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ON TRACK

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The Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense

Summer / Été
2010

Volume 15, Number 2



International Trade and National Security in Historical Perspective

Canada's Interests

Celebrating Canada's Naval Aviation Heritage

Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations

Israel's Maritime Blockade of Gaza



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| | |
|--|----|
| From the Executive Director..... | 4 |
| Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin | |
| Le mot du Directeur exécutif..... | 4 |
| Le Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin | |
| International Trade and National Security in Historical Perspective..... | 12 |
| Dr. Sophus A. Reinert | |
| Canada's Interests - Canada's Security First..... | 15 |
| Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara | |
| Conference Report: | |
| Canadian Navy Centennial Historical Conference..... | 18 |
| Dr. Richard Gimblett | |
| Celebrating Canada's Naval Aviation Heritage..... | 20 |
| General (Ret'd) Paul Manson | |
| The Not Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty Reviewed: | |
| The Barn Doors Close After the Horses Have Bolted..... | 22 |
| Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn | |
| Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations: | |
| The Historical Success of Rural Insurgencies..... | 25 |
| Mr. Eric Jardine | |
| Israel's Maritime Blockade of Gaza is Lawful..... | 29 |
| Commander James Kraska | |
| Book Reviews | |
| A literature review of General Curtis Lemay..... | 34 |
| "Lemay, Lessons in Leadership" | |
| "House of War: the Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power" | |
| "Lemay: the Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay" | |
| "Sunray"..... | 35 |

COVER PHOTO: Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II inspects the Canadian Navy Guard of Honour onboard Her Majesty's Canadian Ship St John's in Halifax Harbour, Nova Scotia, on 29 June 2010. Photo credit: Corporal Johanie Maheu, Formation Imaging Services, Halifax NS. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Sa Majesté la Reine Élisabeth II inspecte la Garde d'honneur de la Marine canadienne à bord du Navire canadien de Sa Majesté St John's dans le port d'Halifax (Nouvelle-Écosse), le 29 juin 2010. Photo: Caporal Johanie Maheu, Formation Imaging Services, Halifax NS.

From the Executive Director

Mot du Directeur exécutif

This summer edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of, among others, nuclear weapons, national security, national interests, the Navy's Centennial, Canadian Naval aviation, counterinsurgency operations, Afghanistan, the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza, and book reviews.

This quarterly journal is an important vehicle through which the CDA Institute contributes significant value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada, with the presentation of excellent articles by experts in those fields.

We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policy-makers, politicians, academics and the public, we help promote change in the policies of our federal government for the betterment of our country.

The CDA Institute was pleased to host the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, William J. Lynn, III, during his address to an audience of some 150 people at the Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, on June 14. Mr. Lynn focused his remarks on the Canada-US defence relationship, particularly in the area of cyber security. A transcript of his remarks can be read at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/publications/depseclynn>.

During the same week, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire was graciously received by the Hon. Gordon O'Connor, Minister of State and Chief Government Whip, in his Centre Block office. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Evraire presented Mr. O'Connor with a model of the Boeing CC-177 Globemaster in recognition of Mr. O'Connor's success in procuring the CC-177 for the Canadian Forces. The model was generously provided by Boeing Aerospace Canada.

In '*International Trade and National Security in Historical Perspective*', Dr. Sophus A. Reinert provides an interesting argument challenging the misconception that conquest and commerce are somehow opposed. Dr. Reinert traces the development of this commonly averred yet misconstrued narrative to the Enlightenment. As evidence, Dr. Reinert cites Baron Montesquieu, who drew on Europe's accumulated experience in imperialism, to argue that nations had been and could still be "enslaved" through economic relations. Dr. Reinert is a Research Fellow in History at Gonville & Caius College, University of Cambridge, UK.



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

Dans ce numéro d'été de *ON TRACK*, nous vous présentons des articles d'intérêt actuel, entre autres, dans les domaines des armes nucléaires, de la sécurité nationale, des intérêts nationaux, du Centenaire de la Marine, de l'Aviation navale canadienne, des opérations anti-insurrectionnelles, de l'Afghanistan, du blocus naval israélien de Gaza, ainsi que des notes de lectures.

Cette parution trimestrielle est un véhicule important par lequel l'Institut de la CAD apporte une contribution de valeur à la

discussion des questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la présentation d'excellents articles dus à la plume d'experts qui évoluent dans ces domaines.

Nous croyons que des politiques efficaces en matière de défense et de sécurité doivent s'appuyer sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et sur des options de politiques raisonnées. En partageant les résultats de nos recherches et nos recommandations avec les responsables des orientations politiques, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous contribuons à promouvoir le changement des politiques du gouvernement fédéral pour le mieux-être de notre pays.

L'Institut de la CAD a eu le plaisir de recevoir le Secrétaire adjoint à la Défense des États-Unis, Monsieur William J. Lynn III, le 14 juin dernier lors de son allocution devant un auditoire de quelque 150 personnes à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. M. Lynn a concentré l'essentiel de ses remarques sur la relation canado-américaine en matière de défense, particulièrement dans le domaine de la cybersécurité. Une transcription de ses remarques est disponible à <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/publications/depseclynn>.

Dans le courant de la même semaine, le Lieutenant-Général (retraité) Richard Evraire a été gracieusement reçu par l'Hon. Gordon O'Connor, ministre d'État et whip en chef du gouvernement, à son bureau de l'Édifice du centre. Le Lieutenant-Général (retraité) Evraire a présenté à M. O'Connor une maquette du Boeing CC-177 Globemaster en signe de reconnaissance du succès qu'il a obtenu concernant l'achat du CC-177 pour les Forces canadiennes. La maquette a été généreusement fournie par Boeing Aerospace Canada.

Dans *International Trade and National Security in Historical Perspective*, M. Sophus Reinert offre un argument intéressant qui s'oppose à l'idée selon laquelle la conquête et le commerce sont de quelque façon opposées. M. Reinert retrace jusqu'au Siècle des lumières le développement de cette narration communément énoncée mais faussement interprétée. M. Reinert cite le Baron de Montesquieu, qui s'inspirait de l'expérience accumulée de l'Europe en matière d'impérialisme pour affirmer que les nations avaient été et pouvaient encore être « soumises à l'esclavage » par le biais de relations économiques. M. Reinert est Research Fellow in

The expression 'national interests' is common terminology in the realm of defence and security, but its broad application can often be confused with 'national values'. In providing some clarity on the issue we are pleased to include the article, *'Canada's Interests – Canada's Security First'*, by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don W. Macnamara. Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Macnamara is a former President of the CDA Institute. He is Chair of the Strategic Studies Working Group, Canadian International Council, and is a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.

As one of the Canadian Navy Centennial activities in the National Capital Region, the Commander Maritime Command (MARCOM) hosted a major international historical conference in partnership with the Canadian War Museum, May 5-6. *The Canadian Navy and the Commonwealth Experience, 1910-2010: From Empire to Independence* was the ninth in the series of MARCOM Historical Conferences, which have been held at irregular intervals (generally every 3-5 years) since 1980 and have contributed significantly to a better understanding of our nation's navy. Dr. Richard Gimblett provides us with a report of the proceedings of this important conference, in *'Conference Report: Canadian Navy Centennial Historical Conference'*. Dr. Gimblett is the Navy Command Historian.

In support of the Canadian Navy's centennial celebrations, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson provides us with an uplifting review of the history of Naval Aviation, from the time of the First World War, through to the integration of helicopter detachments aboard ships, in *'Celebrating Canada's Naval Aviation Heritage'*. General (Ret'd) Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff. He is also the Past President of the CDA Institute and is a Member of the Institute's Board of Directors.

Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn questions the accountability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as it nears its periodic five year review in 2010. *'The Not Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty Reviewed: The Barn Doors Close After the Horses Have Bolted'*, considers potential implications for the continuance and for the replacement of the Treaty. Colonel Nellestyn is President and CEO of Andel Inc. Consulting Services.

Eric Jardine provides an overview of rural insurgencies, from the time of T.E. Lawrence, who fought alongside Arab insurgents against the Ottoman Empire, through to the Vietcong's action against the United States and the Mujahedeen's insurgency against the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan, to the current insurgency that is challenging ISAF forces in that country. In *'Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations: The Historical Success of Rural Insurgencies'*, Mr. Jardine argues that the control of urban areas is politically

History au Gonville & Caius College, University of Cambridge, UK.

L'expression « intérêts nationaux » est un terme d'usage courant dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité, mais l'application étendue qu'on en fait peut souvent être confondue avec les « valeurs nationales ». Pour offrir quelque clarification sur la question, nous sommes heureux d'inclure ici l'article *Canada's Interests – Canada's Security First*, du Brigadier-Général (retraité) Don W. Macnamara. Le Brigadier-Général (retraité) Macnamara est un des anciens présidents de l'Institut de la CAD. Il est président du groupe de travail en études stratégiques du Conseil international du Canada et il est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Dans le cadre des activités du Centenaire de la Marine canadienne, le Commandement maritime (COMAR) a été l'hôte d'une conférence internationale majeure sur l'histoire, les 5 et 6 mai derniers, en partenariat avec le Musée canadien de la guerre. *La Marine canadienne et l'expérience du Commonwealth, 1910-2010 - de l'empire à l'indépendance* était la neuvième de la série des grandes conférences d'histoire tenues à intervalles irréguliers par le COMAR (généralement tous les 3 à 5 ans) depuis 1980 et qui ont contribué de façon significative à faire mieux comprendre notre marine nationale. M. Richard Gimblett nous offre un rapport complet des actes de cette importante conférence, dans *Conference Report: Canadian Navy Centennial Historical Conference*. M. Gimblett est l'historien du Commandement de la Marine.

À l'appui des célébrations du centenaire de la Marine Canadienne, le Général (retraité) Paul Manson nous offre une revue exaltante de l'histoire de l'Aviation navale, depuis l'époque de la Première Guerre mondiale jusqu'à l'intégration des détachements d'hélicoptères à bord des navires ; c'est l'objet de *Celebrating Canada's Naval Aviation Heritage*. Le Général (retraité) Manson est un ancien chef de l'État major de la Défense. Il est également président sortant de l'Institut de la CAD et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut.

Le Colonel (retraité) Andrew Nellestyn soulève des questions concernant l'élément responsabilité du Traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), au moment où approche la période de révision quinquennale, en 2010. *The Not Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty Reviewed: The Barn Doors Close After the Horses Have Bolted*, considère les implications possibles de la continuation et du remplacement du Traité. Le Colonel Nellestyn est pdg des services conseils Andel Inc.

Eric Jardine nous offre un aperçu des insurrections rurales, depuis l'époque de T.E. Lawrence, qui s'est battu aux côtés des insurgés arabes contre l'empire Ottoman, jusqu'à l'action des Vietcongs contre les États-Unis et l'insurrection des mudjahidines contre les Forces soviétiques en Afghanistan, jusqu'à l'insurrection actuelle qui pose un défi aux forces de la FIAS dans ce pays. Dans *Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations: The Historical Success of Rural Insurgencies*, M. Jardine soutient que le contrôle des régions urbaines est politiquement insuffisant pour entraîner la fin d'une



U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence, William J. Lynn, III, (l) delivers his remarks at the Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, on June 14. Dr. John Scott Cowan, CDA Institute President, (r), introduced the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe.

Le Secrétaire adjoint à la Défense des États-Unis, William J. Lynn, III, (g.) remet son allocution à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa, le 14 juin. M. John Scott Cowan, président de l'Institut de la CAD, (d.), a présenté le sous-secrétaire à la Défense des États-Unis.

Photo par le Lieutenant-colonel (retraité) Gord Metcalfe.

insufficient to bring about an end to an insurgency. Eric Jardine is a PhD candidate at the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, and Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University.

World headlines reported on the Israeli interdiction of the "Freedom Flotilla" that set sail from Turkey in May, bound for the Gaza Strip. In *'Israel's Maritime Blockade of Gaza is Lawful'*, U.S. Navy Commander James Kraska writes that the analogies of the American Civil War and the Spanish Civil War offers clues for addressing the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Commander Kraska holds the Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law in the International Department, U.S. Naval War College.

We are pleased to include in this issue of *ON TRACK* reviews of books that should be of interest to our readers. The first is from Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Dean Black, with his review of three relatively recent books that cover General Curtis Lemay's time in the United States Air Force. The books are: *Lemay, Lessons in Leadership*, written by Barrett Tillman; *House of War: the Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power*, by James Carroll; and Warren Kozak's *Lemay: the Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay*. Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Black is the Executive Director of the Air Force Association of Canada.

Finally, Ms. Natalie Ratcliffe reviews *Sunray*, written

insurrection. Eric Jardine est candidat au doctorat à la Norman Patterson School of International Affairs et « boursier au doctorat » au Centre for Security and Defence Studies de l'Université Carleton.

L'interdiction par les Israéliens de la « Flotille de la liberté » qui avait appareillé depuis la Turquie en mai et qui avait mis le cap sur la Bande de Gaza a fait les manchettes dans le monde entier. Dans *Israel's Maritime Blockade of Gaza is Lawful*, le U.S. Navy Commander James Kraska écrit que les analogies avec la guerre de Sécession américaine et la Guerre civile espagnole offrent des pistes pour le traitement du blocus de Gaza. Le Commandant Kraska est titulaire de la Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law du International Department, U.S. Naval War College.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK* des notes de lectures qui

devraient intéresser nos lecteurs. La première nous vient du Lieutenant-Colonel (retraité) Dean Black, qui a lu trois livres relativement récents qui couvrent l'époque du Général Curtis Lemay dans la United States Air Force. Ce sont : *Lemay, Lessons in Leadership*, de Barrett Tillman, *House of War: the Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power*, de James Carroll, et, de Warren Kozak, *Lemay: the Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay*. Le Lieutenant-Colonel (retraité) Black est directeur général de l'Association de la Force aérienne du Canada.

Enfin, Natalie Ratcliffe nous donne un compte rendu de *Sunray*, de Valerie Fortney. *Sunray* est l'histoire de la Capitaine Nichola Goddard, de sa vie et de sa mort alors qu'elle était en service comme officier observateur avancé avec les forces de la FIAS en Afghanistan. Les lecteurs se rappelleront sans doute de l'ultime sacrifice de la Capitaine Goddard pour la cause de la liberté, le 17 mai 2006. Natalie Ratcliffe est une stagiaire du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du MDN employée comme agente de projets à l'Institut de la CAD.

L'une des plus importantes manifestations inscrites au calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD, c'est la remise du prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an passé a connu un

by Valerie Fortney. *Sunray* is the story of Captain Nichola Goddard, her life and death while on duty as a Forward Observation Officer with ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Readers may recall Captain Goddard's ultimate sacrifice in the cause of freedom, on May 17, 2006. Ms. Ratcliffe is a DND Security and Defence Forum Intern employed as the Project Officer at the CDA Institute.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to Warrant Officer William MacDonald by the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, before some 640 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on November 19 at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award truly meaningful the CDA Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go online at www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2009 was Brian Stewart. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), will be presented to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website at www.cda-cdai.ca/cda.

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry and individuals is very encouraging.

This autumn, on 28 and 29 October, in collaboration with the Royal Military College of Canada, CDFAI, and Queen's University's Defence Management Studies Programme, and with the support of Senator Hugh Segal, Dr. John Scott Cowan and the Department of National Defence's Security and Defence Forum, the CDA Institute will host the 13th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The keynote speakers for the two-day event will be Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada, and Dr. Dean Oliver, Director, Research and Exhibitions, Canadian War Museum. The Symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally. Cutting edge research from young scholars will be showcased and cash prizes, totaling \$6,000, will be awarded for the three best papers presented. The aim

succès retentissant, avec un nombre record d'excellentes soumissions sur lesquelles s'est penché le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a connu son point culminant avec la présentation du prix à l'adjudant William MacDonald par la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, devant quelque 640 invités réunis à l'occasion d'un dîner formel qui se tenait au Musée canadien de la guerre.

La présentation du prix Vimy de cette année aura lieu le 19 novembre lors d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui se tiendront encore une fois au Musée canadien de la guerre. Pour donner tout son sens au prix, l'Institut de la CAD a besoin de votre mise en candidature pour le récipiendaire de cette année. Même si nous avons déjà reçu un certain nombre de mises en candidature, nous encourageons les associations et les individus membres de la CAD à nous proposer leur candidat. Nous vous prions de vous reporter à l'avis d'appel de mises en candidature qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro et, en ligne, à l'adresse www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai.

Le Prix Média Ross Munro sera également remis dans le cadre du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix de 2010 fut Brian Stewart. Ce prix prestigieux, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE), sera présenté à un journaliste canadien, homme ou femme, qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le public des questions de défense et de sécurité qui affectent le Canada. Le prix est accompagné d'une somme en argent de 2 500 dollars. L'avis d'appel de mises en candidature paraît également ailleurs dans le présent numéro et sur notre site Web, à l'adresse www.cda-cdai.ca/cda.

Les deux programmes, l'an dernier, ont connu un succès exceptionnel. J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que l'appui accordé aux programmes par l'industrie canadienne et les particuliers est très encourageant.

Cet automne, les 28 et 29 octobre, en collaboration avec le Collège militaire royal du Canada, l'ICDAE, et le programme d'études sur la gestion de la défense de l'Université Queen's, et avec l'appui du Sénateur Hugh Segal, de M. John Scott Cowan et du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense, du ministère de la Défense nationale, nous serons les hôtes du 13^{ème} Séminaire annuel des étudiants diplômés. Les conférenciers invités pour la manifestation de deux jours seront M. Joel Sokolsky, recteur du Collège militaire royal du Canada et M. Dean Oliver, directeur de la recherche et des expositions au Musée canadien de la guerre. Le symposium mettra en vedette les travaux d'étudiants au doctorat et à la maîtrise des universités civiles et militaires de partout au Canada et dans le monde. La recherche de pointe de jeunes chercheurs sera mise en lumière et des prix en argent, d'une valeur totale de 6 000 dollars, seront décernés aux trois meilleures études présentées. Le but du symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires. Veuillez prendre note de l'invitation à soumettre des communications qui paraît ailleurs dans *ON TRACK* et sur notre site Web, à l'adresse www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai.

L'Institut de la CAD va continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse pénétrante des événements et des enjeux qui ont



The Hon. Gordon O'Connor, Minister of State and Chief Government Whip, was presented with a model of the Boeing CC-177 Globemaster in recognition of his success in procuring the CC-177 for the Canadian Forces by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations. Shown l-r during the presentation in Mr. O'Connor's Centre Block office are Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Eddy Morin, VP – Canada Business Development, Integrated Defence Systems, Boeing Canada Operations; the Hon. Gordon O'Connor; Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin, Executive Director Conference of Defence Associations; Harry W. (Pete) Peterson, Vice President Boeing Canada Operations Ltd; and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire.

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe.

L'Hon. Gordon O'Connor, ministre d'État et whip en chef du gouvernement, a reçu une maquette du Boeing CC-177 Globemaster qui lui a été remise par le Lieutenant-général (retraité) Richard Evraire, président de la Conférence des associations de la défense, en reconnaissance du succès qu'il a obtenu dans l'acquisition de l'appareil pour les Forces canadiennes. On voit ici, de gauche à droite, lors de la présentation dans le bureau de M. O'Connor à l'Édifice du centre, le Brigadier-général (retraité) Eddy Morin, vice-président de Canada Business Development, Integrated Defence Systems, Boeing Canada Operations, l'Hon. Gordon O'Connor, le Colonel (retraité) Alain Pellerin, directeur général de la Conférence des associations de la défense, Harry W. (Pete) Peterson, vice-président de Boeing Canada Operations Ltd., et le Lieutenant-général (retraité) Richard Evraire.

Photo du Lieutenant-colonel (retraité) Gord Metcalfe

un impact sur la défense et la sécurité dans ce pays. Grâce à la recherche de l'Institut de la CAD, à des discussions en table ronde, à des séminaires et des symposiums annuels et à notre collaboration avec les universités et d'autres groupes, nous continuons à focaliser sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Nous visons à informer et soutenir notre gouvernement et nos responsables des orientations politiques dans des directions qui vont sauvegarder les intérêts du Canada et de ses citoyens en matière de défense et de sécurité.

En terminant, j'aimerais remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux *patron, compagnon, et officier* pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD ; sans leur contribution il nous serait très difficile de bien nous acquitter de notre mission.

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International Trade and National Security in Historical Perspective

by Dr. Sophus A. Reinert

“The most important world events,” the Italian poet and professor of economics Agostino Paradisi lectured in the late eighteenth century, “have been born from wars and wealth.”¹ More than two centuries later, we like to think of the two major engines of history he identified, i.e., conquest and commerce, as somehow opposed. Unrestrained trade, we happily assume, is the antithesis of warfare; it inevitably creates prosperity for all parties, renders conflict impossible, polities more stable, and governments largely redundant. To argue against the grain is atavistic, worthy only of misguided youths, certain moral conservatives, and unrepentant Marxists on the *Rive gauche*. But does trade inevitably make international relations more secure?

Since history is so often marshalled to the cause of this equation between trade and peace, and too often in a selective manner, it is pertinent to remember that history can be the tool of scepticism as well as propaganda, and that the historical record seldom is quite as straightforward as many would like. In an oft-quoted passage of his 1848 “Principles of Political Economy,” John Stuart Mill warned, “It often happens that the universal belief of one age of mankind ... becomes to a subsequent age so palpable an absurdity, that the only difficulty then is to imagine how such a thing can ever have appeared credible.”² The past is indeed replete with similar instances, from the perceived benefits of bloodletting to the moral rectitude of slavery, the soundness of Enron-style accounting alchemy, and the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In each of these cases, informed scepticism was for a long time met not with arguments but with ridicule, and dissent was tantamount to heresy. The same holds true for today’s mantra that only unfettered market forces can bring peace, liberty, and development.

Intellectually, the grand narrative that commerce superseded conquest in the modern world is often traced back to the Enlightenment, whose mainstream thinkers supposedly believed “free trade” would secure liberty and welfare for all. Against writers such as Thomas Hobbes, who famously imagined a world in which political communities confronted each other “in the state and posture of Gladiators,” generations of subsequent political philosophers indeed dreamt of pacifying international relations by substituting goods for gladii, commerce for conquest. Hobbes himself

briefly suggested this idea, noting, “the passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things that are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them.”³

Adumbrated at the end of the seventeenth century by John Locke and later lionized by the likes of Baron Montesquieu, the opposition between war and trade was most cogently put in the nineteenth century by the French philosopher Benjamin Constant: “Our world is, in this respect, precisely the opposite of the ancient world.”⁴ The ancient world was characterized by barbaric war, modernity by civilized trade. Echoes of this supposed “Enlightenment” consensus are today reiterated by scholars, pundits, and world intellectuals and leaders from Paul Krugman to Tony Blair and Condoleezza Rice, and acted upon to the point that wars themselves are fought to secure peaceful trade.⁵ But is history really univocal on the issue?

Even Montesquieu, after all, thought nations had been and could still be “enslaved” purely through economic relations and that the civilizing consequences of commerce required careful policies, though this is an aspect of the good Baron’s writings that seldom makes its way into college textbooks.⁶

In arguing this, the great Frenchman drew on Europe’s accumulated experience in imperialism, and on the many ways in which its military and economic power were intertwined in history, from the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, to the Dutch Golden Age and the recent rise of the British Empire. In all three cases, trade had worked wonders, but always through conscious policies and seldom, if ever, without bloodshed.

One of the continent’s most experienced practical imperialists, the Dutch officer of the East India Company and twice Governor General of the East Indies, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, had straightforwardly explained to the governing body of the supposedly purely commercial Netherlands that, “one cannot do commerce without war, nor war without commerce,” and similar statements were legion across Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁷ Contrary to what often assumed, the idea that trade also could be a means of coercion in international relations was in fact clearly articulated in the mainstream of Enlightenment political economy by some of its most celebrated practitioners.⁸

As one eighteenth century professor of economics warned in 1781, aggressive export strategies had bestowed upon Britain “dominion” even where it sent no troops, “a different kind of Empire.”⁹

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So though there has existed a tradition of thought emphasizing the incompatibility of trade and war, there also existed a parallel tradition that conceived of trade, and thus liberty and national security, as competitive rather than collaborative. Practically, the case is even clearer. England and later Britain rose to prominence in the eighteenth century through the vigilance of the Royal Navy, and its factories were protected by some of the most prohibitive tariffs in European history well into the late nineteenth century. The case arguing that the British Empire was based on principles of “free trade” is at best a careless extrapolation into the past.¹⁰ Military and economic power were not opposites as Britannia came to rule the waves; they were part and parcel of its imperial project, a synergy which was less inconsequential for the codification of political economy than most modern economists would like to admit. Adam Smith’s memorably emphatic praise of the draconian Navigation Acts, the protectionist sinews of the British Empire, is a case in point.¹¹

One reason for these divergences of opinion was certainly conceptual. For whereas some theorists were happy to consider trade as an abstract term to simply cherish, others saw it harbouring a nearly infinite variety of economic activities and interactions, all with differential potentials for creating wealth and supporting liberal political institutions.

Feudal agriculture, in short, was not decentralized urban manufacturing. Though this idea is an anathema in many circles today, it was once patently obvious that it mattered what business a nation or other political community was in, and that the reason for this was that economic activities were qualitatively different carriers of wealth and security.

Trade itself was not enough, since history recorded numerous cases of asymmetrical trading relations between states strengthening one at the expense of the other, often with catastrophic results in terms of material welfare, social stability, and ultimately political viability in one or the other. Trade itself was not by necessity a stabilizing factor; neither domestically nor internationally. At the time, this problem was often theorized in terms of the observable difference between nations primarily exporting raw materials and those primarily exporting manufactured goods.

One of Europe’s first professors of economics, Antonio Genovesi, could thus observe in the 1750s that the line separating sovereign nations from “servants” in Europe, and functioning civil societies from unstable hotbeds of brigandage and famine, had come to coincide neatly with that which separated exporters from importers of manufactured goods, theorizing that the “freedom, wealth, and power” of a nation was directly proportional to the refinements of its industry.

A nation could, by nurturing a comparative advantage in raw materials, specialize in being poor and insecure.¹² As a New England Federalist echoed this insight in 1789, “an agricultural nation which exports its raw materials, and imports its manufactures” could neither become “opulent” nor “powerful.”¹³ Alexander Hamilton’s assistant Tench Coxe put it even more succinctly, exclaiming that industrialization and its cultural repercussions offered nothing less than

political salvation.¹⁴ In the context of global political economy in the age of revolutions, his observation was not far off the mark.

After centuries of absolutist misrule, economic destitution and social pathology, for example, the sovereign Kingdom of Naples found itself on the brink of a breakthrough in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Its economy had long been considered “colonial,” specialized in supplying Britain with raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods, and its international trade was conducted largely by British vessels. Its internal political crises too had repeatedly been resolved by British force of arms, most recently in the case of the infamous republican revolution of 1799. This had come to a bloody halt at the hands of Admiral Nelson and the Royal Navy, who preferred to keep their absolutist puppets in place rather than risk the will of a democracy that might elect to be less acquiescent to British interests.¹⁵

To break out of a *cul-de-sac* of poverty and dependence in 1823, the Neapolitan finance minister Luigi de’ Medici drew on what he understood to be Enlightenment political economy to launch a massive program of economic policies aimed at industrializing the Kingdom and achieving for it material welfare and *de facto* independence. Dynamic tariffs were introduced to encourage domestic manufactures in emulation of the British model, focusing particularly on “textiles, shipbuilding, and engineering.”

The success of these measures was imminent. Not only were Neapolitan shipyards the first in Italy to launch a modern steamship, but the Kingdom similarly constructed the first railway on the peninsula. By the early 1830s, Naples was by some accounts the most industrialized state in all of Italy, ahead of traditional centres of economic gravity to the north such as Tuscany and Lombardy. Yet, it was not to last.

Gunboat economics, it seems, is a venerable phenomenon

Britain retaliated against Neapolitan exports and, when this did not dissuade the Kingdom’s bid for economic and political independence, dispatched a squadron of gunboats—with orders to seize Neapolitan shipping—to the Bay of Naples for the fourth time in about a century.

Gunboat economics, it seems, is a venerable phenomenon. Under the threat of urban bombardments the Neapolitans finally caved in, dismantling their tariff system to embark on a new era of “free trade” with Britain. Did this result in peace and prosperity? No, it brought about economic privation, political instability and cancerous domestic violence. The overnight liberalization of the Italian market following unification some decades later, the immediate effect of which was the destruction of what remained of Southern industry at the hands of more advanced Northern equivalents, only cemented its role as a depressed source of raw materials for more industrialized neighbours.¹⁶

Neapolitans traded, certainly, and more than ever before, but few can doubt that Naples would have been better off had it been allowed to industrialize and nurture

its domestic market and institutions; had it been allowed, in short, to prioritize freedom and internal development over international trade, thus, with time, securing them all.¹⁷

This forlorn story is hardly unique in the annals of international relations. Indeed, it is archetypical of how Britain expanded its informal empire in the nineteenth century.¹⁸

But was this world so different from ours? The example of twentieth century Latin America is not entirely unlike that of nineteenth century Naples. Economists routinely claim that the continent suffered deeply during its experiment with government-encouraged import-substitution in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Yet, empirically speaking, countries like Peru fared far better then, in terms of real wages, than during its more recent decades of aggressive privatization and market liberalization.¹⁹

State-level historical analyses of the past century and more have in fact demonstrated, surprisingly for some, that states with very strong but asymmetrical ties of economic interdependence have been more belligerent than relatively more autarkic ones.²⁰ Even if the nature of conflict, as one military historian recently warned, is changing fundamentally, and what awaits us is “an open-ended period of nervous vigilance, punctuated by occasional lightning-flashes of mass murder,”²¹ there is no reason to think trade will be able to banish war forever, particularly, perhaps, in light of the current return to Renaissance-style mercenary armies.

Indeed, economic inequalities, as enforced by certain kinds of asymmetrical trade, help foster failing states, failing systems of education, and precisely the sort

of barbaric cocktail of influences that in turn fuels violence, both domestically and internationally.²² The exigencies of economic interest are too demanding, for individuals as well as for political communities, to simply surrender to fate, and the solutions to these problems are better sought in practical politics than in wishful thinking. History, of course, can aid us in doing both.

Yet the past tells us unequivocally that international trade has more complex consequences for domestic liberty, security and material welfare than readily admitted. The lesson of history is not that trade is a zero-sum game, far from it. That would be a simplification as untenable as to claim that trade in itself always makes everyone better off, and nobody could or should deny that international commercial civilization has been an extraordinary achievement of mankind.

The lesson of history is rather that any serious engagement with some of the most burning questions of international security and development in the future must proceed with a far less naïve, far more historically grounded understanding of the international division of labour (including that of projecting force) and its consequences for world order.

Peace, security and development will continue to demand political and ethical choices in situations about which we seldom are sufficiently informed.²³ There is no magic wand to wave, no ideal theory to adopt, no providence to trust. History, of course, does not repeat itself, and similarity is not equivalence. Yet, the dark and brooding labyrinth behind us at least indicates that the way ahead might neither be so straight, nor so well lit as we would like it to be.

(Endnotes)

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Canada's Interests – Canada's Security First

by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara

“It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of social services. *There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.*” (Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor 1953)

“There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens.” (Canada's National Security Policy 2004).

“So, today we learned that without national security, little else matters.” (US News Commentator 11 September 2001)

Introduction

The current and perceived future security environment is both complex and challenging. It is complex because of the various issues, trends, and threats that are now included in a broad and comprehensive national security context. It is challenging because of the need to assess these various factors in terms of their importance and relevance to ensure the most effective allocation of resources to the preservation of our interests and safeguarding and

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promotion of our values. This is no longer the sole purview of the military. It does and will continue to involve and challenge other government departments under the 'whole of government' rubric.

The Current and Future Security Environment and Canada's National Interests

At its most basic level, a concise definition of *national security* was penned by Capt(N)(Ret) Bernard Thillaye in 1973: "*National security is the matter of guarding national values and interests from both internal and external dangers.*"

Of course, this leads to the next question: "What are those national values and interests?" Our fundamental *national values* or beliefs simply put are:

Democracy - a freely elected, representative democratic government - implying the acceptance of the Rule of Law;

Freedom - individual freedom to pursue ones interest to the point that it does not infringe on the rights of others,

Human Rights - the intrinsic and ultimate value of human life, leading to a strong sense of social justice domestically and internationally.

These values both inform and form our interests, the details of which are less often clarified.

Our *national interests*, which we also hold in common with our allies, are sometimes called national objectives – conditions we seek to maintain or achieve, commonly found in foreign and defence policy documents. They can and should be the *lenses* through which we should view the world to assess its impacts on us, and assist in developing appropriate responses. Such an approach assists both decision-makers and citizens in understanding and can be broadly grouped into the following categories:

Security- The defence of Canada and North America - Freedom from Fear

Prosperity- The economic well-being of Canadians - Freedom from Want

Stable World Order - Contributes to Security and Prosperity

Promotion of Canada's Values - Not to impose but to represent democracy and the Rule of Law, freedom, social justice and to contribute to stable world order

The order in which these interests are stated is important. Without *security*, achievement of *prosperity* would be difficult, and a *stable world order* contributes to the other two before it.

Several different agencies and organizations in Canada, the United States, United Kingdom and NATO have recently conducted studies attempting to analyze the range of issues and trends that may be relevant to national security

and our national interests. The first conclusion in examining these documents is how much they have in common. What they do have very much in common is the recognition that the term 'national security' now has a very broad meaning – sometimes referred to as *comprehensive* national security. If the various studies are consolidated and reduced to rather simple terms, a list of issues, trends, risks and threats to national security would include the following:

- Globalization / International Economy including issues of Debt, Credit and Investment capital
- Terrorism
- Cyber-warfare and Cyber-terrorism – disruption of communications, institutions, operations, finance
- World order – Political/economic restructuring in many states in many regions
- Regional Conflict / Failed and Falling States
- Weapons proliferation (including Weapons of Mass Effect)
- Resources (including energy, oil, water)
- Environment / climate change / natural disasters
- Pandemic Disease e.g. Swine Flu, HIV/AIDS
- Refugees/population migration/ human trafficking
- Drugs, organized crime, money laundering
- Demographics – major age profile differences across regions

These twelve headings may not be, to most people, a list of conventional security concerns. But times have changed. In addition, one or more of these issues can create or intensify others. For example, a natural or humanitarian disaster could lead to unexpected refugee immigration that could lead to migration of foreign conflict tensions, with or to ex-patriot communities in Canada.

A more broadly-based definition of national security was adopted at the former National Defence College of Canada in 1981 and the concept was further developed by Barry Bazan in his 1983 book "People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era". More recently, the Thillaye definition has been incorporated along with others, in a new definition to describe the 'comprehensive' approach to national security.

"National security is the first and most important obligation of government. It involves not just the safety and security of its citizens. It is a matter of guarding national values and interests from both

internal and external dangers – threats that have the potential to undermine the state, society and citizens. It must include not just freedom from undue fear of attack against their person, communities or sources of their prosperity and sovereignty, but also the preservation of the political, economic and social values – respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights, economy and environment – which are central to the quality of life in a modern state.”

If national security is indeed the first and most important responsibility of government, then surely citizens should be well informed in terms of which national interests are at stake in an issue and why, and then, how the government plans to deal with it, and with what resources.

Grappling with this now comprehensive list of security issues does require an orderly process, lest opinion or whim dictate priorities. By using the four national interests as ‘lenses’, each issue or risk may be assessed in terms of its relevance to each national interest. In addition, using a system of assigning a level of ‘intensity’ or importance of an issue to each interest, the comparative importance of each issue in terms of the national interests will be identified, and may even suggest the general means by which to address it. The levels of intensity suggested by Dr. Don Nuechterlein, who developed this technique, included survival (critical), vital (dangerous), major (important) and peripheral (bothersome), to which may be added humanitarian (our values demand a response). Clearly, responses for many issues could range from military force to no use of force at all, hence involving other government departmental capabilities, or even sequential combinations.

The Comprehensive / Whole of Government Approach

A comprehensive approach to national security leads naturally to considering how the military would address a ‘comprehensive approach to national security issues. In 2008, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Mr. Peter Gziewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek published a paper in the Canadian Military Journal titled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations.”

In that article they stated:

“CF interest in the development of a more comprehensive approach to operations derives heavily from a “whole of government” perspective recently articulated by the Canadian Government. This perspective calls for bringing previously separate agencies into closer collaboration in achieving policy objectives. In fact, a comprehensive approach encapsulates many of the capabilities that this perspective identifies. Indeed, it involves developing a capacity to interact with such players in a cooperative, constructive manner. As such, it can be seen as a necessary component of a more general whole of government effort. Such an approach is hardly a Canadian invention. Indeed, similar thinking has gained currency

among key allies – most notably the United Kingdom and the United States. And yet, all generally involve creating a competency that cuts across departments and dispenses with ‘stovepipes.’ “

“For the military, a comprehensive approach offers increased chances for achieving greater interoperability and collaboration among key players in the operational arena, as well as in the development of the requisite networking capabilities and skills essential to achieving one’s objectives. And yet, even more fundamentally, such thinking supports a growing consensus that outward-focused, integrated, and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be the norm, given the complex problems and challenges posed by an increasingly multidimensional security environment.”

The ‘comprehensive’ approach to national security and the expected ‘whole of government’ response has placed, and will continue to place new demands on other government departments. The implications of these demands will likely require a change in the ‘strategic culture’, organization and responsiveness of those departments.

As stated in the ‘Canada First Defence Strategy’:

“Only by drawing upon a wide range of governmental expertise and resources will Canada be successful in its efforts to confront today’s threats.”

Strategic Culture

‘Strategic Culture’ has been defined as *the socially transmitted habits of mind, tradition and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based community* (K. Davis “Cultural Intelligence and Leadership”) or, as Colin Gray stated *“Strategic culture is the world of mind, feeling and habit in behaviour.”*

Canada’s military ‘Strategic Culture’ has been for over 100 years the deployment of expeditionary forces abroad to protect Canada’s interests and promote Canada’s values, as exemplified by the Boer War, two World Wars, the Korean War, the Cold War (with the stationing of some ten thousand personnel in army and air force units in Europe from 1950-1993), and dozens of UN ‘Peacekeeping’ operations or coalition interventions, e.g. Gulf War, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Such operations have involved thousands of service personnel, but very few civilians from other government departments – even in the much-vaunted 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) that has been pursued in Afghanistan.

Of course, it must be recognized that there are huge differences between military personnel and civilian public servants. At the outset, the Canadian Forces is an organization staffed, equipped, trained and educated

for deployment in high-risk areas. When not deployed, operational units are training for deployment, attending courses and professional development programs to ensure their operational effectiveness when deployed. All military personnel are trained in certain military skills enabling them not only to look after themselves, but also to do a variety of tasks. All officers and non-commissioned members are taught planning, administration, management and leadership and are subject to undertaking an organized series of professional development programs to prepare them for increased responsibility and higher rank. Virtually everyone expects to deploy somewhere sometime.

With very few exceptions, none of this applies to the public service – there is no ‘deployment culture’ – and yet the ‘comprehensive / whole of government’ approach’ already expects such deployments and will thus require a change in departmental cultures.

Among the many changes will be the need to identify or designate positions that may be ‘deployment capable’. There will be a need to identify necessary skills and the appropriate training and education provided. Particularly important will be the attendance on professional development education programs such as the National Security Program at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), Toronto, where senior public service officials can attend together with senior officers a year-long study of national and international affairs relevant to national security.

A ‘comprehensive / whole of government’ approach to the defence of Canada’s interests and promotion of Canada’s values will require substantial change in the knowledge,

skills and experience within Canada’s public service and its senior leadership.

There are signs that the need for increased public service attendance at the National Security Program at CFC is attracting some recognition. But until a much broader conceptual and organizational approach and understanding of both needs and expectations, including an effective and relevant public service professional development program, is adopted across the whole of government, Canada’s response to the new comprehensive national security environment may again be left primarily to military resources.

Conclusion

The changing national and international security environment requires a heightened government and public understanding and assessment of the issues, trends and risks that can affect Canada’s national interests. The policy that a comprehensive approach to national security will necessarily involve many other government departments – indeed the whole of government- requires that larger numbers of public servants will likely be subject to deployment abroad to protect Canada’s interests. This will require changes in the organization and staffing in many departments and agencies plus education and professional development programs for both military and public service personnel to ensure effective and cohesive execution of their assigned responsibilities. To do so will most certainly be in Canada’s national security interest. ©

Conference Report: Canadian Navy Centennial Historical Conference

by Dr Richard Gimblett


As one of the Canadian Navy Centennial activities in the National Capital Region, the Commander Maritime Command (MARCOM) hosted a major international historical conference in partnership with the Canadian War Museum, 5-6 May 2010. *The Canadian Navy and the Commonwealth Experience, 1910-2010: From Empire to Independence* was the ninth in the series of MARCOM Historical Conferences, which have been held at irregular intervals (generally every 3-5 years) since 1980 and have contributed significantly to a better understanding of our nation’s navy. The proceedings of four have resulted in major academic publications: RCN in Retrospect (1980), RCN in Transition (1985), A Nation’s Navy (1992), and The Admirals (2002). The last was held in Quebec City (2008), whose proceedings will appear in fall 2010 as *Citizen Sailor: Chronicles of Canada’s Naval Reserve*,

1910-2010. It is anticipated that this year’s conference proceedings will be published in spring 2011, as part of the prestigious scholarship program of the Canadian War Museum.

This year’s theme focused on a comparative historical analysis of the Canadian Navy with the other major Commonwealth navies (our nearest equivalents in origins, size and operational culture). The conference broke exciting new ground in comparative naval studies, and participants from all perspectives (speakers, chairs, audience) agreed it was the most important international gathering of scholars and practitioners in this field of research in 2010, a fitting recognition of our Naval Centennial.

The conference aimed to expand on a recent trend in strategic studies scholarship. An emerging school suggests that the Canadian Navy’s origins in the British imperial system and its geographical location next to the American superpower have had unique influences upon our naval force

Dr. Gimblett is the Navy Command Historian.



The Canadian Naval Centennial History Conference, held at the Canadian War Museum 5-6 May 2010, attracted internationally recognized scholars and seasoned naval professionals from Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States.

Photo courtesy Brian McCullough

development over the past century. Rather than focusing on our national naval history, the aim was to contribute to this growing body of knowledge. Towards this end, the conference explored the national, regional and chronological “drivers” shaping commonwealth naval development since independence, with our respective relationships to the US Navy. The naval superpower is considered one of the fundamental drivers that have shaped each of us, but again in different ways.

As should be expected in developing the theme of comparative Commonwealth naval development, the conference attracted internationally recognized scholars and seasoned naval professionals from Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States. Rear-Admiral James Goldrick of the Royal Australian Navy delivered the keynote address, “From Fleets to Navies: The Evolution of Dominion Fleets into Independent Services.” The remaining papers were divided into two broad categories: (1) survey approaches to the histories of various navies (in addition to the AUSCANUK “Big Three,” there were presentations on the histories of the navies of India, New Zealand and Singapore, and one on South Africa is expected for the proceedings); and (2) naval developments regionally.

The latter category was subdivided into three regions: the Western Hemisphere, with a focus on the changing Canada-US relationship over the century; the North Atlantic, focusing on Britain and the shifting European dynamic over the 20th century, including the world wars and NATO; and finally Indo-Pacific, again focusing on the two world wars, the Cold War, as well as current and future dynamics.

The last formal session addressed the development of a new strategy for the Canadian Navy into the 21st century. Further distinguishing this conference was a follow-up round table involving the speakers, chairs and the Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden. They addressed the question, “so what does it all mean?” and explored the implications for future cooperation in matters of force development and employment.

Partnerships were critical to the success of the conference. Coordinating this event in tandem with the Canadian War Museum offered not only the superb facilities of the Barney Danson Theatre and the LeBreton Gallery, but had many administrative benefits. Lockheed Martin Canada and the Friends of the Canadian War Museum provided very generous financial assistance, and volunteers from the Naval Officers Association Canada (Ottawa Branch) ensured sufficient hands to fulfil and surpass our expectation for this conference. ©



Celebrating Canada's Naval Aviation Heritage

by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson



Sea Fire landing on HMCS Magnificent during flying trials, 23 March 1946.

DND photo.

Throughout 2010, as part of the 100th Anniversary of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadians from coast to coast will be treated to a remarkable sight in our skies: a World War II era Corsair aircraft. Aptly named “Gray Ghost,” it is a meticulously restored version of the aircraft flown by Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray on the fateful day in August 1945 when he was killed during an attack on an enemy destroyer in Japanese home waters. For his courage in that operation, “Hammy” Gray was awarded the Victoria Cross, the last Canadian to have received that pre-eminent decoration.

Gray Ghost, bedecked in the sea-blue colour of the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm, in which many Canadians served during World War II, was rebuilt for Michael Potter’s Vintage Wings of Canada aircraft collection in Gatineau, Quebec, across the river from Ottawa. Throughout 2010, the Corsair will traverse the country to remind Canadians that naval aviation is an integral component of the Royal Canadian Navy’s Centennial celebration.

Often overshadowed by accounts of other RCN operations over the years, the aviation element of the story

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989. An Air Force fighter pilot, his first military flight was in an RCN Harvard in November 1952, while a cadet at Royal Roads Military College. General (Ret'd) Manson is a former President of the CDA Institute.

is nevertheless a fascinating one and a matter of justifiable pride to all who served in the Senior Service. Although this brilliant chapter in our military history came to an end with the unification of the three Services in 1968, the naval aviation legacy lives on.

It’s a tradition whose roots go back to the First World War. In that conflict, many Canadians joined Britain’s Royal Naval Air Service and served with distinction. As the war progressed, the U-boat threat to Allied shipping became so severe that on September 5, 1918, a Canadian Order-in-Council was issued establishing the Royal Canadian Naval Air Service (RCNAS). By December of that year, however, the armistice had intervened and the organization was disbanded.

The interwar period saw little advancement in naval aviation in this country. Worthy of note, however, was the postwar gift to Canada by the United States of HS2L flying boats. These operated out of Eastern Passage, N.S., helping to keep alive the maritime dimension in military flying at a time when air power in general was of scant concern to successive Canadian governments and the general public.

By the end of the 1930s the ominous threat of a new world war stimulated a renewed interest in military aviation, including naval aviation. Increasingly, it became clear just how far our air capability lagged behind that of potential enemies. This was manifestly evident following the outbreak of war when, once again, the U-boat menace began to take a devastating toll on Allied shipping.

In 1942, the British and Canadian Governments became painfully aware of the urgent need to develop adequate naval air coverage to counter the threat of U-boats in the mid-Atlantic. Consequently, in October 1943, the Canadian Cabinet War Committee approved the reformation of the RCNAS. By February 1944, RCN personnel were manning two Royal Navy aircraft carriers, *HMS Nabob* and *HMS Puncher*, with many Canadians serving in Royal Navy air squadrons as aircrew and aircraft technicians. Experience levels of RCN personnel in seaborne air operations continued to grow to the point where in May 1945, the Canadian Cabinet War Committee established an RCN force plan for the Pacific Theatre that included two Light Fleet Class carriers, two Naval Air Stations and ten Naval Air Squadrons, totaling nearly 2,000 Naval Aviation personnel.

Despite the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the continued requirement for a Canadian Naval Air Branch was underscored by the fact that experienced RCN personnel had adapted well to the special requirements of carrier operations and were ready to operate as Canadian units. In December 1945, the Canadian Cabinet approved the post-

war permanent RCN Air Branch. Although small, the aviation component of the RCN evolved into a force whose competence was second to none in the Western World in the face of the emerging Soviet threat.

The first RCN carrier, *HMCS Warrior*, was commissioned January, 24 1946. Its two squadrons, 803 (Seafire) and 825 (Firefly), both originally with the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm, became the first official Canadian Naval Air Squadrons. They embarked on *HMCS Warrior* for training, operations and transport to RCAF Station, Dartmouth, N.S., arriving on March, 31 1946. On December 1, 1948, RCAF Station Dartmouth became officially known as RCN Air Station Dartmouth and was simultaneously commissioned as *HMCS Shearwater*. Thus began the formation of a distinct, totally Canadian, Naval Air Service.

By 1948 *Warrior* was returned to the Royal Navy in exchange for *HMCS Magnificent*. "Maggie" would serve with the RCN until June 1957, during which time she would become the focal point for further advancements in aircraft maintenance and operations in the tough North Atlantic environment.

Naval Air Squadrons, including Air Reserve Units, increased in number as the RCN was expanded to meet Canada's commitments to NATO during the early to mid 1950s, including anti-submarine warfare, combat air patrol, air support of land forces as well as search and rescue operations. Increasingly during this period, the RCN Air Branch worked closely with the United States Navy. Squadrons were outfitted with Grumman Avengers and Hawker Sea Fury fighters. Three small Bell helicopters were brought into service in September 1951, precursors of what was to become a major part of naval aviation in Canada, namely shipborne helicopter operations.

The heyday of Canadian Naval Aviation came with the commissioning of the carrier *HMCS Bonaventure*, on January, 17 1957. This new carrier, fitted with an angled flight deck, mirror landing sight, the latest steam catapult technology and a carrier approach radar, provided Canada with its first all-weather, day-night capability, with Banshee jet fighters and the modern Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Tracker aircraft operating from its deck. With the retirement of the Banshee fighter in 1962 and the introduction of the Sikorsky Sea King ASW helicopter, "Bonnie" became a dedicated ASW carrier. New Canadian destroyer escorts, which were built or converted to enable the large Sea King helicopters to operate from their decks, added a third dimension to the team which became renowned in the world of ASW. Of particular note during this golden era was the fact that the Navy led the world in the operation of helicopters from small decks and in the development of the "Beartrap" helicopter haul-down system, permitting day/night operations when helicopters from other navies were often deck-bound.

And then came unification, with the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act on February 1, 1968. The Navy was hit particularly hard by this major and radical restructuring of the Canadian military, and its aviation component was no exception. Within months, *HMCS Bonaventure* was paid off, bringing to an end the relatively short but glorious era



HMCS Bonaventure flying trials, 7 April, 1957. Banshee jet coming in for a landing. On the right are the lights which shine into the mirror to guide the jet onto the deck.

DND photo

of Canadian aircraft carrier operations in support of NATO, NORAD and domestic interests.

Of course, the Navy's hard-won aviation skills were carried through into the new era, under the rubric of "Maritime Aviation", which brought together all naval and light blue sea-related aviation resources into what became the Canadian Forces Air Command in 1975. It was a radical experiment and a difficult transition, especially for those individuals and units that had served so proudly in the RCN. Because Air Command was *de facto* a reborn air force, former naval persons were in a sense having to transfer their loyalty to another service. It was perhaps in the case of the helicopter detachments aboard destroyers and frigates that this situation called for the most delicate consideration, for it was here that members of the two former services came into particularly close contact with lots of potential for friction. Putting Air Force personnel on Navy ships was a test of accommodation on both sides. Greatly to their credit, they made the new system work. Within a remarkably short period the integration of helicopter detachments aboard ships was functioning well. Aircrew and ground crew personnel, regardless of previous service affiliation, were proud to be part of the ship's crew, and teamwork became the watchword.

Thus ended a truly remarkable era in our nation's military history, and it is well that in this Centennial Year Canadians recognize naval aviation as a proud part of the Royal Canadian Navy's rich legacy to the modern Canadian Forces, and to the nation itself.

When you see the Gray Ghost Corsair flying by as part of the RCN 100th Anniversary celebration, give a thought to the members of the Canada's Naval Aviation community who, over the years, served with skill, distinction, dedication and courage. It is a part of our military heritage that needs to be remembered and honoured. ©



The Not Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty Reviewed: The Barn Doors Close After the Horses Have Bolted

by Colonel (Ret'd) Andrew Nellestyn

"I believe that the moment is near when by a procedure of active paranoiac thought, it will be possible to systematize confusion and contribute to the total discrediting of the world of reality." - Salvador Dali

Can it be reasonably, responsibly, and accountably posited that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by states should be allowed to proceed with safeguards, that the world would be no less safe from the destructive scourge of nuclear weapons, that much diplomatic capital has been squandered to the detriment of solving other pressing immediate and longer term challenges, and that promising and progressive opportunities for lasting peace, prosperity, justice, governance, and human rights could be better advanced and achieved, were legitimate and whole-of-governance nation states to acquire or have the capability to avail themselves of nuclear weapons? It is argued that the timing and need for such introspection are indeed propitious and imperative in coping with today's troubled world, particularly in that 2010 marks the five-year interval for the review of the NPT as per Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty. This article, more of an Op-Ed discourse, suggests that the answer is a definitive and critically necessary affirmation.

Much has been said, written, done, un-done, made nonsense of, and nonsense made of, in the quest for the reduction of the world's nuclear arsenals, the total eradication of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their supporting infrastructure; civilian and military. This quest for moral and existential purity of purpose, peace and the psychological comfort thereof, and the avoidance of the apocalyptic nuclear Armageddon, has taken on a Dalian canvas of thought and art; "active paranoiac" herd mentality.

Nuclear disarmament is enshrined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) which came into force March 5, 1970 as an international instrument to bind all nations not to use the destructive power of atomic bombs as a means to wage war and avoid the barbaric loss of life as witnessed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945.

To date 189 nations including the P5, Permanent

Members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) have signed the Treaty. Four states have not signed; India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. These states either have nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan), are nuclear capable (North Korea), or practise a policy of ambiguity or opacity (Israel), that is, are likely nuclear weapon states but deny and/or are silent as to possession or capability. Although not language or specific thematics of the Treaty, the broader NPT concept and its collateral and complementary initiatives and institutions (e.g. the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA) are based on balancing three pillars; non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, to wit, the Atoms for Peace program enunciated by the late President of the US, Dwight Eisenhower.

The NPT even has its own leitmotif, logo and motto, that being the Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS). It is a clock face on which the proximity of the minute hand to midnight signals the possibility of recourse to nuclear war; the closer the minute hand to midnight, the closer to nuclear holocaust is the world. Since its inception in 1947 when the Doomsday Clock was set at seven minutes to midnight to mark the era of the Cold War, the clock has been as dangerously close as two minutes to midnight (1953 the testing of a thermonuclear bomb by both the then Soviet Union and the US) and as optimistically afar as seventeen minutes off midnight (1991 the US/Russia signing of START - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). It has been adjusted 19 times since 1947.

As of January 14, 2010, the clock stands at six minutes to midnight. The March 27, 2010 announcement of the US - Obama/Russian - Medvedev agreement to reduce their respective nuclear stockpiles by thirty per cent, which will replace START subject to the agreement of each country's legislative bodies, has not been factored as of this writing. President Obama hails this agreement as the "start" of the ultimate eradication of all nuclear weapons. Reaction has been sceptical. The clock is unlikely to move significantly. It is noted that since 2007 the Doomsday Clock reflects not only the threat of global nuclear war but also incorporates climate change technologies as well as developments in life sciences and nanotechnologies which may inflict irrevocable

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harm. Cybernetics may well be added to the list of BAS global threats. Does the inclusion of climate change, life sciences, nanotechnology, and, per chance, cybernetics signal a lessened concern relating to nuclear proliferation or just make it more difficult to measure the impact of each of the BAS' constituent threat profiles?

So what of the case for the arrest, containment, reduction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, for that matter, dual-use nuclear technologies? This is not a rhetorical question of intellectual curiosity or one exclusively the domain of strategists be they members of think-tanks, universities, international institutions, governments, the military or terrorist groups. Recall that 2010 is the 5-year review of the NPT. The answers and the decisions taken by the NPT community as well as the non and anti NPT community will have immediate and lasting consequences for world peace, security, prosperity, human rights, safety, and survival.

These are issues which are being debated in world capitals, financial centres, corporate boardrooms, commodity centres of abundance and influence, offices of international institutions, headquarters of national and alliance military forces. The discussions/debates must look beyond the traditional agendas and issues embraced in former reviews; a good number of which contributed little to further the objectives of the NPT, indeed, some were in reality retrograde steps. To wit, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), at the behest of the US, agreed to the supply of nuclear materials to and acquisition of nuclear technologies by India which is not a signatory to the NPT and therefore prohibited from access to assistance of any form by the NSG.

Do sanctions really work? Russia, which has warmed to supporting sanctions against Iran for not heeding, for example, UN calls for full and unconditional IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, has stated in most strong language that it will continue to partner with Iran in developing Iran's commercial nuclear power program. North Korea continues to defy international warnings and sanctions as it marches towards nuclear weapon status. The 4S strategy (speaking, sweeteners, sanctions, and soldiers) employed to date is of no avail, does not resonate, and stalls the process whilst proliferators continue to progress toward nuclear weapon capability.

Let's face these incontrovertible facts and accept that:

- The nuclear genie is out of the bottle, cannot be put back in, and the bottle remain forever stoppered.
- Nuclear weapons have and will continue to have utility well into the future.
- The NSG has abandoned its NPT obligations to control the access to nuclear material and technology and has failed to deny these to those nations not signatories to the NPT; all in the interest of political and economic expediency and interest of its members.
- The possession of nuclear weapons and their

perceived influence and utility in exercising, projecting, and leveraging power begets a desire by neighbouring regional states (China/India, India/Pakistan, Iran/Israel, North Korea/China, etc.) to possess a nuclear weapon capability.

- Sanctions work but selectively and are subject to economic, political, and military objectives, in other words, sanctions do not work.
- Recourse to military force in the destruction of nuclear weapon facilities will of itself beget Armageddon.
- The NPT may well be dead and unresponsive to resuscitation. The NPT regime's final nail in its coffin is disturbingly near at hand.

So now what?

A new paradigm is thus called for in the matter of the arrest and reversal of nuclear non-proliferation and its coterie of weapons and technologies; one that departs dramatically from the NPT's founding principles. The following are some considerations to ponder. And yes they may seem heretical, immoral, barbarian, traitorous, mad, unrealistic, and irresponsible. Again that R word about which Dali philosophized as have many others. Should we put ourselves in their company and be truthful and courageous in admitting:

"An error does not become truth by reason of multiplied propagation, nor does truth become error because nobody sees it."...Mahatma Gandhi

Truth and reality are interchangeable words. Words are concepts; akin to principles and philosophical introspection.

Some guiding words on the NPT; morsels to chew upon and savour. Those which are distasteful and lead to indigestion can readily be spat out.

- Accept nuclear proliferation. No state is suicidal. Not even the Iran's Council of Guardians, Ahmadinejad, or Kim Sung IL.
- Too much diplomatic coin is being squandered on Iran, North Korea, etc., which can be directed more fruitfully towards other immediate and critical national and global issues.
- A MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) concept adopted on a global community basis, not the bi-polar (US/Soviet) model of the Cold War era, may well bring about international stability and order or at least level the "power" playing field.
- The fear of nuclear terrorism particularly as related to nuclear weapons is grossly exaggerated. The knowledge and infrastructure required for rogue nuclear weapon threats and use, including delivery, are not easily and readily obtained. There is no Internet or library handyman's atom bomb builder's guide for dummies. The probability of detection

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2010 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the CDA Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include:

The Rt. Hon Joe Clark, General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Rt. Hon. Brian Dickson, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Hon. Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Hon. John Fraser, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Mr. G. Hamilton Southam, Brigadier-General David Fraser, General Raymond R. Henault, General Rick Hillier, and Warrant Officer William MacDonald.

Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2010, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 19 November 2010, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2010.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la CAD dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué(e) par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le très hon. Joe Clark, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis M. Jack Granatstein, le Très hon. Brian Dickson, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'hon. Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'hon. John Fraser, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault, le Général Rick Hillier, et l'Adjudant William MacDonald.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les

nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2010, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION
HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE
LA DÉFENSE
222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 19 novembre 2010, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

(intelligence and detection/surveillance technology for radiological weapons is high.

- Radiological threats are more likely but still in the realm of improbable to execute.

In conclusion, a new paradigm is needed to manage nuclear weapons; a problem which has been made intractable by state actors' attachment to an unrealistic scenario in the form of the NPT.

Suggested Reading:

Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, Mitchell B. Reiss, Eds.: *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Consider Their Nuclear Choices*. Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Henry Soholski, Patrick Clawson: *Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran*, Strategic Institute, US Army War College, 2005.

Michael J. Mazan, Ed.: *Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals*, St Martins Press, NY, 1997.

William Langewiesche: *The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking*, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, NY, 2007.

Nuclear Forensics: A Weighty Matter, *The Economist*, February 27, 2010, p 87.

William Langewiesche: How to Get a Nuclear Bomb, *The Atlantic Online*, December 2006, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200612/langewiesche-nukes>.

Brad Norington: US Nuke Cuts are Mainly Symbolic, *The Australian*, March 29, 2010, 12:00AM.

David E. Sanger: *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, Harmony Books, NY, 2009. ©



Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations: The Historical Success of Rural Insurgencies

by Eric Jardine

History has clearly demonstrated that the control of urban areas is politically insufficient to bring about an end to an insurgency, while such efforts remain extraordinarily costly for a counterinsurgency. Despite this historical trend, Canada and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have decided to ignore this evidence and bear this cost in their new operational plans for Afghanistan.

The conduct of counterinsurgency is, fundamentally, about the allegiance and political proclivities of the local population, and victory ultimately depends upon the active and passive support of the people. As Lieutenant Colonel David Galula writes, "If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its *active support*, he will win the war."¹ Put more simply, the political allegiance of the local population is the primary objective of this type of war.

Canada's campaign in Afghanistan has increasingly come to reflect this basic principle of counterinsurgency practice.

Eric Jardine is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and the Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University. His Doctoral research focuses upon the conduct and the resolution of counterinsurgencies, with a particular focus on Algeria, Indo-China and Vietnam, Malaya, and Afghanistan.

In its most recent manifestation, Canada has structured its operational plans along population-centric lines. Operation Kantolo, as Canada's operational plan is called, emphasizes the entrenchment of our counterinsurgency forces into the area around Kandahar City for the purpose of protecting the population of urban centres. It has, therefore, an irrefutable urban bias; one which has also been incorporated into ISAF's operational strategy more generally.² And while Operation Kantolo provides the greatest per square kilometre access to the local population – an estimated 75 percent of the population of Kandahar province lives in that area³ – it also provides the insurgency with a potential source of benefit that can be exploited to the detriment of Canada, ISAF, and the Afghan people.

The History of Successful Rural Insurgencies

A history of the major insurgencies throughout the 20th century bears out the prospective danger of an urban bias in counterinsurgency efforts in the sense that all most all successful rebellions have been rurally based. For instance, China's rebellion against the Kuomintang suffered innumerable hardships when, in the early years of the insurrection, it focused upon urban areas, but it resulted in startling successes when its focus later became

THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2010 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, and Brian Stewart.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2010, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 19 November 2010, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held at the the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.

PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2010.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, et Brian Stewart.

Toute personne peut nommer un (une) journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux lettres du soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les

raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des travaux du journaliste. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2010, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
222, RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 19 novembre 2010, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour plus d'informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.



rural. The root of the Vietcong's successful action against the United States, too, was rurally based—although the crystallizing psychological effects of the Tet Offensive cannot be overlooked. And, more ominous still, the Mujahedeen's victorious insurgency against the Soviet Union was based predominantly, as is the current Taliban action, on rural agitation.

In each of these ultimately successful insurgencies, the counterinsurgency was able to retain a high degree of control in urban areas. But, in each case, this mattered little to the final course of the war, which was marked by failure. The reason for this conundrum is simple. No urban area is self-sufficient in material and economic terms and, as an ultimate extension of this fact, *the control of urban areas is necessary but not politically sufficient to cause the end of an insurgency.*

T.E. Lawrence, who fought alongside Arab insurgents against the Turkish counterinsurgents during the course of the Great War, perhaps best presented the core dangers for counterinsurgents that retain cities at the expense of the remainder of the country:

We [the insurgents] must not take Medina [a major city in Saudi Arabia]. The Turk [the counterinsurgent] was harmless there. ...We wanted him to stay at Medina, and every other distant place, in the largest numbers. Our ideal was to keep his railway working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort. The factor of food would confine him to the railways, but he was welcome to [them] for the duration of the war, so long as he gave us the other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the Arab world.⁴

Lawrence illustrates several issues that recur across numerous instances of insurgency. By biasing operational plans towards urban areas, the counterinsurgency cedes the remainder of the country's territory to the guerrillas, who can then conduct extensive military operations that will favour their mobility, local knowledge, and fluidity. In an effort to control the most extensively populated areas at the lowest cost and effort, the counterinsurgency also comes to ignore the majority of the population as a whole. In Afghanistan, for instance, while the greatest concentration of the local people resides in urban centers, some 76 percent of the total population lives in rural areas. The urban focus of ISAF's counterinsurgency operational plans, therefore, abandons this mass of people to the insurgency's political influence.

This process of urban bias, which aids guerrilla warfare and abandons the majority of the population, is highly reminiscent of the Japanese military actions in China. As Mao stated in his lectures *On Protracted War*: "The enemy [the counterinsurgents] *can actually hold only the big cities, ... which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will be taken up*

by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere."⁵

A second category of issues that follows from Lawrence's observation is that all urban areas are tied to rural resources and to the lines of transportation that trace through the greater expanse of the countryside. When an insurgency controls the countryside, it controls those resources and vital arteries of urban life. ISAF certainly has the capacity to supply the major urban centers should the insurgency increase its efforts to close the roadways and the waterway of Amu Darya, but this is of little political consequence given that, ultimately, such extraordinarily costly measures will not be sustained indefinitely. This vulnerability of Afghanistan's urban areas has been well noted in past insurgent campaigns. As Brigadier Yousaf, the Afghan Service Bureau Chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), noted of his direction of Mujahedeen forces: "I knew my enemy's [the Soviet's] sensitive spots—Salang highway, aircraft on the ground, the power supply, the dams, the bridges, the pipelines ... and, at the center of them all, Kabul. ... There was a concerted effort on my part to coordinate attacks aimed at cutting off Kabul from supplies or facilities coming from outside the city. This involved ambushes on convoys on roads leading to Kabul, the mining of dams that provided its water, or cutting its power lines."⁶

By biasing operational plans towards urban areas, the counterinsurgency cedes the remainder of the country's territory to the guerrillas...

The cost of ISAF and UN support for the urban population in Afghanistan is well illustrated through an analysis of aid flows and domestic economic figures. In aggregate terms, over 35 billion U.S. dollars of aid has been dispensed in Afghanistan since 2001.⁷ This is an enormous sum that does not capture the costs of military operations and civil programs. Despite this high cost, macroeconomic data depicts a dismal picture—one that likely drives many Afghans towards violence out of desperation and limited opportunity. In 2003, over 53 percent of Afghans lived below the poverty line, a figure that has not improved despite substantial international efforts. Unemployment has stayed roughly constant at 40 percent from 2005 to 2008. Yet inflation has risen markedly from an estimated 13 percent in 2007 to over 26.8 percent in 2008, resulting in a steadily degrading standard of living and purchasing power.⁸ The government in Kabul is also insolvent, with an annual expenditure of around 3.3 billion dollars and an average revenue of only 1 billion dollars.

The costs of maintaining the Afghan state are clearly enormous and well beyond the capacity of the government in Kabul. This precarious position is sustainable in the short term due to international efforts, but meaningful macroeconomic development is necessary if the state is ever to stand free of such external support. Moreover, if domestic development is to occur, it will have to include Afghanistan's large agricultural sector, which is, of course, rurally based. Agricultural output

represents roughly 31% of the country's domestic GDP (excluding the 600-700 million dollars per annum that is generated by the opium trade) and employs an estimated 78.6 percent of the workforce. The cities of Afghanistan cannot sustain the government, nor can they adequately feed or clothe the population that resides within them. Canada's emphasis on urban centers is therefore unsustainable in material terms and, it follows, that the current operational program will not produce victory. Because urban areas are ultimately dependent upon rural resources, functional political power rests with the population of the rural area. In the end, he who controls the countryside, controls the state.

Conclusion

The control of the rural areas is essential for the successful conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. For the counterinsurgency, the control of urban areas is necessary, but not politically sufficient, to bring an end to an insurgency. Rurally based insurgencies have, in historical terms, been the most successful variant; even obtaining victories over both of the superpowers. While an insurgency

cannot win without eventually assuming control of urban areas, a counterinsurgency that emphasizes the control of cities and towns places itself into a militarily, economically, and politically unsustainable position. From here, victory for the insurgency is merely a matter of time, patience, and incessant guerrilla activity.

When the role of rural areas in Afghanistan is distilled, a permissive environment for guerrilla activity, the opium trade, rural farmers, and open logistical and transport routes are the central issues at hand. Without securing the rural portions of the country, the opium trade – which generates upwards of 700 million dollars per annum – cannot be stopped. Rural farmers, who grow both opium due to its cash value, but also the wheat that sustains the urban population, are invariably left under the insurgent's sway, thus granting the insurgency tremendous political power. Finally, by failing to secure rural areas, logistical lines and transport routes become targetable by insurgent action, particularly by improvised explosive devices. That this is the case ought to be recognized and incorporated into future ISAF operational planning. If it is not, failure will likely follow from the current urban bias in Canada and ISAF's operational plans.

Endnotes

1 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 1964), 4. Emphasis added.

2 “Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan,” *Quarterly Report To Parliament For the Period of July 1 to September 20, 2009*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2009), 8; see also: “Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” *Report to Congress*, (January 2009), 15-17.

3 This figure is available on the Operational Kantolo factsheet available at CEFCOM's website. Available at: <http://www.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/kantolo-eng.asp>

4 T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London: Vintage Books, 2008), 232.

5 Mao Tse-tung, *On Protracted War* (Honolulu: University of the Pacific, 2001), 50. Emphasis added.

6 Mohammad Yousaf, cited in, H. John Poole, *Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Techniques* (Emerald Isle: Posterity Press, 2004), 92-93.

7 See the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, *Donor Financial Review*, Report 1388(November, 2009).

8 These figures are the provided in the CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan. Available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> ©



Israel's Maritime Blockade of Gaza is Lawful

Commander James Kraska, JAGC, USN

On Board the Mavi Marmara

Israel's "Operation Sea Breeze" was the maritime interdiction of the "Freedom Flotilla" that set sail from Turkey in May 2010 bound for the Gaza Strip. The stated intentions of the flotilla were to deliver humanitarian supplies to the beleaguered people of Gaza and also to tangibly break the naval blockade imposed by Israel. A number of nongovernmental groups, led by the controversial Turkish charity İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH), coordinated the flotilla and announced its planned embarkation on 28 April. The largest vessel, the Comoros-flagged passenger ship *Mavi Marmara*, had 561 persons on board, including 67 members of the IHH. In total, the flotilla also included 16 members of parliament and 34 media reporters, underscoring the propaganda or public diplomacy aspect of the voyage.

IHH has a checkered reputation. The group has links with Global Jihad in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya, but has not been designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. Department of State.¹ Israel claimed the right to interdict the "Freedom Flotilla" based upon the law of blockade, which is a part of the law of naval warfare. Commandos boarding the passenger liner were attacked by IHH members using side arms stolen from IDF soldiers. The boarding soldiers were shot at, stabbed at and one was thrown overboard. Israel claims that in self-defence, the IDF commandos opened fire on the attackers. In the melee, nine IHH activists were killed and 34 injured. Seven Israeli soldiers were injured, two of them critically.

Law of Blockade

The law of blockade is included in the Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, which were adopted by the International Law Association at its Taipei Conference on May 20, 1998. U.S. practice on the law of blockade is reflected in a manual published by the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps, the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M).² The Commander's Handbook is a product of the International Law Department at the U.S. Naval War College, where I lead a multi-service effort to revise the document.

A blockade must permit non-belligerent material to flow, but this rule gives rise to inevitable disagreements about

dual use items, which may be used by civilians but also may be "war sustaining." However, the "war sustaining" element is actually quite minimal. Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV, for example, states that blockade must allow "free passage of all consignments of foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity cases," and then only on condition that there be "no reason for fearing ... that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy." There certainly is no right for a blockaded people to insist on luxury goods, spices like cinnamon, let alone construction supplies, such as cement, which could be used to construct bunkers, and steel pipes, which in the past have been used to develop makeshift al-Qassam rocket tubes.³

Vessels attempting to breach a blockade or resist the exercise of a belligerent's right of visit and search are liable to be captured or even sunk.⁴ Thus, a neutral ship has a duty to submit to visit and search, and failure to submit to boarding is an assumption of risk for damage or loss of the ship. Naval forces that are conducting visit and search may use force to compel compliance, including deadly force and the destruction of the vessel.

Although a blockade is declared within a defined area, it may be applied virtually worldwide if a vessel is intent on challenging it. The suggestion that the Israeli interception of the "Freedom Flotilla" in international waters is somehow an illegal act is a spurious and incorrect claim, falling victim to "legal minimalism," as well as conflating the peacetime international law of the sea with the wartime law of armed conflict. Such a claim is legal minimalism in that it so narrowly prescribes the rule against the interests of the belligerent exercising the blockade as to completely undermine the affair.

If a blockading belligerent were forbidden from conducting visit and search in enforcement of a blockade in international waters, then the only place that such activity could occur would be within 12 nautical miles of the shoreline of the enemy—inside the enemy's territorial sea. This would require an impossibly large force lay down to cover a coastline of any size, as well as compel the blockading belligerent to operate exposed in dangerous littoral waters, enforcing a blockade under the nose of visual coastal surveillance and vulnerable to all manner of land-based attack. It is no surprise that these naval operational⁵ aspects of blockade have meant that blockade occurs in international waters rather than the enemy's territorial sea.

Commander James Kraska holds the Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law in the International Law Department, U.S. Naval War College. The views presented are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense.

(continued p. 33)

CALL FOR PAPERS



**Conference of Defence Associations Institute
13th Annual Graduate Student Symposium
“Canada’s Security Interests”**

*Currie Hall, Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario
Thursday and Friday, October 28-29, 2010*

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute will be hosting its 13th annual Graduate Student Symposium, on “Canada’s Security Interests,” on October 28-29, 2010 at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Kingston. The symposium is conducted in collaboration with the Royal Military College of Canada, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Chair of Defence Studies Queen’s University and Queen’s Centre for International Relations, and with the support of Senator Hugh Segal, Dr. John Scott Cowan and the Department of National Defence’s Security and Defence Forum.

Individuals are invited to submit a **one-page (maximum)** proposal to the CDA Institute Project Officer via projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca no later than **Thursday, September 23, 2010**. Please include the title of your presentation, a brief summary/abstract, and your full name, institutional affiliation, program of study, and full contact information (telephone number, email address, and mailing address).

The acceptable range of presentation topics include contemporary and historical analyses of: national security and defence; insurgency and counter-insurgency; conventional warfare; campaign planning; Canadian military campaigns and operations; security and defence alliances, peace enforcement, and peace support operations; conflict resolution; security and defence related economics; intra-state conflict issues; and terrorism and other non-traditional threats to security.

Cash prizes will be awarded to the top three papers. The winning paper will be awarded **\$3,000**, and the second and third place prizes are valued at **\$2,000** and **\$1,000** respectively.

Funding for student presenters may be made available, upon request, to assist with travel costs.

(Please note that Canadian Forces members who receive a full-time salary are not eligible to receive a cash prize. Their work will, however, be recognized, and a non-cash prize will be awarded in lieu.)

Proceedings from previous years’ symposia can be found at the link below:
<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia>

For more information, please contact the CDA Institute’s Project Officer at projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca / (613) 236-9903 or visit our website at <http://cdacdai.ca/cdai/>. The deadline for submissions is **September 23, 2010**.

APPEL DE COMMUNICATIONS



13ième symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés de l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense « Les intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité »

Salle Currie, Collège militaire royal du Canada
Kingston, Ontario
Les jeudi 28 et vendredi 29 octobre 2010

Le 13ième symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, « Les intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité », qui est parrainé par l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (ICAD) en collaboration avec le Collège militaire royal du Canada, l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, la chaire d'Études en gestion de la défense et le Centre de relations internationales, de l'Université Queen's, et avec l'appui du Sénateur Hugh Segal, de M. John Scott Cowan et du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense, du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Les personnes intéressées sont invitées à soumettre leurs projets de communication (**une page au maximum**) à l'ICAD au moyen de projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca **au plus tard le 23 septembre, 2010**. N'oubliez pas d'inclure le titre de la présentation, votre nom complet, l'université et diplôme en cours, et vos coordonnées (numéro de téléphone, adresse courriel, et adresse postal, s.v.p.)

Les exposés acceptables peuvent porter sur les thèmes (dimensions contemporaines et historiques) suivants: la sécurité et la défense nationales; les alliances de sécurité et de défense; les opérations d'imposition de la paix et de maintien de la paix; la résolution des conflits; l'économie liée à la sécurité et la défense; les enjeux des conflits intra-états; et le terrorisme et autres menaces non-traditionnelles constituant une menace à la sécurité.

Les prix seront offerts aux meilleures trois présentations. Un prix de **\$3,000** sera offert à la meilleure présentation. Des prix de **\$2,000** et de **\$1,000** seront offerts aux deuxième et troisième meilleures présentations.


Des fonds pourraient aussi être disponibles pour les frais de déplacements.

(N.B. Les membres plein-temps des FC n'ont pas droit aux prix en argent. Néanmoins, leurs présentations seront reconnus dans l'ordre de mérite.)

Les présentations de l'an dernier sont sur le site web de l'ICAD:
<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/symposia>

Pour plus d'information, veuillez contacter l'agent de projet de l'ICAD, à :
projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca ou au 613-236-9903, ou visiter notre site Web
<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/>. Les personnes intéressées sont invitées à soumettre leurs projets de communication *au plus tard le 23 septembre 2010*.

AGREEMENT ON THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA



The greatest legal wrinkle in the case of “Operation Sea Breeze” is whether the struggle between Israel and Gaza constitutes an “international armed conflict” (IAC) or a “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC). Traditionally, a struggle between two states constitutes IAC, whereas a conflict between a state and non-state entity, such as an insurgency of a terrorist network, constitutes NIAC. The application of the law of blockade in NIAC is less certain, although there is ample precedent for the law of blockade in IAC. Just two examples serve as useful comparables: the American Civil War and the Spanish Civil War.

During the U.S. Civil War, for example, the Union conducted a strangling blockade against the Confederacy. The most ambitious blockade ever undertaken by any nation, it stretched along 3,549 miles of coastline and 180 bays, rivers and harbours, which highlighted the paucity of warships in the Union force.⁵ Confederate commercial ships protested their capture, arguing that that since war can only be conducted between sovereign nations, the Union blockade of the South was unlawful. Initially, European states also questioned the legality of the blockade, echoing the concerns of the Confederacy that Union action was an unlawful impairment of the right of all nations to exercise freedom of the seas. But, slowly, neutral European states began to comply with the terms of the blockade, submitting their merchant ships to inspection by Union naval forces.

In a more contemporary era, the Spanish Nationalists proclaimed a blockade of Republican ports on November, 17 1936. The Nationalists announced that they would attack international shipping bound for these ports. Meanwhile, Stalin was supplying war materiel to the Spanish Republic, and the Soviet merchant freighter Komsomol was the first Soviet ship to transport armoured battle tanks, armoured cars and artillery into the country. Eighty-four Soviet ships were stopped and searched by Spanish Nationalists from October 1936 to April 1937. The Canarias, the flagship of the Nationalist Navy, intercepted and sank the Komsomol on 14 December 1936.⁶ For their part, the Republican forces seized the German vessel Palos, which was bound for Nationalist Spain.

Conclusion

The analogy of the American Civil War and the Spanish Civil War offers a model for addressing the Israeli blockade of Gaza. If Gaza was regarded as a sovereign state, then a state of war—IAC—exists between Israel and Gaza. In such case, blockade is lawful. If Gaza is not a state, then the struggle is best characterized as a NIAC. While blockade originated as a legal concept in IAC, usage, state practice and *opinio juris* have caused it to gravitate into NIAC. It is no longer the case that the application of the law of blockade and other rules of warfare are restricted to conflicts in which both parties are states.

(Endnotes)

1 In a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, however, the Anti-Defamation League of the United States requested that IHH and another group of “Freedom Flotilla” organizers and funders, Union of Good, be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See, Robert G. Sugarman and Abraham H. Foxman letter to the Hon. Hillary R. Clinton, 8 June 2010, available at http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Letter_flotillaorganizers.asp.

2 Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, 208 Consol. T.S. 338 (1909), available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instatee/1909b.htm>.


3 Qassam rockets are 90-115 mm with a range of 6-12 km. See, Rocket threat from the Gaza Strip, 2000-2007, at p. 11 (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), December 2007), available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/rocket_threat_e.pdf.

4 Art. 20, London Declaration.

5 To make matters worse, nearly one-quarter of U.S. naval officers resigned their commissions and offered their services to the Confederacy. Civil War Desk Reference 547 (Margaret E. Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher and Paul Finkelman, eds, 2002).

6 Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* 432 and 555 (2001). ©

Literature Review



Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Dean Black

Curtis Lemay was a hero to many and a villain to many others. To help better understand this controversial figure in American history, there are three relatively recent books that deal with the man some believed to be devoid of charisma. Lemay was considered a hero for his life-long intolerance of failure, while others vilified him for his blunt military methods in peacetime and at war.

Barrett Tillman, author of *Lemay, Lessons in Leadership* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), is a best-selling, award-winning journalist with some 30 non-fiction and ten fiction books to his credit. He is a trained pilot and aviation enthusiast. Among Lemay's creditable conduct, Tillman tells us that the commander of the world's most powerful air force in war-time set a worthy example. In his leadership profile of Lemay, Tillman credits Lemay's mastery of flying, navigating and bomb-aiming. He also explains that Lemay led by example and was noted for his accountability. So great was his influence, Tillman suggests, that four successive commanders of the air force came from the ranks of Strategic Air Command (SAC), the organization shaped largely by Lemay. But on one matter it would appear Tillman agrees with another Lemay expert, James Carroll: Curtis Emerson Lemay believed the air force and all its destructive power were his and his alone to wield against the enemy. Lemay, it would seem, had little understanding of the importance of civil control of military forces in a democracy.

I was ten years' old when my mother decided it would be good for her three children to witness a piece of history and stand on Pennsylvania Avenue for a few hours waiting for Richard Nixon's inauguration cavalcade to pass by. The security guard outside Blair House—at the time a VIP residence across the street from the White House—felt sorry for us. It was one of the most miserable Januaries on record, in Washington, D.C., so he gave up his one-man sentry post for us. Despite the cramped quarters, the space heater was a

blessing. James Carroll, author of *House of War: the Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006) was somewhere nearby, according to his narrative.

His account of the American military machine, and his views on Curtis Lemay, is a remarkable tale. "Lemay," Carroll tells us, "was another commander who operated with little regard for the authority of his civilian superiors." Beginning in 1951, Lemay apparently had refused to submit the "Basic War Plan" to any authority outside SAC. Eisenhower had tried unsuccessfully to wrest control of nuclear planning away from SAC, something one would think belongs to the President of the United States of America. Lemay's subsequent confrontations with Kennedy seem even more remarkable, if not disturbing. Carroll recalls that the *Chicago Tribune* revealed Lemay wanted a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Laos. It would seem Lemay's heavy-handedness exemplified in the burning of Tokyo, had continued into the 1960s. However, Kennedy favoured diplomacy, choosing to ignore Lemay. Kennedy remarked that if he ever chose to follow Lemay's advice, "no one would be alive later to tell [the General] he was wrong."

Warren Kozak, author of *Lemay: the Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay* (Regnery Publishing, 2009) deals directly with the hero versus villain question. One better understands Lemay and his seeming disdain for authority, after learning that at the tender age of eight he assumed responsibilities his own father had shirked. Growing up came early to Lemay; a resultant life-long distrust for authority figures might explain why he had difficulties in Washington. Politics were simply not Lemay's forte, and the debacle over his decision to act as George Wallace's running mate in the 1968 contest for the office of President makes this point. Barrett Tillman describes Lemay's decision to enter politics as "brutally honest," but the decision seems more brutally deceptive.

Carroll appears to agree, and he benefited from a unique vantage point. His father was one of the most senior Pentagon officials for more than twenty years. As a youngster, Carroll would accompany his father on weekends, playing in the cavernous hallways while his father toiled away. That

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proximity, and a budding fascination for history, enabled Carroll to produce his National Book Award winning story of the rise of American power manifest in a building known as the Pentagon.


Regardless of conflicting conclusions, Lemay was the kind of man his country needed during the Second World War. Robert Macnamara, Secretary of Defense for both Kennedy and Johnson during Lemay's command of the US Air Force, said that while stubborn, he was also determined and patriotic. Lemay was flexible, abandoning precision bombing doctrine that worked effectively in the European theatre, in favour of a different winning strategy in the Pacific theatre. Above all, Lemay was relentless in his pursuit of victory, and this determination underpinned his advice to Macnamara to

pursue a larger bombing effort in Vietnam. The sooner he could end the war—any war—the more young lives he might be able to save.

Little else motivated him, but perhaps his time had come and gone. In *The Icarus Syndrome*, author Carl H. Builder reflected on how the US Air Force had lost its way. He described the era in which air power theory had reached its zenith as “a temporary conjunction of [three things:] world politics, technology, and Lemay as one of air power's most able operators. Thereafter, air power would subside.” We can only hope that should we find ourselves in another momentous conflict, such as those at the heart of all three books reviewed here, that men like Lemay will again step forward and perform their duties with courage and tenacity.

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Book Review



Sunray: The Death and Life of Captain Nichola Goddard

by Valerie Fortney

Reviewed by Natalie Ratcliffe

Fortney, Valerie. *Sunray: The Death and Life of Captain Nichola Goddard*. Toronto: Key Porters Books, September 7, 2010, 312 pages. \$32.95.

Sunray: The Death and Life of Captain Nichola Goddard written by Valerie Fortney is an intimate look into the life of an esteemed Canadian soldier. A member of the First Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Captain Goddard was the 16th Canadian to die in Afghanistan and the first Canadian female to die in combat. Fortney chronicles the truly unique path that led Captain Goddard to Afghanistan and the ultimate sacrifice she made in its defence. Yet, this biography transcends the death of a rising star within the Canadian Forces (CF). It is a story about a remarkable individual whose unorthodox life, coupled with an extrovert personality, made her a natural born leader, instilled with the powerful yet nuanced understanding that “confidence does not equal carelessness.”

Captain Goddard, known to friends and family as “Nich or Nichola, never Nicky,” exercised that confidence

in every facet of her life: growing up in remote places and always being the new kid, to making the spirited decision to attend the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), and to leading her Forward Observation Officer (FOO) party in the heat of battle.

Sunray is a moving account of a life too short lived, but also a window through which civilians can better understand the trials and tribulations, as well as the strength, honour and comradeship that accompany military life. Fortney had unprecedented access to Captain Goddard's family, friends and personal correspondence. The generous and candid accounts from her loved ones fill in the contours of Captain Goddard's personality and provide insight into her decision making and leadership style. Equipped with this first hand material and a journalist's eye for detail, Fortney posthumously acquaints her readers with Captain Goddard, her loving husband Jay Beam, her family and her many friends from across Canada and the world.

Born to “hippie-loving” parents, Sally and Tim Goddard, Nichola grew up as a native of Papa New Guinea.

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She lived as a Trobriand Island child, learning two of its languages and many of its customs by the age of three, when her parents moved to Canada. Always a champion for the underprivileged, Sally and Tim viewed education as the key to development. This belief compelled them to accept postings to remote reserves in northern Saskatchewan and Baffin Island before settling in Antigonish, Nova Scotia. Throughout, Nichola maintained her sunny disposition and charismatic personality, forging friendships from coast to coast.

Nichola's decision to attend RMC in Kingston, Ontario after high school shocked everyone close to her. Knowing their daughter's steadfastness, neither of Nichola's parents tried to dissuade her. A natural athleticism, a sense of pragmatism and a need to constantly challenge herself convinced Nichola that RMC was the right decision. She would later recall that pursuing a military career and an Honours in English were "two very uninformed decisions," but "[f]ortunately, I ended up loving both choices."

Nichola's story is also a vehicle through which Fortney examines the daily and abstract issues that pervade military life. She explores the rift that can develop between young officer cadets and their civilian friends as they undergo demanding and rigorous training. Her description of Nichola's daily routine while attending RMC provides the readers a glimpse of what it takes to become a Canadian officer, which helps to cultivate a respect for the institution and its members.

Throughout, Fortney eloquently threads a larger commentary about the transformation of the CF following the attacks on 9/11. That fateful day accelerated a trend already underway in Canada's military, veering away from a focus on Pearsonian style peacekeeping towards a combat ready capacity. According to Fortney, this is a shift that the Canadian public has been slow to adapt to. Captain Goddard enlisted in the Forces as this change was being realized.

At the same time, RMC was undergoing transformations with Dr. John Scott Cowan at the helm. The then RMC principal was a contributor to the 1998 Ramsay Whithers' Report and a firm believer that the liberal arts, in tandem with a technical education, were essential in fashioning effective leaders. As a result of this landmark decision, Nichola was supported on her path to becoming a "warrior poet." Her physical and mental stamina was buttressed by a fierce intellect and unwavering moral compass. She often told her father, an advocate for aid and education as the means to development that, "I do what I do, so you can do what you do."

And Nichola was very good at what she did. She consistently impressed her superiors both in Shilo, Manitoba and later as the Commander of a FOO party in Afghanistan. Captain Goddard regularly operated outside the wire in Kandahar and was an early practitioner of counterinsurgency tactics. She and her crew would spend weeks stationed at Forward Operating Bases, often in a state of lull punctuated by violent encounters with Taliban insurgents. Protective of her troops and non-combatants, Captain Goddard constantly worried about their safety, even at the expense of her own. These leadership qualities instilled a sense of confidence in those that she commanded as well as her superiors. Through Nichola's experience at Kandahar Air Field and her nights camped out under an open sky surrounded by a disarmingly serene and understated natural beauty, the reader is introduced to the Canadian experience in southern Afghanistan. Fortney should be commended for her efforts to make the CF, and its honourable work, more accessible to the average reader.

The theme of 'firsts' is innovatively woven throughout the biography. Under Captain Goddard's direction, her FOO party called in the first artillery fire against enemy combatants since the Korean War, an historic moment. Tragically, Captain Goddard was also the first Canadian female soldier to die in combat. Hours after a successful battle with insurgents, Captain Goddard's LAV was rocked by three rocket propelled grenades. Fortney opens her book with this scene, emphasizing that a soldier's legacy is too often recognized in the hour of their death. In the end, it is not just Nichola's sacrifice that makes her story so important. Fortney masterfully captures Nichola's legacy by delving into a very personal account of her life and her profession, although the reader comes to appreciate that a soldier can hardly separate the two. As Nichola acknowledged on her tour of duty, "I am probably a lifer now."

Captain Goddard was loath to be identified as a woman before a soldier. She was a soldier first, but she was also a woman forging a career in a hitherto male dominated profession. Throughout, Captain Goddard consistently breached the gender barrier, not because she was an outspoken feminist, but because she executed her job with professionalism and competence. If Nichola Goddard would have been uneasy with the way in which her life has been committed to paper, one gets the sense that Fortney's respectful and masterful handling of the story would help ease those reservations. It is undeniable that Captain Goddard has become a critical part of Canada's military history and an example for all members of the CF and Canadians everywhere.

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