'Institut de la CAD a été honoré quand la Très Honorable Beverly McLachlin, Juge en chef du Canada, a présenté le Prix Vimy au Général (ret.) Rick Hillier. La présentation a eu lieu à un dîner formel tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre, le 14 novembre. Parmi les personnes présentes se trouvaient de nombreux dirigeants d'entreprises qui sont des supporters des objectifs de l'Institut de la CAD, c'est-à-dire d'augmenter la sensibilité du public vis-à-vis la contribution significative et exceptionnelle d'un Canadien à la sécurité du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

La soirée a été également rehaussée par la présence de M. Frank McArdle, époux de la Juge en Chef du Canada, du Général Walter Natynczyk, chef d'état-major, et de Mme Leslie Natynczyk, de Mme Joyce Hillier, des récipiendaires passés du Prix Vimy, dont le Très Honorable Joe Clark, premier récipiendaire du Prix Vimy, des élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, de membres de nos Forces armées, et de plusieurs invités de marque. Au cours d'une réception offerte à nos invités, l'artiste Katherine Taylor a présenté au Général (ret.) Hillier un portrait qu'elle avait fait de lui.

Le gala de remise du Prix Vimy fut rempli de beaucoup de couleur et de cérémonie, généreusement fournies par la musique régimentaire des Governor General's Foot Guards, les Regimental Pipes and Drums des Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, le Spitfire Brass Quintet et l'Ensemble à cordes des Forces canadiennes.

L'appui précieux, offert par nos généreuses sociétés commanditaires et par nos associations membres, avec les membres associés, a contribué à un événement significatif qui a été apprécié par tous présents. Le remerciement public que nous adressons à nos sociétés commanditaires paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

- Dans le cadre du dîner de remise du Prix Vimy, nous avons eu la remise du Prix média Ross Munro à Monsieur Alec Castonguay du journal *Le Devoir* et de *L'Actualité*, par le Lieutenant-Colonel honoraire David J. Bercuson, directeur des programmes du Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Le prix a été institué par la Conférence des associations de la défence (CAD) en collaboration avec le CDFAI. L'objet du prix est de reconnaître chanque année un journaliste canadien

has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of Canada's defence and security issues. The CDA Institute is grateful for CDFAI's co-sponsorship of the Award.

Alec Castonguay receives the Ross Munro Media Award from Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. David Bercuson, 14 November 2008, at the Canadian War Museum./ Alec Castonguay reçoit le Prix média Ross Munro du lieutenant-colonel honorifique David Bercuson, le 14 november 2008, au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

- The CDA Institute will present its 25th annual seminar, *Canada-U.S. Relations – The Security Dimension*, on 26 February, 2009, at the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa. The CDA Institute's annual seminar is Canada's most important platform from which defence and security issues are explored. The theme of the seminar is timely, given the ongoing changes that have been brought about by recent events, in particular, the changes in the political administrations of Canada and the United States. The Right Honourable Stephen Harper has been invited to deliver the keynote address. Senator Hugh Segal will deliver the luncheon address.

- Those attending the seminar are also invited to attend the 72nd Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, whose sub-theme, *Changing times, an evolving Canadian Forces: a new defence strategy*, will be held on Friday, 27 February. The Honourable Peter G. MacKay, Minister of National Defence, will deliver the introductory address. We are very pleased that U.S. General James Mattis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander – Transformation, and that General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., Commander NORAD / US NORTHCOM, will each deliver a special address.

It was gratifying to see the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier filled to capacity, last February, for the 24th Annual Seminar and for the 71st AGM. Based on past experience I would recommend that our supporters

qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la compréhension par le grand public des enjeux du Canada en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD remercie le CDFAI de co-commanditer le Prix.

- L'Institut de la CAD présentera son 25e séminaire annuel, *les Relations Canada-U.S. – la dimension sécuritaire*, le 26 février 2009, à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa. Le séminaire annuel de la CAD est la plateforme la plus importante au Canada depuis laquelle sont explorées les questions de défense et de sécurité. Le thème du séminaire tombe à point, étant donné les changements actuels qui ont été amenés par les événements récents, en particulier, les changements dans les administrations politiques du Canada et des États-Unis. Le Très Honorable Stephen Harper a été invité à prononcer l'allocution programme. Le Sénateur Hugh Segal prononcera l'allocution au déjeuner.

- Les personnes qui assisteront au séminaire sont égalementg invitées à assister à la 72e assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense, qui sera tenue le 27 février sous le thème *Les temps changeant, les Forces canadiennes évoluent : une nouvelle stratégie de défense*. L'Honorable Peter G. MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, prononcera l'allocution d'introduction. Nous sommes très honorés que le général américain James Mattis, commandant suprême des Forces alliées de l'OTAN – Transformation, et le Général Victor E. Renuart, Jr., commandant de US NORTHCOM et du NORAD, prononceront chacun une allocution spéciale.

Ce fut gratifiant de voir la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier remplie à capacité, en février dernier, pour le 24e séminaire annuel et pour la 71e assemblée générale annuelle. Sur la base de

register soon to avoid disappointment by visiting our web site at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available on line at http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm.

Thank you. ©

l'expérience passée, je recommanderais à nos supporters de s'inscrire tôt pour éviter d'être déçus, en visitant notre site Web à l'adresse : http://www.cda-cdai.ca/.

Au cours de la dernière année, le gouvernement fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à une telle initiative, il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés sur les enjeux majeurs des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les FC et des pénuries continues dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins à long terme de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Mais l'Institut de la CAD va continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, ce qui nous permet de réaliser notre mission. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous inviterais à le devenir et à recruter un/e ami/e. Les formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et on peut aussi se les procurer en ligne à l'adresse http://cda-cdai.ca/CDAI/joincdai.htm.

Merci. ©

Canada's Air Force: On course, on glide path

by Lieutenant-General Angus Watt

As the Chief of the Air Staff and Commander of Canada's Air Force, I am responsible for the force generation and development of aerospace capabilities. This means providing the right combination of equipment and appropriately trained personnel to the operational level commands – primarily Canada Command for operations in North America and Canadian Expeditionary Force Command for international operations – today, tomorrow and well into the future.

Lieutenant-General Angus Watt is Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). Prior to his appointment as CAS, Lieutenant-General Watt commanded Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (Op APOLLO) in 2002 and served as the Deputy Commander (Air) of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2006.

Respond

First and foremost, Canadians expect their Air Force to respond to operational demands. We respond to the needs of Canadians by providing around the clock, immediate assistance through our Search and Rescue (SAR) operations and emergency airlift, maintaining surveillance and control of the airspace above Canada, conducting NORAD sovereignty patrols and supporting Arctic, maritime and fisheries surveillance.

Air Force personnel are involved in delivering humanitarian aid where needed, and are present in almost every theatre of operations around the world where they are making a significant contribution.

In Afghanistan, for instance, they are providing airlift and surveillance services, as well as personnel to

A CC-177 Globemaster III takes off from 14 Wing Greenwood, N.S., during Operation Alouette Mobile in September 2008.
Credit: Warrant Officer Ron Hartlen

the Theatre Support Element and the Joint Task Force in Kandahar – both on the airfield and outside the wire at the Forward Operating Bases – and to the Provincial Reconstruction Team. On average, we have been deploying at least 300 Air Force personnel in southwest Asia during each rotation and that number will now grow.

In November, we announced that eight CH-146 Griffon helicopters will deploy to Afghanistan in early 2009 as part of the Joint Task Force-Afghanistan Air Wing. The Air Wing will be composed of CH-147 D Chinook medium-to-heavy-lift helicopters, Heron unmanned aerial vehicles and the Griffons. These assets will all be deployed to Afghanistan by February 2009; about 250 personnel will deploy to operate and support them.

The Griffons, with crews from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron based in Edmonton, Alberta, will act as escort aircraft for the Chinooks. The transportation capability provided by the Chinooks, the escort capabilities of the Griffons, and the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance provided by the Heron will contribute to the reduction of risk to Canadian troops and government employees from ambushes, land mines and improvised explosive devices.

Recapitalize

We recognize that we need to maintain a balance of modern, relevant and effective capabilities to carry out these missions. As a result, we are in the midst of an unprecedented level of recapitalization of our aircraft fleets.

We now have all four of our CC-177 Globemaster III strategic airlifters. We will receive 17 J-model C-130 Hercules tactical airlifters to replace the oldest of the current Hercules fleet with first deliveries expected in early 2010.

To address the immediate helicopter lift requirements of our mission in Afghanistan, we chartered commercial heavy-lift helicopters that began operations in November. In the medium term, we have procured six Chinook D-model helicopters, already stationed in Afghanistan, from the United States Army.

The arrival of the new Canadian Chinook F-model

helicopters, expected in 2012 with operations beginning in 2013, will fulfill our long-term medium-to-heavy-lift helicopter requirements for the next 20 years or more.

Since we began employing the Sperwer tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Afghanistan in 2003, there have been significant advances in UAV technology and demands for longer endurance. A long-term solution to these needs, which will include domestic and deployed capabilities, is being procured through the Joint UAV Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project. In the meantime, we signed a contract with MacDonald Dettwiler Associates (MDA) of Vancouver, B.C. to lease an interim UAV – the Heron – through Project NOCTUA for use in Afghanistan.

Domestically, we are acquiring 28 Cyclone helicopters to replace the CH-124 Sea King maritime patrol helicopter. We are working with the manufacturer to minimize the impact of delivery delays and are continuing to move ahead with preparations, including the new infrastructure. We will ensure that the Sea King is sustained until the new maritime helicopter fleet is fully operational.

Other capability investments include a Canadian multi-mission aircraft to replace the CP-140 Aurora and a fixed-wing SAR aircraft to replace the CC-115 Buffalo and CC-130 Hercules that currently carry out the fixed-wing SAR role.

We are also planning for the 'next generation fighter' to replace the CF-18 Hornet beginning in 2017. To that end, we are involved with the US Joint Strike Fighter program for the purposes of industrial cooperation and information sharing. However, the procurement strategy for our next fighter has not yet been determined.

The ongoing fleet recapitalization is critical; in 1985 the average age of our aircraft fleet was 17 years. By 1995 it was 21 years and now the average age of our aircraft is 26 years. But old does not mean unsafe, and I continue to ensure that older aircraft are operationally relevant, safe, and effective to fly. Nevertheless, older aircraft have challenges with serviceability and technological relevance, so I am keen to bring that average age down through the acquisition of new aircraft.

Rebuild

We are ensuring that we have the necessary infrastructure at our Air Force Wings to support our new missions and platforms. Of 13 Wings in total, I have 10 with Air Force infrastructure. Though we should be spending about two per cent of our total assets on recapitalization investment and on maintenance and repair, to date we have not quite reached that goal. We are getting close, however, and construction is booming at wings across the country.

Refocus

To ensure we are focussed on our strategic vision, I am working on a strategy that will lay out the primary effects and characteristics required of a future Air Force – one that is agile and combat-capable, with the reach and power essential to integrated Canadian Forces (CF) operations at home and abroad. I envision the future Air Force to be a learning organization, effects-focussed, networked, interoperable, expeditionary, combat-capable and engaged with Canadians.

To achieve and implement this vision, I intend to group personnel, aircraft capabilities and functions into strategic lines of operation, which are the tools by which aerospace power is applied. The nine lines of operation are envisioned to be first-stage training, aerospace force application, aerospace management and control, air demonstration, air expeditionary support, air mobility, domestic search and rescue, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and control, and tactical helicopters.

By setting out this vision, and organizing capabilities in this manner, we will be better able to convert strategic intent into identifiable objectives.

Rejuvenate

Notwithstanding the urgent requirement for modernized and new equipment, the number one issue that affects the future of the Air Force is personnel.

I have approximately 13,000 Regular Force personnel, 2,300 reservists and 2,000 civilians. However, I face personnel shortages, long training times and challenging demographics amongst my military personnel.

Therefore, I need to attract, train and, most critically, retain people.

Attract. Canadian demographics are shifting and society is ageing. Therefore, we face more competition for potential military applicants. Recruiting is going well but we face challenges in certain occupations, especially in the technical occupations.

We also want to attract former servicemen and women back into the Air Force. The CF pay and benefits package has improved, and many former service members miss the challenges and opportunities of Air Force life. For those who are interested, we will welcome them back.

Train. Air Force occupations require a high level of technical skill and knowledge, requiring lengthy training periods and regular, consistent practice. For the long-term health of the Air Force, training production must increase and I am implementing initiatives to improve the situation.

We have already shortened the duration of training courses for our aircraft technicians, increased

course capacity and improved the quality of training. We have incorporated performance-oriented training at our technician schools, we are investing in training technologies and simulation techniques and, where possible, we use retired aircraft and dedicate them to technician training.

However, aircraft technicians are not the only occupation for which I need to increase training output. Pilot production is also critical. We intend to increase pilot training to increase the number of graduates from about 80 this year to 105 next year and eventually higher. We also need to move these novice pilots through the system with greater speed by implementing initiatives such as allowing pilots who possess a fixed wing Transport Canada commercial license to bypass primary pilot training at Portage la Prairie, Manitoba. There is also a need to increase the number of instructors, revise training methodologies, use better selection tools to reduce attrition, and increase the use of simulators.

Retain. As a result of downsizing in the 1990s and reduced recruiting, the Air Force, along with the other elements of the CF, faces large gaps in our demographic distribution. In several occupations, I have a severe shortfall in personnel with 12 to 16 years of service.

Sample Demographic - Air Technician



I cannot simply replace these people with new military members directly from private industry. Therefore, I would like to keep my airmen and airwomen with 15 to 20 years of service or more a few years longer to improve the ratio of experience to inexperience. We are working with Chief Military Personnel on several initiatives, but we are especially looking to improve family services to encourage my personnel to stay longer.

Re-engineer

We are also actively re-engineering personnel structures that were largely based on Cold War models.

These include our aircraft technician occupations. In 1995, 13 air maintenance occupations were amalgamated into three, which inadvertently created gaps in expertise. We will reorganize and increase the number of these occupations to better reflect the development of an expeditionary Air Force and the introduction of new fleets, technologies and maintenance requirements.

Air navigators will be re-designated as Air Combat Systems Operators (ACSOs) and will become the leaders of our UAV capability. Airborne electronic sensor operators (AESOPs) will be taking over some responsibilities as acoustic sensor operators on the CP-140 Aurora and will also become an integral part of the future UAV team. We are also studying options for evolving the Flight Engineer (FE) occupation in keeping with changing technology and new aircraft.

As we make the transition to new platforms and new capabilities, we will continue to rely on the skill, experience and adaptability of each and every one of our people. Flexibility is a necessity, but the changes will be gradual and evolutionary.

Reinforce

I am tremendously proud of the outstanding work our highly skilled people perform every day, both here in Canada and in dangerous places around the world. There

is a 'shine' on the CF right now; Canadians are proud of our CF personnel, and our members are proud to be in uniform. We need to continue to 'Connect with Canadians' to demonstrate our relevance and our missions, and we need to ensure that our members continue to view the CF as the very best career choice possible. ©

Renewing for Success Today and Tomorrow

by Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson

On 12 May 2008, the Right Honourable Stephen Harper unveiled the *Canada First Defence Strategy* by stating, "If you want to be taken seriously in the world, you need the capacity to act – it's that simple." That's a message anyone in uniform can understand. Building on the work of previous governments, the Government has made the commitment to renew the Canadian Forces, including the entire maritime force, over the next 20 years:

- Investing industry with the capacity and responsibility for long-term in-service support of the *Victoria* Class submarines in the decades to come;
- Modernizing the *Halifax* class frigates, to ensure these fleet 'workhorses' remain as operationally effective in the second half of their service lives as they have been in their first;
- Acquiring 28 Cyclone maritime helicopters that, when teamed with the modernized frigates, will constitute one of the most tactically formidable ship / helicopter combinations in any navy;
- Modernizing the Aurora fleet and eventually replacing it with 10 to 12 new multi-mission maritime patrol aircraft;
- Adding new capabilities and capacities the navy has never had before, through the acquisition of 6 to 8 Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and 3 Joint Support Ships; and
- Acquiring 15 Canadian Surface Combatants that will initially replace the *Iroquois* class destroyers that quarterback the Canadian task group, and eventually replace the *Halifax* class frigates when they reach the end of their service lives.

From initial approval, major naval combatants take about a decade to be delivered and typically operate over a lifespan of about 30 to 35 years. The Government has essentially defined Canada's navy for the first half of the 21st century. We cannot predict what defence and security challenges await us at mid-century any more than Prime Minister Laurier could have when he presided at the birth of the Canadian navy nearly 100 years ago. However, what we can say is that Canada will continue to need a well-balanced fighting fleet capable of performing missions across the spectrum of maritime operations, in both peace and war, and in numbers sufficient to sustain operations simultaneously at home and abroad.

As significant as the commitment to fleet renewal is, it is just as important that the Government remain committed to long-term and stable defence funding for investments in personnel, readiness and infrastructure, as well as equipment. The latter, however, is especially crucial to maritime force development. The business of naval procurement is one of the most complex large-scale activities in public enterprise, and warships are among most complex machines on the planet. To this day there remain few examples more potent of a country's technical prowess than its ability to successfully build a modern naval combatant. Moreover, the building of warships is a unique activity characterized by high complexity in design and production, and by low production volumes. As such, a long term commitment is just as important to Canadian industry as it is to defence planners.

The navy's first order of business is to organize ourselves to deliver the future fleet – not as easy as it sounds. We have already learned with the Joint Support Ship project that much of the capacity and know-how needed within the navy and other government departments must be rebuilt in order to deliver successfully on major crown projects.

Human resource realities also exacerbate the challenges because the navy currently employs much of the talent that ADM (Materiel) needs to deliver on the

Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson was Director General International Security Policy before he was promoted Vice-Admiral and assumed his current duties as Chief of the Maritime Staff in January 2006.

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For further information or to advise the CDA Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903 or treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.

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En incluant l'Institut de la CAD dans vos plans de succession, vous assurerez un héritage durable pour l'Institut.

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour aviser l'Institut de la CAD de vos intentions, veuillez communiquer avec le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe en composant le 613 236-9903 ou courriel treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. Toute demande d'information sera traitée de manière personnelle et strictement confidentielle.

maritime programme. We must provide him the expertise he needs without jeopardizing our ability to generate maritime forces for operations today. Balancing the ability to deliver the future navy and succeed in operations today will influence everything we do in the navy over the next few years.

The challenge in building the fleet does not stop there. The delivery on several classes of ship in a compressed period of time means we may well need new ways to manage the delivery of the maritime programme as a whole. Inherent in this is a strategic opportunity to move beyond the cycles of 'boom or bust' that have characterized naval and coast guard procurement over the past 60 years.

The second order of business is to lay out how we are going to maintain our operational output over the next decade or so with temporarily reduced capacity due to the *Halifax* class frigates requiring modernization refits. Reduced fleet capacity has important implications for the competency and professional development of a generation of fleet personnel, from Ordinary Seamen to Fleet Commanders. This will need to be addressed in a systematic and coherent fashion.

From an institutional perspective, the navy's third order of business will be to ensure the integrated system that generates and sustains maritime forces becomes increasingly agile and adaptable to deal with the shocks and surprises that undoubtedly await us in the future.

For technologically intensive fighting organizations, agility begins in our platforms. In the next half-century the fleet is likely to be employed in scenarios we have not yet contemplated. Therefore, it is important to design flexibility into our warships and in the missions they are designed to accomplish. This will require a capacity for rapid development and insertion of new sensors and weapons systems into our naval combatants, supported by a focused programme of technology demonstration, fleet experimentation, and operational test and evaluation. There are also important ramifications in all of this for fleet materiel support.

Agility also depends on our effectiveness as a learning organization at the tactical level. Consequently, we will continue to develop maritime and joint tactics and doctrine in concert with our closest defence partners and allies, and to rapidly inculcate lessons learned fleet-wide. Technology has opened up possibilities and we will need to exploit these fully to ensure technical and tactical interoperability with our allies.

At the most fundamental level, however, our future success will continue to reside in our people. We will need to continue investing in a first-class naval training and education system to enhance readiness at the individual, team and task group levels.

In the final analysis, unless we continue to attract and retain quality people who have a sense of duty and commitment to their country, the finest ships, submarines, and aircraft will come to nothing. We will do so by caring for people's well being, supporting their families, paying them fairly for all that their country demands of them, and by ensuring our institution allows our sailors to realize their full potential as naval professionals. ©

BILL C-201

Mr. Peter Stoffer, MP advises that his Private Member's Bill (Bill C-201), aimed at putting an end to the reduction of the military and RCMP Veterans' pension benefits at age 65, is scheduled for Second Reading in thee House of Commons during this or the next session of Parliament (January/February 09).

Your Member of Parliament can be contacted by finding your Member's contact information at http://canada.gc.ca/directories-repertoires/direct-eng.html#mp

PROJET DE LOI C-201

M. le député Peter Stoffer nous informe que son projet de loi d'initiative parlementaire (Projet de loi C-201), qui vise à mettre un terme à la réduction des prestations des vétérans des forces armées et de la GRC à l'âge de 65 ans, est prévu pour une deuxième lecture dans la Chambre des Communes pendant la présente session du Parlement, ou la suivante (janvier/février 09).

Vous pouvez contacter votre député en trouvant ses coordonnées sur le site http://canada.gc.ca/directories-repertoires/direct-eng.html#mp

Putting Procurement Back On Track

by Commander (Ret'd) Ken Bowering & Jerrod Riley

This article is a condensed version of the Sir Arthur Currie Paper entitled "Military/Naval Procurement in Canada - A Flawed Process", by Commander (Ret'd) Ken Bowering.

(The full copy of this paper is available online at

http://cda-cdai.ca/Currie_Papers/Currie%20Paper%201-08%20Navy%20League.pdf – ed.)

Introduction

Armed with the new *Canada First Defence Strategy*, it would seem that life should be rosy for the Canadian Forces (CF) for the next 20 years. Alas, such is not the case. We have recently seen the cancellation of the navy's Joint Support Ship procurement, two of the three qualified bidders for the Halifax Class Modernization project opting out, and a Search and Rescue Fixed Wing Aircraft procurement that has not gotten off the ground after four years and two successive governments. These are the result of a flawed government procurement process.

This article examines the process that has been followed by the navy over the past 60 years in acquiring most of its ships and, in doing so, will point out the flaws in the current process and identify some steps that can be taken to remedy the situation.

Commander (Ret'd) Ken Bowering is Vice-President Maritime Affairs, the Navy League of Canada. Jerrod Riley is the National Deputy Director, the Navy League of Canada.

Background

Between 1950 and 1965, twenty modern destroyer escorts were designed and constructed in Canada. These were followed in the late-60s/early-70s with four new destroyers and three replenishment ships and, in the late-80s/mid-90s, with twelve new frigates.

For two of these projects, the navy did the entire design 'in-house' and managed what in effect were 'build-to-print' construction contracts with the shipyards. For the third project, the entire responsibility was undertaken by industry and supervised by the navy.

While the 20-ship St. Laurent and follow-on classes experienced the normal challenges of complex projects, they were ultimately completed successfully. One key benefit was that the navy was able to incorporate design changes as the ships in the different classes were built. For example, the superstructure and the forward gun and sonar equipment were changed on the Restigouche and Mackenzie Classes, and the Annapolis Class was built with helicopter hangar decks and variable depth sonar.

The Iroquois Class destroyer upgrades and the frigate and coastal defence vessel build projects were similarly successful, providing Canada with a modern

Table 1: Destroyer Escort/Destroyer/Frigate Shipbuilding Projects 1950-1998

Project		Timeframe	Shipyard(s)	Prime/Design Agent Responsibility
Destroyer Escorts	St. Laurent Class (7)	1950-1957	Halifax Shipyard (4) Davie Shipbuilding (2) MIL (Sorel) (3) Canadian Vickers (4) Burrard Drydock (4) Victoria Machinery Depot (2) Yarrows (1)[1]	Navy
	Restigouche Class (7)	1953-1959		
	Mackenzie Class (4)	1958-1963		
	Annapolis Class (2)	1960-1964		
Destroyers	Iroquois Class (4)	1969-1973	MIL (Sorel) (3) Davie (1)	Navy
Frigates	Halifax Class (12)	1987-1996	St. John Shipbuilding (9) MIL Davie (Lauzon) (3)	Industry

1 Laid down and launched by Burrard Drydock in Vancouver but completed by Yarrows in Esquimalt.

fleet with ships as good as, or better, than similar vessels in any of the allied navies. With the recently-announced Halifax Class Modernization contracts, our frigates will continue to serve until approximately 2030.

Current Situation

So, what has happened since our early successes, and can we now recover what was lost? With a few changes to our procurement process, the answer to the second part of this question is a resounding 'yes'. Some of the factors that impact and/or exacerbate the shipbuilding situation of today are listed below:

- The threat/capability deficiency is more complex today, forcing a more demanding operational requirement statement. The navy tends to define these requirements down to the finest detail, rather than asking for industry's solutions to the broader capability-related requirement.

- The navy has gone through a period where its personnel, though suitably educated and trained, are fewer in number and, in some cases, particular classifications and trades have all but disappeared.

- Naval shipbuilding in Canada now occurs only at infrequent intervals, with about 20 years between major projects. With no continuity, industry is not in a position to invest in the infrastructure and workforce necessary to meet anticipated naval requirements.

- The government has introduced complex procurement processes that often take 15 to 20 years to complete.

- Three government departments have key roles in ship procurement: the Department of National Defence (DND), Public Works and Industry. No one department or individual can be held accountable for problems.

- The principle of adequate competition among Canadian companies is not the panacea that it might appear to be. It must be recognized that there will be occasions when only a single product or platform meets the military requirement. In those cases the government needs to make a strategic decision and proceed with a sole source acquisition.

A Way Ahead

Each of these issues can be addressed without diluting the overall integrity of the process in any way. In terms of naval procurement, the following must occur:

Outsource the Design Process. It is extremely unlikely that the navy will ever rebuild its pool of naval engineering expertise to where it once was. However, the navy must maintain the core of talent that it presently has and augment this by outsourcing more to industry. In doing this, the navy could once again develop its own detailed designs and return to the proven 'build to print' form of ship procurement.

Requirements. The tendency today seems to be in over-specifying everything and, as a result, issues that are best left to the shipbuilder are not. This leaves little scope for coming up with alternative solutions. In addition, since specifications are usually written by a number of persons, there is often variation in the details provided. This dilemma could be addressed by having the navy's design team take responsibility for developing all technical specifications.

The need for invoking military standards and/or military specifications has to be rethought, as many industrial/commercial specifications are actually better and more current than their military counterparts, especially for in-service support. Invoking military specifications for logistics support probably doubles the cost over a modern, flexible, commercial approach. The navy must also ensure its requirements are consistent with international commercial standards such as Lloyds and the International Maritime Organization.

Shipyards and Competition. Industry Canada should undertake source qualification of our shipyards and, based on reasonable criteria, pre-select the shipyards that can be contracted to build naval ships. Then, with design specifications produced by the navy, the government could quickly negotiate contracts with these yards on a 'right of first refusal' basis.

Ship Acquisition Schedule. Typically, the lifetime for Canadian naval ships has been somewhere between 35 and 40 years. However, studies conducted by other navies have shown that mid-life modernization projects (as has been our practice) are not cost-effective. It is best to keep destroyers/frigates in operation for at most 15 years, and then replace them while they still have some resale value (to third-tier navies). This principle, coupled with a 'continuous build' concept (whereby ships are always being built at a rate of, say, two per year) would ensure that Canada always has a modern, state-of-the-art navy.

Government Accountability. It is perhaps surprising that the Auditor General has not jumped on this as an area for concern. The issue of three government departments with different areas of responsibility, and no one point for accountability, needs to be addressed. Using the Australian Defence Material Organization's model, total responsibility for defence procurement would be assigned to one organization within DND, reporting directly to the Minister. Of course, this would apply to all military procurement, not just naval.

Terms and Conditions. For several years now, the government's approach to stating the terms and conditions of contracts is nothing less than archaic, dictatorial, and confrontational. In essence, the government wants everything their way, and there is no possibility of negotiation in order to reach reasonable compromises.

In shipbuilding projects these terms and conditions can run to in excess of 200 pages of complex terminology, requiring teams of lawyers to interpret and understand them. These terms and conditions often unrealistically demand that the bidders turn over all intellectual property, whether funded by the project or not, to the government to use as it may wish. This includes giving it to competitors!

Furthermore, government passes all scheduling, technical and financial risk to the bidders. Even with the most complex projects, like shipbuilding, there is no question of sharing risk: all of it is borne by the bidders. These factors escalate costs dramatically and often drive capable bidders away.

Other cost drivers in the terms and conditions include:

- 'Fixed price' versus 'cost plus' and the linkage between cost-constrained acquisition and life cycle costs;

- Liability clauses that lead to unlimited liability on the part of the contractor, plus the potential for severe liquidated damages should there be any shortfall in delivering industrial benefits;

- Government project management oversight requirements and reporting processes are often excessive and, with a constrained budget, sacrifice product for process; and

- Risk and responsibility are both the contractor's, but the government maintains direct oversight, design review and approval and control of work flow. The contractor has all of the responsibility but the government retains all the authority.

Industrial and Regional Benefits. Liked by some and hated by others, IRBs are a fact of life in our government procurement system. However, there are some projects where IRBs should have strong influence in the final decision and others where they should not. For example, since armoured tanks and jet fighters are not designed or manufactured in Canada – and probably never will be – it makes eminent sense to ensure strong requirements for industrial benefits. But since we do have aerospace and shipbuilding industries in Canada, it makes no sense to penalize them with onerous IRB requirements – they are already providing them!

The government's IRB policy should help and encourage Canadian companies and not – as it does now – ridiculously tie their hands. Procurements now call for 100% of industrial benefits, plus equitable regional and acceptable small business benefits. Industrial benefits are an investment in the future. In this regard, we must be more flexible and helpful in identifying opportunities for realization of benefits. The 'who, what, where, and when' variables in the IRB equation can all be determined once the contract is awarded. This would save significant time and money during the contracting process.

Conclusion

This article has identified some concerns with the government's current procurement process and we have recently seen definitive examples of its shortcomings. Like the rusted-out equipment that it aims to replace, the system itself has rusted out and is in dire need of overhaul.

Yes, our procurement system is flawed and, as we continue to delay one project and cancel another, we also stand to lose face with our allies such that, the next time we cry wolf, maybe no one will listen. We have the *Canada First Defence Strategy* – let's live up to it, fix the process and get back on track. ©

The Strategic Importance of Afghanistan

by Major James Scott Taylor, Jr.

(The views here are the author's alone and do not reflect United States policy – ed.*)*

Introduction

Afghanistan is vitally important to United States and international security. Years of warfare left the country susceptible to the influence of religious extremists. These extremists in turn harbored international terrorists who conspired to attack the United States on September 11, 2001. Seven years after the first shot was fired in the Global War on Terrorism, the insurgency in Afghanistan continues. Until the situation in Afghanistan is stabilized the threat from al Qaida remains.

A Brief History of Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a long history of conflict dating back as far as Alexander the Great. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British tried to control Afghanistan in their 'Great Game' with Russia. The current instability can be traced to the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979 and the subsequent anti-Soviet jihad that drew Muslim fighters to Afghanistan to support the Afghan *mujahidin*.

One of the foreign fighters who arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan was Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden set up a relief organization to serve the Arab fighters that arrived from all over the Middle East and, in fighting near Jaji in eastern Afghanistan, earned the reputation as a fierce warrior. The money, arms and covert support provided by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (among others) flooded the region and served to extend the fighting long after the Soviet 40th Army withdrew in defeat at the end of the 1980s. After their victory the various Afghan factions were unable to consolidate power and Afghanistan, fueled by the availability of weapons, slipped into a civil war. Against this background of conflict the Taliban rose to power.

Originally accepted by the Afghan people, the Taliban brought security and stability to the war torn country. As the movement spread out from Kandahar it began to consolidate its hold over the rest of the country. As it gained control of the country, possibly with the monetary support of Osama bin Laden who returned to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996, it began to implement a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The Taliban banned kite flying, music, and television, and forced men to grow long beards and prevented women from traveling outside the home without a male relative serving as an escort. While Islam is a major component of the Afghan identity, Afghanistan as a whole was much more moderate and these restrictions did not sit well with the population. The Taliban doled out severe punishments for anyone who violated their edicts. The Taliban was forcefully removed from power in 2001 after the United States invaded Afghanistan as a result of the September 11 attacks.

Threats to the Stability of Afghanistan

It is against this turbulent history of conflict that the current government of President Hamid Karzai must operate. The central government of Afghanistan has never truly controlled anything beyond the capital city of Kabul and up until the recent past the countryside was controlled by various warlords. The Karzai government faces three main threats to stability in Afghanistan: 1) poverty, 2) record opium production, and 3) a resurgent Taliban.

After nearly thirty years of war poverty is endemic in Afghanistan. More than half of Afghanistan's population lives below the international poverty standard of one US dollar a day. Afghanistan is a resource poor country and export commodities are limited to agricultural and animal products. Unemployment has hovered around forty percent for the last few years.

The United States and coalition forces remain one of the largest employers of Afghans, with the local population providing unskilled labor to work on the large bases around the country.

An additional factor that drives unemployment and the subsequent poverty is the extremely low literacy rate among Afghans. Less than one third of the country over the age of fifteen can read and write. Because of the Taliban's prohibition on educating females it is estimated that only twelve percent of females over the age of fifteen are literate. Furthermore, like most developing countries Afghanistan is experiencing a youth bulge. The

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average life expectancy for both men and women is only forty-four years and the average age is seventeen years. Afghanistan's low literacy rate, coupled with its low life expectancy, contribute significantly to the poverty problem. While volumes of literature exist debating the correlation between poverty and terrorism, it cannot be denied that the poor conditions in Afghanistan at least allow insurgent groups to flourish.

The second major threat to Afghanistan's stability is opium production. According to the United Nations' Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007 was a banner year for opium production in Afghanistan. Afghanistan now accounts for ninety-three percent of the world's opium. Much of this opium is destined for European and Russian markets.

Despite eradication efforts seventeen percent more land was used for the cultivation of poppies in 2007 than in 2006. This is more land than that used in Latin America to grow coca to produce cocaine. Opium production also increased as Afghan opium farmers produced thirty-four percent more opium in the same period. Much of the land used to cultivate poppies is in Afghanistan's southern provinces of Helmand, Nangarhar and Kandahar. These provinces are or have been under Taliban control. The increased opium harvest has provided insurgents with increased revenue to fund their operations.

The final threat to stability in Afghanistan is the resurgence of the Taliban insurgency. Violence is at a higher level than at any other time since the US led invasion in 2001. There have been more American deaths in the first ten months of 2008 than in all of 2007. Additionally casualty rates have increased every year since 2003.

Insurgent activity, namely led by the Taliban although there are other anti-government and anti-US forces in the country, are on the rise. The Taliban have taken to launching spectacular attacks in an attempt to demoralize the population. Examples include the June 13 coordinated attack on Sariposa prison in Kandahar, the July 7 car bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, and the July 13 attack on a small US outpost in Kunar province that killed nine American soldiers. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence exists that foreign fighters are now being redirected from Iraq to Afghanistan.

The emergence of Improvised Explosive Devices, weapons that were common in Iraq but which were not seen early in Operation *Enduring Freedom*, have been used with increasing effectiveness in recent years. Increased violence by insurgents seriously undercuts support for the Karzai government as it serves to remind the population that the central government cannot control the countryside.

Strategic Importance

A quick glance at a map of the world readily shows the strategic importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Situated between a nuclear-armed Pakistan and a would-be nuclear power in Iran, an unstable Afghanistan could contribute to further instability in the region and give al Qaida access to nuclear weapons. Afghanistan also serves as the gateway to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Were the conflict in Afghanistan to spread to these largely Muslim countries it could destabilize states all the way to Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Afghanistan borders the Chinese province of Xinjiang where the Muslim Uyghurs are fighting their own insurgency against the government. The Chinese government considers the Uyghurs to be terrorists and is currently prosecuting a counterinsurgency against them. Chinese Muslim fighters have been found in Afghanistan fighting alongside Chechens, Uzbeks and Pakistanis.

While Afghan stability is important in the region it is also important in the greater Global War on Terrorism. It is well documented that the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 were hatched in Afghanistan.

Today the uncontrolled tribal areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have played a crucial role in recent terror attacks in Europe, including the bombings in London on July 7 and 21, 2005, the Glasgow airport bombing in June 2007, and the plots in Germany to attack German and US military targets in September 2007. The United States has taken to launching limited unilateral attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. These attacks have targeted key leaders of al Qaida but have raised the ire of the Pakistani government.

It will be left to the Obama Administration to decide what future US policy will be towards Pakistan. The United States can either continue to rely on Pakistan to control this region (which it has done unsuccessfully) or it can continue to take unilateral action against insurgent forces in the region.

Conclusion

More than seven years after the attacks of September 11, 2001 the war against al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan is still ongoing. Insurgent activity is at record levels and casualty rates continue to increase annually. But the United States and its Coalition partners cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become an unfettered haven for international terrorism. Regional stability and international security hang in the balance.

Broken Command in Afghanistan[1]

Colonel Ian Hope

"Unity of command is best achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite authority." - FM 100-5 (1954)

In Afghanistan today, want of moral singleness, organizational simplicity, and intensity of purpose, harps of military failure. This is attributable to an abrupt departure from a long-standing Alliance practice of insisting on unity of command.

The principle of 'unity of command' has successfully guided multiple alliances and coalitions since 1918. During the Second World War, it coalesced and focused Allied military power through investiture of 'supreme command' upon singular operational commanders in distinct geographic areas. Unity of command was the principle behind the United States' 1946 Unified Command Plan (UCP), which institutionalized the practice of unifying joint forces under one commander-in-chief. The principle was also foundational in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This article examines the departure from this principle in Afghanistan, creating there a situation where operations have become split between Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Commander US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Canada's continued participation in the Afghan mission should comprehend this issue, and Canada should engage at the strategic level to rectify the dysfunctional command structure currently in place.

American tradition of unity of command was formalized by 1914 as a "Combat Principle"[2] and was elevated to common understanding in March 1918 when the Supreme War Council granted General Ferdinand Foch "supreme command" over French, American, and British Imperial forces. This provided long-needed singleness of moral purpose in allied planning, and led to the coordinated offensives that defeated Germany that autumn.



Figure 1. Unity of Command 1918

The lesson of 1918 was not lost to junior observers. George C. Marshall had been General Pershing's chief of operations and had witnessed his commander's resistance to subordination under Foch and experienced the frustration caused by American caveats. But he had also witnessed the positive effect of Foch's "strategic direction".[3] Upon assuming responsibilities as US Army Chief of Staff in 1939, Marshall began to shape the environment in Washington to embrace the principle of unity of military command under civilian control.

Shortly after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Marshall concluded that "unified command . . . would solve nine tenths of the problems of British-American military collaboration."[4] Thereafter he worked tirelessly

(*continued p. 24*)

Colonel Ian Hope is an instructor at the U.S. Army War College. Previous assignments included commander of the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (Task Force Orion) under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Kandahar, Afghanistan, from January to August 2006, during which his soldiers experienced intense and sustained combat.

25th ANNUAL SEMINAR of the CDA Institute and 72nd ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the Conference of Defence Associations

26-27 February 2009

Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON

The 25th annual seminar, *Canada-U.S. Relations – The Security Dimension*, will be presented by the CDA Institute on Thursday, 26 February, 2009, commencing at 0815 hrs. Participants will include General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault, the Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, Senator Hugh Segal, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers, and Mr. Robert Fowler.

27 February, 0845 – 1530 hrs – *Changing times, an evolving Canadian Forces: a new defence strategy*. Addresses by: the Honourable Peter MacKay, General Walter Natynczyk, General James Mattis, and General Victor E. Renuart, Jr. Participants will include Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, Major-General Walter Semianiw, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Michel Maisonneuve, and Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don W. Macnamara.

Registration Fees (includes reception, 26 February):

- CDA Institute donors, Seminar Sponsors, CDA Member Associations and Associate Member Associations — $175
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25e SÉMINAIRE de l'Institut de la CAD et 72e ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRAL ANNUELLE de la Conférence des associations de la défense

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Le 25e Séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD, intitulé, *les Relations Canada-U.S. - la dimension sécuritaire* aura lieu jeudi, le 26 février, à 8 h 15. Le général (Ret) Raymond Henault, l'honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, le sénateur Hugh Segal, le contre-amiral (Ret) Ken Summers, et M. Robert Fowler, feront partie de séminaire.

Le 27 février, 8 h 45 – 15 h 30 h – *Les temps changeant, les Forces canadiennes évoluent: une nouvelle stratégie de défense*. Présentations par: l'honorable Peter MacKay, le général Walter Natynczyk, le général James Mattis, et le général General Victor E. Renuart,Jr., le vice-amiral Drew Robertson, le lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, le lieutenant-général Angus Watt, le major-général Walter Semianiw, le lieutenant-général (Ret) Michel Maisonneuve, et le brigadier-général (Ret) Don W. Macnamara.

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with General Eisenhower to establish unified commands in each major theatre of the war, uniting all services of every participating nation under one commander-in-chief (CINC). Simultaneously Marshall forced the US military to adapt to the British committee system for managing the strategy of the war,[5] through the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). This body had unquestioned authority over the theatre commanders. The CCS addressed 'grand strategy' where national war aims were amalgamated to produce sanctioned military strategy to be implemented by theatre commanders.



Figure 2. CCS and Supreme Commands 1945

Marshall and Eisenhower affirmed two lessons by war's end: the efficacy of a single CINC as essential to achieving military unity of effort in a given theatre of war, and the requirement that theatre commanders be responsive to a higher strategic body where the competing requirements of different national policies and strategy come together to be debated.

The first lesson was foundational in creating the UCP in 1946; the second guided the formation of NATO in 1949.

The UCP was established in the US military in order to institutionalize joint theatre command and reduce the service rivalries that had characterized US strategy formulation during the war.[6] It helped simplify the command and control of US Army, Navy, and Air forces in designated areas by placing them under a single CINC, assisted by a joint staff. But these unified commanders were not entitled to perform unique-to-service functions – administration, training, supply, or expenditure of appropriated funds. These tasks had to be delegated to a service component headquarters whose 'Title 10' authorities came from Washington. Therefore, while the unified commanders had authority to execute operations, the sustainment of these operations remained squarely in the hands of the national military authorities, who reconciled priorities between unified commands.

Perhaps the most important geographic unified command was in Europe. Under the UCP, the senior American military headquarters in Germany became US European Command (EUCOM), commanded by the CINC Europe (CINCEUR) who was responsible for all United States forces on the continent. In a brilliant move to ensure unity of military command among alliance partners, the US CINCEUR was also designated as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), in command of all allied forces.

When NATO was established in 1949 there was no questioning this American-led command construct. Within the alliance, however, American military and political leaders understood that military command of a theatre did not equate with American control of strategy formulation. This had to be done in a multi-lateral forum that could achieve results similar to the CCS committee system of World War Two. Therefore, the NATO Military Committee was established, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was created, becoming the civil-political forum for debate over combined strategy to which Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was responsive.



Figure 3. Unified Commands in the UCP – 1950

Within SHAPE, and in the military chain of command in each member nation, the sentiment favoring powerful supreme command was so strong that it became entrenched. Europeans have always since deferred to SACEUR, provided that alliance strategy formulation remains within the Military Committee and the NAC.

UN-sponsored intervention into the Former Yugoslavia in 1996 demonstrated how NATO operations could be executed within the UCP framework, maintaining the principle of military unity of command under multi-lateral political oversight. SACEUR remained the singular operational commander, responsive to both the NAC and to the US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). SACEUR accepted such frustrating factors as national caveats in order to sustain the alliance's political support that has endured for over a decade.



Figure 4. Unity of Command in NATO

Operations in Kosovo in 1999 were far more problematic as lack of political agreement to attack Serbia created unprecedented caveats, yet SACEUR still maintained that, "The NATO process worked . . . I was persuaded of the basic soundness of NATO decision-making."[7] Such conviction was not held by many officers on the EUCOM staff who remembered how their CINC's orders were not always obeyed, and who sensed differences in perspective that Eisenhower and Pershing would have recognized as normal within an alliance, but was constraining to those working within the parallel US unified headquarters. They saw stark contrast between these constraints and the seemingly easy success achieved by the *ad hoc* coalition in CENTCOM during operation Desert Storm, where short duration and limited objectives granted a commonality of moral purpose that allowed unity of effort.

After Kosovo, American sentiment has favored coalitions that are defined by (US) military missions, rather than an alliance that seeks collective definition of the mission before military action. In the post 9/11 world, war strategy has become increasingly confined within the Executive Branch of the US Government, and executed by US combatant commanders, with tactical support from 'invited' coalition members. The problems this creates have surfaced in Afghanistan.

At the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001, 'supreme command' fell upon Commander CENTCOM. In the absence of a combined strategic forum, CENTCOM – and the US Office of the Secretary of Defence – also assumed lead role in coalition war management. Sympathy for the United States, and the assumption that operations in Afghanistan would be short, caused few nations to raise political objections to a CENTCOM lead, even though CINCCENT was not subject to any non-US political scrutiny. Nor did CINCCENT feel compelled to subject himself to any political concerns other than those of the SECDEF or the President.

Aside from guidance emanating from the Bonn Conference, and from bilateral military-to-military relationships, war strategy for Afghanistan was made almost entirely in Washington and Tampa (despite the fact that the Bonn Process allowed four other nations – Germany, Italy, UK, and Japan – to work individual initiatives for police, justice, counter-narcotics and disarmament reforms in Afghanistan, independent of CENTCOM or the SECDEF). From a purely military-centric perspective, coalition contingents were 'unified' under one CINC in Tampa, where each coalition member had a liaison team. From a grand strategic perspective, no one was in charge of the overall Afghanistan mission.

In 2001, CINCCENT deployed land, air, and maritime component command (CFLCC, a CFACC, and a CFMCC) headquarters to the Arabian Gulf, and a special operations task force (now called Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – CJSOTF) into Afghanistan.[8] However, unifying the tactical efforts of these multiple service components and their coalition partners was very difficult, as evidenced in Operation Anaconda in March 2002.[9] Therefore, in 2003, Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) was established as the joint operational level headquarters for Afghanistan.

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A subordinate unified command, CFC-A was also responsible for building the Afghan Army (through the Office of Military Cooperation – now called Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan - CSTC-A), pushing reconstruction efforts through their newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and managing the joint special operations fight.

CFC-A was supported by the CENTCOM CFLCC, CFACC and CFMCC, who were also supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Under this construct tactical unity of command existed for in-country ground combat; however, the CFC-A commander quickly found himself competing for critical ground, close air support (CAS) and Intelligence / Surveillance / Reconnaissance (ISR) assets against the OIF mission. While the CFLCC, CFACC, and CFMCC considered him a 'supported commander,' he was not the primary supported commander in CENTCOM and his theatre became an economy-of-effort mission to operations in Iraq.

Somewhat akin to the problem faced by Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), the commander of CFC-A found that his agency was limited by having to work his legal Title 10 concerns – train, organize, move, equip, and fund – through a CFLCC and a CFACC serving dual missions, and his operational concerns through a CINC pre-occupied with other operations.



Figure 5. Command Relationships CENTCOM 2003

Unity of command and political oversight of multi-national forces emerged as a larger issue with the growth of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Originally ISAF had no command relationship with the senior US headquarters in Bagram and worked through national channels to Britain and coordinated non-British assets through coalition representatives in Tampa. This independent approach was confusing and it ended in 2003 when the ISAF mission was taken over by NATO and command and control moved to an entirely European chain of command, from ISAF Headquarters in Kabul to NATO Joint Forces Command (JFC) –Brunssum in the Netherlands, then upward to SHAPE. NATO assumption, however, did not clarify a relationship between the ISAF and OEF missions.

ISAF HQ changed every six months as designated NATO corps headquarters assumed the mission on a rotating basis, ensuring no continuity in command and little progress establishing a standing relationship with HQ CFC-A. As the senior American headquarters in Afghanistan, CFC-A saw itself as the superior headquarters, functioning at the operational level. But from the NATO perspective, CFC-A was another tactical level headquarters, separate and distinct from the three-star ISAF tactical headquarters, and certainly not its superior.

Unable to see or reconcile this difference in perspectives, with each side assuming it was correct, a decision was nonetheless made to expand the ISAF area beginning in 2004 to assume responsibility for the northern part of the country, the western part of Afghanistan in 2005, and all territory in Afghanistan in late 2006. This decision was predicated upon the US desire to reduce its military commitment to Afghanistan, backfilling American troops with NATO forces.

SHAPE looked to JFC Brunssum as the operational level headquarters under which ISAF was a tactical component. Yet Brunssum was ill-equipped for this task, and was too far removed from the realities of Afghanistan to provide the necessary planning or operational guidance. Most importantly, JFC Brunssum had no authority over the US service component headquarters remaining inside or supporting Afghanistan, making unity of command impossible. In a benign stability operation this might have been made to work, but events in 2006 emphasized the divisions.

NATO found itself inheriting a growing insurgency that it had previously dismissed as an American problem. Fighting produced a growing number

of Canadian and British casualties, and NATO was unprepared psychologically for this development. Despite this, CFC-A was disbanded in February 2007, and ISAF headquarters became responsible for the country before the unity of command issue was addressed.



Figure 6. Command in Afghanistan 2008

Although NATO assumed responsibility, SACEUR/CINCEUR was still not the 'supported' combatant commander that the US held accountable for Afghanistan. He had no relationship with critical supporting US headquarters – especially the CLFCC, CFACC and its much-needed Coalition Air Operations Centre (CAOC), and CJSOTF, and CSTC-A. These remained with CENTCOM.

Through CSTC-A, CJSOTF, and the senior US tactical headquarters in Afghanistan – currently Task Force 101 – CINNCCENT continues to exercise authority for six critical functions that would historically been transferred to SACEUR/CINCEUR if unity of command was still important: (1) US Title 10 (including logistics and medical support) responsibilities; (2) capacity-building of the Afghan security forces; (3) special operations coordination; (4) ISR and CAS support; (5) counter-narcotics coordination; and (6) regional engagement with neighboring countries, most importantly Pakistan. NATO and EUCOM have no part in these efforts. CENTCOM ownership of these functions has for seven years precluded formulation of a strategy or campaign plan acceptable to all major parties.

The mixing of command authorities inside the Afghanistan theatre is only the second major departure from sixty years of practice in the UCP. The first occurred in Vietnam. Yet the White House and CENTCOM have been reluctant to shift any of these functions to NATO and EUCOM because they fear being constrained by the alliance, and because they remain understandably unimpressed by alliance timidity. At the same time NATO members are suspicious of continued CENTCOM involvement, and have placed heavy caveats upon their forces in order to protect them from being sucked into OEF missions that are directed unilaterally by the White House and CENTCOM with no alliance input.

US reluctance to work within and lead NATO and European refusal to support US unilateralism has created a fractured command structure that is abetting the Taliban insurgency. Canada should understand this and dedicate efforts to overcoming the current impasse between NATO and the USA.

Specifically, it is recommend that Canada push for a re-alignment of all US functions under US EUCOM and the empowerment of SACEUR/CINCEUR. This would help to solve all six of the issues currently fracturing command in Afghanistan. While having the CENTCOM CLFCC and CFACC support both Afghanistan and Iraq is highly efficient for controlling US force rotations, logistics, medical support, ISR and CAS allocations, this construct makes full NATO integration and involvement in Afghanistan impossible.

Unity of command would be better achieved by the establishment of a EUCOM/NATO JLFCC and JFACC, supporting a US/NATO JFC HQ for Afghanistan. All US Title 10 responsibilities would be fulfilled, with the added benefit of NATO alignment in securing troop contributions, coordinating troop rotations, integrating logistics, and reducing redundancies.

Re-alignment under US EUCOM (with EUCOM JFLCC and JFACC) would require the establishment of a NATO air operations centre for operations in Afghanistan. This would alleviate current problems associated with reliance upon a singular CENTCOM CFACC/CAOC that provides ISR and CAS for competing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

CSTC-A's Afghan National Army capacity-building function and CENTAF's Afghan Air Corps capacity-building initiative should be re-aligned to US

EUCOM and integrated with NATO staffs, allowing the integration of NATO money and personnel.

ISAF commanders work beside US SOF daily, and there is significant mixing of all forces in certain areas of Afghanistan. However, that these forces operate under different mandates and report to different combatant commanders remains problematic. The superimposition of different missions and chains of command upon the same piece of terrain leads to recurring friction when ISAF troops unintentionally compromise a SOF mission, or when SOF missions produce adverse effects that impact negatively upon ISAF soldiers. Unity of command is the central issue here, and the obvious improvement to be made is re-alignment of all special operations under a US/NATO CJSOTF responsible to SHAPE and EUCOM (who would coordinate with SOCOM).

Unity of command is the central issue here...

The opium problem in Afghanistan is one of strategic import, and requires a unified strategy that can only be produced by a multi-lateral body that can formulate strategy and prioritize in a manner similar to the work of the CCS during the Second World War and the NAC during the Cold War. The counter-narcotics efforts of CENTCOM and the US Department of State (lead agency) have failed in this regard. The job of multilateral strategy formulation is an issue for the NAC. So too is the concern about how best to engage Pakistan and other regional neighbors. Currently, CINCCENT has the US lead with regard to this critical function, and SACEUR, whose troops are bearing the brunt of perennial insurgent offences from Pakistan, remains as hamstrung as COMUSMACV was in dealing with communist force incursions into South Vietnam.

The problem of the Taliban insurgency, like that of opium, has regional dimensions and requires multi-lateral strategy and commitments. These problems are by their nature long-term, necessitating commitment of multinational resources for decades to come. The NAC has a track record of success in dealing with these sorts of complex issues, and, once it passes through the frustrating process of strategy formulation, offers the advantage of an enduring alliance as the mechanism to ensure that such commitments can be sustained. Its longevity and its ability at formulating acceptable strategy give it a clear advantage over the *ad hoc* coalitions that are currently eroding in OEF, OIF and the Global War on Terror.

Solving the command problem in Afghanistan requires renewal of our understanding of the principle of unity of command. It requires recognition of past wisdom and appreciation for the singularity of purpose and organizational simplicity that comes with investiture in a 'supreme commander.' It is, therefore, my conclusion that we must ask the US to amend the UCP and invest supreme command over Afghanistan in SACEUR.

In order to galvanize NATO alliance partners and begin the difficult process of coalition building around a NATO-run fight, while keeping parallel American capabilities in-theatre, the entire OEF joint operating area must be re-aligned under EUCOM, and EUCOM must be designated as a supported combatant command.

The ISAF Headquarters in Kabul should be designated as an integrated sub-unified command under EUCOM in the UCP and reporting directly to SHAPE in the operational chain of command.

JFC Brunssum should be delinked from this operational chain of command and made a 'force generating' headquarters.

Separate EUCOM CFLCC, JFACC, and JFSOCC should be established so that the Afghan fight can receive proper Title 10, air, ISR and SOF support without having to go to Tampa for arbitration over priorities.

While hardly efficient from an American perspective, and while this means a long and frustrating period of strategy formulation in the multi-lateral forums of NATO, it is the only way that NATO partners can be integrated into the fight under their traditional supreme commander, and under the alliance's normal strategic war-management system.

In summary, the US needs to lead NATO in Afghanistan as it led NATO throughout the Cold War, and not compete with the alliance. Canada should once again assume the role of intermediary and work to make all alliance partners see this as a required course of action. The only alternative is to understand the impossibility of the current construct and ask NATO to leave Afghanistan, an alternative that would leave Canada and other alliance members in a very precarious position.

Endnotes

1 This article is a summary of an award-winning Strategic Research Paper written by the author when attending the United States Army War College, now available as a Carlisle Paper entitled "Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War" (go to : http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB889.pdf). It is an original thought piece and in no way represents official policy in the USA or Canada.

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The Afghanistan War: The Pakistani Dimensions

by: Louis A. Delvoie

Many commentators have remarked in recent months that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) prospects of success in restoring security and fostering political and socio-economic development in southern Afghanistan will be heavily dependent on the unfolding of events in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this they are probably quite right.

There is strong evidence that elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda have found safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of North-Western Pakistan from which they can mount cross-border operations into Afghanistan and to which they can retreat when directly confronted with the overwhelmingly superior firepower of NATO forces. It is also generally believed that these areas serve as training grounds for new recruits and depots for weapons, ammunition and other supplies.

Faced with these realities, the governments of the United States, Canada and several NATO allies have brought heavy pressures to bear on Pakistan's government to take action to remedy the situation. They have urged it to deploy the Pakistani army in strength into the tribal areas to combat the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their local hosts and supporters, and to seal off the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In these endeavours they have been only very partially successful.

After a relatively short campaign in which the Pakistani army lost some 800 soldiers and destroyed numerous villages, causing immense resentment among the local population, the Pakistani government halted operations and concluded agreements with local tribal leaders under which they were to stop harbouring and aiding elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. However, these agreements proved to be of little practical value; they were far more frequently breached than they were observed. Thereafter the Pakistani government displayed remarkable ambivalence in its response to Western pressures and in its approach to the problem. It see-sawed between sporadic military operations and prolonged attempts at negotiation, neither of which led to any satisfactory conclusion.

Why has the Pakistani government displayed such ambivalence in its response to this situation? The answer is to be found in an examination of Pakistan's national interests related to Afghanistan, and of a number of Pakistani political and socio-economic phenomena.

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National Interests

Pakistan has a variety of national interests tied up in its relationship with Afghanistan, some more vital and fundamental than others.

First and foremost is the fact that demographic realities in the two countries pose a direct threat to Pakistan's national unity and territorial integrity. The Pachtun people who straddle the border constitute the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the overwhelming majority of the population of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Given the highly traditional tribal nature of Pachtun society it is not astonishing that Pachtuns in one country have often displayed far more solidarity with Pachtuns in the other as opposed to loyalty to their respective national governments. Indeed, since the creation of Pakistan sixty years ago, there have been political movements on both sides of the border advocating secession and the creation of a new country to be called 'Pachtunistan.' And as if this were not a sufficient concern for Pakistan, it is also true that Afghan governments have on occasion deliberately and actively fomented dissent among the Pachtuns of the NWFP and given sanctuary to opponents of the Pakistani government. Such interventions in Pakistan's internal affairs were particularly blatant in the 1970s during the tenure of Afghan President Mohamed Daud.

Another fundamental Pakistani interest relates to the country's border with Afghanistan. This border was established by a senior British official, Sir Mortimer Durand, in 1893 and was accepted by the Amir of Afghanistan in a treaty concluded that same year. The border, which has come to be known as the 'Durand line,' was also accepted by Pakistan, as the successor state to the British Empire, when it became an independent country in 1947. However, since that time, successive Afghan governments have refused to recognize the Durand line as a valid international border, claiming that it was imposed by a stronger power upon a weaker one. The delineation of the border has been a source of friction between the two countries for the last sixty years.

Over the last quarter century or so, developments in Afghanistan have had serious deleterious effects on Pakistan. In the years immediately following the Soviet invasion of 1979, Pakistan found itself confronted with an influx of some 3.5 million Afghan refugees. Despite the assistance provided by international organizations and foreign donors, the housing and feeding of these refugees imposed a considerable economic burden on Pakistan. Their presence in the country also gave rise to some localized social unrest as they competed with Pakistanis for jobs and resources (e.g. firewood).

The period of intense civil war which followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 not only ensured that the Afghan refugees remained in Pakistan, but gave rise to yet another problem. In the absence of any centralized control, an Afghanistan awash in weaponry supplied to the various protagonists by the Soviet Union, the United States and others, became a veritable armaments bazaar. Enormous quantities of modern small arms made their way from Afghanistan into Pakistan where they were acquired by criminal gangs and political dissidents, creating what came to be known as the 'Kalashnikov culture.' During the same period there was a surge in the quantity of illegal narcotics transported from Afghanistan into Pakistan, creating unprecedented levels of drug addiction in the country. All of these phenomena created enormous challenges for successive Pakistani governments.

Pakistan also has a strategic military interest in Afghanistan. Ever since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been at loggerheads with its much larger and more powerful neighbour, India. From the start, the two countries adopted significantly different ideologies and came to differ greatly in their foreign policy orientations. Most important, however, was their dispute over the contested territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Their disagreements have over the years led to three full-scale wars and to numerous border clashes. They have also led to a climate of deep mutual suspicion, whereby any major calamity which occurs in Pakistan is almost automatically blamed on India, and vice-versa.

Pakistan's hostile relationship with India has been and remains the central issue in the country's foreign policy. It is in this context that Afghanistan enters the picture. Pakistani strategic thinkers have long recognized that, in the event of an all-out war with India, the country's relative narrowness and the proximity of its major urban centres to the Indian border make it extremely vulnerable. They have tended to view Afghanistan as the key to providing Pakistan with a degree of strategic depth in any long fought defensive campaign against India. Thus having a friendly and cooperative government in Kabul is seen by these thinkers as a matter of major importance to Pakistan.

Finally, there is one further foreign policy issue that needs to be mentioned. Since the 1970's, Pakistan has maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis provided Pakistan with much needed economic assistance and Pakistan stationed forces in the Kingdom to train and support the Saudi army. The relationship took on an additional dimension in the 1980s. In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, conservative Sunni Saudi Arabia entered into a vigorous competition for influence in the Muslim world with revolutionary Shia Iran. Among

the countries where that competition took place was Afghanistan.

During and after the Soviet occupation of the country, Iran actively supported the Shiite Hazzara of Afghanistan and gave sanctuary to some 2 million Afghan refugees. On the other hand, Pakistan cooperated actively with Saudi Arabia in providing financial and military support to Sunni Afghan parties and movements. Thus for the sake of its relations with Saudi Arabia, and because of the difficulties which it constantly experiences with its own Shia minority, Pakistan has a clear interest in seeing that Iranian influence does not grow in Afghanistan.

This assortment of national interests goes some way towards explaining the ambivalence displayed by the Pakistani government in confronting the Taliban and its supporters. It is for example not too difficult to understand why some Pakistanis might prefer an Afghan government owing a debt of gratitude to Pakistan and founded on a Sunni Islamist politico-religious ideology (i.e. the Taliban) to one based on Pachtun dominance and ethno-nationalism, and owing its principal external loyalty to the United States (i.e. the Karzai government).

Pakistani Realities

Beyond the question of basic national interests, there are a number of features of Pakistani society and politics which play into this equation.

...since the 1980s there has been a slow but steady increase in the number of Islamists in the officer corps of the Pakistani army and of the powerful Inter Services Intelligence organization.

First and foremost, it must be recognized that while most Pakistanis embrace a middle of the road, moderate Islam, there are millions of Pakistanis who embrace political Islam or Islamism. While some of these Pakistani Islamists may be critical of some of the excesses of the Taliban, they are generally supportive of the Taliban's basic objective of creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, with a constitution and laws deriving directly from the Koran and the Sharia. After all, this is what they themselves are advocating for Pakistan. Numbering in the millions, Pakistan's Islamists have over the years adhered to political parties such as Jamaat I Islami and the Jamiat Ulema Islami. While never securing more than fifteen percent of the vote in any national election, the Islamist parties have exercised an influence out of all proportion to their numbers by virtue of their fervour and organization, and their ability to mount strikes and demonstrations on short notice. Another source of Islamist power is to be found in the thousands of religious schools or *madrassas* which dot the Pakistani landscape; the students and graduates of these schools are not only ideologically in tune with the Taliban, but also supply it with a steady stream of new recruits. Finally, it must be noted that since the 1980s there has been a slow but steady increase in the number of Islamists in the officer corps of the Pakistani army and of the powerful Inter Services Intelligence organization. All of these elements in Pakistani society can be counted upon to advocate a supportive attitude toward the Taliban for reasons of ideological affinity.

There are millions of other Pakistanis, including senior politicians and military officers, who have no particular ideological sympathy for the Taliban, but who would not wish to see the Taliban eliminated, because they consider that the continued existence of the movement serves the Pakistani national interests discussed above. For them it is not so much a question of supporting the Taliban as of opposing the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai. President Karzai is seen by them not only as a symbol of Pachtun dominance in Afghan affairs, but also as a dangerous adversary who is trying to cement close relations with Pakistan's arch enemy, India. This is, of course, a cardinal and unforgivable sin in the eyes of even the most secular of Pakistani ministers and generals.

Another relevant feature of Pakistani society is a strong and widespread strain of anti-Americanism. This is the product of essentially four factors. First, throughout the Cold War the United States very deliberately counted on the support of Pakistan in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, and Pakistan became its most loyal ally in the region. With the end of the Cold War, the United States not only turned its back on Pakistan, but invoked sanctions against Pakistan in pursuit of its nuclear non-proliferation policy. This was viewed even by Pakistan's elites as an abominable act of betrayal, as a casting aside of Pakistan once the United States no longer needed it.

Second, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was widely seen and portrayed in Pakistan as a brutal and unjustified attack on fellow Muslims. Third, the United States government was seen as the principal support for the continued existence of the military regime of President Pervez Musharraf, even as that regime was garnering ever increasing hostility in Pakistan itself. Finally, the decision of the Bush administration to develop a so-called strategic partnership with India, including a deal on civilian nuclear cooperation, is anathema in Pakistan. In short, no Pakistani government can be seen to be aligned with, or subservient to, the United States without incurring a substantial political backlash.

What must also be recognized is that Pakistan is essentially a fragile state. Confronted with active secessionist movements in three of its four provinces, it is a country which has never been able to fully overcome its ethnic divisions and inspire a strong sense of national unity in its citizens.

With the exception of the army, Pakistan's institutions are essentially weak. Its two main political parties, the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, are best known for their mutual hostility and their endless in-fighting; the governments over which they presided in the 1990s were notable for economic mismanagement, political chaos and widespread corruption, leading eventually to the military coup of 1999. Yet it is these two parties that are once again in power in Islamabad, in a thoroughly uncomfortable coalition in which endless bickering has been the order of the day. To hope that this government would be capable of courageous and decisive action on any front, political or economic, is a chimera, especially when it knows that it is under constant surveillance by the army and by the Islamists.

Finally, there is the Pakistani army, which is certainly the country's most robust institution. With a strength of more than 500,000, it is undoubtedly large. Its officer corps is by and large highly professional and its troops generally well disciplined. In the course of its history it has often displayed both courage and resolve. That said, it is also the army of a poor developing country with low rates of literacy. Neither in its training nor its equipment can it match the standards of a modern Western army. By virtue of its lack of mobility and high tech gear alone, the army would find it difficult, if not impossible, to mount a successful counter-insurgency campaign in the vast regions of northern Pakistan. And the notion that the army might be able to effectively seal the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan seems ludicrous, given that the border runs for more than 1,500 kilometres through some of the most inhospitable mountain and desert terrain on Earth, and that the border region is inhabited by hostile tribes with strong war fighting traditions. (One has only to think about how successful the United States has been in sealing its border with Mexico, despite its vast financial and technological resources.)

Beyond the question of capability is that of will. The high command of the Pakistani army seems to be divided on the question of more robust operations against the Taliban and their allies. For some it is a matter of ideological or pragmatic affinity with the Taliban. For others, it is a strategic calculation that any concentration of forces in the north will reduce the country's defensive capabilities against India. For yet others it is a matter of bringing the army into national disrepute by suffering and inflicting large-scale casualties in a fight against fellow Pakistanis.

Conclusion

This brief review of Pakistani interests and realities suggests that in their endeavours to create security and stability in southern Afghanistan, Canada and its NATO allies will have to rely on their ability to defeat or accommodate the Taliban on the ground and to win the proverbial hearts and minds of the Afghan population. They cannot realistically expect much effective help from Pakistan, whether in destroying Taliban bases or in sealing the border between the two countries.

Afghanistan – A Personal Perspective

by Major-General Dennis C Tabbernor

Author's note: *The comments and observations in this article are reflective of my time in Afghanistan and may not reflect changes that have happened since my return to Canada.*

I had been to Afghanistan on a number of occasions, first arriving in country in the spring of 2003 as Commander Joint Task Force South-West Asia. Memories of the recent fighting were everywhere and the city of Kabul was a shell of its former glory, with a little over 400,000 people living there. Elsewhere in the countryside Afghans were working hard to eke out a living and restore their farms, villages, towns and cities that had been damaged or destroyed during the decades of fighting. The Afghan National Army (ANA) was in its infancy and had fielded a small number of battalions that, although well

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led and trained, were having a minimum impact on the ongoing fight with the bad guys. Four years later, again in the spring (April 2007), I arrived in Kabul to find a dramatically changed city with over 4 million people going about their daily lives.

In my new position with Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) as Deputy Commanding General, Afghan National Army Development, a post I occupied for the better part of a year, we traveled constantly, visiting the ANA in all corners of the country. This provided me with a good overall perspective of Afghanistan, with a focus on the ANA.

On our first trip out of Kabul, we travelled to the east, Gardez, to visit the Commander of 203 ANA Corps and his counterpart in the Regional Police. We were met by an American convoy of Humvees and convoyed to the Regional Police Headquarters, where we shared the obligatory *chai* with the Chief of Police and toured his facilities, discussing his concerns. While there, we heard a rather large explosion and found out that another American convoy had been attacked at an intersection we had passed through not ten minutes before.

We continued with our visits and travelled by an alternate route to meet the Commander of 203 Corps. Our meeting was interrupted by the arrival of American military and Afghan civilian casualties at the American and ANA medical facilities (respectively). Shortly thereafter, we found ourselves helping to load the more severely wounded Afghan civilians onto US Army medical evacuation helicopters to take them to the American hospital at Bagram, where they would receive better care for their severe injuries. So started my time in Afghanistan – every day was different and exciting.

The organization chart below shows the chain of command within which CSTC-A was operating when I left at the end of April 2008. This was much the same organization I worked within for my time in Afghanistan. It should be obvious from the diagram that CSTC-A was very much an American Headquarters, answering to an American chain of command operating alongside, but not reporting to, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), also headquartered in Kabul.

CSTC-A was a Coalition formation, comprising military personnel from Albania, Canada, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as contracted civilian advisers, all working together as mentors and trainers. Our mission was to partner with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to organize, train, equip, advise and mentor the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

CSTC-A's mission, although one of mentoring



Command and Control construct in Afghanistan as of April 2008. Note that CSTC-A is not in the NATO chain of command with Commander CSTC-A reporting directly to Commander CENTCOM.

The author addressing soldiers of the ANA in Jalalabad. Note the semi-tropical lushness of the surroundings.

and training, saw our soldiers deployed throughout Afghanistan, often in section or smaller groups, working and fighting with the ANA on a daily basis. Success for us was an ANA that was professional and competent, literate, ethnically diverse, and capable of providing security throughout Afghanistan. The ANA comprised five ground manoeuvre Corps and one air Corps, for a total of about 50,000 personnel; by December of 2008 the intent was to expand to 70,000 troops. One ground Corps secured each region of the country.

Afghans came to their army already quite willing to fight. Training occurred nationally and in each Corps' area. Beyond the basics any new soldier learns, commanders at all levels honed the ability to work in units and in co-operation with Coalition forces. Growing leaders in the non-commissioned officer and officer ranks took time, but the dividends were obvious. By the time I left theatre two of the five ground Corps were able to plan and conduct complex missions with ANA, ANP and Coalition Forces. Of the security operations then in progress across the country, the ANA were in the lead in all but a small minority.

To provide extra combat depth to the ANA, a Commando training programme was introduced in early 2007 (the first serial was in training when I arrived in Kabul). Mentored by Special Forces from a number of countries, as well as by selected Afghan officers and non-commissioned officers who had taken special Commando instructor training in the Middle East, this program turned out a trained Commando battalion about every 14 weeks. At this writing, the sixth Commando Battalion is in training for a graduation in early 2009.

We worked with the ANA artillery units (which were equipped with old Soviet equipment) to improve their equipment and procedures to make them compatible with NATO. This would allow the ANA to utilize their own artillery in the indirect fire role. We also put in place a plan to replace their Soviet-style small arms with NATO standard weapons, and to purchase and provide over 4,000 up-armoured Humvees.

During my time in theatre the Coalition provided the vast majority of air support and aero-medical evacuation to the ANA. The ANA Air Corps, with its American mentors, worked hard to increase its capacities and capabilities, and as I was leaving were capable of limited aero-medical evacuation and non-tactical movement of resources around the country. As the ANA Air Corps' capabilities and resources increase, they will begin assuming more responsibility for these missions.

With soldiers from all of Afghanistan's major ethnic groups – the Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Turkmen – the ANA is truly a national force. Their battlefield successes attested to their competence. These were soldiers who wanted to close with and engage their enemy. Whenever that enemy was foolish enough to stand and fight, they lost. As a result, instead of fighting, insurgents resorted to improvised explosive devices

Aftermath of a vehicle borne suicide bomber attack. This British up-armoured SUV was similar to the ones we used daily. After seeing this and learning that the British soldiers walked away from this attack with flash burns and minor shrapnel wounds, my Close Protection Team had a lot more confidence in our vehicles

and suicide bombers; the growth of confidence among Afghans in their army is, in turn, prompting more tips that expose such threats.

The spectacle of suicide bombs notwithstanding, violence was not the rule. Last year, 70 percent of incidents occurred in 10 per cent of the nearly 400 districts. The American Commander of our Regional Command East, centred on Jalalabad, reported that more than 90 percent of Afghans there enjoyed a peaceful life – by Afghan standards; the violence shown by the media did not represent the lives of the vast majority of Afghans. Instead, the lives of most Afghans were lived peacefully, with increasing access to basic services, the prospect of a representative and responsive government at the local, regional and national level.

The economy rewarded honest work, and the possibility of education exists for children. Instead of a breeding ground for corruption and terror, Afghanistan was becoming, ever so slowly but surely, a nation of stability and dignity with something of value to offer its global neighbours.

Our soldiers also worked hard to return a sense of normality to Afghan life. During one of our visits out west, near a city called Herat, we visited a battalion of Afghan soldiers who were being mentored by some American Army Reservists. A few of these American soldiers worked for the American Department of Agriculture in their civilian lives and were experts in their agricultural fields. While they were working hard to mentor and train the Afghan soldiers, they found time to work with the local villagers to improve their farming techniques. They also set up a melon growing program where the villagers grew and sold melons to the local Afghan Army garrison – Afghan soldiers love melons – and sold the excess product on the local economy or used them to help to feed their families.

These young Americans also established an agricultural farm where they trained the Afghan farmers on ways to improve their crop yields and what crops were best for their local growing conditions. They also re-established vineyards to re-introduce grape growing in the area – you may know that Afghanistan used to be one of the world's largest producers and exporters of raisins.

They introduced fish farming with ponds that grew grass that the fish ate – a sustainable supply of food for the fish, and fish for the farmers. They re-introduced bee keeping, which had been a traditional occupation for women in that area. All this they did on their own time, not because they had to, but because they wanted to. They were going to leave Afghanistan a better place than when they arrived – and they did.

Since my return home, I am asked on a regular basis if we should be in Afghanistan and if we are

Afghan Army soldiers at Camp Morehead undergo 60 mm Mortar training as part of the Commando training program.

making a difference. We need to understand some of the background.

The terror of 9/11 was born and bred in the lawless vacuum that was Afghanistan, a shattered land of shattered lives left desperate after 30 years of war and corruption. Around this vacuum swirled the regional turbulence afflicting Iran, Pakistan, China, India and Russia. An Afghanistan left unstable and vulnerable to the inrush of these forces would prove an immense incubator for terrors beyond the compass of imagination.

So, as part of a Coalition, we went to Afghanistan. If we fail there, if we leave Afghanistan without security forces, without sound governance, without the rule of law, without an infrastructure and an alternative to narcotics, we will invite back the forces that spawned 9/11.

I have been to Afghanistan every year since 2003; every year, I have seen improvement as the country, with the help of the international community, reawakens. Kabul is home to ten times the population I recall in 2003. Young women and girls are in school, an economy is growing and the people have a capable, principled ANA of which they are proud. In the growth of a police force and the admittedly, but perhaps understandably, more gradual birth of a system of governance, Afghans can see the dawn of a rule of law.

Perhaps I can best sum it up by reciting a poem written by a young Canadian soldier, Corporal Andrew Grenon of Windsor, Ontario, who was killed in an ambush in Afghanistan on 3 September, 2008:

"Why We Fight

I've often asked myself why we are here. Why my government actually agreed to send troops to this god-forsaken place. There are no natural resources. No oil, gold or silver. Just people.

People who have been at war for the last 40 plus years. People who want nothing more than their children to be safe. People who will do anything for money; even give their own life.

I look into the eyes of these people. I see hate, destruction and depression. I see love, warmth, kindness and appreciation.

Why do we fight? For in this country, there are monsters. Monsters we could easily fight on a different battlefield, at a different time. Monsters that could easily take the fight to us.

Surrounding these mud walls and huts is a country in turmoil. A country that is unable to rebuild itself. A country that cannot guarantee a bright future for its youth.

Why do we fight? Because, if we don't fight today, on this battlefield, then our children will be forced to face these monsters on our own battlefield.

I fight because I'm a soldier.

I fight because I'm ordered.

I fight, so my children won't have to."

These Afghan refugee children and their families lived not far from our camp in Kabul. They all go to school and are the future of their country

Towards the end of my tour, an American colleague asked me if I thought Afghanistan was worth the death of a Canadian soldier. That was a hard question to answer and an article I wrote, published in The Globe and Mail on 29 April 2008, summarized my feelings at that time. A number of months later, I think back on my time in Afghanistan and, if asked the same question now, my answer would be the same. You cannot put a price on a life, but I still strongly believe that the time that I and other Canadians have spent and will spend in Afghanistan has and will make a difference for the future of that great country still struggling to rebuild. ©

US Joint Warfighting Developments

by Major Bob Near

The experiences of the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with detailed analysis of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, has led to a number of new developments in the US approach to warfare, with corresponding impacts on doctrine, training and force structures. These developments featured prominently in the second annual Joint Warfighting (JW) conference, which took place this past June in Virginia Beach, and attracted some 5,000 participants from across the US military, the Department of Defense, and the corporate sector.

Speaking to conference thematic, *Department of Defense Capabilities for the 21st Century: Dominant – Relevant – Ready?,* more than twenty serving and retired

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Flag and General officers, including four star Combatant Commanders, provided their assessment of the evolving security environment, and what capabilities they believe US forces must develop to operate successfully in it.

While 'lessons learned' from Iraq were frequently referenced, it was the Israeli-Hezbollah 'war' of July-August 2006 that was a constant inflection point for many of the speakers. In that conflict, the highly regarded Israeli forces, whose doctrine and training embraced many US 'transformation' concepts, were fought to a virtual standstill and failed to achieve their operational and strategic objectives.

In examining what went wrong – why numerically superior US and Israeli forces fitted with the most modern high-tech equipments, trained to very high standards, and operating against, at best, semi-professional and seriously outgunned enemy forces in a contained battle space, were unable to prevail – has resulted in serious introspection on the part of senior US commanders and doctrine developers. This has led some of them, most notably General James Mattis, Commander of US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), to call into question a number of hitherto unchallenged assumptions which have characterized the great *transformation* exercise which has governed US, NATO and Israeli force structuring and capabilities development for the past seven years.

The biggest target to date in this critical analysis has been 'effects based operations' (EBO) both in terms of the methodology EBO expounds – a high dependence on computer information networks – and an accompanying techno-centric ideology that posits uncertainty, friction, and unpredictability in war can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated through the 'movement of electrons.'

General Mattis firmly rejects such thinking, and in his speech at JW 08 made clear that the conduct of operations must be based on what is known and tangible – the specific political and military goals to be achieved, a "flesh and blood" enemy, and a given piece of terrain.

From this baseline, a suitable campaign plan must be drawn up, which in turn needs to be executed in accordance with the principles of Commander's Intent and Mission Command. Supporting this must be well-trained junior leaders who are empowered to act as part of a unified, cohesive team, and who are assigned specific tactical objectives within the campaign plan.

These and similar perspectives from other senior US commanders were a highlight of JW 08.General Mattis' firm rejection of EBO and its associated components of System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) and Operational Net Assessment (ONA), reflect his belief (subsequently set out in a Commander's memorandum) that such thinking is deeply impoverished – at least regarding the nature of war – and constitutes, in his words, an "intellectual Maginot Line." Instead, he calls for US force developers to acknowledge both the fundamental unpredictability of war along with its tendency to reflect the nature of its time.

It is this Clausewitzian precept that warfare constantly evolves (although its physical characteristics of friction, violence and uncertainty remain enduring) that is leading some US military theorists to view the Israeli-Hezbollah struggle as a radical new development in military affairs, referred to as 'hybrid wars.' As described by Frank Hoffman of the US Marine Corps' Warfighting Laboratory, hybrid wars entail a convergence and fusion of regular and irregular warfare techniques that can be employed both by states and non-state actors, and in which

Sergeant Miranda Roberston and Sergeant Derek Shaw discuss security needs during a CIMIC patrol in a village outside Kandahar City.

DND Photo *by: Cpl David Cribb*

no one type of warfare necessarily predominates. As such, they incorporate a range of different modes of fighting including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts and coercion, and criminal disorder. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects.

Asymmetric methods are employed by a technologically savvy enemy who operates inside the US observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) cycle while manifesting an ideology that draws young and fanatical fighters to the cause. Hybrid war thus allows a militarily weak opponent to operate effectively against larger, traditionally structured and trained armed forces, notwithstanding the superior firepower and technology these forces may possess.

Many US officers have come to believe that this type of conflict will be the main strategic and operational level challenge facing the US military for the foreseeable future. That being the case, a strong argument is being made by General Mattis and his intellectual supporters that existing force development methodologies based on working backwards from a plethora of wide-ranging imaginary scenarios and alternate futures, are irrelevant and a waste of time. This has led him to urge force planners to "… get over their *next-war-itis*." This means concentrating on the immediate challenges at hand, and not devoting scarce resources to things force planners think *might* happen in 10 or 20 years time. In short, the future is here, now.

In summary, it may be said that the hard lessons of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, coupled with the arrival of a new generation of officers who have personally experienced the demands and challenges of the evolving security environment, have, in effect, transformed the 'transformation' that was launched back in 2001-02. Certainly, 'transformation' as conceived by Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, championed by former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and subsequently embraced by most Western military establishments is moribund, if not dead – done in by the enduring nature of war and its ceaseless complexities as encountered in the crucibles of Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Replacing it is a new paradigm of military conceptual thinking being led by the US Army, Marines and US JFCOM that concentrates less on technology-driven concepts and more on the moral, physical and psychological dimensions of warfare. In short, the focus returns to the art rather than the science of war. As one US general stated, "We need to remember that war is a human endeavor, not an engineering outcome." ©

Transition in American Effects Based Doctrine - Should Canada be Concerned?

by Bonnie Butlin

General Mattis outlined in a 14 August Memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) that Effects Based Doctrine will no longer be used by Joint Forces Command, due to its lack of clarity.[1] While Effects Based Operations (EBO)[2] doctrine has received support from across the U.S. military, and variations are used by Canada and NATO, there is growing debate in the U.S. over whether the approach should be abandoned.[3] This article will look at why EBO has run aground in the U.S. and how concerned Canada should be given the Afghanistan mission and the impending influx of American troops.

Ms. Bonnie Butlin is a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum (SDF) Intern, employed as the Project Officer with the CDA Institute.

Why Did American EBO Run Aground?

EBO doctrine emerged from Soviet deep-operations doctrine of the 1920s and 1930s, and was later adopted and developed by the U.S. Air Force.[4] American EBO became bogged down with 1) casualty aversion influence in doctrine 2) over-reliance on technology for effect, 3) doctrinal confusion between information flows and command and control flows, and 4) the interpretation of EBO as service-specific and not useful to the Army in counterinsurgency.

Casualty Aversion Influence in Doctrine

First, the U.S. interpretation of EBO was influenced by American casualty-averse doctrinal developments,

such as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine which reflected battle losses of the Vietnam War.[5] They directed focus on force protection and produced perceptions of a casualty-averse America. This was reinforced by the Khobar Tower losses.[6] EBO as a result came to over-emphasize casualty aversion and force protection.

Military casualty aversion became dangerously amalgamated with civilian casualty aversion. Civilian neutrality became increasingly threatened in warfare due to globalization, urbanization, and radicalism trends.[7] Human security and peacebuilding movements emerged, and international law concerning responsibility and warfare was more actively applied. This blurring of warfighting doctrine with the human security agenda was amplified by the 9/11 attacks that targeted simultaneously military personnel and civilians.

This legitimacy focus complicated U.S. warfighting in civilian-populated areas without losing support at home. The U.S. military lacked the ability to provide the narrative that would reassure the American population of the legitimacy of American war efforts, in the event of casualties, as did the government and media.

Without an effective way to sustain support at home over the duration of protracted conflict, U.S. doctrine fell back on security - attempting to sustain support through casualty reduction. This required providing the predictability and information that would clear the fog from the battlefield. The U.S. looked to EBO, with its technical precision and ability to minimize collateral damage, as an extension of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).[8] EBO would provide force protection and civilian protection, and support a forward-acting military while not antagonizing the casualty-averse and rights-cautious American population.

This casualty avoidance "patch" in doctrine melded with dramatic increases in precision technology to forge an EBO silver bullet to conduct effective operations while sustaining domestic support.[9] Expectations for EBO's potential were set too high and operational conduct was excessively restricted to avoid casualties. [10]

Overreliance on Technology for Effect

Second, EBO was operationalized in a way that reduced clarity and reliability, and banked on predetermined outcomes. The approach overreached in attempting to manage with certainty the battlefield through technology and information operations. Though EBO gained momentum with several successes, including the First Gulf War and Kosovo, disillusionment with EBO and its parent RMA followed when it did not perform as well for ground forces. Accurate information and predictable reactions to counterinsurgency actions did not precipitate, and counterinsurgency's increased interface with civillians exacerbated civilian casualties and associated concerns.[11] Debate over whether EBO was service-specific or simply flawed doctrine resulted. Technology and scientific calculations of warfare failed in both achieving effect and sustaining support at home.

Partly to blame was the American operationalization of EBO, which was influenced by war-gaming, producing the Systems-on-Systems Approach (SoSA) that treated insurgent and counterinsurgent forces as distinct, unified systems. EBO resembled more of an intelligence disruption-focused, network-to-network model, than a counterinsurgency model, as evidenced in the Thunder Run race up the desert in the 2003 Iraq War, to disrupt Ba'athist control toward system failure.[12]

SoSA was accompanied by Operational Net Assessment (ONA),[13] based on the concept of chain-reactions producing complete system failure. This was consistent with the U.S. Army's focus on capabilities more than motivations or intentions in identifying threats requiring action.

The Israeli Defense Forces has been engaged in similar doctrinal efforts aimed at staying ahead of enemy decision cycles through gaming calculations, requiring assumptions of accurate information and reliability in reaction calculations. Israel however failed to achieve its objectives in Lebanon in 2006, and was seen as having over-relied on EBO,[14] which had choked out improvisation and failed to produce the second and third order effects predetermined by the wargaming sequences.[15] Questions emerged as to whether EBO was only useful at a strategic level, as Effects Based Strategy (EBS).[16]

Doctrinal Confusion between Battlefield Information Flows and Command and Control Flows

Third, EBO doctrine has confused information flows and Command and Control flows.[17] EBO has been criticized for producing top-down micromanagement and with it, battlefield confusion through bureaucratic delays and distortion. The information flow from tactical sensors, or "strategic corporals," up to the strategic level and back down to the tactical level is not the same as the Command and Control flows.[18] Relaying Commander's Intent based on intelligence-informed strategy to the tactical level is not the same as commanding at the tactical level from the strategic level. Battlefield decisions should be influenced by strategy, but not directed from the strategic level. ONA with its chain reaction calculations from the strategic level precludes this distinction, and choked off improvisation at lower levels.

Al-Qaeda understood the EBO distinction between information and Command and Control flows, only dealing with regional, not local level insurgents, while maintaining overall strategic effect and fluidity without distortion due to micromanaging.[19] Hezbollah also operated as such during the 2006 war. At its best EBO is a way of thinking, not a pre-mapped sequence of pre-determined actions and reactions.[20] As tactical events can have strategic impact, so EBO must be able to push strategic *effect* down to the tactical level, without micromanagement.

This confusion is affecting how the U.S. fights global insurgency. The SoSA system of mapping and disruption is not as effective against global insurgencies as against state insurgencies.[21] Global insurgencies are not networks or distinct, unified systems, but operate at a higher level of organization. Threat groups are networked or "plugged in" to the global ideology or movement. Threat groups should not be aggregated, but rather disaggregated, or "unplugged" from the global insurgency, and dealt with separately, sequentially and at the regional level.[22] The SoSA and ONA operationalization of EBO is suboptimal against global insurgency.

American doctrine must abandon the network-to-network approach, and adopt a more fluid military model of interdiction that can manage all levels of threat. This is the message behind the General Mattis memo.

Interpreting EBO as Service-specific

Fourth, EBO is seen as service-specific - consistent with USAF strategic tradition. Defeating an insurgency requires a holistic approach, with a universal strategy across the effort. EBO has proved to be of lesser value for the Army, which faces higher casualty risks and adverse reactions at home. The casualty avoidance doctrine "patch" was wearing thin for the Army. General Mattis suggested that EBO was more than mis-operationalized, but rather flawed.[23] EBO was suggested to be inherently unsuitable for the Army and counterinsurgency writ large.[24]

Far from being of questionable utility for the Army, EBO may be critical to sustaining and building resilience into domestic support over the duration of protracted conflict. The U.S. Air Force was able to achieve effect through technology, which reduced casualties. The army in counterinsurgency must achieve effect through perceptions, for which technology is less useful. EBO is designed to change the perceptions of not only the enemy, but perceptions at home, and may be essential for counterinsurgency.[25]

EBO, through innovative domestic application, may go beyond protecting critical vulnerabilities in-theatre through force protection and casualty avoidance, to hardening the domestic Centre of Gravity by addressing the perceptions of the population at home.

Canadian Concerns

Decades of American doctrinal development is being rebalanced. Canadians need not be concerned so long as the U.S. does not overcorrect toward attrition strategies out of frustration with the EBO approach. This would decrease interoperability among coalition partners, create exploitable seams between American and Canadian areas of operation and jeopardize the outcomes of combating global insurgency.

This is of particular concern for Canadians with the large number of U.S. troops scheduled to come into Afghanistan, and with Canada being less able to shift away from EBO. Other Canadian government departments have made considerable investments toward partnership with the Canadian Forces and Afghans and there are fewer Canadian Forces resources available to re-write doctrine.[26] Two aspects of this U.S. Joint Doctrine transition are key for Canada.

Re-operationalization

General Mattis's memo portends a necessary re-operationalization of American EBO, rather than its wholesale abandonment. A more "realist" operationalization may take on several characteristics that would be beneficial to Canada.

First, a more fluid operationalization may take a more conservative view of the ability of technology and action-reaction calculations to reduce the fog of war. Reduced emphasis on expensive high-tech innovation may ease Canadian-U.S. interoperability, which Canada has struggled with. Second, re-operationalized EBO may distinguish between military and civilian casualties in terms of military doctrine versus human security and peacebuilding thought. Merging the two can distort strategy and effect, benefiting neither military doctrine nor civilian-focused agendas. It would enable sound military choices based on merit, and success breeds support in its own right. Third, re-operationalization may rebalance management of the battlefield from the strategic to the tactical level by separating conceptualization of information flows and Command and Control flows, improving interaction among Canadians and Americans.

Falling Back on the Familiar – Improvisation and Attrition

American frustration with EBO has resulted in America's falling back on familiar Jominian (annihilatory) and Clausewitzian (chaotic) understandings of warfare. General Mattis' memo reflects this, calling for a return to warfighting basics.[27] Too great of an American shift toward attrition and improvisation may create friction with the Canadian EBO approach.

Strategy will remain critical as U.S. Joint Force Doctrine transitions. First, strategy provides focus, which provides clarity and prevents overstretch.[28] Strategic clarity within chaos is critical for coalition partners, and focus is needed more than ever in the midst of countering global insurgency and networked threats. Second, strategy provides credibility to improvisation. Improvised attrition increases risk to soldiers,[29] compounding domestic support issues in counterinsurgency. Third, maintaining the larger strategy is key to setting the narrative and sustaining support at home when greater casualties are at risk.

There is no reason at this point to raise alarms about American doctrinal transition in terms of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan or Canadian interoperability with American forces. General Mattis's call for reform appears to be both necessary and measured. ©

(Endnotes)

1 General James Mattis, "Commander's Guidance for Effects-Based Operations." *Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command.* (Issued 14 August 2008). General Mattis, USMC, is the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation/ Commander, US Joint Forces Command.

2 EBO is a conceptual process "for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or 'effect' on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities." U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces Command Glossary, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm quoted in David B. Lazarus, "Effects–Based Operations and Counterterrorism." *Air and Space Power Journal*, (Fall 2005):1-7, 1 .http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/lazarus.html

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See also, Carl Osgood, "Revolution in Military Affairs Suffers Setback." *Executive Intelligence Review.* (September 19, 2008): 43-44.

9 Kelly and Kilcullen, 65.

10 James N. Mattis. "Guidance for Effects-Based Operations." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Issue 51, 4th Quarter, 2008), 107.

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14 Mattis, "Guidance for Effects-Based Operations,"

15 David B. Lazarus, "Effects–Based Operations and Counterterrorism." *Air and Space Power Journal*, (Fall 2005):1-7, 2. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/lazarus.html

16 *Ibid*., 1.See also, John Arquilla. *Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 4.*

17 Mattis, "Guidance for Effects-Based Operations," 108.

18 General Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War."*Marines Magazine*. (January 1999).

19 David J. Kilcullen. "Countering Global Insurgency." *The Journal of Strategic Studies.* (Vol. 28, 4, August 2005), 597-617, 602.

20 LG David A. Deptula, "Effects-Based Operations: A U.S. Commander's Perspective." *Pointer. Ministry of Defence Singapore.* (Vol. 31, 2, 2005.) See also, Grover "Gene" Meyers. "JFCom commander is wrong to scrap effects-based operations." http://www.afji.com/2008/11/3740140

21 This is supported by the practice of identifying persons of influence or key persons and their capabilities, not just structures and features. Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army and Major Mark S. Ulrich, US Army, "Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-or-Gravity Analysis." *Military Review*. (Sept-Oct 2007): 45-51, 50.

22 Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency,"608.

23 As Gen Mattis points out in, "Report: The End of Effects-Based Operations?" *Rethinking Security.* (August 22, 2008.)

24 Kelly and Kilcullen, 63-68.

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26 The new Canadian Counterinsurgency Manual is in the pre-publication stage.

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28 See Kelly and Kilcullen, 73, for "whole of coalition responses."

29 *Ibid.*, 63-66.

Centre for Military and Strategic Studies - University of Calgary

by Nancy Pearson Mackie and Andrew Sullivan

As the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) nears its 30th anniversary at the University of Calgary, it has much to celebrate. Over the past three decades as a member of the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) community, it has grown from a small research programme to a large Centre with a full graduate programme, a network of scholars from a variety of disciplines, and the mandate to promote and develop excellence in military, security and defence studies.

The strength and success of the Centre is a function of its people – its Fellows, students, associates, and staff. The Centre's eleven core research areas reflect the multi-disciplinary flavour of the activities of the Fellows and are categorized within the following subject areas: Canadian Military Studies; Civil Military Relations and Military Anthropology; Peacebuilding Development and Security; Unconventional Warfare; Domestic Security; Ethics and Morality in Conflict; Seapower/Naval History; Arctic Security; Strategic Thought; Israeli Security Studies; and United States Policy and Politics. Dr. David Bercuson, Director of the Centre, specializes in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history and has just published a book, *The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan.* Dr. Holger Herwig, Director of Research at the Centre, is the holder of the Canada Research Chair in Military and Strategic Studies.

The Centre's growth over the past several years has made it possible to establish two research chairs at the University of Calgary. The Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute Chair in Civil-Military Relations is currently held by Dr. Anne Irwin of the Anthropology Department. She is working on a book about her experiences as an academic outside the wire with Canadian forces in Afghanistan. Dr. Terry Terriff holds the Arthur J. Child Chair of American Security Policy and is currently completing a book on military change and the US Marine Corps. Additionally, the Centre is currently funding the J.L. Granatstein Post Graduate Fellowship, currently held by Dr. Patrick Lennox. He recently returned from being embedded for two months on Her Majesty's Canadian Ships *Iroquois* and *Protecteur* as they patrolled in the Arabian Sea during Canada's most recent contribution to the maritime dimension of the American-led war on terror. As this is Dr. Lennox's second and final year in the position, the Centre is now accepting applications for the Fellowship for the fall of 2009.

The Centre is part of a network of government organizations, non-governmental groups, institutes, and centres including the Department of National Defence, the CDFAI, and the Canadian International Council. This had led to many cooperative efforts in research and scholarship. For example, the CDFAI, in partnership with the Centre, sponsors the Canadian Military Journalism Course. The course includes a combination of media-military theory coupled with field visits to armed forces regular force and reserve units in order to enhance the military education of Canadian journalists who will report on the issues facing the Canadian Forces and their activities domestically and abroad.

Another joint venture is the Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program (PDSP), with the Institute of World Affairs in Washington, D.C. The PDSP's mission includes the fostering of both practitioner-focused and scholarly research along with interagency and civil-military dialogue in order to improve the practice, and ultimately the effectiveness, of international assistance to conflict-affected countries.

The Centre's Master of Strategic Studies degree programme has been offered for several years at the University of Calgary. The number of students selected for this program remains intentionally small, with a total of only 26 Masters' students and 10 'Special Case' Ph.D students in 2007-08. This very low student-to-professor ratio combined with its multi-disciplinary focus permits CMSS to offer a unique Master of Strategic Studies degree (MSS). Recently, the University's Board of Governors approved a Ph.D programme in Strategic Studies for fall 2009. This will regularize the 'special case' Ph.D now offered and allow the Centre to offer a full complement of post-graduate studies.

The MSS Co-op component places students with one of several private sector or government institutions to gain a practical perspective on their research. This hands-on program is unique in Canada, and provides an additional opportunity for students to distinguish themselves in the eyes of future potential employers.

The Centre has extended its academic reach through an international student exchange programme with the Helmut Schmidt University (HSU) in Hamburg, Germany. This agreement allows University of Calgary graduate students to study abroad at both HSU and at the University of Hamburg while registered at the University of Calgary. In exchange, the Centre benefits from hosting students of HSU at the University of Calgary, promoting the sharing of ideas and perspectives.

Students admitted to a CMSS degree program are assured of funding. In 2008, students earned $342,580 in external funding. Since 2001, the Centre has graduated approximately 37 MSS and 3 Ph.D students. These graduates have taken up positions in government or industry, or have gone on to further educational challenges. Students are encouraged to present their research at national and international conferences and monies are made available for conference or research travel.

Students at the Centre contribute innovation and diversity to the variety of issues in the field. Current thesis research encompasses a wide range of issues and geographic locations, from water security to conflict resolution and from Africa to the Arctic. A key part of the school year is the Strategic Studies Student Conference. Students plan and promote this conference, providing post-secondary students an opportunity to present their research to their peers. The 2008 Tenth Anniversary conference saw keynote presentations on a variety of security-related fields, such as the psychology of terrorism, military-media relations, and myth-making in the First World War.

The heightened intellectual energy experienced by the Centre over the past three decades has led to the creation of two scholarly journals. *The Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* (www.jmss.org) is a quarterly peer-reviewed electronic journal edited by Drs. John Ferris, Jim Keeley and Terry Terriff, and draws articles from around the world on strategic issues. One of the oldest electronic journals in the fields of military and strategic studies, the *JMSS* will be relaunched in the winter of 2009 with the aim of becoming the journal of record in Canadian security policy and one of the best electronic open access journals in the world on issues of strategic and military studies. In addition to the *JMSS*, the Centre publishes the *Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies*. Under the direction of Dr. John Ferris, this peer-reviewed journal provides an additional opportunity to enhance awareness of security and defence issues among the general public and to contribute to the public policy debates and public education on defence and security issues.

Conferences, workshops, and guest lecturers all contribute additional perspectives to the work of the Centre. Now in its eleventh year, the Ellis Lecture in Military and Strategic Studies is an annual lecture series, held in cooperation with the Calgary Highlanders Regiment, to honour a Canadian war hero of World War Two. Past lecturers include J. L. Granatstein, David Pratt, and Terry Copp. Conferences and workshops on the role of reserves, homeland security, military education, and the future of the Canadian Navy have contributed to the dynamic research agenda of the Centre and have provided an avenue for students, faculty, and others to share their research. The proceedings from the conference, *Preparing for the Next Century of Canadian Sea Power*, are being produced into an edited volume to be ready for the 100th anniversary of the Canadian Navy in 2010.

Thirty years from its humble beginnings, the Centre has grown into an influential and engaged community of scholars who are actively working on the problems and challenges faced by Canada in a dynamic and rapidly changing world. ©

Notes on the CDA Institute's 11th Annual Graduate Student Symposium

by Bonnie Butlin

The 11th Annual CDA Institute Graduate Student Symposium was held in Currie Hall at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC), Kingston, on October 31st – November 1st, 2008. The Symposium contributes annually to education and dialogue on security and defence issues, which are core to the CDA Institute's role. The Symposium is a popular public and established gathering that showcases the best of a growing body of graduate-level research on security and defence subjects. The Symposium provides an opportunity for students to network within the security and defence community, both military and civilian. Approximately 100 people were in attendance.

The Symposium received a record number of submissions this year, as well as an unprecedented number of submissions at the PhD level. The Symposium featured the work of graduate students from 14 academic and military institutions, including Security and Defence Forum Centres from across the country. Thirty-seven graduate-level students from across Canada and from the United States and Germany presented research at this bilingual event.

A broad range of security and defence issues were covered by the presenters across 10 panels:

1. Canadian Foreign Policy Issues
2. Intelligence and Terrorism
3. Military Privatization
4. Counterinsurgency Strategy and Operations
5. Organization in Conflict
6. Engagement and Escalation: Canada's International Role
7. Emerging Security Issues
8. Assets, Procurement and Transformation
9. Strategy and Doctrine
10. Eurasian Conflict Issues

The Symposium featured two keynote speakers: Mr. Mel Cappe, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), gave a well-received talk entitled, "Defence of Canada – Who Cares?" Senator Hugh Segal was the keynote speaker for the second day, speaking on, "NATO and the New Russian Reality: Coming to Terms."

Presenters included:

University of Calgary – Doug Munroe, Wilfrid Greaves, Marshall S. Horne, Joseph Zeller, Geoff Jackson, Craig Leslie Mantle, and Second-Lieutenant Sebastian Schramm (on attachment from *Helmut Schmidt University of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany, Hamburg*).

Royal Military College of Canada – Second-Lieutenant Alexandra Duval, Kathleen Pellatt, Willemijn Keizer, Jordan Axani, Edward P. Soye, Second-Lieutenant Roch Carrier, Second-Lieutenant Pierre-Luc Rivard, Gregory Liedtke, and Mils Farmus.

Queen's University – Sarah Shapiro, Robert Engen, Erica Maidment, Ryan Dean, and Michael E. Dietrich.

Carleton University – Eric Jardine, Brandon Deuville, and Doug MacQuarrie.

University of Waterloo – Sophie Khuon.

University of Ottawa – Natalie Ratcliffe, and M. Spilka O'Keefe.

University of Alberta – Vandana Bhatia, and Satish Purushottam Joshi.

Université Laval – Marie-Louise Tougas.

Indiana University, Bloomington – Nicholas Corbett.

Université du Québec à Montréal – Amélie Forget.

Brock University – Alexandra Thomson.

Simon Fraser University - Linda Elmose.

Land Forces Quebec Area and Joint Task Force (East) Headquarters, Montreal – Major Eric Dion.

American Military University and Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, Kingston – Captain Nils N. French; and

Dalhousie University – Sabrina Hoque.

The top five presenters received signed copies of Major General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie's book, "Soldiers Made Me Look Good." The top three presenters also received cash prizes of $3,000, $2,000 and $1,000. The CDA Institute is very pleased that for the first time the book and cash prizes were complemented by all-expenses paid trips to the April 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg–Kehl for the top five presenters, sponsored by NATO.

Those finishing in the top five were Linda Elmose, Marie-Louise Tougas, Mils Farmus, Wilfrid Greaves, and Major Eric Dion.

Honourable mention was given to M. Spilka-O-Keefe, Natalie Ratcliffe, Kathleen Pellatt, Robert Engen, and Captain Nils N. French.

Presentations, photos and prize winners can be found on our website, online at
http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia.htm

Next year's Symposium has been tentatively booked for October 30th and 31st, 2009, to be held again in Currie Hall at RMCC. ©

Book Review

The Post-American World

by Fareed Zakaria

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Fareed Zakaria, "The Post-American World." Norton, May 2008. Hardcover, 288 pages, $28.50.

Theorizing about the future of world affairs has become quite fashionable. Some analysts talk of a shift away from the idealism of the post-Cold War era and a 'return' to power politics, others of a shift of economic and military power away from the United States and the West. Such analysis is often couched in a sense of inevitability, and at other times contains advice for Western policymakers. Such contemplation has come to a head with the ongoing global financial crisis and the election of Barack Obama as the next American president.

In *The Post-American World* Fareed Zakaria, noted international affairs writer and editor of *Newsweek International*, takes the prescriptive approach. He explores the political and socioeconomic dynamics of a 'post-American' era in world affairs. Zakaria argues economic modernization and prosperity dominate as the central driving forces as more societies embrace the benefits of modern civilization. This has led to a shift in relative economic power, away from the United States and towards rising powers such as India and China. This, in turn, has implications for the global balance of power and foreign policy, and Zakaria writes that US policymakers must be proactive to avoid international irrelevance.

He explores these shifts by examining the prospects of the two main new players, China and India.

China's rise is a matter of brute economic power, market size and production, and Zakaria writes that the country is becoming the next economic giant. Furthermore, its strong government can exercise direct control and develop its infrastructure and capabilities with a long-term perspective. This economic power will bring more international influence for China, which will be fundamentally different from that of the United States, less interventionist and more incrementalist.

There are obstacles, however. Zakaria warns that rapid economic development and rampant poverty in the countryside could surpass the ability of the Chinese state to manage the social and environmental ramifications and lead to internal instability. Figures of Chinese economic growth and Gross Domestic Product are often overblown or unclear, and its skewed demographic profile as a result of the one-child policy will cause future socioeconomic hardship. Furthermore, openness and accountability are

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not hallmarks of China's government. Indeed, while China may profess to follow a harmonious and peaceful approach to foreign policy, her rise will be viewed with suspicion in some quarters. For instance, its deals with questionable African regimes for resources and its stirring up of violent nationalism on occasion are examples of the 'dark side' of rising powers.

India's rise, in comparison, is almost the antithesis of China's. India's society, Zakaria argues, is dynamic and innovative. A commitment to the rule of law and property rights also stands in stark contrast to China's top-down approach. The ease of India's integration into the global economy indicates that while its development may not be as quick or dramatic as China's, it may be more enduring. However, massive poverty, poor infrastructure, and the threat of social instability and terrorism (as evidenced recently in Mumbai) remain obstacles to India harnessing its national assets for larger purposes. Furthermore, Indian foreign policy is often rooted in airy idealism and not in concrete calculations of national interest. Zakaria notes that this is changing, for instance with the India-US nuclear deal.

Far from being just another theory that laments or celebrates American decline, Zakaria does what Robert Sibley described recently in the *Ottawa Citizen*: "With all their dire warnings declinists demonstrate a key reason for American dynamism: the capacity for self-correction. Declinism raises the alarm against the dangers it perceives and thereby fosters the will to ward off the decline it predicts."[1]

Zakaria's central prediction is that the United States will no longer be able to utilize its power unilaterally to direct world affairs. Instead it will have to take into account other states' viewpoints and interests, as these countries will be able to conduct more independent foreign policies. It will have to be more pragmatic and more discerning in its foreign policy interests if it hopes to maintain its leading role, and will have to engage with all kinds of regimes, as the use of force alone is not an effective strategy. Similarly, asymmetric challenges such as those that span borders must be addressed with 'soft power,' by harnessing the power of civil society, legitimacy, and international institutions and rules.

Zakaria describes the current US response to these global changes as more defensive than engaging: "Just as the world is opening up, America is closing down." He writes that this must change, and that the US has the economic, political, military, social and cultural strength and appeal to continue to be the dominant international actor for several decades.

1 Robert Sibley. "Beware false prophets." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 August 2008.

There are some contradictions and discrepancies in Zakaria's arguments. He writes that the US should engage in 'à la carte' multilateralism by utilizing whatever international mechanisms suit the situation; however, this does not quite gel with his call for the US to engage in a more rules-based international system, as an 'à la carte' approach is arguably already embodied in the current American approach of engaging 'coalitions of the willing' and bypassing certain international treaties. Furthermore, Zakaria simultaneously calls for the strengthening of *existing* international institutions and the creation of *new* ones, without being specific.



In addition, the author often gets caught in the 'magpie and shiny objects' trap: he gushes over the number of news channels in India, the height of new skyscrapers in Dubai, and the largest shopping mall in the world in Beijing. To his credit, he does recognize that size does not entail economic and political success. This remains dependent on the inventiveness and incentivization of wealth creation within a country, factors that make the United States so successful.

Zakaria also makes some rather questionable claims about which powers – apart from India and China – will play prominent leadership roles in global politics and economics. Readers looking for a treatise on contemporary power politics should pay attention instead to Robert Kagan's *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. Zakaria writes that Europe will soon balance the US; however, in reality the continent is likely to remain an international economic giant and military pygmy. He also notes that South Africa and Mexico will lead their continents, but this seems rather optimistic given their domestic weaknesses. Zakaria also describes Russia as a re-emerging player, but its declining population and stifling centralized state will impede this in the long-term, notwithstanding its military forays into its 'near-abroad' such as recently in Georgia.[2] In addition, Zakaria does not discuss the role of non-state actors after initially alluding to their growing influence in the configuration of global power. He glosses over the threats posed by amorphous and stateless entities such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates,

2 For a fascinating view of demographics and Russian ambitions, see: Spengler, "Americans play Monopoly, Russians chess," *Asia Times Online*, 19 August 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH19Ag04.html

and the challenges posed to Western culture and practices by those who reject them.

Despite these shortcomings, Zakaria's underlying theory remains mostly sound. Moreover he provides some useful lessons for countries that wish to make an impact in the world. One, they must be willing to engage with outside influences and ideas. Two, they must have a clear calculation of their interests and harness national resources for a national purpose. And third, states and societies must enable wealth creation and innovation over centralization and extraction. ©

Book Review

The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism

by Ron Suskind

Reviewed by Anne Frances Cation

Regaining American Moral Leadership

Ron Suskind. *The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism*. 2008. Doubleday Canada, $32.95.

The United States of America fights many battles. For Ron Suskind, these battles are internal, and are fought within the Bush Administration and inside each American. Suskind portrays the United States as a broken whole, which, if each person begins to act selflessly and without clandestine motives, will regain its moral authority. This need for a moral compass is Suskind's central point, which he frames with the moral struggles of several sundry characters.

While his characters are not all American, their encounters with the United States alter, or even end, their lives. The challenges of Ibrahim Frotan, a troubled Afghan exchange student in Denver, Candace Gorman, a lawyer representing a Guantánamo Bay detainee, and the late Benazir Bhutto, among others, colour Suskind's book. All characters have an inner battle, which are mostly resolved with an enlightening cross-cultural experience or an affirmation of democratic values. These characters also demonstrate the importance of a shared search for truth. Suskind terms this search the transforming question of American culture.

Suskind's fluid prose and stark character insights make *The Way of the World* a smooth and enjoyable read. The frankness and relatable protagonists reflect Suskind's experience as an author: in 1995 he received the Pulitzer Prize for Featured Writing and this book was a New York Times nonfiction bestseller. His analysis of President George W. Bush is particularly powerful. Bush's inclination to act instinctively helped him get elected but interferes with his ability to function effectively. Bush lives in a Presidential Bubble, which Suskind argues is created because all relationships after election as President become "corrupted by the gravitational incongruities between the leader of the free world and everyone else." Instead of working to pop this bubble, Bush continues to live by his instinct. Suskind's strengths are manifest during his portrayal of such tragic situations and characters.

Suskind's woven stories are an excellent medium to convey his morally prescriptive statements. One is carried along with the stories, and easily grasps his concepts. His analysis of the 9/11 Commission, for instance, ends with just such a digestible prescriptive statement. The 9/11 Commission blamed the September 11 attacks on the American leadership and intelligence community's lack of imagination. Suskind warns that the same leaders still lack imagination because they cannot imagine the negative ramifications if the United States of America continues to act dishonestly and without moral authority. The key to overcoming this problem, Suskind states, is transparency and information sharing.

Likewise, he condemns the American administration for not taking greater measures to

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prevent Bhutto's death. Such inaction exemplifies how the Administration was unable to see Bhutto's evolution, through which she became more democratic and representative of Pakistan's moderates. Instead, the Administration supported President Pervez Musharraf because he had the support of the military. The American failure to support Bhutto, Suskind holds, demonstrates that the United States has fallen so far from its moral principles that it chose the wrong side in the contest between democracy's ideals and tyranny's prerogatives.

These various characters, while effective in affirming the importance of democracy and of thinking for oneself, muddle Suskind's voice and create a mosaic of personalities and opinions. The randomness with which Suskind scatters his first person disorients the reader, making it difficult to gauge where Suskind ends and where his characters begin. In the end, one cannot know if Suskind agrees with most of his character's opinions or if his character's opinions are his own.

Controversy surrounded the release of this book. It alleges that the United States ignored former Iraqi intelligence official Tahir Jalil Habbush's statements in 2003 that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destruction, later resettled him in Jordan, bribed him with $5 million, and forged a letter from him which tied Saddam Hussein to 9/11's leader Mohammad Atta. Shortly after this book's release, Robert Richer, a former CIA official and main character in the book, issued a denial, which Suskind countered with taped conversations, supporting his book's allegations. In late August 2008, American House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers announced plans to review Suskind's forged-documents allegations. Conyers' findings have not been released.

Overall, this is a book about simple contrasts: the America that foreigners see in Hollywood versus the America that foreigners' experience; open source knowledge versus secret CIA files; and democracy versus militancy. Of his contrast cases, Suskind champions political liberalism over realism. He depicts Bush as short-sighted and focused on the next election, and contracts him to former President Gerald Ford, who, Suskind writes, chose ethical decisions which flouted electoral calculations, such as pardoning disgraced former President Richard Nixon. *The Way of the World* contains two Americas: one America represents the country, and the other the dream. These, for Suskind, act as tragic contrasts. Ibrahim Frotan, the Afghan exchange student, encounters this disconnect during his difficulty in adjusting to American life. By restoring its principles of honesty and democracy, Suskind holds, America can once again become this dream.



Like any good book, *The Way of the World* will maintain its relevancy. While its August 2008 release missed two key events – the November 2008 presidential elections and the subprime mortgage crisis – its central call for a reinstatement of legitimacy remains applicable. Importantly, this book questions the most effective way for the United States to engage the world. Standing back from answering this question, Suskind states that, "a complex personal truth about selfless giving" can create a moral standard which will guide the nation. The "way of the world," Suskind explains, is that people save one another. This push to a global collective, alongside the struggle of the world's most powerful country to rediscover its original, transforming principals, is a captivating story. Beyond being a deconstructive criticism of the United States, Suskind remains hopeful: think for yourself and act on behalf of everyone. ©

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