




AUTUMN / AUTOMNE 2009

ON TRACK

VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3



The State of the Canadian Army

Conceiving an army for the 21st Century

**The Wars of the 21st Century and
Stability Operations**

A Most Mis-communicated War

Two Years Past Kandahar Tour

La philosophie et les militaires

Heroes Program



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ON TRACK

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COVER PHOTO: Corporal Alex Parenteau (left), 1 R22eR, and Corporal Bienco Bouchard (right), 3 R22eR, stand guard in Deh-E Bagh, Kandahar province. **PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE:** Le Caporal Alex Parenteau (à gauche), du 1 R22eR, et le Caporal Bienco Bouchard (à droite), du 3 R22eR, montent la garde à Deh-E Bagh, province de Kandahar.

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

ON TRACK, now in its fourteenth year, has become more widely read with each succeeding edition. We attribute *ON TRACK*'s increasing readership to the excellent quality of the material that is provided by members of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and by members of the Canadian Forces, academics and researchers who are the acknowledged experts in their respective fields.



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

The intent of *ON TRACK* is to provide a medium of informed and *non-partisan* debate on defence and security matters of importance to the interests of Canada. We will continue to publish credible, informed research as well as opinion which we believe will provide Canadians with insight to the concerns of the defence community. The articles that are published express the views of the authors, and may not necessarily coincide with those of the CDA Institute.

This autumn edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of Canada's Army, an army of the future, the economic dimension of stability operations, procurement challenges, Afghanistan, United States Africa Command, philosophy and the military, a resort for youth, and book reviews.

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, the CDA's Senior Defence Analyst, recently conducted an in-depth interview with Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff. The interview touched on the personnel, equipment and training issues that the Army is currently facing. We are pleased to include a transcript of the interview in this edition.

Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek argues, in '*Conceiving an Army for the 21st Century*', examines two futures research methods that provide utility for military planners. Lieutenant-Colonel Rostek is completing his doctorate in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada while employed as Concepts Team Leader in the Directorate of Land Concepts and Design.

In '*The Wars of the 21st Century and Stability Operations: the Economic Dimension*', Dr. Jack Treddenick

ON TRACK, qui en est maintenant à sa quatorzième année, a vu son public lecteur s'accroître avec chaque publication successive. Nous attribuons l'augmentation des lecteurs de *ON TRACK* à l'excellente qualité des articles qui sont fournis par des membres de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (Institut de la CAD) et par des membres des Forces canadiennes, des universitaires et des chercheurs qui sont des experts reconnus dans

leurs domaines respectifs.

Ce que vise *ON TRACK*, c'est d'offrir un média de débat informé et *non partisan* sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui ont de l'importance pour les intérêts du Canada. Nous continuerons à publier des recherches crédibles et informées, ainsi que des opinions qui, à notre avis, présenteront aux Canadiens des aperçus des préoccupations des milieux de la défense. Les articles qui sont publiés expriment les points de vue des auteurs, et ne correspondent pas nécessairement à ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

Ce numéro d'automne de *ON TRACK* présente des articles d'intérêt actuel dans les domaines suivants : l'Armée du Canada, une armée de l'avenir, la dimension économique des opérations de stabilité, les défis des processus d'acquisition, l'Afghanistan, le *Africa Command* des États-Unis, la philosophie et les militaires, un camp de vacances pour les jeunes et des comptes rendus de livres.

Colonel (retraité) Brian MacDonald, l'analyste principal de défense de la CAD, a récemment fait une entrevue en profondeur avec le Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre. L'entrevue a touché aux difficultés auxquelles l'Armée doit présentement faire face en matière de personnel, d'équipement et d'entraînement. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure la transcription de cette entrevue dans le présent numéro.

Dans son article « *Conceiving an Army for the 21st Century* », le Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek examine deux futures méthodes de recherche qui présentent une utilité pour les planificateurs militaires. Le Lieutenant-Colonel Rostek termine son doctorat en Études sur la guerre au Collège militaire royal, tout en étant employé comme chef d'équipe de concepts à la Direction des concepts et de la doctrine.

Dans « *The Wars of the 21st Century and Stability Operations: the Economic Dimension* », M. Jack Treddenick

argues that successful combat operations are only the beginning of the main struggle for peace and notes that economic underdevelopment has emerged as a major global security challenge. He examines the broad strategic elements that make up the reconstruction and development process and details challenges for their success. Dr. Treddenick is Professor of Economics and Chairman, Department of Nonresident Activities, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany.

Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn provides a review of some of the procurement challenges that the Canadian Forces faces. In *'DND staff shortages imperil CF capital acquisitions'* he outlines a proposal to alleviate the current significant personnel shortage that project management centres are experiencing. Colonel Nellestyn is CDA Membership Coordinator.

In *'A Most Mis-communicated War'* Cincinnatus writes that, when young men and women lose their lives on a foreign battlefield, it is incumbent on a state to continually apprise its citizens for what purpose they do so. He notes that while the task in Afghanistan was to remove the Taliban regime and its al Qaeda brothers, it was implicit that the state would have to be rebuilt but that we did not explain that very well.

Dr. Lee Windsor notes that the statistics garnered from media reports of acts of violence from Afghanistan over the summer of 2009 suggest that security and stability there are spiralling out of control. He provides an overview of the factors which have contributed to the reports, in *'Two Years Past Kandahar Tour: Turning Point for Canada's Afghan Mission'*. Dr. Windsor is a former DND-sponsored intern with the CDA Institute and is Deputy Director of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick.

The United States established United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) as a US Department of Defence (DOD) response to the 'whole of government' approach. Colonel Stephen Mariano and Major George Deuel provide us with the background that led to the creation of USAFRICOM and an outline of USAFRICOM's mission. Colonel Mariano is the US Army Africa Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Strategic Plans, Policies and Assessments. Major Deuel is a Strategic Plans and Policy Officer at the US Army Southern European Task Force/US Army Africa in Vicenza, Italy.

Ms. Manon Turgeon writes, in *'Philosophy and the Military'*, that the study of philosophy can promote tolerance,

allègue que les opérations de combat réussies ne sont que le commencement de la lutte principale pour la paix et note que le sous-développement économique a émergé comme un défi majeur à la sécurité mondiale. Il examine les grands éléments stratégiques qui composent le processus de reconstruction et de développement et fait le détail des difficultés qui s'opposent à leurs succès. M. Treddenick est professeur d'économie et président du département des activités non résidentes au George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Allemagne).

Le Colonel (retraité) Andrew Nellestyn propose un examen de quelques-unes des difficultés d'acquisition auxquelles les Forces canadiennes doivent faire face. Dans *« DND staff shortages imperil CF capital acquisitions »*, il décrit une proposition qui a pour but de soulager la pénurie significative actuelle à laquelle font présentement face les centres de gestion de projets. Le Colonel Nellestyn est coordonnateur des membres de la CAD.

Dans *« A Most Mis-communicated War »*, Cincinnatus écrit que, quand de jeunes hommes et de jeunes femmes perdent la vie sur un champ de bataille étranger, il incombe à un État de rappeler continuellement à ses citoyens dans quel but ils l'ont fait. Il note que, même si la tâche, en Afghanistan, était de supprimer le régime des Talibans et ses frères d'al-Qaïda, il était implicite que l'État aurait à être reconstruit, mais ça, nous ne l'avons pas très bien expliqué.

M. Lee Windsor note que les statistiques recueillies des rapports médiatiques sur les actes de violence commis en Afghanistan pendant l'été 2009 suggèrent que la sécurité et la stabilité sont en train d'entrer dans une spirale de perte de contrôle. Il offre une vue d'ensemble des facteurs qui ont contribué aux rapports, dans l'article *« Two Years Past Kandahar Tour: Turning Point for Canada's Afghan Mission »*. M. Windsor est un ancien stagiaire parrainé par le MDN auprès de l'Institut de la CAD et il est directeur adjoint du Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society de l'Université du Nouveau-Brunswick.

Les États-Unis ont créé le United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) comme réponse du US Department of Defence (DOD) à l'approche « pangouvernementale ». Le Colonel Stephen Mariano et le Major George Deuel nous exposent le contexte qui a mené à la création du USAFRICOM et en décrivent la mission. Le Colonel Mariano est US Army Africa Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Strategic Plans, Policies and Assessments. Le Major Deuel est Strategic Plans and Policy Officer at the US Army Southern European Task Force/US Army Africa, à Vicenza (Italie).

Mme Manon Turgeon écrit, dans *« La philosophie et les militaires »*, que l'étude de la philosophie peut promouvoir

the search for objectivity and impartiality, and enables Canadian military personnel to pledge allegiance to and defend Canadian values in a voluntary and reflective manner. Ms. Turgeon teaches philosophy at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, Québec.

Muskoka Woods is a Christian youth resort located in Rosseau, Ontario. Muskoka Woods operates all year round as a non-profit youth organization. In 2008, 13 military youth were given an opportunity to enjoy a week at Muskoka Woods. This year, the number is 42 campers. Mr. Thomas Caldwell provides us with a background of his involvement with Muskoka Woods, in *'Heroes Program'*. Mr. Caldwell is Chairman & CEO Caldwell Financial Ltd., and is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

We are pleased to receive from Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Rémy Landry his review of the book, *'La guerre probable: Penser autrement'*, written by Major-General Vincent Desportes. In this book, Major-General Desportes warns that war is ready to make a comeback around the globe and that Western powers are not prepared for it. Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Landry is Associate Researcher at the Research Group in International Security, University of Montréal.

Mr. Arnav Manchanda has provided two book reviews, one that concerns the logistical challenges faced by Canada's troops in Afghanistan; the other, a survey of the global illegal and grey economy. In *'What the thunder said: reflections of a Canadian officer in Kandahar'* Mr. Manchanda reviews a revealing monograph by Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad, which details the challenges that his logisticians dealt with on a daily basis in Kandahar province in summer 2006. *'McMafia: A Journey Through The Global Criminal Underworld'* provides a fast paced and accessible introduction to the underworld of the post-communist and 21st century international economy, and was written by Misha Glenny, whose previous works include *'The Third Balkan War'*. Mr. Manchanda is a defence policy analyst with the CDA and a research analyst with The SecDev Group.

Dr. David Anido reviews *'Seeds of Terror'*, by Gretchen Peters. The tenor of the book is that criminals and terrorists easily cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and that the nexus of smugglers and extremists presents a security threat to Afghanistan and the West. Dr. Anido is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

la tolérance, la recherche de l'objectivité et de l'impartialité, et qu'elle permet au personnel militaire canadien de plaider allégeance aux valeurs canadiennes et de défendre celles-ci d'une façon volontaire et réfléchie. Mme Turgeon enseigne la philosophie au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (Québec).

Muskoka Woods est un lieu de villégiature chrétien pour les jeunes situé à Rosseau (Ontario). Il fonctionne à l'année longue comme organisation jeunesse à but non lucratif. En 2008, 13 jeunes fils et filles de militaires ont eu l'occasion de bénéficier d'une semaine à Muskoka Woods. Cette année, le nombre est passé à 42 campeurs. M. Thomas Caldwell nous présente l'historique de cette participation à Muskoka Woods, dans son article « *Heroes Program* ». M. Caldwell est président et directeur général de Caldwell Financial Ltd., et il est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Nous sommes heureux de recevoir du Lieutenant-colonel (retraité) Rémy Landry son compte rendu du livre « *La guerre probable: Penser autrement* », du Major-général Vincent Desportes. Dans ce livre, le Major-général Desportes nous avertit que la guerre est prête à faire un retour dans le monde entier et que les puissances occidentales ne sont pas préparées à cette éventualité. Le Lieutenant-colonel (retraité) Landry est chercheur associé au Groupe de recherche en sécurité international de l'Université de Montréal.

M. Arnav Manchanda nous offre deux comptes rendus de livres, un qui touche les difficultés logistiques auxquels font face les troupes canadiennes en Afghanistan, l'autre qui est une enquête sur l'économie mondiale illégale et grise. Dans « *What the thunder said: reflections of a Canadian officer in Kandahar* », M. Manchanda examine une monographie révélatrice du Lieutenant-colonel John Conrad, qui raconte en détail les difficultés que ses logisticiens ont dû subir jour après jour dans la province de Kandahar à l'été 2006. « *McMafia: A Journey Through The Global Criminal Underworld* » offre une introduction rapide et accessible au monde interlope de l'ère post-communiste et de l'économie internationale du 21^e siècle, et a été écrit par Misha Glenny, dont les travaux précédents incluent « *The Third Balkan War* ». M. Manchanda est analyste de politiques de défense à la CAD et analyste de recherche chez The SecDev Group.

M. David Anido fait un compte rendu de « *Seeds of Terror* », de Gretchen Peters. La teneur du livre est que les criminels et les terroristes traversent facilement la frontière entre le Pakistan et l'Afghanistan et que le noeud de trafiquants et d'extrémistes présente une menace à la sécurité de l'Afghanistan et de l'Ouest. M. Amido est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

ON TRACK

We are very pleased to welcome to the CDA Institute Ms. Natalie Ratcliffe as the DND Security and Defence Forum-sponsored intern. Natalie recently attained her MA in history at the University of Ottawa.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute has been and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence interests, such as the annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Vimy Award Dinner, as well as the annual seminar, and numerous roundtable discussions.

This autumn, on 30 and 31 October, the CDA Institute, in collaboration with the Department of National Defence's Security and Defence Forum, the Royal Military College of Canada, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Queen's University Defence Management Studies Programme, Queen's Centre for International Relations, Honourary Captain (N) the Hon. Hugh Segal, and Mr. David Scott, will host the 12th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The symposium will highlight the work of graduate students from civilian and military universities from across Canada, and cash prizes, totalling \$6,000, will be awarded for the three best papers presented.

The keynote speakers for the two-day event will be Elissa Golberg, the former Representative of Canada in Kandahar, and Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Anyone with an interest in defence, national and international issues is welcome to attend.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding

Nous sommes très heureux d'accueillir à l'Institut de la CAD Mme Natalie Ratcliffe à titre de stagiaire parrainée par le Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du MDN. Natalie a récemment décroché sa maîtrise en histoire à l'Université d'Ottawa.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD a participé et participera à de nombreuses initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité et de défense, comme le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, le dîner du prix Vimy, ainsi que le séminaire annuel et de nombreuses

discussions en table ronde.

Cet automne, les 30 et 31 octobre, l'Institut de la CAD, en collaboration avec le Forum sur la défense et la sécurité du Ministère de la Défense nationale, le Collège militaire royal du Canada, le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, le Defence Management Studies Programme de l'Université Queen's, le Queen's Centre for International Relations, le Capitaine honoraire (M) l'Honorable Hugh Segal et M. David Scott, sera l'hôte du 12^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés. Le symposium mettra en valeur le travail d'étudiants diplômés d'universités civiles et militaires de tous les coins du Canada, et des prix en argent d'une valeur totale de

6 000 \$ seront remis aux auteurs des trois meilleurs travaux présentés.

Les orateurs invités pour l'événement de deux jours sera Elissa Golberg, ancienne représentante du Canada à Kandahar, et le Lieutenant-général Marc Lessard, commandant du Commandement de la force expéditionnaire du Canada. Le symposium a pour but de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires. Tous ceux et celles qui ont un intérêt envers les questions de défense et les questions nationales et internationales sont invités à y assister.

Une des activités majeures au calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution



WARRANT OFFICER WILLIAM KENNETH MACDONALD

STAR OF MILITARY VALOUR

"On August 3, 2006, amidst chaos and under sustained and intense enemy fire in Afghanistan, Sergeant MacDonald selflessly and repeatedly exposed himself to great peril in order to assist his wounded comrades. Despite the risk, he ensured that his men held on until reinforcements arrived and that the platoon's focus remained on holding the ground that they had fought so hard to secure."

contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The 2008 programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff, by the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, before some 630 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

On 13 August 2009, the Vimy Award Selection Committee unanimously selected Warrant Officer William Kenneth MacDonald as this year's recipient of the Award. Warrant Officer MacDonald epitomizes the best of today's soldier and is a living example of one who puts service before self. The Vimy Award Selection Committee was composed of Dr. John Scott Cowan as Chairman, and, as Members, the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Général (Ret) Raymond Henault, Dr. George A. Lampropoulos, Monsieur Richard Bertrand, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard J. Evraire, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Major-General (Ret'd) Tom de Faye, and Mr. Dan Donovan.

The Award will be presented on Friday, 20 November, at a mixed gala dinner in the LeBreton Gallery of the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, has graciously accepted the invitation of the CDA Institute to present the Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2008 was Alex Castonguay, journalist for the newspaper *Le Devoir* and magazine *L'actualité*. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented this year to Mr. Brian Stewart, who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500.

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry, organizations and individuals is very encouraging.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military

significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un succès retentissant, alors qu'un nombre record d'excellentes présentations furent considérées par le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme de 2008 a connu son point culminant avec la présentation du prix au Général (retraité) Rick Hillier, ancien chef d'état-major de la Défense, par la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, devant quelque 630 invités lors d'un dîner formel tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Le 13 août 2009, le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy a choisi à l'unanimité l'Adjudant William Kenneth MacDonald comme récipiendaire du prix de cette année. L'Adjudant MacDonald est l'exemple même de ce qu'il y a de mieux chez le soldat d'aujourd'hui et il est un exemple vivant de quelqu'un qui fait passer le service avant lui-même. Le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy était composé de M. John Scott Cowan, à la présidence, et, comme membres, de la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, du Général (retraité) Raymond Henault, de M. George A. Lampropoulos, de M. Richard Bertrand, du Lieutenant-général (retraité) Richard J. Evraire, du Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, du Major-général (retraité) Tom de Faye et de M. Dan Donovan.

Le Prix sera remis le vendredi 20 novembre, au cours de dîner de gala mixte, dans la Galerie LeBreton du Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa. La Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, a gracieusement accepté l'invitation de l'Institut de la CAD de remettre le Prix.

Le Ross Munro Media Award sera également remis à l'occasion du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix 2008 était Alec Castonguay, journaliste au journal *Le Devoir* et à la revue *L'actualité*. Ce prestigieux prix, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, sera remis cette année à Monsieur Brian Stewart, qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le public des enjeux qui affectent le Canada en matière de défense et de sécurité. Le prix est accompagné d'un prix en argent de 2 500 \$.

Les deux programmes ont eu un très grand succès l'an dernier. Je suis heureux de dire que l'appui des programmes de la part de l'industrie, d'organismes et d'individus du Canada est très encourageant.

Pendant la dernière année, le gouvernement fédéral a donné aux citoyens du Canada un point focal sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Si nous, pour notre part, faisons bon accueil à cette initiative, il y a encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien

operations, the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. Donor forms are printed on the last page of this journal and are available online at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor>.

Thank you. ©

informés des enjeux majeurs des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les Forces canadiennes et du manque continu des ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins de longue date de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD continuera toutefois à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité de ce pays.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos donateurs des niveaux patrons, compagnons et officiers pour l'appui financier qu'ils ont accordé aux travaux de l'Institut de la CAD ; sans eux il nous aurait été difficile de remplir notre mandat. Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur de l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais de le devenir et de recruter un/e ami/e. Des formulaires de donateurs sont imprimés sur la dernière page de ce journal et ils sont disponibles en ligne à l'adresse <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor>.

Merci. ©

Recorded interview

The state of the Canadian Army: an interview with Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff

Interviewer: Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, Senior Defence Analyst, CDA

"We are the best small Army in the world!"

MacDonald: General Leslie, you had commented, before the Government's July 23rd announcement of a \$5.2 billion investment in new and refurbished armoured fighting vehicles for the Army, that there might be a need for a pause after it completes the current mission in Afghanistan so that you could "reset" the Army. How does the Government announcement affect your earlier statement and what are the implications for the Army?

Leslie: My earlier comments were that if nothing changed then by 2011 the Army might well need a pause. The big stumbling block, the bottle neck, wasn't our soldiers but

rather our equipment. I was looking at a situation where, by 2011, most of my fighting vehicles would have been off the road. Obviously, the Government's announcement means that the "something" that I was looking for has now taken place.

Currently our ranks are full of eager young men and women who are joining their Army to go overseas to fight the foe or to help protect the weak and innocent. Good Canadians all. But, the middle grade senior NCOs, who are the backbone of the Army and, together with our iron captains and majors, are facing their second, third, fourth rotation in Afghanistan on top of previous international deployments. And they

support a very intensive training regime, where *they* are not being trained but are needed to train the young ones who are coming behind them. An Army is only as good as its NCOs and field grade officers and we have to think very carefully about the impact of multiple deployments on them as individuals and on their families.

Our task force in Afghanistan comes from across



Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

Canadian Forces soldiers stand by on their LAV III vehicles as they await the order to move out after spending 8 days in the field aiding in the construction of a new compound that will be used by Afghan National Army (ANA) and Canadian soldiers as a checkpoint in the Zhari District, Afghanistan.

Photo by Master Corporal Robert Bottrill, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

the entire Canadian Forces. It is effectively a brigade, plus a very significant and extraordinarily valuable helicopter component, and some navy folk doing some special EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] tasks and other activities like that. If nothing changes we will have enough soldiers because we've got a real push on to produce more Master Corporals, Sergeants, and Second Lieutenants and we've done so very successfully over the last year.

Our fighting vehicles are a totally different matter, a fact recognized by the Auditor General of Canada, who has stated that the depreciation rate for equipments deployed in Afghanistan is many multiples beyond that which the planners who bought this stuff a decade or fifteen/twenty years ago anticipated.

We have something over a hundred LAVs [Light Armoured Vehicles] deployed. A significant number have

been destroyed or damaged to an extent which requires that they have to come back to Canada to be repaired. We've lost those vehicles. I don't really care about them in one sense because they're doing their job and keeping the soldiers alive, but eventually you have to replace them, so we have to refresh the fleet with stocks from Canada.

We have vehicles that are now carrying much more armour and steel than they have in the past, which puts a further drain on their long term sustainability, and the terrain they're driving over in Afghanistan is savage. All of that contributes to a very high breakage rate even though the LAVs are super vehicles [and] the mainstay of the Canadian Army.

In turn that AFV [Armoured Fighting Vehicle] attrition impacts back here because we have to do a good job making sure the troops in combat have the right number of spare parts and vehicle techs to fix them. That means we have to fly them from Canada which means our ability to serve and support our vehicles in Canada has gone down at the same time that we're sending thousands of young Canadians every year to CFB Wainwright to train them in these AFVs before deployment to Afghanistan, so the usage

rate in Canada has also accelerated.

We don't have a lot of LAVs left that I can afford to send overseas or to support training here in Canada. So we need to upgrade them. They are a Canadian product and as soon as the factory can start upgrading them that will relieve the maintenance burden on the regular Army. In the factory they are being made heavier, better protected and newer, and as they are produced we can throw them back into the fray, or wherever we may be going next.

That's why the government's very welcome decision to go forward with the Army equipment project is so important for the Army's present and future.

MacDonald: The Parliamentary Budget Office in its report argued that the *de facto* depreciation rate is Afghanistan is roughly six times that of Canada. Using the estimate of a

twenty-year life expectancy of the LAV under normal usage suggests that a LAV in Afghanistan has a life expectancy of somewhere between three and four years, which then suggests that it's a problem that is larger than simply a repair and rebuild of some of the LAVs that are capable of being looked after but instead represents a requirement to look at a complete replacement of the LAV fleet?

Leslie: I wouldn't say replacement – I would say upgrades. These vehicles are extraordinarily well built and what we want the rebuild project to do is to make the LAVs bigger, heavier, better armoured, with a better fire control system, better fire suppression system, better shock absorbency, and a more powerful engine. So at one end of the product line an old war-veteran LAV goes in and at the other end of the production line a spanking new LAV which started out as the same vehicle but now looks dramatically different pops out. Why? Because we are effectively resetting the clock back to zero.

There are a couple of dramatic differences between the US Army Stryker and our LAVs. The levels of protection are, in the main, the same but we've gotten to our current levels of protection by slapping extra armour on a chassis which was originally in the 40,000 to 42,000 pound range. Our LAVs are now pushing 52,000, 53,000, 54,000 pounds, whereas the very latest model of the American Stryker is already at 55,000 pounds.

MacDonald: And presumably the American Stryker has the suspension designed for that weight.

Leslie: And the power behind it.

MacDonald: Whereas you are using appliqué armour – putting a weight load on a suspension and power pack that was not originally designed to handle it.

Leslie: Ergo, the very high attrition rates among the LAVs.

There is another issue: the Americans decided not to have the 25 millimetre chain gun. While I have the utmost respect for the American Army, I believe they made a mistake several years ago. Our soldiers really like having the comfort of that 25 millimetre chain gun, which can do a great job protecting them and can reach out and touch 2,000 meters. By not having that 25 millimetre gun they ended up having more room in the weight budget to do a variety of other things. But I am confident that the LAV upgrade will allow us to get up to 55,000 to 60,000 pounds in what will look to you and I like an essentially new vehicle.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

MacDonald: How big is the LAV fleet and how many vehicles do you see being required in this upgrade?

Leslie: Originally we bought about 650 – slightly more than that, but there are a bunch tucked away in test and establishment facilities.

MacDonald: How many do you need to upgrade or replace the ones that have been damaged?

Leslie: I would say as a bare minimum somewhere between 550 and 650.

MacDonald: My second question is that if the government decides to maintain a Canadian presence in Kandahar post 2011, what could the Army contribute to that?

Leslie: The military mission in Kandahar terminates in 2011. No one has suggested to me that we are staying past 2011. As such we currently do not have any plans or even any line diagrams on a blank sheet of paper for post 2011. This is the will of Parliament. Of course, if anything comes our way we



Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

Anticipation runs high as soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group prepare to board the Chinook helicopters that will fly them deep into Zhari District for Operation SANGA FIST, a one-day air-mobile deliberate operation.

Photo : Corporal James Nightingale

will provide that which we are told to provide. If it is of such importance, we will do what we're told.

MacDonald: My third question relates to "Transformation" and the Army. From an outsider's perspective it seems that the Army concept of transformation was based on a concept of a joint, medium weight force based on a family of wheeled



CFB SHILO, MANITOBA

The M777 Howitzer will enhance the Army's operational capability to provide indirect firepower at any time of the day or night, and under severe weather conditions.

Photo credit: Master Corporal Bern LeBlanc, Reporter, LFWA HQ,

APCs [Armoured Personnel Carriers] and associated support vehicles. Has the specific experience in Afghanistan led to a significant modification of this earlier concept of transformation – one which might include a requirement for heavyweight forces?

Leslie: Yes. About eight or nine years ago, my predecessors several times removed were mainly concerned with wrestling with budget cuts. They were looking at the requirement to replace a variety of fleets of vehicles; the main battle tanks, the armoured engineer vehicles, the M-113s, the tracked armoured personnel carriers and command posts, the self-propelled guns – with almost no funding above and beyond that which they were currently using to manage the various fleets.

The experience of contemporary operations of that time was predicated mostly on what had happened with a variety of conflicts in the Middle East. And a niche role was envisioned wherein Canada's potential contributions to such an activity would be in a supporting role, with the main threat being from enemy direct fire weapons with ranges of say 500 to 2,000 to 3,000 metres. Protection, while important, wasn't a driving factor. And protection on the bottom of the vehicles where mines and IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] lurk was a factor, but not a driving one.

Based on our recent experience, and on a good deal of rigorous intellectual debate done within the Army, the armed forces think tanks, and organizations like yours, we

concluded that whatever we're doing now, while not a perfect model for what will happen in the future, is predictive of the type of threat that will remain relatively constant. It will be an asymmetric threat wherein indigenous insurgency forces attack the rule of law, or whatever state we're invited to help with, and the enemy will come after our soldiers and those whom we are charged to protect by planting mines and IEDs, or by using suicide bombers and the like.

Canadians care a great deal about the safety of our soldiers, so protection is now a huge issue for us, keeping in mind that we still have to get our job done. The Canadian Forces does not work in camps. Canadians go out at night, interacting with the local populations. In order to have a visible presence you can't always clatter overheard in a helicopter, though having those helicopters has really saved lives.

So in the absence of a breath taking revolutionary technology, we need to put weight on. Armour on the bottoms and sides – you still can't abandon the idea of a flanking or frontal attack. To distribute that pressure on the ground for really heavy vehicles you need multiple points of contact, which drives you to tracks. We need heavy vehicles to take the hit and that's why we've reinstituted the Main Battle Tank, reinstituted Armoured Personnel Carriers that are tracked.

Underlying all of this is the premise that the bulk of the Army still remains based on our LAV fleet of roughly 650 but with the capability to add on heavies, be they Leopard-2s, be they tracked Armoured Personnel Carriers, Armoured Engineer Vehicles, to a modest force size. Or you can down scale to soft-skinned, lighter vehicles which is why we need more Armoured Patrol Vehicles as well (which are modular in construction, probably wheeled, to do command and liaison work, reconnaissance and surveillance, and to give our light infantry further mobility), but not as heavy as a LAV. So the future vision of the Army is LAV based on being in the middle of the capabilities spectrum so you can do peace keeping, peace support, or limited war fighting.

If you get into more serious or contentious issues you bolt on the tanks and the other tracks, as in Afghanistan, all with a view to enhance protection and tactical mobility on the battlefield. Tracks give you greater cross country mobility; LAVs give you wheels, give you enormous speed, and a lessened maintenance train to take care of it. With an upgrade to the LAV, a Canadian built product from London, Ontario, and a great piece of kit, we will be able to maintain the focus of the Canadian Army as a medium-weight Army,

with some heavy and some light capabilities.

So, LAV in the center, Armoured Patrol Vehicles on the lighter side blending into the middle, and heavies to reinforce the middle and to be able to take part in more conventional activities, keeping in mind that today the role of the tank is not to kill other tanks but to support our infantry.

MacDonald: How does this impact your training system? If you are going to have, in effect, three capabilities of medium, light, and heavy are we going to see the mix of all three within a given brigade, or are we see it in a specialized brigade?

Leslie: No, not specialized brigades, because we are a general-purpose Army, though of course our main remit is to be able to close in and destroy the foe when required. That's our most dangerous operation.

Three balanced brigade groups and within each brigade group the same battalion or regimental structures that we have now, though we are moving more towards formal affiliations in terms of battle group concepts.

The heart of the Army, essentially an infantry-centric battle group, will have two LAV companies and a light armoured patrol vehicle company – something we have not yet acquired. You will have within the armoured regiments – one in each of the brigade groups – two or three recce squadrons and a tank squadron. You will not have soldiers with multiple suites of equipment for each soldier. You'll have soldiers who are trained and specialized on either the Armoured Patrol Vehicle, on the LAV, or on the heavies.

MacDonald: Then presumably we would see the same pattern as we see today where you are using the brigades as force generation entities providing people to an expeditionary force which then undergoes the final work up training in Wainwright?

Leslie: My number one job is always domestic and we stand ready at a moment's notice to respond domestically both regular and reserve. The brigades are not only force generators, but force employers, as well. For example, Jon Vance is overseas as a brigade commander. He's effectively got a brigade under command. He has a very large infantry battalion. He's got the elements of an artillery regiment, elements of an engineer regiment, elements of a service battalion, a recce squadron, an EOD Squadron, an electronic warfare squadron, an intelligence company and the list goes on. 3,000 soldiers overseas is two-thirds of a brigade group.

MacDonald: The defence performance review 2007/8 paints a picture of very slow increase in regular force strength and notes the impact of the increased attrition rates particularly among the key middle leadership ranks. What do you see as the prime causes of this attrition and what can the Army do to deal with it?

Leslie: Attrition is a combination of a variety of factors. First is demographics. We had an increase in our strength roughly twenty years ago. Those great soldiers are now Sergeant-Majors, Captains, Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, and as they hit a variety of normal gateways, be it 20, 30, or 35 years, their families tend to say, "You know what, you've done your duty." The CDS [Chief of the Defence Staff] has a great saying: "You recruit the soldier but you have to retain the family." A family's willingness to let their loved one continually deploy gets a bit strained after four or five or six tours in a twenty year career,



Kandahar, Afghanistan

The first Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), built for operations in Afghanistan, on Mike Ramp which will be the new home for the Heron UAV.

Photo by: Cpl Andrew Saunders

so it's demographics in the first instance.

The second factor is the operational tempo wherein our more experienced folk, after finishing leading their soldiers overseas, are sent off to our training institutions to train the younger ones to replace them. Perhaps in the civilian world there is an expectation that a soldier after getting home sort of rests for six months or a year and doesn't do much. That's not the case at all. That priceless experience has to be passed on to the members of the next generation who

are about to follow them.

The third factor has been, until very recently, a red hot economy where the innate character of our soldiers – the leadership skill sets, the common sense, integrity, the ability to work really hard, the ability to solve incredibly complex issues, the “Can Do” spirit – was, and still is, very attractive to civilian industry. People tell me the economy’s in a bad shape. But negative economic news doesn’t seem to have diminished industry’s appetite for my soldiers. So, on the one hand I’m delighted that when our soldiers leave the Army to get great jobs. On the other, when I think about what we’re losing, I’m not. But you know something – I would rather they serve us honourably and well, which they all do, and leave happy, than stay and become a causality themselves through psychological trauma, physical injury, or increased family tension.

MacDonald: Are any of them coming back?

Leslie: We had close to five or six hundred last year who rejoined our ranks and we’ve had a significant number of transfers from the Reserve Force into the Regular Force. I read a letter sent to a whole bunch of folks who served us, for example, as reservists overseas. Let’s say a master corporal in the reserves competes for and finds a spot overseas as a corporal. When he or she gets home I’ll offer them employment as a regular in the same rank as they fought the war in, and quite a large number have taken us up on that.

MacDonald: Over the years we had always noticed that the number of regulars transferring into the reserves was much smaller than the number of reservists who transferred into the regulars.

Leslie: The same is true today, but the numbers are more balanced. I think now the ratio’s roughly 1 to 2, whereas before it was more like 1 to 10.

MacDonald: That is an interesting demographic change. Any idea as to why?

Leslie: Those great soldiers who fought overseas want to come back because they have established such strong bonds with their regimental families that they want to carry it on. As a reservist they have another choice they can make in terms of volunteering again for deployment. And a lot of them believe in passing on their experiences to the young reservists, and that’s changed the nature of our

reserve force. I’ve been out on several reserve exercises watching those reserve combat veterans put their buddies through the paces in the training exercises – it’s just like you’re in Afghanistan. And the proficiency and battle skills and basic drills have gone up many hundredfold, though that’s probably an exaggeration. In terms of their ability to do the job, the quality of the reserves has increased dramatically over the last while – the innate nature of the reserves is still excellent, but I’m still talking about the soldier skills of the Reserve Force.

The recent government support to the reserves, in terms of the legislation that is now in place to guarantee jobs, has made reserve service a lot more attractive. In my first year as Army commander I was probably involved in a slightly snarky exchange with industry leaders once a week about why can’t Warrant Officer So-and-So go on deployment – and there were very good reasons from industry why not – you know he’s absolutely vital, or she has a specific skill set and I can’t afford to lose her. I haven’t had to make such a phone call in over two years – not one. And of course the Armed Forces Liaison Council has done wonders. We have true captains of industry right now, and we’ve got organizations such as the Canada Company.

MacDonald: In the pre-World War One period the Honorary Colonels of the Militia regiments were real captains of industry in their local areas.

Leslie: There is always a balance and blending and I think a perfect mix is to have one of the two Honoraries, be it the Lieutenant-Colonel or the Colonel, as someone who can provide wholesome advice to the Commanding Officer and the Regiment upon military issues, as someone who’s done their time in the trenches of the Army.

The other one could be a very influential captain of industry who can afford to send the band somewhere, or to equip the regiment with additions to their kilts, or who can help shape and nurture participation in the regiment amongst their factories. When they get a request, as a billionaire CEO, for ten soldiers in their organization to go overseas there is no debate for they understand the value. Moreover, if you have seventy or eighty captains of industry, who are also in the Honorary Colonel group, they are valuable for support, for influence leaders tend to pay a lot more attention to CEOs of multi-national corporations. We are Canada’s Army, so the importance of our connection with Canadians is more than a trite saying – it’s a way of life.

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MacDonald: The most recent report of the Auditor General on the Defence Department has criticised the CF's financial management reporting system's ability to track the flow of data about expenditure patterns in accordance with approved financial appropriations as to be able to identify lapses in expenditure fast enough for the sums to be profiled to other parties before the end of the fiscal year. The AG noted that at the end of 2007/8 there was over 300 million dollars

of lapsed funding which had to be given back, in addition to frozen funding which was waiting simply for major projects to finally get approved at cabinet level. What has been the impact on the Army?

Leslie: In FY [Financial Year] 2007/8, to my intense irritation, I as the Army commander lapsed 50 million dollars. The Army budget is several billion, so it's a very tiny percentage, but the

fact remains we lapsed 50 million dollars which I would have much rather spent on the soldiers – and was there a need to do so.

How did we lapse 50 million dollars? Over the course of the year the central staff had done a good job, I think, of identifying additional requirements – additional needs for money. And between the time they asked for it and got it, not unreasonably a bunch of months went by. So that means that by the time that we got the additional money we were in the last quarter of the year to go out and buy ammunition, or buy spare parts for vehicles. From the moment we identify the need until we actually get a contract let, many months can go by, so if you get the money in the last quarter sometimes it's extraordinarily difficult to spend it because of the process.

There has to be checks and balances – there has to be oversight as to how the taxpayer's dollar is being spent, but I think I'll quote the Minister of National Defence at your conference several months ago when he said that in certain instances he would like to see a purge of some of the obstacles which people, both in and out of uniform, have allowed to creep into our procurement systems, so that we can do things better, faster, smarter.

MacDonald: The AG noted that the other government departments are permitted to carry forward five percent of their budget from this year, if it has not been spent, into the next year but that the Defence Department is restricted, not to a percentage, but to \$150 million *in toto*. If the Defence Department were permitted the same five percent as other government departments, and given a twenty billion dollar total defence budget, a substantially increased amount of funds could be re-profiled from one year into the next. Has there been any thought given, to your knowledge, about increasing the allowable carry-forward for the Defence Department?

Leslie: I'll think you'll find several throne speeches ago that the Prime Minister of Canada identified defence procurement reform as an important issue, so that intent is still being shaped and working its way through town. I am no longer Director-General of Strategic Planning, or Chief of Programme, or Chief of Force Development, when I was paying a great deal of attention to the mechanics and nuances of that issue. As Army Commander I am more interested in the results than tracking how we get there, so I'm not the guy to talk to on the current status on defence procurement reform. In terms of the lapsed funding, I would simply

like to say that I have the utmost admiration for the Auditor General and I think we should do exactly what she says.

By the way, when it's been truly urgent, the folks in PWGSC [Public Works and Government Services Canada], and Treasury Board, and Industry Canada, have jumped through hoops to get my soldiers the kit they need in Afghanistan right bloody now. Where the process slows down, and I understand why, is when I make the arguments for the sustainment fleets here in Canada. They, quite rightly, push back at me and say through the various interlocutors that there are other considerations, and I understand

all those. But in terms of getting kit in the hands of the soldiers who are fighting the war and protecting lives, we have introduced more fleets of new equipment into the Army faster than at any other time going back to the Second World War.

MacDonald: Certainly the case of the M-777 howitzers is an example.

Leslie: Oh, my goodness – radars, sound ranging bases, mini-UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], small UAVs, large UAVs, the Heron, triple seven guns, Excalibur ammunition, weapon systems, LAV upgrades, the Cougar mine protected vehicles, the EROC [Expedient Route Opening Capability] packages, EOD ensembles, new night vision capability, thermal image capability, close air support. There is a list of success stories which gets overshadowed by criticisms of not doing this better, faster, smarter. Where there is friction is in trying to get the sustainment fleets here in Canada moving at the same rate.

MacDonald: Can I just push down this road a little bit farther? The success stories that you have described seem to have all been acquired by virtue of single source procurement or ACAN [Advance Contract Award Notice], or the Unforecasted Operational Requirement process, rather than by the elaborate procedures of competitive bidding, and by the ability to use the National Security Exemption as a means of breaking it loose from all the trade agreements.

Leslie: Let me try to present a balanced response to your very good question.

Jobs, jobs, jobs.

Would it rather a Canadian be employed manufacturing a protective or armaments system for Canadians than somebody

else? Absolutely. And the multiplier effect of defence dollars is probably historically in the region to two or three to one, or better. And a lot of these jobs are high tech – a LAV is a high-tech piece of machinery – and the list goes on. We want those dollars to stay in Canada, or we want the equivalent value of the dollars that may go to an international competitor who wins the contract to be reinvested through Industrial Regional Benefits. The government is very good at making sure that their tax dollars don't just scamper out of the country. There is an equal flow coming in as going out, and in some cases there is actually more coming in than going out.

Here is another factor. For things like vehicles and automotive ensembles I would much rather have a Canadian company or Canadian-led consortium win the contract, because it allows me to get my vehicles reset or repaired much more quickly. It also ensures that there is a community stake in making sure that the LAV fleet, for example, or whoever is going to win the main battle tank upgrade contract, is sustainable, and that the turnaround time is dramatically less. And so is the cost of turning those weapon systems around and making them better, faster. You don't have high transportation costs for very heavy vehicles sent many miles overseas or down to the States, or wherever the case may be.

Currency fluctuations on large contracts can be huge. We lucked in, for example, with the C-17, which is a magnificent airplane, which was actually purchased at below what we originally thought the value of the American dollar is going to be, so it was great. The Government of Canada didn't have to spend as much as they originally thought on those beautiful airplanes, which can carry a main battle tank, by the way.

MacDonald: What do you need for operations in Canada?

Leslie: C-17s. People may say, "The Canadian Army is getting too focused on being expeditionary." Nonsense! Nonsense! As soon as we leave our camps for domestic operations, be it up North or wherever, we are on an expedition.

Let me tell you my personal story. When I was Commander of 1 Brigade, I got a call saying, "Andy, what are you doing this afternoon?" I said, "Nothing." "Good 'cause you and the entirety of your brigade are going to the south shore of Montréal to give a hand during the ice storm." "OK." So, while thousands of soldiers were sent on Air Canada flights to the south shore of Montréal, landing via Mirabel, it took

weeks for our equipment to get there because we didn't have any aircraft big enough to lift it. We actually ended up renting Antonovs from Ukraine. We're a G8 nation and we should be better than that – and now, with the C-17s, we *are* better than that.

MacDonald: And you can land a C-17 on a strip that won't take an Antonov.

Leslie: And there is no guarantee you can get Antonovs when you absolutely need them. You can rent them if it's months in advance and you know what's going on, but emergencies are another matter. So there we go. We've got our C-17s and they're working their butts off – bless them all. The new Hercules upgrade, the C-130J, will be able to carry more, farther. Heavy lift helicopters – the Chinooks – we currently have six in Afghanistan – are doing the job and doing it brilliantly. I was there less than a month ago and am very proud of them.

The vast majority of our needs are focused on the automotive industry, so the new government announcement will ensure that when these projects go forward there will be gainful employment for many tens of thousands of Canadian man-years of automotive expertise to help to either build, repair, reset, or upgrade the Army's equipment fleets.

MacDonald: It's interesting to realize we have an Army that has war experience again. And we'll see that impact cascading down the next twenty years.

Leslie: Those young men and women will, because of the demographics, rise through the ranks very rapidly, and they are bringing a focus and ability to understand hideously complicated issues. They have experience in making life and death decisions. They're proven under fire and they're going to change the CF more over the next five to ten years than any amount of staff-led transformation can do and it's already happening – Regular and Reserve. The Army field force and the training institutions that support it are just full of enthusiastic, aggressive, focused, really energetic young Canadians who act more like lions than lambs and, bless them all, it's the kind of Army you want. They're smart, they're studious, they're also very tough, and I submit to you we are the best small Army in the world.

MacDonald: Anything else you want to say?

Leslie: Just how proud I am of the Canadian Army.

Conceiving an Army for the 21st Century

by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael A. Rostek¹

“Without a destination, any road will get you there” - Lewis Carroll



Introduction

The future cannot be predicted. Indeed, uncertainty is a predominant characteristic of the 21st century global security environment, and defence establishments around the world continue to strive to understand and define how their

national security policies will fit within this paradigm. States' militaries routinely engage in forward planning for a variety of reasons that extend from defence procurement to recruitment and retention of personnel to assessment of emergent forms of warfare. Arguably, however, military planners seek to diminish uncertainty instead of learning to function within it. Such an approach carries risks. In fact, Colin Grey notes that, “[t]he challenge is to cope with uncertainty, not try and diminish it. That cannot be achieved readily. Such ill-fated attempts will place us on the road to ruin through the creation of unsound expectations.”²

Accordingly, one might sensibly ask that if the future cannot be predicted and uncertainty prevails, how do military planners prepare for the future? A vast amount of information exists today that can usefully offer guidance for understanding the future. However, making sense of that information and its military application can be difficult. While it would be wrong to proclaim that future conflict will look much like that occurring today ‘only more so,’ it would be equally wrong to predict that it will bear few of the hallmarks of conflict as we have known it.³ As such, a balanced yet proactive method of future analysis is required to stave off reactionary defence planning, which can be costly in both blood and treasure.

If military planners are to be proactive in future planning, utility may be found in futures methodology. Several futures research methods exist and greater rigour

is obtained when one or more methods are employed. This was the case for the Army 2040 project – an ongoing project that employs both Trend Impact Analysis and Futures Wheel methodologies. The former involves the extrapolation of historical trends into the future while the latter, through structured brainstorming, aims to derive second and third order interaction effects from those same trends. While this research does not claim to be prophetic, a careful study, using the methods described above, may highlight certain areas that could inform Army decisions today in order to meet expectations in the future. As Colin Grey explains, “We do not just discover the truth about future warfare as time passes. In addition, we construct the truth through the decisions we make.”⁴

The Process

The path to the future for the Army begins with a capabilities based development process. The condition of being capable is derived through fulfillment of specific human, scientific, doctrinal, infrastructural, environment, material and institutional conditions necessary for successful service; the ability to achieve an effect. In developing capabilities, a three step process is used:

1. Conceive – concepts are conceived and translated into capability requirements;
2. Design – selected capability requirements are translated into validated designs for future use; and
3. Build – validated designs for force capabilities are refined for use in the field.

While each step represents a unique set of challenges and outcomes, it is the conceive step that perhaps demands the greatest degree of abstract thinking. This step is mostly associated with horizon three (thirty years in the future) planning. Indeed, the individuals working in this realm can be considered futurists⁵ engaging in what is commonly referred to as foresight. This group within the Army – known as the Concepts Team – examines the future security environment and identifies areas requiring more focussed research, which in turn will lead to the identification of capabilities required to operate in the future. In turn, the team’s objective through its principle project Army 2040 is to propose alternative

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


Figure 1

Land Capability Development Continuum

concepts and technologies to achieve desired capabilities.

While several methods exist in the growing field of futures research, the Concepts Team employed Trend Impact Analysis and Futures Wheel in order to better understand the possible outcomes for the Army in the 2040 timeframe.

- Trend Impact Analysis (TIA) is a quantitative process that allows for an extrapolation of data into the future, where future events have little or no effect on the extrapolated trend. Indeed, the forces at play in history are assessed to be the same for the future. While this is acknowledged as a weakness of the method, it remains a useful starting point for examining the future. The Concepts Team focussed their TIA in eight areas deemed relevant to the Army in the 2040 time frame: science and technology, social, political, economic, international law, physical environment and security.
- The Futures Wheel is a simple way of organizing thoughts and questioning the future. It can be compared to what is more commonly referred to as structured brainstorming and is aligned closely with mind mapping, a similar futures methodology. It is a simple graphic organizer that allows for a representation of complex interrelationships between trends.

The use of TIA and the Futures Wheel methodologies allowed the Concepts Team to refine their thinking about the future environment in more concrete terms through focusing on the convergence of trends rather than simple extrapolation of a trend itself. The many trends discussed within the futures wheel resulted in key change drivers deemed significant for the Army in the 2040 time frame. The impact of demographics and the exponential growth of technology, amongst others, are illustrative of key change drivers that the Concept's Team considered most significant to the Army.

While a significant amount was learned from the development of the key change drivers, the next challenge became how to represent this knowledge in a useable form. An impact-uncertainty classification for each key change driver followed, which in turn provided the framework for the development of four alternative futures – logical, coherent, detailed, and internally consistent descriptions of plausible future operating environments. It is premature to release the results of the Army 2040 project here; however, results are on schedule to be promulgated early 2010.

Paradoxically, the Concepts Team fully expects that much of their analysis will not hit the mark. But it does not matter that it will not be perfect, as it is the process that is considered most important, not necessarily the end product. Indeed, Dwight D. Eisenhower highlighted this issue when he proclaimed: "In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable." Further, the Concepts Team fully expect that surprises (shocks) will occur. Military planners win when the effects of surprise do not inflict lethal damage.⁶ As shocks are often derived from known trends interacting in unexpected ways, the Concepts Team strive to provide analysis that will allow Army decision makers to get it right quickly to ensure their mitigation. It is commonly understood that the further we project into the future the less confident we can be in our analysis. However, it is also understood that without a path, "any" road will take you to the future.

Conclusion

The future cannot be predicted and uncertainty remains extant. Considerable effort has been aimed at reducing uncertainty but with varied results. Arguably, the increasing pace of change and resultant complexity of the world holds little promise for complete understanding. As such, organizations must learn to operate within uncertainty, and the Army will not be excluded from this necessity.

The Army has employed a Concepts Team in an attempt to better understand the distant future (2040). Through the use of Trend Impact Analysis and Futures Wheel, a small dedicated team is working towards providing information on key drivers, critical uncertainties, and alternative futures needed to allow Army decision makers to more effectively assess and act today in order to hedge against the future. If we accept the dictum that, “the future is not something that just happens . . . it is something we do, by the choices we make or avoid,” maintaining a small dedicated team investigating the distant future makes sense. While much of the research and conclusions may eventually prove inaccurate, the intention is not to get it fully right – indeed, this is an impossible undertaking. Rather, the underpinning

philosophy is to provide valuable insight enabling the Army to get it right when it matters. Here, Sir Michael Howard’s declaration is instructive:

I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.⁷

To restate, military planners succeed when the effects of surprise or shocks do not inflict lethal damage. As surprise comes from the unanticipated consequences of known trends interacting in unexpected ways, the Concepts Team attempts to provide analysis aimed at allowing military planners to get it right quickly when the time comes; in short, allowing for the swift adjustment needed to help mitigate inevitable surprises. It is commonly understood that the further we project our analysis into the future the less confident we are in our result. Yet it is equally true that without a path, “any” road will take you to the future.

(Endnotes)

- 1 This paper would not be possible without the fine work and assistance from LCol Brad Boswell, LCol Steve Larouche, LCol Ron Bell, Maj John Sheahan, Mr. Peter Gizewski, Mr. Regan Reshke, Mr. Neil Chuka, and Ms. Nancy Teeple.
- 2 Colin Grey, “The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War”, *Parameters*, Winter 2008-09: 15.
- 3 Colin Grey, *Another Bloody Century*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson: 2005): 21.
- 4 Colin Grey, *Another Bloody Century*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson: 2005): 39.
- 5 To study the future is to study potential change - not simply fads, but what is likely to make a systemic or fundamental difference over the next 10 to 25 years or more. Studying the future is not simply economic projections or sociological analysis or technological forecasting, but a multi-disciplinary examination of change in all major areas of life to find the interacting dynamics that are creating the next age. AC/UNU Millennium Project Futures Research Methodology – V2.0: 6.
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- 7 Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* 119, No.1 (March 1974): 7. ©

The Wars of the 21st Century and Stability Operations: the Economic Dimension

by Dr. Jack Treddenick

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US

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Department of Defense, or the US Government.

The Wars of the 21st Century

Today’s wars are different. By comparison with wars of recent centuries, they are longer and more drawn out. They are less intense and less destructive, at least on a global level, though they are often accompanied by localized but still devastating humanitarian catastrophes. At the same time,

these wars are globally more pervasive: in some way they continuously and indiscriminately affect the personal lives and security of almost everybody, no matter how remote they may be from the actual conflict. The geographical boundaries of these wars are nebulous, and the enemy is often a shadowy amalgam of groups of insurrectionists, terrorists and criminals, intensely motivated groups capable of exploiting power voids in weak and failing states



and at the same time taking advantage of the technological opportunities offered by globalization. So these are not wars of the strong against the strong, or even the strong against the weak, but rather the weak against the entire global system, and the global system has yet to win any significant victories.

But in these new wars even the concepts of winning and losing are being challenged. Thus the distinction between war and peace has almost ceased to have any meaning, at least where peace is seen as the ultimate outcome of successful combat operations. Rather it would now appear that successful combat operations are not the end but only the beginning of the main struggle, and that the best we can hope for is that military predominance will buy the international community sufficient time to help weak and failing states achieve a level of political stability and economic functionality that will ensure that their weakness no longer presents a threat to international stability. War has in effect become armed state-building.

The Problem: Failed States

The sources of these new wars are to be found in the existence of fragile, failing or even fully failed states, states which are ripe for insurrection and states which easily accommodate international criminal and terrorist elements – in short, states that invite violence and states that have the potential to export that violence to the rest of the world. As the sources of state failure are generally to be found in some toxic combination of failed economic development and weak or predatory state institutions, economic underdevelopment, which was formerly almost exclusively a humanitarian concern, has itself emerged as a major global security challenge. It is a complex challenge, one with a particularly complex dynamic: while poverty and weak institutions provide lush breeding grounds for conflict, conflict itself invariably leads to even more poverty and further undermines state institutions, ultimately creating a conflict trap, a vicious, downward spiral of poverty and violence that is difficult to stop.

Checking and reversing this vicious cycle has become the ultimate goal of stabilization and reconstruction missions. Not surprisingly, especially given the apparent increasing incidence of state failure and its implications for global stability, and given the international community's demonstrated though sometimes halting resolve to deal with such conflicts, stability operations have become the central issue in international strategic

interests. Economic reconstruction and development activities have become decisive elements in these operations, and it is increasingly accepted that it is in the outcome of those activities where the success or failure of a stability operation is ultimately determined.

The Economic Dimension

Our understanding of how to go about achieving economic development, particularly under the complex conditions of a post-conflict recovery operation, remains strikingly modest. Nonetheless, some progress has been made, and we can at least identify the broad strategic elements that make up the reconstruction and development process, even if we are not exactly sure how they actually fit together in any particular situation. With a minimum of detail, these are as follows:

Physical Security and Humanitarian Relief: the establishment of a sufficient level of public order to permit relief agencies to deliver crucial supplies and services.

Rehabilitation: the provision of immediate work opportunities, particularly to ex-combatants and displaced persons, and direct assistance to farmers.

Economic Reform: the creation of appropriate fiscal, monetary and regulatory frameworks that provide a predictable economic environment and legal structure within which economic growth can take place and which can provide trade and investment linkages to the wider global economy.

Reconstruction: the delivery of basic services, initially SWET projects (sewage, water, electricity, trash removal) and then ultimately more advanced infrastructure projects, particularly in transportation and communications.

Development: the preparation of the appropriate conditions for sustained growth.

Timing and Priorities

Listing the elements of economic reconstruction and development is one thing; it is quite another and far more difficult to know when and with what priority they should be applied, and indeed who should be doing the applying. Each of these five strategic elements will inevitably be incorporated into every operation, but their ordering and relative intensity will vary from operation to operation. Importantly, they will never be sequenced in some tidy consecutive order, but in fact will overlap considerably, which can indeed be an advantage since success in one element can reinforce success in others.

However, no matter how precisely we define what has to be done, the challenges of economic reconstruction and development in post-conflict situations are formidable. The surviving economy will have been hollowed out by the emigration of professionals and skilled workers, by the flight of capital and by the destruction of critical infrastructure. The weakening of institutions and effective governance will have led to a loss of fiscal integrity, macroeconomic control, perhaps hyperinflation and plummeting currencies and even the collapse of the money economy altogether. In these circumstances it is difficult to know where to begin, even as there is intense pressure to come up with early successes that will suggest normalcy and progress to the population, endorse government legitimacy and effectiveness, and impart some sense of momentum to the overall mission.

This pressure for early successes raises a number of dilemmas for stability operations. In the early stages, external actors are generally unfamiliar with the specific, often complex historical, economic and social conditions that characterize the area of conflict. They can thus have little knowledge of the actual needs of the population or of the true centres of power and leadership with whom they should cooperate in defining those needs. This can lead to unintended consequences in the longer term. In particular, it can clash with the essential principle of local ownership, undermining the ultimate goal of establishing government legitimacy and competency.

More insidiously, excessive focus on the short term can bleed resources and effort from longer term concerns. As a result, sustainable development may never really take off, and the host country may remain a prisoner of international charity or, worse, slip back into chaos and conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction is a complex, multidimensional effort that takes time and an inordinate amount of patience and perseverance. Serious external actors therefore have to commit for the long-haul; however, in reality they tend to do just the opposite, providing large amounts of support in the immediate aftermath of a conflict when the situation

commands massive world media attention and then allowing it to taper off as donor fatigue sets in and attention is diverted to other issues.

The Hurdles

In addition to the tricky issues of timing and priority there exist real physical obstacles to reconstruction and development activities. The most immediate economic challenge is invariably the ability of the host country to absorb and make effective use of assistance. In this respect, the availability of competent nationals is critical, especially at the beginning of the recovery process when the country is most vulnerable. Typically, though, not only are such individuals in scarce supply, but the emergent institutional structures in which they work are fragile and unfinished. At the same time, however, the sheer number of external actors involved in stability operations – including international organizations, national governments, militaries, donor agencies, private contractors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – can easily overwhelm the limited capacity of the host country.

Large numbers of diverse agencies bring both capacity and legitimacy to stability operations, but they also raise huge issues of coordination and efficient use of resources. With so many players operations can be easily confused by a myriad of often conflicting mandates, objectives and priorities, leading to duplication in some areas and an absence of effort in others. Ideally, then, some minimum level of coordination and communication is desirable, if only to clarify goals and capabilities, possibly opening the way to some rudimentary division of labour allowing greater impacts to be squeezed out of limited resources. Effective coordination of this sort is extremely difficult, and probably impossible to achieve. Many NGOs, for example, highly value their independence, refusing to be controlled and in many cases defending their impartiality by refusing to even associate with military or governmental development assistance organizations.

A related though more complicated problem concerns the appropriate level of host nation government to entrust with recovery projects. With regard to some elements, like the creation of fiscal and monetary structures, the case for national government responsibility is clear. However, at least at the beginning of stability operations, there is often the perception that the central government is incompetent, excessively bureaucratic, corrupt and predatory. At this stage, especially with regard to rehabilitation and infrastructure projects, locally directed efforts would seem to have more potential for success, particularly for those carried out at some distance from the national centre. Thus, local actors –

tribal elders, clan chieftains, even warlords – can be effective in establishing local stability. The dilemma is of course that empowering local actors compromises the central government's capacity and legitimacy, and thereby threatens the wider state-building agenda.

Economic change of any kind, especially of the kind typical of reconstruction efforts, is inevitably going to affect the distribution of economic and political power within the host country. It is therefore always contentious and will give rise to groups that oppose it, leading to delay and postponement, or perhaps even complete failure. Still other local actors will have direct interests in ensuring that economic reconstruction and development does indeed fail and that conflict persists. Young men, for example, particularly if they are uneducated and have little chance of alternative employment, can take up paid work as insurgents. To others, the chaos of ongoing conflict and the absence of effective governance provide favourable conditions for criminal activities, including black market operations, the diversion of aid, contract fraud, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans.

Can We Go Home Now?

While contributors to stability operations must be simultaneously focused on short-term successes and geared up for the long haul, they must also be prepared for their own disengagement. They must know when it is time to leave and to complete the transfer of authority to the host country. But what do we mean by success? The ultimate goal is to leave, at least eventually, and to do so leaving behind a state that is reasonably secure, stable, economically viable and increasingly integrated into the global economy. These are largely subjective criteria, and hence can be interpreted to suit one's purposes, but it might be generally agreed that they have been satisfied if, for example, conflict resurgence is increasingly unlikely, if there is clear local ownership of recovery activities, and if corruption and organized crime are seemingly in check. More comforting would be signs that private foreign investment has begun to flow in, that per capita GDP is near or approaching pre-conflict levels, and that the fruits of recovery are beginning to be shared by all sectors of society. ©

DND staff shortages imperil CF capital acquisitions

by Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn

Procurement and project management staff shortages imperil ADM (Materiel)'s capability to effectively deliver capital equipment and economic stimulus programmes in a timely and responsive fashion, thereby potentially jeopardizing modernization, equipment replacement, operational readiness, training, recruiting, and mission deployment. The Afghan mission termination date of 2011 is near at hand. Without a persuasive political and security justification to substantiate budgetary allocations, any funds not expended or committed may well be lost. A solution is offered below to address the staff shortage dilemma.

David Pugliese's article in the Ottawa Citizen on May 4, "Navy brass fret over staff shortage," publicly brought to light a severe and critical dilemma facing the Department of National Defence (DND), a problem which calls for immediate and effective resolution. The article quoted Vice-Admiral

Drew Robertson, then Chief of the Maritime Staff, as saying, "I remain concerned with the CF's [Canadian Forces] ability to provide [ADM (Materiel)] with the project management personnel to successfully deliver the maritime equipment program." Admiral Robertson also noted that, "the Navy will require about 400 additional military and civilian staff by 2011 for the new projects. 309 of those employees – most to be based in Ottawa – will be needed this year, but only 151 are in place."

In a piece for the *Toronto Star* on August 25, Allan Woods paints a most disturbing and accurate picture: "more than 32,000 military personnel – about half the entire Canadian Forces – will be training or set to deploy on missions in Kandahar, the Vancouver Olympics and next summer's [2010] G8 meeting in Huntsville [Ontario] between now and 2010 . . . [t]he defence department has labelled the problem 'Personnel Crunch 2010'."

The CF is being stretched beyond the breaking point. At the time of writing, DND and the CF are short 181 military and 270 civilian procurement and engineering personnel. They are recruiting 166 civilian procurement and

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engineering personnel and may potentially have to replace up to an additional 166 positions due to retirement. While there is no compulsory retirement age for civilians, this is not the case for the military.

While Admiral Robertson specifically addressed the Navy's conundrum and Allan Woods' *Toronto Star* article dealt with the Army and, more generally, the CF, the staffing crisis applies equally to the Air Force. In fact, it is the Army that is arguably the most adversely affected of the three services, not only in its modernization and readiness programmes but particularly in its operational, effectiveness and sustainability posture. How did this come about and what can be done about it?

"The Army equips the soldier while the other services man the equipment."

The Army has some 87 projects to manage. Air Force and Navy capital procurement programmes are generally of a mega dollar nature and hence fewer in number. Air Force and Navy equipment acquisitions are generally expensive and complex weapon platforms and systems whose timeline, from conception to entry into operational service, can now run to a distressing 15 years or more. The Army's acquisitions are generally more immediate. Colonel (Ret'd) Howard Marsh differentiates the services as: "Army acquisition differs from the other services in that the soldier is central to mission success. The Army equips the soldier while the other services man the equipment [weapon system platforms]."

The staff available within DND and the CF are being pulled in many and competing directions. The demands of the mission in Afghanistan are severely straining the available human resources. While deployments to Afghanistan more directly affect the Army, the Navy and Air Force are likewise impacted as they too have personnel in Afghanistan and need to fill in behind the Army wherever possible. This is compounding human resource availability, allocation and distribution; operational requirements, quite understandably, are trumping staff support assignments. Couple this with the number of military personnel who are training and preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, or who are returning from Afghanistan and must therefore be granted time to acclimatize before returning to duty in Canada, and it becomes clear that the staffing challenge is multiplied manifold.

Compulsory and voluntary retirement of qualified personnel, both military and civilian, is quickly depleting the pool of experienced procurement and project managers to a level whereby ADM (Materiel) is unable to fully address the challenges imposed by an accelerated

capital acquisition programme.

This is not to say that this dark situation is without a silver lining. The Government has adopted a realistic, responsible stance with respect to ensuring that Canadian military personnel are adequately equipped, provisioned and supported for deployment and operations in Afghanistan.

It must be understood that policy directs that the military mission in Afghanistan will terminate in 2011. This termination date will have a considerable impact on reset and post-Afghan planning. Without a persuasive and compelling strategic and political rationale to extend capital procurement milestones and programmes beyond the cessation of the Afghan deployment, any funds not expended or committed may well be redirected and hence lost. Such an outcome would be entirely untenable as not only has the Army to rebuild and modernize its capital stock, but so do the Air and Naval services which have had to delay their operationally critical equipment acquisition programmes due to factors such as the Afghan commitment. Not to re-equip will thrust the CF into a state of irrelevance. This would be a great detriment to Canada's national security and role as a relevant and influential player on the world stage. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is supposed to mitigate the demand for taking "peace dividends" from a withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, it remains to be seen if the policy of mitigating peace dividends lasts beyond a change in government.

Procurement is a multi-departmental responsibility and serves military, defence industry, and political (regional and national economic development) imperatives. Additionally, Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) has embarked on a rebuilding programme as many of its staff have retired and a substantial number of the replacement staff have been recently engaged. Like DND and the CF, PWGSC labours under a shortage of experienced staff. Couple these dynamics with evolving procurement policies and the length of time to introduce equipment requirements and the challenge takes on an entirely new, gargantuan, and compounding dimension. The dilemma of competitive versus sole source acquisition also comes into play. It can be rationally argued that in certain circumstances, for example the Afghan mission and for specific equipment procurement activities where the industrial base is limited and time is of the essence, sole sourcing is justified when and where operational requirements are urgent.

However, the purpose of this article is not to dwell on procurement policy and process. Rather, the issue at hand is how to resolve the staff shortages that impede the delivery of equipment to the CF, which is in desperate and immediate need of the tools with which to discharge its present and near-term operational objectives.

Potential solutions must take into account a number of factors. Firstly, the CF cannot achieve more by rebalancing its staff allocations. This is impossible considering its present and near-term tasks. Secondly, other collateral departments of government are similarly challenged and are unable to pick up the slack. Thirdly, a change in procurement policy will not address these issues in the timeframe that confronts DND and the CF. Any changes in procurement policy are too complex and involve too many constituencies to lend themselves to expeditious, responsive, mutually beneficial, decisive and universally acceptable solutions.

We are left with several proposals that merit consideration, such as re-instituting the Department of Defence Production (DDP), a restructuring of ADM (Material), recasting procurement policy and associated processes, a revamped HR management philosophy, and the “shared services” concept developed and now being implemented by IBM UK, PWC UK and the British Government. However, these do not lend themselves to expeditious implementation and are highly complex. No “one-size-fits-all” solution exists. A combination of some or all is required. Space does not permit a detailed examination of these solutions and may well be the subject of a future study.

However, one solution which comes immediately to mind, one which is both effective and expeditious given the 2011 Afghanistan withdrawal, is the engagement of retired military and civilian personnel.

There exists a vast and substantial body of retired military officers and civilians, be they formerly associated with DND, the CF, the DDP, and PWGSC or its predecessor the Department of Supply and Services, who possess the requisite experience, knowledge and qualifications and can be called upon to fill the ranks of the depleted procurement and project management positions now plaguing ADM (Material).

Dan Ross, ADM (Material), has made considerable progress in improving the procurement process in emphasizing and executing the merits of performance based procurement. Delivery times of equipment have decreased across the board. However, Mr. Ross appears to diminish the potential contributions that retired military and civilian personnel with procurement experience can make. In an interview with *Vanguard* this summer, Mr. Ross stated that in considering retired military officers for vacant procurement positions, “very few of them . . . [had] experience in managing large, complex projects.”⁶ This assertion is not entirely correct and understates the value of this pool of expertise and experience. Perhaps the retired personnel database is inadequate as to the information it contains or is not readily accessible.

A number of retired individuals, military and civilian, have also gone on to second careers in the private sector

where they have gained invaluable experience in and knowledge of providing major capital equipment and services to a broad spectrum of clients, including governments and defence ministries.

Polling of this body of individuals indicates that this approach is tenable and that they are willing and available. This cadre would be engaged on a temporary basis, one sufficient to get ADM (Material) over the two-year hump. They could be either of the CD Howe Dollar-A-Year Man variety or they can be engaged on an individual, contractual basis or become fixed or limited time employees of DND. The proposal does not suggest an engagement of professional services enterprises or consultants. This is “a clarion call to arms,” an appeal to members of professional persuasion, loyalty, and a strong sense of duty and “family.” This is not “pie-in-the-sky relativism” and wishful, dreamy thinking – it is realistic and doable. Allan Woods’ *Toronto Star* article states: “Already military officials are considering passing some signature work in Afghanistan . . . to civilian contractors or retired soldiers.” The concept is thus not without its proponents.

Personnel databases would have to be searched. Additionally, there is an extensive network of contacts in the Ottawa area that can be deployed to identify candidates. A principal requirement would be to create and establish an Office of Primary Interest within National Defence Headquarters to formulate objectives, policy, *modus operandi*, and a plan of execution.

Any changes in procurement policy are too complex and involve too many constituencies to lend themselves to expeditious, responsive, mutually beneficial, decisive and universally acceptable solutions.

In summary, the imminent termination of the Afghan military mission in 2011 entails that immediate action must be taken to redress the shortfall in procurement and project management which imperils ADM (Material)’s ability to execute and deliver equipment to the three services, particularly the Army. Failure to do so may well constitute the loss of the largesse of funding allocated by the Government to make the CF whole and to position it to successfully complete present and future equipment acquisitions and economic stimulus programmes. To proceed otherwise may also introduce gross inefficiencies and waste. Never in the last two to three decades have the CF and DND been so favoured and well funded to obtain and realize their requirements. It would be grossly irresponsible to sit idly by and do nothing or to embrace policies and programmes which may well be of no avail. This would jeopardize the CF’s acquisition

funding, modernization, operational readiness, effectiveness, training, recruiting, and mission deployment capability. The engagement, for a period of at least two years, of retired military and civilian personnel with the requisite background

and experience offers a potentially expeditious and effective solution. This is not a final and definitive solution, but it does get ADM (Materiel) over the acquisition hump. In addition, the evidence and analysis presented above are but constituent components of a much needed new White Paper.

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A Most Mis-Communicated War

by Cincinnatus

When young men and women lose their lives on a distant foreign battlefield, it is incumbent on a state to continually apprise its citizens for what purpose they do so, what they are fighting against, and what they are trying to accomplish. To not so justify the sacrifice of its youth rightly permits troubling doubts to arise, especially when the conflict is long and bloody, gains are difficult to measure, and there is no clear end in sight.

After 9/11, when it was clear beyond question that a repressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan gave sanctuary to its ideological fellow travelers with their murderous actions and intentions, the world could no longer turn a blind eye and allow such a state to exist; and so the world intervened. For most nations, the case against al Qaeda and its Taliban allies was convincing and persuasive.

For some, however, that mission was accomplished when the Taliban was removed from power. For others, our continued presence, and the subsequent international effort to rebuild the Afghan state was, and is, seen as a step beyond what we were capable of, outside the realm of the possible

and of why we went to Afghanistan.

Whilst the explicit task was to remove the Taliban regime and its al Qaeda brothers, it was implicit that the state would have to be rebuilt. We did not explain that very well.

In the Second World War the explicit task was to destroy the Axis regimes, but it was implicitly understood that Germany and Japan would need to be rebuilt politically and economically. To not have done so would have left both countries susceptible to the rise of totalitarianism, just as Nazism sprung from the ashes of the First World War. And thus, rebuilding Afghanistan is not mission creep: it is central to the notion of not having to do this again.

But without continual reminders and without a clear expression of principle, doubts sap our will. In the lexicon of those who question the very purpose of our presence, we demand that our leaders “acknowledge and address the legitimate needs and grievances of people that terrorists claim to represent,” as a senior US official recently said. The error in that notion is that the Taliban do not claim to represent anyone or anything except themselves.

And what, pray tell, are the Taliban's legitimate grievances, other than to grasp for power so that they can revert Afghanistan into some sort of medieval feudal theocratic state, that they might legally and with a perverted morality butcher all who oppose them in both thought and deed. Notwithstanding the fact that for all the faults of the present Afghan state, and of our own errors over the past eight years, the vast majority of Afghans are by any measure still petrified of a potential Taliban return and fearful of our premature departure before they can stand on their own two feet, economically, politically and militarily. That is, equally, why we are there.

But in the court of public opinion, we continually hold our actions, conduct and strategy to question and account, communicating our faults and errors with aplomb – and rightly so. Yet, that same standard of public accountability is not imposed on the Taliban, in the forlorn hope that they will negotiate and be part of an illusory political solution. This dream has come to dominate the public discussion simply because leaders have failed to communicate the reality; as Zieba Shorish-Shamley, an Afghan writer and activist, said, “show me a moderate Nazi, [and] I will show you a moderate Taliban.” The recent Afghan presidential election is crucial to our purpose and we must communicate that.

For all its imperfections, millions of Afghans participated in the election. They were presented with a

choice of futures and of who might best lead them there. And unlike in the West where a bad rainfall or snowfall is enough to dissuade citizens from voting, in Afghanistan they trudge miles to do so by foot at the threat of their very lives.


In contrast, the Taliban is only able to utter death threats and issue night letters, providing nothing even approximating a vision for the future. In doing so, and through their actions, they have violated their own supposed code of conduct issued by Mullah Omar less than a month ago: “Suicide attacks should only be used on high and important targets. The Mujahidin must do their best (utmost effort) to avoid civilian deaths, civilian injury and damage to civilian property. It is forbidden to disfigure people. Mujahidin should not collect donations from people forcibly.”

And yet, in every single attack that they have launched since its publication, they have violated every single tenet of their code. Their actions and deeds damn their words. In three attacks in Kabul, no high or important target was hit, but over 150 civilians were killed or injured, their livelihoods and property destroyed.

Thomas Jefferson once said that, “the tree of liberty needs to be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.” Our governments must explain simply and continually the agonizing truth of why the blood of both is shed. This is something they have not done very well at all, and in that sense, it is a most mis-communicated war. ©

Two Years Past Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point for Canada's Afghan Mission

by Dr. Lee Windsor



The intensity of the fighting that raged around Kandahar Province during the summer of 2006 took all Canadians by surprise and sparked intense political and public debate. It was then that Gregg Centre faculty at the University of New Brunswick began studying Canada's NATO mission in Afghanistan. The Centre took on the project

out of concern that the debate over the Kandahar mission, while necessary and constructive, was poorly informed.

Our plan was to write a case-study history of one Canadian tour of duty in Kandahar – one that would address many common questions and concerns Canadians were expressing. The tour selected was Task Force 1-07, which at the time was preparing to form Canada's 3rd rotation into Kandahar since taking responsibility for the province in 2005. The original goal was to write about this tour as a sample of 'any tour' to Kandahar. That included questioning how the development, diplomatic and military elements of Canada's mission function worked on the ground, how Canadian troops prepared for deployment and how the Canadian Forces evolved to meet the challenge of a growing wave of new combat veterans. Indeed, the originally planned title was “Kandahar Tour: Six Months of Canada's Afghan Mission.” However, once

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the research began it was soon evident that Roto 3 was much more than a typical six-month tour. Indeed, in the constantly evolving conditions of southern Afghanistan, no tour is typical.

Major Findings

Our findings suggest that Roto 3 was a major turning point in Kandahar province, if not Afghanistan as a whole. The first half of 2007 marked a transition from the heavy conventional fighting of 2006. Task Force 1-07 exploited the military victory and corresponding local prestige won by their predecessors. It was not that the problems of Kandahar were suddenly fixed and the insurgency defeated in 2007. But the year did open a dramatic increase in the scale of Canadian and international efforts to rebuild Kandahar into the legitimate agricultural engine and transportation hub that it once was. Likewise, the process of undermining the grip over Kandahar's people held by the Taliban/drug-trafficker alliance that had supplanted the traditional local tribal social-economic system in the previous twenty years began in earnest.

Our principle finding is that in the last weeks of 2006 and into the new year of 2007 the balance of Canada's mission to Kandahar fundamentally shifted so that the main effort did become short term aid, longer term development, diplomacy from the village to the international level, and governance reform. Some commentators suggest that combat operations, peacekeeping and especially international aid and development are incompatible and impossible to do, successfully that is, at the same time. Our study found that in 2007 all of those things were in fact happening in a very compatible and interdependent fashion, although not without being violently challenged by the Taliban.

A Continuation of Post-Cold War Stability Missions

Our study also challenges the view that Canada's Afghanistan mission is a hard turn away from Canada's peacekeeping legacy. In many ways efforts in Kandahar bear strong similarities with other peace and stability missions undertaken since 1992. Most of those 1990s missions were interventions in collapsed states where armed warring parties and criminal gangs sought to dominate the population for power and profit. In the Former Yugoslavia UN and then NATO troops had to use force, or demonstrate the will to, against armed groups thriving from the chaotic lawlessness that characterizes conflict ridden failed states in Europe, Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. On those missions security tasks went along with rebuilding local infrastructure, security forces and education facilities, all with local input and labour. These tasks are now central for Canada's Provincial

Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar.

Overall, Afghanistan looks more like the peace-building and failed state rescue missions of the 1990s than it does not. Yet, Afghanistan is also certainly different. The threat level from a wide variety of groups opposed to Afghanistan's return to a civil society in the international community of nations is much higher than previous missions, making the rate of casualties also higher. Fortunately or unfortunately, the UN and NATO decision to expand nation building activity to an impoverished southern Afghanistan collided with a Taliban resurgence powered by and harnessed to a lucrative drug trade that had completely taken over the southern economy.

Canada Takes Over in Kandahar

2006 was the year Canada and NATO began to get the measure of how massive a task rebuilding Kandahar was. It included undoing the damage of several years of uncoordinated reconstruction projects, often carried out without the consultation of Kandaharis or Afghan ministries in Kabul.

Therefore, in those early months in Kandahar no Canadian reconstruction effort was more important than local relationship building and consultation on which projects would best help villages to break out of poverty and drought.

The overwhelming number of requests from rural farmers was for assistance in rebuilding their centuries-old irrigation systems and secondary farm road networks. These two vital pieces of agricultural infrastructure were either destroyed by the Soviets in the 1980s or languished under a Taliban regime that had no public works interest or capacity in the 1990s. The result was increased dependence on opium as a cash crop that could produce high yields on small enough pieces of land and would be harvested and collected by the Taliban-drug trafficker armies at the farm gate. For the farmers to break free of this feudal servitude, they needed more water in more fields to return to traditional fruit and nut cash crops, as well as a road network to carry this heavier produce to markets and production facilities in Kandahar City.

Tragically, those consultations and the promise of a better future under a United Nations and NATO backed Afghan Government prompted a violent response in the high summer of 2006. The Taliban-drug trafficker alliance launched a wave of attacks to shut down aid and reconstruction efforts before they could start. Escalating violence and Taliban concentration of forces west of Kandahar City resulted in the large military showdown. The summer and early fall of 2006 was a time of conventional warfare, highlighted by the battles around Pashmul in August and September. By necessity, PRT efforts were sharply curtailed or focused on repairing what was destroyed in the heavy fighting.

Kandahar's Turning Point

In the aftermath of battle, the stage was set for a major transition. When Task Force 1-07 relieved 3-06 in February and March 2007, they had the full benefit of new assets added to the Canadian contingent a few months before. TF 1-07 trained in Canada to work with a squadron of tanks and a heavy engineer troop which would bring precision

fire and mine-clearing equipment to help in the battle against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). These assets gave the Canadians the option to go anywhere they chose, but to pick their battles carefully and greatly reduce the need to use artillery fire and air strikes when trouble called. Most importantly of all, the Canadian mentoring and liaison team working with 2nd Kandak, 1st Brigade of the 205th "Hero" Corps of the Afghan National Army in the fall of 2006 readied their protégés to the point that they could go 'outside the wire' for company-level operations in 2007.

All in all, during the winter lull in early 2007 the Canadian-Afghan task force doubled in size in a few short months. The force had much better mobility and could restart consultations with rural community leaders and carry on with helping Afghans rebuild irrigation canals, *wadis*, culverts and roads to make ready for spring planting. The lull in fighting was used to push patrols on foot and by vehicle deeper into the vital greenbelt along the Arghandab River, enabling PRT detachments to re-ignite the development work led by diplomat Glyn Berry, killed in action only a year prior.

Efforts to restore irrigation and secondary roads were blessed by winter snow and rain that approached normal levels for the first time in ten years. When it came time to plant, a plentiful water supply could flow through rebuilt canals, *wadis* and underground *karez* systems. This reconstruction was not completed with outside contractors or western military engineers, but by the people who knew best how to make this 1,000 year old system function – Kandaharis themselves. Money to hire them was supplied by a variety of international donors including the Canadian International Development Agency, all coordinated out of the PRT Headquarters. Positive developments aside, it remained to be



Foreign Service Officer Gavin Buchan and LCol Bob Chamberlain from Canada's PRT sit in a shura with then Governor Khalid and village elders in a rural Kandahar district.

seen what would happen when the poppy harvest ended in mid-May and the young men employed by the Taliban-drug trafficker armies were freed to rejoin the Taliban spring offensive. Ominous signs of the summer ahead grew during spring clashes with Taliban IED cells. That cat and mouse hunt brought heartbreaking losses on the 90th Anniversary of Canada's victory on Vimy Ridge. The 'fighting season' truly opened on 15 May in the heart of

Zharey District with a foiled Taliban ambush at Kolk. The fight intensified into June and carried through until TF 1-07 handed over to the Quebec-based soldiers of Task Force 3-08.

A number of promising differences distinguished this fighting season from the previous year's. Most importantly, the Taliban force that came to Kandahar was a fraction of the size it was in 2006. While casualties from Operation *Medusa* explain some of the numbers, it was apparent that many angry young men from Kandahar who had served as Taliban militia the year before now had other safer employment opportunities.

The nature and scale of fighting in the summer of 2007 was also different. Smaller numbers of Taliban were fought "the Afghan way," using dismounted small unit infantry tactics in the midst of Kandahar's rural villages, backed when needed by precision fires of tanks, snipers and observed artillery fire. As June turned to July, the Taliban repeatedly attempted to incite disproportionate Canadian-Afghan responses that would inflict civilian casualties, thus scoring them points in the information war. All such Taliban attempts were foiled. In fact, unlike the previous year when the people of Zhari-Panjwayi districts fled their homes before the fighting started, in 2007 Kandaharis stayed in their homes, trusting that the Canadians and their own soldiers would drive the Taliban out without harming them. As a result, local consultations and reconstruction work carried on right through the summer fighting season. So did the locally-led agricultural renewal process, producing a wide variety of bumper crops.

Kandahar Since 2007

The struggle for Kandahar was not yet won, but signs from 2007 indicated that the way to success was open.

Unfortunately while summer 2007 was a summer of hope, the past two years have seen some frustration. The Taliban-drug trafficker alliance changed their tactics, training more insurgents to operate more sophisticated IEDs. They seem to have determined that local consultation and reconstruction was the NATO-Afghan main effort, and that letting it continue could only result in strengthened support for the Afghan government. Widespread use of IEDs, targeted assassination of village elders and other terror tactics slowed the pace of rebuilding and led to continuing violent clashes that create fear, exhaustion and exasperation among Afghans. It remains to be seen how much more violence and intimidation Kandaharis and Afghans can take.

On the bright side, sustained Taliban-drug trafficker violence has not stopped the consultation and reconstruction process. The new influx of US 5th Striker Brigade in Kandahar and a Marine Brigade in Helmand this year may help defend the development process in Kandahar and spread it to other provinces. Ongoing international efforts to unify aid efforts and limit corruption are also bearing fruit. Whatever the outcome, 2009-2010 will be a decisive period for the people of Afghanistan. We remain guardedly optimistic about the future. Whatever the final outcome of the NATO mission our study of Task Force 1-07 revealed a story of an extraordinary group of men and women carrying out a noble mission in the service of their own nation and for Afghanistan. ©

Crisis Prevention: USAFRICOM, Partnerships, and the US Army

by Colonel Stephen J. Mariano and Major George L. Deuel

These views reflect those of the authors and not the United States Department of Defense or the Department of the Army.

Africa and US National Interests

Though US President Barack Obama has yet to produce his own National Security Strategy, his recent trip to Africa – and the travels of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – surely indicates that African peace and stability will feature prominently in his administration’s foreign and security policies. The prior administration, anticipating increased interest in Africa, established United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) as a Department of Defense (DOD) response to the “whole of government” approach. The command was designed to strengthen US security cooperation with African states and their militaries, although there has been concern that this approach would over-militarize US foreign policy. To be clear, USAFRICOM currently serves as the DOD lead and offers supports to government agencies and departments responsible for implementing US foreign policy in Africa.¹

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USAFRICOM operates in a dynamic and complex environment. The 54 continental and island nations of Africa encompass nearly 12 million square miles. Africa’s population is nearly one billion, boasting over 800 ethnic groups speaking 1,000 separate languages.² Opportunities for progress in Africa abound due to rising regional institutions, expanding economies, increasing democratization, and emerging security institutions. Perhaps most importantly, Africans have a growing political appetite to confront their challenges and are increasingly providing for their own security, thus reducing their reliance on outside assistance. Nevertheless, significant security challenges persist on the African landscape: illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, non-professional/irregular militaries, piracy, terrorism, extremism, ethnic strife, as well as under-governed areas all threaten African stability and security. Africans recognize the crucial link between security and development in creating the conditions that prevent conflict.

Not surprisingly, preventing conflict, promoting peace and providing stability is not something that the United States or DOD can do alone. “Security” in Africa extends beyond traditional military and defence sector terms, mandating a holistic approach that includes contributions from other security sector elements such as police forces, border patrol and customs agents, and their judicial equivalents, including



004 - Sgt. 1st Class Eddie King, a U.S. Army Africa operations NCO, works with soldiers from the Armed Forces of Liberia during range qualification as part of the U.S. State Department-led Liberia Security Sector Reform in April 2009.

Photo credit: Rick Scavetta, Writer/Editor U.S. Army Africa Public Affairs Office, Vicenza, Italy

jailers and judges. Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOD does not have special authority to train non-military forces. The US Department of State (DOS) leads all diplomatic efforts but relies on DOD to implement defence portions of its policy, such as Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training. The DOS also retains the lead for training international police forces and gendarmes for UN peacekeeping operations as part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and through venues like the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) channels US support to African states' indigenous development efforts, while the DOD helps develop the capacity of those African states' militaries. In turn, national militaries can complement USAID development efforts in areas ranging from crisis response to civil-military education.

Consequently, US military support assists African partners "by, with, and through" Ambassadors abroad and other agencies in the field, while remaining aligned with US foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, members of the military work with other nations, international organizations, and corporations whose interests in Africa are consistent with those of the US and who are engaged in both security and development issues.

USAFRICOM Mission

This synchronizing approach is reflected in the opening words of USAFRICOM's mission statement: "*in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through*

military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations *as directed* to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy." For doctrinaires, including a "how" in a military mission statement is taboo but USAFRICOM's architects believed that partnership was such a vital part of the mission that they elevated the "how" to a position of prominence, demonstrating that it is a listening and learning organization which supports the work of others.

Two other aspects of the mission statement are worth highlighting. USAFRICOM's commitment to "sustained security engagement" is vital because security assistance programs are implemented in a predictable, rather than an episodic, fashion. The command emphasizes the importance of reliability in its partnerships with African states and their militaries to ensure lasting added value to peace and stability.

Finally, two important words, "as directed," means that USAFRICOM stands ready to conduct military operations like any other US combatant command. While widely misunderstood, the ability to respond to crisis is a critical aspect of the mission. It provides reassurance that, should conflict prevention efforts fail and the president determines that US military action is warranted, USAFRICOM retains the ability to act decisively.

US Army Africa

According to US law (Title 10, US Code), each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) is required to have assigned service components. The service components provide administrative and logistic support to GCC headquarters. Additionally, they are tasked to prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of military operations in theatre.³ The service component commands assigned to USAFRICOM are: 17th Air Force (US Air Forces Africa), US Naval Forces Africa (the commander is dual-hatted as the Commander of Naval Forces Europe), Marine Forces Africa (the commander is dual-hatted as the Commander of Marine Forces Europe), Special Operations Command Africa, and Southern European Task Force (SETAF/US Army Africa).

Each of these service components conducts theatre security cooperation activities, provides support to on-going operations, and simultaneously carries out selected congressionally-mandated "Title 10" responsibilities for their service's forces in-theatre. In the case of US Army Africa, the command is tasked to perform these three functions while simultaneously deploying – *as directed* – a Combined Joint Task Force in support of a national, multinational or

international crisis response effort.

SETAF was selected as the Army Component for USAFRICOM in part because it has deployed to Africa for five major contingency operations as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) during the past fifteen years. Each mission was a successful joint or combined operation and SETAF earned the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its efforts.

DOD leaders have concluded that emergency deployments were not only institutionally expensive but also preventable. Five large scale deployments since 1994 to the African continent meant five interventions where US or international interests were threatened and five times that the US military exported stability to the African continent. In retrospect, if African states had the capacity to provide for their own security then the US and international community

establishing strategic relationships, and performing civil-military activities to foster conditions favourable to conflict prevention, with over 100 types of security cooperation activities to offer African partner countries every year. A few of the best examples that involve US Army Africa are described below.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA). With 22 participating countries, the ACOTA programme is managed and funded by DOS and implemented by DOD, and is designed to improve African partner nations' ability to respond quickly to crises by providing selected militaries with the training and equipment required to execute humanitarian or peace support operations. US Army officers and non-commissioned officers participate in ACOTA to enhance the capacities and capabilities of its African partner countries, regional institutions, and the continent's peacekeeping resources as a whole so that they can plan for, train, deploy, and sustain sufficient quantities of professionally competent soldiers to meet peacekeeping requirements with minimal non-African assistance.⁴

Military-to-Military (M2M) Engagement Program. M2M includes more than 250 scheduled engagements per year and is intended to foster relationships with African partners, illustrate the US-style military under civilian control, and encourage stability and military professionalism. These events include co-hosted conferences, familiarization visits by US military travelling contact teams, and African forces observing training exercises in the United States. These M2M activities are a mainstay of USAFRICOM's security cooperation programme – US Army Africa will conduct over 150 events in 2010. M2M can also complement other bilateral or multinational programmes as demonstrated by Canada's Military Training Assistance

Program (MTAP) in North America and Africa. MTAP provides language, staff/professional development and peace support operations training to more than 1,300 students annually from 68 member states, including 16 from Africa.⁵ M2M events promote more than force interoperability – they also develop relationships among leaders.

Partnership. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is unique to American security cooperation activities. As originally conceived, the SPP connects a US state's National Guard with an African country for training and relationship



UGCHJones - Capt. Charlie Jones, a U.S. Army Africa logistician, mentors Ugandan soldiers during an African Deployment Assistance Phased Team program in the fall of 2008.

Photo credit: Rick Scavetta, Writer/Editor U.S. Army Africa Public Affairs Office, Vicenza, Italy

would not have to respond to future crises. Ideally, less intrusive activities could be undertaken earlier to prevent these crises from becoming catastrophes.

Programmes to Prevent Crisis

USAFRICOM and its components conduct several programs to prevent crisis. The strategy includes three major categories of activities: building partner security capacity,

THE RECIPIENT OF THE VIMY AWARD

Warrant Officer William Kenneth MacDonald has been unanimously selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2009. The Award will be presented by the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, on Friday, 20 November, at a gala dinner at the LeBreton Gallery of the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa.

Warrant Officer MacDonald epitomizes the best of today's soldier and is a living example of one who puts service before self. On August 3, 2006, amidst chaos and under sustained and intense enemy fire in Afghanistan, the then Sergeant MacDonald selflessly and repeatedly exposed himself to great peril in order to assist his wounded comrades. He was awarded the Star of Military Valour for his actions.

The CDA Institute is dedicated to increasing public awareness of Canada's security situation and the vital role that is played by the Canadian Armed Forces in our society. The Institute is the sponsor of the Vimy Award. Since 1991, the Award recognizes one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

For more information please contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute by e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.

LE RÉCIPIENDAIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

L'Adjudant William Kenneth MacDonald a été choisi à l'unanimité comme récipiendaire du Prix Vimy 2009. Le prix lui sera remis par la très honorable Beverley McLachlin, La juge en chef du Canada, le vendredi 20 novembre, à l'occasion d'un dîner de gala qui aura lieu à la Galerie LeBreton du Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa.

L'Adjudant MacDonald est l'incarnation même du meilleur soldat d'aujourd'hui et il est un exemple vivant de quelqu'un pour qui le service passe avant lui-même. En Afghanistan, le 3 août 2006, dans le chaos et sous les tirs intenses et soutenus de l'ennemi, le sergent, à l'époque, MacDonald n'a pas hésité à s'exposer aux plus grands dangers, et ce, à maintes reprises, afin de venir en aide à ses camarades blessés. Il est le récipiendaire de l'Étoile de la vaillance militaire pour ses actes.

L'Institut de la CAD consacre son activité à sensibiliser le public à la situation du Canada en matière de sécurité et au rôle vital que jouent les Forces armées canadiennes dans notre société. L'Institut est le commanditaire du prix Vimy. Depuis 1991, le prix reconnaît un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Pour de plus amples informations veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense par courriel : pao@cda-cdai.ca; or téléphone (613) 236 9903.



building. Though the programme started with military-to-military contacts, SPP has since expanded to include military-to-civilian (e.g. military support to civil authorities) and even civilian-to-civilian (e.g. civilian university or hospital exchanges). Current pairings are: Botswana and North Carolina, Ghana and North Dakota, Morocco and Utah, Nigeria and California, Senegal and Vermont, South Africa and New York, Tunisia and Wyoming. Partnering with

existing regional training centers is another area poised for increased cooperation. As an example, British, Canadian and US military collaboration exists at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana but the multi-lateral partnerships could be formalized with the African Union and the African Standby Force Brigade of the Economic Community of West African States. Such relationships would increase the overall capacity of the brigade for use

in UN peacekeeping missions and serve as a model for the four other regional brigades. US Army Africa is currently exploring an adaptation of these two ideas by developing partner relationships among the five African Standby Force Brigades and select US Army National Guard brigades and training institutions.

Civil-Military Activities. USAFRICOM undertakes humanitarian assistance projects that support US and its host country's security and foreign policy interests, while promoting the specific operational readiness skills of the participating US forces. USAFRICOM and US Army Africa coordinate complementary military humanitarian efforts with other US government agencies. The DOS leads this initiative in concert with US Embassy personnel and USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, particularly when deployed in a JTF capacity. The bottom line is that the military will follow USAID's lead on development initiatives, whether in peacetime or in crisis. For example, US Army Africa conducts humanitarian assistance exercises such as the annual MEDFLAG exercise, designed to enhance military medical capabilities and interoperability. This year, the US Army Africa-led JTF exercise was conducted in Swaziland to enhance its disaster response capabilities.

Joint and Combined Exercises. USAFRICOM and its service components participate in several joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational) exercises with African and international partners annually. These exercises are the largest and most visible evidence of US Army engagement with African partners. Most are sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and fall into several categories: Disaster Preparedness, Crisis Response, Command and Control, Capacity Building, and Medical Training. In the past, exercises in Africa were disconnected with disparate US commands sponsoring exercises in North Africa, East

Africa and the island nations of the Indian Ocean. In the future, the CJCS exercise programme will be synchronized, geographically and functionally, by lining up ACOTA, M2M, Partnership, Civil-Military and other US security cooperation activities in Africa. *Natural Fire '10*, which will take place in Uganda, is US Army Africa's first major attempt at conducting a regionally oriented crisis response exercise with several African partners.

Conclusion

A healthy debate continues about USAFRICOM and the necessity for establishing a GCC in Africa.⁶ Developing Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force and Special Operations component commands has been less controversial. Despite recent criticism about USAFRICOM and its components, it is a unique command that breathes life into the "whole of government" approach in Africa. Not overly focused on traditional war-fighting capabilities, the mission emphasizes professionalism within African militaries so they can independently conduct peacekeeping operations; to paraphrase President Obama, "African solutions to African problems." Countries like Canada, Great Britain, and the United States can coordinate training and assistance efforts to strengthen African military capacity and capability. Helping professionalize African militaries does not always require a large force. In fact, the most effective engagement tools frequently tread lightly: skilled individuals, small advisory groups, and professional teams. Balancing a lighter touch with a robust assistance programme is the acme of skill for foreign and domestic policy makers, but capable, professional African forces will reduce the risk of conflict and the need for external security force assistance – a proposition upon which all constituencies can agree.

(Endnotes)

- 1 US Africa Command Public Affairs, "U.S. Africa Command," <http://www.afcom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>
- 2 USAFRICOM has 53 countries. Egypt is part of Africa but remains in the US Central Command Area of Responsibility.
- 3 US Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (November 13, 2003), 13
- 4 U.S. Department of State, "Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance," <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota>
- 5 *Directorate Military Training Assistance Programme (DMTAP) Home Page*, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/mtap-eng.html>
- 6 Edward Marks, "Why USAFRICOM," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 52 (1st quarter 2009): 148; Mary C. Yates, "U.S. Africa Command: Value Added," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 52 (1st quarter 2009): 152

Philosophy and the Military

by Manon Turgeon



Every day, Canadian military personnel working in or outside of Canada are confronted with dilemmas that force them to make difficult decisions. They must, among other things, analyze the orders they receive to ensure that they comply with Canadian laws and values. In order to do this, the men and women of the Canadian Forces (CF) must be able to exercise judgment and justify their decisions. These obligations are part of the Canadian population's requirements towards its soldiers.

It is false to believe that the Canadian military must obey without thinking. On the contrary, reflection, along with the ability to analyse and to evaluate, often under stressful and urgent circumstances, forms an integral part of the responsibilities of members of the Armed Forces.

Learning to Think

Because lack of understanding is often the source of intolerance, prejudices and hatred, philosophical reflection is vital for all CF members. In fact, the study of philosophy can promote tolerance, the search for objectivity, and impartiality. But more importantly, philosophy opposes pure and simple indoctrination; therefore, it enables Canadian military personnel to pledge allegiance to, and to defend, Canadian values in a voluntary and reflective manner.

The study of philosophy is the best way to develop the faculty of judgment. Furthermore, philosophy contributes to the development of the critical mind that all Canadian military members need in order to evaluate the behaviours and social systems with which they are confronted. Military personnel regularly question the information they receive, for their own lives and those of others depend on that reflection. The 21st century soldier often has a high level

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La philosophie et les militaires

par Manon Turgeon

L'auteure remercie le Dr Marc Imbeault, Directeur des Études permanentes au CMR de Saint-Jean, pour son aide précieuse lors de la rédaction de cet article.

Les militaires canadiens œuvrant au Canada ou à l'étranger sont confrontés quotidiennement à des dilemmes qui les forcent à prendre des décisions difficiles. Ils doivent, entre autres, analyser les ordres qu'ils reçoivent afin de s'assurer qu'ils sont conformes aux lois et aux valeurs canadiennes. Pour cela, ils doivent être capables d'exercer leur jugement et de justifier leurs décisions. Ces obligations font partie des exigences de la population canadienne envers ses soldats.

Il est faux de croire que les militaires canadiens doivent « obéir sans réfléchir ». Au contraire, la réflexion, la capacité d'analyser et d'évaluer, souvent dans des circonstances stressantes et urgentes, font partie intégrante des responsabilités des membres des Forces canadiennes (FC).

Apprendre à réfléchir

Puisque l'incompréhension est souvent la source de l'intolérance, des préjugés et de la haine, la réflexion philosophique est nécessaire à tous les membres des FC. C'est, en effet, par l'étude de la philosophie que l'on peut favoriser la tolérance, la recherche d'objectivité et l'impartialité. Mais la philosophie s'oppose surtout au pur et simple endoctrinement, de sorte qu'elle permet aux militaires canadiens de s'engager volontairement et de prêter allégeance aux valeurs canadiennes de manière réfléchie.

L'exercice de la philosophie est la meilleure façon de développer la faculté de juger. En ce sens, la philosophie contribue au développement de l'esprit critique nécessaire aux militaires canadiens pour évaluer les comportements et les systèmes sociaux auxquels ils sont confrontés. Les militaires se questionnent régulièrement au sujet des informations qu'ils reçoivent, car leur propre vie et celle des

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of education and knows how to evaluate strengths and weaknesses in reasoning. Philosophical education, in that context, is an essential prerequisite to modern soldiering.

The objectivity of judgement is crucial, because it is unacceptable for a military professional to make a decision based on personal interests or preferences, which may include, but are not limited to, issues of religion, gender, or sexual identity. By the same reasoning, we cannot, in this day and age, forbid a member of the CF to execute a certain task based on his or her own sexual orientation or gender. Military personnel, just like other Canadian citizens, cannot let their personal interests guide their actions. An education in philosophy helps the military understand this principle.

Military and Moral

The individuals who become members of the CF (at least, the majority of them) do so in order to defend Canadian principles and values, such as the right to education, health, freedom and life.

In a letter to her brother who is opposed to her deployment in Afghanistan, Catherine Déri,¹ a Logistics Officer in the CF, depicts in clear terms this commitment when she tells her brother that she respects the passion he demonstrates for his convictions. She encourages him to use his freedom of speech to communicate these principles, underlining the fact that this act of democracy is a cherished value for the Canadian population, a fundamental liberty that we wish for all individuals living in the countries where members of the CF are deployed to have. Déri notes that we all want to make a difference, each in our own way, and that in the end, both she and her brother want world peace.

Thus, philosophy can help develop an allegiance (rationally justified) to the CF's principles and obligations as well as to justice as we understand it in Canada. When understood in this way, philosophy is in fact the theoretical formulation of methods that allow individuals to reflect in the fairest and most impartial way. It is also understood as the vehicle of ideals and values that we want to promote in our society.

As a matter of fact, moral responsibilities imposed by the Statement of Defence Ethics require a capacity to analyse and to judge rationally that can be promoted by philosophical reflection. The Statement of Defence Ethics iterates the fundamental obligations and principles that guide

autres en dépendent. Les soldats du XXI^e siècle sont souvent très instruits et savent évaluer les forces et faiblesses des argumentations qu'on leur soumet. L'enseignement de la philosophie est, dans ce contexte, un pré-requis indispensable.

L'objectivité du jugement joue un rôle primordial puisqu'il est inacceptable qu'un militaire prenne des décisions en fonction de ses intérêts personnels, de ses goûts ou de ses préférences. Il n'est pas acceptable non plus qu'un membre des FC prenne des décisions uniquement en fonction de ses intérêts personnels, de sa religion, de son sexe ou de son identité sexuelle. On ne peut plus aujourd'hui interdire à un membre des FC d'accomplir une tâche parce qu'il est homosexuel ou parce que c'est une femme. Les militaires, pas plus que les autres citoyens canadiens, ne doivent laisser leurs intérêts particuliers guider leur action. La formation en philosophie contribue à faire comprendre ce principe au sein des FC.

Militaire et moral

Les individus qui deviennent membres des FC (du moins la majorité d'entre eux) s'engagent dans le but de défendre les principes et les valeurs des Canadiens, les droits fondamentaux à l'éducation, à la santé, à la liberté et à la vie.

Catherine Déri, officier de logistique au sein des FC, dans une lettre écrite à son frère qui s'oppose à son déploiement en Afghanistan, illustre bien cet engagement :

« Je respecte la passion que tu démontres pour tes convictions et je t'encourage à faire plein usage du principe de liberté d'expression pour les communiquer. Cet acte démocratique est une des valeurs chéries par la population canadienne. C'est une liberté fondamentale qu'on souhaite à tous les habitants des pays où les membres des Forces canadiennes sont déployés. »¹
« Nous voulons tous faire la différence à notre façon... dans le fond, nous rêvons tous les deux à la paix mondiale... »²

Ainsi, la philosophie peut aider à développer une allégeance (justifiée rationnellement) aux principes et obligations des FC ainsi qu'à la justice telle que nous la concevons au Canada. La philosophie, lorsqu'elle est ainsi comprise, est en fait la formulation théorique de méthodes susceptibles de permettre à tout individu de réfléchir de façon plus juste et plus impartiale. Elle est aussi comprise comme le véhicule des idéaux et des valeurs que nous voulons promouvoir dans la société.

En effet, les responsabilités morales imposées par l'Énoncé d'éthique de la Défense nationale exigent une capacité d'analyse et de jugement rationnel qui peut être favorisée par la réflexion philosophique. L'énoncé d'éthique de la Défense joue un rôle primordial puisqu'il représente les

all individuals working for the CF and for the Department of National Defence (DND):²

Principles: Respect the dignity of all persons; serve Canada before self; obey and support lawful authority.

Obligations: Integrity; loyalty; courage; honesty; fairness; responsibility.

This statement is part of a long tradition that goes back to the thinkers of virtue, such as Socrates, or of Justice, such as John Rawls, including thinkers who elaborated the principles of Just War theory. Interpreted in the light of that tradition, the Statement of Defence Ethics represents on its own an invaluable guide to reflection.

From a larger perspective, we could illustrate the importance of philosophy for military life using a convincing example from *The World of Epictetus: Reflections on Survival and Leadership*. In his text, James Bond Stockdale gives a testimony concerning the experience he lived when he was on mission, in 1965, in South Hanoi, Vietnam. He was then commandant and a pilot of the Air Wing 16 when his airplane crashed after being hit by enemy fire. He was then captured and imprisoned for the next seven and a half years. The Admiral explains in this article the importance of personal integrity for survival under imprisonment, isolation and constant torture. Attributing his own survival to his classical education as well as to his understanding of history, the Book of Job, and Epictetus' stoic philosophy, he believes that we must provide an education that will help individuals avoid moral weakness that inevitably leads to personal ruin: "Education should illuminate values, not bury them amongst the trivia . . . Integrity is one of those words which many people keep in that desk drawer labelled "too hard." It's not a topic for the dinner table or the cocktail party. You can't buy or sell it. When supported with education, a person's integrity can give him something to rely on when his perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when he's faced with hard choices of right or wrong. It's something to keep him on the right track, something to keep him afloat when he's drowning; if only for practical reasons, it is an attribute that should be kept at the very top of a young person's consciousness."³

Stockdale's story emphasizes the importance for everyone to understand moral philosophy. The message is fundamental when it comes to understanding how philosophy can influence and help the military to accomplish their task and to bring their mission to terms while keeping their integrity.

(continued p. 39)

obligations et les principes fondamentaux qui guident tous les individus travaillant pour les FC et pour le Ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN). Il vaut la peine de le reproduire ici :³

Principes : Respecter la dignité de toute personne; Servir le Canada avant soi-même; Obéir et appuyer l'autorité légale.

Obligations : Intégrité; Loyauté; Courage; Honnêteté; Équité; Responsabilité.

Cet énoncé s'inscrit dans une longue tradition qui remonte jusqu'aux penseurs de la vertu comme Socrate et de la justice comme John Rawls, en passant par ceux qui ont développé les principes de la théorie de la guerre juste. Interprété à la lumière de cette tradition, l'énoncé d'éthique représente à lui seul une source inestimable d'aide à la réflexion.

D'un point de vue plus global encore, nous pouvons illustrer l'importance de la philosophie dans la vie militaire à partir d'un cas probant. Dans son texte, *The World of Epictetus : Reflections on Survival and Leadership*, James Bond Stockdale⁴ témoigne de l'expérience qu'il a vécue lorsqu'il était en mission, en 1965, au sud d'Hanoi au Vietnam. Alors qu'il était commandant et pilote de l'Air Wing 16, son avion s'écrasa après avoir été touché par des tirs ennemis. Il fut capturé et emprisonné pendant sept ans et demi. L'amiral explique dans cet article l'importance de l'intégrité personnelle pour la survie dans des conditions d'emprisonnement, d'isolement et de constantes tortures. Il considère qu'il faut fournir une éducation qui aidera les individus à éviter la faiblesse morale qui inévitablement mène à la ruine personnelle. Il attribue sa propre survie à son éducation classique ainsi qu'à sa compréhension de l'histoire, du Livre de Job et de la philosophie stoïcienne d'Épictète. L'histoire de Stockdale met en évidence l'importance pour nous tous de la compréhension de la philosophie morale. Le message qu'il lance est primordial lorsqu'il s'agit de comprendre comment la philosophie peut influencer et aider les militaires à accomplir leur tâche et à mener à terme leur mission tout en restant intègres.

(voir p. 39)

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Conclusion

Stockdale's testimony shows the importance of teaching philosophy, not only for the Canadian military organization but also for any individual seeking means and tools to live better. Charles Oliviero,⁴ in an article published in the Canadian Military Journal in the spring of 2005, deplores the fact that philosophy does not have a more important place in the CF. Oliviero writes that in order for our future leaders to meet the requirements and responsibilities that will be demanded of them, they must have the necessary tools – tools that teaching and understanding philosophy can provide.

There is hope for a happy marriage between philosophy and the CF because the common core programme for students of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean includes three mandatory philosophy courses. As well, the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston offers other philosophy courses dedicated to political ideas and a psychology course, Leadership and Ethics, in which a large portion is devoted to philosophical ethics.

1 Boucher, D., Imbeault, M., Lepage, J.P., Moya, O., Paquin, J., Provencher, M., Rochon, S., Réponse à mon frère qui s'oppose à mon déploiement en Afghanistan, in *Philosophie 3, Éthique et Politique*, Beauchemin, Québec, 2008, p. 293.

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4 Oliviero, C., "Put away that calculator and pick up a book", in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2005. www.Journal.forces.ca/engraph/vol6/no1/PDF/13-ViewsOpinions2_e.pdf

Conclusion

Le témoignage de Stockdale démontre l'importance de l'enseignement de la philosophie, non seulement dans l'organisation militaire du Canada, mais pour tout individu désirant trouver des moyens et des outils pour mieux vivre. Charles Oliviero⁵, dans un article paru dans le *Journal militaire canadien* du printemps 2005, déplore le fait que la philosophie n'ait pas une place plus importante au sein des FC. D'après M. Oliviero, les futurs dirigeants et commandants doivent avoir les outils nécessaires afin de satisfaire aux exigences de leur poste et des responsabilités qui en découlent. Or, l'enseignement de la philosophie est nécessaire pour développer ces aptitudes.

Il y a espoir d'un mariage heureux entre la philosophie et les FC puisque le programme commun de tous les étudiants du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean inclut trois cours obligatoires de philosophie. Il y a, de plus, au Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston, d'autres cours de philosophie consacrés aux idées politiques, ainsi qu'un cours de psychologie intitulé Leadership et éthique où une large place est faite à l'éthique philosophique.

1 Boucher, D., Imbeault, M., Lepage, J.P., Moya, O., Paquin, J., Provencher, M., Rochon, S., Réponse à mon frère qui s'oppose à mon déploiement en Afghanistan, dans *Philosophie 3, Éthique et Politique*, Beauchemin, Québec, 2008, p. 293.

2 Idem, p. 295.

3 Programme d'éthique de la défense, Canada, Défense nationale, [En ligne], 2007. www.forces.gc.ca/ethics/index_f.asp

4 Stockdale, James Bond, *The World of Epictetus: Reflections on Survival and Leadership in War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, edited by Malham M. Wakin, 2nd edition, revised and updated, Boulder, Westview Press.

5 Oliviero, Charles, Put away that calculator and pick up a book, in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Printemps 2005, page 69. www.Journal.forces.ca/engraph/vol6/no1/PDF/13-ViewsOpinions2_e.pdf

HEROES PROGRAM

by Thomas S. Caldwell



Summer camps have traditionally provided a welcome respite for children and parents alike. The camping experience generally adds to a young person's sense of accomplishment and self esteem as skills such as canoeing, swimming, mountain biking and leadership are

gained or enhanced.

Most parents remark on how their children have matured, calmed down, or have even become more considerate as a result of being at camp. Children do become more responsible and generally less self absorbed as they learn to 'get along,' make their own decisions and defer to a counsellor only a few years their senior.

The camping experience is a great addition to any young person's life. In some cases, such as those young people in high tension family situations, difficult economic or social environments or single parent families, it is almost a lifesaving necessity.

Personally speaking, I grew up in a high tension environment (the word 'dysfunctional' had not yet been invented), yet within that difficult period and during those formative years there was one oasis of calm, encouragement and accomplishment. For one brief period in one summer, I joined a friend at a summer camp.

Although I could only go once, the impact of that experience stayed with me throughout my life. I came home a little bit more grown up and feeling a lot better about myself.

It was this mini-adventure and respite from stress that has motivated my associates and me to make it a charitable priority to send children to summer camps. We know we are changing lives.

When we at Caldwell Investment Management Ltd. and Caldwell Securities Ltd. originally began our camping programme, the children came from disadvantaged or difficult environments – often single parent families where typically their mothers also needed a break.

Over time, we took on the sponsorship of children through Prison Fellowship Canada. These young people have or have had a parent incarcerated. Statistics show that

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these children have a very high probability of imitating their offending parent. In partnering with Prison Fellowship, we are attempting to change their thinking and outlook through the adventures, accomplishments and friends provided through the camping experience.

We focus on faith based camps as many of these and other young people need a shifting of values and outlook – along with a need to forgive.

This brings us to the exciting initiative of the Heroes Camp Program through Muskoka Woods Sports Resort.

By the way of introduction, Muskoka Woods is a Christian youth resort located in Rosseau, Ontario. Muskoka Woods welcomes all young people to life changing experiences. Camp guests choose from water sports and athletics, media and arts, leadership and team building programmes. Muskoka Woods operates all year round on Lake Rosseau as a non-profit youth organization.

I was contacted in early 2008 by John McAuley, the President and CEO of Muskoka Woods. He shared his vision for the children of members of our Canadian Forces (CF) who were serving on overseas assignments. John was a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary during the difficult times in Northern Ireland, and knew firsthand about the stresses on both the individuals involved and their families. He was particularly sensitive to the needs of the affected children.

Similar stresses affect many of the children of our CF personnel, such as:

- Discipline issues with kids acting out of stress and having only one parent at home. Other anxiety driven issues include aggression, nightmares, domestic violence, depression and marital breakdown.
- Naturally occurring issues created by a single parent home.
- Constant worry, exacerbated when military personnel are killed or wounded and announced in the media.
- Highway of Heroes processions taking place are a time of great stress.
- Many children from remote locations in Canada find it difficult, as they may be the only military kid in their

class or school and lack a support network.

- Many of the affected youth require some form of anti-anxiety assistance.

Returning military personnel can also experience post-traumatic stress disorder. This greatly impacts spouses and children trying to regain a normal family life.

When John McAuley communicated his vision, I jumped at the opportunity to 'do something' for those who were doing so much for us. Clearly the challenge fit within our desire to provide young people with an exciting growth experience through camping.

Further, having been in New York City on September 11, 2001, I personally felt a debt to those now protecting us.

What is particularly significant and moving for both John and me was the fact that a past Muskoka Woods camper, Corporal Andrew Grenon, had paid the ultimate price in Afghanistan.

The opportunity to do something meaningful for our Forces and their children has been enthusiastically supported by all of our people at the Caldwell group of companies. The feeling is that while someone is taking care of our interests, we should take care of theirs.

Clearly, we cannot address all the needs arising from difficult and dangerous postings, but we can help to deal with

some of the challenges being faced by our military families. They too are paying a price on our behalf.

Behind my desk in our Toronto office I have a framed photograph of the first 2008 campers participating in the Heroes Program, on which each has signed their camp name. Seeing them relaxed and smiling is one of the most touching and meaningful images I personally have ever experienced.

In 2008, thirteen military youth were given an opportunity to enjoy a week at Muskoka Woods. The camp has received applications from families through five Military Family Resource Centres – Ottawa, Kingston, London, Borden and North Bay. The Heroes Program has been established for families that have at least one parent about to go on a mission, currently serving or returning from an overseas mission.

This year, the number is forty-two campers. We look forward to expanding this programme, and welcome other corporations and individuals to join us in this great initiative.

Donations can be sent to:

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20 Bamburgh Circle, Suite 200
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Une critique du livre

La guerre probable: Penser autrement

par Vincent Desportes

Une critique par le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Rémy Landry

Vincent Desportes. *La guerre probable: Penser autrement*. Paris : Economica, 2008, 202 p.


(English version: *Tomorrow's War*, Brookings Institution Press, 2009, \$28.00)

Saint-cyrien, issu de l'arme blindée/cavalerie, le général Vincent Desportes est aussi gradué de l'École Supérieure de Guerres de France et du War College de l'armée des États-Unis d'Amérique. Il est l'auteur de plusieurs textes

de doctrine et de stratégie militaire dont entre autres : *Comprendre la guerre* (2000), *L'Amérique en Armes* (2002), *Décider dans l'incertitude* (2004), et *Introduction à la Stratégie* (2007).

La guerre probable : penser autrement

« L'avenir est en nous-



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mêmes, dans nos capacités de compréhension et d'adaptation, il n'est pas ailleurs. Nous, responsables politiques et militaires, devons donc redonner son utilité à cette force indispensable aujourd'hui autant qu'hier; or, redonner son utilité à cette force, c'est comprendre la guerre probable et les formes qu'y prend l'efficacité politique.»

Le général Desportes nous présente un ouvrage pédagogique qui se veut à la fois un constat et une étude sur la nature des guerres probables, qui habiteront dorénavant l'espace international. Sa réflexion propose aussi une démarche stratégique très actualisée pour l'état-major français afin de contrer la nouvelle menace à la paix et à la sécurité de l'ordre international. L'auteur aborde sa thématique sous deux grandes parties :

La première, 'Le retour de l'Histoire' se veut avant tout un constat sur l'état actuel de la guerre, tout en rappelant que la puissance militaire a toujours un rôle légitime à jouer au sein de la communauté internationale.

L'auteurs'interrogesurlanaturedesnouveauxconflits qui assaillent la scène internationale depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide. Il le fait en tirant des leçons sur les guerres récentes et celles qui dominent toujours l'actualité. Il met à profit la stratégie dominante américaine, reconnaissant sa suprématie conventionnelle et technologique, tout en lui reprochant son manque de flexibilité. Il souligne, entre autres, les difficultés apparentes que cette formidable machine de guerre éprouve à contrer un adversaire, en apparence, beaucoup plus faible.

Le général Desportes nous rappelle aussi que la terminologie employée pour qualifier la nature de ces nouvelles guerres, telle qu'asymétrique, n'est en fait qu'une nouvelle description de réalités stratégiques historiques. En effet, Clausewitz, pour ne citer que lui, décrivait les stratégies de contournement, où tous bons stratèges cherchent, avant tout, à affronter son adversaire sur un terrain où il aurait une chance de le vaincre. D'ailleurs, le combat entre David et Goliath n'était-ce pas une forme de combat asymétrique?

Il fait état de l'héritage culturel de plus de 50 ans de Guerre Froide entre superpuissances et des fixations qu'elle a engendrées dans les quartiers généraux occidentaux; en ce qui concerne l'emploi massif de la technologie, la cueillette incessante d'information pour la prise de décision, et du besoin stratégique d'une vision de la victoire militaire.

Il prend un soin minutieux à décrire le nouvel adversaire, son intelligence, sa stratégie, et le champ de bataille qu'il privilégie, nous rappelant régulièrement que la victoire finale doit être avant tout politique, le militaire n'étant

qu'une composante d'une trilogie victorieuse. C'est un aspect que la Guerre Froide a fait oublier aux États occidentaux.

« Ainsi, il ne s'agit plus pour les armées ni de simplement « gagner la bataille » ni non plus à elles seules, de « gagner la paix » : il s'agit pour elles d'établir les conditions qui permettront l'établissement de la paix. Interrogé en juillet 2007 sur les conditions du succès en Irak, le général d'armée Petreaus, commandant en chef les forces de la Coalition, l'affirme clairement : « Le succès en Irak ne se définira pas en termes militaires, mais en termes politiques. Les actions militaires sont nécessaires mais non suffisantes pour assurer une stabilité politique à long terme. »

En deuxième partie, 'Les nouvelles conditions de l'efficacité militaire', le général Desportes nous présente une réflexion stratégique, toujours inscrite dans une démarche pédagogique, sur les conditions qu'il faut créer et les actions requises par le bras militaire pour contribuer à gagner la paix, et non la guerre, avec le politique et la population.

Ce n'est pas notre intention de résumer cette partie au risque de ne pas refléter l'ampleur de la démonstration de l'auteur. Nous chercherons plutôt à mettre en perspective les aspects novateurs qui la distinguent. En effet, le général Desportes sort des sentiers battus en nous proposant un traité sur la démarche stratégique qui devrait animer les états-majors afin de mieux cerner cette nouvelle réalité qu'est la guerre probable. Il exige de son lecteur un changement culturel aussi radical que celui que durent subir les armées impériales au XIX^e siècle avant de pouvoir infliger à Napoléon sa pire défaite lors de la « Bataille des Nations », de Leipzig en d'octobre 1813.

L'auteursuggèrepaspourautantqu'ilfautdélaisser l'aspect dit conventionnel des conflits interétatiques, mais simplement que l'effort principal doit être mis pour faire face auxguerresprobables.L'auteuravanceainsiquela préparation pour la pire option n'est plus une solution viable et qu'il faut chercher, dorénavant, à optimiser les ressources disponibles pour contrer différentes menaces, nécessitant des stratégies, des structures, des équipements et surtout des effectifs variés.

« Au contraire, la guerre revient en force sous de nouveaux visages tandis que la planète ne cesse de se réarmer. Céder à la tentation du retranchement serait un dangereux aveuglement ; la violence qui s'enfle et se répand n'est plus, en effet, arrêtée par les anciennes barrières. Très probablement, les

décennies à venir seront des temps difficiles de crises et de conflits. Nous devons donc nous préparer à la guerre, à la guerre probable, et adapter nos armées.»

« La guerre probable sera une succession d'événements où les décisions les plus importantes seront prises au niveau subalterne. »

Pour exemplifier ces besoins différents, il rappelle la présence de nouveaux joueurs sur le champ de bataille autrefois limité qu'aux militaires. En effet, en plus d'affronter un combattant aux allures et stratégies différentes, il faut gérer un environnement à l'intérieur duquel des populations entières sont prises en otages, où de nombreux intervenants humanitaires et politiques interagissent, et où l'omniprésence des médias influence tant l'appui de l'opération sur le terrain qu'à l'étranger, auprès des capitales des forces de la coalition internationale.

Mais, avant tout, le général Desportes nous rappelle que la guerre probable ne peut être gagnée par une bataille décisive, comme dans une dualité à la Clausewitz, car nous devons plutôt l'envisager dans une lutte triangulaire. En effet, l'enjeu est dorénavant l'appui des populations prises en otage.

« Il s'agit finalement moins, pour chacun des partis, de se combattre l'un contre l'autre que de lutter pour gagner le soutien de la masse de la population.

Cette nature triangulaire des guerres probables [...] explique pourquoi seules peuvent être efficaces des stratégies générales visant d'abord cette conquête du soutien et ne recherchant que comme un moyen pour une fin le silence des armes adverses. »

Ces propos ne nous rappellent-ils pas ceux récents d'un certain général McChrystal, commandant des forces de la FIAS en Afghanistan ?

En conclusion, le général Desportes ne fait pas qu'élaborer son concept de guerre probable, mais il décrit en détail la façon de s'y préparer, de la confronter et de la vaincre. Il le fait en proposant aux Forces armées occidentales, entre autres, un rôle subalterne qu'elles doivent retrouver face au politique, tout en demeurant un des intervenants incontournables pour un retour à un environnement étatique durable.

De plus, il nous propose une réflexion renouvelée de ce qu'est la guerre en ce début du XXI^e siècle, au moyen d'un texte des plus inspirants, qui nous rappelle ceux des grands stratèges qui marquèrent l'histoire militaire. En effet, ses propos nous forcent à regarder vers l'avant, tout en nous rappelant d'où nous venons.

J'ose espérer que ce livre deviendra sous peu un sujet d'étude et de débats dans nos Collèges d'état-major, afin de poursuivre la réflexion du général Desportes, sur ce que doivent devenir nos Forces armées afin de relever avec succès les défis politiques du XXI^e siècle. ©

Book Review

What the thunder said: reflections of a Canadian officer in Kandahar

by Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad. *What the thunder said: reflections of a Canadian officer in Kandahar*. Canadian Defence Academy Press, Dundurn Press (Kingston and Toronto), June 1, 2009, 240 pages, \$29.95.

Battles are decided by quartermasters before the first shot is fired.

- Erwin Rommel

The summer of 2006 in Kandahar, Afghanistan saw some of the most intense and ferocious operations conducted

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by the Canadian Forces (CF) in many decades. This was a critical tipping point in the international and Afghan mission to secure the heartland of the Taliban insurgency. In his monograph Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad explores the



lessons learnt, and relearned, by the CF in terms of logistics and war-fighting during its summer 2006 deployment. Conrad is a combat logistics officer in the CF and was commander of Canada's logistics battalion in Kandahar.

After giving a brief and readable accounting of the evolution of logistics in the Canadian military in the modern era, Conrad explores the major innovation in and challenge to Canadian logistics in Kandahar, which is that there is no clear front line or safe area from which troops can stage and store supplies. The entire Kandahar province is a contiguous battlefield, with small areas of secure bastions scattered about, and expanses of dangerous, Taliban-infested terrain in-between. There is no real distinction between a combat patrol and a resupply convoy in terms of the dangers faced: they all have to travel the same road, so to speak.

Further challenges abounded in summer 2006: Canadian LAV companies were based largely outside the wire, closer to the Afghan population; ammunition usage would often spike and supplies would become dangerously low; and repair and maintenance facilities would often be stretched to capacity by the intensity of the fighting. Throughout the account it is clear that the Kandahar deployment presented logistical challenges that could only be met by innovative thinking and rethinking lessons from past wars instead of by relying on any recent doctrine.

Underlining all this was, as the author emphasizes, the extremely small size of the logistics element of the

Kandahar task force, some 300 individuals. Conrad's personnel worked long and difficult hours in a dangerous theatre to keep Canadian troops supplied and equipment and vehicles maintained.

Conrad's effort offers a mix of writing styles. Often the monograph reads as a very personal memoir, with Conrad pithily describing fellow officers (for instance, a cigar-smoking Ian Hope) and the physical and emotional state of convoy personnel after an Improvised Explosive Device attack. However, awkward phrasing, repetition and colloquialisms often make it a frustrating read. Furthermore, the extremely personal recounting of events, doctrinal challenges and logistical difficulties can often make the perspective seem overly subjective. I often wished for a more systematic presentation of the material.

However, these minor difficulties should not detract from the book's unique value as a first-hand account by a Canadian officer in the extremely important 'back end' of the Kandahar mission. It highlights the importance of the logistics branch in the CF and its unfortunate neglect over time. It also brings home the important point that the notion of a clear "frontline" is outdated in a modern counter-insurgency, and that we should acknowledge the dangers faced by CF personnel and allied militaries in such operations. It should be mandatory reading for analysts of the Afghan mission, the Canadian military and personnel deploying to theatre. ©

Book Review

McMafia: A Journey Through The Global Criminal Underworld

by Misha Glenny

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Misha Glenny. *McMafia: A Journey Through The Global Criminal Underworld*. House of Anansi, January 19, 2009, Trade Paperback, 400 pages, \$19.95.

Correspondent for the BBC and *Guardian* Misha Glenny provides a fast paced and accessible introduction to the underworld of the post-communist and 21st century international economy. In *McMafia: A Journey Through The Global Underworld*, Glenny covers almost every conceivable type of illegal and grey economic activity – racketeering, narcotics, arms, financial fraud, cybercrime, human trafficking, prostitution – and introduces readers to colourful arms

dealers, drug producers and traffickers, corrupt government officials, Japanese *yakuza* members, pimps, Russian crime bosses, Indian gangsters, British Columbian cannabis growers, and law enforcement personnel. The narrative sprints all over the world, to the Balkans, Middle East, North and South America, Europe, South Asia, East Asia, and beyond.

Glenny's main strength is his ability to demonstrate that the global economic underworld emerges from socioeconomic factors such as a lack of economic

opportunity, weak states and governments, corruption, legal loopholes, the massive international gap in opportunity and wealth, wars and conflicts, and the insatiable demand for prostitution, drugs and cheap consumer goods. Glennly does not fall into the trap of labelling the global criminal economy as a unified network that is centrally-directed and is more nuanced in his analysis. The author differentiates between localized, regional and international crime networks, sketching for us distinguishing features such as the good or service being provided, the gaps and loopholes (geographic, economic, legal, etc.) being exploited, the interested parties, and the implications for regular life.

The writing also brings colourful facts, events and personalities to life in vivid and unsanitized prose, and Glennly has clearly gone above and beyond the call of duty in researching and putting himself in harm's way to illuminate pertinent details. Whether it's organized crime led by former boxers in Bulgaria or rival gangsters in Bombay, the reader is never bored.

McMafia's major weakness, however, is the sheer breadth of coverage and a lack of depth in the analysis. The writing is very much in the style of sensational journalism (not a bad thing *per se*), designed to shock and raise awareness. However, a reader will not learn much beyond a basic understanding of the structures, membership or *modus operandi* of various criminal underworlds. In addition, while Glennly does not have a particular national or ideological axe to grind – indeed, no economic or political system is immune to criticism – he comes close. His “root causes” of the evils of the underworld are, to varying degrees, the orthodoxy of deregulation in the global economy (led by the United States), a lack of regulation (whatever that means), the War on Drugs (once again, US-led), the insatiable demand for consumer

goods (wonderfully vague), and general poor treatment for those who come from poorer countries (more concrete). While each factor is valid, the manner in which he trots out these explanations – using them as target practice with little critical analysis – gives them a predictable and tacked-on feel. Indeed, Glennly's prose would have been strengthened by omitting such straw men. For instance, the narrative is already enhanced by the author *not* including the usually mandatory (and very boring) academic discussions of what constitutes “organized crime,” “underworld,” “criminal network” and so on. Glennly should have stuck to the journalism and left aside the perceived evils of global capitalism.

In terms of further reading material for the interested reader there is a useful annotated bibliography of major sources consulted at the back of the book. However, as the narrative is often exaggerated, a system of footnotes or references would have been useful for immediate corroboration. This is especially the case when it comes to facts, figures and references to events or publications.

In summary, Glennly's *McMafia* provides the average reader with a grand and comprehensive introduction to the global criminal underworld, replete with description and examples that are often deplorable. However, those looking for in-depth analysis or coherent policy options will be disappointed. But, then again, Glennly's aim is not to provide a dry accounting but a more personal tale of how the global criminal economy is intertwined with everyday life. And in this he succeeds. ©



Book Review

Seeds of Terror

by Gretchen Peters. *Seeds of Terror*

Reviewed by Dr. David Anido

Gretchen Peters. *Seeds of Terror*. New York: St. Martin's Press, May 2009. Hardcover, 320 pages. \$32.95

In *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda*, author Gretchen Peters identifies

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Afghanistan as a narco-state where terrorists work with impunity and use Pakistani ports for the transport of opium and heroin. It is estimated that Afghanistan produces ninety percent of the world's supply of these

drugs. The main thrust of *Seeds of Terror* is that criminals and terrorists easily cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and that “the nexus of smugglers and extremists present (sic) a critical security threat to Afghanistan and the West.”

Peters was motivated by a desire to find the facts about poppy cultivation and efforts to eradicate it in Afghanistan. Peters travelled to various places embedded with heavily armed escorts, but as her research progressed, she met privately with warlords and gained their confidence. She found that insurgents were less interested in capturing cities and towns as their tactics “shifted to protecting poppy fields and drug convoys.” Their first priority was “money not territory.”

Peters found that drugs were transported in dhows to ocean-going ships using satellite telephones to call terrorist cells. A trick known as the U-turn scheme saw Pashtun trucking companies transport neutral goods from Karachi to Afghanistan and then return “to the coast laden with hashish, heroin, and other contraband.” Also highlighted is the hypocrisy in the interpretation of Islamic law when it comes to drug production – the law forbids the use of drugs but not their cultivation. Terrorists have no compunction when selling opium or heroin to “infidels.”

In her chapter entitled the “narco-terror state,” the author writes that the Taliban had originally banned the growing of poppies, but later revoked the ban because they needed money. In 1996 Osama bin Laden flew to Afghanistan on the Afghan state’s Ariana Airlines with three million dollars of his own money to buy off warlords. That same year, “Afghanistan had produced a whopping 2,248 metric tons of opium.” By 1999 the tonnage was 4,581 metric tons. Under the Taliban regime Ariana’s passenger loads diminished and the airline became a cargo system for carrying drugs. The price of opium rose from a low of USD28 per kilo to a high of USD400. After the attacks of 9/11 a kilo cost US\$746.

Peters reiterates that drug smuggling is no longer a political force but “more a criminal syndicate.” A Taliban system called “salaam” was created whereby poor sharecroppers and farmers were provided with money to feed their families during the winter months. The salaam system was established on the understanding that their harvests would go to the traffickers who provided the money. The Taliban had instituted mobile labs where sites were numbered at about fifty.

Peters describes several interceptions of shipments that demonstrate the scale and reach of the trade. In one incident Pakistani authorities intercepted a camel convoy in the Baluchistan Desert where each camel carried “a ton of heroin and morphine base worth millions of dollars.” In the same year the New Zealand Air Force picked up a

couple of drug dhows on the Arabian Sea. They followed the two boats until the USS Philippine Sea intercepted the boats, finding “millions of dollars’ worth of heroin and amphetamines on board.” The US Navy discovered a shipment in 2003 that led to the uncovering of links to al Qaeda, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The author also addresses some of the organizations and personalities involved in the trade. She writes that the insurgent group with the “deepest reach” in the drug trade is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Iran, a country with one of the world’s highest opium addiction rates, strengthened border crossings to prevent drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan from entering the country, but corrupt Iranian officials let vehicles with “special plates” cross unhindered. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence was equally corrupt on drug shipments.

The author also tracked a kingpin in the drug trade by the name of Haji Juma Khan (HJK) for two years and ended up in one of his 200 houses, only to speak to one of his followers. The elusive HJK travelled with impunity in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, selling contraband to the Makran coast of the UAE. Iranian weapons were available to HJK which inflicted serious damage on NATO troops. In October 2008, HJK was lured to Jakarta from Dubai, ostensibly to secure a major drug deal, where the US Drug Enforcement Agency, assisted by Indonesian authorities, arrested him and transported him to New York City. His financial launderings in real estate and formal bank accounts gave Western intelligence agencies the ability to track patterns of how funds were used by the drug kingpins and their terrorist partners.

The United States regards Afghan President Hamid Karzai as “unwilling to assert strong leadership on the narcotics issue.” Moreover it is believed that his immediate family takes an active role in coordinating the drug trade. The author writes that, “[t]he best strategy against the Taliban is not to fight them but to make them irrelevant.” Her suggestions for an improved counternarcotics strategy are: “support regional peace; support regional trade; launch a proper counterinsurgency effort; blend counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts; target criminals, not farmers; create a farm support network; improve the public relations campaign; isolate and obstruct drug money; (provide) alternative livelihoods before eradication.”

This is a highly informative and well-researched book by an insightful journalist who uses her personal acumen, research knowledge and engagement to illuminate a crucial issue that has been on the strategic backburner for too long, and the story is far from over. ©



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