

Independent and Informed

# ON TRACK

Indépendant et Informé



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Power Projection and the Canadian Forces

Security in an Uncertain World:  
A Canadian Perspective

Crise identitaire et stratégique à l'OTAN

Afghanistan and Al Qaeda:  
Second Thoughts

Fighting for work



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*COVER PHOTO: General David Petraeus, Commander US Central Command, addresses the 73rd Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations. Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le Général David Petraeus, Commander US Central Command, s'adresse à la 73e assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Photo: Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gord Metcalfe.*



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## From the Executive Director

## Mot du Directeur exécutif

We are pleased to begin our 15<sup>th</sup> year of the publication of the CDA Institute's *ON TRACK*. This quarterly journal is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes significant value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada, with the presentation of excellent articles by experts in those fields.

We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policy-makers, politicians, academics and the public, we help promote change in the policies of our Federal government for the betterment of our country.

This spring edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of the CDA Institute's annual seminar and the Conference of Defence Associations' AGM, NATO's new strategic concept, national development and reconstruction, the Arctic, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Al Qaeda, and book reviews.

Our 26<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar was held on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March. Its theme, *Protecting Canada's National Interests in an Uncertain World*, was a timely one, given the challenges that Canada faces both externally, in the war against terrorism and, domestically, with the government wrestling with the nation's financial deficit. The Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar was held, was filled to capacity with some 500 attendees, our largest crowd in memory. The luncheon address, highlighting the Centennial of Canada's Navy, was delivered by the Hon. Hugh Segal to high applause. We heard presentations given by Dr. Eliot Cohen, Johns Hopkins University; Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations; Dr. Rob Huebert, University of Calgary; Dr. Ronald Deibert, of the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab; Chris Alexander, formerly Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan and formerly Deputy United Nations Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan; Dr. David Kilcullen, author; Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, former Commander Canadian Joint Task Force – Afghanistan; Margaret Purdy, University of British Columbia; Dr. Charles Doran, Johns Hopkins University; and Dr. Fen Hampson, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

C'est avec un grand plaisir que nous entreprenons notre 15<sup>e</sup> année de publication du magazine *ON TRACK* par l'Institut de la CAD. Ce journal trimestriel est un important véhicule grâce auquel l'Institut contribue une valeur significative à la discussion des questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la présentation d'excellents articles issus de la plume d'experts de ces domaines.

Nous croyons que des politiques efficaces de défense et de sécurité doivent être fondées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et sur des options de politiques raisonnées. En partageant les résultats de notre recherche et nos recommandations avec les auteurs de politiques, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous contribuons à promouvoir le changement dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour le mieux-être de notre pays.

Le présent numéro du printemps de *ON TRACK* propose des articles d'intérêt actuel dans les domaines du séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD et de l'A.G.A. de la Conférence des associations de la défense, du nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN, du développement et de la reconstruction nationaux, de l'Arctique, de l'Afghanistan, du Pakistan, d'al-Qaïda, ainsi que des comptes rendus de lectures.

Notre 26<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel s'est tenu le 3 mars. Son thème, *Protéger les intérêts nationaux du Canada dans un monde d'incertitude*, tombait à point étant donné les défis auxquels le Canada fait face tant à l'extérieur, dans la guerre contre le terrorisme et, à l'intérieur, avec un gouvernement qui lutte avec le déficit financier du pays. La salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, où se tenait le séminaire, était remplie à capacité avec quelque 500 personnes présentes, notre foule la plus importante de mémoire d'homme.

La causerie du déjeuner, qui soulignait le Centenaire de la Marine canadienne, a été prononcée par l'Honorable Hugh Segal et a récolté des applaudissements nourris. Nous avons entendu les présentations de M. Eliot Cohen, de la Johns Hopkins University, de l'Amiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, de M. Rob Huebert, de l'Université de Calgary, de M. Ronald Deibert, du Citizen Lab de l'Université de Toronto, de Chris Alexander, ancien ambassadeur du Canada en Afghanistan et ancien représentant spécial du secrétaire général de l'ONU pour l'Afghanistan, de M. David Kilcullen, auteur, du Brigadier-général Jonathan Vance, ancien commandant de la Force opérationnelle interarmées canadienne – Afghanistan, de Margaret Purdy, de l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique, de M. Charles Doran, de la Johns Hopkins University, et de M. Fen Hampson, de la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs de l'Université Carleton.

There was significant media interest in the seminar, at which simultaneous interpretation was provided. I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received.

The seminar was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, Ambassadors, Senators and MPs, military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College of Canada and from Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, and members of the Canadian public.

Electronic copies of the addresses that were delivered at the seminar are available online at [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai).

The conference, continuing on 4 March, was held in conjunction with the 73<sup>rd</sup> annual general meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations. Addresses included those of General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff; journalist Brian Stewart, the University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies, and the 2009 recipient of the Ross Munro Media Award; Jocelyn Coulon, Université de Montréal; Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) James Soligan, Deputy Chief of Staff NATO Allied Command Transformation; Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, Chief of the Maritime Staff; Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff; Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Chief of the Air Staff; General David Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central Command; Dr. Jack Granatstein, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute; Dr. Douglas Bland, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University; and Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, Conference of Defence Associations.

Both the annual seminar and the AGM were truly successful, reflecting the general public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and national defence. Our Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, presents a summary of the proceedings of the two-day conference in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

The presence of so many speakers from around the world was made possible through the financial assistance of General Dynamics Canada, Irving Shipbuilding, NEXTER, Airborne Underwater Geophysical Signals, Pratt & Whitney Canada, ADGA Group Consultants, SNC Lavalin, Boeing, the Department of National Defence, Defence Management Studies of the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University, NATO and The SecDev Group. Coffee for the seminar was generously provided by CSMG of Ottawa and by Irving Shipbuilding. NEXTER was the sponsor of the luncheon and, following the conclusion of the seminar, General Dynamics graciously hosted a reception for the attendees.

The meaning of the Washington Treaty's Article 5, the bedrock of the NATO Alliance, is changing. NATO's current Strategic Concept dates back to 1999. The process leading to a new Strategic Concept formally kicked off at NATO's

Le séminaire, doté d'un système d'interprétation simultanée, a suscité un grand intérêt médiatique. J'ai le plaisir de noter les commentaires très positifs que nous avons reçus.

Ont assisté au séminaire des membres des Forces armées canadiennes, des ambassadeurs, des sénateurs et des députés, des attachés militaires, des élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, ainsi que des membres du public canadien. La journée a été remplie de conférenciers de tous les coins du Canada, de l'Australie et des États-Unis.

On trouvera à l'adresse [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai) des copies électroniques des allocutions présentées au séminaire.

La conférence, qui s'est poursuivie le 4 mars, était tenue de concert avec la 73<sup>e</sup> assemblée générale annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Notons, parmi les conférences, celles du Général Walter Natynczyk, chef de l'état-major de la Défense, du journaliste Brian Stewart, du Munk Centre for International Studies de l'Université de Toronto, récipiendaire de 2009 du prix Ross Munro, de Jocelyn Coulon, de l'Université de Montréal, du Lieutenant-général (retraité) James Soligan, chef d'état-major adjoint du Commandement allié de l'OTAN Transformation, du Vice-amiral Dean McFadden, chef de l'état-major de la Marine, du Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie, chef de l'état-major de l'Armée de terre, du Lieutenant-Général André Deschamps, chef de l'état-major de l'Armée de l'air, du Général David Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central Command, de M. Jack Granatstein, du d'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Etrangères, de M. Douglas Bland, de la School of Policy Studies de l'Université Queen's, et du Colonel (retraité) Brian MacDonald, de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Le séminaire annuel et l'A.G.A. ont connu un vrai succès, reflet de l'intérêt accru du grand public vis-à-vis le rôle du Canada dans la sécurité internationale et la défense nationale. Dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*, notre analyste principal de la défense, le Colonel (retraité) Brian MacDonald, présente un sommaire des actes de la conférence qui a duré deux jours.

La présence d'un si grand nombre d'orateurs venant de tous les points du globe a été rendue possible grâce à l'aide financière de General Dynamics Canada, ainsi que de Irving Shipbuilding Inc., NEXTER, Airborne Underwater Geophysical Signals, Pratt & Whitney Canada, ADGA Group Consultants, SNC Lavalin, Boeing, du programme Sécurité et Défense du ministère de la Défense nationale, du Defence Management Studies de la School of Policy Studies de l'Université Queen's, de l'OTAN et du SecDev Group. Le café pendant le séminaire était une généreuse contribution de CSMG of Ottawa et de Irving Shipbuilding Inc. NEXTER était un des commanditaires du déjeuner et, suite à la conclusion du séminaire, General Dynamics a gracieusement offert une réception aux membres de l'assistance.

Le sens de l'Article 5 du Traité de Washington, l'assise fondamentale de l'Alliance de l'OTAN, est en train de changer. Le Concept stratégique actuel de l'OTAN remonte à 1999. Le processus menant à un nouveau concept stratégique a été



*Current and former CDA Institute Interns with Executive Director and Chief of the Defence Staff at the annual mess dinner of the Conference of Defence Associations, 4 March 2010. L-R: Natalie Ratcliffe (current), Kyle Christensen (2002-2003), Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin (Executive Director) with General Walter Natynczyk (Chief of the Defence Staff), Elizabeth Sneyd (2006-2007), and Arnav Manchanda (2007-2008). Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe.*

*Les stagiaires d'aujourd'hui et d'hier de l'Institut de la CAD avec le directeur général et le chef de l'état-major de la Défense lors du dîner régimentaire annuel de la Conférence des associations de la défense, le 4 mars 2010. (de gauche à droite) Natalie Ratcliffe (présentement), Kyle Christensen (2002-2003), le Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin (directeur général) avec le Général Walter Natynczyk (chef de l'état-major de la Défense), Elizabeth Sneyd (2006-2007) et Arnav Manchanda (2007-2008). Photo : Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gord Metcalfe.*

60<sup>th</sup> anniversary Summit in 2009. On that occasion, NATO's leaders decided that it was time to work on a new strategy. To facilitate the process leading to the new Strategic Concept, the NATO Secretary General appointed a group of experts led by former U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Madeleine Albright, composed of representatives from public and private sectors, including Marie Gervais-Vidricaire, former Permanent Representative of Canada to the International Organizations at Vienna and Canadian Ambassador to Austria.

In early May, the NATO-appointed group of experts will present their analysis and recommendations to the Secretary General. The new NATO Strategic Concept will be tabled at the NATO Summit in November. In *A new mission statement for NATO*, Dr. Gerlinde Niehus provides us with a background of the main issues to be examined. Dr. Niehus

lancé au cours du sommet du 60<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de l'OTAN, en 2009. À cette occasion, les dirigeants de l'OTAN ont décidé que le temps était maintenant venu de travailler à une nouvelle stratégie. Pour faciliter le processus menant à un nouveau Concept stratégique, le secrétaire général de l'OTAN a nommé un groupe d'experts sous la direction de l'ancienne secrétaire d'État des États-Unis, Madeleine Albright, composé de représentants du secteur public et du secteur privé - dont fait partie Marie Gervais-Vidricaire, ancienne représentante permanente du Canada auprès des organisations internationales à Vienne et ambassadrice du Canada en Autriche.

Au début de mai le groupe d'experts nommés par l'OTAN présentera son analyse et ses recommandations au secrétaire général. Le nouveau Concept stratégique de l'OTAN sera déposé au sommet de l'OTAN, en novembre. Dans son article « *A new mission statement for NATO* », Mme Gerlinde Niehus nous donne un aperçu d'ensemble des principaux

leads the Corporate Communications Section within NATO's Public Diplomacy Division.

In late 2009 members of the CDA Institute and the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) came together to articulate a way ahead for NATO. The outcome of this collaboration of eminent Canadians was the release, on 23 March, of the paper *Security in an Uncertain World: A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept*, at a press conference in the National Press Theatre. Arnav Manchanda, Defence Policy Analyst, provides us with an overview of the paper in this edition. The paper can be found online at [www.natoconcept.ca](http://www.natoconcept.ca).

Frédéric Labarre writes that Article 2 and Article 5 are two fundamental provisions of the NATO Charter under which members of the Alliance base their foreign and defence policies in support of the general interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. In *Crise identitaire et stratégique à l'OTAN*, he examines the two Articles and provides us with his conclusion of what their impact on a new Strategic Concept might be. Monsieur Labarre is a PhD candidate at Royal Military College.

Drew Gilmour has been working on and off in Kandahar since 2001. He has helped build schools, import chickens, haggle over produce, and held endless debates over tea. In *Fighting for Work* Drew provides us with a critical assessment of the probability of success in Afghanistan in overpowering the insurgents. Mr. Gilmour is the director of Development Works, a Canadian enterprise agency.

Louis Delvoie first envisaged Al Qaeda as simply an armed adversary. He has since re-examined Al Qaeda's *modus operandi* and has arrived at a conclusion that may surprise our readers, in *Afghanistan and Al Qaeda: second thoughts*. Monsieur Delvoie, Canada's former High Commissioner in Pakistan, is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.

Adnan Qaiser notes that the world is not all on the same page when it comes to fighting terrorism. In *The Af-Pak Conundrum* he writes that Pakistan's role in power struggle in Afghanistan has remained crucial but also dubious. Mr. Qaiser is a defence and political analyst.

Dwight N. Mason examines, in *Canada, the United States and the Arctic*, the consequences for the United States and Canada the beginning of tourism, interest in oil, gas and mineral exploration and exploitation of the seabed in the U.S. and Canadian Arctic and on the Canadian islands in the area. He provides an approach that the two neighbours could take that would facilitate cooperation in the region. Mr. Mason is Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

enjeux qu'il faudra examiner. Mme Niehus est à la tête de la Corporate Communications Section, qui fait partie de la Division de la Diplomatie Publique de l'OTAN.

À la fin de 2009, des membres de l'Institut de la CAD et du d'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE) se sont réunis pour articuler quel pourrait être l'avenir de l'OTAN. Le résultat de cette collaboration de Canadiens éminents a été la publication, le 23 mars, du document intitulé « *La sécurité dans un monde d'incertitude : un point de vue canadien sur le nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN* » dans le cadre d'une conférence de presse tenue à l'Amphithéâtre national de la presse. Arnav Manchanda, analyste des politiques de défense, nous donne un aperçu de l'étude. On peut trouver le document à l'adresse [www.natoconcept.ca](http://www.natoconcept.ca).

Frédéric Labarre écrit que l'Article 2 et l'Article 5 sont les deux dispositions fondamentales de la Charte de l'OTAN sur lesquelles les membres de l'Alliance basent leurs politiques d'affaires étrangères et de politiques en appui des intérêts généraux de la communauté euro-atlantique. Dans l'article « *Crise identitaire et stratégique à l'OTAN* », il examine les deux articles et nous donne sa conclusion de ce que pourrait être leur impact sur un nouveau concept stratégique. Monsieur Labarre postule un Ph.D. au Collège militaire royal.

Drew Gilmour a travaillé périodiquement à Kandahar depuis 2001. Il a contribué à construire des écoles, à importer du poulet, à marchander sur des produits agricoles, et il a tenu des débats interminables autour d'une tasse de thé. Dans « *Fighting for Work* », Drew nous offre une évaluation critique de la probabilité de succès, en Afghanistan, si on veut prendre le dessus sur les insurgés. M. Gilmour est directeur de Development Works, une agence locale d'entreprises canadienne.

Louis Delvoie a d'abord envisagé al-Qaida comme simplement un adversaire armé. Il a depuis lors réexaminé le *modus operandi* d'al-Qaida et en est venu à une conclusion qui peut surprendre nos lecteurs ; on le verra dans « *Afghanistan and Al Qaeda: second thoughts* ». Monsieur Delvoie, ancien Haut-commissaire du Canada au Pakistan, est un agrégé supérieur du Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's.

Adnan Qaiser note que le monde ne chante pas toujours la même chanson pour ce qui est de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Dans « *The Af-Pak Conundrum* », il écrit que le rôle du Pakistan dans la lutte de pouvoir en Afghanistan est restée crucial mais également douteux. M. Qaiser est analyste de la défense et de la politique.

Dans « *Canada, the United States and the Arctic* », Dwight N. Mason examine les conséquences, pour les États-Unis et le Canada, du début du tourisme, de l'intérêt envers le pétrole, le gaz et l'exploration minière, ainsi que de l'exploitation des fonds marins dans l'Arctique américain et canadien, et sur les îles canadiennes de cette région. Il propose une approche que les deux voisins pourraient adopter, qui faciliterait la coopération dans la région. M. Mason est associé principal du Center for Strategic and



Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, Executive Director of the CDA Institute, was presented with the Canadian International Council Brigadier-General Dr. George G. Bell Shield Award for Strategic Excellence by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara, Chair of the Strategic Studies Working Group, on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Canadian International Council, during the annual mess dinner of the Conference of Defence Associations, 4 March. Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe.

Le Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin, directeur général de l'Institut de la CAD, a reçu le prix Brigadier-General Dr. George G. Bell Shield Award for Strategic Excellence, du Conseil international du Canada, des mains du Brigadier-Général (Ret) W. Don Macnamara, président du Groupe de travail en études stratégiques au nom du conseil d'administration du CIC au cours du dîner régimentaire annuel de la Conférence des associations de la défense, le 4 mars. Photo : Lieutenant-colonel (Ret) Gord Metcalfe.

Dr. Rob Huebert writes, in *The Coming Arctic Storm*, that recent and converging developments will make it increasingly difficult to maintain the hopes for nations for peace and cooperation in the Arctic region. He details four forces that are fundamentally transforming the Arctic. Dr. Huebert is Associate Professor with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

We are pleased to include in the issue of *ON TRACK* reviews of five books that should be of interest to our

International Studies.

M. Rob Huebert écrit, dans « *The Coming Arctic Storm* », que les développements récents et convergents feront qu'il sera de plus en plus difficile de maintenir les espoirs des nations pour la paix et la coopération dans la région de l'Arctique. Il fait le détail de quatre forces qui sont en train de transformer fondamentalement l'Arctique. M. Huebert est professeur agrégé au Centre for Military and Strategic Studies de l'Université de Calgary.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK* des comptes rendus de lecture de cinq livres qui devraient intéresser nos lecteurs. Le premier nous vient de M. Serge Durflinger, qui a lu le volume bien illustré intitulé *In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army: Northwest Europe 1942-1945*. M. Durflinger donne une impulsion favorable au livre et souligne les qualités qui devraient inciter le lecteur à chercher à se procurer ce beau travail d'écriture et d'illustration. M. Durflinger est professeur d'histoire à l'Université d'Ottawa.

Bonnie Butlin a lu pour nous *Uprising*, du Lieutenant-Colonel (retraité) Dr. Douglas L. Bland. Mme Butlin note que l'auteur utilise habilement le format d'un roman pour plonger profondément sous le dur placage de la rectitude politique pour faire le détail des problématiques actuelles auxquelles font face les Canadiens, autochtones ou non. *Uprising* offre une analyse franche des capacités et des vulnérabilités canadiennes en matière de gestion des défis intérieurs et des répercussions qui peuvent s'ensuivre au plan international. Mme Butlin est une ancienne stagiaire du FSD à l'Institut de la CAD. Elle est maintenant secrétaire exécutive à la l'Association canadienne pour les études de renseignement et de sécurité.

Le Colonel (retraité) Andrew Nellestyn a lu pour nous *FOB Doc*, du Capitaine Ray Wiss, M.D. Le livre du Capitaine Wiss est un compte rendu autobiographique de son temps de service comme médecin avec nos troupes en Afghanistan, tant à la base d'opérations canadienne (aéroport de Kandahar) que sur le front de l'aire de mission. Le Colonel (retraité) Nellestyn est président-directeur général de Andel Inc. Consulting Services.

Jesse Mellott nous présente un compte rendu de *Intrepid Warriors*, un recueil d'essais sur le leadership et le commandement exercés par des individus en situation de combat. Cette anthologie a été préparée sous la direction du Colonel Bernd Horn et elle jette un regard intimiste sur un certain nombre des meilleurs commandants et leaders militaires canadiens. Même si la publication de *Intrepid Warriors* remonte à il ya quelques années, le livre offre des aperçus de différentes façons d'approcher le commandement et le leadership, ainsi que des comportements et des styles qui sont aussi applicables aujourd'hui que jamais. M. Mellott vit et travaille à Guelph.

Peter Forsberg nous donne un compte rendu de sa lecture de *Courage Rewarded*, un sujet qui n'a pas été très bien couvert jusqu'ici – la question est celle de savoir qu'est-ce que le courage au combat, un ouvrage écrit par Robert Fowler, ancien fonctionnaire. Dans son livre M. Fowler examine comment les soldats de l'Armée canadienne ont fait

readers. The first is from Dr. Serge Durlinger, who reviews the well-illustrated volume, *In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army: Northwest Europe 1942-1945*. Dr. Durlinger provides the impetus for the book and outlines the book's qualities that should entice the reader to search out this fine work of writing and illustration. Dr. Durlinger is a professor of history at the University of Ottawa.

Bonnie Butlin reviews *Uprising*, by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd), Dr. Douglas L. Bland. Ms. Butlin notes that the author adeptly uses the format of a novel to go deep beneath the hard veneer of political correctness to detail the current issues facing Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike. *Uprising* provides a frank analysis of the Canadian capacities and vulnerabilities for managing domestic challenges, and of the international repercussions that may follow from them. Ms. Butlin is a former SDF-sponsored intern with the CDA Institute. She is now Executive Secretary with the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies.

Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn reviews the book, *FOB Doc*, by Captain Ray Wiss, M.D. Captain Wiss's book is an autobiographical account of his time served as a medical doctor with our troops in Afghanistan, at both the main Canadian operating base (Kandahar Air Field) and on the front lines of the mission area. Colonel (Ret'd) Nellestyn is President and CEO of Andel Inc. Consulting Services.

Jesse Mellott provides us with a review of *Intrepid Warriors*, a collection of essays on leadership and command exercised by individuals during battle. This anthology was edited by Colonel Bernd Horn and takes an intimate look at a number of Canada's finest military commanders and leaders. Although *Intrepid Warriors* was published a few years back, the book offers insights into different command and leadership approaches, behaviours and styles that are as applicable today as they ever were. Mr. Mellott lives and works in Guelph, Ontario.

Peter Forsberg has written a review of *Courage Rewarded*, a subject that has not been well covered before—the question of what is courage in battle, written by Robert Fowler, a former civil servant. In his book Mr. Fowler examines how bravery was shown by soldiers in the Canadian Army from the time of the Boer War in South Africa, 1900, to Afghanistan in 2007. Peter Forsberg is the CDA Institute's Public Affairs Officer.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to Warrant Officer William MacDonald by the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, before some 640 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 19 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award

preuve de bravoure depuis le temps de la Guerre des Boers de 1900, en Afrique du Sud, jusqu'à l'Afghanistan, en 2007. Peter Forsberg est l'officier des affaires publiques de l'Institut de la CAD.

Un des événements majeurs du calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a connu un vif succès, avec un nombre record d'excellentes soumissions qui ont été considérées par le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a connu son point culminant avec la présentation du prix à l'Adjudant William MacDonald par la Très honorable Beverley McLachlin, Juge en chef du Canada devant 640 invités lors d'un dîner formel donné au Musée canadien de la guerre.

La présentation de cette année du Prix Vimy aura lieu le 19 novembre dans le cadre d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui se tiendront à nouveau au Musée canadien de la guerre. Pour que ce prix ait vraiment tout son sens, l'Institut a besoin de vos mises en candidatures parmi lesquelles sera désigné le récipiendaire de cette année. Même si nous avons déjà reçu un certain nombre de candidatures, nous encourageons les associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les individus à soumettre des mises en candidature pour leur candidat. Veuillez vous reporter à l'avis d'appel de candidatures publié ailleurs dans le présent numéro et allez en ligne à l'adresse [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai).

Le prix Ross Munro Media Award sera aussi remis lors du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix pour 2009, fut Brian Stewart. Ce prix prestigieux, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec l'ICDAE, sera présenté à un/e journaliste canadien/ne qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité qui touchent le Canada. Le prix est accompagné d'un prix en argent d'une valeur de 2 500 \$. L'avis d'appel aux candidatures paraît également ailleurs dans le présent numéro et sur notre site Web, à l'adresse [www.cda-cdai.ca/cda](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda).

L'an dernier, les deux programmes ont connu un succès retentissant. J'ai le plaisir d'annoncer que l'appui accordé à ces programmes par l'industrie canadienne et des individus est très encourageant.

L'Institut de la CAD continuera à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse réfléchie des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et sécurité de ce pays. Par la recherche, les discussions en table ronde, les séminaires et symposiums annuels de l'Institut de la CAD, et par notre collaboration avec les universités et d'autres groupes, nous continuons à mettre l'accent sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Notre but est toujours d'informer et de soutenir notre gouvernement et les auteurs de politiques dans des directions qui sauvegarderont les intérêts du Canada et de ses citoyens en matière de défense et de sécurité.

En concluant, je veux remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux *patron*, *compagnon*, et *officier*, pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD ; sans eux il nous serait très

truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go online at [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai)

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2009 was Brian Stewart. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), will be presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website at [www.cda-cdai.ca/cda](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cda).

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is very encouraging.

The CDA Institute will continue to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country. Through the CDA Institute's research, roundtable discussions, annual seminars and symposia, and our collaboration with universities and other groups, we continue our focus on defence and security issues. Our aim is always to inform as well as support our government and policymakers in directions that will safeguard the defence and security interests of Canada and its citizens.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation \$75, or at a higher level, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months following your donation:

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A copy of Donor forms is printed elsewhere in this journal. Donor forms are also available on line at [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor).

difficile de remplir notre mission.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau *supporteur*, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les avantages suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

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- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription au séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD.

Une copie du formulaire de donateurs est imprimée ailleurs dans ce magazine. Également disponible en ligne, à [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor).

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**Proceedings of the 26<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar and of the 73<sup>rd</sup> Annual General Meeting**

**La Séance du 23<sup>e</sup> Séminaire annuel et de la 73<sup>e</sup> Assemblée générale**

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

CDA Institute 26th Annual Seminar

*Protecting Canada's National Interests in an Uncertain World*

Opening address – Eliot Cohen



par Colonel (Ret) Brian MacDonald

26<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD

*Protéger les intérêts nationaux du Canada dans un monde d'incertitude*

Allocution d'ouverture – Eliot Cohen

In the opening address **Dr. Eliot Cohen**, Johns Hopkins University spoke of *Warfare and Security in an Uncertain World*, drawing to our attention the extraordinary changes that have taken place in international conflict and security since the end of the Cold War. We still have difficulty in breaking out of that Cold War frame as we confront the new strategic uncertainty.

The changes are profound. Among them is the appearance of hybrid warfare, in which conventional and unconventional operations are merged in the same battlespace. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence and nuclear strategy are still part of the strategic reality. Assassination has reappeared as a weapon, particularly in the hands of non-state actors, and the distinction between states and non-state actors is increasingly blurred, especially with respect to collapsed states.

Nor is it entirely clear who “we” are, since “we” are changing. While Canada in Afghanistan is recovering its hard power capabilities, those of the European liberal democracies are weakening. And new relationships, such as that between the United States and India, are developing, whose ultimate outcome is not yet clear.

Keynote speaker – Gary Roughead

Keynote speaker **Admiral Gary Roughead**, US Chief of Naval Operations, in speaking of *The Importance of Seapower in the 21st Century*, began with the blunt statement that though the nature of war changes, the criticality of seapower endures, noting that 75 percent of strikes against Afghanistan at the beginning of the operation against the Taliban were launched from the sea. He noted that the business of

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L'allocution d'ouverture prononcée par **M. Eliot Cohen**, de Johns Hopkins University, s'intitulait *Warfare and Security in an Uncertain World (La conduite de la guerre et la sécurité dans un monde d'incertitude)*, a attiré notre attention sur les changements extraordinaires qui ont eu lieu dans les conflits internationaux et la sécurité depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. Nous avons encore de la difficulté à nous sortir de ce cadre de la Guerre froide, à l'heure où nous faisons face à une nouvelle incertitude stratégique.

Les changements sont profonds. Parmi eux, il y a l'apparition de la conduite de la guerre hybride, dans laquelle des opérations conventionnelles et non conventionnelles sont fusionnées dans le même espace de combat. Les armes nucléaires, la défense anti missiles balistiques et la stratégie nucléaire font encore partie de la réalité stratégique. L'assassinat est réapparu comme arme, particulièrement aux mains d'acteurs non étatiques, et la distinction entre acteurs étatiques et non étatiques est de plus en plus floue, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les États déliquescents.

Il n'est pas tout à fait clair non plus, de savoir « qui » nous sommes, puisque « nous » sommes en changement. Alors que le Canada regagne ses capacités de puissance dure en Afghanistan, celles des démocraties libérales de l'Europe s'affaiblissent. Et de nouvelles relations, comme celle qui se nouent entre les États-Unis et l'Inde, sont en train de se développer sans que nous puissions encore voir clairement quel en sera le résultat ultime.

Conférencier principal – Gary Roughead

Le conférencier principal, l'**Amiral Gary Roughead**, US Chief of Naval Operations, avait intitulé sa causerie *L'importance de la puissance maritime au 21<sup>e</sup> siècle*, et il a commencé en affirmant carrément que, malgré la nature des changements de la guerre, l'attribut critique de la puissance maritime demeure, en notant que 75 pour cent des coups portés contre l'Afghanistan au début des opérations contre

Le Colonel (Ret) Brian MacDonald est l'Analyste principal de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

navies still includes sea control through the convoy of goods and supplies as well as blockading those of opponents, and that these functions have expanded to include anti-narcotics and anti-piracy operations, as well as riverine operations in hybrid warfare. Nor should we forget the potential role of naval forces in the “storming of the beaches” in humanitarian operations to deliver assistance to threatened populations.

He pointed out seapower’s utility to diplomacy in that the presence of significant naval forces can change the calculus of the situation and thereby act as a means of preventing conflict as well as its capacity to win them. However, problems remain for navies in the form of defence budgets, since navies need ships to project power and shipbuilding industries to provide those ships.

*Panel I – Canada’s Strategic Interests: Opportunities and Challenges*

**Dr. Rob Huebert**, of the University of Calgary, speaking about Arctic Security, reminded us that we are in a transformational period, in which the Arctic is changing, literally before our eyes. The new Arctic security environment is characterized by rapid climate change with the lowest ever extent of multi-year ice, new areas of resource development and the increasing interest in the Arctic as a transit route between Asia and Europe, and a geopolitical transformation in which Russia is reasserting itself as a Great Power with a strong Arctic focus. China is extending its reach, the European Union is showing an increased interest, and all Arctic states are building or re-building Arctic capabilities. Accordingly Canada needs to take diplomatic action to prevent an Arctic arms race, develop more robust and capable Arctic forces, and increase our surveillance and enforcement capabilities.

**Dr. Ronald Deibert**, of the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, addressed the issue of the *Strategic Importance of Cyberspace*, which is increasingly becoming an intense zone of cyber espionage. He argued that the cyber sphere has evolved through three phases. In the beginning there was the concept of “The Commons,” a space which could be accessed and used by all, which evolved into a cyberspace “with borders,” which was controlled by the private sector, though increasingly influenced by the criminal sector, and now an evolving cyberwar space with state actors becoming involved. He called for the development of a new paradigm of cybersecurity based upon a concept of Arms Control in Cyberspace, which would draw heavily upon the existing body of arms control practice and literature, moving ultimately to

les Talibans étaient lancés depuis la mer. Il a noté que les affaires dont traitent les forces navales comprennent encore le contrôle de la mer par des convois de marchandises et d’approvisionnements ainsi que par des blocus imposés à ceux des opposants, et que ces fonctions se sont étendues aux opérations anti-narcotiques et anti-piraterie, ainsi qu’aux opérations riveraines dans la conduite de la guerre hybride. Il ne faudrait pas oublier non plus le rôle potentiel des forces navales dans « l’envahissement des plages » lors d’opérations humanitaires ayant pour but de dispenser de l’aide à des populations menacées.

Il a souligné l’utilité de la puissance maritime pour la diplomatie en ce que la présence de forces navales importantes peut changer le calcul de la situation et, par là, agir comme un moyen de prévenir les conflits, ainsi que la capacité de les gagner. Toutefois, il reste des problèmes pour les forces navales sous la forme de budgets de la Défense, puisque les forces navales ont besoin de navires pour projeter la puissance et d’industries de construction navale pour produire ces navires.

*Panel I – Les intérêts stratégiques du Canada : Les possibilités et les défis*

**M. Rob Huebert**, de l’Université de Calgary, nous a rappelé, en parlant de sécurité de l’Arctique, que nous sommes dans une période de transformation, au cours de laquelle l’Arctique change, littéralement, sous nos yeux. Le nouvel environnement de sécurité de l’Arctique est caractérisé par un changement climatique rapide, avec la plus faible étendue de glace pluri-annuelle jamais vue, de nouvelles aires de développement de ressources et l’intérêt croissant envers l’Arctique comme voie de passage entre l’Asie et l’Europe, ainsi que la transformation géopolitique dans laquelle la Russie se réaffirme comme grande puissance, avec une forte concentration sur l’Arctique. La Chine est en voie d’étendre son influence, l’Union européenne montre un intérêt accru et tous les États arctiques sont à construire ou à reconstruire des capacités arctiques. En conséquence, le Canada a besoin d’agir au niveau diplomatique pour empêcher une course aux armements arctique, développer des forces arctiques plus robustes et plus capables, et pour accroître nos capacités de surveillance et d’activité policière.

**M. Ronald Deibert**, du Citizen Lab de l’University of Toronto, a traité du sujet *L’importance stratégique du cyberspace*, qui est de plus en plus en train de devenir une zone intense de cyberespionnage. D’après lui, le cyberspace a évolué en trois étapes. Au début, on a eu le concept de « The Commons », un espace auquel tout le monde aurait accès et que tout le monde pourrait utiliser, qui a évolué en un cyberspace « avec des frontières », qui était contrôlé par le secteur privé tout en étant de plus en plus influencé par le secteur criminel, et qui évolue maintenant en un espace de cyberguerre que les acteurs étatiques sont en train d’investir. Il a préconisé le développement d’un nouveau paradigme de cybersécurité fondé sur le concept du contrôle des armes dans le cyberspace, qui pourrait s’inspirer fortement du

a Treaty of Cyberspace with a global monitoring and early warning system capability.

## *Luncheon speaker – Hugh Segal*

Luncheon speaker **Senator Hugh Segal's** sparkling address, *Beyond the Celebration: The Next Naval Century*, took him from a review of the outstanding historical performance of the Canadian Navy to a grand *tour d'horizon* of the capabilities that a naval task force, "fleet ready and self contained and ready to engage," can offer to government in meeting and responding to coming foreign policy challenges. He called for serious investment in the Navy, arguing that it is clearly the Navy's turn with respect to modernization, replacement and new capacity, regardless of the views of the "four bureaucratic horsemen of the fiscal eclipse, places like Treasury Board, Finance Canada, PCO, and Supply and Services Canada, often described by insiders as the places where good ideas go to die."

## *Panel II – Learning from Afghanistan: Capabilities Across the Spectrum*

**Chris Alexander**, formerly Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, and formerly United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan reminded us that we came late to understanding the nature of our enemy as a consequence of inadequate analysis of the Taliban in the 2001-2006 period, which was driven by the focus on the war in Iraq, and still have not deployed enough people who understand the differences between Pashto and Dari speakers and the cultures they come from. He noted the inadequacies of the current Afghan government, which was, in part, the outcome of the emigration of the professional educated classes during the years of war in that country. While some development has taken place, a fully functioning Afghan government still does not exist, particularly at the sub-national level. Nor has the Afghan private sector developed enough. Moreover there must be a greater focus on diplomatic relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**Dr. David Kilcullen**, author of *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, criticized what he referred to as the international actors' preference for a "shared diagnosis," which emphasizes a unity of command and unity of effort that do not exist. The key problem in Afghanistan is a weak Afghan government that is disliked because of its criminality, corruption and incompetence. While we centralized power in Kabul, the resulting government was unable to act effectively, particularly in dealing with grievances and other issues at the district level. Accordingly we need to revisit the governance issue with a combined coalition military/Afghan military/Afghan police/Afghan civilian

corpus actuel de pratique et de littérature sur le contrôle des armes, pour aller éventuellement vers un Traité du cyberspace, accompagné d'une capacité de système de surveillance mondiale et d'alerte rapide.

## *Conférencier invité au déjeuner – Hugh Segal*

La brillante causerie du conférencier invité au déjeuner, le **Sénateur Hugh Segal**, qui avait pour titre *Au-delà de la célébration : le prochain siècle naval*, a amené celui-ci d'un examen de la performance historique exceptionnelle de la Marine canadienne à un grand tour d'horizon des capacités qu'une force opérationnelle navale, « prête à appareiller, autonome et prête au combat », peut offrir au gouvernement pour répondre et réagir aux défis à venir en matière de politique étrangère. Il a réclamé un investissement sérieux dans les forces navales, avec l'argument que c'est clairement au tour de la force navale de profiter d'une modernisation, de remplacements et d'une nouvelle capacité, quels que soient les points de vue des « quatre cavaliers bureaucratiques de l'éclipse fiscale, des lieux comme le Conseil du trésor, Finances Canada, le BCP et Approvisionnement et Services Canada, souvent décrits par les gens de l'intérieur comme les endroits où les bonnes idées s'en vont pour mourir. »

## *Panel II – La leçon de l'Afghanistan: les capacités à travers le spectre*

**Chris Alexander**, ancien ambassadeur canadien en Afghanistan et ancien représentant spécial adjoint du secrétaire général de l'ONU pour l'Afghanistan aux Nations Unies, nous a rappelé que nous sommes parvenus tard à comprendre la nature de notre ennemi en conséquence d'une analyse insuffisante des talibans pendant la période de 2001 à 2006, qui était sous l'empire de la guerre en Iraq et qui n'a pas encore déployé assez de personnes qui comprennent la différence entre les interlocuteurs pachtous et daris et les cultures dont ils sont issus. Il a noté les insuffisances du gouvernement afghan actuel, qui était en partie le résultat de l'émigration des classes professionnelles et instruites pendant les années de guerre dans ce pays. De plus, on doit s'intéresser davantage aux relations diplomatiques entre l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan.

**M. David Kilcullen**, auteur de *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, a critiqué ce qu'il appelle la préférence des acteurs internationaux pour un « diagnostic partagé », qui met l'accent sur une unité de commandement et une unité d'effort qui n'existent pas. Le problème fondamental, en Afghanistan, c'est un gouvernement afghan faible qui est détesté à cause de sa criminalité, de sa corruption et de son incompetence. Alors que nous avons centralisé le pouvoir à Kabul, le gouvernement qui en a été le résultat a été incapable d'agir de façon efficace, particulièrement dans son traitement des griefs et d'autres questions au niveau des districts. Par conséquent, il nous faut

oversight structure capable of providing governance oversight. (see "Fighting for Work" by Drew Gilmour elsewhere in this edition of On Track – ed.)

**Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance**, former Commander Canadian Joint Task Force-Afghanistan drew our attention to the "Three Ages" of the conflict in Afghanistan. In the "First Age," from 2001-2006, the emphasis was upon a dual OEF/NATO operation in which the OEF half was focused on a counter-terrorist operation intended to depose the Taliban, while the NATO half acted as quasi-NGOs at

revisiter la question de gouvernance avec une structure de surveillance combinée d'armée de coalition, d'armée afghane, de police afghane et de civils afghans capable d'offrir une supervision de gouvernance. (voir « Fighting for Work » par Drew Gilmour ailleurs dans ce numéro de On Track – réd.)

Le **Brigadier-Général Jonathan Vance**, ancien commandant de Force interopératoire canadienne-Afghanistan, a attiré notre attention sur les « Trois époques » du conflit en Afghanistan. Dans la « Première époque », de 2001 à 2006, l'accent a été mis sur une opération double OEF/OTAN dans laquelle la moitié OEF était concentrée sur une opération antiterroriste qui avait pour but de déposer les talibans, tandis que la moitié OTAN agissait comme une quasi-ONG qui essayait d'établir les équipes provinciales de reconstruction (EPR) comme mécanismes de développement. Malheureusement, l'insurrection a grandi plus rapidement

(continued p. 17)

(voir p. 17)

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For further information or to advise the CDA Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903 or [treasurer@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:treasurer@cda-cdai.ca). All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.

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*Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, former Commander Canadian Joint Task Force-Afghanistan, addresses the 26<sup>th</sup> Annual Defence Seminar that was presented by the CDA Institute, 3 March, at the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa. Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe.*

*Le Brigadier-Général Jonathan Vance, ancien commandant de la Force opérationnelle interarmées canadienne-Afghanistan prononce une allocution dans le cadre du 26<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel de la Défense qui fut présenté par l'Institut de la CAD le 3 mars, à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Photo: Lieutenant-colonel(Ret) Gord Metcalfe.*

qu'on le réalisait et plus rapidement que ce que pouvaient y faire avec succès les forces de coalition aux ressources limitées. Dans la « Deuxième époque », de 2006 à 2009, la coalition a réalisé qu'elle était aux prises avec une insurrection et qu'il faudrait employer des tactiques de lutte à l'insurrection. Malheureusement, les forces de coalition étaient encore limitées dans leurs ressources et les « conditions gagnantes » n'étaient toujours pas présentes, ce qui a eu pour résultat que l'objectif opérationnel de la coalition a été de « ne pas perdre ». Une fois à la « Troisième époque », de 2009 à nos jours, une plus grande quantité de ressources ont été fournies, la criticalité de Kandahar a été reconnue, ainsi que le caractère critique de la défense contre des menaces faites à la population.

*Panel III – Préoccupations contemporaines en matière de sécurité*

**Margaret Purdy**, de l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique, en faisant l'examen des *Implications du changement climatique sur la sécurité*, a commencé en reconnaissant la controverse qui avait fait irruption suite aux courriels de l'Unité de recherches climatiques de l'Université d'East Anglia révélés sur Internet, mais elle a fait remarquer qu'ils n'ont pas démontré que les données scientifiques elles-mêmes avaient été réfutées. Il est clair que le climat change et que les effets vont se faire sentir plus durement dans certaines régions que dans d'autres. Elle a suggéré que ce n'est pas une idée radicale que de s'attendre à ce que l'élévation du niveau des océans, par exemple, aura de profondes implications en matière de sécurité, particulièrement quand plusieurs des régions les plus susceptibles d'être noyées par l'élévation des niveaux d'eau sont déjà parmi les plus instables. Il existe un large consensus à l'effet que personne ne réussit à s'en tirer sur cette question, que certains des plus vulnérables sont parmi les moins intéressés et que le changement climatique va déclencher d'autres enjeux de sécurité.

**M. Charles Doran**, de Johns Hopkins University, a commencé son analyse de *La Sécurité énergétique* en faisant remarquer que le monde nage présentement dans le pétrole à un prix de 80 \$ le baril, avec une capacité de réserve substantielle de l'Arabie Saoudite

tempting to establish the PRTs as development mechanisms. Unfortunately, the insurgency grew faster than realized and faster than the under-resourced coalition forces could successfully deal with. In the "Second Age," from 2006-2009, the coalition realized that it was involved with an insurgency and that counter-insurgency tactics needed to be employed. Unfortunately, the coalition forces were still under-resourced and the "conditions to win" were still not present, with the result that the operative coalition objective was "Don't lose." By the "Third Age," from 2009 to the present, more resources have been provided, the criticality of Kandahar acknowledged, and the need to defend against threats to the population recognized.

et avec le commencement d'un développement pétrolier ambitieux en Iraq, dont le but est d'augmenter la production de deux à douze millions de barils par jour. Cependant, la question de la stabilité du gouvernement iraquien, une fois que les Américains auront complété leur retrait, et du potentiel d'impact, pour la dynamique politique du Golfe, des conséquences du programme nucléaire de l'Iran continue à présenter de graves conséquences pour une époque où le Golfe produira 70 pour cent du pétrole mondial. En plus, le « pétrole de pointe » s'en vient, avec le déclin de la production de la plupart des champs d'environ 6 pour cent par année. Par conséquent, la relation énergétique US-Canada se resserre et

## Panel III – Contemporary Security Concerns

**Margaret Purdy**, of the University of British Columbia, in reviewing the *Security Implications of Climate Change*, began by acknowledging the controversy that had erupted as a result of the University of East Anglia's Climatic Research Unit e-mails revealed on the Internet, but pointed out that they did not demonstrate that the science itself had been disproved. It is clear that climate is changing and that the effects will be felt more severely in some areas than in others. She suggested that it is not a radical idea to expect that rising ocean levels, for example, will have profound security implications, especially when many of the areas most likely to be drowned by rising sea levels are already amongst the most unstable. There is a broad consensus that no one is coping successfully with the issue, that some of the most vulnerable are among the least interested, and that climate change will trigger other security issues.

**Dr. Charles Doran**, of Johns Hopkins University, began his analysis of *Energy Security* by pointing out that the world is currently awash with oil at a price of \$80 per barrel, with a substantial Saudi reserve capacity and with the beginning of an ambitious oil development in Iraq intended to increase production from two to twelve million barrels a day. However the question of the stability of the Iraqi government when the Americans have completed their withdrawal, and the potential for the political dynamic of the Gulf being impacted by the consequences of Iran's nuclear programme continue to present grave consequences when the Gulf produces 70 percent of world oil. Moreover, "Peak Oil" is on its way with most fields' production declining at about 6 percent a year. Consequently, the US-Canada energy relationship is tightening and the development of the Oil Sands remains critical to US-Canada energy security.

**Dr. Fen Osler Hampson**, of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, speaking about the *Regionalization of Global Security* noted that security has become more disaggregated and diverse than ever before, with economic and military power becoming increasingly multipolar. Though sixty countries are on the verge of collapse, potential interveners seem more interested in confused arguments about unequal burden-sharing than in actual intervention. While emerging trends include the growth of international organizations willing to deal with insecurity their actions remain too often *ad hoc*, and the future problem will be in finding sufficient willing parties to participate in conflict management operations, particularly in an era in which we are just beginning to come to grips with the implications of the US deficit and its potential for limiting the capacity of the United States to provide the leadership and resources that global security has come to rely upon.

le développement des sables bitumineux reste critique pour la sécurité énergétique des deux pays.

**M. Fen Osler Hampson**, de la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs de l'Université Carleton, en parlant de *la Régionalisation de la sécurité mondiale* a noté que la sécurité est devenue plus désagrégée et diversifiée que jamais auparavant, alors que le pouvoir économique et militaire devient de plus en plus multipolaire. Bien que soixante pays soient sur le bord de la déliquescence, les possibles intervenants semblent plus intéressés à des arguments confus sur l'inégalité du partage du fardeau qu'à une intervention réelle. Pendant que les tendances émergentes comprennent la croissance d'organisations internationales consentant à traiter de l'insécurité, leurs actions restent trop souvent *ad hoc* et le problème futur sera de trouver un nombre suffisant de parties consentantes pour participer à des opérations de gestion des conflits, particulièrement dans une ère dans laquelle nous ne faisons que commencer à saisir les implications du déficit américain et du potentiel qu'a celui-ci de limiter la capacités des États-Unis d'offrir le leadership et les ressources sur lesquels la sécurité mondiale en est venue à se fier.

73<sup>e</sup> Assemblée générale annuelle de la CAD**La projection du pouvoir et les Forces canadiennes : ressources et capacités***Allocution d'ouverture – le Général Walter Natynczyk*

Dans son allocution d'ouverture, le **Général Walter Natynczyk**, le chef de l'état-major de la Défense, a donné à l'auditoire une présentation pleine d'entrain et de bonne humeur qui reconnaissait que, même si nous vivons dans un monde de grande incertitude, nous avons encore bien des raisons d'être optimistes et que la performance des Forces canadiennes, qui contribuent à résoudre tant de problèmes de sécurité du monde, doivent rendre tous les Canadiens fiers d'elles. Avec 12 000 personnes des FC déployées à l'extérieur du Canada ou en train de s'entraîner pour partir, les FC sont devenues les gens « à qui s'adresser » pour produire des résultats.

L'Afghanistan demeure un problème difficile, mais il règne un optimisme prudent qui veut que 2010 pourrait être une année charnière, alors que nous nous concentrerons sur un progrès régulier jour après jour, semaine après semaine, mois après mois. La *Stratégie de défense Le Canada d'abord* continue à faire des progrès, avec le nombre des FC s'élevant maintenant à 68 000 réguliers et 30 000 réservistes et avec une attrition qui a maintenant diminué à 6 pour cent par années, comparativement à 9 pour cent l'an dernier, et une amélioration majeure de l'équipement.

Quoiqu'il en soit, il y a des secteurs où il reste de la place à l'amélioration. Nous avons besoin d'un plus grand élan dans la tâche de recapitalisation. Nos CF-18 ont 25 ans et le projet de remplacement d'avions de recherche et de sauvetage n'est toujours pas approuvé. Nous avons besoin de revitaliser notre capacité de construction navale, avec les 50 navires qui seront nécessaire au cours des 30

**CDA 73rd Annual General Meeting**  
***Power Projection and the Canadian Forces:***  
***Resources & Capabilities***

*Opening address – Walter Natynczyk*

In the opening address, **General Walter Natynczyk**, the Chief of the Defence Staff, provided the audience with a cheerful and upbeat presentation which recognized that while we live in a world of much uncertainty, we still have much to be optimistic about and that the performance of the Canadian Forces, who are helping to resolve so many of the world's security issues, must make all Canadians proud of them. With 12,000 CF personnel deployed outside Canada or under training to go, the CF has become the "go to" people who make things happen.

Afghanistan remains a tough problem but there is a cautious optimism that 2010 could be a corner-turning year as we focus on steady progress day by day, week by week, month by month. *The Canada First Defence Strategy* continues to make progress, with CF strength now running at 68,000 regulars and 30,000 reserves and with attrition now down to 6 percent annually from last year's 9 percent, and a major improvement in equipment.

Nonetheless there are areas for improvement. We need more momentum in the task of recapitalization. Our CF-18s are 25 years old and the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue aircraft project is still not approved. We need to cut steel on ships and to revitalize our shipbuilding capacity, with 50 ships needed over the next 30 years including replacements for our 40-year-old AORs and our Destroyers. We need to continually improve our support for our people in uniform and their families, particularly with respect to PTSD.

*Panel I – The Media and the Military*

Journalist **Brian Stewart**, now at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto complimented the CF Public Affairs function as being very well organized and with a clear communications strategy, which contributed successfully to maintaining a higher level of public support for the Afghanistan operation than was the case in Europe. Two problems remain, however. The first is "Messaging the Departure" of the CF from Afghanistan and its potential impact on NATO solidarity. The second will be the question of the CF communications strategy post-2011. During the 1990s the CF was much less open than it is now and we should remember that war reporting is not the same as defence reporting.

**Jocelyn Coulon**, of the Université de Montréal, spoke from experience on the relationship between the military and the media, having covered military life and affairs for 20 years as a journalist. He noted that while the goals of the military and media (to protect and to inform) benefited society, these goals are not always complementary. The military will always try to put a positive spin on events and the media must be critical when evaluating this information. Coulon also spoke about the importance of journalists and

prochaines années, y compris le remplacement de nos pétroliers ravitailleurs d'escadres (AOR) qui ont 40 ans et de nos destroyers. Nous avons besoin d'améliorer continuellement notre appui pour nos gens sous l'uniforme et leurs familles, particulièrement quand au TSPT.

*Panel I – Les médias et les militaires*

Le journaliste **Brian Stewart**, maintenant au Munk Centre for International Studies de l'Université de Toronto a adressé des compliments à la fonction Affaires publiques des FC parce qu'elle est très bien organisée et qu'elle a une stratégie de communications claire, ce qui a contribué avec succès au maintien d'un niveau plus élevé d'appui du public pour l'opération de l'Afghanistan que ce fut le cas en Europe. Deux problèmes demeurent, cependant. Le premier, c'est le « traitement des messages concernant le départ » des FC de l'Afghanistan et l'impact possible sur la solidarité de l'OTAN. Le deuxième, ce sera la question de la stratégie de communications des FC après 2011. Pendant les années 1990, les FC étaient beaucoup moins ouvertes que c'est le cas maintenant, et nous devrions nous rappeler que les reportages de guerre ne sont pas la même chose que les reportages sur la défense.

**Jocelyn Coulon**, de l'Université de Montréal, a parlé d'expérience de la relation entre les militaires et les médias, lui qui a couvert la vie et les affaires militaires pendant 20 ans comme journaliste. Il a noté que, bien que les buts des militaires et des médias (de protéger et d'informer) aient bénéficié à la société, ces buts ne sont pas toujours complémentaires. Les militaires vont toujours essayer d'apporter un angle positif sur les événements et les médias doivent être critiques lorsqu'ils évaluent l'information. M. Coulon a aussi parlé de l'importance de ce que les journalistes et les militaires comprennent les sociétés dont ils font partie, culturellement et politiquement. Par exemple, le Québec a toujours eu une relation difficile et compliquée avec les militaires ; on y apprécie les actions de ses soldats, mais on n'y est pas toujours d'accord avec les politiques du gouvernement.

*Allocution spéciale – James Soligan*

Dans son allocution spéciale, le **Lieutenant-Général (retraité) James Soligan**, chef d'état-major adjoint du Commandement allié de l'OTAN Transformation, a présenté un exposé complet et étendu du *Multiple Futures Project* de l'OTAN, en commençant par la question « Que se passera-t-il après l'Afghanistan ? » Ce futur verra l'impact de la montée de la Chine et de l'Inde parallèlement à une décroissance de la capacité de l'Europe d'influencer les événements du monde. Les contraintes financières viendront imposer l'achat d'articles de série du commerce qui ont une capacité militaire. La menace de prolifération nucléaire, y compris celle d'acteurs non étatiques et, peut-être, d'États délinquants, va demeurer. L'accès à l'espace, vu notre dépendance à cet égard pour la surveillance et l'emploi d'armes et de véhicules guidées par GPS, représentera une nouvelle vulnérabilité. L'OTAN devra passer d'un concept d'opération au niveau de

the military understanding the societies that they are a part of, culturally and politically. For instance Quebec has always had a difficult and complicated relationship with the military, appreciating the actions of its soldiers but not always agreeing with government policies.

*Special address – James Soligan*

In a special address, **Lieutenant General (Ret'd) James Soligan**, the Deputy Chief of Staff NATO Allied Command Transformation, in a thorough and wide ranging briefing on *The NATO Multiple Futures Project*, began with the question of “What Happens After Afghanistan.” That future will see the impact of the rise of China and India paralleled by a decreasing European capacity to influence world events. Financial constraints will see a new focus on buying commercial off-the-shelf items that are militarily capable. The threat of nuclear proliferation, including that to non-state actors and possibly failed states, will still be with us. Access to space, given our dependence on it for surveillance and the employment of GPS-guided weapons and vehicles, will represent a new vulnerability. NATO will have to move from a concept of formation-level operations to joint operations by small units and will have to solve the question of providing tactical support to small formations and units and the provision of special teams that include civilian capabilities.

*Panel II – Canada’s National Interests and Force Projection: Required Capabilities*

**Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden**, Chief of the Maritime Staff, began by referring to the long-standing tension between the concepts of *mare liberum* and *mare clausum*, between the concept that the seas are a commons free for all to use, and the concept that the seas can be made sovereign to the limits of effective state control. He argued that Canada’s interests are best served by a regulated oceans commons and a globally deployable sea control navy. He then noted that it is critical that we be able to defend the global system at sea and to be able to operate as part of a joint force *from* the sea, as was the case with Haiti. However, “defending the global system ‘from the sea’ doesn’t mean the kind of high-end capabilities that are associated with modern amphibious warfare.”

**Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie**, Chief of the Land Staff, observed that the Army needs to have the ability to operate within the full spectrum of land centric operations and has concluded that an equipment mix of 20 percent low, 20 percent high, and 60 percent medium is about right. He also noted that counter-insurgency operations requires a greater proportion of high end equipment than had been thought before Afghanistan. He stated that the current Army personnel base of approximately 24,000 Regulars, 28,000 Class A (Part-time) Reserves, and 8,000 Class B (Full-time) Reserves could sustain an expeditionary force of 2,500 to 3,000, but that was dependent upon the reconstitution of the equipment fleets which had been worn down in Afghanistan. He closed by reminding the audience that the Army becomes

la formation à des opérations conjointes par de petites unités et devra résoudre la question de fournir un soutien tactique à de petites formations et de petites unités et la fourniture d’équipes spéciales qui comprendront des capacités civiles.

*Panel II – Les intérêts nationaux du Canada et la projection des Forces : les capacités requises*

Le **Vice-Amiral Dean McFadden**, chef d’état-major de la Force maritime, a commencé en faisant référence à la tension qui existe depuis longtemps entre les concepts de *mare liberum* et *mare clausum*, entre le concept voulant que les mers soient un bien commun que tout le monde est libre d’utiliser et celui qui veut que les mers peuvent être faites souveraines dans les limites du contrôle effectif de l’État. Selon lui, les intérêts du Canada sont le mieux servis par un fonds océanique commun réglementé et une marine de contrôle des mers déployable dans le monde entier. Il a ensuite noté qu’il est critique que nous soyons capables de défendre le système mondial en mer et d’opérer dans le cadre d’une force conjointe *depuis* la mer, comme ce fut le cas à Haïti. Cependant « défendre le système mondial ‘depuis la mer’ ne veut pas dire la sorte de capacités de haut niveau qui sont associées à la conduite de la guerre amphibie moderne ».

Le **Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie**, chef d’état-major de l’Armée de terre, a besoin d’avoir la capacité d’opérer au sein du spectre complet des opérations centrées sur terre et il a conclu que le mélange d’équipement composé de 20 pour cent de bas de gamme, 20 pour cent de haut de gamme et 60 pour cent de niveau moyen est à peu près correct. Il a également noté que les opérations de lutte contre l’insurrection exigent une plus forte proportion d’équipement haut de gamme qu’on ne le pensait avant l’Afghanistan. Selon lui, la base de personnel actuel de l’Armée, d’environ 24 000 réguliers, 28 000 réservistes de classe A (temps partiel) et 8 000 réservistes de classe B (plein temps) pourrait soutenir une force expéditionnaire de 2 500 à 3 000 personnes, mais que cette proportion était fonction de la reconstitution du parc d’équipement qui a été usé en Afghanistan. Il a conclu en rappelant à l’auditoire que l’Armée devient une force expéditionnaire dès l’instant où elle quitte sa base—même pour des opérations en terre canadienne.

Le **Lieutenant-Général André Deschamps**, chef d’état-major de la Force aérienne, a expliqué les hypothèses de planification de la Force aérienne à l’effet que les priorités demeurent les mêmes, que l’instabilité régionale serait la norme et que le besoin d’agilité de la réaction et de l’interopérabilité continueraient – le tout entretenant le besoin d’une force aérienne équilibrée – mais que le budget de la défense resterait restreint. La période post-Afghanistan verra la Force aérienne continuer à avoir un point focal expéditionnaire rapidement déployable, capable de travailler indépendamment ou conjointement au sein d’un environnement moins permissif. Si de nouveaux parcs d’appareils ont été acquis et que quelques parcs plus anciens ont été mis à niveau et améliorés, comme celui des CP-140, qui ont maintenant une capacité améliorée de surveillance conjointe, il reste le

an expeditionary force the minute that it leaves its base—even for operations within Canada.

**Lieutenant-General André Deschamps**, Chief of the Air Staff, explained the Air Staff's planning assumptions that priorities would remain the same, that regional instability would be the norm, and that the requirement for agility in response and interoperability would continue—all driving a need for a balanced air force—but that the defence budget would remain constrained. The post-Afghanistan period will see the Air Force continue to have a rapidly deployable expeditionary focus capable of working independently or jointly within a less permissive environment. While some new fleets have been acquired, and some legacy fleets updated and improved, such as that of the CP-140s, which now have an improved joint surveillance capacity, there still remains the problem of legacy fleets whose capabilities have to be sustained. The challenge will be to ensure that these capabilities will remain effective and affordable over the next ten years.

### *Special address – David Petraeus*

In a special address, **General David Petraeus**, Commander US Central Command began with a review of the situation in Afghanistan in recent years as Taliban operations increased and “the need to reverse the downward trend in security underscored the need for ISAF to posture for a robust, sustained, comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign.” ISAF's Commander was dual-hatted as both a NATO Commander and the commander of US forces, thereby achieving unity of effort between ISAF and OEF operations. Other organizational changes were made including the appointment of General Stanley McChrystal, and the addition by the ISAF states of their most talented officers. Their diplomatic counterparts deployed to Afghanistan are equally talented.

With the right people and organizations in place the next step was getting the overarching concepts and plans right. General McChrystal has issued superb counterinsurgency guidance including local security initiatives intended to empower Afghans to play a role in securing their towns and villages. ISAF has also produced a Civil-Military Campaign Plan designed to bring in civilians alongside the security forces as close as possible on the heels of the military operations.

To enable the organizations, leaders and strategies put in place over the past year, there was also a need for new resources. There are now 75,000 US troops on the ground with another 30,000 on their way. Non-US ISAF nations will have over 40,000 when they are all deployed. An additional 100,000 Afghan National Security Forces have been authorized between now and 2011, and we are also taking steps to improve the quality of those forces. Financial resources have been increased as well.

ISAF and its Afghan partners can now start to see the progress that is possible when and where those inputs are applied. An enormous amount of hard work and tough fighting lie ahead in Afghanistan to regain the initiative and establish the conditions to transition security tasks to the Afghans.

problème des parcs existants dont les capacités doivent être maintenues. Le défi sera de s'assurer que ces capacités resteront efficaces et abordables au cours des dix prochaines années.

### *Allocution spéciale – David Petraeus*

Dans son allocution spéciale, le **Général David Petraeus**, Commander US Central Command, a commencé par une revue de la situation en Afghanistan ces dernières années, alors que les opérations des talibans ont augmenté et que « la nécessité de renverser la tendance vers le bas en matière de sécurité a souligné le besoin, pour la FIAS, de camper une figure de campagne anti-insurrectionnelle civile-militaire robuste, soutenue et globale ». Le commandant de la FIAS a porté le double chapeau de commandant de l'OTAN et de commandant des forces américaines, ce qui a réalisé l'unité de l'effort entre les opérations de la FIAS et de l'OEF. D'autres changements organisationnels ont été apportés, y compris la nomination du Général Stanley McChrystal et l'addition, par les États de la FIAS, de leur officiers les plus talentueux. Leurs contreparties diplomatiques déployées en Afghanistan sont dotées d'un égal talent.

Une fois les bonnes personnes et les bonnes organisations en place, l'étape suivante a été de formuler les bons concepts et plans globaux. Le Général McChrystal a produit un superbe guide de lutte contre l'insurrection qui comprenait des initiatives de sécurité locales dont le but était de donner aux Afghans le pouvoir de jouer un rôle dans la sécurisation de leurs villes et villages. La FIAS a également produit un Plan de campagne civil-militaire conçu pour amener les civils parallèlement aux forces de sécurité aussi près que possible sur les traces des opérations militaires.

Pour habiliter les organisations, les leaders et les stratégies mis en place pendant la dernière année, il y avait aussi un besoin de nouvelles ressources. Il y a maintenant 75 000 militaires américains sur le terrain et 30 000 autres sont en route. Les pays non étatsuniens de la FIAS auront plus de 40 000 hommes et femmes une fois qu'ils seront tous déployés. Un nombre additionnel de 100 000 membres des Forces de sécurité nationale afghane a été autorisé entre maintenant et 2011, et nous prenons aussi des mesures pour améliorer la qualité de ces forces. Les ressources financières ont été augmentées également.

La FIAS et ses partenaires afghans peuvent maintenant commencer à voir le progrès qui est possible quand et où ces intrants sont appliqués. Une quantité énorme de dur travail et de durs combats reste à faire en Afghanistan pour reprendre l'initiative et établir les conditions de transfert des tâches de sécurité aux Afghans.

*(Le Général Stanley McChrystal, commandant de la FIAS, s'est adressé à quelque 500 personnes, lors d'une fonction de l'Institut de la CAD tenue à la salle de bal de l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa le 16 décembre 2009. Son allocution est disponible en ligne à l'adresse [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai) - ed.)*

(General Stanley McChrystal, Commander ISAF, spoke at a CDA Institute event to some 500 attendees in the Ballroom of the Fairmont Chateau Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, on December 16, 2009. His address is available online at [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai-ed](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai-ed).)

## Panel III – The Harper Government & Defence: How Far Have We Come, Where Are We Going?

**Dr. Jack Granatstein**, of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute began his paper *The Harper Government and Defence After Four Years* with the statement, “No government since that of Louis St. Laurent in the 1950s had such will and determination to improve the CF” as he reviewed the re-capitalization of the CF that the Harper government undertook in the early stages of its mandate. But he then cautioned, “these promises have run into difficulty” and suggested that there “is regrettably strong opposition to the DND in key agencies of the government—in the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Public Works.” He reminded the audience that “the incredibly ham-handed and limp way the coming withdrawal [from Afghanistan] of 2011 has been handled threatens to undo much of the gains the CF earned for Canada,” and closed with the sombre remark that, “[t]he CF cannot survive another decade of darkness, despair and despondency.”

**Dr. Douglas Bland**, of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University, posed the sceptical question of whether NATO would occupy as central a position in Canadian security policy in the future as it has in the past. He noted the increasing potential for aboriginal alienation to result in civil disobedience and violence in Canada, which could require a major deployment of the CF internally in an “Aid to the Civil Power” operation. He noted, too, the effect of the policy statement “Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress,” and the evolving security crises affecting that region. He concluded by proposing the creation of a Canadian joint light brigade with an amphibious capability, with a particular interest in Western Hemispheric security issues.

**Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald**, CDA Senior Defence Analyst, reviewed briefly the composition of the British Operation Palliser, which restored stability to the African nation of Sierra Leone, as a potential model for the type of force proposed by Dr. Bland. He then undertook a preliminary costing of such an addition to the CF, including a strengthening of the existing brigades establishment in order to also be able to meet the “Aid to the Civil Power” operations forecast by Dr. Bland. This analysis included an allowance for the much higher rate of “defence inflation” that is calculated by the US-based RAND Corporation of 7 to 12 percent annually. ©

## Panel III – Le gouvernement Harper et la Défense : jusqu’où sommes-nous allés et où allons-nous ?

**M. Jack Granatstein**, de l’Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, a commencé son étude intitulée *Le Gouvernement Harper et la Défense après quatre ans*, en disant « Aucun gouvernement depuis celui de Louis St. Laurent, dans les années 1950, a eu une telle volonté et une telle détermination d’améliorer les FC » alors qu’il examinait la re-capitalisation des FC que le gouvernement Harper a entreprise dès les premières étapes de son mandat. Mais il a ensuite ajouté un bémol en ajoutant que « ces promesses ont rencontré des difficultés » et suggéré « (qu’)il existe une forte opposition regrettable vis-à-vis le MDN dans des organismes clés du gouvernement—au Bureau du Conseil privé, au Bureau du premier ministre, aux Affaires étrangères, aux Finances et aux Travaux publics ». Il a rappelé à l’auditoire que « la façon incroyablement maladroite et molle avec laquelle le retrait prochain [de l’Afghanistan] de 2011 a été traité menace de défaire une grande partie des gains que les FC avaient acquis au Canada », et il a conclu sur la sombre remarque que « les FC ne peuvent pas survivre à une autre décennie de noirceur, de désespoir et d’accablement ».

**M. Douglas Bland**, de la School of Policy Studies de l’Université Queen’s, a posé la question sceptique de savoir si l’OTAN occuperait une position aussi centrale dans la politique de sécurité du Canada dans l’avenir que par le passé. Il a noté le potentiel croissant d’aliénation autochtone résultant en désobéissance civile et en violence au Canada, ce qui pourrait nécessiter un déploiement majeur des FC à l’interne dans une opération « (d’)aide au pouvoir civil ». Il a aussi noté l’effet de l’énoncé de politique « Le Canada dans les Amériques : priorités et progrès » et les crises de sécurité en évolution qui affectent cette région. Il a conclu en proposant la création d’une brigade légère canadienne conjointe dotée de capacité amphibie, avec un intérêt particulier dans les questions de sécurité hémisphériques occidentales.

Le **Colonel (retraité) Brian MacDonald**, analyste principal de la défense de la CAD, s’est livré à un bref examen de la composition de la British Operation Palliser, qui a restauré la stabilité de la nation africaine de Sierra Leone, comme un possible modèle pour le type de force proposé par M. Bland. Il a ensuite entrepris un établissement préliminaire des coûts d’une telle addition aux FC, en incluant un renforcement de l’établissement des brigades existantes afin de pouvoir aussi réaliser les opérations « (d’)aide au pouvoir civil » prédites par M. Bland. Cette analyse comprenait une allocation pour le taux de beaucoup supérieur « d’inflation de la défense » qui est calculé par la RAND Corporation des États-Unis, de 7 à 12 pour cent par année. ©



## A New Mission Statement for NATO

by Dr. Gerlinde Niehus

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of NATO and NATO nations.*

2010 will be a decisive year for the Alliance. Allied leaders are expected to agree on NATO's new Strategic Concept on the occasion of the next NATO Summit in Portugal in November 2010. First indications as to the results of these deliberations are expected in May 2010, when a NATO-appointed Group of Experts will present their analysis and recommendations to the Secretary General.

The process leading towards a new Strategic Concept formally started at NATO's 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg-Kehl in April 2009. The current Strategic Concept dates back to 1999. As such it does not take into account many of the new threats and challenges characterizing the 21st century. Likewise, the 1999 Strategic Concept describes the Alliance as "Eurocentric," but today's NATO is dealing with security issues well beyond Europe's borders. Lastly, in 1999 NATO had 16 members; now there are 28 Allies.

To facilitate the process leading to the new Strategic Concept, NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed a group of external experts led by former US Secretary of State, Dr. Madeleine Albright, and composed of representatives from the public and private sectors and coming from a good mix of small and large NATO members. Following an initial reflection phase, centred around four key international seminars, the group has been conducting a consultation phase, visiting Allied capitals to discuss their findings and proposals with governments and, where possible, parliamentary committees.

A key feature of the process is its openness and inclusiveness, explicitly aiming to foster public participation and discussion. To that end, NATO has also, for the first time in its history, set up a dedicated Strategic Concept website and discussion forum<sup>1</sup> as a tool for sharing views and opinions. Raising public awareness, understanding and eventually support is more important today than ever: NATO is an alliance of democratic nations, and many of them, like Canada, regularly experience the heavy burden of a "NATO

in action," especially in Afghanistan. Engaging the public in a frank dialogue and, where necessary, controversial debate must be part and parcel of the democratic security culture of an organization "founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."<sup>2</sup>

### *Defining the new strategic environment*

NATO was initially invented to deal with 20th century challenges, mainly the risk of conventional war between predictable, organized, military alliances with states as the key actors—where the response was also essentially military. However, in the 21st century conflicts *within* states have largely replaced conflicts *between* them. In addition, many threats today come from non-state actors and are often *per se* unpredictable. As such, NATO is confronted with a host of new threats—terrorism, cyber warfare, energy insecurity, etc.—as well as old, latent threats that are urgent again, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In an age of globalization, we face globalised insecurity. Addressing these issues requires a mix of policy instruments that go well beyond military capabilities, and frequently beyond NATO itself. Deciding which challenges fit most readily into NATO's frame of reference and where the Alliance can add value to international efforts is fundamental.

### *Updating the meaning of the Washington Treaty's Article 5*

In light of the new security environment, how should Article 5,<sup>3</sup> the bedrock of the Alliance, be interpreted and implemented today?

There is no doubt that NATO's core task was, is and will remain the defence of its territory and populations. For the Alliance to endure, all members must feel that they are safe and secure. That is a fundamental *raison d'être* for a security alliance. But in a changed and changing world, the meaning of Article 5 is changing too. When NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this was not an attack in the traditional sense or in the sense Article 5 was initially thought of.

In the 21st century, terrorism has mutated into a global franchise. Cyber attacks or disruptions to energy

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*Dr. Gerlinde Niehus leads the Corporate Communications Section within NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and acts as Editorial Director for NATO Review, NATO's online magazine on current transatlantic issues. In 1999 she joined NATO, and in 2008 assumed her present position. Gerlinde Niehus holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Muenster University, Germany.*

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supplies can seriously destabilize a country. Iran and North Korea highlight the risk of nuclear proliferation. Piracy poses, once again, a major threat to international shipping. Climate change is likely to intensify conflicts over arable land, competition for natural resources and migration. Addressing these threats does not necessarily require *military* responses, but it does require a *collective* response by all Allies.

However, the approaches of a bygone era no longer work. Static, heavy metal armies are not going to impress terrorists, pirates or computer hackers. Burying our heads in the sand and hoping that these threats will fade away will only increase our insecurity and exposure. Security today is about active engagement, possibly far away from the borders of Allied nations. As geographic distance will not protect us, territorial defence means to engage, to cooperate with partners and to deal with problems when and where they emerge, before they end up on our doorstep.

This implies that any debate about Article 5 versus non-Article 5 missions is distorted and artificial. It is distorted as the discussion mainly focuses on the purely military dimension of the Alliance, thereby neglecting the much more fundamental political dimensions of Alliance solidarity and credibility; and it is artificial as it seeks to reinstate the already obsolete dichotomy between security at home and abroad as a yardstick for prioritization.

### *Boosting NATO's role as a joint political forum*

We cannot meet today's and tomorrow's security challenges effectively without engaging much more actively and systematically with other important players on the international scene, nor without broadening the scope of political dialogue, opinion shaping and decision-making amongst Allies and partners. This cannot be done *ad hoc* or on a case-by-case basis. It has to be an ongoing, systematic process, and very much the way NATO does business.

The foundations for doing this are in place; in many ways they only need to be reinvigorated. One is enshrined in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, whereby, "the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." Another is the rediscovery of Alliance core values founded on the principles of the UN Charter. And, finally, the rediscovery of the transatlantic link, based on solidarity and partnership between America and Europe.

In vigorously drawing on these assets, NATO should or could become a key forum for networking security partnerships and for consultations on global security issues—even on issues on which the Alliance might never take action. As NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently remarked, "NATO can be the place where views, concerns and best practices on security are shared by NATO's global partners. And where, if it makes sense—if we decide that NATO should have a role—we might work out how to tackle global challenges together."<sup>4</sup> This development also implies that NATO needs to strengthen its global networking

capabilities, be this by strengthening the various partnership arrangements, or by reaching out to a broader range of actors such as India, China and Japan and organizations like the World Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the G20, to name but a few. And it will imply that NATO will have to move from a largely geographical understanding of partnerships to a much more functional approach.

### *Incorporating the notion of a "Comprehensive Approach"*

Today's security challenges cannot be dealt with by NATO or by military means alone—but, equally, no other institution can do everything on its own. Today, the effectiveness of NATO depends on how well and efficiently the Alliance cooperates with other organizations and nations. This is not a question of hierarchy, but of synergy. Security in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, demands a comprehensive application of economic, political and military measures that go far beyond NATO's capabilities. A new Strategic Concept has to lay out the role NATO can play within a comprehensive approach and how the necessary civilian and military means are to be applied coherently, effectively and in a coordinated manner.

NATO has made good progress these last few years in building closer ties with other international actors such as the United Nations and the African Union. The adoption of the European Union's Lisbon Treaty should encourage greater EU-NATO cooperation and a more strategic partnership. Notwithstanding, there are a number of key issues that need to be addressed collectively. One is strategic alignment—by reinforcing joint analysis and political dialogue among major international organizations, it should be possible to better identify together key priority areas, helping to concentrate resources and thereby maximizing our chances of success.

A second issue is planning, especially at the strategic level. A third issue concerns the relationship between security and development. It is certainly true that there is no development without security, and no security without development. But beyond the theory, the practice is challenging: strengthening cooperation between civilian and military actors implies achieving better mutual understanding, strengthening information sharing and timely coordination.

### *Fostering military transformation*

NATO has been engaged in a process of continuous and systematic transformation for many years to ensure that it has the capabilities, policies and structures required in the changing security environment. But this does not imply that the Alliance can rest on its laurels—there are many challenges ahead, which require innovative thinking and candid discussion among the Allies and also NATO's partners. How do we ensure that we do not spend tomorrow's money on yesterday's conflicts? How can we narrow the capability gap between the United States and its European allies?

NATO's fundamental value resides in the ability

to translate political decisions into military action. This is a precious asset. But to preserve its value, NATO needs to focus on capabilities that are relevant for the new security environment. This means capabilities and forces that are mobile, flexible and employable in a variety of contingencies, in distinction to the largely static armed forces of previous times. In the current economic crisis it is more important than ever that we get our priorities right.

This implies that NATO needs to keep reviewing and innovating the ways in which it plans, mans and pays for operations. We need to continue focusing on capabilities that are relevant in the new security environment, such as strategic lift, helicopters and modern command and control systems. And we need to promote more multinational solutions for acquiring and operating these vital assets, such as joint funding and pooling arrangements. Having multiple national projects running simultaneously is simply a waste of scarce resources. In addition, while possessing technical capabilities and devices to do a job is certainly important, equally if not more important is the human factor. The profession of arms has come to require an increasingly broad range of skills and competences that can only be met by embracing an approach of life-long learning.

## *Pursuing the consolidation of Europe*

Amidst all these challenges there is clearly still unfinished business in Europe. NATO's open door policy and related enlargement process have contributed significantly over recent decades to consolidating Europe as a whole, free and democratic security zone. The process has minimized the risk of a large-scale war in Europe. It has enhanced stability and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, not just for NATO nations but also for NATO's neighbours.

The process needs to continue. The prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration remains the most effective way to bring lasting peace and stability to the strategically important western Balkans. Prospective NATO membership for both Ukraine and Georgia has been confirmed at recent NATO summits and ministerial meetings. Keeping NATO's door open to other European states is anchored in the NATO treaty's article 10.<sup>5</sup> However, application and implementation of this policy depends upon key two factors: the performance of the applicants themselves, underscoring that they are willing and able to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and consensus among NATO nations to offer membership or the preparatory membership action plan to a candidate (although the latter does not indicate automatic membership).

Key events over the past two years have demonstrated that attaching timetables or fixed scenarios to any of these questions is unproductive. The crisis in Georgia in 2008, the subsequent deterioration (and now progressive resurrection) of NATO-Russia relations or the recent elections in Ukraine have intensified discussions on enlargement, modified expectations, yet so far without any major definitive decision for or against it. With a view to

avoiding a short-term perspective, it seems therefore likely that the new Strategic Concept will underscore the principles of enlargement, similar to the provisions of the 1999 Strategic Concept, and go for the long haul. In that respect it could also help to get back to some of the fundamentals of this policy, as initially outlined in NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement, putting particular emphasis on the readiness of candidates to fulfil membership requirements. That way, the current mainly political- and often (mis)perception-based membership process could be re-anchored in more objective and performance-based principles.

## *Forging a productive partnership with Russia*

NATO cannot talk seriously about an undivided Europe if the organization is unable or unwilling to engage Russia. Clearly, among the 28 Allies there are different views on Russia. History cannot be erased, but neither should the Alliance become a prisoner of the past.

The international security environment will not wait for NATO and Russia to sort their act out. The partnership has the potential to contribute strategically to security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. As such, NATO-Russia cooperation is not a matter of choice but of necessity.<sup>6</sup> The goal must be a relationship that allows NATO and Russia to pursue common interests even when disagreements and differences remain in other areas.

There are many *de facto* zones of common interest providing opportunities to intensify practical cooperation with Russia. These range from the fight against terrorism and measures to enhance maritime security, to steps countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and building a more effective missile defence system. Some take this scenario even further by calling for (or at least not excluding) future NATO membership for Russia.<sup>7</sup> Amidst these bold and controversial proposals, two foundations of the Alliance should not be sacrificed, as they constitute the lifeblood of the Alliance: living up to its common core values as enshrined in the Washington Treaty, and constantly striving towards Allied unity and solidarity. The recently launched joint review of NATO's and Russia's common threats and challenges could serve as a facilitator to these ends.

## *Conclusion*

Since its founding in 1949, NATO's strategic flexibility, embedded in its original treaty, has allowed it to fulfil the different requirements of different times. In the 1950s, the Alliance was mainly a defensive organization. Since the 1960s NATO became also a political instrument for *détente*. In the 1990s, the Alliance became a tool for the stabilization of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Now NATO has a new mission: extending peace though the strategic projection of security. This is not a mission of choice, but of necessity, and it is what the new Strategic Concept should reflect.

(Endnotes appear on page 28)

**THE VIMY AWARD**

**LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY**

Nominations are invited for the 2010 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the CDA Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include:

General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Honourable Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Honourable John Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Mr. G. Hamilton Southam, Brigadier-General David Fraser, General Raymond R. Henault, General Rick Hillier, and Warrant Officer William MacDonald.

Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award.

accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2010, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE  
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 222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B  
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The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 19 November 2010, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca); or telephone (613) 236 9903.



Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2010.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la CAD dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué(e) par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le vice-amiral Larry Murray, le lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'Honorable John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault, le Général Rick Hillier, et l'Adjudant William MacDonald.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les

nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2010, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION  
 HONORIFIQUE VIMY  
 L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE  
 LA DÉFENSE  
 222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B  
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La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 19 novembre 2010, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca); ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

## (Endnotes)

- 1 NATO's New Strategic Concept website, [www.nato.int/strategic-concept.html](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.html)
- 2 Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. 4 April 1949.
- 3 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  
  
"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."
- 4 Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2010.
- 5 Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession."
- 6 See also speech of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18 September 2009.
- 7 Volker Rühle et al., "It's time to invite Russia to join NATO," in *Der Spiegel*, online, 9 March 2010. ©



## Security in an Uncertain World: A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept

overview by Arnav Manchanda

### Background

In July 2009, with a view to releasing a new Strategic Concept for NATO at the Alliance's Summit to be held in Portugal in late 2010, the Secretary General of NATO tasked a Group of Experts, headed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, with addressing the issue and proposing recommendations by the spring of 2010.

In the fall of 2009 members of the Ottawa-based CDA Institute came together to articulate a way ahead for NATO. The aim was to provide a public domain contribution to the work of the Group of Experts that would outline, from a Canadian perspective, the most salient challenges and opportunities facing the Alliance. In early 2010 the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute of Calgary acknowledged the importance of the work the CDA Institute was undertaking, recognized its links with its own priorities and therefore chose to formally join the undertaking as a partner by offering the help of several subject matter experts.

The group of contributors to this project is a mélange of military, diplomatic and policy practitioners and academics. The range and weight of their experience - a former Minister of National Defence, three former Chiefs of the Defence Staff and a former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, a former Ambassador to NATO, a Clerk of the Privy Council, NATO field commanders, strategists and staff officers, former Ambassadors, public servants and politicians, academic experts, among others - deliver a paper that offers a vision for NATO's future that is grounded in the art of the possible.

Over the course of three workshops held in Ottawa, Ontario and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec, members of the group came together to advocate, discuss and refine their views. The result is a paper that reflects the collective opinion of the group, and not that of any one individual.

*Arnav Manchanda is the CDA Institute's Defence Policy Analyst.*

*(continued p. 30)*

## THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2010 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, and Brian Stewart.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca), click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2010, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE  
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS  
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B  
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 19 November 2010, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held at the the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca), or telephone (613) 236-9903.

## PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2010.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Champion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, et Brian Stewart.

Toute personne peut nommer un (une) journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux lettres du soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les

raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des travaux du journaliste. Pour les détails voir [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca), click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2010, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO  
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE  
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Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 19 novembre 2010, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour plus d'informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca), ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.




## Summary of the paper

Maintaining the security of liberal democratic states everywhere will pose great challenges in the 21st century. Freedom from physical attack or coercion, from internal subversion and from the erosion of the political, economic and social values essential to people's way of life will all be under threat.

Problems will arise from great power ambitions, regional disputes, the collapse of states and ecological disasters. But widely accessible new technologies, the spread of weapons of mass effect, and a high degree of global mobility have increased the vulnerabilities of democratic states to adversaries with trans-national ideologies willing to use violence to achieve their aims. Radical Islamism is currently the most visible ideological opponent to have adopted methods which exploit these vulnerabilities, but it is not alone and certainly unlikely to be the last. Small numbers of persons can now deal potentially lethal blows to any society.

The security interests of liberal democratic states have become so interdependent that a global effort is required to protect these states, wherever they may be, from global or particular threats wherever they may arise. NATO has expanded to take in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, but it has been slow to partner with major democracies elsewhere.

During the Cold War, NATO endured because its members shared common interests and values they were prepared to defend against an existential threat from Soviet communism. Allies today do not perceive threats the same way and do not always seem to care enough about what unites them to forego the gratification of pursuing national interests that may undermine the security of others.



NATO decision-making is unnecessarily ponderous and afflicted by a "UN syndrome" according to which governments often authorize action without committing all the resources required for success. Furthermore the Alliance still finances its peace support operations by relying on archaic arrangements which penalize those most willing to help.

Members' enormous military resources are designed mostly for static territorial defence and are, therefore, not suited to expeditionary campaigns. Non-military resources for policing, governance and reconstruction remain underdeveloped despite the importance of their role in the

development and execution of the "exit strategy" for military engagements.

The current campaign in Afghanistan exemplifies all that is good in NATO. It also demonstrates that NATO needs a major overhaul.

The paper proposes that the renewal of NATO be guided by four main concepts:

- (1) commitments must be supported by resources;
- (2) NATO and member-states must have well developed civil affairs capacity;
- (3) the costs of peace support operations must be commonly funded; and
- (4) NATO must enhance its special relationships with key democratic states outside the Euro-Atlantic region, especially those helping out in Afghanistan.

*The 60 page study, Security in an Uncertain World: A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept, is available online in both English and French at [www.natoconcept.ca](http://www.natoconcept.ca). ©*

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## Crise Identitaire et stratégique à l'OTAN: une explication

par Frédéric Labarre

La crise d'identité qui secoue l'OTAN présentement n'est pas due au désaccord suite à sa réaction concernant le conflit russo-géorgien du mois d'août 2008. De même, les divergences d'opinion quant à la conduite de la contre insurrection en Afghanistan sont des *indicateurs* de cette crise d'identité, mais ni la guerre russo-géorgienne, ni la mission afghane n'en sont la source. Au contraire, elles en sont les *symptômes*.

L'OTAN n'était pas légalement garante de la sécurité géorgienne, mais pourtant, le sacrifice de cette dernière dans les conflits afghan et irakien pouvait laisser croire à une gratitude de l'Alliance et des États-Unis qui se serait traduite par une exception en cas de malheur. Ce ne pouvait être, et ce ne fut pas le cas. Mais l'OTAN non plus n'est légalement garante de la transformation démocratique de l'Afghanistan, et pourtant, l'Alliance s'y acharne depuis près d'une décennie, faisant même peser le spectre de sa possible désintégration en cas d'échec. Quoiqu'il arrive en Afghanistan, un échec ne sera pas plus la cause de sa désintégration que la tiédeur de sa réaction face au conflit dans le Caucase.

De quelle crise d'identité parlons-nous? Pourquoi cette question est-elle pressante? Elle est pressante parce que l'OTAN va bientôt accoucher d'un nouveau concept stratégique pour son sixième anniversaire. Pour la toute première fois, les membres qui se sont joints à l'Alliance depuis avril 1999 auront leur mot à dire dans la formulation de ce concept. Quand nous parlons de crise d'identité, nous ne parlons pas de l'identité qui fait d'un pays un « nouveau » membre par opposition à un membre « fondateur ». Nous ne parlons pas non plus des facteurs identitaires liés au fait que les nouveaux membres sont en fait des anciens membres du camp adverse. Bien que ce soit une question intéressante, les sociologues sont mieux équipés que les analystes stratégiques pour y répondre.

Par quoi se définit l'identité de l'OTAN? Force est de parier que c'est son texte fondateur qui la définit. Le

Traité de l'Atlantique Nord codifie à la fois les relations entre ses membres et leur voisinage. Ce traité n'a pas changé en soixante ans, mais on compte au moins trois changements de l'environnement stratégique au cours de cette période; la guerre froide, l'après-guerre froide, l'ère du onze septembre, sinon l'après onze septembre. Malgré tout, deux aspects fondamentaux définissent l'identité de l'OTAN comme une Alliance dans laquelle les membres subliment leurs politiques étrangères et de défense en fonction des intérêts généraux de ce que nous appelons la communauté euro atlantique.

J'ai nommé l'article 2<sup>1</sup> et l'article 5<sup>2</sup> du Traité comme étant ces deux aspects distincts. L'hypothèse de la crise est confirmée par ce que certains membres tendent à vouloir faire prédominer un article au détriment de l'autre. Pour comprendre comment la crise identitaire de l'OTAN est structurelle et non dépendante des aléas de l'histoire populaire ou des nouvelles courantes, il faut comprendre la signification de l'un et l'autre article et se remémorer les motifs qui poussent les pays à s'allier.

### *Les Origines des Alliances*

Les théories économiques des alliances proposent un motif logique pour la réunion des ressources des acteurs internationaux pour rendre la défense à la fois moins coûteuse, mais aussi plus efficace. Une alliance, quelle qu'en soit le type ou l'objet, propose un bien public non divisible et non exclusif à ses membres. Par exemple :

La dissuasion par triade nucléaire est effective et indivisible indépendamment du nombre de membres en autant que les représailles soient automatiques. Les capacités stratégiques et la crédibilité de leur emploi déterminent l'efficacité de la dissuasion. Si cependant la crédibilité des représailles dépend du nombre d'acteurs au nom desquels elles sont faites, alors l'indivisibilité pourrait se produire au fil de l'élargissement de l'alliance.<sup>3</sup>

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D'antan, la question de partage des charges communes occupait les notions de divisibilité ou d'indivisibilité de biens publics de défense fournis par l'OTAN à ses membres.<sup>4</sup> Si la disproportion de contributions aux capacités militaires de l'OTAN est moins sources de discorde, il n'en reste pas moins qu'un allié qui aurait des doutes sur sa sécurité aurait tendance à dépenser beaucoup plus en matière de défense que les autres membres même si les ressources disponibles pour chacun d'eux étaient absolument égales. C'est pourquoi Sandler et Hartley ont pu observer que plus la participation à une alliance est désirable aux agents qui d'ordinaire étaient exclus (comme l'étaient la Pologne, la République tchèque, la Slovaquie, la Hongrie et les pays baltes) plus élevés

seraient leurs sacrifices relativement à leur capacité de payer.<sup>5</sup> Certes, les anciens pays du Pacte de Varsovie et de l'URSS ont démontré un enthousiasme pour leur accession à l'OTAN qui s'est mesuré en fonds publics, en vies humaines en Irak et en Afghanistan et parfois même en sacrifice de souveraineté.

Au moment où les premières théories économiques justifiant la création d'alliances étaient formulées, l'OTAN existait contre un adversaire bien défini; l'URSS.<sup>6</sup> Pourtant, les moyens à employer pour faire face à cette menace (surtout en ce qui concerne les contributions au fonds communs de l'Alliance) n'ont pas toujours fait des heureux. Olson et Zeckhauser nous cautionnent qu'il ne faut pas se leurrer. La participation à une Alliance n'empêche pas la jouissance de biens

privés de défense qui néanmoins continuent de rajouter à l'accumulation de capacités militaires. Ils mentionnent en particulier le cas du Portugal qui, en tentant de maintenir ses colonies en Angola, exerçait son indépendance et créait un bien privé qui en même temps rehaussait le pouvoir militaire de l'Alliance.<sup>7</sup> C'est une observation malhonnête si l'on exclut l'argument purement logique de l'économie.

En effet, la situation n'est pas la même dès que l'on parle de la crise de Suez de 1956. La décision de la France et de la Grande Bretagne de maintenir un contrôle quasi-colonial sur l'Égypte par l'entremise du canal est un sujet hautement stratégique pour l'OTAN, car il mettait en cause non seulement deux grandes puissances fondatrices de l'Alliance et membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU, mais aussi les intérêts fondamentaux de l'URSS dans cette région. Les modèles économiques, parce qu'ils n'expliquent pas tout, ne sont donc pas un gage de l'optimalité d'une alliance, ni de ses motivations à voir le jour.

De plus, le modèle économique n'est pas représenté dans le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. On n'y explique pas comment les richesses nationales seront mises à contribution pour générer des biens de défense. On dit seulement que ces biens de défense seront disponibles pour tous en cas d'attaque, et ce sous certaines conditions nationales. C'est en quelque sorte ce que stipule l'article 5 du Traité. En fait, comme le rappellent Olson et Zeckhauser, cet article 5, une fois le Traité signé, prive les plus grands pays de leur outil de négociation le plus puissant. Ils ne peuvent empêcher la distribution de ce bien particulier sans affecter la crédibilité de toute l'Alliance. Ils ne peuvent contraindre les petits agents récalcitrants à contribuer financièrement à la défense commune.<sup>8</sup>

C'est absolument vrai. Cependant, ils peuvent empêcher les petits pays, ou les pays qui sont aux prises avec des inquiétudes de sécurité plus pressantes ou plus rapprochées, de se servir de l'Alliance comme d'un bien *exclusif et privé*.<sup>9</sup> L'article 2 du Traité permet d'arriver à cet état de fait en exigeant de ses signataires qu'ils transigeront entre eux et avec leurs voisins de manière non agressive. Encore une fois, il ne s'agit pas là d'un argument économique, mais politique. Dans le cas de l'OTAN, le modèle d'Alliance économique n'explique pas la présence de l'article 2.

Jeremy Pressman, dans son récent *Warring States : Alliance Restraint in International Politics*, prétend que les alliances se forment expressément pour restreindre les acteurs récalcitrants dans les domaines stratégiques, et non économiques.<sup>10</sup> De plus, son analyse suggère également que dans certains cas, ce sont les acteurs les plus puissants qui sont restreints

dans leur liberté d'action. En tout cas, la capacité à contraindre des grands acteurs se trouve limitée dès que les prescriptions du Traité sont adhérees par tous les membres également. De plus, la validité des garanties d'une alliance dépend plus des capacités militaires que des fonds qui génèrent ces capacités. Donc ce n'est pas une question d'argent, mais bien de qualité ou de quantité d'équipement et de personnel, et de l'effet dissuasif de leur combinaison.

Donc la combinaison est attrayante pour son effet dissuasif, ce qui confirme que les alliances se créent aussi pour rétablir un équilibre contre une menace précise.<sup>11</sup> Les raisons qui motivent l'attraction d'un pays envers une alliance correspondent donc à des enjeux de défense et/ou de sécurité bien identifiés. Lorsque le nombre de membres est restreint, ou encore que leur identité collective le permet, il est plus facile de se définir en opposition à un « autre ». <sup>12</sup> C'est pourquoi l'unité de l'OTAN ne faisait aucun doute du temps de la guerre froide, et que de nouveaux membres (la Pologne, la République tchèque, la Hongrie, entre autres mais surtout les pays baltes) se sont précipités dans ses bras.

Ce serait un truisme que de dire que ces récents membres se sont joints à l'OTAN à cause de leurs inquiétudes face à la Russie. Ce qui l'est moins c'est de rappeler que les nouveaux membres ont joint un *Traité*, et non une Alliance. Ils ont signé un contrat beaucoup plus qu'obtenu le droit d'occuper des locaux à Bruxelles. Le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord ne reflète pas l'argument économique d'Olson et Zeckhauser, mais chacun des arguments de Pressman, Walt et Risse-Kappen, pour ne nommer que nos sources principales, s'y retrouvent par l'entremise des articles 2 et 5.

Ces articles représentent respectivement la contrainte que fait peser le Traité sur chacun des signataires en termes de bon voisinage (l'article 2) et de secours quasi-assuré (article 5). Rien de neuf sous le soleil, donc, mais si nous pouvons définir la naissance, l'identité et les objectifs de l'OTAN par ces deux articles, seule une analyse approfondie de leur signification pour les membres peut nous permettre de tirer des conclusions sur sa crise d'identité actuelle, et sur l'emphase à apporter au nouveau concept stratégique.

## *L'Article 2 et l'Article 5 en perspective*

Comment ces articles sont-ils mis en application? Comment cette application affecte-t-elle le sentiment de sécurité des membres? La discussion qui précède rappelle l'évidence de la création des alliances pour mieux mettre en opposition l'article 2 et l'article 5. Les deux articles s'opposent mais ne peuvent absolument

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pas être pris séparément. Si on les sépare, c'est le pouvoir relatif des membres qui sera l'arbitre de la direction de l'Alliance. En effet, l'article 2 existe pour prévenir que les grandes puissances (ou la majorité des membres) ne soient piégées par les politiques d'un membre récalcitrant. D'un membre, donc, qui appliquerait toute la mesure de sa souveraineté au risque de créer un conflit qui nécessiterait l'intervention des autres membres. En termes économiques, pour prévenir qu'un acteur n'utilise une unité de défense commune ou de sécurité collective au détriment de la jouissance des autres membres. L'article 5, tout au contraire, existe pour prévenir l'abandon des membres à leur sort. Pris ensemble, l'article 2 et l'article 5 résument et mitigent le dilemme de la prise au piège et de l'abandonnement.

Similairement, on peut équivaloir ce dilemme à

celui de la « prise du train en marche » (bandwagoning en Anglais) et de l'équilibrage des pouvoirs. La prise en marche du train signifie, dans sa définition de la guerre froide, que des états se liguent ensemble suite aux pressions exercées par le plus gros membre. C'est le cas de l'ancien Pacte de Varsovie, où les membres obtempéraient aux politiques de Moscou. Au contraire, l'OTAN est une alliance destinée à rétablir l'équilibre stratégique par la participation libre de ses membres (sous certaines conditions) contre le Pacte de Varsovie.<sup>13</sup> Ces concepts sont toujours valides, mais prennent un sens nouveau dans un monde où les menaces sont diffuses.

Dans un article de septembre 2008, le très influent *Financial Times* publia un sondage qui révéla l'opinion générale que la Russie représentait une

menace pour le monde occidental.

Malgré tout, une majorité claire des gens en Europe occidentale demeurerait fermement opposée à l'idée que leur gouvernement augmente les budgets de défense et détourne les fonds destinés à la santé et aux services sociaux.<sup>14</sup>

Pis encore, aucune population de grandes puissances européennes membres de l'OTAN ne supporterait l'idée de se porter au secours des nouveaux membres en cas d'attaque de la Russie. En d'autres mots, ils semblent que certains membres refusent de maintenir l'équilibre contre une menace perçue par d'autres membres.<sup>15</sup> Il n'est donc pas surprenant que le ministre de la défense letton, Mr. Imants Liegis, insiste pour que l'Alliance développe des plans de contingence précis à la lumière de la crise russo-géorgienne et des révélations de tels sondages. Les plans de contingences, tels qu'ils étaient employés du temps de la guerre froide, adoptent ici une forme euphémistique visant à axer un concept stratégique sur la défense commune et non sur la sécurité collective.<sup>16</sup>

Aux yeux de Volker Krause et David Singer, la sécurité collective *inclut* la défense commune et prévoit une mesure de protection contre des risques plus larges (telles les catastrophes environnementales) et aussi contre les risques émanant des membres eux-mêmes.<sup>17</sup> Ils font donc écho aux arguments de Pressman. Autrement dit, les nouveaux membres de l'OTAN (la Pologne et les pays baltes en particulier, car ils ont été récemment ébranlés par la décision de Washington de renoncer à la défense anti-missile en Europe centrale), tentent de forcer un débat entre les deux termes, ou de séparer les deux termes comme s'ils invoquaient deux postures défensives différentes, alors que la défense commune participe de la sécurité collective.

L'Étude sur l'Élargissement de l'OTAN de 1995 et le Plan d'action pour l'Adhésion (MAP) dévoilé au Sommet de Washington en avril 1999 prescrivent comment on s'attend à ce que les nouveaux membres se conforme aux principes de l'article 2. En particulier, la section I.2 du MAP codifie les conclusions de l'Étude de 1995 et prévoit que les aspirants membres doivent résoudre les disputes frontalières, élargir les droits politiques aux minorités ethniques et promouvoir la stabilité interne et externe.<sup>18</sup> De plus, l'OTAN s'attend à ce que les nouveaux membres « acceptent la conception de la sécurité exprimée dans le Concept stratégique. »<sup>19</sup> Le concept de sécurité stratégique de l'OTAN décidé en avril 1999 met l'accent sur la défense commune. Il

n'y a donc pas d'asymétrie entre les besoins de sécurité régionaux et nationaux.<sup>20</sup> Et il n'y a pas nécessité de rassurer les nouveaux membres de la garantie de l'article 5. Mais si les nouveaux membres doivent se conformer aussi à la nouvelle vision du concept stratégique, cela veut aussi dire se conformer à ce qui suit :

L'Alliance est attachée à une approche globale de la sécurité, qui reconnaît l'importance des facteurs politiques, économiques, sociaux et environnementaux en plus de l'indispensable dimension de défense. Elle se fonde sur cette approche globale pour accomplir efficacement ses tâches de sécurité fondamentales, et pour déployer un effort croissant afin de développer des relations de coopération efficace avec d'autres organisations européennes et euro-atlantiques ainsi qu'avec les Nations Unies. Notre but collectif est de mettre en place une architecture de sécurité européenne dans laquelle la contribution de l'Alliance à la sécurité et à la stabilité de la région euro-atlantique et la contribution de ces autres organisations internationales se complètent et se renforcent mutuellement, à la fois dans l'approfondissement des relations entre pays euro-atlantiques et dans la gestion des crises. L'OTAN reste le forum essentiel de consultation entre les Alliés et l'enceinte où ceux-ci s'accordent sur des politiques touchant à leurs engagements de sécurité et de défense au titre du Traité de Washington.<sup>21</sup>

Donc le concept de sécurité collective a lui aussi une valeur dominante. Cette décision émane des membres de l'OTAN tels qu'ils étaient en avril 1999. Elle s'impose donc aux nouveaux signataires. En même temps le dévoilement du MAP articulait ces conditions *sine qua non* aux autres aspirants. Dix ans plus tard, le bilan que l'on pourrait faire du processus du MAP montrerait que malgré des efforts certains, les nouveaux membres de l'OTAN ont été accueillis sans avoir rempli toutes les conditions. Par exemple, seule la Lettonie a conclu un accord ratifié par la Russie au sujet de ses frontières. Les droits politiques des minorités en Estonie et Lettonie continuent de faire obstacle à de meilleures relations internes et externes.

Les nouveaux membres craignent que la défense commune, dont ils dépendent plus immédiatement, ne cède à la sécurité collective, malgré que le concept de

sécurité mentionne la défense commune cinq fois plus souvent que la sécurité collective (mentionnée une seule fois). Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, du temps qu'il était secrétaire-général de l'OTAN, donna le ton en disant que des « préparatifs du genre du temps de la guerre froide contre une menace visible et mesurable étaient désormais révolus, et que le cap vers des forces flexibles et plus aisément déployées serait maintenu... » Ceci eu l'effet d'un signal « d'alarme dans les pays baltes, qui se mirent à craindre que les bénéfices de sécurité de leur jonction avec l'Alliance ne se matérialiseraient pas. »<sup>22</sup>

## *L'Article 2 et l'Article 5 en opposition par les politiques des nouveaux membres*

Jusqu'à présent, les politiques des nouveaux membres reflètent plus la véracité de certaines théories économiques de formation des Alliances que l'adhésion à tous les principes auxquels ils sont supposés se conformer par le MAP de 1999. Les pays baltes, par exemple, ont fait preuve de diligence avant de rejoindre l'OTAN par la manière assidue avec laquelle ils ont modifié leurs lois, leur politique intérieure, et aussi par leur enthousiasme à planifier et re-planifier leur défense en fonction des préférences de Bruxelles. Rappelons que jusqu'ici, ce sont les seuls, avec la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Slovénie, à avoir dû répondre aussi techniquement à ces conditions.

Avant même d'avoir reçu l'invitation, en novembre 2002, de se joindre à l'OTAN, ils volèrent au « secours » des États-Unis en Afghanistan et en Irak, prouvant du même coup les suppositions de Hartley et Sander selon lesquelles les membres aspirant à une participation formelle à une Alliance tendent à multiplier les sacrifices. On peut en dire autant de la Géorgie, qui a en effet plus que doublé son budget de défense de 2007 par rapport à 2006 (près d'un milliard USD).<sup>23</sup>

Cependant, elle inverse la logique quant à la question des minorités ethniques et des régions insurgées; l'intégration à l'OTAN (intégration signifie ici le statut de membre et non l'adoption de normes) doit supporter l'harmonisation des relations interethniques.<sup>24</sup> Autrement dit, on exige une invitation dans l'OTAN (qui est sensée se matérialiser par une participation au MAP, et non par une invitation formelle), suite à laquelle la Géorgie règlera ses contentieux. Elle dicte déjà les limites des conditions d'un MAP quelconque. Dans le cas de la Géorgie, ceci n'a rien de surprenant. Au terme du Sommet de Bucarest, tenu en 2008, on lui promet ainsi qu'à l'Ukraine, qu'elle sera un jour membre de l'OTAN. Il est normal qu'elle se considère déjà admise.

Ce sentiment d'admission est si fort qu'il rend incapable les grandes puissances de restreindre la Géorgie lorsqu'elle s'élançait à l'assaut de l'Ossétie du sud. Se sentant admise, la Géorgie mise sur la puissance accumulée de l'OTAN pour l'aider dans son objectif de balancier contre la Russie. Les principes de l'article 2 se trouvent donc éjectés et ceux de l'article 5 invoqués.

Depuis leur admission, les pays baltes semblent eux aussi avoir délaissé les principes inscrits dans l'article 2, et s'efforcent de faire parler l'article 5. Il est impossible de croire que le gouvernement estonien aurait ordonné le déplacement du « soldat de bronze », mémorial aux soldats soviétiques tombés pour la « libération » de l'Estonie du joug fasciste durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale si elle n'avait pas été membre de l'OTAN. En avril 2007, le gouvernement retire ce monument pour le replacer dans un cimetière militaire tout aussi approprié pour sa fonction.<sup>25</sup>

Ce geste était cependant planifié depuis un certain temps, et non une riposte aux émeutes qui s'y multipliaient depuis quelques années à l'approche du 9 mai.<sup>26</sup> L'Estonie fut victime d'attaques cybernétiques qui la paralysèrent pendant plusieurs jours.<sup>27</sup> Au lendemain de ces attaques, on parlait déjà d'élever les attaques cybernétiques au niveau d'attaques armées, nécessitant la réplique par l'article 5. Aujourd'hui, à près de 100m de l'endroit où se trouvait le soldat de bronze, se dresse un monument trois fois plus gros pour commémorer la guerre d'indépendance de 1919. La réception de ce monument par la communauté russophone fut sans violence, mais hostile tout de même.

Ailleurs dans les pays baltes, on remarque la multiplication des bases aériennes où s'ajoutent Ämari et Lielvarde (Estonie et Lettonie) à celle de Siaulai, d'où partent les patrouilles aériennes de l'OTAN. À ce titre, l'OTAN prévoyait que les pays baltes eux-mêmes seraient en mesure d'assurer la défense de leur espace aérien, mais il appert qu'ils ont fait la demande formelle à l'OTAN de continuer les patrouilles indéfiniment.

Les ministres de la défense baltes ont demandé la continuation des patrouilles aériennes de l'OTAN au moins jusqu'en 2018. Les États baltes se sont en outre mis d'accord pour explorer d'ici 2011 toutes les solutions raisonnables pour la surveillance de l'espace aérien après 2018. Il fut aussi conclu que la base de Siaulai continuerait d'être la base d'opération principale tant que les bases d'Ämari (Estonie) et Lielvarde (Lettonie) ne seraient pas prêtes. Ensuite, les trois bases pourraient être employées pour les opérations de surveillance.<sup>28</sup>

Ceci témoigne de la crainte persistante des pays baltes envers leur voisin russe, mais témoigne aussi du fait que l'Alliance semble désormais passagère de leurs demandes de sécurité. En effet, l'OTAN est prise au piège; elle se sent obligée de subvenir aux besoins de défense des nouveaux membres, car sinon, elle sera perçue comme non crédible pour tous les autres (et pour les adversaires potentiels). C'est pour cette raison que les États-Unis ont pourvu la Géorgie d'une aide financière et humanitaire à la reconstruction suite à sa défaite d'août 2008. Les grandes puissances membres de l'OTAN, celles qui en 1999 avaient décidé d'orienter l'Alliance vers la sécurité collective, sont donc incapables de faire valoir la nécessité du bon voisinage par l'article 2 chez les nouveaux membres.

Ainsi, les grandes puissances se trouvent contraintes par les plus petites, comme Pressman l'a expliqué. L'identité de l'OTAN se retrouve définie par l'article 5 beaucoup plus que par l'ensemble du Traité. Ceci ne peut que continuer d'avoir des conséquences néfastes sur les relations avec la Russie, car il est évident que la Russie n'a pas besoin d'être équilibrée par l'ensemble des membres de l'OTAN ou par l'ensemble de ses capacités militaires. La définition de l'identité de l'OTAN ne peut se résumer qu'à un facteur de contrepoids si l'on veut faire avancer les causes de la sécurité collective pour l'ensemble de la zone euro-atlantique. La question est maintenant de savoir si l'OTAN a besoin d'un nouveau concept stratégique qui reflète cette identité de contrepoids, ou d'acteur de sécurité collective.

## *L'ironie comme conclusion*

Si les nouveaux membres ont besoin de faire contrepoids à un adversaire dont la taille les dépasse, ils doivent donc aussi faire preuve d'obéissance à certains principes théoriques de la balance des pouvoirs qui ressemblent étrangement aux prescriptions du MAP entre autres;

Tout acteur d'un bloc non-hiérarchique...  
s'abstiendra de déclencher une guerre  
pour augmenter ses capacités militaires...  
Tout acteur d'un bloc devra subordonner  
ses objectifs à ceux de l'acteur universel  
(en l'occurrence, l'OTAN).<sup>29</sup>

Au sein d'un système politique comme l'OTAN, il se peut que certains groupes régionaux se dessinent autour d'intérêts communs. Les conflits d'intérêts devraient normalement trouver une solution par l'entremise des règlements inhérents au système (par exemple, par la discussion qui devrait mener à un nouveau concept stratégique).

Il est crucial, quand on parle de l'Alliance du 21<sup>e</sup> siècle, de maintenir le cap sur l'avenir, sur les risques à la sécurité qui pourtant incluent les menaces à la souveraineté. Le nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN demeurera lettre morte, et sera cause de dissension qu'il s'agisse de continuer la mission en Afghanistan, ou qu'il s'agisse de rassurer les nouveaux membres, tant et aussi longtemps que les membres eux-mêmes ne se seront pas entendus sur le fait que l'article 2 et l'article 5 se supportent mutuellement, car la défense commune fait partie de la sécurité collective, et que nul ne sera abandonné tant qu'il ne piège pas l'organisation à laquelle il participe.

## (Endnotes)

### 1 Article 2

Les parties contribueront au développement de relations internationales pacifiques et amicales en renforçant leurs libres institutions, en assurant une meilleure compréhension des principes sur lesquels ces institutions sont fondées et en développant les conditions propres à assurer la stabilité et le bien-être. Elles s'efforceront d'éliminer toute opposition dans leurs politiques économiques internationales et encourageront la collaboration économique entre chacune d'entre elles ou entre toutes.

Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, 4 avril 1949, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)

### 2 Article 5

Les parties conviennent qu'une attaque armée contre l'une ou plusieurs d'entre elles survenant en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord sera considérée comme une attaque dirigée contre toutes les parties, et en conséquence elles conviennent que, si une telle attaque se produit, chacune d'elles, dans l'exercice du droit de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, reconnu par l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, assistera la partie ou les parties ainsi attaquées en prenant aussitôt, individuellement et d'accord avec les autres parties, telle action qu'elle jugera nécessaire, y compris l'emploi de la force armée, pour rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord. Toute attaque armée de cette nature et toute mesure prise en conséquence seront immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Conseil de Sécurité. Ces mesures prendront fin quand le Conseil de Sécurité aura pris les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir et maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, 4 avril 1949, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)

3 Todd Sandler et Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Defense*, (Cambridge, UK: CUP, 1995), 21. Traduction de l'auteur. "Deterrence, as provided by a nuclear triad, is nonrival among allies because, once the triad is deployed, its ability to deter enemy aggression is independent of

the number of allies, provided that the retaliatory response is automatic. The strategic capabilities and credibility of the response determine its ability to deter aggression. If, however, the credibility of the retaliation pledge depends on the number of allies on whose behalf it is made, then nonrivalry may occur as group size expands.” En page 4 du même ouvrage, les auteurs définissent un bien comme étant « indivisible quand une unité du bien peut être consommée par un seul agent sans que cela ne nuise, en aucune façon, à la jouissance de cette même unité de bien par les autres agents. Si cependant, la consommation d’une unité de ce bien engloutit tous les bénéfices disponibles, alors on dit que les bénéfices de ce bien sont divisibles, ou rivaux. »

- 4 Mancur Olson, Jr, et Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances” in Francis A. Beer, ed., *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World*, (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), 124.
- 5 Sandler et Hartley, *Economics of Defense*, 20.
- 6 Olson et Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory...”, 122.
- 7 Ibid., 131. C’est pourquoi une alliance peut continuer longtemps à fonctionner alors que les relations entre ses membres deviennent tendues.
- 8 Olson et Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory...”, 132.
- 9 Ibid., 131.
- 10 Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics*, (Ithaca, NY: CUP, 2005).
- 11 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power”, *International Security*, 9:4, Spring 1985, 33.
- 12 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO”, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-399.
- 13 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power”, 4.
- 14 James Blitz, “Europeans See Moscow as Security Threat”, *Financial Times*, 22 Septembre 2008. “Despite this, a clear majority of people in western Europe remain firmly opposed to their governments spending more on defence and diverting resources away from public health and social programmes.” Traduction de l’auteur.
- 15 Ibid. La population de la France se disait d’accord de venir en aide aux pays baltes à 40% seulement, et elle était la plus généreuse dans ses intentions.
- 16 Michael Moran, “We’ve got your back, Balts: NATO, after year of tip-toeing, promises to defend its small, eastern-most members”, *GlobalPost*, 1 February 2010, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/100128/baltic-states?page=0,0>
- 17 Volker Krause et J. David Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns”, in Erich Reiter et Heinz Gärtner, eds., *Small States and Alliances*, (Vienna: Physica Verlag, 2000), 17.
- 18 Plan d’Action à l’Adhésion (MAP), [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)
- 19 Ibid., II.2.a.
- 20 Concept stratégique de l’OTAN, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), 24 avril 1999, I.6, III.28, IV.41, 47, 52 et V.65.
- 21 Ibid., III.25.
- 22 Keir Giles et Susanna Eskola, “Waking the Neighbour: Finland, NATO and Russia”, *Special Series 09/14, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Research and Assessment Branch*, 2009, 30. “Cold War style preparation for a visible and measurable threat was now outmoded, and the course toward more flexible and deployable forces for out of area operations would continue... This raised a crescendo of alarm in the Baltic States that the promised hard security benefits of joining the Alliance were not materialising.” Traduction de l’auteur.
- 23 Ministry of Defence of Georgia, *Strategic Defence Review 2007*, (Tbilisi, 2007), 100.
- 24 Ibid., 70.
- 25 “Tallinn Erupts in Deadly Riots, Bronze Soldier Removed”, *The Baltic Times*, 28 April 2007 <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/17774>
- 26 L’auteur a effectivement appris par l’entremise d’un proche collaborateur du président estonien, Toomas Hendrik-Ilves, que le gouvernement planifiait depuis au moins juin 2006 de déplacer ce monument.
- 27 Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia”, *The Guardian*, 17 May 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia>
- 28 Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la Lituanie, “In 29-30 August 2006, the Defence Ministers of the Baltic States decided to jointly seek for the continuation of the NATO Air Policing mission at least until 2018. By 2011 the States decided to have explored all possible options and to have decided (sic) on reasonable solutions regarding the Baltic air space surveillance after 2018. It was also agreed to maintain Šiauliai airbase as the main base for the NATO Air Policing operation until the necessary capabilities are developed in Āmari (Estonia) and Lielvarde (Latvia) airbases. After that all three airbases could be used for the Air Policing operation.” Traduction de l’auteur. <http://www.urm.lt/index.php?693551770>
- 29 Morton Kaplan, “Balance of Power and Other International Systems”, in Richard B. Gray, ed., *International Security Systems: Concepts and Models of World Order*, (Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1969), 44. ©

## Fighting for Work

by Drew Gilmour

*Implementing a rural development project in Kandahar for the Canadian International Development Agency from 2007 to 2009, Drew Gilmour conducted over 400 site visits. The project included the repair of roads and irrigation canals, establishment of a market, bakery, factory, poultry business, industry sewing centre and other initiatives.*

*The line stretched almost a mile into the Kandahar desert.*

*Six hundred farmers dug and hacked and clawed at the ground, opening up irrigation canals clogged after three decades of war and drought.*

*I was on a site visit, somewhat listening to the briefing of the youngish-elder in the black turban. "...look at them, all working," said the elder, grabbing me by the arm to make a point, "and many of them are Talibs."*

*He shrugged. "There must be 40 or 50 of them at least—probably a lot more." He paused, "just because you are with the Talibs, it does not mean that you are one."*

*He smiled. "Farms need water, we need work," and then strolled down the line.*

I have been working on and off in Kandahar since 2001. I've helped build schools, import chickens, haggle over produce, and held endless debates over tea. Over the years, I've made many friends there and I have seen how the situation has turned from poor, to grim, to even worse.

In Kandahar, the poor are truly poor. They lack proper food, water, jobs and hope. Each day the war gets worse as does their daily, grinding struggle to survive.

A few, when they can endure being hungry no longer, or cannot suffer another day watching their children wither, turn desperate and do whatever it takes to survive. They see that the only way out of destitution is to join Taliban Inc.

What other choices are there? Unemployment in the south is well over 50 percent. There is not enough arable, irrigated land to go around, and farms tend to be small and unproductive. There is really no industry to speak of and therefore few jobs to be had. A few may join the police or army, but the pay is low, risk high, and many simply do not trust these national agencies.

I am not sure the Canadian military truly appreciates the deadly threat that poverty and joblessness create. The restless south excels at creating legions of poor men, denies them any hope of a real job, and then tempts them with a devil's choice between joining the Talibs and growing opium.

My sense is that many of the foot soldiers of the insurgency, the local men who pick up an AK for money, view the Taliban's conservative vision with varying degrees of

unease. They need a job and through the insurgents a man can earn some pay, while a younger son can relieve his family of one more mouth to feed.

Those more fortunate, with a bit of land, may elect to stay on the farm and grow opium poppy, which supplies an income slightly better than farming wheat.

If poor villagers form the foot soldiers of the Taliban, the opium trade is its paymaster.

Most observers estimate that the Taliban earns at least 250 million dollars annually through the opium trade, either through direct tax or fee-for-protection services.

The opium industry and the insurgency are mutually dependent. One cannot survive without the other. As opium goes, so does the insurgency—and times are good for the poppy trade.

Opium is the dominant industry of Afghanistan. No other agricultural, industrial or service industry can begin to approach its volume. Especially in the south, it pervades every segment of society. It erodes the traditional tribal community structures, displaces tolerant clerics with fanatics, corrupts governance on a massive scale and effectively kills off other economic opportunities.

Yet this industry, borne of poverty, must be destroyed if the insurgency is to be won.

So far, the Canadian military, NATO and the Afghan army have not made a serious push against the poppy. Soldiers want to take on insurgents, not farmers. Eradication efforts to date have largely failed, creating enemies out of farmers who are rendered destitute as their crops are destroyed.

Support from local government officials is lukewarm at best because their control over poppy areas is tenuous or non-existent, or contrary to their financial interests. Further, attempts to replace opium with an alternative crop have done little to displace the opium trade's supremacy.

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All true. Take away the illegality and the immorality of the opium trade, and it is easy to see why it is so commanding. The opium poppy is exceptionally well suited to Afghanistan. It requires little water, and once refined into gummy paste it is able to survive the rugged roads of the country. It can be sold immediately, or left to sit in warehouses until market prices improve.

Farmer networks are well established and vertically organized. Management is efficient, providing training as needed, access to specialist labour pool and advances on seeds or funds. Transport, protection and other services are provided.

Linkages to foreign markets are well established, and taxation systems imposed by the insurgents are accepted by farmers as well-defined and reasonable. If opium were a legal crop, it would be the model to replicate.

As strong as it is, no industry is invulnerable—just look at Detroit’s car industry.

Most opium farmers I know would rather not be involved in the trade. They feel it is unclean and immoral, and a labour intensive, difficult crop to cultivate. They dislike dealing with opium merchants, do not like paying the high interest rates charged for advances on seeds and goods, and feel much of their profit flows out to pay for itinerant harvesters. Add to this the relatively minor inconvenience of the illegality of the trade, and it is a crop they would rather not grow.

While the money they make with opium is generally greater than that of legal crops, the real profits are taken higher up the chain. An opium farmer will make just enough to keep his family well fed, clothed and housed, and perhaps enough to buy a motorcycle.

Over the years, I have spoken to dozens, likely hundreds, of opium farmers. All of them told me that they would rather grow anything else—as long as they could maintain roughly the same income. They do not want to descend, once more, into poverty. Fair enough.

As opium goes, so goes the war. And the opium industry is vulnerable. Provide poverty-beating opportunity—with security—and farmers will flock to it.

Unfortunately, the development community seems completely overwhelmed at the prospect of tackling the opium industry with a reasonable alternative.

Too many in the donor community view the opium industry as a law and order issue and outside their remit. They implement small-scale, short-term projects that provide good optics, but ultimately fizzle because Afghans can earn much more with the poppy.

Others in the donor community go the other way, and mount huge, complex programs hoping that one good flagship industry will revive the economy and minimize the opium trade. These ambitious and complex projects, requiring first world organization and infrastructure, usually run aground in the chaotic environment of Afghanistan.

Still a third set of development planners, housed in their cubicles in Washington or Ottawa, see the disappointing results of small-scale and large-scale economic development schemes and decide it would be less risky to focus on

infrastructure programs. These “Pay & Forget” projects are simple and neat. It is a lot easier to work with a few Western engineers than to engage in the messy business of commerce with hundreds of Afghan entrepreneurs and thousands of farmers. Witness Canada’s bet on the Dahla Dam irrigation project. An excellent irrigation project that will benefit thousands of farmers downstream, but whose impact will be dramatically lessened because little thought or resource has been given to supporting farmers once the water flows. Vision without follow-through is wasted.

Frankly, we need a change of approach—and people. The vast majority of Canadian development planners tasked with revival of the Afghan economy have almost no experience in private enterprise. Having never run a business, sweated payroll or been rewarded with market success, they are just not equipped to find, develop, exploit and support business opportunities, much less evaluate a business plan. I suspect many view engagement with private enterprise as slightly beneath them and would rather focus on social results instead of monitoring trade development and job creation.

The Canadian Whole-of-Government approach, a strong idea so far raggedly adopted in Afghanistan, is not enough. Canada was not built by bureaucrats, but by farmers, workers, merchants and industrialists. How can Afghanistan be different? It is absurd for Canada to continue engaging in the colossal task of reconstruction of a nation’s economy without the engagement of the private sector.

We need to have businesspeople making business investment decisions, developing small and large businesses. These people, comfortable with the risks involved in business, are naturally more aggressive than risk-adverse bureaucrats. This is the only way that we can begin to roll back the power of the poppy and with it the insurgency’s resource. (Curiously, the military seems to be much savvier in this respect. At the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, I ran across two soldiers who were armed with both a weapon and an MBA.)

I have spoken to hundreds of successful Canadian entrepreneurs, many of whom would be interested in participating in the planning process or in actually investing in Afghanistan if the Canadian government would provide support. We should do everything we can to engage these entrepreneurs, either through the Canadian International Development Agency or to explore opportunities.

Once we find, support and equip the right businesspeople on the ground, they will doubtless conclude that there is indeed much opportunity to create jobs, build agriculture and develop industry.

Not far from the Kandahar Air Field are the world’s best pomegranates. Pakistan, just down the road, requires huge amounts of fruits and vegetables. There is a global demand for dried fruits and vegetables, and an insatiable local demand for chicken, eggs and produce. All are capable of providing jobs and income that can compete with the poppy.

With the right people in place, a coherent economic investment strategy that balances infrastructure with agriculture, opportunity with demand can be formed. Small business can be encouraged, and medium sized industries



*Hundreds of farmers, some nominally insurgents, work together to improve the local irrigation system in Dand District, Kandahar last spring. This and other projects helped revitalize the local economy by increasing farmland, creating jobs and promoting stability.*

*Photo: Drew Gilmour, Development Works*

sparked. Short-term work projects that keep large numbers of villagers from joining the insurgents can be designed to support longer term initiatives. I am sure that half these investments would fail, but the business success rate would be much higher than what we experience in Canada.

Considering the volatility of Kandahar, such investments would need to be closely protected. This is where the military comes in.

It seems that in the past, much of NATO's strategy has been to go after insurgents, on whichever deserted patch of desert they may be. Operations were made on military and political considerations, with little thought given to the impact on the economy. This has been a mistake.

Lately, NATO seems to understand that development, which includes job creation, is just as important as active operations. Canadian Brigadier-General Jon Vance, for instance, proved a pioneer by not just securing and holding Kandahar villages, but by focusing on rebuilding the community of Deh-e-Bagh in Dand District.

This promising approach needs to be institutionalized. The old way of going after insurgents has not worked. It is time for the military to consider economic development as

a strategic goal.

I've mentioned this to a few soldiers I know who have balked at the idea. Yet, such engagement of military in support of trade and industry is nothing new. The British ruled the waves so they could control trade and build empire. Canadian industry surged to support the Second World War effort, while Canadian Lord Beaverbrook did the same in the United Kingdom.

I do not advocate ending direct contact with insurgents—this will have to continue, but the targets should be modified. Instead, I propose that economic objectives be considered on par with purely military and political aims.

In practice:

- Business, agricultural and industrial experts develop an economic plan for Kandahar focusing on key areas chosen for their investment, not political or military, potential.
- The Canadian military and NATO revise their approach to secure and support these areas.

Military support provided could include:

- Suppression of the opium trade (coupled with immediate reinvestment into new crops).
- Protection of transport routes and/or convoy security.
- Crackdown on insurgent or warlord tax collections and money laundering.
- Site and regional security in target areas of villages, fields, business and industry.
- Communication and housing support for expatriate advisors.

It would need to be considered a prime and prestige task given to professionals, and not another mission add-on farmed out to *ad hoc* units. Such support, in coordination and agreement with Afghan governance, would have to be prioritized, dedicated and sustained to be effective. In time, these duties could be gradually handed over to Afghan counterparts.

By placing economic development as a strategic goal, thereby tackling directly poverty and the opium industry, the military will gain the support of villagers, erode the recruiting pool of the Taliban and degrade the insurgents' resources.

Fight poverty and win the war. ©

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## Afghanistan and Al Qaeda: Second Thoughts

by Louis Delvoie

The distinguished French surgeon, physiologist and Nobel Prize winner Alexis Carrel once wrote that, "l'homme qui ne change jamais est absurde." The same idea is conveyed by the English expression, "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." I cite these phrases by way of prelude to confessing that I have very reluctantly changed my mind about the NATO mission in Afghanistan and have come to harbour the most serious doubts about its validity.

From the fall of 2001 onward I fully supported the mission undertaken by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. The initial purpose of that mission was to punish the leadership of Al Qaeda, which had mounted the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and to overthrow the Taliban regime, which had given sanctuary to Al Qaeda. The subsequent purpose was to secure and stabilize Afghanistan so that it did not revert to Taliban rule or failed state status and thus once again become a safe haven from which Al Qaeda could pose threats to the West and its interests. While long dubious about the prospects of converting Afghanistan into a liberal democracy, I thought that these more limited and realistic objectives made eminent good sense. Now I am not so sure, given the realities of the situation and the human and financial costs involved.

My doubts were in the first instance fuelled by three hard facts. First, despite repeated efforts over eight years by the mightiest military machine and the most elaborate intelligence apparatus that the world has ever known, neither Osama bin Laden nor Ayman al Zawahiri has been either killed or captured. Second, the lack of a base in Afghanistan has not prevented Al Qaeda and its affiliates from mounting murderous attacks against primarily Western targets in London, Madrid, Istanbul, Casablanca, Mombasa, Amman,

and perhaps Bali and Jakarta in the years since 2001. Third, eight years of military, diplomatic and development efforts by the world's wealthiest and most developed countries have not brought either security or stability to Afghanistan.

These facts are in and of themselves sufficient to give one pause, if not necessarily to inspire a sense of exasperation or desperation. What was far more important in my case, however, was a process of reflection on the nature of Al Qaeda and on the nature of the threats it poses.

Although a career civilian, I think that I fell prey to fairly conventional military thinking when I first envisaged Al Qaeda as simply an armed adversary. While recognizing that it was not a normal state actor or military organization, I saw it as needing some of the same infrastructure: headquarters, bases, training facilities, etc. In this I was completely wrong. To mount the kinds of operations that it has conducted against Western targets, Al Qaeda needs neither a Pentagon nor a Fort Hood, nor even a National Defence Headquarters or a Camp Gagetown. Aircraft hijackers, kidnappers and suicide bombers are not trained on infantry obstacle courses or artillery firing ranges, and they do not depend for their effectiveness on an elaborate command structure or supply chain. Indeed Al Qaeda needs no more than a few houses or huts with reasonably decent communications to indoctrinate, train and control its operatives, and to spread its message to the world. In this it is entirely different from more conventional insurgent movements such as the Taliban or Hezbollah.

If Al Qaeda is not a more or less normal paramilitary organization, then what is it? One is tempted to say that it is primarily an idea, an ideology or a brand, but this is perhaps too nebulous for practical purposes. It might more accurately be described as a directed network of like-minded people. These are people who share the view that Western domination or influences in the Muslim world must be eliminated and

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replaced by an Islamist political order. Their motivators are remarkably varied: religious fanaticism, unfulfilled socioeconomic expectations, despair, envy, repression at the hands of their own Western-backed governments, and revulsion prompted by various manifestations of Western popular culture (from the pornographic video industry to the exploitation of sexual imagery to sell magazines, blue jeans and beer). What is certain is that there continues to be copious quantities of these people throughout the Muslim world from Morocco to Indonesia, and that with a certain amount of indoctrination they can readily be recruited as Al Qaeda operatives. Supply probably outruns demand.

In an article published a few years ago, I wrote, “the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism is a malign manifestation of deep divisions within the Muslim world, divisions which are religious, political, economic and social in nature. These are not divisions which will be easily or soon overcome, and Islamist extremism is likely to be part of our world for many years to come. In the longer term the views and values of the vast majority of Muslims, combined with contemporary global realities, will no doubt lead to the marginalization and eventual demise of the more retrograde and objectionable forms of Islamism. This will take some considerable time, however, and there will be no Waterloo or Stalingrad in a so-called war on terrorism.” I still believe this to be true and very much applicable to Al Qaeda.

Another characteristic of Al Qaeda is that it closely resembles the proverbial globule of mercury: as soon as a finger is put on it, it scurries off in a different direction, but does not disappear. Under pressure in Afghanistan in 2001, its leadership escaped to the tribal areas of Pakistan where it has enjoyed a relatively secure existence despite the efforts of the United States, with the half-hearted cooperation of the Pakistani army. Following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al Qaeda suddenly sprang up in a country where Islamist extremism was virtually unknown, and under the leadership of the bloodthirsty Abu Musab al Zarqawi became the scourge of the American military and of Iraq’s Shia majority. After being more or less quelled in Iraq, Al Qaeda made an appearance in Somalia, where in conjunction with the local Islamic Courts Union, it was able to force the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces that had come to the aid of the Western-backed Somali government. And Al Qaeda remains active as Somalia descends even further into chaos, as a fully failed state host to hundreds of pirates seizing cargo ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Unfortunately the story does not end there. Al Qaeda has now found a new sanctuary and theatre of operations in northwest Africa. The Armed Islamic Group, which was the Algerian government’s main antagonist throughout a decade

of bloody civil war in the 1990s, has morphed into Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), apparently with the blessing and support of Osama bin Laden. Operating in the border areas linking Algeria, Mali and Niger, AQIM poses a threat to Westerners and Western mining interests there. (It came to the direct attention of the Canadian government following its kidnapping of Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay in December 2008). Most recently Al Qaeda has emerged as a force to be reckoned with in Yemen. In conjunction with a variety of secessionist movements, it represents a serious threat to the stability of the Yemeni government. Its decision to join forces with brethren in Saudi Arabia to create an organization called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has become a source of deep concern to the Saudi government. And following the December 2009 attempted bombing of a US airliner by an Al Qaeda operative trained in Yemen, it has become a focus of attention for several Western governments.

Add to all of this the strong possibility that Al Qaeda may well have sleeper cells in a number of Western countries, and two questions must be asked: does having or not having a secure base in Afghanistan really matter to Al Qaeda? Will the absence of such a base severely constrain its ability to mount attacks against the West and Western interests? On the basis of the historical evidence available to date, the answer would seem to be a resounding no.

The obvious objection to this conclusion is that since its expulsion from Afghanistan Al Qaeda has not mounted any attacks against Western targets comparable in scope to the attacks on New York and Washington. This is, of course, absolutely true. It is not, however, a particularly compelling refutation. Even leaving aside the debate among experts as to whether the 9/11 operations were planned and directed from Afghanistan as opposed to Hamburg, Germany, it is fair to ask what the specific importance of Afghanistan was to the success of those operations. Could they not just as readily have been plotted from Yemen, Somalia or Niger, or from the tribal areas of northern Pakistan for that matter? Judging by what we know of Al Qaeda’s *modus operandi*, the answer to that question would seem to be a resounding yes.

This leads to two further questions. Is it really sensible and worthwhile expending thousands of lives and billions of dollars in securing and stabilizing Afghanistan so as to prevent a return of Al Qaeda to that country, especially when the prospects of success are at best highly debatable? Would our principal purposes not be better met by enhanced investments in security and intelligence capabilities and cooperation aimed at confronting what is a serious but non-existential threat, a threat that is going to be with us for many years to come regardless of the outcome of the NATO mission in Afghanistan? ©



## The Af-Pak Conundrum

by Adnan Qaiser

A crisis is an opportunity riding a dangerous wind! Afghanistan has been in a series of conflicts for the past three decades, giving several opportunities to various state and non-state actors to further their agendas, making it a battlefield of competing interests, which does not allow stability to return to this war ravaged country.

As Afghanistan became a game of *Buzkashi* (goat grabbing), NATO forces failed in eliminating Taliban and Al Qaeda and in bringing peace and security in the past eight years.

Notwithstanding that terrorist attacks in the United States, Europe and around the world were planned and executed from this region, the world is not on the same page when it comes to fighting terrorism. Seen in the backdrop of the Clash of Civilizations,<sup>1</sup> the world has become polarized with several new power centres pursuing their own strategic interests.

For the United States and the West, the world changed after 9/11 and other terrorist attacks, but the world changed too for Muslims around the world after the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which led to breaking of the myth of Western invincibility. Radical scholars,<sup>2</sup> have fostered a perception that if just a few thousand Taliban can take on the military might of the West, what could over one billion united Muslims do to them? With the Iraq war inquiry held in Britain in February and Iranian nuclear belligerence (threatening a doomsday scenario if their nuclear installations are hit), this notion has further gained strength.

Afghanistan has turned out to be a long war, both in terms of human cost and financial outlay. It is an essential war for our own security, the security of the world and the security of our coming generations. However, it can neither be fought effectively nor brought to a justified end with conflicting goals and international polarization. NATO countries have seen their partners running out of steam in just eight years in this war of attrition, with public mud-slinging going on for not sufficiently contributing in cash or combat,<sup>3</sup> forcing NATO to seek a new Strategic Concept after 60 years of its existence.<sup>4</sup>

It would be naïve to believe that through all the international conferences, like the one held in London on January 28, peace and stability can be brought in Afghanistan. At all these international conventions only superficial speeches and lofty pledges are made, which are hardly ever fulfilled because of diverging interests and compulsions.

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Owing to the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries' intrusions,<sup>5</sup> Afghanistan remains an arena of power struggle. With everyone's agenda now out in the open, there are limits to Western influence due to inner dissensions and weak political will.

Out of all Afghanistan's neighbours, Pakistan's role has remained crucial but also dubious, where it is alleged that the Taliban were created by its intelligence agencies<sup>6</sup> and protected as *Quetta Shura* and the *Haqqani* group.

The United States has tried to both engage as well as restrain Pakistan. However, owing to the US dependence on the Pakistan army in the war as well as safe passage of NATO supplies (which, despite security provided by a host of private security companies that are not allowed to carry guns,<sup>7</sup> regularly come under attack by "unknown miscreants"), the United States has remained unsuccessful in controlling this key non-NATO ally.

The uneasy Pakistan-United States relationship saw conspiracy theories<sup>8</sup> emerging in 2008 when the United States was accused of sponsoring *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, a militant organization, and of conducting surveillance of Pakistani nuclear facilities through an Antiterrorism Training Centre in 2009. These ties further soured after Pakistan enhanced scrutiny of visas of US officials, followed by media reports that US elite units were ready to seize control of Pakistan's nuclear assets in case they fell into the hands of *jihadi* elements through their sympathizers in the security and intelligence network.<sup>9</sup> Finally, the linking of Pakistani banned *jihadi* organization *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, allegedly having affiliations with Pakistani intelligence agencies,<sup>10</sup> to Al Qaeda created roadblocks in vital cooperation.

Pakistan, after finding the "Af-Pak" term demeaning to its geopolitical stature, has now begun wielding pressure on regional developments after eight years of lying dormant, to the extent that it got its archrival India excluded from eminent Afghan forums<sup>11</sup> and refused to carry out operation in North Waziristan (a known sanctuary of Sirajuddin/Jalaluddin Haqqani network and Al Qaeda, though it has lately changed its stance and started appeasing the United States, either by design or under duress).

The Inter-Services Intelligence's (ISI) reported demand to be the sole interlocutor in any talks with Afghan Taliban<sup>12</sup> with Pakistan touting its "unique position" to facilitate such talks cannot be far from truth. This development has apparently taken place after the collapse of secret talks between the *Quetta Shura* and (now former) UN Special Representative Kai Eide, held in Dubai, Maldives and Saudi Arabia,<sup>13</sup> and the arrest of key Taliban figures by

Pakistani security agencies under dubious circumstances, with Pakistan refusing to hand them over to either the United States or Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup> Kai Eide's recent revelation that Pakistan blocked the ongoing talks by arresting the Taliban leaders confirms Pakistan's reach and extent of its involvement in the Afghan imbroglio.

The Taliban have already given a short shrift to the 60 countries' London enterprise.<sup>15</sup> However, despite being in a relatively stronger position, the Taliban are not achieving their stated goal of driving out all foreign forces. Being pragmatic, they are simultaneously opting for a peaceful settlement, resulting in back channel talks (by some accounts facilitated by Saudi Arabia and ISI since 2008) and giving Western forces a possible face-saving mechanism.

Soviet veterans like Lieutenant General Ruslan Aushev, who served five years in Afghanistan, and Major General Makhmud Gareyev, a former Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff have said that the *Mujahedeen* were more moderate than the radical Taliban. Gareyev's doubts about US and NATO success are corroborated by General Victor Yermakov, commander of Soviet Forces from 1982 to 1983, who called it an impossible fight.<sup>16</sup>

NATO commanders are said to be receiving counsel on cultural and tribal sensibilities by PhD scholars. But what good is that advice, which does not let them feel the pulse of illiterate Afghans who want security, even if it is brought by the Taliban.<sup>17</sup> They cannot fathom the gulf and the alienation between English speaking, suave and savvy bureaucrats and the majority Pashtun populace. Like in the past, whenever the dice turns the first ones to catch a plane out of Afghanistan will be these Afghan expatriates holding key government positions.

In every counterinsurgency, whenever the fighting forces clear an area it causes a vacuum, which needs to be followed up by development of infrastructure and a sense of national belonging. Unfortunately this is nowhere to be seen because of fundamental differences between the international paraphernalia comprising military, diplomatic, United Nations and aid agencies.

A famous military dictum notes that failure should not be reinforced. Taking a heavy toll, largely from the non-commissioned ranks, it is evident that NATO forces are unable to extend their areas of operation, putting their strategy in question. Frankly speaking, just holding a few districts which they have cleared from improvised explosive devices and insurgents in the past eight years is no achievement. Following Mao's dictum, the insurgents live to fight another day. They fall back, only to strike at a time and place of their own choosing. It is ironic that the rural areas and highways are virtually left to the mercy of insurgents. And after the American troop surge, NATO forces are said to be only securing the urban centres. If this is not a sign of withdrawal or a total failure, then what is it?

The much publicized Operation Mushtaraq in Marjah is a classic example of half-baked strategy, with senior military commentators calling it "a hurried, insufficiently provisioned, and a botched operation."<sup>18</sup> NATO forces tried

to emulate the Pakistani army's strategy of forfeiting tactical surprise (exercised in two operations against militants) by announcing the D-Day well in advance. However, what was not understood was that the Pakistani army evacuated the civilian population from the areas affected and millions of Internally Displaced Persons were moved and provided shelter to avoid civilian casualties. The same could not be arranged in Marjah with Daud Ahmadi, spokesman for Helmand Governor Muhammad Gulab Mangal noting that they deliberately did not provide alternate accommodation to the Afghan families lest they make it their permanent abode.<sup>19</sup> The resulting national apologies on collateral damage and the Afghan president's discomfiture facing the residents of Marjah on his visit—with the president now standing in between the forthcoming military operation in Kandahar using all kinds of nonsensical barbs, allegations and threats—should be a lesson for starters in counterinsurgency operations.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai is indeed upset at the roadblocks to his reconciliation efforts and convening of Afghan Peace Jirga, which, according to Farooq Wardag, his Education Minister and Peace Jirga Secretary, has a 5,000 year history and cannot be left to outsiders.<sup>20</sup> With such fundamental differences, the vibes of President Karzai's replacement in the shape of King Zahir Shah's grandson Mustafa Zahir Shah hold some credibility.<sup>21</sup>

From Alexander the Great to Soviet Russia, and now to the US-NATO supported Karzai regime, Afghanistan has never been at peace with itself and probably shall never be. Afghan history and culture has never let them trust each other, except themselves.

In the Af-Pak context, no one can be trusted or believed as everyone speaks with a forked tongue, follows his own agenda and is backed by some state or non-state actor (at a price, of course). Commanders who cite village elders' support are perhaps out of sync as it is never genuine. The Taliban have effectively eliminated all eminent tribal leaders and *Maliks* who could pose any threat to them. Those who are left are time-servers—they do not matter while the sun is shining and shall change sides when the clouds gather fearing retribution.

While the resolve of the military that success is achievable is appreciable, the factors that need to be dealt with simultaneously are: (1) international apathy, polarization and clash of civilizations, (2) NATO and Western nations' discord, (3) regional interference and influence, (4) Pakistan-US conflict, (5) India-Pakistan rivalry, (6) NATO forces' inadequacies and diverging priorities among aid agencies, and (7) Afghanistan's internal disparities and power tussles. It is imperative that political and military configuration must correspond to the ethnic mosaic and no group should feel disenfranchised.

This is a tall order. Let us accept the fact that NATO forces have little capacity to fathom the power politics of "that" part of the world, understand the dynamics of its people or take charge of events. It is unfortunate that due to our own handicaps Islamist militants are given the ultimate pleasure of winning what they call a 21st century crusade!

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## Canada, the United States and the Arctic

*by Dwight N. Mason*

The Arctic ice cover is diminishing and may disappear in this century. At present the Arctic is warming at twice the rate of the rest of the Earth. It may be ice free in the summer five years from now and pretty surely by 2030; however, this does not mean free of floating pieces of ice. More and more attention is being paid to the consequences of that development.

There will be more shipping and other maritime activity in the Arctic. However, most of the increase in freight shipping is likely to pass along the Russian side of the Arctic, gradually moving away from the coast towards the North Pole as the ice retreats. The Russian route is simpler, has deeper water and is shorter from Japan or China to Europe than the Northwest Passage.

However, the fact that the Northwest Passage will not be the principal trade route through the Arctic does not mean that maritime activity will not increase in the US and Canadian region. We are beginning to see tourism, as well as interest in oil, gas and mineral exploration and exploitation of the seabed in the US and Canadian Arctic and on the Canadian islands in the area. As the region becomes more accessible, this activity will increase.

The consequences for the United States and Canada are obvious: environmental, safety, social and new defence problems and responsibilities. While it is becoming more accessible, the Arctic is and will remain a harsh and dangerous place. US and Canadian search and rescue capabilities are extremely limited and may not be available at all in a timely manner. Distances are great, leading to very long transit times in this environment. Not all the region is adequately charted; there are few, if any, aids to navigation. Neither country has

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Arctic capable surface ships apart from a small number of icebreakers. In the US case, they are old and include only one active service heavy icebreaker. In the Canadian case there are six, none of which are in the heavy class.

There is little if any disagreement between the United States and Canada on the importance of the Arctic and its management. Neither country has much in the way of resources to cope with the problems the increasingly accessible Arctic will present. This situation seems likely to persist for three reasons: the problems lie largely in the future, managing them will be expensive, and more immediate and important issues will come first.

Resource requirements and Arctic management responsibilities are not distributed equally between Canada and the United States. Rather, they fall primarily on Canada because the Canadian Arctic region is vastly larger than that of the United States, as well as more complex, containing a number of islands.

Canada has added to its problems in the Arctic through enactment of ambitious environmental legislation, which it is not in a good position to implement, through legislation claiming excessively long straight-line boundaries which do not meet international standards and which are not recognized by the United States,<sup>2</sup> and through unilateral attempts to terminate the international strait status of the Northwest Passage, in the process isolating itself from the international community on that point.<sup>3</sup>

These acts create responsibilities and expectations, both in Canada and abroad. Other countries now have reason to expect that Canada will provide appropriate aids to navigation to facilitate innocent passage, search and rescue facilities as well as environmental protection in its part of the Arctic. Yet few of these capabilities are present, and they are not likely to increase for some considerable time. By claiming authority, Canada has also accepted largely unfunded responsibilities and the resulting liabilities.

In the past, the United States and Canada have seen that cooperation is the best policy in situations where problems are shared. This is clearly such a situation even though the Canadian Arctic is much larger than the US region. The United States faces many of the same problems in the Arctic as Canada, only on a smaller scale. For example, the most practical approach from the Pacific Ocean to the Northwest Passage passes through waters subject to US jurisdiction off Alaska.

Canadian unilateralism and occasional anti-American rhetoric about Arctic maritime boundaries and the Northwest Passage can make cooperation more difficult than it might otherwise be. But, on the whole, they have not,

perhaps because of their minor importance in the context of the larger US-Canadian relationship plus the bias of both countries to cooperation in North America. It is in the US interest to work with Canada in the Arctic. The Arctic region is part of the North American defence area. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) manages its air defence and maritime warning system. Furthermore, corporations owned wholly or in part by American citizens (often allied with Canadians) will wish to operate in both regions of the Arctic and thus aids to navigation, search and rescue, and related capabilities will become important to the United States throughout the Arctic. It is clearly in the US interest that the Arctic environment be protected, and not just in the US zone. This latter kind of cooperation is a well-established US-Canadian practice. Bilateral cooperation is also the most practical, efficient and effective way ahead.

The United States and Canada have in place an agreement and a method for such cooperation—the North American Air Defense Agreement and NORAD.

NORAD is now responsible for air defence and maritime warning for North America. The information generated by these activities is available equally to both governments and can be used by either or both together or separately for purposes other than defence, including surveillance for environmental enforcement or safety purposes. Indeed, both governments now use it for drug interdiction. Both countries would do well to consider augmenting NORAD's capabilities in the region, if they are not already doing so, especially with respect to acquiring information about maritime activity.

Use of NORAD in this manner will not, however, alter the resource problem presented by acting on the information acquired. Suitable ships, (and in Canada's case, bases), aircraft and personnel will be required. There seems to be little prospect of any such infusion of resources, and here the burden falls most heavily on Canada.

Given this situation, it makes sense to rationalize the use of whatever scant resources are available, especially for search and rescue. Here the two countries could exploit NORAD if they wished through use of its planning and surveillance resources as well as perhaps assigning activities to it on a case-by-case basis as a result of such planning. Such planning and assignments would facilitate cooperation in the region because it could be done without reference to political differences since NORAD is a bi-national organization, and its area of responsibility is North America including the US and Canadian Arctic regions. This approach is practical and offers economy and efficiency because it builds on past and current practice and capabilities for air defence and maritime warning, while avoiding political pitfalls.

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## The Coming Arctic Storm

by Dr. Rob Huebert

There is fear that the Arctic is on the precipice of developing into a region of international conflict and competition. Recent and converging developments will make it increasingly difficult to maintain the hopes of the Arctic nations for peace and cooperation in the region. Five of the Arctic states—the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway—have signed a declaration that they will cooperate in the region and will take the steps necessary to ensure that it remains an area of peace and cooperation. However, can these promises be maintained or are they wishful thinking? It is becoming apparent that the forces now transforming the Arctic are interacting in such a manner that the Arctic is poised to become a region of increasing tension, thereby negating the intentions of the Arctic states.

Four forces are fundamentally transforming the Arctic: climate change, resource development, technological development, and geopolitical development. Any one of these alone could lead to increasing tension in the Arctic region. Having four such interacting forces creates a greater likelihood of less, not more, cooperation in the Arctic and, inevitably, greater tension and conflict.

First, climate change is drastically increasing the temperature in the Arctic. This is resulting in melting of the permanent ice cover, which allows for greater international accessibility to the region. Secondly, the increased accessibility is advantageous to those seeking to exploit what is expected to be a literal treasure trove of natural resources. The ongoing discovery of natural resources in the region, such as oil, gas and diamonds, are leading many to conclude that the Arctic may be the last unexploited source of these resources. Thirdly, new technologies are increasing the ability to operate in the Arctic. Countries such as South Korea and China are taking advantage of developments to improve their ability to operate in the Arctic and will likely increase their presence in the region. Fourthly, redeveloping geopolitics are at work in the Arctic. The globe's two most powerful states—the United States and Russia—are Arctic

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states that are now rebuilding their northern military forces. At the same time, an international treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), allows states to extend their maritime boundaries. Consequently, new boundaries will converge in the Arctic between Russia, the United States, Canada and Denmark, which will then need to be redrawn.

Climate change is propelled by the increasing use of carbon fuels worldwide. The Arctic increasingly heats as more oil and gas are burned. As it heats, the ice cover increasingly melts. As it melts, new technologies allow for greater exploitation of the Arctic's resources. Their use will produce carbon gases which will then feed into the warming Arctic, and the cycle of melting, accessibility and exploitation continues. The United States and Russia (and to a lesser degree Norway, Denmark for Greenland and Canada) stand to gain the most economically from the increasing availability of these resources. However, they will need to deal with an increasing number of new actors who are interested in the region. As the resources are developed, all of the circumpolar states will need to prove their claim and control over these resources. Russia is using the revenue from its northern oil and gas resources to rebuild its military capability in the region. Norway is doing the same. Canada and the United States have both stated that they will soon follow suit in order to protect the security of their resources. It is also becoming increasingly clear that one of the driving forces behind the non-Arctic states' (such as China and Japan) interest in the Arctic is the desire to find new sources of resources such as oil, gas and gas hydrates.

The best intentions of the Arctic states for peaceful cooperation in the region may be negated by the interaction of these new forces. Inevitably the combination of great resource wealth, a more accessible Arctic and the interaction between two of the strongest military powers in the world will result in some form of tension. Compounding all of this is the need to delimit the new maritime boundaries.

There are developing indications that the Arctic states are already moving away from the cooperation of the 1990s. A hardening of positions relating to the Arctic is already developing in foreign and defence policies. The United States, Norway, Russia and Canada have all recently issued new policies that, while reaffirming their commitment to cooperation in the region, make it clear in no uncertain terms that they will also be defending what they see as their national interests in the region.

There is also a resurgence of construction of combat capable forces designed to operate in the Arctic. Both the

Norwegian and Danish forces are being substantially rebuilt. More importantly, the Russian forces—and especially their submarine fleets—are now being modernized and rebuilt. While the Russian decision to do so goes beyond the Arctic, its geographic reality means that any effort to rebuild and modernize its navy after the economic collapse of the 1990s inevitably affects the north. The Russians can only base these forces at its Pacific Ocean bases or around those on the Kola Peninsula. This resurgence has caught the United States' attention and debate is growing over how to prepare its military capability for an increased presence in the Arctic.

A third indicator is the renewed efforts of the Arctic states to prepare their forces to operate in the Arctic. These types of exercises were cancelled at the end of the Cold War. However, by the end of the 2000s all of the Arctic states had resumed large-scale training exercises in the region. They are increasingly more complex and larger, and have also been held during the more challenging periods of spring and winter. Even the formally neutral Arctic states such as Finland and Sweden are now conducting large-scale military operations in areas such as northern Sweden.

Fourth, both the United States and Russia have also begun to expand the normal operations of their forces in the region. Russia resumed long-range Arctic bomber patrols in 2007 and surface naval patrols in 2008. The United States has begun deployment of its newest fighter, the F-22 Raptor, to Alaska in significant numbers despite cutbacks in the total number of aircraft to be built that was ordered by the Obama Administration. Both the Russians and the Americans have taken steps to publicize the deployment of their submarine forces to the region in what is clearly an effort to remind the other of what they can do in the Arctic Ocean.

Taken as a whole, it is clear that the Arctic states are now taking steps to ensure that they have improved their ability to defend their interests in the region. The question that arises from these concerns is the ramification of these actions. Will such actions make the Arctic a more competitive region that could lead to conflict? On the positive side, it is possible to find several forces that may negate the above-mentioned trends. First, it remains unclear what would trigger a conflict in the region. Any conflict over resources would be counterproductive for the Arctic states. From a rational perspective, any military action taken in the region would probably create an environmental disaster that would

affect the borders of all Arctic states. Second, the five states that have claims for extending their maritime boundaries in the region have made verbal promises to ensure that any disagreements will be settled on the basis of international law and in a peaceful manner. Third, international efforts are now underway to develop rules for the conduct of other economic activities such as international shipping when it begins to increase.

However, there are three main problems that cast an increasingly dark shadow on these positive elements. First, the emergence of the Arctic Ocean as a new international region is still in its early stages. While states may continue to employ the rhetoric of cooperation, their efforts to bolster their military capabilities as they become convinced that the region will be increasingly accessible suggests that they are not convinced the Arctic will remain a region of cooperation.

Second, as the Arctic opens up, it will become connected to the rest of the world. Thus, conflicts elsewhere in the world will increasingly spill over into the region. A re-emergence of the conflict in Georgia could easily cause the United States and Russia to take actions in the Arctic. Thus the conflict does not have to be an "Arctic conflict," but the geopolitical reality of an opening Arctic Ocean in which the two powers have their closest borders would make it difficult to prevent outside problems from seeping in. What that would look like is not yet clear.

Third, the issue of competition for resources remains. It is relatively easy for the Arctic states to promise to cooperate. Only Norway has completed its claim for its section of the seabed in the Arctic. The issue of overlapping claims still remains theoretical since all of the other states have not yet finalized theirs. The spirit of cooperation inevitably becomes strained when such overlaps become reality. Likewise, current ice conditions still inhibit any exploration for resources in the high Arctic. The history of international systems peacefully developing shared or overlapping resources is not good. This is particularly true when oil or fish are involved, and competition for these will arise when the Arctic opens.

While the hope remains that the Arctic will continue to be a region of cooperation, signs are developing that that may be wishful thinking. The Arctic is emerging as a new international region that could very easily become a zone of competition. This is going to make life much more complicated for all Arctic states, including Canada. ©

## Book Review



## In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army: Northwest Europe 1942-1945

by Angus Brown and Richard Gimblett

Reviewed by Dr. Serge Durlflinger

Angus Brown and Richard Gimblett. *In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army: Northwest Europe 1942-1945*. Ottawa. Magic Light Publishing, 2009. ISBN 978-1-894673-32-7, \$25.00.

In the summer of 2009, the leaders of the Canadian Battlefields Foundation's study tour of battlefield and commemorative sites in France and Belgium equipped two vanloads of university students with key publications to assist these young Canadians to better understand the historical context and contemporary settings of the many iconic locations visited. One of these works was the enormously useful First World War guidebook, *In the Footsteps of the Canadian Corps*, written by Richard Gimblett and Angus Brown. Not surprisingly, many of these highly engaged students, enjoying the outstanding illustrations and crisp accompanying text, commented on the desirability of having a volume similar in design covering the years of the Second World War. With their most recent publication, *In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army: Northwest Europe 1942-1945*, Brown and Gimblett now offer readers just such a worthy companion volume. The format is more or less the same as the first instalment and so, too, will the second volume match the utility and success of the first.

*In the Footsteps of First Canadian Army* is a beautifully illustrated, efficiently written, and quickly paced book intended for a general reader. The outstanding archival and contemporary photos, standing in fascinating juxtaposition, of the "then and now" or "after the battle" variety, are consistently interesting and helpful. Time marches on, but the history (and geography) of Canadian feats of arms during the Second World War remain visible and accessible, as this book clearly demonstrates. John McQuarrie, the principal modern day photographer, did a superb job. To strongly supplement period photographs, the authors also have privileged many lesser-known, though no less evocative, illustrations from the Canadian War Museum's massive war art collection. They also have carefully combed through the museum's extensive, though underexplored, photographic, oral history and documentary archives. One senses that the museum was an important partner in assembling many of the key visual and other features of the work.

But it is not only the use of rarely seen vintage material that is valuable in this volume. Brown, Gimblett and McQuarrie provide plenty of new, important photos of little-seen plaques and markers, especially in the Netherlands and Germany,

commemorating the achievements of the First Canadian Army's numerous formations. The modern photographs also detail principal start lines, locations of river crossings and critical terrain features. Occasionally, though, it appears to have proven difficult from a layout perspective to ensure that the photos follow in chronological sequence or that they remain adjacent to the relevant accompanying text.

The authors' focus on the First Canadian Army as an organizational structure, and as the principal interpretive tool through which to explain Canadian operations in Northwest Europe, is useful and innovative. Still, by concentrating at this highest Canadian formation level, it might be more difficult for readers, especially those less familiar with military organization and the principles of command, to gain a vivid and immediate sense of events on the ground. The need to frequently remind readers of the many subordinate formations and units which rotated through the First Canadian Army's command is administratively informative, but does not always lend itself towards an understanding of the flow of events operationally or tactically—the levels at which most readers and users of this guide would feel most comfortable. To be fair to the authors, however, the task of documenting a far more complex organizational and command structure during fluid, as opposed to generally static, field operations—in a book relying especially on visual cues—was no doubt a difficult task. On the other hand, this work is intended to be neither about the full functioning or intricate development of the First Canadian Army as a major administrative entity nor about its command arrangements or internecine rivalries. Still, Brown and Gimblett's interpretive model serves to remind us of the complexities of orchestrating a multinational formation at war; the First Canadian Army was not even mainly "Canadian" until the spring of 1945, as the text points out.

The authors appropriately end with a chapter about the army's war art program, the Canadian Army Film and Photo Unit, the numerous overseas memorials celebrating service and sacrifice, overseas military cemeteries, and recent or ongoing commemorative activities. However, they appear to misconstrue one aspect of the issue of memorial building in Canada after the Second World War. The absence of memorials unique to that conflict, as opposed to merely adding the years "1939-1945" to existing First World War memorials, was not,

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as might be implied in the text, an oversight by parsimonious government bureaucrats but rather something the veterans themselves actually sought. The Canadian Legion and the returned men preferred that their memorials be in the form of suitably named arenas, parks, libraries, and other recreational

or cultural venues of immediate and direct benefit to their communities. By serving and risking their all, they had sought to safeguard Canada and, at war's end, they hoped to contribute tangibly to their country's improvement. They did both, and this book is a fitting testament to their achievements and sacrifices.

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## Book Review



### Uprising

by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Dr. Douglas Bland

Reviewed by Bonnie Butlin

Lieutenant-colonel (Ret'd) Dr. Douglas Bland. *Uprising*. Toronto: Blue Butterfly Books, 19 January, 2010, Hardcover, 507 pages, \$39.95

*The author's opinions herein are her own.*

*Uprising* is a must-read for Canadian security and intelligence practitioners, Canadian Forces (CF) personnel, law enforcement officials and policymakers. It will also provide answers to Canadians who have been perplexed by recent events such as the Aboriginal protests of the Olympics in Vancouver, the unresolved Haldimand Tract dispute including the housing development dispute near Caledonia, Ontario, and the blockage of Highway 401, the most heavily travelled highway in North America.

*Uprising* follows the Canadian political and military responses to a domestic challenge to the Canadian state, its institutions and instruments of power by a small subset of the Aboriginal population. *Uprising* reveals dangerous limitations in Canadian political and military vigilance, preparedness and resilience in countering domestic threats. With limited capacity to act against a dispersed and sustained domestic attack, Canada's military and police forces struggle to put down the insurgency. As resources and shared industries become affected, the American response to the conflict quickly becomes a concerning *fait accompli*.

Dr. Douglas Bland has delivered an extensively researched and deeply considered examination of first, the complex relationships between Aboriginal people and the broader Canadian society, and second, the domestic security

situation facing all Canadians. He highlights the root causes and grievances that contextualize these relationships, including discrepancies in average lifestyles and life chances, even when compared to new Canadians, and decades of political decisions and attitudes that have limited Canada's capacity to ensure domestic security. Dr. Bland goes beyond this to identify why resolving these problems and grievances has proven elusive, with government responses often having escalated disputes, produced limited results, and arguably having fostered further division among Canadians.

Dr. Bland skilfully uses the format of a novel to examine Aboriginal and domestic security issues.

First, the novel format takes the reader deep beneath the hard veneer of political correctness to examine the issues facing Canadians with frankness and depth. *Uprising* merges a historical perspective with a clear look at what is happening on the ground. Historically, Canadian governments have failed to adequately address Aboriginal-related issues, including both root and contemporary causes of frustration among Aboriginal peoples in Canada—land claims representing but one. Over the last decades the relationship has been plagued by intransigence, avoidance through defining the problem as being manageable at lower levels, painfully slow negotiations within rigid legal frameworks, and expensive but low-yield government management. Canadian governments have also failed to sustain a level of Canadian preparedness needed to protect the state against domestic violent challenges generally. Together, Canadian mismanagement and failure to invest in domestic security have produced conditions that

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could now enable a significant challenge to the Canadian state. Dr. Bland identifies a counter-logic innovation that is being discussed by some disaffected groups to break out of the troubled *status quo*, an innovation that would circumvent the historical processes and existing arrangements and involve a unilateral, grass-roots redefinition of relationships and redistribution of land and assets. Such a result would be detrimental to all Canadians.

Second, the novel format breaks free from the usual framework of Aboriginals versus the rest of Canadians, rooted in treaty and land claim negotiations and in media reporting on Aboriginal issues. Such division belies the complexity and diversity of Aboriginal relationships within Canadian society. This narrow focus also hinders the ability of the state, including its military and first responders, to protect all Canadians, including the Aboriginal population, who may also be vulnerable to criminal, politically motivated and foreign influence threats, as well as the more mundane events of Canadian life. Using the broader framework, *Uprising* contextualizes what role Canadians—both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal—might play in a domestic conflict. Dr. Bland raises concerns around what effect a decidedly neutral civilian reaction might create for first responders, and how population support might be affected by collapsing state control and security.

Third, the novel format allows for a blunt assessment of Canadian domestic capacity and vulnerabilities when faced with a dispersed, prolonged threat. Neither Canadian law enforcement nor the CF currently have the capacity to address prolonged and coordinated domestic actions against the state, or even themselves, individually or in an integrated manner. This reflects decades of inadequate funding. Political downloading of domestic problems onto law enforcement and the military, which have been charged with containing the problems at the tactical level, can no longer be assumed to be an acceptable response, or even possible. This downloading stems from a Canadian complacency toward domestic threats, and is based on the hope that successful resolutions will eventually follow. In the novel, this government “hope for the best” approach is not consistent with the rising insurgency action. Inconsistency in response is also due to the regional priorities and divisions that exist within Canada’s multi-level government structure,

and government policies that encourage escalation, such as inclusion policies without security assessments and the creation of shadow governments.

The Canadian lack of domestic capacity is exacerbated by unique Canadian vulnerabilities. There are unique challenges associated with providing security across the sparsely populated and largely unprotected Canadian expanse. The infrastructure that crosses the Canadian landscape typically did not include security as an integral component in its design. Canada’s relatively peaceful environment has led to open and transparent infrastructure planning, largely devoid of security planning and protocols for first responders and the military. Largely untested in domestic threats, Canada faces uncertainty as to how to respond to insurgency threats. There is also uncertainty as to how threats and insurgents in Canada would operate in action. This can fuel distrust among the politicians and the military over competence in addressing unknowns. The United States may have parallel concerns over the ability of the Canadian government, under conditions of threat, to sustain control over vulnerable resources and shared industries.

Fourth, the novel provides a scenario that clearly highlights that Canada can no longer act in isolation on its domestic security issues. Complacency and globalization are incompatible, in particular given the deep integration between Canadian and American resources and shared industries. As with the Arctic, other states not only monitor Canadian security and control, they also act based on their observations. The novel indicates that it would take very little for Canada to appear unable to control the situation, precipitating American intervention in what Canada perceives as its affairs.

*Uprising* is neither a conspiracy tale nor a slippery slope argument. It is the canary in the mineshaft. With a frustrated, young Aboriginal population with limited chances relative to the broader Canadian population, with current means of addressing historical and current grievances wanting, and with limited Canadian capacity to ensure domestic security, it simply would not take that much to ignite a stronger opposition to the state and its mechanisms. The domestic security situation is more fragile and our means more limited to address threats than Canadians would like to think, and hoping for the best is not enough. ©

## Book Review



## FOB DOC: A Doctor on the Front Lines in Afghanistan

by Captain Ray Wiss, M.D.

Reviewed by Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn

Captain Ray Wiss, M.D. *FOB DOC: A Doctor on the Front Lines in Afghanistan*. Vancouver and Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, October, 2009, Hardcover, 208 pages. \$32.95

Definitely worthy of a Canadian Literary Award! Still wondering why Canadian servicemen and women are prepared to and do lay down their lives in a far-off, remote land half way round the world and why Canada is and must be in Afghanistan or any other spot where liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are threatened or non-existent? Rush out, buy the book (it is a keeper), and read on. You won't be able to put it down! Truly a page turner.

But that is not all *FOB DOC* represents. It is an excellent, hard-hitting, compelling, passionate, and persuasive political and social statement. It is primarily a day-by-day, week-by-week, month-by-month account in real time of an emergency doctor's tour at both the main Canadian operating base (Kandahar Air Field), and front lines (Forward Operating Base). The author writes as he speaks; in plain, folksy, entertaining, direct, and unambiguous talk.

In this new era of counter-insurgency and asymmetrical warfare there are no forward and rear areas; everywhere is the area of operation and combat and support troops all have as their first and foremost duty to engage and defeat an enemy who is no longer distinguishable by dress or manner from non-combatants. Support troops, Combat Service Support elements, which consist of specialists from the transportation, logistics, maintenance, chaplain, and health services branches must be skilled in combat arms as well as their specific specialty. Hence the concept of the Warrior Doctor.

The significant role and contributions provided by Canada's reservists, of whom the author is a member, are fully described. The Canadian Forces could not conduct operations in foreign theatres of operations such as Afghanistan without the participation of Canada's military reservists.

The adoption of the diary format is most fitting. This format is the book's enduring strength and differentiator. Captain Wiss' accounts spring from the pages as living,

vibrant, captivating, poignant, informative, illuminating, compassionate, and humanitarian events reflective of the Hippocratic Oath to which he adheres and which he honours.

It is evident that the author is a leader and a team player and that he values integrity, honesty, trust, leadership, team effort, professionalism, and the bonds and camaraderie which those who put themselves in harms' way and make the ultimate sacrifice, hail as the Holy Grail of the military ethos. Illuminating is the description of the changes in battle field health care and philosophy which have evolved over time. These include the tools and skills now at hand to preserve the troops' lives and physical and psychological well-being at the Forward Operating Bases, the FOBs, and every level of health care delivery such as the MMU (Multinational Unit); the "Role 3" Hospital at KAF, the US military hospital in Germany, and the extensive facilities in Canada.

Doctor Wiss introduced the use of a portable ultrasound machine to Afghanistan for emergency and operating theatre use; a device and a procedure which proved to be of enormous value. And like a true and dedicated teacher and humanitarian demonstrated its utility and taught its use to the medical staff of NATO, ISAF, and the Afghan National Army (ANA).

*FOB DOC* depicts the everyday lives of our soldiers both in battle, in anticipation of battle, and in their off-duty time; a look-in which adds tremendous poignancy to his war diary. The author writes of hope, fear, anxiety, passion, love, dreams, aspirations, and relaxation activities such as video games, the internet, calls home to families and friends, and a myriad of other factors which shape and define life in a theatre of operations.

Captain Wiss speaks to PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) and the debilitating effects this psychological disease or injury can manifest. He urges that PTSD be regarded not as a sign of weakness or reason to stigmatize those who are so afflicted but that PTSD and other Operational Stress Injuries (OSI) be regarded and treated as diseases and/or injuries.

The author also addresses the history of Afghanistan, the plight of the Afghan people, their trials and tribulations,

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their quest and desire for security, stability, peace, harmony, prosperity, and good governance, protection of human rights, economic development, a promising future, and the rule of law.

The book is richly illustrated by the inclusion of more than one hundred photographs taken with the author's camera. This adds immeasurably to its enjoyment and informative attributes. The photograph of the adopted puppy, the Combat Team Lynx mascot, on page 73, speaks volumes, as stated by the author, "...about soldiers seeking solace from war by showing tenderness when they can..." The glossary is invaluable to better appreciate and understand the tenets of this erudite work of literary merit.

The publication of *FOB DOC* came about not by design but by request; request from the author's family and friends for an account of his experience in Afghanistan, why Canadian troops are there, what they do, and how they live

and adjust. It was a plea for understanding Canada's role in Afghanistan and in today's volatile and violent world. Nor did it come about for personal gain. The proceeds from royalties are to be donated to the Military Families Fund in order to assist military families with unexpected and pressing needs resulting from conditions of service.

The author, a reserve officer and a emergency medical doctor, has shed a light on today's troubled world and on the professionalism and dedication of Canada's military in bringing promise and hope to all citizens who dwell thereon. Canada and its military have and continue to provide an excellent account and example of what it means to be Canadian. Captain Wiss has done Canada, the Canadian Forces, the CF Health Services, and himself proud.

*FOB DOC* is a must read. The book provides a perspective from all angles: combat, combat support, humanitarian contributions, and the promise of a better life and future for the Afghan people. ©

## Book Review



## Intrepid Warriors: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership

edited by Colonel Bernd Horn

Reviewed by Jesse Mellott

Colonel Bernd Horn. *Intrepid Warriors: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*. Toronto. Dundurn Press, November 2007, \$39.95

*Intrepid Warriors*, a collection of essays edited by Colonel Bernd Horn, takes an intimate look at a number of Canada's finest military commanders and leaders during the crucible of war. The chapters in this volume offer insights into different command and leadership approaches, behaviours, and styles. They also reinforce the timeless truth that the character and presence of courageous leaders are critical to military outcomes.

In the introduction Colonel Horn argues that aspects of command are timeless despite technological advancements.<sup>1</sup> Horn states that problems encountered during warfare and the leadership personalities that emerge from warfare maintain a marked consistency. He contends that the nature of command and leadership is determined by personal traits, positing: "Command is a very personal experience. How an individual commands speaks more to the character and personality of the person than it does to the concept of command itself."<sup>2</sup>

*Intrepid Warriors'* strength lies in its reliance on primary source material: letters, diaries or reports from commanders and higher officials. Where the historical record falls short, the work is supplemented by contemporary evidence drawn from commanders.

Andrew Godefroy, a contributing author, highlights another issue in his chapter: the "culture of reluctance" in Canada to engage in military biography.<sup>3</sup> While the anthology as a whole addresses command related issues, three chapters will be discussed.

The first chapter, "*The Power of Patronage and the Value of Knowledge: The Leadership Experience of Lieutenant Adamson with Strathcona's Horse 1899-1900*," by Craig Leslie Mantle, addresses knowledge, experience and patronage. It explores the experience of command from a novice perspective; through the lens of a person with no prior combat experience but due to his connections, was able to gain an advantage over others.

Mantle's study of Lieutenant Adamson is based on the latter's correspondence with his wife. In one letter, Adamson laments, "Fathers write me, M.P.'s [Members of Parliament] write me and Mothers and Sisters, and in nearly

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every case the men are not worth considering...The power of leadership, which I think is born rather than acquired, I consider first. After that, quick decision and, even in training, quick action and the ability to realize the situation he finds himself in.”<sup>4</sup> Mantle masterfully exposes Adamson’s hypocrisy; a man whose professional successes were a result of political connection rather than personal aptitude.<sup>5</sup>

When discussing the Battle of Wolve Spirit, Adamson’s first major combat experience, one instance of the battle is important to note. Command is about analyzing and problem solving, characteristics which Adamson displayed when providing covering fire for Sergeant Richardson who was saving a wounded soldier on horseback. Adamson recognized this act of bravery by offering citation and recommendation for Richardson to receive the Victoria Cross.

Wolve Spirit also highlights the conflicting versions that can emerge from battle. Mantle agrees with Adamson’s recollection of the battle, described as an orderly and controlled affair.<sup>6</sup> While another commander, Thomas Eaton Howell, remembered total chaos and remarked in a report “no one knew where Adamson was.”<sup>7</sup> Mantle concludes that “[t]he remainder of Agar’s time in South Africa could now be approached with the knowledge that command was not easy, especially in battle, and that orders, if poorly given, could have devastating consequences for those who were obliged to follow.”<sup>8</sup> Adamson addresses his men’s welfare in his correspondence, : “I do not want to have any good men shot down for the sake of a few wagons of bulley beef and biscuits.”<sup>9</sup> Mantle instills in the reader the idea that only a battle hardened commander understands the risks, and takes every example for training to guard against the worst.<sup>10</sup>

Andrew Godefroy’s article: “Portrait of a Battalion Commander: Lieutenant-Colonel George Stuart Tuxford at the Second Battle of Ypres April 1915,” relies on the personal reflection of Lieutenant-Colonel George Stuart Tuxford at the Second Battle of Ypres. Godefroy writes that Tucker was

“reflective of a wider group of senior Canadian officers whose intelligence and personal courage, and ability to learn on a tactical operational level inspired Canadian Corps to victory on the Western front.”<sup>11</sup> Godforey provides a complete copy of Tuxford’s assessment of the battle, as a teaching aide to students trying to show the importance of source material. The dearth of source material in published sources reflects Canada’s reluctance to recognize its military past.

An important command responsibility is maintaining troop morale as examined by Douglas Delaney’s chapter titled “When Leadership Really Mattered: Bert Hoffmiester and Morale during the Battle of Ortona December 1943.” Delaney argues that morale is perhaps the greatest single factor in war.<sup>12</sup> Hoffmiester’s argument regarding morale is that: “[A commander] has to be prepared to go forward and been seen by troops under shellfire, and indicate that you know what they’re putting up with and you’re not afraid to expose yourself a bit when necessary.”<sup>13</sup>

Delaney provides a number of examples where Hoffmiester tried to improve moral; from delivering ammunition to troops on the front line, to making sure that wounded men were well looked after.<sup>14</sup> Delaney notes that Hoffmiester had “a well-established practice of passing on as much information as possible, to as low a level as possible, ensure his subordinates that he was on top of things, and that those above him were as well.”<sup>15</sup> Hoffmiester resembles most of the commanders described in *Intrepid Warriors*, who were also concerned with the welfare of their men.

Whether it is the characteristics of an individual commander or the use of sources, *Intrepid Warriors* is an academic book in its scope and scholarship, meant for specialists in the field or students interested in Canadian military history. Most of the contributors are either members of the Canadian Armed forces, or military historians, and in some cases both. Each chapter seeks to mention particular characteristics of commanders by using examples in combat.

#### (Endnotes)

1 Horn, Colonel Bernd. Editor. *Intrepid Warriors*. Dundurn Press: Toronto; 2007. p. 13.

2 Ibid. p. 14.

3 Godforey, Andrew B. “Portrait of a Battalion Commander: Lieutenant-General Stuart Tuxford at the Second Battle of Ypres April 1915.” *Intrepid Warriors*. Colonel Bernd Horn ed. Dundurn Press: Toronto; 2007. p. 59.

4 Mantle, Craig Leslie. “The Power of Patronage and the Value of Knowledge: The Leadership Experience of Lieutenant Adamson with Strachona’s Horse 1899-1900.” *Intrepid Warriors*. Colonel Bernd Horn ed. Dundurn Press: Toronto; 2007. p.21

5 Ibid. p..22.

6 Ibid. p. 35.

7 Ibid. p. 36.

8 Ibid. p. 38.

9 Ibid. p. 40

10 Ibid. p. 48.

11 Ibid. p. 60.

12 Delaney, Douglas. “When Leadership Really Mattered: Bert Hoffmiester and Morale during the Battle of Ortona December 1943.” *Intrepid Warriors*. Colonel Bernd Horn ed. Dundurn Press: Toronto; 2007. p. 139.

13 Ibid. p. 144.

14 Ibid. P. 147-148

15 Ibid. p. 148 ©



## Courage Rewarded

by T. Robert Fowler

Reviewed by Peter Forsberg

T. Robert Fowler. *Courage Rewarded: The Valour of Canadian Soldiers Under Fire 1900-2007*. Ottawa, Victoria, British Columbia. Trafford Publishing, November 2008. 369 pages. \$29.95. Available to order online at [www.couragerewarded.com](http://www.couragerewarded.com).

*Courage Rewarded: The Valour of Canadian Soldiers Under Fire 1900-2007*, written by Robert Fowler, explores a critical, yet underappreciated necessity of war—the question of what is courage in battle. Robert Fowler examines Canadian soldiers' acts of bravery from the time of the Boer War in South Africa in 1900 to Afghanistan in 2007. Most importantly for the reader, he analyzes the meaning of courage by referring to a wide variety of sources ranging from psychology, philosophy and memoirs by Canadian soldiers, both those who demonstrated courage and those who witnessed and reported on such actions.

Mr. Fowler noted the main challenge he encountered in his research was convincing veterans to discuss their combat experiences. Few were willing to talk about their emotions and fewer still to write about them. Despite these hurdles, he was able to use as many quotations as possible from these men without paraphrasing them. Through scouring memoirs and archival material and secondary sources, Mr. Fowler has provided a human perspective on courage during combat. *Courage Rewarded* is a valuable record of bravery in battle and these individual stories combine to fill a critical component of Canada's military history.

*Courage Rewarded* opens with the diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard, Commanding Officer of Les Fusiliers de Mont-Royal, whose battalion landed in the disaster of Dieppe early on the morning of August 19, 1942. Ménard gave a rare description of what men in battle must face to overcome their own emotions and carry out their duty. Fowler points out that, in battle, ordinary men suddenly face great danger, beyond the scale that they would ever experience in normal life, and that in such an environment, courage of a special kind arises. His book explores this special variant of courage, as shown in wars in which Canadians have been involved throughout the 20th and into the 21st centuries.

The author points out that courage is a challenge to define adequately. He notes that Field Marshall Slim, for example, tried to determine some criteria for identifying potential Victoria Cross winners but gave up, observing that “it was astonishing how many men or women in any large group could summon up the strength to act with great courage when needed.”

Fowler explores a different campaign in each chapter, outlining its prosecution and conclusion, providing historical background and detailing the campaign's highlights. He opens with the South African War and paints a vivid picture of the battles won and lost, and illustrates the bravery that was demonstrated by the soldiers who fought. He details the actions of the soldiers who were awarded the Victoria Cross. In addition, he describes the honours and awards and how they were determined to be handed out. He noted instances where individual courage and bravery were demonstrated in battle but were not given official recognition. At the end of each chapter he provides a tally of the gallantry awards to Canadian soldiers who fought in the campaigns.

In the chapters that follow Fowler surveys courage in battle in the Great War, the Canadian mission in Russia in 1919 (a little known campaign), the Second World War—including the actions of Private “Smokey” Smith who received the Victoria Cross in Italy in 1944—the Korean War, and Afghanistan. In his concluding chapter the author poses the question of, what form will courage in battle take in the 21st century?

He completes his work with a number of annexes that detail the origin of British honours, awards and decorations, the Victoria Cross recipients, gallantry decorations awarded for the Russian interventions, the recipients of the George Cross and the George Medal, awards to soldiers who defended Hong Kong, awards to Canadian soldiers taken prisoner in Europe, and awards to Canadian soldiers for clandestine operations.

While one could become bored reading lists of names, *Courage Rewarded* avoids this pitfall. Robert Fowler has written an account of the bravery of Canadian soldiers in battle that is vivid without overpowering the reader

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Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg is the CDA Institute's Public Affairs Officer.

with detail. The book is a valuable record of courage on the battlefield. The author provides us with a look at the controversy that has surrounded the awarding of medals and honours to brave soldiers, as well as some insight into what may constitute courage and how it is demonstrated on the battlefield.

*Courage Rewarded* is in effect the most complete history I have read of gallantry awards to Canadians. With

the first of the new Canadian decorations of military valour awarded in 2007, this era of British awards has ended and a new one begun. I commend this work to those have an interest in an aspect of Canadian heritage of which we should be proud.

*Robert Fowler was raised in Windsor, Ontario, but now lives in Ottawa. Following a career in the federal civil service he returned to his main interest, writing about Canadian military history. ©*

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