

Independent and Informed

# ON TRACK

Indépendant et Informé



The Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense

Winter/Hiver  
2009/10



## INSIDE

CANADIAN NAVAL CENTENNIAL  
1910-2010

THE DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR IRAN  
AND NORTH KOREA

AFGHANISTAN  
- OUR TROOPS AND THE CONFLICT

UNE MISSION POUR LES CANADIENS  
OU POUR LES AFGHANS?

## A L'INTÉRIEUR

KANDAHAR LESSONS IN  
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

DISINFORMATION IN A DIGITAL WORLD:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA



**DONOR PATRONS of the CDA INSTITUTE    DONATEUR PATRONS de l'INSTITUT de la CAD**

Mr. Keith P. Ambachtsheer  
Dr. John Scott Cowan  
Colonel The Hon. John Fraser  
The Hon. Colin Kenny  
Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Morrison  
Mr. David Scott  
Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers

Colonel (Ret'd) John Catto  
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) James S. Cox  
The Jackman Foundation  
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara  
Colonel (Ret'd) Gary H. Rice  
The Hon. Hugh D. Segal

**COMPANIONS of the CDA INSTITUTE    COMPAGNONS de l'INSTITUT de la CAD**

Admiral (Ret'd) John Anderson  
Mr. M. Corbett  
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire  
Colonel Blake Goldring  
Colonel (Ret'd) I. Isbester  
L3 Communications  
Colonel (Ret'd) D. Bruce McGibbon  
Colonel (Ret'd) Ben Shapiro  
Mr. Robert G. Tucker

Mr. Robert Booth  
Mr. John A. Eckersley  
Major-General (Ret'd) Peter Gartenburg  
Dr. J.L. Granatstein  
Mr. Jon Jennekens  
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George E.C. MacDonald  
Mr. Daniel Rodrique  
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Skutezky  
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Jack Vance

**OFFICER LEVEL DONORS to the CDA INSTITUTE    DONATEURS de l'INSTITUT de la CAD - NIVEAU d'OFFICIER**

Major-général (Ret) Clive J. Addy  
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile  
Colonel (Ret'd) David Burke  
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) L.W.F. Cuppens  
Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Roger Girouard  
Mr. Ted Itani  
Colonel (Ret'd) Charles R. Keple  
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Donald C. MacKenzie  
Lieutenant-Colonel Markus C. Martin  
Colonel (Ret'd) William McCullough  
Captain (N) (Ret'd) Charles M. Nicholson  
Major Angus V. Read  
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) David L. Stinson  
Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Lucien Villeneuve  
General (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers  
Mr. W. H. Young

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) J.A. Bélanger  
Breakout Educational Network  
Honourary Colonel James Burns  
General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain  
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Sheila Hellstrom  
The Hon. R.A. Jacobson  
Mr. Albert Kranenburg  
General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson  
The Hon. Dwight Mason  
Colonel (Ret'd) Conrad A. Namiesniowski  
The Hon. David Pratt  
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) T.H.M. Silva  
Major (Ret'd) Mirosław Szulc  
Lieutenant-Commander Arnold R. Westerbert  
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Yost  
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W.A.D. Yuill

# ON TRACK

VOLUME 14 NUMBER 4  
WINTER / HIVER 2009 / 10

## PRESIDENT / PRÉSIDENT

Dr. John Scott Cowan, BSc, MSc, PhD

## VICE PRESIDENT / VICE PRÉSIDENT

General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain, OC, CMM, CD

## EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR / DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

## SECRETARY-TREASURER / SECRÉTAIRE TRÉSORIER

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gordon D. Metcalfe, CD

## HONOURARY COUNSEL / AVOCAT-CONSEIL HONORAIRE

Mr. Gavin Freitag

## PUBLIC AFFAIRS / RELATIONS PUBLIQUES

Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg, CD

## PROJECT OFFICER / AGENTE DE PROJET

Ms. Natalie Ratcliffe, MA

## DEFENCE POLICY ANALYST / ANALYSTE DES POLITIQUES DE DÉFENSE

Mr. Arnav Manchanda, MA

Conference of Defence Associations Institute  
222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B  
Ottawa ON K2P 2G3

## PHONE / TÉLÉPHONE

(613) 236 9903

**e-mail / courriel:** pao@cda-cdai.ca

**website / site web:** www.cda-cdai.ca

*ON TRACK* is published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute). The views expressed in *ON TRACK* are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute. The publication of *ON TRACK* was made possible in part through a grant from the Department of National Defence.

*ON TRACK* est publié par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (l'Institut de la CAD). Les points de vues exprimés dans *ON TRACK* reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'Institut de la CAD. La publication de *ON TRACK* est rendue possible en partie grâce à une subvention du Ministère de la Défense nationale.

Copyright © 2009. ISSN 1916-6699 *ON TRACK* (Print) (imprimé)

Copyright © 2009. ISSN 1916-6702 *ON TRACK* (Online) (en ligne)

**COVER PHOTO:** Sea King helicopter delivers cargo to HMCS Algonquin during Exercise "Rimpac 96". **CF photo**  
**PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE:** L'hélicoptère Sea King livre de la cargaison pendant l'exercice "Rimpac 96". **Photo FC**



<b>FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.....</b>	<b>4</b>
Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin	
<b>LE MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL.....</b>	<b>4</b>
Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin	
<b>CANADA'S NAVY TODAY AND TOMORROW.....</b>	<b>12</b>
Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden	
<b>CANADIAN NAVAL CENTENNIAL 1910-2010.....</b>	<b>16</b>
Master Corporal Rob McKinnon	
<b>OUR CANADIAN FORCES.....</b>	<b>17</b>
The Hon. Peter MacKay	
<b>ADDRESS - THE VIMY AWARD.....</b>	<b>20</b>
Warrant Officer William MacDonald	
<b>AFGHANISTAN: THE RETURN OF HISTORY?.....</b>	<b>21</b>
Louis Delvoie	
<b>AFGHANISTAN - OUR TROOPS AND THE CONFLICT.....</b>	<b>23</b>
Thomas Caldwell	
<b>UNE MISSION POUR LES CANADIENS OU POUR LES AFGHANS?...26</b>	
Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Rémi Landry	
<b>IMPRESSIONS OF AFGHANISTAN.....</b>	<b>30</b>
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald	
<b>THE 2009 TOUR OF TRANSATLANTIC OPINION LEADERS TO AFGHANISTAN.....</b>	<b>33</b>
Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald	
<b>FROM MENTORING TO PARTNERING: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AFGHAN ARMY-BUILDING.....</b>	<b>35</b>
Captain G. Bruce Rolston	
<b>KANDAHAR LESSONS IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION.....</b>	<b>37</b>
Dr. Kimberly Marten	
<b>THE DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR IRAN AND NORTH KOREA.....</b>	<b>40</b>
Sharon Squassoni	
<b>DISINFORMATION IN A DIGITAL WORLD: IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA AND ITS DEFENCE POLICY.....</b>	<b>42</b>
Colonel (Ret'd) Sean Henry	
<b>12<sup>th</sup> ANNUAL CDA INSTITUTE GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM...44</b>	
Natalie Ratcliffe	
<b>Book Reviews</b>	
<i>A Soldier First.....</i>	<b>45</b>
<i>War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.....</i>	<b>46</b>
<i>The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power.....</i>	<b>48</b>

Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from *ON TRACK*. A credit line is desired. For inquiries contact the Public Affairs Officer, Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg, CD, at: (tel) (613) 236 9903; (fax) (613) 236 8191; (e-mail) pao@cda-cdai.ca. Permission est accordée de reproduire en tout ou en partie des articles de *ON TRACK*. Nous souhaitons que la source soit mentionnée. Pour demander des renseignements, contactez l'agent des affaires publiques, le Capitaine (ret.) Peter Forsberg, CD au (tél) 613-236-9903; (fax) 613-236-8191; (courriel) pao@cda-cdai.ca

## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

## MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

At the CDA Institute we are working hard to find policy solutions to the many defence challenges that Canada faces. Since 1987 we have been examining a variety of defence and security issues of concern to Canadians.

The CDA Institute promotes informed public debate on national security and defence issues through what has become Canada's largest annual defence seminar. The annual graduate student symposium, presented by the CDA Institute, brings together the brightest young minds from across the country and abroad to present informed, post-graduate discussion on defence matters. The CDA Institute also hosts round table discussions on defence and security-related topics from subject matter experts, military, academic, diplomatic, and governmental. Some 20 round table discussions were held in 2009.

We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policy-makers, politicians, academics and the public, we promote change in the policies of our Federal government for the betterment of our country. One product of our research work is the Vimy Paper series, the latest of which, Vimy Paper 4 (2009): *The Strategic Impact of Energy Dependency / L'impact stratégique de la dépendance énergétique*, was released this past autumn.

*ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute's quarterly journal publication provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters of importance to Canada's interests. The CDA Institute publishes credible and informed research as well as opinion which will provide Canadians with insight to the concerns of the defence community.

This winter edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of naval affairs, Ministerial views, the Vimy Award recipient's address, weapons of mass destruction, Afghanistan, defence myths, and book reviews.

The CDA Institute is proud to salute the Canadian Navy's century of service to Canada with the front cover of this edition of *ON TRACK*. 2010 will be the year of the Canadian Navy's Centennial. The CDA Institute is pleased to mark the occasion, beginning with two articles in this edition of *ON TRACK*: one from the Commander Maritime Command,



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

À l'Institut de la CAD, nous travaillons fort à chercher, sous la forme de politiques, des solutions aux nombreux défis auxquels le Canada fait face en matière de défense. Depuis 1987, nous avons examiné une variété de questions de défense et de sécurité qui préoccupent les Canadiens.

L'Institut de la CAD fait la promotion d'un débat informé sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale par le truchement de ce qui est devenu le plus important séminaire annuel de la défense au Canada. Le symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, présenté par l'Institut

de la CAD, réunit les plus brillants jeunes esprits du pays et de l'étranger pour présenter une discussion informée, au niveau des études supérieures, sur des questions de défense. L'Institut de la CAD est également l'hôte de discussions en table ronde sur des sujets reliés à la défense et à la sécurité de la part d'experts en la matière provenant des milieux militaires, universitaires, diplomatiques et gouvernementaux. En 2009, quelque 20 discussions en tables rondes ont été tenues.

Nous croyons que des politiques de défense et de sécurité efficaces doivent être fondées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et reposer sur des options raisonnables en matière de politiques. En partageant les résultats de notre recherche et nos recommandations avec les auteurs de politiques, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous faisons la promotion du changement dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour le mieux-être de notre pays. Un des produits de notre travail de recherche est la série des Cahiers Vimy dont le dernier, le Cahier Vimy 4 (2009), intitulé *The Strategic Impact of Energy Dependency / L'impact stratégique de la dépendance énergétique*, a été publié l'automne dernier.

*ON TRACK*, la revue que publie trimestriellement l'Institut de la CAD, offre un débat informé et non partisan sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui ont de l'importance pour les intérêts du Canada. L'Institut de la CAD publie une recherche crédible et informée et forme une opinion qui fera mieux comprendre aux Canadiens quelles sont les préoccupations des milieux de la défense.

Ce numéro d'hiver de *ON TRACK* présente des articles d'intérêt actuel dans les domaines des affaires navales, d'un point de vue ministériel, l'adresse du récipiendaire du prix Vimy, traite des armes de destruction massive, de l'Afghanistan, des mythes de la défense et offre des comptes rendus de livres.

L'Institut de la CAD est fier de saluer le centenaire de service rendu au Canada par la Marine canadienne avec la page couverture de ce numéro de *ON TRACK*. 2010 sera l'année du centenaire de la Marine canadienne. L'Institut de la CAD a le plaisir de souligner l'occasion, à commencer par deux articles paraissant dans le présent numéro : l'un du Commandant du Commandement Maritime, le Vice-amiral



Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden, and the other, *Canadian Naval Centennial 1910-2010*, by Master Corporal Rob McKinnon, who is currently working for the Canadian Naval Centennial Project as a Public Affairs NCO. In *Canada's Navy Today and Tomorrow*, Vice-Admiral McFadden outlines the challenges that the Navy is facing following the government's announcement, last year, of the *Canada First* Defence Strategy. Master Corporal McKinnon describes some of the many activities that will celebrate the Navy's celebration of its Centennial, with the theme Bring the Navy to Canadians, in *Canadian Naval Centennial 1910-2010*.

We are pleased to present for our readers *Our Canadian Forces*, a tribute to the accomplishments at home and abroad of the members of the Canadian Forces (CF), by the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. Mr. MacKay outlines the goals the Federal government has set for the CF.

The CDA Institute was honoured, in November, when the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, presented the Vimy Award on behalf of the CDA Institute to Warrant Officer William Kenneth MacDonald. The presentation was made at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum. With his acceptance of the Award Warrant Officer MacDonald addressed the guests at the dinner. We are pleased to include the text of his address in *ON TRACK*.

In *Afghanistan: The Return of History?*, Louis Delvoie provides us with a review of two reform movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century that were attempted in Afghanistan and provides a view on the balance that the Coalition Forces in that theatre might consider for their prime mission. Monsieur Delvoie is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan. He is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.

Seven defence stakeholders, including the Executive Director and representatives of the CDA Institute and the Board of Directors, were privileged recently to visit Afghanistan. Their impressions of their visit provide our readers with informative, critical assessments of developments that are not often reported in the regular media.

In *Afghanistan – Our Troops and the Conflict*, Thomas Caldwell provides us with his impressions of what he witnessed during his tour of the Kabul and Kandahar regions of Afghanistan. He points out, for example, the positive impact the Canadian project to develop the Dahla Dam will have on the country. Mr. Caldwell is a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors. He is Chairman of Caldwell Securities Ltd.

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Rémi Landry also toured the Afghan theatre of operations. He outlines, in *Une mission pour les Canadiens ou pour les Afghans?*, the impact that the Canadian mission is having on the land and provides an assessment of the proposed end of Canada's current mission in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-colonel (Ret'd) Landry is associate researcher at the Research Group in International Security, University of Montréal.

P. Dean McFadden, et l'autre, *Canadian Naval Centennial 1910-2010*, du Caporal-Chef Rob McKinnon qui travaille présentement pour le projet du Centenaire de la Marine canadienne comme sous-officier aux Affaires publiques. Dans *Canada's Navy Today and Tomorrow*, le Vice-Amiral McFadden décrit les défis qu'affronte la Marine suite à l'annonce faite par le gouvernement, l'an passé, de la stratégie de défense *Le Canada d'abord*. Caporal-Chef McKinnon décrit quelques-unes des nombreuses activités qui souligneront les célébrations du centenaire de la Marine, avec le thème Faire connaître la Marine aux Canadiens et Canadiennes, dans l'article *Canadian Naval Centennial 1910-2010*.

Nous sommes heureux de présenter à nos lecteurs *Our Canadian Forces*, un tribut rendu par l'Honorable Peter MacKay aux réalisations, au pays et à l'étranger, des membres des Forces canadiennes (FC). Le Ministre de la Défense nationale MacKay décrit les buts fixés par le gouvernement fédéral pour les FC.

L'Institut de la CAD a été honoré, en novembre, par la présentation que la Très honorable Beverley McLachlin, Juge en chef du Canada, a faite du prix Vimy, remis au nom de l'Institut de la CAD à l'Adjudant William Kenneth MacDonald. La présentation a été faite lors d'un dîner officiel tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre. Avec son acceptation, l'Adjudant MacDonald s'est adressé aux invités du dîner. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure le texte de son adresse dans *ON TRACK*.

Dans *Afghanistan: The Return of History?*, Louis Delvoie nous offre un examen de deux mouvements de réforme qui ont été tentés en Afghanistan au 20<sup>e</sup> siècle et donne un aperçu de l'équilibre que les Forces de coalition dans ce théâtre pourraient considérer comme leur mission première. Monsieur Delvoie est un ancien Haut-Commissaire au Pakistan. Il est agrégé supérieur de recherche au Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's.

Sept personnes intéressées aux questions de défense, dont le directeur général et des représentants de l'Institut de la CAD et du conseil d'administration, ont récemment eu le privilège de visiter l'Afghanistan. Les impressions de leur visite donnent à nos lecteurs une évaluation critique instructive de développements qui ne sont pas souvent rapportés dans les médias réguliers.

Dans *Afghanistan – Our Troops and the Conflict*, Thomas Caldwell nous livre ses impressions de ce dont il a été témoin pendant sa tournée des régions de Kabul et de Kandahar, en Afghanistan. Il souligne, par exemple, l'impact positif que le projet canadien de développement du réservoir de Dahla aura sur le pays. M. Caldwell est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD. Il est président de Caldwell Securities Ltd.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel (Retraité) Rémi Landry a aussi fait une visite du théâtre des opérations afghan. Il décrit, dans *Une mission pour les Canadiens ou pour les Afghans?*, l'impact que la mission canadienne a sur le pays et propose une évaluation de la fin proposée de la mission canadienne actuelle en Afghanistan. Le Lieutenant-Colonel (Retraité) Landry est associé de recherche au Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale de l'Université de Montréal.





*Previous recipients of the Vimy Award with Dr John Scott Cowan, President of the CDA Institute. L-R: Major-General David Fraser (2006), General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain (1992), Dr John Scott Cowan, Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie (1993), General (Ret'd) Paul Manson (2003), Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Charles H. Belzile (1999), Honorary Colonel, the Hon. John Fraser (2002), and Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray (1998).*

*Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe*

*Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy avec M. John Scott Cowan, Président de l'Institut de la CAD. G-D: le Major-général David Fraser (2006), le Général (Ret) John de Chastelain (1992), M. John Scott Cowan, le Major-général (Ret) Lewis MacKenzie (1993), le Général (Ret) Paul Manson ((2003), le Lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile (1999), le Colonel honoraire, l'Hon. John Fraser (2002), et le Vice-amiral (Ret) Larry Murray (1998).*


*Photo par le lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gord Metcalfe*

In *Impressions of Afghanistan*, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald reports on the changes in the lives of the Afghan citizens. He notes that Afghanistan is a country fighting for its survival but that progress on many fronts from a 'ground zero' start in 2002 is dramatic. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Macdonald provides us with a few encouraging examples of the progress being made to enable stability to come to that war-ravaged country. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Macdonald is a former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff and is the Honorary National President of the Air Force Association of Canada.

CDA's Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, participated in the Transatlantic Opinion Leaders Tour to Afghanistan at the invitation of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. The tour included eight days of briefings by senior Afghan leaders in government and the military and senior members of ISAF, NATO, other senior European

Dans *Impressions of Afghanistan*, le Lieutenant-Général (Retraité) George Macdonald fait état des changements survenus dans la vie des citoyens afghans. Il note que l'Afghanistan est un pays en lutte pour sa survie, mais que les progrès enregistrés sur plusieurs fronts depuis un départ au « point zéro », en 2002, sont dramatiques. Le Lieutenant-Général (Retraité) Macdonald nous donne quelques exemples encourageants des progrès qui se font pour permettre à la stabilité de venir en ce pays ravagé par la guerre. Le Lieutenant-Général (Retraité) Macdonald est un ancien Vice-chef d'État-major de la Défense et il est président honoraire national de l'Association des Forces aériennes du Canada.

L'analyste principal de la défense de la CAD, le Colonel (Retraité) Brian MacDonald, a pris part à la tournée des leaders d'opinion transatlantique en Afghanistan, à l'invitation de la Division de la diplomatie publique de l'OTAN. La tournée comprenait huit jours de briefings par des hauts dirigeants afghans du gouvernement et de l'armée et des hauts fonctionnaires de la FIAS, de l'OTAN, d'autres hauts



officials, and officials of the United States Embassy. Colonel (Ret'd) MacDonald provides us with a personal reflection on the major lines of thought among the participants, in *The 2009 Tour of Transatlantic Opinion Leaders to Afghanistan*.

Captain Bruce Rolston returned to Canada, earlier in 2009, following a tour of duty in Afghanistan as a member of the Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team. In *From Mentoring to Partnering: the Changing Nature of Afghan Army-building*, Captain Rolston provided us with an insight of his experience working with a brigade of the Afghan National Army and the challenges that he dealt with in carrying out his mission. Captain Rolston is an information management specialist and is currently second-in-command of 2 Intelligence Company in Toronto.

Dr. Kimberly Marten, in *Kandahar Lessons in Civil-Military Cooperation* notes that in the past Canadians had witnessed dueling civilian and military perspectives and rivalries over the war in Afghanistan. She highlights the civil-military coordination success in Ottawa and Afghanistan that followed from the recommendations of the Manley Panel Report of 2008. Dr. Marten is Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University.

Ms. Sharon Squassoni notes, in *The Dilemmas of Nuclear Iran and North Korea* that this past autumn marked the seventh year of negotiations with two nuclear proliferators, North Korea and Iran. She examines the challenges that have been presented to the Nonproliferation Treaty and offers some recommendations to address the issues. Ms. Squassoni was, formerly, a senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In his article, *Disinformation in a Digital World: Implications for Canada and Its Defence Policy*, Colonel (Ret'd) Sean Henry notes that Canadian vulnerability to disinformation has continued over the years, as witnessed *inter alia* by entrenchment of the myth of peacekeeping. He provides examples of disinformation that have existed in Canada since the 1970s. Colonel (Ret'd) Henry is a defence analyst in Ottawa.

We are pleased to include in this issue of *ON TRACK* reviews of a number of books that should be of interest to our readers. The first is from General (Ret'd) Paul Manson who reviews the book, *A Soldier First* by General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier. General (Ret'd) Hillier's book is an autobiographical account of his military life, with a particular focus on his years as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). General (Ret'd) Manson is also a former CDS, and is Past President of the CDA Institute and a member of the Institute's Board of Directors.

Mr. Jesse Mellott provides us with a review of Richard N. Haass' book, *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraq wars*. Mr. Mellott provides the reader with a detailed picture of the author's qualifications for writing his book, and points out that Haass effectively ties each point that he makes back to his argument. Mr. Mellott lives and works in Guelph, Ontario.

représentants européens et fonctionnaires de l'ambassade des États-Unis. Dans *The 2009 Tour of Transatlantic Opinion Leaders to Afghanistan*, le Colonel (Retraité) MacDonald nous offre une réflexion personnelle sur les principales lignes de pensée qui se sont dégagées chez les participants.

Le Capitaine Bruce Rolston est rentré au Canada, plus tôt en 2009, suite à une période d'affectation en Afghanistan comme membre de l'ELMO canadien (l'Équipe de Liaison et de Mentorat Opérationnel canadien). Dans *From Mentoring to Partnering: the Changing Nature of Afghan Army-building*, le Capitaine Rolston nous donne une idée de son expérience de travail avec une brigade de l'Armée nationale afghane et des défis auxquels il a dû faire face dans l'accomplissement de sa mission. Le Capitaine Rolston est un spécialiste de la gestion de l'information et il est présentement commandant adjoint de 2 Intelligence Company, à Toronto.



*Warrant Officer William "Willy" MacDonald receives the Vimy Award from the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, 20 November 2009, at the Canadian War Museum. / Adjudant William "Willy" MacDonald reçoit le prix Vimy de la très Hon. Beverley McLachlin, le 20 novembre 2009, au Musée canadien de la guerre.*

*Photo by / photo par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe*

Mme Kimberly Marten, dans *Kandahar Lessons in Civil-Military Cooperation*, note que, par le passé, les Canadiens ont été témoins de duels de points de vues et de rivalités entre civils et militaires sur la guerre en Afghanistan. Elle souligne le succès de la coordination entre civils et militaires, à Ottawa et en Afghanistan, qui a découlé des recommandations du rapport du Panel Manley de 2008. Mme





Brian Stewart receives the Ross Munro Media Award from Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Bob Millar, President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 20 November 2009, at the Canadian War Museum. / Brian Stewart reçoit le Prix média Ross Munro du brigadier-général (Ret) Bob Millar; président de l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, le 20 novembre 2009, au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Photo by / photo par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Ms. Natalie Ratcliffe reviews David E. Sanger's book, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*. She notes that Sanger's book is a compilation of longer chapters and short stories which depict scenarios that range from biological warfare to debilitating cyber attacks, but notes that the central thesis is often diluted by digressions into interesting, yet superfluous detail. However, Ms. Ratcliffe gives Sanger high marks for his meticulous research. Natalie, a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Intern, is the CDA Institute's Project Officer.

I am pleased to report that the 12<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium, *Canada's Security Interests*, was an unqualified success. The Symposium was presented by the CDA Institute, in collaboration with Queen's Centre for International Relations, with the financial support of the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Honourary Captain (N) Hugh Segal and Mrs. Segal, and Mr. David Scott and Ms. K. Tieman. Ms. Ratcliffe was the principal organizer of the symposium, and has provided a report on the proceedings.

Marten est professeure de Sciences politiques au Barnard College de l'Université Columbia.

Mme Sharon Squassoni note, dans « *The Dilemmas of Nuclear Iran and North Korea* », que cet automne passé a marqué la septième année de négociations avec deux proliférateurs nucléaires, la Corée du Nord et l'Iran. Elle examine les défis qui ont été présentés au Traité de non prolifération et offre quelques recommandations pour traiter de ces questions. Mme Squassoni est un ancien correspondant supérieur dans le Nuclear Policy Program au Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Dans son article, « *Disinformation in a Digital World: Implications for Canada and Its Defence Policy* », le Colonel (Retraité) Sean Henry a noté que la vulnérabilité canadienne à la désinformation a continué au cours des années, tel qu'en témoigne, entre autres, l'enracinement du mythe du maintien de la paix. Il donne des exemples de désinformation qui existent au Canada depuis les années 1970. Le Colonel (Retraité) Henry est analyste de la défense à Ottawa.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK* des comptes rendus d'un certain nombre de livres qui devraient présenter un intérêt pour nos lecteurs. Le premier nous vient du Général (Retraité) Paul Manson, qui a lu le livre « *A Soldier First* » du Général (Retraité) Rick Hillier. Le livre du Général (Retraité) Hillier est un compte rendu de sa vie militaire, qui met un accent particulier sur ses années comme CEMD. Le Général (Retraité) Manson est lui aussi un ancien chef de l'État-major de la Défense et ancien président de l'Institut de la CAD et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut.

M. Jesse Mellott nous présente un rendu de livre de Richard N. Haass, « *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraq wars* ». M. Mellott donne au lecteur une image détaillée des qualités de l'auteur pour écrire ce livre, et fait remarquer que M. Haass relie efficacement à son argument chacun des points qu'il mentionne. M. Mellott vit et travaille à Guelph (ON).

Mme Natalie Ratcliffe a lu le livre de David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*. Elle note que le livre de Sanger est une compilation de nouvelles qui dépeignent des scénarios qui vont de la guerre biologique aux cyberattaques débilitantes, mais fait la remarque que la thèse centrale est souvent diluée par des digressions dans des détails intéressants mais superflus. Mais Mme Ratcliffe accorde à Sanger des notes élevées pour sa recherche méticuleuse. Natalie, stagiaire du FSD du Ministère de la Défense nationale, est l'agente de projets de l'Institut de la CAD.

Je suis heureux de rapporter que le 12<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel des étudiants diplômés, sur *Les Intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité*, a connu un succès incontestable. Le symposium était présenté par l'Institut de la CAD, en collaboration avec le Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's, avec l'appui financier du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du Ministère de la Défense nationale, du Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, du Capitaine honoraire (M) Hugh Segal et de Mme Segal et de M. David Scott and Mme K. Tieman. Mme Ratcliffe fut l'organisatrice principale




The symposium featured two keynote speakers: Ms. Elissa Golberg, the former Representative of Canada in Kandahar, and Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command.

A number of the papers that were presented at the Symposium can be viewed at: <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia/symposium2009>.

On December 16, the CDA Institute was pleased to host General Stanley McChrystal, Commander International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, at a speaking engagement in the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier. His address, *The Road Ahead for Afghanistan*, was well received by a packed audience of some 450 persons.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute has been and will continue to be involved in a number of initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces, such as the Vimy Award, as well as the Annual Graduate Student Symposium (as mentioned earlier), the annual seminar, and numerous round table discussions.



*General Stanley McChrystal addresses the audience in the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier, 16 December 2009 / Le Général Stanley McChrystal s'adresse à l'auditoire réuni dans la Salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, le 16 décembre 2009.*

*Photo by / photo par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe*

- Amongst those in attendance at the largest Vimy Award evening at the Canadian War Museum were many of Canada's corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of the CDA Institute to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the Security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

du symposium et elle a produit un rapport des débats.

Le symposium présentait deux conférenciers principaux: Mme Elissa Golberg, ex-représentante du Canada à Kandahar, et le Lieutenant-Général Marc Lessard, commandant du Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada.

On peut consulter un certain nombre des documents présentés au symposium à l'adresse suivante : <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia/symposium2009>.

Le 16 décembre, l'Institut de la CAD a eu le plaisir de recevoir le Général Stanley McChrystal, commandant de la Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité en Afghanistan, qui a prononcé une conférence dans la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier. Son allocution, *The Road Ahead for Afghanistan*, a été bien reçue par une salle comble d'environ 450 personnes.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD a été et continue d'être impliqué dans un certain nombre d'initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes, comme le prix Vimy, ainsi que le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés (tel que mentionné ci-dessus), le séminaire annuel et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

- Parmi ceux qui assistaient à la plus grande soirée du prix Vimy au Musée canadien de la guerre on trouvait plusieurs des chefs d'entreprise du Canada qui appuient les objectifs de l'Institut de la CAD de sensibiliser le public à la contribution significative et exceptionnelle d'un Canadien à la sécurité du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

La soirée a été aussi relevée par la présence de la Très honorable Beverley McLachlin, Juge en chef du Canada; M. Frank McArdle, le mari de la Juge en chef du Canada, du Général Walter Natynczyk, chef de l'État-major de la Défense, et de Mme Leslie Natynczyk, de récipiendaires passés du prix Vimy, d'élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de St-Jean, de membres de nos Forces armées, et de beaucoup d'autres invités distingués.

Le gala du prix Vimy a été rempli de couleur et de cérémonie généreusement fournies par la Musique régimentaire des Governor General's Foot Guards, les Regimental Pipes and Drums des Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, le Spitfire Brass Quintet et l'ensemble à cordes des Forces canadiennes.

Le précieux appui accordé à cette soirée par nos généreuses entreprises commanditaires et par nos associations membres, ainsi que par nos membres associés, a contribué à la tenue d'une activité très significative qui a été appréciée par tous ceux qui y ont assisté. Nos remerciements publics à nos entreprises commanditaires paraissent ailleurs dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Dans le cadre du dîner du prix Vimy eut lieu la présentation du prix Ross Munro Media Award à M. Brien Stewart, journaliste chevronné des affaires étrangères qui a fait des reportages depuis dix zones de guerre et qui a tout récemment couvert le conflit en Afghanistan dans son segment régulier « Inside the Mission » sur *The National*. Le prix a été présenté par le Brigadier-Général (Retraité) Bob Millar,



The evening was dignified also by the presence of the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada; Mr. Frank McArdle, husband of the Chief Justice of Canada; General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Mrs. Leslie Natynczyk; previous recipients of the Vimy Award; Officer Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada and Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean; members of our Armed Forces; and many other distinguished guests.

The Vimy Award gala was filled with colour and ceremony, generously provided by the Regimental Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards, the Regimental Pipes and Drums of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the Spitfire Brass Quintet and the Canadian Forces String Ensemble.

The valuable support of the outstanding evening provided by our generous corporate sponsors and by our Member Associations, together with the Associate Members, contributed to a very significant event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors appears elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Included with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award to Mr. Brian Stewart, veteran foreign affairs journalist who has reported from ten war zones and most recently covered the conflict in Afghanistan on his regular feature "Inside the Mission" on *The National*. The Award was presented by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Bob Millar, President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The Award was initiated by the Conference of Defence Associations in collaboration with the CDFAI. The purpose of the Award is to recognize annually one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of Canada's defence and security issues. The CDA Institute is grateful for CDFAI's co-sponsorship of the Award.

- The CDA Institute will present its 26<sup>th</sup> annual seminar, *Protecting Canada's National Interests in an Uncertain World*, on Wednesday, 3 March, 2010, at the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa. The annual seminar is Canada's most important platform from which defence and security issues are explored. The theme is timely, given the ongoing challenges that have been brought about current events surrounding Canada's defence and security concerns. Speakers will include Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy.

Those attending the annual seminar are also invited to attend the 73<sup>rd</sup> Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, whose sub-theme, *Power Projection and the Canadian Forces: Resources and Capabilities*, will be held on Thursday, 4 March. The Hon. Peter MacKay will deliver the introductory address. Special addresses will also be given by General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff; General David Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central Command; and by Dr. Michael Ignatieff, Leader of the Opposition.

It was gratifying to see the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier filled to capacity, last February, for the 25<sup>th</sup> annual seminar and for the 72<sup>nd</sup> AGM. Based on past experience I would recommend that our supporters register

président d'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE). Le prix a été créé par la Conférence des associations de la défense, de concert avec l'ICDAE. Il a pour objectif de reconnaître chaque année un journaliste canadien qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la compréhension par le grand public des enjeux que doit affronter le Canada en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD remercie l'ICDAE d'avoir co-parrainé le prix.

- L'Institut de la CAD présentera son 26<sup>ème</sup> séminaire annuel, *Protéger les intérêts nationaux du Canada dans un monde incertain*, le mercredi 3 mars 2010 au Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Le séminaire annuel est la plateforme la plus importante du Canada où sont explorées les questions de défense et de sécurité. Le thème tombe à point nommé, étant donné les défis constants qui ont été amenés concernant des événements d'actualité qui entourent les préoccupations de défense et de sécurité du Canada. Les conférenciers seront notamment l'Amiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy.

Les personnes qui assistent au séminaire annuel sont également invitées à assister à la 73<sup>e</sup> assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense, dont le sous thème *La projection de puissance et les Forces canadiennes : ressources et capacités*, qui sera tenue le jeudi 4 mars. L'Honorable Peter MacKay prononcera l'allocution d'introduction. Des conférences seront également présentées par le Général Walter Natynczyk, chef de l'État-major de la Défense, le Général David Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central Command, et M. Michael Ignatieff, chef de l'Opposition.

Il a été gratifiant de voir la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier remplie à capacité, en février dernier, pour le 25<sup>e</sup> séminaire et la 72<sup>e</sup> assemblée générale annuelle. En nous fiant à l'expérience passée, je recommanderais à nos supporters de s'inscrire à bonne heure pour éviter d'être déçus, en visitant notre site Web à l'adresse <http://www.cdai.ca>.

Par la recherche, les discussions en table ronde, les séminaires et symposiums annuels de l'Institut de la CAD, et par notre collaboration avec les universités et d'autres groupes, nous continuons à mettre l'accent sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Notre but est de toujours informer le public et soutenir notre gouvernement et les auteurs de politiques dans des directions qui sauvegarderont les intérêts du Canada et de ses citoyens en matière de défense et de sécurité.

En concluant, je veux remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux *patrons*, *companion*, et *officiers*, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD ; sans eux il nous serait très difficile de remplir notre mission.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau *supporter*, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les avantages suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :



soon to avoid disappointment by visiting our web site at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca>.

Through the CDA Institute's research, roundtable discussions, annual seminars and symposia, and our collaboration with universities and other groups, we continue our focus on defence and security issues. Our aim is always to inform the public as well as support our government and policymakers in directions that will safeguard the defence and security interests of Canada and its citizens.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation \$75, or at a higher level, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months following your donation:

- A charitable donation tax receipt;
- Four issues of the CDA Institute's quarterly magazine, *ON TRACK*;
- Advance copies of all other CDA Institute publications, such as the *Vimy Papers*; and
- A discount registration rate at the CDA Institute's Annual Seminar.

A copy of the donor form is printed on the last page of this journal. Donor are also available on line at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor>.

Thank you. ©

- Un reçu d'impôt pour don caritatif ;
- Quatre numéros de la revue trimestrielle *ON TRACK* de l'Institut de la CAD ;
- Des exemplaires anticipés de toutes les autres publications de l'Institut de la CAD, comme les *Cahiers Vimy* ; et
- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription au séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD.

Une copie du formulaire de donateurs est imprimée sur la dernière page de cette revue. Également disponible en ligne, à <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor>.

Merci. ©





## Canada's Navy Today and Tomorrow

by Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden

This year, Canada's navy is celebrating its 100th year as a national institution. When Sir Wilfred Laurier guided the Naval Service Act to Royal Assent in 1910, he led the young dominion to make a clear and historic strategic choice: to build a navy for Canada rather than cruisers for the Royal Navy. Today, that choice to pursue a sovereign capacity for independent action at sea is embodied in the Canadian Task Group.

Canada's navy is driven by our national interests, as dictated by history and geography: the need to protect one of the world's largest maritime estates in three widely separated ocean spaces, coupled with our deep and abiding stake in a stable global order. This is the navy that Canada needs.

It's also the navy the government last year committed itself to renew. Since Prime Minister Harper announced the government's *Canada First Defence Strategy*, we've been working hard to prepare for the most comprehensive reinvestment of our maritime forces ever, beginning in 2010:

- To modernize the *Halifax*-class frigates,
- To replace the *Protecteur*-class AORs with new joint support ships,
- To add 6 to 8 new Arctic offshore patrol ships to the fleet,
- To replace the venerable *Sea Kings* with the *Cyclone* maritime helicopters,
- To modernize the existing *Aurora* fleet and eventually to procure a new fleet of multi-mission maritime patrol aircraft, and
- To procure a new class of surface combatants, initially to replace the *Iroquois*-class destroyers and eventually the modernized frigates.

Much of this work is well underway. However, there are a number of challenges in the years immediately ahead of us if we are to secure this bright future. So let's begin by looking back at the last 15 years to understand what the navy needs to do in the coming decade.

### Strategic Decisions Deferred

As the military's budget and personnel were reduced in the 1990s to bring the country's finances under control, our navy put to sea the most combat-effective task group in

our history. In a sweeping transformation of our business, we evolved in a few short years from a force specializing in antisubmarine warfare to a general-purpose combat-effective navy. We also transformed our naval reserves around a new coastal defence mission. As a result, we became widely regarded as the best medium power navy in the world. In the first decade of this Century, we became global leaders in maritime domain awareness and pioneered the implementation of interagency Marine Security Operations Centers. We led the way in developing fully joint regional headquarters for domestic and continental operations.

We sustained an unparalleled tempo of operations throughout this period, including an extraordinary commitment to the international campaign against terrorism. We were given leadership of an entire maritime theater of operations. We took interoperability to an entirely new level, integrating our frigates into the U.S. Navy's carrier and expeditionary striking groups.

Doing these things consumed much of the navy's talent and energy. Over this same period, government and industry got out of the business of building warships. Our fleet became older and more expensive to operate. Decisions to reinvest in our maritime forces were repeatedly deferred, while the skill sets and capacity needed to build warships slowly atrophied across the department and elsewhere.



*Offshore Halifax, Nova Scotia*

*LS Ian Genneau operating radar controls. Operations room personnel preparing for 76mm gun shoot. HMCS ATHABASKAN conducting trials exercise.*

*Photo by Jacek Szymanski NAVY Public Affairs.*

*Vice-Admiral P. Dean McFadden is Chief of the Maritime Staff.*



The procurement failures last year of the navy's joint support ship and the Coast Guard's mid-shore patrol vessel were a wake-up call for the entire machinery of government and industry: building warships is not just about cutting steel. It requires investment in people who understand the art and science of designing the most complex machines on the planet, as well delivering them on time and budget. Encouragingly, a fundamental reevaluation of how this country builds warships is well under way. A national shipbuilding procurement strategy should soon emerge that frees us of the cycle of boom or bust in which our navy has been trapped since the 1950s.

## *The Way Ahead*

Having focused with great success on operations for the past 15 years, we must now rebuild our capacity to implement the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. This will not be easy. We must move quickly, but we must also proceed carefully.

Our challenges mostly stem from the need to manage a highly compressed transition to the future fleet. First, we need to crew a number of large capital projects that will be running more or less continuously for much of the next decade and longer. Many of the people who have the needed skills will have to be drawn from the organizations the navy depends on to get the fleet to sea and keep it there. Second is the need to maintain the seagoing skills of an entire generation of sailors, with potentially half of the hulls that are now available to train the fleet for its difficult and dangerous work.

But our most immediate challenge is the one that keeps me up at night: while the CF has been expanding, the navy has been getting smaller. We're now about four ship's companies below where we need to be. Moreover, our shortages are concentrated largely in our high-tech trades that are so crucial to our business. There is a great deal of action now underway to attract Canadians to a career in the navy. However, while I am greatly encouraged at the early results to reverse recruiting trends, it will be some time before I can state with confidence that the worst is astern of us.

Finally, there's no getting around the fact that maritime readiness will go down substantially during the next decade. Managing the risks associated with a smaller fleet will be no mean feat, as the world will not accommodate us. We will need to find a way to sustain a degree of forward deployment in support of our national interests and maintain a credible response option to protect the nation. And we will need to be ready to bridge potential gaps in fleet capabilities should our capital projects be further delayed.

But in an age that is largely devoid of major battle at sea, why should any of this matter to Canadians?

## *Canadian Seapower in this Maritime Century*

It's evident from the daily headlines that the world's deepest problems will not soon be resolved. However, in the face of global uncertainty and volatility, it's critical to remember what hasn't changed in our turbulent world:

- More than 90 percent of the world's trade travels by sea.
- The oceans are free for all states to use, without infringing on any other's sovereignty.
- The power of the United States and its principal maritime allies, including Canada, is still preeminent at sea, with all the strategic freedom that this entails.



*SLt Radek Wasak on the bridge of Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) Calgary on Task Group Exercise (TGEX). HMCS Calgary, participates with HMCS Algonquin, HMCS Protecteur and the American Navy during TGEX.*

*Photo by David Snashall*



Sir Walter Raleigh, in a more eloquent age, summarized these points as follows: “Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”

Today’s global system has evolved markedly since Sir Walter’s day, but the succession of the world’s principal maritime powers over the centuries highlights the deep, reciprocal and enduring links between seapower and the global economic, legal, and political system. Think of it this way: while armies and air forces operate in the global system, navies are part of the system itself.

The noted British defence academic Geoffrey Till has observed: “Seapower is at the heart of the globalization process in a way that land and air power are not.” As mariners, we see globalization at work every day—not just how it critical it is to our collective prosperity, but just how crucial globalization is to our collective futures.

Why has the navy deployed nearly three dozen times to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean since the end of the Cold War? It wasn’t just to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 or to answer the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Nor is it simply to address the rise of piracy today. While these were important things to do, we deployed there for a more fundamental purpose: because an unregulated ocean is a threat to our way of life.

### *The Intensification of Ocean Politics*

The maritime domain has changed more in the past 40 years than in the previous 400. A majority of the world’s commercially exploitable marine resources has been enclosed by coastal states, and a greater portion will become enclosed under article 76 of the Law of the Sea. Coastal states are making increasingly pronounced investments in their maritime estates, as actions in our own high north attests.

Indeed, we may be seeing the shape of future ocean politics in the Arctic. This region is being propelled towards the center of world affairs, as the five Arctic coastal states, including Canada, establish their claims to the vast energy and mineral reserves that are believed to lie in the Arctic Basin and its periphery. Climate change is likely to make these resources commercially exploitable much sooner than was thought possible only a few years ago.

But the situation in the Arctic is not unique. It serves as a parable for what this century may witness as globally coupled forces alter our world in ways that may be difficult to imagine today. Even far inland, in places such as Darfur, these changes are likely to be most intense precisely among those peoples and states that are least able to deal with them. But most of the world’s population is concentrated in the littorals, and this is where our navy must be prepared to operate.

Ocean politics will make for a global maritime commons of great strategic complexity and growing competition, with a latent but ever-present potential for conflict among great states. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific, a vast region of the globe where ocean politics already occupies centre stage.



*HMCS Algonquin fires its 76mm gun during an Anti-Air firing exercise May 8 2007. The Canadian Iroquois Class Destroyer participated in Exercise TRIDENT FURY 2007 while sailing off the west coast of Vancouver Island. Behind to the right is the USS CURTIS and USS INGRAHAM. Both are Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates from the United States.*

*Photo by MCpl Robert Bottrill, CF Combat Camera*

China—the most important of the emerging maritime powers—has acknowledged this fundamental reality. During celebrations of the 60th anniversary of its navy last year, China confirmed that its principal security challenges and vulnerabilities come from the sea, requiring a navy aligned with its growing maritime interests. This is a remarkable shift for a state whose thinking for millennia has been dominated by the need to consolidate its continental frontiers from threats originating inland. But it’s a shift that also was inevitable, as China assumed a more prominent place in the global system.

The navy touches upon the daily lives of all Canadians in profound but subtle ways. It’s a consequence of the fact that Canada trades. It’s because we live in times when ocean politics will increasingly shape the course of this maritime century. It’s inherent in the nature of maritime power itself.



This is why Canada operates a globally deployable sea-control navy:

- To safeguard Canada's sovereignty in its three ocean approaches, ensuring that our jurisdictions as one of the world's great coastal states are respected by all,
- To secure our prosperity by helping to keep the oceans free for all to use lawfully,
- To work with our allies and partners to prevent conflict where possible, leading international maritime operations when the government so chooses,
- But benchmarked for combat both in capabilities and ethos, "ready, aye ready" to prevail in conflict when necessary.

## *Looking Back, Looking Ahead*

The story of our second century as a naval service is about to begin. I can't pretend to foresee all the challenges that await us in the decades ahead. But then neither could Sir Wilfred Laurier, when he was looking forward from 1910. But he held an abiding faith in what Canada stood for and a vision of the country as a leading member of the community of nations—a vision that our navy helped to secure, and as we continue to sustain today. That alone gives me great confidence for our next century, because Laurier's vision remains undiminished nearly 100 years later: that Canadians will continue to strive to make a difference, knowing that the world will not be as we wish but rather as we are prepared to help make it. ©

## DONATIONS

### The CDA Institute

A gift provided under your will means a great deal to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. It perpetuates a commitment in support the mission of the Institute.

Planned gifts are commonly referred to as deferred gifts, such as bequests, life insurance, charitable remainder trusts and similar undertakings, whereby the commitment is made now, but the funds do not become available to the Institute until a set time in the future.

Including a bequest to the CDA Institute in your will is one of the most popular and simplest ways to make a planned gift.

For further information or to advise the CDA Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903 or [treasurer@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:treasurer@cda-cdai.ca). All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.

## LES DONs

### L'institut de la CAD

Un don inscrit à votre testament revêt une grande importance pour l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense (l'ICAD). Il perpétue votre engagement envers l'Institut et assure le soutien continu à sa mission.

Les dons planifiés sont communément appelés dons différés. Ils incluent les legs, l'assurance-vie, les fiducies résiduelles de bienfaisance et toute entente similaire. La personne s'engage dès maintenant, mais les fonds ne sont versés à l'organisme qu'à une période déterminée dans le futur.

Un legs à l'Institut de la CAD est une des façons les plus simples de faire un don planifié.

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour aviser l'Institut de la CAD de vos intentions, veuillez communiquer avec le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe en composant le 613 236-9903 ou courriel [treasurer@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:treasurer@cda-cdai.ca). Toute demande d'information sera traitée de manière personnelle et strictement confidentielle.



## CANADIAN NAVAL CENTENNIAL 1910-2010

by Master Corporal Rob McKinnon

The aim of the Canadian Naval Centennial in 2010 is to build and instill in Canadians an appreciation for their navy within the Canadian Forces. The theme is to “Bring the Navy to Canadians”. Events will be focused on honouring the past, showcasing the current navy, and reinforcing the requirement for a strong navy in the future.

The navy, along with several naval service groups, has been planning for this momentous occasion for more than four years. This article will provide information regarding national-level events occurring throughout 2010.

Three major events that took place in 2009 set the stage for the centennial year. In early June, Vancouver City erected a naval mast at the Prospect Point Lookout during a ceremony presided over by His Royal Highness The Prince Edward, Earl of Wessex. Later in June, Her Excellency The Rt. Hon. Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada and Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces, presented the navy with their new Queen’s Colour. The ceremony was held at the foot of the historic Citadel in Halifax and over 500 sailors and officers from across the country were in attendance.

The re-enactment of the founding of the dockyard in Halifax, which occurred 250 years ago, marked the final event. Naval re-enactors presented a telescope to the Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, symbolizing the turn-over of the watch from the colonial navy to the modern navy with “A Clear View Of The Past; A Clear View Of The Future.”

The year 2010 will witness much more celebration and commemoration. Construction is slated to begin in the spring on a new naval monument at Richmond Landing in Ottawa. Team McWilliams/Bakker/Haden was selected by an internationally renowned jury which convened in Ottawa this past October to select from submissions by five design competition finalists. The winning design reflects many facets of the Canadian Navy in its use of the naval black, white and gold colours to create a distinctively sculpted open space charged with meaning. At the heart of the monument site is a white form suggestive of a multitude of naval associations, ranging from sails to classic ship design lines to icebergs to naval attire. The design also incorporates gold spheres, conjuring up images of the sun, the moon and the stars, and the global reach of the Canadian Navy.

Three gala balls have been scheduled to honour the occasion. The first will be held in Ottawa at the Hampton Inn on April 30, 2010. The second will be held at the World Trade and Convention Centre in Halifax on August 7, 2010 and the third will be held in October 2010 in Victoria. These three

very special events will be open to all military personnel, retired members, friends of the navy and their spouses.

---

*One of the year’s highlights will be the presentation of the Centennial Bell to the people of Canada*

---

One of the year’s highlights will be the presentation of the Centennial Bell to the people of Canada through the Parliament of Canada on May 4, 2010. The 30-centimetre, 90-pound frigate-size bell was cast at CFB Esquimalt in September 2009. Naval artefacts from the last century, including medals, buttons and badges, navigational tools and shell casings, were used in its casting. After having received blessing from First Nations and HMCS SACKVILLE, the navy’s memorial, water collected by the navy from our three oceans, Great Lakes, St Lawrence River and an area of international maritime operations will be incorporated into the ceremony.

Following the 4 May official birthday, there will be international fleet reviews taking place in Victoria from June 9 – 14, 2010 and in Halifax from June 28 – July 2, 2010 during the Royal Nova Scotia International Tattoo which will feature a theme dedicated to 100 Years of Naval Service to Canada. More than 60 foreign nations have been invited to participate in the two international fleet reviews and the Royal Nova Scotia International Tattoo will feature more than 200 world-class Canadian and international military and civilian performers.

Several other events will also take place with the aim of “Bringing the Navy to Canadians.” The first of these events is a travelling road show entitled “Sailors and Songs - A Musical Tribute to 100 Years of Naval Service to Canada.”

Two CF naval bands, the NADEN Band based out of CFB Esquimalt and the STADACONA Band based out of CFB Halifax, will perform throughout Canadian communities. The musical repertoire will cover major periods in the navy’s history, and be accompanied by visual images/film footage, to create a tapestry of sight and sound. A recording is also in production which will be available to the public.

Another event which will touch Canadians throughout the country is the presentation of Namesake Mementos to the communities for whom HMC Ships have been named over the last 100 years. Every First Nation, city or town for whom a ship has been named will be presented with a framed photograph of their namesake ship, along with accompanying text, in order to strengthen the historical link with their namesake ship as well as promote a special relationship between the community and the navy. These presentations are designed for public display so to educate Canadians about the special relationship between the Navy

*Master Corporal Rob McKinnon is a musician in the Regimental Band of the Governor General’s Foot Guards. He is currently working for the Canadian Naval Centennial Project as a Public Affairs NCO.*



and Canada's various communities.

In addition to these high profile events, the Canadian Naval Centennial team has been working with several organizations to commemorate this momentous occasion on a national scale. A project in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mint to produce a commemorative silver dollar is one example. In a similar vein, Canada Post has approved the design and forthcoming issue of a two-stamp set celebrating the centennial of the navy. The design has been approved and the commemorative stamps will be available beginning in May 2010.

Merchandise will be available throughout 2010 in celebration of the naval centennial. Items such as centennial swords and cutlasses, etched glassware, ties and scarves, plaques, sports clothing, ball caps, magnets, coffee mugs, etc are for sale and information regarding this initiative can be found on the centennial web site.

Six centennial paintings were commissioned to commemorate the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Canadian Navy as part of a formal art program. The paintings highlight the achievements of the Canadian Navy since its founding and cover six key periods of the navy's history: World War I (1914-1918); World War II (1939-1945); the Korean War (1950-1953); The Cold War (1945-1991); The First Gulf War (1990-1991); and The Campaign against Terrorism (2001-present).

The six works were created by four celebrated Canadian artists. Douglas Bradford, Peter Rindlisbacher, and

Richard Rudnicki contributed one painting each while John Horton contributed three of the paintings. All of the artists were on-hand to present their paintings at an unveiling ceremony held at Cartier Square Drill Hall in Ottawa on October 15, 2009. Prints of these works are for sale, and the information can be found on the centennial web site.

*"The Naval Service of Canada 1910-2010. The Centennial Story"* was edited by Mr. Richard H. Gimblett, command historian of the Canadian Navy, and features a foreword by Governor General Michaëlle Jean. The contributions of the 11 authors highlight the origins of the Canadian Navy dating back to 1867 and its role in both world wars, the Korean conflict and the postwar period. There is also a chapter which looks at the navy of the future and a section on naval war art.

The book was unveiled to the public in a ceremony held in Ottawa on November 16, 2009 where the authors were on-hand to autograph copies. Plans are also underway for a similar book on the Naval Reserve of Canada which will be published next spring.

In addition to the activities discussed in this article, there will be many more events, at both the national and local levels, which will be of interest to the general public.

A complete and detailed listing of these events can be found at the Canadian Naval Centennial website <http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/centennial/> along with hyperlinks to partnering organizations and their projects. ©



## Our Canadian Forces

by The Hon. Peter G. MacKay

Members of the Canadian Forces risk their lives every day to protect Canadians and Canadian interests. Their accomplishments at home and abroad are fundamental to the well-being of our country. Our Government recognizes this reality and that is why we have taken the long overdue steps required to ensure that the Canadian Forces have what they need to do what Canadians ask of them.

Prime Minister Harper and I set some very ambitious goals two years ago when we officially released the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. We are expanding, rebuilding and modernizing the Canadian Forces to ensure that they can fully take on their roles in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With our Government's recent purchases of new equipment and investments in infrastructure, we are providing Canada with a strengthened, state-of-the-art military and providing Canadian allies with a more robust, capable and reliable partner.

These announcements demonstrate the Government's determination to rebuild the Canadian Forces. After coming to office in 2006, we acted on our commitment to expand the Canadian Forces and acted to acquire new tactical and strategic lift aircraft, Chinook medium-to-heavy lift helicopters, logistics trucks and Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships.

The Canadian Forces have already taken possession of the strategic lift aircraft, which are essential to our 21<sup>st</sup> century responsibilities. Our four C-17 Globemasters are delivering crucial supplies to the international mission in Afghanistan, and have delivered vital aid to the people of Jamaica and Burma in the aftermath of natural disasters. We have also made other critical acquisitions such as tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles.

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is based on a rigorous analysis of the security environment and establishes a level of ambition that sees our military delivering excellence at home, being a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and projecting leadership abroad.

*The Honourable Peter G. MacKay is Canada's Minister of National Defence.*



In Afghanistan, for example, the Canadian Forces' contribution represents a vital component of the UN-mandated, NATO-led mission. They are playing a critical role, as members of a whole-of-government team, working to bring stability and comprehensive development to that country.

Continentially, the strategy reinforces our commitment to the shared defence of North America with our US counterparts. The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), of course, is one of the most visible examples of this partnership, but it also extends to bilateral training and exercises, assisting each other in times of crisis, and interoperability with our US allies.

At home, the Canadian Forces have important responsibilities in the Arctic where they contribute to Government-wide efforts as part of the newly announced Northern Strategy. The Canadian Forces are working closely with their partners in the federal and territorial governments to exercise Canada's sovereignty and protect Canadian interests in the North. We have made important progress recently on our commitment to improve our military's capabilities in the region. We're moving forward with the acquisition of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, the establishment of a naval facility in Nanisivik and the setting up of the Canadian Forces' Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay. We are increasing the size of our Canadian Rangers, who play an especially crucial role

by maintaining a military presence in isolated and coastal areas of northern Canada. On August 17, I also announced the establishment of a new primary army reserve unit in the Northwest Territories, the Yellowknife Company, which will contribute to our presence in the region.

Similarly, the support provided by our military to the RCMP in preparation for security at the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games is essential. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is designed to ensure that the Canadian Forces maintain this excellence in operations over the long-term.

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is supported by a twenty-year planning framework that will see National Defence's budget grow from \$19 billion in 2009-10 to \$30 billion in 2027-28. The strategy brings unprecedented financial predictability and stability to the Department and the Canadian Forces and to our defence partners. Over these two decades, our strategy invests \$490 billion on Defence in a balanced way across the four pillars of military capabilities: personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure.

The *Canada First Defence Strategy* is a robust plan for sustained and determined defence growth. Its stated objectives are increasing the size of the Canadian Forces, replacing core equipment platforms such as fighters and land combat systems, replacing or refurbishing 50% of defence infrastructure over twenty years, and increasing funding for spare parts and training.

A significant part of our plan is investing in our most important resource: the soldiers, sailors and airmen and women of the Canadian Forces. We have committed to expand the size of our military to 100,000 – 70,000 regulars and 30,000 reservists. Despite demographic and retention challenges, our recruitment efforts are delivering results. Young men and women are inspired by the possibilities offered by a career in the Canadian Forces and are showing



September 22, 2009 - Trenton, Ontario.

*The Honourable Peter Gordon MacKay, Minister of National Defence and Minister for the Atlantic Gateway, at 8 Wing Trenton.*

*DND Photo / Photo MDN*

up at recruitment centres. Over the last three years, our regular force has grown by 3,000 personnel and our reserve force by almost 2,000.

The strategy ensures that members of the Canadian Forces have the critical resources they need to do their jobs. Infrastructure investments might not sound as exciting as acquiring new tanks or fighters, but they are just as essential to the readiness of the Canadian Forces. National Defence is the largest real estate holder in the federal government. The state of much of the infrastructure, however, is inadequate and requires renewal. We need to make urgent investments to restore or replace some of our military facilities. Since March, I had the opportunity to visit Halifax, Gagetown, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Esquimalt, as well as Gander and Valcartier, to launch our infrastructure initiatives.

These important projects, with a value of almost half a billion dollars, include the building of modern accommodations, training, storage and maintenance facilities. They will improve the quality of life of the men and women of the Canadian Forces, and enhance their ability to prepare for operations and support deployments. In addition, the value of these projects to regional economies should not be understated in terms of benefits for local businesses and jobs generated.

Renewing the Canadian Forces' equipment platforms is also crucial. Some of our military's equipment fleets have



reached the end of their operational lives, or will soon. Now is the time to act to make the necessary decisions if we want to be in a position to replace Canadian Forces' equipment on time.

In July, I announced our decision to act on our core *Canada First* Defence Strategy equipment commitments, by replacing land combat vehicles. This \$5 billion investment provides our land forces with the capabilities to better respond to the full spectrum of missions we call on them to perform. The project includes the upgrade of our fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles – the LAV IIIs – and the acquisition of three new fleets of modern and robust land combat vehicles: Close Combat Vehicles, Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles and Armoured Engineer Vehicles. The new vehicles will be operational within three years.

I announced another significant purchase in August when we awarded a contract to Boeing for 15 new Chinook medium-to-heavy lift helicopters. The Chinooks that our Government already acquired for the Afghanistan mission have made such a difference for our men and women in uniform, considerably improving their safety and effectiveness. Our new fleet – which is expected to be delivered by 2014 – will be an essential asset for future operations.

Progress has also been made towards providing our navy with the most capable fleet possible. Model testing for the design of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships is underway, and the Statement of Operational Requirements for the ships has been approved. Additionally, at the end of July, the Government launched shipbuilding consultations with the marine industry and other stakeholders on the development of a long-term shipbuilding strategy. As the Government plans on investing more than \$40 billion to build fifty large vessels during the next thirty years – mostly for the navy and the Canadian Coast Guard – establishing a strategic relationship with the marine sector is key to the successful implementation of procurement projects for the navy. These include the acquisition of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships and Joint Support Ships, as well as the replacement of our destroyers and frigates.

Partnership with industry and responsible stewardship of public funds are absolutely essential to the execution of the *Canada First* Defence Strategy as a whole. Considering the magnitude of financial investments involved, prudent spending of taxpayers' dollars is critical. That is why my officials have developed a clear and focussed investment plan that ensures that the timing of major investments corresponds with the availability of funds, and that the *Canada First* Defence Strategy is implemented in a coherent

manner. The Department is also working very closely with our partners at Public Works and Government Services Canada, Industry Canada and Defence Construction Canada to find ways to streamline the military procurement process. Our long-term commitment to rebuilding the Canadian Forces is helping industry plan ahead as well, allowing companies in Canada to pre-position themselves and to be readily prepared to participate in our various equipment and infrastructure projects.

The *Canada First* Defence Strategy represents a win-win situation for both the Canadian Forces and industry in Canada. While our military receives the right assets at the right time, businesses and communities across the country will reap significant benefits from the many opportunities offered by our investments. This is in part because under the Government's Industrial and Regional Benefits Policy, firms from outside the country that have made a successful bid for a Canadian defence procurement contract are required to reinvest in Canada an amount equal to the contract value. This means that every investment in our military translates dollar for dollar into an investment in the Canadian economy. Already, defence investments are having an impact on regional economies and bringing jobs to Canadians from Victoria to St. John's.

We have also made care and support for the Canadian Forces and their families a key priority. For example, last March, I was proud to announce the creation of the Joint Personnel Support Unit, a network of nineteen support centres where ill or injured Canadian Forces members, veterans, their families and the families of the deceased can receive care and support. We have recognized the need to take care of our Canadian heroes who sacrifice for Canadians everywhere.

The Government is committed to keeping Canadians safe and secure, exercising our sovereignty, being a reliable continental partner and NATO ally, and ensuring that Canada performs a leadership role on the international stage.

The Government is making the necessary investments to build a military that is flexible, combat-capable and ready to take on the multiple challenges presented by the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment.

The *Canada First* Defence Strategy sets long-term objectives for expanding, rebuilding and modernizing our military based on stable and predictable funding. Our intention is to ensure that Canada has today – and well into the future – the Canadian Forces that it needs.

With the progress we have made over the past months, and with our determined commitment to keep moving forward, we are well on our way towards achieving this important objective. ©





Address

## The Vimy Award

by Warrant Officer William Kenneth MacDonald

Chief Justice...General Natynczyk... Dr Cowan...Colonel Pellerin...Distinguished Guests...Ladies and Gentlemen...Fellow Warriors

It is with humility and pride that I accept this award on behalf of all the NCO's of the Canadian Forces. Having been selected as the recipient and the representative for all of my colleagues is truly an exciting experience. I did some homework, including reflection, on the significance and history of this prestigious award and so with trembling hands, because I now must live up to all the nice things you have said about me, I would like to say a few words.

The battle of Vimy Ridge from 9 to 12 April 1917 was perhaps the single most important battle fought in our storied history as a nation and as a military. Not only did our predecessors succeed in taking an objective which was widely thought to be unachievable, but they applied the most modern tactics available and incorporated all their assets with great skill and great success. The vision and the warrior spirit which evolved from competent leadership and, more importantly, trust, is something which still lives on in today's military. Evolving tactics, excellent equipment and combined arms co-operation has led to many successes on all of Canada's battlefields since that time. One of the keys to that success was leadership. In reflecting on this, I began to think about leadership and that raised some questions.

What does it mean to be a leader? It means to me that you accept responsibility for failure as an individual and that you share in successes as a team. That is and always has been the spirit of the Canadian soldier, sailor and airman/ woman. Humility and silent professionalism is and always will be a trait which uniquely categorizes our military. This is perhaps the single biggest reason why it is impossible for me to accept this award on a personal level. We, as a people, understand that it is impossible to be successful without good leadership and, even more importantly, supportive subordinates. In order for this to happen there needs to be trust, perhaps the single most important factor in success and in the shaping of a good leader. That trust must be both up and down the chain of command and in order to achieve this vital component, leaders must constantly strive to develop themselves personally and professionally. My personal successes have always come with a cost which invariably leads to the belief that everybody needs someone to lean on, regardless of rank or position and, in order to be comfortable enough to lean on one another, trust must be apparent.

It has been said that the definition of being a good leader is "Having the ability to persuade ordinary people to do extraordinary things". I would disagree with this statement, militarily, as I do not feel that any Canadian service man or woman is merely "ordinary". Volunteers all, and focused on a common goal is what sets them apart from the ordinary. With an almost certainty of finding themselves in combat, "ordinary" Canadians have lined up at our recruiting centres to volunteer for service.

Although I have stated that I am accepting this award on behalf of the NCO corps, I must also acknowledge the officer corps as I have had many Platoon Commanders, Company Commanders and Battalion Commanders who shaped what I have become and afforded me the opportunities to develop both as a soldier and a leader. I will not say that I have always been so lucky as to have a good example; however, learning from poor examples is and was just as valuable.

I must also not forget the young men and women who form the junior non-commissioned officer ranks of our military and who are all important in our success. Good and supportive subordinates are key to achieving our goals. Their tenacity, motivation, forward thinking and respect is something which I personally will never forget.

Lastly, I need to recognize those who really epitomize the meaning of this award in its words of contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the upholding of our democratic values. Those who have left a part or all of themselves on our battlefields. Our Wounded Warriors and Our Fallen. It is for them that we really do owe a debt and an inherent need for recognition. I was asked, during an honours and awards board, where I was speaking on behalf of Corporal Bryce Keller, "Are you just doing this because he is dead?" My answer, at the time, was sufficient for him to receive, posthumously, the Medal of Military Valour. Looking back, if I had been bold enough, I think my answer would have been a question, "Is that not enough?" In reflecting on this, I also reflect on the families and what they have sacrificed. Without them, we could not do what we do and without their sacrifice(s) we would not be as successful as we are. They have stepped up to the plate time and again, and for that they deserve special recognition.

*Warrant Officer William Kenneth MacDonald is a member of Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and is the recipient of the 2009 Vimy Award.*



In closing, I would like to again thank the CDA Institute and all the members of the selection committee. I would also like to recognize a few certain people who are attending this

evening, my fellow warriors: Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Fletcher, Major Mason Stalker and Chief Warrant Officer Pierre Leger. Without your guidance, tenacity, insistence in success, compassion and rock solid leadership I don't believe I would find myself as passionate about certain topics or as eager as I have become to develop without you and the impact you have had on me. I must

not forget to thank the Canadian Infantry Association for the nomination and my Regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, who has provided a constant amount of support to me throughout the years. I only hope that I can live up to this award, what it represents and be as positive and inspirational a recipient as those who have won the Vimy Award in the past. Thank you. ©

## AFGHANISTAN: THE RETURN OF HISTORY?

*by Louis Delvoie*

In assessing the prospects of NATO countries and forces in Afghanistan, many commentators have pointed ominously to the experiences and defeats of the British and Soviet armies in that country. This appeal to history has a certain amount of merit if it is meant to underline the difficulties of coming to grips with a country with literally dozens of centres of power, each with its own armed might and its parochial interests. It also has merit if it is intended to stress the problems inherent in operating in a country in which much of the population is deeply suspicious of foreigners and hostile to the presence of foreign forces in its midst. But much beyond that, the analogies fall flat. After all NATO forces are in Afghanistan on a temporary basis to stabilize and rehabilitate the country, not to occupy, colonize or dominate it. While that distinction may not always be clear to the average man in the street or man in the mountain, it is certainly one which is readily understood by Afghanistan's leaders.

There is, however, another lesson to be drawn from the history of Afghanistan which is perhaps far more relevant to the objectives now being pursued by NATO countries. This has to do with past efforts to reform and modernize Afghan society and Afghan governance. The story of the outcome of these efforts should be sufficient to give pause to those still sufficiently naïve to believe that Afghanistan can be transformed into a thriving liberal democracy in a matter of a few years.

### *The Amanullah Reforms*

The Amir Aminullah came to power in 1919 under quintessentially Afghan circumstances. His predecessor's

murder had precipitated a bloody series of plots and counter-plots involving various clans and tribes. Amanullah eventually emerged triumphant in this power struggle by generously bribing and securing the loyalty of the military garrison of Kabul. Apart from his role in proclaiming Afghanistan's full independence from Britain and precipitating the third Anglo-Afghan war, Amanullah is best known for his endeavours to reform and modernize the Afghan state.

By virtue of his readings and foreign travel, Amanullah was profoundly conscious of how backward his country was and set about to change it. He started by having the country's first written constitution drawn up, one modeled on the secularist constitution promulgated in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In this he sought to create a secular space in which the government could operate and to define the proper relationship between religion and the state. He also took steps to reform the legal system, creating an independent judiciary and a secular penal code.

In the social sphere, Amanullah placed heavy emphasis on education, creating a number of secondary and vocational schools, including schools for girls. He sent numerous young Afghans to study abroad and imported teachers from France, Germany and India. He also enacted laws to enhance the legal status of women and issued decrees abolishing domestic slavery and forced labour.

Amanullah then set on to reform the financial sector, creating a new system of tariffs and taxes. In the process he abolished a host of titles and sinecures, and campaigned actively against corruption and nepotism.

Taken together, Amanullah's reforms were truly radical. Had they been accepted and implemented they would have transformed Afghan society. This was not to be however. Resistance to the reforms grew louder and stronger with the passage of every year of Amanullah's relatively short reign. On the one hand, the reforms came as a shock to a very conservative and tradition-bound society which saw them

*Louis Delvoie is Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. He is a former Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan.*



as being incompatible with Islam. This was particularly true of those dealing with women's rights and education. On the other hand, they were seen as a direct threat by the traditional power broker in Afghan society. Both tribal leaders and religious leaders saw them as undermining their power, status, wealth and privileges.

By 1924 Amanullah was confronted with a tribal uprising led by mullahs. This he was able to put down in the course of a two year campaign which resulted in much bloodshed. In 1928 he faced a much more widespread tribal revolt, which he was unable to master. In a desperate attempt to save his throne, he rescinded most of his reforms, but it was too late. He was forced to abdicate and spent the rest of his days living in exile in Italy. With his demise died the first serious attempt at reform and modernization in Afghanistan.

## *The PDPA Reforms*

In 1965, in a singular departure from traditional tribal politics, a new left wing political party was created in Afghanistan: The Popular Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Although out of concern for the religious sentiments of the Muslim population the PDPA did not proclaim its adherence to Marxism-Leninism, it was in fact a communist party which established close links with the Soviet Union. In the decade following its foundation it made steady headway in recruiting adherents among the more educated classes in Afghanistan's urban regions and within the officer corps of the Afghan army. Despite having to overcome divisions within its own ranks between the Khalq and Parcham factions, the PDPA was able to challenge the authority of the sitting government by 1978.

In another quintessentially Afghan political manoeuvre, the PDPA launched a coup with the support of army officers against the government of President Mohamed Daoud. Daoud was not only overthrown, but he and his family and some 200 supporters were killed in the process. While it has long been debated how active the Soviet Union was in supporting this coup, it did have the effect of bringing to power a communist and pro-Soviet party.

Among the first tasks undertaken by the new PDPA government was to launch a programme of socio-economic reform and modernization. Some of the measures proposed were essentially populist in character, such as the reduction or cancellation of debts owed by farmers and limitations on land holdings. Others went to the heart of tribal customs and society: the emancipation of women, the obligatory education of girls, the abolition of child marriages and excessive dowries etc.

The reactions to these measures were not long in coming and were reminiscent of those which had greeted the reforms of Amanullah 50 years earlier. By the end of 1978 the government was confronted by more or less spontaneous tribal insurrections in one region of the country after another. In this instance the tribal chieftains were joined by a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan, Islamist political movements. The Islamists were not only strongly opposed to the government's reforms, but were also horrified by the fact that it had concluded a formal treaty of friendship and cooperation with the godless, officially atheistic Soviet Union. Throughout 1979 the PDPA government steadily lost what little control it had of the country and by the end of the year was about to be overthrown. It was saved *in extremis* by the Soviet invasion.

## *Lessons of History?*

Is there anything which NATO governments can or should learn from these two episodes in Afghanistan's history? Henry Ford famously said that all history is bunk. George Santayana equally famously said that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it. Somewhere in between lies the injunction of the distinguished Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan who wrote that we can derive lessons from history, but that we should do so carefully.

Without subscribing to any particular notion of historical inevitability, what those past experiences suggest is that before pressing any particular set of reforms on the Afghan government, NATO governments should ascertain the extent to which they are acceptable to the Afghan population at large. What this means in practice is not relying on consultations with educated urban elites, but ascertaining the sentiments of the tribal groupings in the hinterland far removed from Kabul. This is no easy task, but failure to undertake it may well result in the creation of a system of governance not only sure to further alienate the Taliban, but also much larger segments of the population, with predictable consequences in the longer term.

As in all things, a degree of realism and pragmatism should inform the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The central objective has been and should be a secure and stable Afghanistan free of Taliban rule and of the presence of Al Qaeda, an Afghanistan no longer host to elements which pose a threat to the West and its interests. If that Afghanistan more faithfully reflects its inherent tribal conservatism and traditionalism rather than the ideals of a liberal democracy, so be it. ©





## AFGHANISTAN – OUR TROOPS AND THE CONFLICT

by Thomas S. Caldwell

Having recently returned from an intensive tour of the Kabul and Kandahar regions of Afghanistan, I feel it important to communicate a civilian's perspective. This mission involved numerous briefings with Afghan government, diplomatic and aid officials as well as military of all ranks from varying countries.

Military briefings extended from ISAF (International Security Assistance Force – the umbrella command and name for all forces serving in Afghanistan) headquarters to numerous visits to Forward Operating Bases. ISAF forces were both efficient and forthright in the planning and execution of the Defence Analysts' tour which I was part of.

First, let me say how very impressed I was with the high calibre of the men and women serving in our Forces in Afghanistan. Canadian troops are simply outstanding, from their positive attitudes, to their innovation through all ranks, to their professionalism and as "on the ground" diplomats.

I could go on for pages, but suffice to say, as a civilian businessman, I would love to see their capabilities and attitude of service more evident in the private sector.

Canadian troops and their exceptional commanders, from Brigadier-General Jon Vance down, are leaders in this counter insurgency conflict.

General Stanley McChrystal's (Senior U.S. and Allied Commander in Afghanistan) recent report has maple leaves all through it. His recommendations are, in great measure, reflective of the achievements of our Canadian troops in the Kandahar region.

For example, the new "clear, hold, build" policy is based on our troops now having enough "boots on the ground" to clear a town of Taliban and hold it, thus providing security for the villagers. Once this phase is completed we do our patrols on foot, live in the town and help the locals to rebuild.

A prime example is evidenced by Warrant Officer Chartrand of the Royal 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, whose foot patrols now have children holding his troops' hands (with their parents' permission) and locals often assisting in pointing out the location of explosive devices. This is at great danger to themselves.

Much of the unrest in the region is based upon three words – jobs, jobs, jobs. Canadians hire locals to rebuild

irrigation ditches, schools, hospitals and even areas of mosques. This deprives the Taliban of many paid recruits.

Counter insurgency is, to a significant degree, trying to replace a bad idea with a better one. As one Afghan said to me, "the Taliban did not build 1 km of road, you built hundreds". Our better idea is to build, heal and educate.

Afghans want to get on with their lives. Thirty years of conflict have devastated an already impoverished nation. In this regard, one great Canadian project is the Dahla Dam which will provide irrigation to over 10,000 acres and directly benefit the lives of 10,000 people. Kandahar Province used to be the bread basket of Afghanistan. It can be that again, with our help.

Our successful efforts at eradicating childhood polio are even recognized by the insurgents with "days of tranquility". These are just a few of the positives resulting from our presence, few of which seem to be reported.

Counter insurgency operations take time. It took the British more than 20 years in both Malaya and Northern Ireland. We are attempting peace making and rebuilding simultaneously. It is challenging. The arrival of American forces has enabled us to shrink our sphere of operations to the more immediate Kandahar City area and thus concentrate our efforts.

There will continue to be casualties, but our troops have volunteered for this dangerous and important task. They know the stakes and are witnessing results. It is interesting to note that one of the great punishments for our soldiers in Afghanistan is to be sent home.

Afghanistan is a new country, having really only started in 2002. Nation building is a sloppy business. There are problems with governance, corruption, illiteracy (87% of the population) and a lack of basic services. Kabul has only had reliable electricity for three months. Kandahar still does not have electricity for much of the time.

It will take time to build Afghanistan's institutions. Clearly, their electoral processes are deeply flawed, but remember, several revered U. S. leaders have stuffed ballot boxes in their resumes. This was Afghanistan's first election. The key point is that Afghans turned out at a higher percentage to vote than is often the case in the west. They did this despite threats of death. They are a brave people and the struggle is about them, not their current leaders.

*Thomas S. Caldwell is Chairman of Caldwell Securities Ltd.  
Mr. Caldwell serves on the Board of the Conference of Defence  
Associations Institute.*

(continued page 26)



THE CDA INSTITUTE  
and  
THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS

WISH TO THANK OUR SPONSORS FOR THEIR GENEROUS SUPPORT  
IN HONOUR OF THE 2009 RECIPIENTS OF



THE VIMY AWARD



THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

WARRANT OFFICER WILLIAM MACDONALD

BRIAN STEWART

Premier Sponsors

**GENERAL DYNAMICS**

*Strength On Your Side®*

**ATCO** Structures  
& Logistics



Airborne  
Underwater  
Geophysical  
Signals



**Pratt & Whitney Canada**

Une société de United Technologies / A United Technologies Company

Groupe  
**adga**  
Group



**SNC • LAVALIN**



Irving Shipbuilding Inc.

Co-sponsors of the Dinner



**Raytheon** Canada Limited

*Customer Success Is Our Mission*



L'INSTITUT DE LA CAD  
et  
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

REMERCIENT SES COMMANDITAIRES POUR LEUR APPUI GÉNÉREUX  
AUX LAURÉATS 2009



DU PRIX VIMY

ADJUDANT WILLIAM MACDONALD



DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

BRIAN STEWART

Commanditaires principaux

**GENERAL DYNAMICS**

*Strength On Your Side®*

**ATCO** Structures  
& Logistics



Airborne  
Underwater  
Geophysical  
Signals



**Pratt & Whitney Canada**

Une société de United Technologies / A United Technologies Company

Groupe  
**adga**  
Group



**SNC • LAVALIN**



Irving Shipbuilding Inc.

Co-commanditaires du dîner



Pacific Safety Products Inc.



**Raytheon** Canada Limited

*Customer Success Is Our Mission*



Our goal here is not to hand over a perfectly functioning democracy. Our goal is to build Afghanistan to the point where it can continue to evolve on its own.

The Taliban do control major swaths of the country but they are, in great measure, the wastelands. We control roughly 85% of the populated areas. This is where this conflict will be lost or won. One good sign is the traffic jams in Kabul and Kandahar. People are shopping, going to theatres, going out in the evenings and establishing myriad businesses. Yes, the insurgents can and will try to turn this back with bombings and assassinations.

On a personal basis, having witnessed first hand FLQ bombings in Montreal and the New York World Trade Centre attack, I am aware that terrorism is a fact of modern life everywhere.

I also know that planting bombs to kill people indiscriminately is the sign of an ideologically defeated cause. Seeing children with limbs blown off, along with a little child not expected to live through the night attest to that. We should always remember that the Taliban kill more Afghans than do foreigners.

The bottom line is that we are making a positive difference in people's lives in Afghanistan. We are rebuilding a shattered people and country. The Afghans want peace and prosperity as all of us do and, frankly, we are their only real hope.

Our troops know this and want to see this business through; however, we in the west have notoriously short time frames. Regrettably, we often make important geo-political

decisions for less important domestic political reasons. Obviously the locals worry about our long-term resolve. History gives them cause for concern.

Why we can and should win is illustrated in one simple story. A man in our sector farmed a patch of ground with his two sons. They had to cross a road to get to his field. Recently the two boys stepped on an implanted Taliban explosive. Both lads died and their father was understandably devastated.

One of our young Canadian soldiers had taken a picture of this man and his family a short time prior to the tragedy. Upon hearing of it, he had the picture enlarged and framed. He gave it to the man as a memorial.

In a region with no real communications several local villages knew of that simple act of compassion within days. Compassion and respect are important factors in combating terrorists and that is why we can and must prevail.

The risk is that without even "measured" success, the region, possibly Pakistan and even India (both nuclear powers) may well be destined for even greater tragedy.

It was an honour for me to be briefly associated with some truly incredible young Canadians who have put themselves in harm's way to help others.

A day after returning to Canada, I waited for my wife outside a store in Toronto and watched families walk by. I felt I should tell every passerby how blessed we are to live in this magnificent country. Our troops are trying to give a little bit of what we have to strangers in a torn land far away.

Thank you to all of them. ©



## Une mission pour les Canadiens ou pour les Afghans?

par Rémi Landry

Je reviens d'un court séjour en Afghanistan, dont 2 jours passés à Kaboul et 3 à Kandahar. Malgré cette brève visite, j'ai été à même de constater les progrès accomplis dans plusieurs domaines par la contribution canadienne, tout en réalisant l'amplitude des nombreux besoins qui restent à combler afin de permettre au peuple afghan de voler de ses propres ailes. Mon propos se limitera à la contribution canadienne et aux changements qui s'y sont opérés depuis ma dernière visite en 2004. J'ai aussi cherché à répondre à la question : pourquoi tant de vétérans de l'Afghanistan se portent-ils volontaires pour un deuxième et même un troisième tour, ceci malgré les dangers inhérents à la mission et une opinion publique canadienne de plus défavorable?

*Rémi Landry est doctorant et chercheur associé au GERSSI de l'Université de Montréal.*

La visite fut organisée par la division des affaires publiques des Forces canadiennes avec la collaboration des divers ministères appuyant la mission. L'objectif était de permettre à un groupe de commentateurs et d'analystes militaires de renouer avec la conjoncture afghane de la mission canadienne. Nous avons pu avoir accès aux diverses autorités canadiennes et afghanes, de même qu'à certaines de la Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (FIAS) et de l'Opération Liberté immuable, nous fûmes ainsi introduits à leurs réalisations, leurs échecs, leurs projets, et à leur volonté intarissable de contribuer aux mieux-être des afghans. Lors des quelques moments libres dont nous disposons, nous avons pu rencontrer des militaires de tous grades, ainsi que certains afghans, pour des discussions informelles.

(voir p. 28)



**26<sup>th</sup> ANNUAL SEMINAR of the  
CDA Institute  
and  
73<sup>rd</sup> ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING  
of the  
Conference of Defence Associations  
(CDA)  
3-4 March 2010**



**26<sup>e</sup> SÉMINAIRE de  
l'Institut de la CAD  
et  
73<sup>e</sup> ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRAL  
ANNUELLE  
de la Conférence des associations de  
la défense (la CAD)  
3-4 mars 2010**

**Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON**

The 26<sup>th</sup> annual seminar, *Protecting Canada's National Interests in an Uncertain World*, will be presented by the CDA Institute on Wednesday, 3 March, commencing at 0815 hrs. Participants will include Dr. Eliot Cohen, Admiral Gary Roughead, Mr. Richard Holbrooke (invited), Mr. Bill Roggio, Dr. Rob Huebert, Ms. Lyse Doucet, Mr. Chris Alexander, Dr. David Kilcullen, Ms. Margaret Purdy, Dr. Charles Doran, and Dr. Fen Hampson.

4 March, 0815 – 1645 hrs – *Power Projection and the Canadian Forces: Resources and Capabilities* Addresses by: the Hon. Peter MacKay, General Walter Natynczyk, and General David Petraeus. Participants will also include Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara, Dr. Jack Granatstein, Dr. Douglas Bland, Lieutenant-général (Ret) Michel Maisonneuve, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Dr. Christopher Waddell, Mr. Brian Stewart and M. Jocelyn Coulon.

**Registration Fees** (includes reception 3 March):

• CDA Institute donors, Seminar Sponsors, CDA Member Associations and Associate Member Associations	\$200
• full-time students (Captain/Lt (N) and below)	\$30
• all others	\$275
• luncheon	\$25
• mess dinner	\$90

**Enquiries and individual registration** online by 21 February, at:  
<http://www.eplyevents.com/cda-cdai2010>

**Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON**

Le 26<sup>e</sup> Séminaire annuelle de l'Institut de la CAD, intitulé *La protection des intérêts nationaux du Canada dans un monde d'incertitudes*, aura lieu mercredi, le 3 mars, à 8 h 15. M. Eliot Cohen, l'amiral Gary Roughead, M. Richard Holbrooke (invité), M. Bill Roggio, M. Rob Huebert, Mme. Lyse Doucet, M. Chris Alexander, M. David Kilcullen, Mme. Margaret Purdy, M. Charles Doran, et M. Fen Hampson, feront partie au séminaire.

Le 4 mars, 8 h 15 – 16 h 45 – *La projection de puissance et les Forces canadiennes: ressources et capacités*. Présentations par: l'Hon. Peter MacKay, le Général Walter Natynczyk, et General David Petraeus. Le Brigadier-général (Ret) W. Don Macnamara, M. Jack Granatstein, M. Douglas Bland, le Lieutenant-général (Ret) Michel Maisonneuve, le Vice-amiral Dean McFadden, le Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, le Lieutenant-général André Deschamps, M. Christopher Waddell, et M. Jocelyn Coulon, feront partie de l'assemblée générale annuelle.

**Frais d'inscription** (incluant la réception du 3 mars):

• donateurs de l'Institut de la CAD, les commanditaires à la séminaire, membres et membres associés de la CAD	200 \$
• étudiants à temps plein (équivalent du grade capitaine/Lt (N) ou inférieur)	30 \$
• les autres	275 \$
• le déjeuner	25 \$
• dîner au mess	90 \$

**Renseignements et enregistrement**, avant le 21 février, à notre website:

<http://www.eplyevents.com/cda-cdai2010>

C'est ma deuxième visite à Kaboul depuis 2004 et j'avoue ne pas avoir reconnu la Ville, tant il y a de nouveaux édifices et de nombreux chantiers en construction. De plus, nous nous sommes déplacés en 4X4, sans escortes, circulant sur ses principales artères et constatant la densité et la nature variée du trafic urbain. De plus, il fut étonnant d'y constater l'intensité de l'activité humaine qui n'apparaît aucunement être prise en otage par un niveau de sécurité qui ne peut prévenir les attentats meurtriers et leur progression sur l'ensemble du territoire. Il semble bien que la volonté afghane de renouer avec le progrès et de joindre le 21<sup>e</sup> siècle soit plus forte que la peur générée par les taliban.

---

*...le changement le plus visible est le degré d'intégration de la mission entre les différents ministères et agences canadiennes sur place, et l'unicité de l'effort qui s'en dégage.*

---

D'une perspective canadienne, le changement le plus visible est le degré d'intégration de la mission entre les différents ministères et agences canadiennes sur place, et l'unicité de l'effort qui s'en dégage. En effet, en plus d'être manifestes à tous les paliers du gouvernement afghan, les centres de coordination canadiens sont colocalisés avec leurs représentants, tant au siège du gouverneur de Kandahar qu'à celui des districts. Cette coordination incessante, même si laborieuse, garantit que l'effort sur le terrain optimisera nos ressources, tout en permettant de prioriser et de répondre aux besoins des citoyens afghans.

La partition du territoire de Kandahar avec les troupes américaines, depuis l'été dernier, a de plus permis au Canada de concentrer ses efforts militaires que dans certains districts, où près de 80 % de la population provinciale réside. Le résultat fut de permettre, en l'espace de quelques mois, un meilleur ratio de troupes militaires canadiennes et afghanes dans certains villages du district de Dan, banlieue sud-ouest de la ville de Kandahar, améliorant ainsi leur niveau de sécurité et obtenant le niveau de stabilité requis pour entraîner l'accélération et la densité du travail de l'équipe de reconstruction provinciale selon les besoins des autorités locales. Les progrès ne tardèrent à se manifester, c'est d'ailleurs un de ces villages, celui de Deh-eBāgh, qui fut visité par les autorités de la FIAS, pour exemplifier la nouvelle stratégie de contre insurrection, fondée sur le rétablissement de l'ordre en passant par le bien être des afghans.

Avec un territoire réduit et disposant d'un ratio de troupes plus élevé, le Canada a pu concentrer ses efforts dans l'établissement et le renforcement de centres multinationaux de coordination au niveau des districts. L'accent fut aussi mis sur l'appui et l'amélioration des capacités d'intervention afghane, tant civile, militaire que policière. Entre autres, dans le district de Dan la présence canadienne, en plus d'être colocalisée avec les autorités gouvernementales, a permis la mise sur pied d'un centre d'appel de type 911, géré par les autorités afghanes. Les résidents peuvent le rejoindre afin de communiquer des informations sur la sécurité du district. Il

est intéressant de constater que plusieurs familles sont dotées de téléphones cellulaires.

La sécurité demeure toujours problématique et les décès récents du lieutenant Boyes et du sapeur Marshall, 132<sup>e</sup> et 133<sup>e</sup> victimes militaires, nous rappellent la détérioration croissante qu'elle a connue depuis les deux dernières années. On peut se demander si la persistance de cette insécurité ne vient pas contrer les progrès accomplis depuis le début de la mission. Nous constatons aussi que depuis l'arrivée des Canadiens à Kandahar en 2006 les demi-mesures prises par la communauté internationale sur l'Afghanistan n'ont pas été à la hauteur des défis posés par les insurgés.

C'est d'ailleurs ce qui explique, en partie, pourquoi les taliban représentent toujours une menace pour faire dérailler la mission internationale, non pas parce qu'ils ont la capacité militaire de vaincre les militaires de la FIAS, mais en raison de leur résilience et leur adaptabilité. En effet, depuis le début ils ont su rajuster leurs stratégies, leurs tactiques et malgré des moyens limités ils ont su garder une certaine initiative. Et, contrairement aux forces de la coalition, ils ont toujours été en mesure d'influencer l'opinion mondiale et afghane à leurs fins. De plus, les taliban ont l'avantage du temps et, concilié avec la brutalité et la terreur de leurs actions ils parviennent toujours à terroriser leur propre population, afin de s'approprier leur appui, ou du moins leur silence. Se faisant, ils nourrissent, jour après jour, l'opinion publique mondiale de leur apparente indéfectibilité, de l'indifférence de la population afghane, et de la futilité à chercher à transformer ce vaste pays, plus vieux que l'occident.


Selon ce constat, comment alors expliquer que tant de militaires veulent y retourner et croient au succès de cette mission?

La réponse est simple, contrairement à ce qui est véhiculé dans les médias, les militaires ne sont pas principalement utilisés pour combattre et débusquer les insurgés. Au contraire, les efforts de la mission canadienne sont consacrés à nourrir chez les afghans l'espoir qu'il est possible de transformer leur quotidien d'insécurité et de survie en de meilleures conditions.

C'est ce que j'ai vu à l'hôpital militaire de Kandahar où quatre petites filles afghanes luttèrent pour leur vie, victimes d'engins explosifs improvisés ou de mines. Elles étaient entourées de leurs proches, qui avaient confié leurs sorts à de purs étrangers, dont des femmes, qui ne reculaient devant rien pour les maintenir en vie. Le dévouement et l'engagement du personnel médical présent se lisaient dans leurs yeux, ils étaient solidaires d'un même objectif, soulager la souffrance et sauver des vies, souvent au détriment de leur propre santé. Nous, moi et mes collègues, les regardions bouche bée, incapables de dire le moindre mot, les larmes aux yeux, mais fiers d'appartenir à cette solidarité humaine qui cherche à contribuer au mieux-être des peuples et des individus en besoin.

Et que dire de l'adjudant Chartrand dans son petit village de Belandey qui, avec un franc parlé et une conviction à déplacer des montagnes, commente les succès que son équipe a obtenus auprès des ses habitants. Convaincu






*The Army Ball*  
**2010**

**Hotel Hilton Lac Leamy, Gatineau**  
**24 April 2010**

Cocktails 6:00 pm   Dinner 7:00 pm   Dance 10:00 pm

Price \$100 per person

Order your tickets through the Army Officers' Mess  
149 Somerset Street West, Ottawa  
(613) 236-0186 ext 227  
[www.army.forces.gc.ca/armyball/](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/armyball/)

**ARMY**  **ARMÉE**

**TICKETS NOW ON SALE**



*Le Bal*  
*de l'Armée*  
*de terre*  
**2010**

**Hôtel Hilton Lac Leamy, Gatineau**  
**24 avril 2010**

Cocktails 18h00   Dîner 19h00   Danse 22h00

Prix 100 \$ par personne

Réservez vos billets au Mess des Officiers de l'Armée de terre  
149, ouest rue Somerset, Ottawa  
(613) 236-0186 poste 227  
[www.armee.forces.gc.ca/baldelarmee/](http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/baldelarmee/)

**ARMY**  **ARMÉE**

**BILLETS EN VENTE MAINTENANT**

l'adjudant Chartrand nous informait que la culture la langue et la religion n'étaient pas des obstacles quand vient le temps d'aider des gens, comme il l'avait appris en Bosnie. Son approche respectueuse et empathique envers les villageois a su contrer toutes leurs inquiétudes et ne tarda pas à avoir un effet d'entraînement auprès des habitants des autres villages contigus.

On veut la présence et l'appui des Canadiens afin de reconstruire son village et où les talibans ne sont plus les bienvenus. C'est un processus qui nécessite une certaine patience, tout en s'assurant que les projets réalisés par les villageois sont les leurs, et graduellement la dynamique et les interactions avec le village se transforment. L'image d'enfants afghans qui prennent la main de soldats canadiens et qui les interpellent par leur nom m'apparaît tout à fait inusitée dans un pays où les étrangers, culturellement, ne sont pas les bienvenus. Et que dire des habitants qui saluent les militaires au lieu de les fuir et qui coopèrent de bonne foi avec la police afghane, que l'on aide à remplir son rôle? Les interactions sont à un tel niveau que la majorité des engins explosifs improvisés et des activités illicites des insurgés sont rapportés en grande partie par les villageois. Lors de notre rencontre avec le représentant du district de Dan, ses inquiétudes concernaient le départ de l'adjudant Chartrand

et le retrait annoncé des Canadiens, qui les remplacerait et leur permettrait de repousser les talibans.

De voir nos militaires avec leurs semblables des autres ministères s'investir auprès des Afghans, de travailler avec eux à améliorer leur sort et à construire leur futur, n'est-ce pas la manière canadienne? On reproche aux autorités canadiennes d'avoir laissé tomber l'héritage 'pearsonien' des bérets/casques bleus, mais en ce début de 21<sup>e</sup> siècle faut-il porter un casque bleu pour faire la promotion et défendre les valeurs canadiennes, dont celle de la solidarité humaine et du concept de l'intervention humanitaire?

Certes, il s'en trouvera toujours pour critiquer et c'est nécessaire, afin d'améliorer l'efficacité et de questionner les pratiques douteuses. Mais cette mission, ne l'oublions pas, est bel et bien légitime et est renouvelée annuellement par la communauté internationale depuis 2002, au même titre que toutes les autres missions onusiennes, qui ont aussi leur lot de problèmes. De plus, personne ne nous a contraints de l'accepter et nous avons voulu y faire une différence, la façon canadienne, en y investissant d'énormes ressources dont les impacts sont toujours en cours. Ne serait-il donc pas inapproprié d'abandonner ces afghans, sous prétexte que la mission d'aide est impossible et futile, ou qu'il est temps de se retirer parce que nous en avons assez fait, peu



importe les conséquences? Et, qu'advient-il lorsque nous déciderons d'aider un autre pays dans le besoin, nous faudra-t-il nous assurer que la future mission garantisse un succès à l'intérieur d'un temps limite? Aider, non pas ceux qui en ont le plus besoin, mais seulement ceux qui peuvent s'en sortir et qui nécessitent un minimum d'aide? Quel message le Canada cherche-t-il à envoyer? Est-on toujours animé ce trait culturel de resquillage qui nous a animés dans les années 199, soit en faire le moins possible avec nos alliés pour en bénéficier le plus possible, tout en se donnant bonne conscience?

N'oublions pas, nous sommes dans une année de transition en Afghanistan et les facteurs qui ont déterminé la fin de notre effort à l'été 2011, ne sont plus les mêmes. Entre autres, en 2006 seul le groupement tactique canadien

était présent pour sécurité de Kandahar, aujourd'hui plus de 10 y sont déployés, dont cinq bataillons afghans et quatre groupements tactiques américains. Les décisions d'hier sont-elles irrévocables, n'est-ce pas l'attitude contraire que nos gouvernements ont adoptée au cours des dernières années? En effet, la solution d'hier, compte tenu du contexte présent, n'est peut-être plus la plus rentable pour demain, tant pour nos intérêts que pour ceux de la mission, et des habitants du pays que l'on veut aider.

À la veille de Noël, ayons une pensée pour tous ceux et celles qui sont au service du Canada à l'étranger, et pour ceux et celles qui ont donné leur vie au service de la paix. N'oublions pas, ce sont leurs sacrifices et ceux de leur famille qui nous permettent de pouvoir encore rêver à un meilleur futur. ©



## Impressions of Afghanistan

by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald

Seven representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and CDA Institute were recently privileged to visit Afghanistan. An intense five-day program, coordinated by the Department of National Defence (DND), facilitated our exposure to a wide range of strategic and tactical issues. This article will briefly address the trip's more memorable experiences, emphasizing aspects of the Afghanistan situation which might be less familiar to those who have not had such a firsthand opportunity.

The group consisted of General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers, Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Rémi Landry, Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gilles Paradis, CDA Board Member Tom Caldwell, and myself, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George MacDonald. The DND program coordinator was Clarence Roussel from the National Department Headquarters (NDHQ) Directorate for External Communications and Public Relations, and our accompanying officer was Colonel Richard Giguère, Director of Current Operations in the Strategic Joint Staff at NDHQ.

Staging through the Canadian Forces (CF) Middle East support base, Camp Mirage, the group spent two days in the capital, Kabul and three in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan. In addition to a program at the Kandahar Air Field (KAF), we spent considerable time "outside the wire"

visiting the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and other sites where Canadians are carrying out their duties.

We met with senior Afghan officials, staff at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters, Canadian officials in Kabul and Kandahar and, most importantly, Canadians serving in Task Force Kandahar (TFK). We were left with a deluge of impressions about the country, its people, and about the ISAF mission.

Kabul is a bustling city with traffic jams, people out and about and businesses popping up everywhere. Notwithstanding the long road ahead, there has been dramatic progress since the "ground zero" start in 2002. Western nations need to recognize that Afghanistan, economically fragile and ravaged by three decades of war and oppression, is not going to turn around in the space of a few years. The fact that they have conducted national elections, dramatically increased educational opportunities and continue to find alternatives to poppy cultivation signals dramatic positive change. This is a longer term undertaking. Afghanistan is a country fighting for its survival. We need to do what we can to get it to a point where it can evolve on its own.

Throughout, we were most impressed by the professionalism and dedication of CF members serving in Afghanistan. Their personal commitment to the mission is a powerful testament to the progress that has been made in Kandahar province. National media coverage of Afghanistan frequently depicts firefights with the Taliban and Canadian casualties. We often don't hear about the progress that is being made by TFK, which was under the leadership of Brigadier-General Jon Vance during our visit.

With the influx of American reinforcements over the past several months, Canadians have been able to consolidate

*Lieutenant-General (Retired) George Macdonald joined CFN Consultants in 2005 after serving 38 years in the Canadian Forces, culminating in the position of Vice Chief of the Defence Staff from following three years as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. He is the Honorary National President of the Air Force Association of Canada.*





*The visiting group kitted up for Afghanistan. From L-R: Colonel Richard Giguère, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers, Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gilles Paradis, Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin, Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Rémi Landry, Monsieur Clarence Roussel, Mister Tom Caldwell, and General (Ret'd) Paul Manson.*

their area of operations and adopt a more robust approach to protecting the population and enabling development. Rather than simply clearing an area of Taliban, the task force is now able to hold villages, providing the security necessary for inhabitants to work on local projects and establish business activities to energize their economy. Ultimately, Afghans seek only what anyone else would want—to live in peace and work to earn a living for them and their families. Understandably, they would like to provide a better future for their children.

Canadians are directly enabling this to happen and we repeatedly saw evidence of it. In one village, Deh-e-Bagh (commonly referred to as the “model village”), Canada has embarked upon a number of community development projects. Canada provided the wherewithal to rebuild the local district headquarters after it was bombed by insurgents several months ago. Damages to a local mosque have been repaired, irrigation ditches cleared, and solar-powered lighting installed in the market area.

The employment opportunities that have been provided by these and other local projects are fundamental to helping Afghans help themselves. The CF currently employ 750 Afghan workers now, are expanding to 1,000 in the near future, and could engage many more for the longer term. This has really struck a chord among Afghans. At the time of our visit, dozens of men were gathered outside the district headquarters seeking employment, and village elders throughout the region have approached the Canadian contingent for a piece of the action. Insurgents are being turned out of villages and Taliban recruitment is down.

In another village, Balanday, where the Vandoos coexist with a contingent of Afghan National Police right in the village, peace and stability are burgeoning. The police are learning the fundamentals of community policing, the locals (and their children) welcome soldiers on foot patrol, and intelligence on potential improvised explosive device (IED) locations is volunteered to the Canadians. At another stop, Forward Operating Base Wilson, we observed the work of the Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) with the Afghan National Army. The size and competence of the army continues to grow with training assistance from ISAF forces. In the end, they will need to assume the responsibility to provide security to the population and they are slowly working towards this goal with ISAF help.

Despite the progress resulting from Canadian efforts in Afghanistan, it remains a war zone. Insurgents are present throughout the country, but especially in the south. Kandahar is the source of the Taliban movement and will not be fully cleared of insurgents easily. As their other tactics have become progressively more ineffective, the insurgency has increasingly resorted to IEDs. Even though this suggests an enemy's desperation from a military perspective, the threat is real and is treated seriously. That is why the introduction of a medium-heavy lift helicopter capability into theatre in 2009 has been so popular.

Following the Manley Panel Report of 2008, the government committed to acquiring a small fleet of Chinook model D helicopters from the US Army. Additionally, Canadian Griffon utility helicopters have been sent to KAF



to support the mission and fly as escorts for the Chinooks. This has proven to be extremely effective, with extensive rotary wing operations being conducted throughout the area of operations every day. We flew on a Chinook several times to get from point to point and can attest to their operational efficiency.

Additionally, the air wing in Afghanistan has the responsibility for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations through a leasing agreement and has two Hercules tactical transport aircraft for use in Afghanistan and for transport to and from Camp Mirage.

Users are delighted with the support being provided throughout. The Canadian Air Wing has demonstrated a very high level of professionalism and a degree of responsiveness and flexibility that other coalition partners have not provided.

Another significant Canadian contribution has been the Role 3 hospital at KAF. Initially intended to be a one-year commitment, Canadians have commanded this facility for over 3½ years with a rotational staff of 100 or more Canadian medical personnel. While the hospital has been handed over to the Americans, there will still be more than two dozen Canadians at the hospital, which has some awesome capabilities.

Serious casualties can be in surgery within ten minutes of landing at the nearby helipad. While the majority of the patients are coalition personnel, Afghans are also treated. This includes some heart wrenching cases where young children have lost limbs or sustained other serious injuries from IEDs or mines.

The most striking impression left by our visit was the potential effectiveness of a sound counter insurgency strategy. Canadians are focusing on a “clear, hold and build” approach in the TFK area of operations and the early successes are very promising. Job one is the protection of the area in and around Kandahar City where 85 percent of the population lives. This means that the insurgents will find it increasingly difficult to access this area and influence the population, with the result that they will be relegated more and more to the outlying countryside.

The key to this approach’s success will be the promise of a better future for Afghans, as represented by a healthier, growing economy; better governance with good national and sub-national coordination; and reliable protection provided by the Afghan army and police. Military defeat of the insurgency is not realistic, but reducing their fighting capabilities and ability to intimidate the population will eventually render them less and less relevant in the Afghanistan of the future.



*Chinook operations at Canadian Forward Operating Base in Kandahar Province.*

There is hope for Afghanistan. There will continue to be ISAF tactical setbacks due to IED strikes or suicide bomber attacks, but the probability for a brighter future is very real. Canadian military personnel and their Canadian colleagues from other government departments are making inroads.

Notwithstanding the Government’s declared intent to withdraw from the military mission in 2011, there remains much that we can—and should—do to continue to provide assistance. There is too much at stake, and too much already invested, for us to discontinue development assistance. Security and protection provided by a military force, be it the ANA, ISAF forces, or a combination of both, will be needed for some time yet.

It is in our national interests, consistent with our values as Canadians, and appropriate with the aims of the United Nations-sanctioned mission in this volatile region of





## The 2009 Tour of Transatlantic Opinion Leaders to Afghanistan

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

As the Conference of Defence Associations' (CDA) Senior Defence Analyst, I was pleased to accept an invitation from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division to participate in this year's Transatlantic Opinion Leaders Tour to Afghanistan. The group consisted of academic and policy analysts from ten NATO countries including Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Three of us had prior military experience and all were active in the international relations/strategic studies area in our home countries. The group interacted in a friendly and productive manner, which facilitated a most useful sharing of ideas and impressions.

The tour comprised eight days of briefings in Kabul except for one day in Kandahar, plus one in Brussels. Afghan briefers included the Speaker of Parliament plus Parliamentary committee Chairs, the Minister of Defence, the Deputy Minister of Rural Development, the Commander of the Kabul Military Training Centre, a Senior Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, and other officials.

NATO and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) briefers included Commander ISAF, the NATO Deputy Senior Civilian Representative, the Head of Mission of EUROPOL (the police mission), the European Union Special Representative, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan staff including the Head Donor of Coordination and the Senior Advisor on Aid Effectiveness, the Deputy Chief of Staff Stabilization, the Electoral Complaints Commission Chairman, and officials of the United States Embassy.

We visited the Kabul Military Training Centre, the Counter Insurgency Academy, and one of the Canadian Stabilization Companies which are part of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team.

Briefings, for the most part, were not for attribution, so the following is really a personal reflection on the major lines of thought among the participants as we digested the torrent of briefings and tried to make an overall assessment.

We were certainly conscious of the complex relationship between international actors. "Stovepiping" seems to be a chronic phenomenon—different agencies working in isolation towards the same goal and failing to coordinate their efforts. This phenomenon is noticeable among different international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and national and international security forces, as well as Afghan government agencies.

These stovepipes can be broadly grouped into three areas: governance (in both a macro and a micro nature), development and the economy, and security. (A companion paper by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald in this issue of *On Track* describes another CDA visit coordinated by the Department of National Defence, which centred on Kandahar rather than Kabul and focuses on security issues, particularly with respect to the Canadian Forces. The remainder of this paper will, therefore, concentrate more on the first two stovepipes.)

One exception to note was the strong sense that time was of critical importance. This was driven by the expressed intentions of the Netherlands to withdraw its forces in 2010 and Canada to withdraw by the end of 2011, and the fear that these two early moves might encourage other states to withdraw. At the same time, the very senior military officers briefing us estimated that it would take four years for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to develop a self-sufficient security apparatus. Consequently, the Dutch and Canadian withdrawal decisions could compromise the success of the mission.

### Governance

The tour participants examined the governance issue in two dimensions. The first was at the individual or micro level, manifested in widespread corruption, such as the massive exercise in ballot stuffing which destroyed the credibility of the electoral process of the recent presidential election or the endemic practice of bribery. The other was at the state organizational model, or macro, level.

Much has been written about the first but few authors seem to consider the second. The tour participants, however, gradually began to think that severe organizational problems persisted. This has resulted in a very weak sub-national governance structure, especially at the district level though also at the provincial level. These problems are exacerbated by concerns over the executive-parliamentary relationship.

Parliamentarians, for example, lament their relative exclusion from executive decisions. Others feel that the presidential appointment of provincial and district governors with little or no input from provincial and district assemblies does not provide enough scope to achieve local priorities.

Sub-national levels of government are also hampered by an inadequate budget and limited staff resources. These weaknesses contribute to the government's inability to provide infrastructure and social programmes at the

---

*Colonel MacDonald is the CDA's Senior Defence Analyst and a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.*



provincial and district level that more developed countries consider routine.

### *Development and the Economy*

It is deeply frustrating to see how little real attention is paid by the international media to the area of development and growth in the Afghan national economy. The reality is that, according to figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank, the Afghan economy from 2002 to 2010 (estimates for 2009 and 2010) has grown at an average annual rate of 12.7 percent—a growth rate which exceeds that of China. While it is certainly correct to point out that this growth is from a very small base, the fact remains that the Afghan national economy is experiencing very real growth.

Growth in GDP per capita is also positive, though not yet adequate to deal with the very large labour surplus. And this labour surplus is, in turn, a principle factor in the strength of the Taliban. Put simply, “Young Men with No Jobs and No Prospects” turn to jobs with the Taliban as their only economic choice. And so the improvised explosive device (IED) job season has come to succeed the poppy harvest job season with inevitable regularity.

As briefed during our too-short Kandahar visit, this is what makes the Canadian “model village” programmes remarkably successful. The Canadian analysis of the seasonal job market pattern led to a focus on alternative employment for the “Young Men with No Jobs and No Prospects,” by spending the winter drinking gallons of tea with the local village elders (including the local Imams) to determine what small infrastructure projects would be their priorities if support money were available. As a result of this consultation the Canadians were able, at the end of the poppy harvest employment season, to offer infrastructure jobs to the “Young Men with No Jobs and No Prospects” such that jobs with the Taliban were no longer required. And since repairs to the local mosque were also on the job list the influence of the Imams was added to that of the elders. The level of violence dropped precipitously.

The Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development has also developed a somewhat similar programme which now covers 78 percent of the country. Grants equivalent to \$200 per person are offered to groups ranging from about 20 to 200 persons who submit applications. Projects deemed suitable require a 10 percent contribution from the group, which can be paid in the form of money, goods, or labour.

Yet another useful series of projects are those undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture to provide high quality seed wheat to farmers. With opium prices down because of the huge market overhang of opium in inventory, and with planting, tillage, and harvesting costs for wheat less than half that of poppy, and with wheat prices up because of lower global production, the trade-off between poppy and wheat is less favourable to poppy. Add increased production because of better seed and the trade-offs get better still (now, if we could just get the NGOs to buy their wheat for food distribution in Afghanistan instead of importing it and driving down the internal Afghan prices...).

It does not take a momentous “Adam Smith Moment” to realize that the major basis of the economy is agricultural and therefore investments in agriculture will prove most effective.

### *Conclusion*

There is no question that there are a lot of bad things going on in Afghanistan. But the 2009 NATO Transatlantic Opinion Leaders Tour to Afghanistan was able to show the other side of the coin, one that the media often neglects—there are a lot of good things going on in Afghanistan too. And it is important to the Afghans, and to us, that the Canadians stay engaged in Afghanistan and allow the coalition to build on the success of the model villages and the other “Adam Smith Moments.” ©



## From Mentoring to Partnering: the changing nature of Afghan army-building

by Captain G. Bruce Rolston

*From September 2008 to April 2009 Captain Rolston was the intelligence officer responsible for the Canadian OMLT, and intelligence mentor for 1 Bde, 205 ANA Corps. While he was with them 1 Bde HQ was rated Capability Milestone 1 by American military evaluators. He received a CEFCEOM Commander's Commendation for his service. Captain Rolston has since returned to his civilian occupation, as an information management specialist with the University of Toronto. – ed.*

In August, the new commander of ISAF (COMISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, urged a “radical” change to the mentoring of the Afghan National Army (ANA), with a new emphasis on what he called “full partnership”: the integration of headquarters, joint planning, and physical co-location. COMISAF's comments reflect widespread dissatisfaction with the development of ANA to date.

McChrystal is hardly the only critic. The time required to train a self-sufficient Afghan army sometimes seems unfathomable. Even a cursory review of Canadian history reveals that it successfully rallied armies of new soldiers for two world wars and trained them to world-class standards in much less time. Too simplistic a comparison? Perhaps. But, after all, when a commander-in-chief calls for a radical strategic shift in the middle of a war, the obvious conclusion is that the preceding approach was flawed.

As the Canadian Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team's (OMLT) intelligence officer, returning in April 2009, I had participated in the former approach. And at that time, it was fair to say our ANA brigade's progress appeared to be levelling off. The development of the brigade's higher military functions, including my area of intelligence capacity, seemed to have peaked. Across ISAF, while OMLTs continued to have success in developing company-level light infantry leadership and basic soldier skills in all the ANA trades, further progress in the Afghans' ability to coordinate their own battalion- or higher-level activities appeared increasingly incremental.

It would be too easy to blame the Afghans themselves here. One really needs to discount the too-pat arguments on this score, whether cultural (Afghans are inscrutable or inherently corrupt), or motivational (their soldiers are poorly paid or have divided loyalties). While undoubtedly true of some individuals in any army, this was not characteristic of the Afghans we worked with. Goodwill between us was consistently mutual: for every issue on whose significance both armies agreed, we managed to find a solution.

Literacy and language barriers are hardly insur-

mountable either. Illiterate armies have been trained to fight before, as have bilingual ones. Technology-related excuses do not have traction either. While the complexity of building an army might be facilitated by greater digitization, effective armies have self-organized with much less. Instead of giving these sorts of excuses undue credence, the McChrystal critique addresses more fundamental, structural issues.

The first and most obvious structural impediment has been the lack of a common operating picture, largely due to ISAF-imposed restrictions on information sharing. The *Los Angeles Times*, reporting this past November, noted that even a request to establish a secure communication link for the first time between ISAF's new senior intelligence officer and the Afghan army's high command had initially been turned down. While the story reports the general has now secured his Afghan hotline, a year ago we were much less successful.

With perhaps five staff in their G2 cell, and no reconnaissance assets of their own to task, Afghan brigades are necessarily net consumers of intelligence. During my time in Kandahar, however, our Afghan counterparts received no intelligence of any significance from coalition sensors or analysts. Furthermore, critical operational manoeuvre detail about our own forces supposedly operating with Afghan brigades could be released only under the most herculean, regulations-defying efforts.

Physical access to our tactical operating centres (TOC) was also off-limits, making it difficult for Afghans to internalize how modern armies operate. As a result of these restrictions, we also concealed the professionalism, synergy, and information-rich environments of our battle group and task force-level TOCs. Like asking a blind man to describe an elephant, we were asking the Afghan Army to emulate something they had never seen or experienced.

Translation was another major barrier. At the time, Task Force Kandahar had extremely limited written translation resources. Mentors were dependent upon our local national interpreters, who had to return to an insecure city at night, often working on mentors' personal laptops to translate the large streams of written information that both armies were generating for the other's benefit. This combination of factors made it difficult to give them any of the formal benefits of our intelligence or planning capabilities.

Incorporating ISAF assets into an Afghan command structure was particularly challenging. In practice, coalition unit and sub-unit commanders operating within an Afghan scheme of manoeuvre struggled with ambiguous direction. Afghan planners, while capable of simple battle procedure, lacked the experience to conceptualize and plan effectively for all of our Western armies' “moving parts.” Attempts to loan the Afghan Army elements of those “moving parts”

*Captain Bruce Rolston is a member of the Army Reserve. He is second-in-command of 2 Intelligence Company in Toronto.*



encountered western resistance; some were concerned with the misallocation of resources to the potential advantage of the enemy.

Still, the ease in information-sharing that co-location afforded us during brigade-level field operations showed what could be possible. In our shared field command post I might only have had the SITREPs I heard over combat net radio, but I could turn to my Afghan counterpart and immediately discuss its meaning, whether he'd heard the same thing over his means, and how the brigade staff should respond. At the battalion (*kandak*) level and lower, mentors' closer proximity also led to more positive results. Mentoring schedules that only involved drop-in *chai* visits, however well-planned, seemed far less effective.

It should come as no surprise, then, that General McChrystal has called for "a radically improved partnership at every level, to improve effectiveness and prepare [Afghans] to take the lead in security operations." ISAF nations, he says, cannot expect Afghan higher headquarters to develop further unless we show them examples and build them together. Our Afghan counterparts need regular, reliable access to our operations and planning staff. On a practical level, this means putting our radio desks next to theirs and sharing our ISR monitoring stations; jointly interpreting the intelligence and distinguishing the farmers from the IED-planters in the process.

Fully embracing partnering will hopefully lead to other changes, such as improving our translation and research capacity. As mentioned, all military translation in Afghanistan, even of unclassified Afghan documents, has often "bottlenecked" through a few local interpreters. A



*The author at the intelligence desk of 1 ANA Brigade, Patrol Base Ashoqeh, Dec 2008. Afghan kandaks and brigades did not have the resources or sensors to be more than net consumers of intelligence, but Canadians were limited in what we could offer them.*

*Photo by Captain Brad Elms*

well-designed program, which capitalizes on e-mail and the large number of Dari- or Pashto-speakers in Toronto or Saskatoon, could easily have alleviated this. It is bizarre that we trust a Predator pilot flying from a trailer in Nevada with the ability to drop bombs in Afghanistan through an Internet connection, but if we want to translate an ANA memo or intelligence report, it needs to be done *in situ*.

Partnering also means that units working closely with the Afghans need to keep up. Afghan forces are logistically light, and therefore have more difficulty sustaining a prolonged operation. But they are also operationally nimble, ready to shift provinces to help out a neighboring Afghan brigade on short notice. This operational agility has helped compensate for insufficient numbers. But until recently, successful out-of-area deployments of Afghan *kandaks* and their mentors, as performed during my rotation twice into Helmand province, remained very much the exception. For partnering to work consistently and effectively, mentors and Western forces will need to be prepared to forego anything that prevents them from keeping pace.

A previous commander of the Canadian OMLT told a journalist recently that, "Lawrence of Arabia was an OMLT-er," meaning a role model for military mentors. That is true: T.E. Lawrence was one of the best, worthy of study.

But Lawrence didn't train the Arabs he worked with to fight as Westerners: he examined their strengths and weaknesses, helped them clarify their own plan, and then brought Western resources (machine guns, armoured cars, dynamite, mortars) and the tactics to employ them, incorporating and



*The author (right), talking with Afghan National Army Sergeant-Major (E-8) Bakhtiar, Camp Hero, October, 2008: local civilian interpreters were essential to all communications including written translation.*

*Photo by Master Corporal Rob Mueller*



adapting what worked well in our own way of war within theirs, seamlessly integrating Arab military culture with superior Western military technology. The result was the winning of independence of much of the Arab world from Turkish rule, at Arab hands, in a remarkably short period of time.

In many ways, we have been doing the opposite in Afghanistan, putting an adjunct “Afghan face” on a war

that we are fighting in the way we feel most comfortable. If we persist, our prospects for a stronger Afghan Army and a reduced reliance on Western forces will likely remain remote. Lawrence knew you could not teach people how to fight for their country. You might, however, be able to find the ones who wanted to, in their own way, and stand beside and enable them. It worked for him, and it will be approaches with that same spirit in mind that offer us our best hope for developing the Afghan Army now. ©



## Kandahar Lessons in Civil-Military Cooperation

by Dr. Kimberly Marten

*Dr. Marten is grateful to Karin Imas, Alain Pellerin, George Petrolekas, Stephen Saideman, and Joel Sokolsky for their help in arranging interviews, but her views are entirely her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of either the granting agency or these individuals. – ed.*

Canadians have witnessed duelling civilian and military perspectives and rivalries over the war in Afghanistan. The most prominent episode is the mutual finger-pointing found in two best-selling books—one by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, and the other by retired General Rick Hillier—about exactly who was responsible for the 2005 decision to deploy to Kandahar.<sup>1</sup> There have been other contentious issues surrounding Hillier’s time as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).<sup>2</sup> One unfortunate kerfuffle involved his Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan (SAT-A) initiative, designed to assist the government in Kabul with its development and aid generation efforts.<sup>3</sup>

Amidst all this conflict over Hillier and his role, there is a danger that the positive experiences of civil-military cooperation on the ground in the Canadian mission in Kandahar will be forgotten. This danger is especially acute because the Canadian military role in Kandahar is being increasingly overshadowed by the growing US military presence there, and another Kandahar-type operation for the Canadian Forces (CF) is unlikely anytime soon. After the current mission draws down in 2011, it would be surprising if sufficient political will could be generated for Canada to deploy a similarly dangerous and large-scale mission in a failing state for years to come.

Bureaucracies will move on to new tasks, and agencies that have historically viewed each other with suspicion may slide back into old patterns, unless there is a conscious (and well-resourced) effort to record these positive interagency

lessons in organizational memories. Otherwise the decision to draw on these positive experiences could depend entirely on the individuals who lived them.

The lessons could easily be lost to history if enough time passes before another operation like Kandahar arrives. This article is one small attempt by an outside observer to encourage the organizational memory process. It follows from interviews I was privileged to conduct with around two dozen Canadian military and civilian officials earlier this year.

Civil-military coordination success followed directly from the recommendations of the bipartisan Manley Panel Report of January 2008. While media reports about the panel focused on issues of inter-party harmony and recommendations for a CF exit date, the panel had another significant achievement: it managed to put together a strategic policy direction for Afghanistan that overcame a long history of tensions (especially about peace operations) that had developed between the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).<sup>4</sup> The Manley Report led to two major changes in how Canada administered its Afghanistan policy.

First, the Privy Council Office (PCO) established an Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) to coordinate and oversee the Afghanistan policies of all government departments and agencies involved, to keep them in line with the government’s strategic priorities. While there had been a similar PCO coordination effort over the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) in years past, there had never before been this kind of coordination on an issue involving a military deployment. Before the Manley Report, DFAIT had attempted to coordinate policy across agencies with its own Afghanistan Task Force (ATF), but that had not worked well.

The new PCO ATF did essentially what Hillier had suggested needed to be done in the defence policy statement that he crafted as the incoming CDS in 2005<sup>5</sup>: it ensured that Canadian efforts in Kandahar would follow a unified, well thought-out strategy as “Team Canada.” It enabled the

*Dr. Kimberly Marten is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Her research was supported by a Canadian Studies Grant from the Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC.*



government to act with a single clear voice and vision, doing for the civilian leadership what Hillier's establishment of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) had done for military command in Afghanistan (and elsewhere): streamlining and unifying policy decisions.

Many of the same personnel who had earlier been in the DFAIT ATF joined the new PCO ATF, but now it also included representatives from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and DND.<sup>6</sup>

One can criticize the PCO for going too far in message control on Afghanistan issues, something I experienced firsthand because few civilians were willing to go on-the-record in their interviews with me. One can also criticize the *content* of decisions made by the government, for example the controversial decision to focus all Canadian efforts on Kandahar rather than nationwide in Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup> But the *process* of the government's strategic coordination was a success in terms of directing people's actions toward common ends, and that was unprecedented.

The second major change was the creation of a civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). This, too, was unprecedented; in the past, the Canadian ambassador to a particular country had been the *de facto* coordinator for civilian operations on any mission, in amongst his or her diplomatic duties and time commitments. The full-time RoCK position was designed to align all civilian actions on the ground in Kandahar, so that everyone regardless of home department would coordinate their activities in a single strategic direction, maintaining PCO priorities and lending more focus, weight and authority to the civilian presence.

The RoCK and the military commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan (who is also responsible for commanding forces in Task Force Kandahar [TFK]) were tasked with synchronizing their actions, and worked to coordinate their public messages as well. A "synch board" began to meet weekly at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) to make sure there would be no duplication (or negative feedback) between civilian and military efforts in the aid distributed to the population.<sup>8</sup>

The RoCK and the TFK commander also began to attend all meetings with Afghan provincial officials together. While the military commander would lead the weekly security meeting and the RoCK would lead the weekly governance meeting, their joint presence was intended to send a message that Canada had a unified whole-of-government approach. It also ensured that there was sharing of information between the CF and civilian departments and agencies about the situation on the ground with Afghan authorities.

Everyone I interviewed agreed that coordination between the RoCK and the TFK commander has been surprisingly successful, and that Canadians from different agencies deployed in Kandahar have had an easier time working with each other on the ground than is often true back in Ottawa. The process was not always easy. The soldiers had to learn to share their space in Kandahar with a growing civilian presence; not only did the RoCK bring more authority to the civilian side of things, but the raw number of Canadian civilians in the field skyrocketed from 27 people in 2007 to

103 by early 2009.<sup>9</sup> Then, too, most of the civilians deployed in Kandahar had never been in a war zone before, and had never worked closely with the military.<sup>10</sup>

There was a lot of cross-cultural learning to be done. There were also security issues to negotiate for civilians going outside the wire, as the tragic death of diplomat Glyn Berry in 2006 had demonstrated their vulnerability.

Successful coordination was in part due to the presence of two compatible personalities. The first RoCK, starting in February 2008, was Elissa Golberg, a young diplomat who had earlier served as the executive director of the Manley Panel secretariat. Her job was made easier in May 2008 when Brigadier-General Denis Thompson became the TFK commander. Thompson had earlier been seconded to DFAIT, and had worked closely there with Golberg on Canada's responses to a number of international humanitarian crises. Thompson and his spouse had become family friends with Golberg.<sup>11</sup> This history helped them work together productively.

By October 2008, Thompson and Golberg together had written a joint operational philosophy document that became the Kandahar Action Plan, directing all civilian and military activities on the ground toward common goals.<sup>12</sup>

---

*...organizational cultural barriers fell as military and civilian personnel were forced to live and work side-by-side in close quarters at both Kandahar Air Field and the outlying KPRT.*

---

Beyond this connection of personalities, organizational cultural barriers fell as military and civilian personnel were forced to live and work side-by-side in close quarters at both Kandahar Air Field and the outlying KPRT. CIDA added some seconded military reservists to its own internal ATF, both in Ottawa and in the field, leading to a further sharing of perspectives and understanding. For the first time in spring 2009, more than 70 civilians participated in the CF's preparatory training course for the Kandahar deployment at CFB Wainwright in Alberta.<sup>13</sup>

It will take an unusual future crisis to garner the attention in Ottawa, in terms of both political capital and budgetary expenditure, that was necessary to make the whole-of-government approach work in Kandahar. But what the Kandahar example suggests is that the conflicts that have sometimes plagued the CF and DFAIT on past peace operations might be overcome in the future by a combination of three factors.

First is the establishment of a coordinating office in the PCO, operating in a way that is somewhat similar to the way the National Security Council works in the United States, except within a narrower issue frame. This is necessary to corral the actions of various agencies under one strategic framework, keeping people on track and on message.

Second is the establishment of a position equivalent to the RoCK in future peace operations or other military



deployments involving a significant Canadian component. This allows the actions of various civilian agencies to be coordinated in the field, adding weight and focus to the civilian presence and giving the mission's military commander one overarching civilian counterpart to engage.

Third is the promotion, both to military field command and to civilian field leadership positions, of individuals who have a proven track record of interdepartmental harmony. One way to enable this is to expand the opportunities for

secondment experiences inside other Canadian agencies, and then to offer career rewards to the people who complete them.

The successes of Canadian civil-military interactions on the ground in Kandahar can serve as an example to other countries, including the United States as it struggles with its own future plans in Afghanistan. It would be a shame if traditional interagency bickering were allowed to obscure those successes.

## (Endnotes)

- 1 Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007), lays the responsibility for the Kandahar decision primarily on Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier; Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats, and the Politics of War* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2009), argues that he wanted to stay in Kabul and that it was Liberal politicians and civilian bureaucrats who pushed for the Kandahar deployment.
- 2 Phillipe Lagassé, "A Mixed Legacy: General Rick Hillier and Canadian Defence, 2005-08," *International Journal*, Summer 2009: 605-23.
- 3 For positive assessments, see Col Mike Capstick, "A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan," *On Track* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 13-14, and LCol Michel-Henri St.-Louis, "The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan—Part of the Canadian Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (Spring 2009): 58-67. For criticism see Karin Phillips, "Afghanistan: Canadian Diplomatic Engagement," Library of Parliament Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Feb. 4, 2008, available at [www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0738-e.htm](http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0738-e.htm). For an accusation that the real motive in shutting down the SAT was professional jealousy, see George Petrolekas, "In Afghanistan, Our Rivalries Conspire to Make a Great Nation Small," *Globe and Mail* Update (web-exclusive comment), January 26, 2008, available at <http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php?topic=68928.5;wap2>.
- 4 For descriptions of these conflicts, see Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping*, Significant Issues Series 16, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), and Kimberly Marten, "Lending Forces: Canada's Military Peacekeeping," in *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc O'Reilly (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006).
- 5 "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence—Summary," Canada's International Policy Statement (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005).
- 6 Jeff Davis, "New Afghan Team, New Afghan Tasks," *Embassy Magazine*, June 24, 2009, available at [www.embassymag.ca](http://www.embassymag.ca).
- 7 For a discussion of those criticisms, see Mark Iype, "Kandahar Aid Focus Detrimental: Officials," *Embassy Magazine*, May 20, 2009, available at [www.embassymag.ca](http://www.embassymag.ca).
- 8 Paul Wells, "Q and A: Elissa Golberg," Inkless Wells column for *Maclean's* online, April 7, 2009, available at [www.macleans.ca](http://www.macleans.ca).
- 9 These numbers were reported by Stephen Wallace, Vice President of the CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, in a public meeting sponsored by the Canadian Consulate in New York at New York University, Jan. 26, 2009.
- 10 Government of Canada, "Interview with Elissa Golberg," Jan. 1, 2009, available at [www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/speeches-discours/yir-2.aspx?lang=en](http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/speeches-discours/yir-2.aspx?lang=en).
- 11 Author's interview with BGen Denis Thompson, Ottawa, June 24, 2009, and further email communication, Aug. 31, 2009.
- 12 Author's interview with BGen Denis Thompson, Ottawa, June 24, 2009.
- 13 Government of Canada, "Civilian Participation at Exercise Maple Guardian," July 30, 2009, available at [http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/stories-reportages/2009\\_07\\_27i.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/stories-reportages/2009_07_27i.aspx?lang=eng). ©





## The Dilemmas of Nuclear Iran and North Korea

by Sharon Squassoni

This autumn marks the seventh year of negotiations with two nuclear proliferators, North Korea and Iran. Despite short-lived progress along the way, both have added to their nuclear capabilities since 2002. While posing different dilemmas for the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the message the world must take away is the same: ultimately, only comprehensive solutions can help ensure that these become the last nuclear proliferators. This is especially important as world leaders consider eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, which would raise the stakes in detecting covert production of nuclear weapons by any state or terrorist group.

### *A "Hot" Autumn - 2002*

In October 2002, after an eight year freeze on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) plutonium production, the Agreed Framework with North Korea fell apart. US negotiators confronted their North Korean counterparts with reports of a clandestine uranium enrichment program. This allegation provoked the DPRK to kick out international inspectors, declare the Agreed Framework null and void, and drop out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty several months later. While evidence suggests that North Korea received some Pakistani assistance with uranium enrichment technology, in violation of its Joint Declaration with South Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the full range and extent of North Korea's uranium enrichment activities is unknown.

At about the same time, Iranian dissident groups were reporting the existence of undeclared uranium enrichment and other facilities in Iran. In early February 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, travelled to Tehran for talks and site visits. By the end of that year, IAEA inspectors had uncovered significant violations of Iran's NPT commitments dating back to 1985. These violations spanned almost the entire nuclear fuel cycle, raising serious questions about Iran's intentions.

Thus began two different, yet parallel, sets of negotiations on nuclear capabilities strengthened by the implementation of punitive measures for non-compliance. A new process for negotiations with North Korea was developed – the Six Party Talks – which won a few concessions from North Korea, including some dismantlement steps and a commitment in 2005 to denuclearize. But in October 2006 and again in May 2009, North Korea tested nuclear weapons. North Korea has recently expressed its willingness to engage in bilateral (with the United States) and multilateral negotiations aimed at resolving the nuclear issue. DPRK's commitment to denuclearize, now

that it has an established nuclear weapons capability, is anyone's guess.

Iran's nuclear capabilities are not as advanced as North Korea's and it still remains within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In October 2003, representatives from Britain, Germany and France (the so-called European Union Three, or EU-3) opened a second track of negotiations to halt Iran's uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing and heavy water production activities. Iran agreed to a halt, and to more extensive inspection authority for the IAEA, signing what is known as the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, but these measures were only implemented temporarily. By 2005, dismayed by provocative statements and actions by the newly elected Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the IAEA Board finally reported Iran to the United Nations Security Council for noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. More than three UN Security Council resolutions later, Iran defiantly continues its uranium enrichment activities, installing thousands of centrifuges at facilities in Natanz. In contrast to North Korea, Iran strives to remain within the bounds of what it describes as its legal rights under the NPT. However, Iran's nuclear diplomacy was dealt a blow this fall when another clandestine uranium enrichment facility was discovered in the vicinity of Qom. Iran is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its "legal" actions under the NPT.

### *Noncompliance: What does it mean?*

Noncompliance with the NPT can weaken confidence in the treaty, especially when it takes years for resolution and when nuclear capabilities grow despite negotiations. The DPRK demonstrated that it is possible to withdraw from the NPT without consequence or further inspections and with virtually no response from the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, this precedent has made withdrawal from the NPT a viable option unless state signatories act to ensure this cannot be repeated.

It would be particularly damaging if states with full fuel cycle capabilities, such as Iran is trying to develop, followed suit. Although Iran appears to have acquired its uranium enrichment and heavy water technology from states outside the NPT (Pakistan and India, respectively), it tries to frame discussion of its nuclear file in terms of its legal rights under the treaty. If Iran manages to develop nuclear weapons while still a member of the treaty, this will pose an existential threat to the treaty itself.

Some specific responses to North Korean and Iranian noncompliance should include making strengthened safeguards universal, creating a mechanism to require inspections in perpetuity, even if a country withdraws from the treaty, and introducing a menu of consequences, in advance, for noncompliance. Ultimately, however, such remedies do not

*Sharon Squassoni was a Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*



attack the roots of the dilemma, which is the inherently dual-use nature of fissile material production capabilities.

## *Roots of dilemma*

The NPT sought to encourage peaceful applications for nuclear energy while deterring nuclear proliferation. During NPT negotiations, several ambassadors to the Eighteen National Conference on Disarmament questioned the narrow scope of the treaty's monitored limits, remarking that perhaps it did not go far enough to curb proliferation activities. These ambassadors asked whether monitoring only to ensure that nuclear material was not diverted allowed a state to develop capabilities far along the path to acquiring nuclear weapons. In particular, negotiators worried about the lack of restrictions on uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, which can produce fissile material either for peaceful purposes or for bombs. However, tremendous optimism about nuclear power in the 1960s dampened enthusiasm for curtailing the growth of commercial opportunities. At the same time, some observers believed that covert uranium enrichment would be too costly and difficult to present a serious risk.

There are few now who believe that uranium enrichment is too difficult or expensive, primarily because Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was able to make centrifuge and weapons technology available to Libya, North Korea and Iran, among other states. Khan stole his information from the multinational enrichment consortium, URENCO in the 1970s and decided to market it further. The extent to which the Pakistani government was complicit in Khan's actions is unclear.

It is, at present, perfectly legitimate under the NPT to transfer enrichment and reprocessing technology. Iran could decide to transfer uranium enrichment technology elsewhere in the future, subject to IAEA safeguards, of course. Still, most observers agree that any spread of sensitive nuclear technologies is a negative development for nuclear non-proliferation.

## *A better fuel cycle approach?*

Fundamentally, the noncompliance of North Korea and Iran have raised, once again, concerns about how to manage the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle to reduce the risk of proliferation. Although tweaks to institutional structures and responses may be necessary, they will not be sufficient. State parties to the NPT

will need to devise a new fuel cycle approach that reduces the risks of proliferation within the treaty.

This is particularly important as developed nations ponder the next generation of peaceful nuclear power, which relies on fast reactors (which can either burn or breed plutonium) and spent fuel recycling techniques. Since it will be unacceptable to create two distinct tiers of nuclear fuel cycle states – advanced states versus developing states – it will be necessary to create an equitable scheme. Piecemeal proposals to create incentives for developing countries to forswear uranium enrichment and spent fuel recycling have elicited only lukewarm responses thus far.

One of the most difficult aspects of restricting access to sensitive nuclear technologies like enrichment and reprocessing is the element of national prestige that is often attached to these high-profile projects. A way of divorcing the element of national pride from the technology is ultimately to “denationalize” those activities by requiring that future facilities be multinationally owned and operated. Existing plants would need to be converted to multinational ownership and, perhaps, operation as well. Such an approach could face heavy resistance, even though experts maintain that the nuclear industry has become increasingly multinational in nature.

One way of creating legally binding restrictions would be to use a fissile material production cut-off treaty (FMCT) to ban not just the production of fissile material for weapons, but also national enrichment for any purpose. The logic is simple: if no country is making fissile material for weapons, there is no longer any need for national capabilities.

In addition to deflecting the element of national prestige, multinational enrichment and reprocessing facilities would raise the probability of detecting clandestine enrichment and reprocessing and hence substantially lower the risk of a national breakout from FMCT restrictions. This could become increasingly important in a future where there are lower numbers of nuclear weapons.

In an era where nuclear energy is becoming increasingly attractive as an option to help mitigate global climate change, it is imperative that whatever nuclear expansion does occur is safe, secure and helps reduce, rather than magnifies, the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Efforts that increase transparency and dissuade the development of latent national capabilities are urgently needed. ©



## DISINFORMATION IN A DIGITAL WORLD: IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA AND ITS DEFENCE POLICY

by Colonel (Ret'd) A. Sean Henry

The times are indeed interesting for Canadians, although many of them seem unaware of it. A national survey conducted by *Maclean's* magazine<sup>1</sup> just before Canada Day, 2009, showed that some 90% of Canadians believed that Canada was “the best country in the world.” Shortly thereafter commentators, including Andrew Cohen and Jeffrey Simpson, had little difficulty showing that, whereas Canada is a fine place to live, it is not without serious problems and *hubris* is therefore inappropriate. If people do not recognize problems they will not be amenable to solutions.

An earlier poll, conducted by Ipsos Reid on behalf of the Department of National Defence<sup>2</sup>, indicated that a strong majority of Canadians still view their soldiers as peacekeepers. They would rather have them perform disaster assistance and international social work than engage in combat operations. This, notwithstanding the fact the Conservative government and the military leadership have done their best to reverse that outlook. These attempts have met with relatively little interest and still less acceptance.<sup>3</sup>

One may therefore ask: What is going on here? The short and simple answer is that the Canadian population has been swept by a tide of disinformation, starting in the 1970s and continuing to this day. The fact so many Canadians accept “good news” without question is an example of the effectiveness of disinformation disseminated through modern electronic communications and digital information systems.

Disinformation is defined in the *Oxford Dictionary* as “information which is intended to mislead.” It differs from misinformation, which is information that is simply incorrect for one reason or another. The concept of disinformation was applied extensively against Western nations by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Canada during the Trudeau era was fertile ground for its sowing and reaping.

This situation is described in the book, *Peace with Freedom*, by Maurice Tugwell<sup>4</sup>, the founder of the MacKenzie Institute. Canadian vulnerability to disinformation has continued in succeeding years, as witnessed *inter alia* by entrenchment of the myth of peacekeeping.<sup>5</sup> Overall, the Canadian population has likely been influenced by disinformation more than those in many other Western nations – to the extent that Canadians could be said to be living in a ‘bubble of unreality’ in relation to themselves and the world around them.

In the 1970s the dissemination of disinformation was not easy, and the standard Soviet practice was to insert tainted material into news agencies in the Third World and

hope it would be picked up and distributed by major wire services in the West, such as Reuters and Associated Press. This very often occurred, and the disinformation was soon on its way to becoming ‘common wisdom’ and a given – repeated endlessly in media coverage of the topic(s) in question.

In due course many single-issue interest and advocacy groups in Canada and elsewhere adopted techniques of disinformation to court public support for their causes. Examples in Canada would include anti-Americanism, climate change, health care, bilingualism, gun control and animal welfare. In all of these cases and others the aim was to generate government support for the causes being advanced. The technique involved creation of ‘motherhood’ issues espoused by the majority of the population, and therefore unassailable by critics.

With the onset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a wave of change has engulfed the field of disinformation. By far the most important factor has been the development of state-of-the-art electronic and digital information systems. This melds with a second factor, the implementation of the concept of “everything everywhere”<sup>6</sup>— demonstrated by globalization of economics, commerce, travel and information. The cumulative effects of these changes have been both exponential and explosive. The world is being turned upside down, and those who do not understand and respond to the implications will be left behind and lost.

New generations of people are growing up in a world that is very different from that of their predecessors. This is especially true in terms of the creation and passage of knowledge and information. The corollary is that knowledge and information equal power. One could make a strong case that we have entered the early stages of a world that will evolve in the manner of Orwell's *1984* (comprehensive surveillance and passage of disinformation) and Huxley's *Brave New World* (secularism, hedonism and cloning).

It is easy to understand how disinformation would flourish in such a world. It would erode democracy, as irresponsible interest groups forced governments to respond to their agendas by duping large populations of voters. To some extent this is the story of the myth of peacekeeping in Canada. Its success has made the Canadian government reluctant to discuss openly the threat of terrorism sponsored by radical Islam, and the need to wage war to defeat it. The Director of CSIS has confirmed this by stating that Canadians neither understand nor accept the terrorist threat and the action required to deal with it.<sup>7</sup>

The CSIS director and others note that Al Qaeda and the Taliban retain a symbiotic relationship,<sup>8</sup> and Afghanistan is still an attractive base to coordinate terror operations

Colonel (Ret'd) A. Sean Henry is a defence analyst in Ottawa.



in support of Osama bin Laden's three-phase strategy<sup>9</sup> to enhance and expand fundamentalist Islam throughout the world. This plan has been strengthened by the emergence of Salafism,<sup>10</sup> another brand of radical Islamism with aims coincident with those of Al Qaeda, and which seeks to re-establish a Muslim caliphate stretching from the far East to Spain. The threat that "dares not speak its name"<sup>11</sup> in this equation is the determination of Muslim radicals to obtain a nuclear capability.

The practical component of the digital revolution in information has been the creation of popular knowledge sources such as Wikipedia, Yahoo, Google and blogs, assisted by social media such as Facebook, YouTube, Myspace and Twitter. Even wider distribution may be achieved through social bookmarking applications like Blinklist, Digg, Newsvine, Blogmarks and many more.

---

*This new virtual landscape is a disinformation specialist's dream.*

---

Equally important are the ubiquitous means of distribution on personal communication devices. Reportage on regular television and radio rounds off the process. A great concern is that these applications and means are becoming the sole sources of information for young people. Unless a government is able to convey its own messages through the noted channels, it will become powerless to implement its policies.

This new virtual landscape is a disinformation specialist's dream.<sup>12</sup> There is no longer a need for Third World wire services. Half-truths, rumours and bogus facts and arguments can now be placed directly into the main stream of public consciousness. Moreover, sites such as Wikipedia can be altered to favour the disinformation artist's line, by removing and/or replacing material of rivals. Climate change advocates employ this technique extensively. Business and industry are already aboard this new world. Molson Coors Canada has been working the social media scene for some

time and now promotes its brands through 19 websites, a community blog, numerous Facebook sites and Twitter feeds.<sup>13</sup>

Results of another recent poll indicate that public support for the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan has finally dropped below 50%.<sup>14</sup> It is therefore crucial that the federal government take cognizance of the situation outlined above and create and execute a plan to counter the flow of disinformation – to educate the Canadian public and explain and justify its foreign and defence policies.

It is suggested that a framework for a program of this sort already exists. Since the early 1980s, government public information has been guided and vetted by a set of Privy Council Office and Treasury Board directives and similar regulations. They are focused on promoting causes such as gender equality, visible minorities, multiculturalism, social justice and peacekeeping. Either knowingly or unknowingly this policy reinforces some of the disinformation flowing from interest groups.

The link is a desire to portray Canada and its place in the world in utopian fashion. For example, there is a reluctance to show images of Canadian Forces members engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Evidence of this ranges from the scene on the ten dollar bill to images in the *Canada First* Defence Strategy document and *The Maple Leaf* newspaper. This strengthens the hand of those propagating the myth of peacekeeping.

The government must lead the way to wean Canadians away from utopian notions and puncture the bubble of unreality that surrounds them. The existing public information framework should be used to deconstruct myths and to publicize Canadian defence policy in light of threats such as terrorism, and the way in which operations in Afghanistan are dealing with it – all to guard and advance the interests of Canadians.

In summary, the government must publicize its intentions to the public strongly and clearly throughout the new digital environment. That is, fight and defeat disinformation on its own ground. This is the new reality in politics and in the formulation and delivery of government policy.

#### (Endnotes)

- 1 Maclean's. June 30, 2009.
- 2 Brewster, Murray. *The Canadian Press*, September 5, 2008.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Tugwell, Maurice. *Peace With Freedom*. Key Porter Books, 1988
- 5 Gunter, Lorne. "Liberal myth-making." *The Ottawa Citizen*. July 23, 2009
- 6 Knoke, William. *Bold New World*. Kodansha International, 1996
- 7 Macleod, Ian. "Canada oblivious to terror danger: CSIS boss." *The Ottawa Citizen*, October 30, 2009
- 8 Galloway, Gloria. "Taliban, al-Qaeda still allied, officials warn." *The Globe and Mail*. October 13, 2009
- 9 Scheuer, Michael F. (Anonymous). *Imperial Hubris*. Brassey's Inc. 2004
- 10 Williams, Daniel. Salafism: A new threat to Hamas. *International Herald Tribune*. October 28, 2009
- 11 Lord Alfred Douglas. 1896
- 12 Sunstein, Cass et al. *On Rumours*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2009
- 13 Shaw, Holly. "Tweeting." *National Post*. October 30, 2009
- 14 Bouzane, Bradley. "Support For Afghan War Takes a Hit." *National Post*. October 26, 2009 ©





## The 12<sup>th</sup> Annual CDA Institute Graduate Student Symposium

by Natalie Ratcliffe

The 12<sup>th</sup> Annual CDA Institute Graduate Student Symposium, held in Currie Hall at the Royal Military College (RMC) on October 30<sup>th</sup> – October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2009, was extremely successful. The Symposium contributes annually to education and dialogue on security and defence issues, which is core to the CDA Institute's role. The Symposium is a popular and established gathering that showcases the best of a growing body of graduate-level research on security and defence issues, and is a unique venue for graduate students to present scholarly work on defence and security issues in a public forum. It also provides an opportunity for students to network within the security and defence community, both military and civilian. Approximately 100 people were in attendance.

This annual event provided 32 graduate-level students from across Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany with an opportunity to present their research. This year's theme, "Canada's Security Interests," attracted students from a variety of fields, at both the MA and PhD level. Fifteen academic institutions were represented in the bilingual event. The Symposium featured the work of graduate students from various DND-sponsored Security and Defence Forum (SDF) Centres across the country, military institutions such as RMC, and other academic institutions.

The presenters were divided into 11 panels addressing the following topics:

- 1) Emerging Security Issues
- 2) Terrorism, Counterinsurgency and Afghanistan
- 3) Western Militaries in Contemporary Perspective
- 4) COIN: A "Population-Centered" Approach
- 5) Conflict and Political Economy
- 6) Failing States: Causes and Prescriptions
- 7) International Security Issues
- 8) Canada's Security and Defence: Historical Perspectives
- 9) The Canadian Forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century
- 10) Geopolitics: Europe and Russia
- 11) Extremist Propaganda: Dissemination and Indoctrination

The Symposium featured 2 keynote speakers: Ms. Elissa Golberg, from the Department of Foreign Affairs gave a well-received talk, framed in a real-time and on the ground perspective of her tenure as Canada's representative in Kandahar from February 2008 to January 2009. Lieutenant-

General Marc Lessard, the keynote speaker on the second day, addressed the state of Canada's mission in Afghanistan, the progress thus far and what is required to move forward.

### Presenters Included:

*University of Calgary:* Cindy Strömer, Tammy Lambert, George Heng, Alex McDougall,  
Second-Lieutenant Marius Schwarz, (*Helmut Schmidt University of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany, Hamburg*)

*Royal Military College of Canada:* **Andrew Vine, Mils Farmus, Robert B. Marks,**  
LCol Ian Hope, (*Queen's University / Royal Military College of Canada*)

*University of Manitoba:* Rebecca Jensen

*University of Toronto:* Wilfrid Greaves, Charles Bélanger

*University of British Columbia:* Michael D. Cohen

*Carleton University:* Eric Jardine, Todd J.R. MacDonald, Mark Agnew, Paul Knight, Brandon Deuville, Adam Coombs

*Royal Roads University:* Alim Sutherland

*Boston University:* Alexei JD Gavriel

*University of Oxford:* Second-Lieutenant Stephen Brosha

*University of Western Ontario:* Adam Kochanski

*Dalhousie University:* Anita Singh, Andrew Fraser

*University of Ottawa:* Alex Souchen, Tyler Turek, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

*Wilfrid Laurier University:* Natasha Hope Morano

*Universiteit van Amsterdam:* Renée Gendron

*Queen's University:* Howard G. Coombs, Neil Irvine

The Symposium awarded cash prizes to the top three presenters. First place received \$3000, second place \$2000, and third place \$1000. The top five presenters also received an autographed copy of General Rick Hillier's book, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*.

*Natalie Ratcliffe is a DND Security and Defence Forum Intern employed as the Project Officer at the CDA Institute. She received her Master's in History from the University of Ottawa in 2009.*




1. **First place** went to **Adam Coombs** of Carleton University for his "Red Scare: Canada's Rush to Integrate North American Air Defence Systems" He received a copy of the book and \$3,000.
2. **Second place** went to **Alex Souchen** of the University of Ottawa "On Razor's Edge: Individuals and the Experience of War, D-Day 6 June 1944." He received the book and \$2,000.
3. **Third Place** went to **Adam Kochanski** of the University of Western Ontario, for his presentation "Liberal Peacebuilding and Its Limitations: Reassessing the Record of Post-Conflict Transitional Administrations." He received a copy of the book and \$1,000.

4. **Fourth place** went to **Anita Singh** of Dalhousie University. She received the book.
5. **Fifth place** went to **Wilfrid Greaves** of the University of Toronto. He received the book.

Presentations, photos and prize winners can be found on our website, online at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia/symposium2009>

The next Symposium has been tentatively booked for October 29<sup>th</sup> and 30th, 2010. ©

## Book Review



## A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War

by Rick Hillier

Reviewed by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson

Rick Hillier. *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*. Toronto, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., October 2009. 498 pages, \$34.99

In the post-war era few senior Canadian military officers have written important memoirs. Notable exceptions are Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire and Major-General Lewis Mackenzie. Until recently, the only Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to have published a memoir was General Jean-Victor Allard (1966-1969).

Now, General Rick Hillier has penned an autobiographical account of his military life, with a particular focus on his years as CDS from 2005 to 2008. It is an interesting and readable story. That it has become an instant bestseller is no surprise, given Hillier's remarkable career as a dynamic leader whose rise to national prominence was unmatched for a military officer in this country.

*A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* is an intensely personal account, written in the simple, direct language that served Hillier so well as a senior military officer whose manner, style and accomplishments made his name a household word in Canada. Although his recollections of early days in Newfoundland and of his formative years as an armoured corps officer are interesting enough, especially to those having served in the military, it is in the latter half of the book, as Hillier describes the challenges of increasingly senior and demanding posts, that his story becomes engrossing, with his description of personal involvement in events on the field of battle and in the halls of power in Ottawa. In this regard the book will become an important part of the historical record.

*General (Ret'd) Paul Manson is past president of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989.*

By virtue of his remarkable leadership skills (and as always in such careers, with a dash of good luck) Hillier found himself increasingly involved in situations of great national and international significance, ranging from the Winnipeg Flood of 1997, to the Great Ice Storm of 1998, to conflict in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, through to bureaucratic battles back home. With a convincing demonstration of skill along the way, it was perfectly natural that he should rise to command the Army and eventually the Canadian Forces (CF).

Readers will be particularly drawn to Hillier's description of his involvement in critical aspects of the war in Afghanistan, first as the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and later, as CDS, in overseeing the expanded Canadian military operation in Kandahar Province. Likewise, his description of relationships with two Prime Ministers (Paul Martin and Stephen Harper) and three Defence Ministers (Bill Graham, Gordon O'Connor and Peter MacKay) paints a picture of frankness and trust that – especially in the case of O'Connor – doesn't quite jibe with the frequent media reports at the time of personal clashes. He was extraordinarily successful in bringing several important equipment programs into fruition, often by breaking through the bureaucratic inertia that has traditionally plagued defence procurement in Canada.

The book has its weaknesses. Throughout, Hillier uses direct quotations in recounting conversations in which he was engaged, purporting to record exactly what was said. It's a popular technique these days, but it tends to diminish the reader's sense of historical accuracy; not even Hillier's memory can be that good.



Another questionable practice, one that will offend some of his older readers, is the unnecessary sprinkling of obscenities throughout the book. Hillier is not a crude man, but he sometimes comes across that way with his choice of language. He could have conveyed an image of toughness in other ways.

In the same vein, the man who raised eyebrows across the nation with his famous statement referring to the Taliban as “detestable murderers and scumbags” (a pretty apt description) has let his rhetoric get the best of him by referring in the book to NATO as, “a corpse, decomposing, and somebody’s going to have to perform a Frankenstein-like life-giving act by breathing some lifesaving air through those rotten lips into those putrescent lungs.” It’s a bit of hyperbole that will not sit well with those who hold out hope for the Alliance as a force in the emerging struggle with the global threat of Islamism, let alone the more immediate goal of success in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, while he rightfully reflects upon the many good things that happened to the CF in his time as CDS, Hillier has a tendency to decry the quality and accomplishments of the Service in earlier days. The “Decade of Darkness” was a truly bad time for the military, but our soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen likewise faced all sorts of difficulties before then, going back to Unification in the sixties. Nevertheless, by and large they did their jobs well (we did win the Cold War, after all). To quote one egregious example, Hillier says at one point, writing about helicopter operations in Afghanistan, that, “It wasn’t so long ago that it would have been unthinkable for pilots or aircrew in combat to show a little esprit de corps, pride in what they do and the aircraft they fly.” Tell that to the pilots who flew in combat in the first Gulf War and in the Kosovo campaign and to their supporting ground crews, let alone to the countless Air Force

personnel who served with great spirit and dedication in NATO Europe and in NORAD over the years. Hillier’s words were an unaccountable lapse.

More convincingly, he doesn’t mince his words in criticizing those individuals and institutions which hampered the ability of the CF to fulfill their mandate. His disparagement of the federal bureaucracy, including the Privy Council Office, is quite telling, and a common theme of the volume. Nor does he spare the United Nations, for which he has nothing but utter disdain, and for good reason.


Hillier the man (as opposed to Hillier the memoirist) comes through best in his genuine demonstration, throughout the book, of affection and respect for the current generation of Canadian service personnel and their families, a sentiment that was returned in kind. Through sheer force of personality, he changed the way Canadians look upon those who wear the military uniform as well as those who support them at home. An important part of this was the way in which he personally honoured casualties of the Afghan conflict, to the extent that the entire nation came to share the grief with each and every fatality.

He gave the military a human face that resonated with the people of Canada in untold ways, and to an extent that had not been seen since the fifties.

This is a book that can be read with great interest by all who seek an insight into the workings of Canada’s armed forces at a momentous time in our history, as seen from the very top level of the military rank structure. It sheds much light on the personal relationships between key players, and the factors that go into the making of critical decisions.

Above all, it paints a fascinating picture of an officer whom Canadian historians will surely recognize as one of the most important public figures of our time. ©

## Book Review



## War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars

by Richard N. Haass

*Reviewed by Jesse Mellott*

Richard N. Haass. War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, May 5, 2009, Hardcover, 352 pages, \$34.99

Richard Haass achieves in fewer than three hundred pages a clear and concise account of the major events, decisions and personalities involved with Iraq during the presidencies of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. *War of Necessity, War of Choice* is not just a personal recollection of

the events and people involved in the two Iraq wars, but also how they were differently planned and executed. Haass also discusses the nature of war itself. He argues that there are two types of wars, one of necessity, the other by choice. He discusses in bullet-point form the matters of comparison and contrast between the two conflicts: the coalition building, UN resolutions, the intelligence and planning of both wars, and the people involved.

*Jesse Mellott graduated from Wilfrid Laurier University with a BA in history in 2006. He lives and works in Guelph, Ontario.*



Richard Haass is current president of the Council on Foreign Relations. His book is a memoir, taking into account personal observations about events and people, yet it reads much like a scholarly work, presenting an argument in the introductory chapter, the body of the work to discuss the argument, and the conclusion.

Haass is an authoritative figure on the subject of war, having worked in the Carter, Reagan and both Bush administrations at various levels, and was involved in the policy and planning for both Iraq wars. On the subject of war, Haass argues in the manner of a historian: "There is the political struggle over whether to go to war. There is the physical war itself. And there is the struggle over the different interpretations of what was accomplished and the lessons of it all." It is with that idea in mind that Haass gives rational reasons that the war with Iraq that began and concluded under George H.W. Bush was one of necessity, while the conflict that began under George W. Bush was one of choice.

What makes *War of Necessity, War of Choice* such an effective read is Haass' skill in poring over government documents and picking out the important points. One of the first documents mentioned in the book is the National Intelligence Estimate from 1989 on Iraq. The summation of the document is that, "Iraq was too drained from eight years of war to cause much trouble for some time and would want to devote its time and energy to its economy." Taking the lead from the NIE, the author argues that war with Saddam Hussein in the winter of 1990-1991, under the first President Bush, was one of necessity, due to Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait. Anyone familiar with Middle East history will know that Saddam had just fought an eight year war with Iran. Invading Kuwait in August 1990, in a way, was meant to alleviate any economic problems that Iraq had because of a long protracted war. The NIE was not wrong in assuming that Saddam would focus on economic problems – it just left out how he would deal with them.

Indeed, the invasion of Kuwait is the reason why Haass argues so forcefully that war with Iraq was a necessity, so forcefully in fact to the point of exaggeration: "Not only would he control its great wealth and oil, but also the Saudis and the other smaller Gulf states would essentially be under his sway. He would dominate the Arab world and OPEC, the global oil cartel, something that would make him a force to be reckoned with not just in the region but worldwide."

Whether or not Saddam would have been a dominate force in the Persian Gulf is unclear; yet, the first Iraq war was the most important event in the Middle East since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Aside from his philosophy of war, Haass's work is also of interest for another matter: his access to and characterization of the personalities involved in the decision-making process. He has a very clear view of American history, and the examples he provides demonstrate that. When describing George H.W. Bush, Haass asserts, "the President was firm in his conviction that he would not replicate LBJ [poring] over proposed bombing targets." Haass also argues, and quite rightly, that civilians should not be involved in the

daily tactics of fighting a war, but should focus on strategy and selling the war to the public.

According to the author, the first war with Iraq was just,<sup>1</sup> based upon the circumstances surrounding it: Iraq invaded a sovereign nation, and should pay for the consequences. Haass sees the first Iraq war largely as a success based upon coalition building, getting Congressional approval, and finally the actual fighting of the war. This is not to say that Haass is not critical of the aftermath. He says, laconically, that it could have been handled better.

While believing in the justness and success of the first Iraq war, Haass remarks of the second Iraq war, "the worthiness of the cause, the likelihood of success, the legitimacy to undertake it-all were questionable." He thus distinguishes between the two wars: the first was an international response to the Iraqi army occupying its neighbour, while the second war dealt with questionable intelligence concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, an assumed danger that never materialized.

Human beings drive policy, and Haass is well aware of that. In describing his first formal meeting with the then-governor of Texas George W. Bush, Haass is very adamant that, "the problem was not with the candidate so much as with the advisors . . . What came to my mind was the first Reagan administration, when it was too much ideology, too much combativeness and . . . not enough emphasis on diplomacy." Haass places much of the blame for the planning of the second Iraq war on the president's advisors. Although Haass does not single anyone out for particular blame, it is clear to the reader that the charge to war was led by the Vice President's office.

He also sees the only effective part of the whole build up to war during the fall of 2002 and early 2003 as Secretary of State Colin Powell's role, pushing the President to do what his father did: going to the United Nations for approval before attacking Iraq. George H.W. Bush appears noble in asking for help from the UN. During the George W. Bush administration, the UN is treated with scorn, if not by the President, then certainly by his subordinates.

Yet, the only real criticism that Haass has of George W. Bush was his unwillingness to change his views, something that he [Bush] saw as a sign of weakness. The author's contention suggests that part of the failure of the second Iraq war, at least on the planning side, stemmed from the president's managerial style, his informal meetings and lack of discussion. Haass is quick to note that this approach changed when it came time for the 2006 troop surge.

What makes *War of Necessity, War of Choice* such an essential read is that Haass's authorship, accessibility and writing style is virtually unparalleled. Reading other books about the subject of any war, not just Iraq, can lead the reader to get lost in the details. Haass effectively ties each point that he makes back to his argument. He provides as much detail about the context of events, policy and importance of events that he feels is necessary.

1 In reference to Just War theory, that there are certain codes and conducts to follow during war, can also apply to the reasons why a country goes to war.



One instance where Haass is quite clear about the contrast between the two wars is regime change, which was not the main factor of the first Iraq war; yet, that was the driving force of the second Iraq war. In a conversation with Richard Helms, Haass recalls the former CIA chief as remarking, "I've spent most of my life overthrowing governments and I hope you guys know what you'll put in Saddam's place." This statement by Helms underlies all the

problems that Haass, as a member of the State Department in George W. Bush's administration, had with overthrowing Saddam. Helms' comment enhances the general feeling of frustration expressed in the latter half of the book. More time, Haass argues, should have been spent on other matters instead of on a war that was deemed by many of its critics as a detour at best, and at worst a blunder. ©

## Bo7ok review



## The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts And The Challenges To American Power

by David E. Sanger

Reviewed by Natalie Ratcliffe

David E. Sanger. *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts And The Challenges To American Power*. Crown Publishing Group, Hardcover, 528 pages, January 2009 - \$32.00

Chief Washington Correspondent for *The New York Times* and two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize, David E. Sanger provides an accessible and gripping, if discouraging, account of the world America faces and the challenges which US President Barack Obama has inherited. *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power* is somewhat of a misnomer, as the book primarily focuses on what Sanger characterizes as former president George W. Bush's many blunders in the foreign policy arena. The central thesis forwarded is the motif of missed opportunities.

As Sanger directs his readers from one volatile region to the next, his conclusion remains the same, that is, while Bush funnelled resources, manpower and intelligence into the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the plethora of global threats to American security developed unabated. In its eagerness, bordering on obsession, to deal with Saddam Hussein, the Bush Doctrine did not have a geopolitical vision and strategy to respond to other looming threats to American interests, nor the insight to think long-term and forestall emerging threats.

Opening with Iran, Sanger posits a commonly accepted argument: America's invasion of Iraq destabilized the power balance in the region. Sensing a shift in his favour and buoyed by a distracted United States, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set his sights on acquiring a nuclear capability. Not enough to achieve nuclear parity, a near impossibility, but enough to cloak Iran in a perimeter of nuclear protection, a lesson clearly demonstrated by India, Pakistan and North Korea.

With Iran well on its way to developing a nuclear deterrent, Sanger shifts his focus to Afghanistan. Home to the Taliban and a safe haven for Al Qaeda, Afghanistan

became the Iraq war's collateral damage through neglect. After toppling the Taliban regime in 2001 and prematurely claiming victory, Bush moved onto Iraq, a venue which he deemed "the center front" on terrorism. This miscalculation provided the breathing room the insurgency needed to regroup across the Durand line in Pakistan.

The Durand Line constitutes an artificial border imposed by the British during the 19th century. The effect was to geographically separate Afghanistan's Pashtu tribes along an Afghan/Pakistani divide, a continuing source of agitation to this day. As Australian army officer and counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen told Sanger, "We never finished the Afghan war...we just shifted our problem east."<sup>1</sup>

Sanger then shifts his focus east as well, clearly outlining the paradox America faces in its tumultuous relationship with Pakistan in his aptly titled chapter, "How do you invade an ally?" Plagued by a militant insurgency, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal poses one of the gravest threats to American security. Moreover, Pakistan is home to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Father of the Islamic Bomb and the notorious "exporter" of nuclear expertise and technology to ambitious regimes around the globe, one of which is North Korea, the next focus in Sanger's book.

The United States' preoccupation with Iraq permitted North Korea to accelerate its development of a nuclear weapon and missile delivery system under Bush's watch. This sent the unfortunate message to nuclear aspirants that America does not confront countries which have WMD aspirations or have passed the nuclear threshold.

In his final case study, Sanger examines China, a long-time member of the nuclear club, which clearly has opted to concentrate on regional and global strategic superiority, or at the very least, parity with the United States, in all



facets of Chinese national and global areas of interest and preoccupation—military power and its projection beyond its borders, economic development, technology, trade, resource security, finance, culture, diplomacy, etc.

Nuclear deterrence has limited utility according to Chinese officials; instead China focuses on anti-satellite missile technology, ballistic missiles and cyber warfare to check, contain and diminish American dominance. Sanger argues that the current administration has a unique opportunity to engage China, thereby ensuring that China has a vested interest in America's continuance as a major global power and the ability to exercise and project that power.

Overall, *The Inheritance* provides an exhaustive and insightful overview of contemporary threats to American security. What he does not address in the body of his book, Sanger packs into the conclusion, which is a compilation of CSI-style short stories which depict doomsday scenarios ranging from biological warfare to debilitating cyber attacks. The central thesis is often diluted by digressions into interesting, yet superfluous detail. Sanger's message would have been more potent if he had limited his analysis to the first three case studies. However, even these are confused by a sporadic timeline and a journalistic flair for colourful details

and hyperbole. Sanger brings his actors to life; he puts a face to and injects a personality into otherwise monotone officials. However, his excessive attention to detail often comes at the expense of sound academic analysis and discretion. There is simply too much unfocused information, and the reader gets lost in the hair-raising tangents that make this book so readable, but unfortunately forgettable.

While there is reason to criticize Sanger's meandering analysis, bereft of academic rigour, Sanger must be credited for his exhaustive research. His vast network gives him access to high level officials who, trusting of and familiar with Sanger, speak with surprising candour. As a result of his journalistic skills and professional connections, both of which are considerable, Sanger was able to circumvent the blackout period generally associated with the declassification of protected national security material by going directly to the source, thereby adding a much valued current and historical perspective to matters that shape our world. However, what cannot be circumvented is the value of historical distance. Sanger was writing as events were still unfolding and the end product reflects the evolving, complex and seemingly incomprehensible nature of global security.

(Endnote)

1 Sanger, 171. ©

## *A Tribute to Our Fallen Soldiers*

### **My Nation**

There is a nation which stands by the guardrail  
Of the highway overpass  
On a negative twenty winter afternoon.  
Their backs are to the setting grey disc.  
Their faces slapped by the north wind  
This nation peers to the east  
To the winding asphalt  
Which binds our northern land's metropolises.

Three fifteen comes and goes  
The awaited procession of hearses  
Bringing home valiant fellow citizens  
From the vales of the Kush mountains  
Do not appear.  
Stamping feet, huddled shoulders  
Clasping hands about thin Tim Horton's comfort  
This nation of guardrail sentinels continues to assemble in the lull.



Cars are left at the foot of the underpass.  
 They snake to Jocelyn Avenue.  
 A bundle of young teenagers  
 Not sartorial wiser on a winter Sunday  
 Than a school Monday clad in thin pea jackets  
 Absent scarfs and hats  
 Stand and stamp amidst middled aged couples  
 And greying citizens who shuffle more than stamp.  
 Frozen smiles nod at acquaintances  
 And vaguely recognized neighbours  
 Under wool and frosty grimaces.  
 Occasional quick trips to the few nearby cars  
 The only concession to the elements  
 The vigilante nation yet grows.  
 None leave.

As five p m comes a collective stir arises  
 Through the heavy dusk to the east  
 The white headlights are broken.  
 Dead space  
 No more weekend traffic Toronto bound  
 The dead space grows.  
 Sentinels straighten  
 Flags are brought to attention.  
 Twirling red lights break through the dusk  
 Around the bend from Cobourg.  
 A long line of mourning cars stretching from underpass to underpass  
 Bear our fallen Canadians.

The leading car approaches  
 Our guardrail nation stiffens  
 Onwards they come  
 Passing underneath  
 One, two, three  
 Five hearses  
 Followed by more and more companions  
 In moments the long sombre procession is rushing under and past  
 Westward on its pilgrimage.

There is a nation which stands by the guardrails  
 On a January afternoon  
 Sentinels for sacrifices past and present and to come  
 Vigilante of honour earned and redeemed.  
 There is a nation which stands long and true  
 This is my nation.

William Spotton      ©

---

*William Spotton lives in Port Hope, Ontario*

---





### CDA INSTITUTE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Admiral (Ret'd) John Anderson	Dr. David Anido
Général (Ret) Maurice Baril	Dr. David Bercuson
Mrs. Kathleen Birchall	L'hon. Jean-Jacques Blais
Dr. Douglas Bland	Mr. Robert T. Booth
Mr. Thomas Caldwell	Mr. Mel Cappe
Dr. Jim Carruthers	Mr. Paul H. Chapin
General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain	Dr. John Scott Cowan
The Hon. Barnett Danson	Mr. Dan Donovan
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard Evraire	Mr. Robert Fowler
Colonel, The Hon. John Fraser	Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Roger Girouard
Honourary Colonel Blake C. Goldring	Dr. Jack Granatstein
Général (Ret) Raymond Henault	Honourary Colonel, Dr. Frederick Jackman
The Hon. Colin Kenny	Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald
Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie	Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara
Lieutenant-général (Ret) Michel Maisonneuve	General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson
Mr. John Noble	The Hon. David Pratt
The Hon. Hugh Segal	Colonel (Ret'd) Ben Shapiro
M. André Sincennes	Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Joe Sharpe
Dr. Joel Sokolsky	Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken Summers
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Jack Vance	The Hon. Pamela Wallin
Mr. John Watts	





**CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE  
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE**

**222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B, Ottawa ON K2P 2G3**  
**PHONE / TÉLÉPHONE: (613) 236 9903 FAX / TÉLÉCOPIEUR: (613) 236 8191**

<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>

**L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense**

**Donateur - formulaire d'adhésion**

**222 rue Somerset Ouest, Pièce 400B, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2G3**

**Tél: (613) 236-9903 Fax: (613) 236-8191 Courriel: treasurer@cda-cdai.ca URL: [cda-cdai.ca/cdai/](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/)**

\_\_\_\_ American Express  
\_\_\_\_ Chèque/mandat poste  
° Patron (\$ 1,000+) \_\_\_\_ Master Card  
\_\_\_\_ VISA Date d'expiration: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

° Compagnon (\$ 500)

° Officier (\$ 300)

° Associé (\$ 150)

° Supporter (\$ 75)

Nom: \_\_\_\_\_

Adresse: \_\_\_\_\_

Ville: \_\_\_\_\_ Prov: \_\_\_\_ Code postal: \_\_\_\_\_ Tél: (\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_

**The Conference of Defence Associations Institute**

**Donor Application Form**

**222 Somerset Street West, Ste 400B, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2G3**

**Tel: (613) 236-9903 Fax: 236-8191 E-mail: treasurer@cda-cdai.ca URL: [cda-cdai.ca/cdai/](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/)**

\_\_\_\_ American Express  
\_\_\_\_ Cheque/Money Order  
° Patron(\$ 1,000+) \_\_\_\_ Master Card  
\_\_\_\_ VISA \_\_\_\_\_ Expiry Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

° Companion (\$ 500)

° Officer (\$ 300)

° Associate (\$ 150)

° Supporter (\$ 75)

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City: \_\_\_\_\_ Prov: \_\_\_\_ Postal Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Tel: (\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_