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# ON TRACK

Indépendant et Informé



The Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense

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Volume 15, Number 3



**Today's Canadian Soldier and the Mission in Afghanistan**

**More Boots on Deck, on the Tarmac and on the Ground: 70,000  
Target Fails the Test**

**Helping Afghans Secure a Brighter Future**

**Pakistan's Sponsorship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan**

**The Profession of Diplomacy**



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COVER PHOTO: 10 August 2010 - Panjwa'i District, Kandahar, Afghanistan. Corporal Matt Jenkins mans the radio while a compound is being searched. DND Photo by: Sergeant Daren Kraus, Image Tech, TFK Afghanistan, Roto 9. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le 10 août 2010 - District de Panjwa'i, à Kandahar (Afghanistan). Le Caporal Matt Jenkins parle à la radio pendant la fouille d'un site. Photo MDN : Sergent Daren Kraus, Tech Imagerie, ROTO 9, FO Kaboul (Afghanistan).

## From the Executive Director

## Mot du Directeur exécutif

*ON TRACK*, now in its fourteenth year, has become more widely read with each succeeding edition. We attribute *ON TRACK*'s increasing readership to the excellent quality of the material that is provided by members of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and by members of the Canadian Forces, academics and researchers who are the acknowledged experts in their respective fields.

The intent of *ON TRACK* is to provide a medium of informed and *non-partisan* debate on defence and security matters of importance to the interests of Canada. We will continue to publish credible, informed research as well as opinion which we believe will provide Canadians with insight to the concerns of the defence community. The articles that are published express the views of the authors – and may not necessarily coincide with those of the CDA Institute.

This autumn edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, ballistic missile defence, peace operations, the Canadian Forces, transformation, Foreign Affairs diplomacy, war art, and a book review.

Honourary Captain (N), the Hon. Hugh Segal notes that there is a mismatch between the many required missions and actual capacity of our forces and writes, in *'More Boots on Deck, on the Tarmac and on the Ground: 70,000 Target Fails the Test'*, that it is apparent that an increase in total force to 100,000 regular with 50,000 reserves needs consideration. Mr. Segal chairs the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism, and is a Board member of the CDA Institute.

Over the last year, the Hon. David Pratt spent five months in Baghdad working on the "Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program". Mr. Pratt, in *'Doing Governance Work in Iraq'*, outlines his experience working in the Iraqi capital and provides a vivid description of life on the ground in that ancient city. He is a former Minister of National Defence and is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Canada's current military mission to Afghanistan will come to an end during the summer of 2011. Dr. Howard G. Coombs and Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Cotton, in *'Helping Afghans Secure a Brighter Future'*, have provided us with a brief background, to date, of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Dr. Coombs is an Assistant Professor with the Royal Military College of Canada and a serving Army Reserve officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton is an officer of the Royal Canadian



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

*ON TRACK*, qui en est maintenant à sa quatorzième année, est allé chercher de plus en plus de lecteurs à chacune de ses parutions. Nous attribuons cette croissance de *ON TRACK* à l'excellente qualité des articles dus à la plume de membres de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (Institut de la CAD) et de membres des Forces canadiennes, d'universitaires et de chercheurs qui sont des experts reconnus dans leurs domaines respectifs.

Le but poursuivi par *ON TRACK* est d'alimenter un débat informé et *non partisan* sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui ont de l'importance pour les intérêts du Canada. Nous allons continuer à publier une recherche crédible et informée, ainsi que des opinions qui, à notre avis, donneront aux Canadiens une idée des préoccupations des milieux de la défense. Les articles que nous publions expriment les points de vue de leurs auteurs – et peuvent ne pas coïncider avec ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

Ce numéro d'automne de *ON TRACK* présente des articles d'intérêt actuel dans les domaines de l'Iraq, de l'Afghanistan, du Pakistan, de la défense antimissiles balistiques, des opérations de paix, des Forces canadiennes, de la transformation, de la diplomatie des Affaires étrangères, de l'art de guerre, ainsi qu'un compte rendu de lecture.

Le Capitaine honoraire (M), l'Honorable Hugh Segal note qu'il existe une disparité entre les nombreuses missions demandées à nos forces et la capacité réelle de celles-ci, et il écrit, dans *'More Boots on Deck, on the Tarmac and on the Ground: 70,000 Target Fails the Test'*, qu'il est apparent qu'une augmentation de la force totale à 100 000 réguliers, avec 50 000 réserves, devra être considérée. M. Segal est président du Comité spécial du Sénat sur l'antiterrorisme et il est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

L'an dernier, l'Honorable David Pratt a passé cinq mois à Baghdad à travailler sur le « programme de renforcement législatif de l'Iraq ». Dans *'Doing Governance Work in Iraq'*, il décrit son expérience de travail dans la capitale iraquienne et donne une description sur le vif de la vie sur le terrain dans cette ville ancienne. M. Pratt est un ancien ministre de la Défense nationale et il est membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

La présente mission du Canada en Afghanistan va se terminer à l'été 2011. M. Howard G. Coombs et le Lieutenant-colonel Roger Cotton, dans *'Helping Afghans Secure a Brighter Future'*, nous ont brossé une brève toile de fond, jusqu'à nos jours, de la mission du Canada en Afghanistan. M. Coombs est professeur adjoint au Collège militaire royal du Canada et officier de réserve de l'Armée. Le Lieutenant-colonel Cotton est officier des Royal Canadian Dragoons et il sert

Dragoons and is currently serving as the J5 (Plans) for the Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10.

Major Ryan Jurkowski recently deployed on his second tour to Afghanistan with the TF 3-09 BG from September 2009 to May 2010 in command of A Company Combat Team, First Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. In *'Any Mission, Anywhere, Anytime'*, Major Jurkowski outlines the many challenges that his Company faced in carrying out their mission. Major Jurkowski is attending the Joint Command and Staff Programme in Toronto.

Master Corporal Justin Lupichuk participated in the Kingston Military Conference, last March, as a panellist along with other veterans who have returned recently from active duty. *'Today's Canadian Soldier and the Mission in Afghanistan'* is a summation of Master Corporal Lupichuk's presentation at the conference. He is a member of the Princess of Wales Own Regiment and in his final year of study at the Royal Military College of Canada.

The Afghanistan war is in its 10<sup>th</sup> year, and the time has now come to think of an exit strategy. Monsieur Louis Delvoie, also a regular contributor to *ON TRACK*, writes, in *'Afghanistan: Getting Out'*, that it will be full of problems and challenges – both internally and externally. Louis Delvoie is Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. He is a former Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan.

Chris Alexander notes that the Afghan state and Afghan society are now stronger than at any time in the past decade, while the scale of the insurgency is also expanding. He explains, in *'Pakistan's Sponsorship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'*, why this is so. Chris Alexander was Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan (2003-05) and Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (2006-09).

While noting that the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan-led construction of the new Afghan Defence University cannot fail to impress visitors to its site on the western edge of Kabul, Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Kilford writes, in *'Military and Modernization in the Developing World'*, that political involvement by military forces in the developing world during the Cold War was an unexpected by-product of foreign military assistance programs. He provides us with a few examples around the world of the changes that came about as an outcome of military assistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Kilford served as Canada's Deputy Defence Attaché in Kabul from July 2009 until July 2010.

Dr. James Fergusson notes that missile defence will be a central component when the NATO alliance confirms its New Strategic Concept in November and that, for Canada, this represents a major conundrum. He writes, in *'The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence'*, that if the current (U.S.), or a future administration concludes that a Canadian territorial contribution is vital to the defence of the U.S., the failure

présentement au J5 (Plans) pour la Force opérationnelle interarmées Afghanistan 5-10.

Le Major Ryan Jurkowski a été récemment déployé pour son deuxième tour en Afghanistan avec le GT FO 3-09 de septembre 2009 à mai 2010, au commandement du A Company Combat Team, First Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Dans *'Any Mission, Anywhere, Anytime'*, le Major Jurkowski décrit les nombreux défis auxquels sa Compagnie a fait face dans l'accomplissement de sa mission. Le Major Jurkowski fréquente le Programme de commandement et d'état-major interarmées, à Toronto.

Le Caporal-chef Justin Lupichuk a participé à la Conférence militaire de Kingston en mars dernier, où il était panéliste avec d'autres anciens combattants qui venaient de revenir du service actif. *'Today's Canadian Soldier and the Mission in Afghanistan'* est un sommaire de la présentation du Caporal-chef Lupichuk lors de la conférence. Il est membre du Princess of Wales Own Regiment et il en est à sa dernière année d'études au Collège militaire royal du Canada.

La guerre en Afghanistan en est à sa 10<sup>ème</sup> année et le temps est maintenant venu de réfléchir à une stratégie de sortie. Monsieur Louis Delvoie, lui aussi un collaborateur régulier de *ON TRACK*, écrit, dans *'Afghanistan: Getting Out'*, que cette opération sera bourrée de problèmes et de défis – tant à l'interne qu'à l'externe. Louis Delvoie est agrégé supérieur au Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's. C'est un ancien Haut-commissaire du Canada au Pakistan.

Chris Alexander note que l'État afghan et la société afghane sont maintenant plus forts qu'à n'importe quel moment de la dernière décennie, alors que l'échelle de l'insurrection prend aussi de l'ampleur. Il explique, dans *'Pakistan's Sponsorship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'* pourquoi il en est ainsi. Chris Alexander a été ambassadeur du Canada en Afghanistan (2003-05) et représentant spécial adjoint du secrétaire général des Nations unies (2006-09).

Tout en notant que la construction, sous l'égide de la mission d'entraînement en Afghanistan de l'OTAN, de la nouvelle « Afghan Defence University » ne peut pas manquer d'impressionner ceux qui visitent son site, en bordure ouest de Kabul, le Lieutenant-colonel Chris Kilford écrit, dans *'Military and Modernization in the Developing World'*, que l'implication politique des forces militaires dans le monde en voie de développement pendant la Guerre froide a été un sous-produit inattendu des programmes d'aide militaire à l'étranger. Il nous donne quelques exemples, ailleurs dans le monde, de changements qui sont survenus comme un des résultats de l'aide militaire. Le Lieutenant-colonel Kilford a servi comme attaché de la Défense adjoint du Canada à Kabul de juillet 2009 à juillet 2010.

M. James Fergusson note que la défense antimissile sera une composante centrale quand l'alliance de l'OTAN confirmera son nouveau concept stratégique, en novembre, et que, pour le Canada, cela représente une énigme majeure. Il écrit, dans *'The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence'*, que si l'administration actuelle des États-Unis, ou une administration future, conclut que la contribution territoriale

of the Canadian Government to respond will likely have significant ramifications for the relationship. Dr. Fergusson is the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.

Earlier this year, on 6 May, Dr. Douglas Bland addressed the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence on their study, *'Canadian Soldiers in International Peace Operations After 2011'*. The main point of his remarks is that a study of the future of peace operations that begins from the premise that peace operations or peacekeeping are military operations distinct from war-fighting sets up a false dichotomy that may diminish the study's influence in the formulation of Canada's future defence policies. We are pleased to include Dr. Bland's deposition, *'The Future of Peace Operations'*. Dr. Bland is Chair, Defence Management Studies, at the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, and a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Lieutenant-général (Ret) J.O. Michel Maisonneuve's compelling piece, *'On Change and Transformation'*, examines the motivating factors behind military transformation. Lieutenant-général (Ret) Maisonneuve provides an analytical overview of contemporary military transformation and optimistically forecasts the impact Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie will have on future CF transformation. Lieutenant-général (Ret) Maisonneuve is Academic Director of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and Member of the CDAI Institute's Board of Directors.

In *'The Profession of Diplomacy'*, CDA Institute Board of Directors Member Paul H. Chapin discusses the changes that have occurred in diplomacy in the past few decades. Paul contends that the profession of diplomacy has changed to become as "hard-edge" as the profession of arms. He suggests that Canadian Forces personnel are well suited to be accepted members of the diplomatic community. Paul Chapin was the principal author of the recent CDA Institute study, *'NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT - A Canadian Perspective'* (<http://www.natoconcept.ca/>).

Gertrude Kearns is a Toronto-based artist who has executed four portraits of Canadians serving and who have served on various missions. In *'War Posters?'*, Ms. Kearns explains the rationale for her work and provides a commentary for the first of four portraits that we will feature in *ON TRACK*.

The CDA Institute's new Project Officer, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, reviews *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North*, and provides commentary on the rationale for why the Arctic needs to be of concern to Canada.

We are very pleased to welcome to the CDA Institute Meghan Spilka O'Keefe as the DND Security and Defence Forum-sponsored intern. Meghan recently attained her MA in public and international affairs, with a focus in defence

canadienne est vitale pour la défense des États-Unis, le fait de ne pas réagir, de la part du gouvernement canadien, aura vraisemblablement d'importantes ramifications pour la relation entre les deux pays. M. Fergusson est directeur du Centre for Defence and Security Studies de l'Université du Manitoba.

Plus tôt cette année, le 6 mai, M. Douglas Bland s'est adressé au comité permanent de la Chambre des communes sur la défense nationale concernant l'étude de ce comité intitulée « Les soldats canadiens dans les opérations de paix internationales après 2011 ». Le point principal de ses remarques est qu'une étude de l'avenir des opérations de paix qui part de la prémisse que les opérations de paix ou le maintien de la paix sont des opérations militaires distinctes de la conduite de la guerre établit une fausse dichotomie qui peut diminuer l'influence de l'étude dans la formulation des futures politiques de défense du Canada. Nous avons le plaisir d'inclure la déposition de M. Bland, *'The Future of Peace Operations'*. M. Bland est titulaire de la chaire d'études en gestion de la défense à la School of Policy Studies de l'Université Queen's de Kingston et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Le texte convaincant du Lieutenant-général (ret.) J.O. Michel Maisonneuve, *'On Change and Transformation'*, examine les facteurs de motivation derrière la transformation militaire. Le Lieutenant-général (ret.) Maisonneuve donne un aperçu analytique de la transformation militaire contemporaine et prédit de façon optimiste l'impact que le Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie aura sur la future transformation des FC. Le Lieutenant-général (ret.) Maisonneuve est directeur des études du Collège militaire royal St-Jean et membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Dans *"The Profession of Diplomacy"*, Paul H. Chapin, membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD discute des changements qui se sont produits dans la diplomatie pendant les dernières décennies. Il soutient que la profession de la diplomatie a changé pour devenir aussi « hard-edge » que la profession des armes. Il suggère que le personnel des Forces canadiennes est bien préparé à être accepté au sein de la communauté diplomatique. Paul Chapin a été l'auteur principal de la récente étude de l'Institut de la CAD intitulée *LE CONCEPT STRATÉGIQUE DE L'OTAN – Un point de vue canadien* (<http://www.natoconcept.ca/>).

Gertrude Kearns est une artiste de Toronto qui a fait quatre portraits de Canadiens qui servent et ont servi dans diverses missions. Dans *'War Posters?'*, Mme Kearns explique la raison d'être de son travail et donne un commentaire sur les quatre premiers portraits que nous allons publier dans *ON TRACK*.

La nouvelle agente de projets de l'Institut de la CAD, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, donne un compte rendu de lecture de *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North*, qu'elle assortit d'un commentaire sur la raison pour laquelle l'Arctique doit faire partie des préoccupations du Canada.

Nous sommes très heureux d'accueillir Meghan Spilka O'Keefe à l'Institut de la CAD comme stagiaire parrainée par le Forum de la Sécurité et de la Défense du MDN. Meghan vient de recevoir sa maîtrise en affaires publiques et

policy, at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute has been and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence interests, such as the annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Vimy Award Dinner, as well as the annual seminar, and numerous roundtable discussions.

This autumn, on 28 and 29 October, in collaboration with the Royal Military College of Canada, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and Queen's University's Defence Management Studies Programme, the CDA Institute will host the 13<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium, with financial assistance provided by Senator Hugh Segal, Dr. John Scott Cowan, and the Department of National Defence and Security Forum. The keynote speakers for the two-day event will be Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada, and Dr. Dean Oliver, Director, Research and Exhibitions, Canadian War Museum. The Symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities from across Canada and internationally. Cutting edge research from young scholars will be showcased and cash prizes, totaling \$6,000, will be awarded for the three best papers presented.

The aim of the Symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Anyone with an interest in defence, national and international issues is welcome to attend.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The 2009 programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to Warrant Officer William Kenneth MacDonald, by the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, before some 630 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

On 19 August 2010, the Vimy Award Selection Committee unanimously selected the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson as this year's recipient of the Award. Madame Clarkson is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout her career of service to Canada, as Governor General, and to the Canadian Forces (CF), as Commander-in-Chief. During her tenure Madame Clarkson gave recognition to the duties carried out by members of the CF by her visits with Canada's troops in Kosovo, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, and moved and educated Canadians on the role of the CF with her tributes

internationales, avec concentration en politiques de défense, de l'École supérieure d'affaires publiques et internationales de l'Université d'Ottawa.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD prend et prendra part à de nombreuses initiatives faisant la promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité et de défense, comme le symposium annuel des étudiants de niveau supérieur, le dîner du prix Vimy, ainsi que le séminaire annuel et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

Cet automne, les 28 et 29 octobre, en collaboration avec le Collège militaire royal du Canada, l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, et le Defense Management Studies Programme de l'Université Queen's, l'Institut de la CAD sera l'hôte du 13<sup>ème</sup> symposium annuel des étudiants de niveau supérieur et avec l'appui de Sénateur Hugh Segal, M. John Scott Cowan, et du Forum sur la Sécurité et la défense du Ministère de la Défense nationale. Les conférenciers invités pour l'activité de deux jours seront M. Joel Sokolsky, directeur du Collège militaire royal du Canada et M. Dean Oliver, directeur de la recherche et des expositions au Musée canadien de la guerre. Le symposium mettra en valeur les travaux d'étudiants au doctorat et à la maîtrise d'universités civiles et militaires de tous les coins du pays et d'ailleurs dans le monde. La recherche de pointe de jeunes chercheurs sera mise en valeur et des prix en argent d'une valeur totale de 6 000 dollars seront remis aux trois meilleurs rapports présentés.

Le but visé par le symposium est de renforcer les liens entre les institutions d'enseignement civiles et militaires. Toute personne ayant un intérêt envers la défense et les questions nationales et internationales est invitée à y assister.

Une des manifestations majeures au calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD, c'est la présentation annuelle du prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an passé a remporté un vif succès, avec un nombre record d'excellentes soumissions qui ont été prises en considération par le comité de sélection du prix Vimy. Le programme de 2009 a eu son point culminant dans la présentation du prix Vimy à l'Adjudant William Kenneth MacDonald, par la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, devant les 630 invités d'un dîner formel tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Le 19 août 2010, le comité de sélection du prix Vimy a choisi à l'unanimité la Très Honorable Adrienne Clarkson comme récipiendaire du prix de cette année. Madame Clarkson est une distinguée Canadienne qui a fait preuve des normes les plus élevées de leadership tout au long de sa carrière de service au Canada, comme gouverneure générale, et aux Forces canadiennes, dont elle a été commandante en chef. Pendant qu'elle était en poste, Madame Clarkson a su reconnaître les services rendus par les membres des Forces par ses visites auprès des troupes canadiennes au Kosovo, dans le golfe Persique et en Afghanistan, et elle a ému et

to the Unknown Soldier and Canada's war Veterans, and their families. His Excellency, the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor General of Canada, has graciously agreed to present the award on 19 November, at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum.

The Award honours the bravery and sacrifices of the Canadian soldiers who were victorious at the Battle of Vimy Ridge in April 1917. Fighting together for the first time, the battle won by the four divisions of the Canadian Corps brought global recognition to the nation's arms and declared Canada a young nation entitled to a place at the councils of the world. The Institute is the sponsor of the Vimy Award. Since 1991, the Award recognizes one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

The Vimy Award Selection Committee was composed of Dr. John Scott Cowan as Chairman, and, as Members the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Général (Ret) Raymond Henault, General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson, Dr. George A. Lampropoulos, Monsieur Richard Bertrand, Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Lieutenant-General (Ret) Richard J. Evraire, Monsieur Pierre Camiot, Mr. Chris MacDonald, and Mr. Colin Robertson. His Excellency, the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor-General of Canada, has graciously agreed to present the Award on 19 November, 2010, at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum.

The Ross Munro Media Award will also be presented at the Vimy Dinner. The recipient of the Award for 2009 was Brian Stewart, foreign correspondent and news anchor for CBC. This prestigious award, launched in 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, will be presented this year to Murray Brewster, journalist for the Canadian Press who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500.

Both programmes last year were outstanding successes. I am pleased to report that support for the programmes from Canadian industry, organizations and individuals is very encouraging.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within Canadian society who are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of

éduqué les Canadiens sur le rôle des Forces canadiennes avec les tributs qu'elle a payés au Soldat inconnu et aux anciens combattants du Canada et à leurs familles. Son Excellence le Très Honorable David Johnston, gouverneur général du Canada, a gracieusement accepté de présenter le prix, le 19 novembre, lors d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Le prix veut honorer la bravoure et les sacrifices des soldats canadiens qui remportèrent la victoire lors de la bataille de la crête de Vimy, en avril 1917. Les quatre divisions du Corps canadien, combattant ensemble pour la première fois, ont gagné une bataille grâce à laquelle les armes du pays ont été reconnues et le Canada fut déclaré être devenu une jeune nation qui avait acquis le droit d'être admise à prendre sa place à la table des conseils du monde. L'Institut est le commanditaire du prix Vimy. Depuis 1991, le prix reconnaît un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Le comité de sélection du prix Vimy était composé de M. John Scott Cowan, qui en était président, et, comme membres, de la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, du Général (ret.) Raymond Hénault, du Général (ret.) Paul D. Manson, de M. George A. Lampropoulos, de Monsieur Richard Bertrand, du Vice-Amiral Bruce Donaldson, du Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Richard J. Evraire, de Monsieur Pierre Camiot, de M. Chris MacDonald et de M. Colin Robertson. Son Excellence le Très Honorable David Johnston, gouverneur-général du Canada, a gracieusement accepté de présenter le prix, le 19 novembre, lors d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Le prix Ross Munro Media Award sera également remis lors du dîner Vimy. Le récipiendaire du prix de 2009 était Brian Stewart, correspondant à l'étranger et chef d'antenne pour la SRC. Ce prix prestigieux, lancé en 2002 en collaboration avec le l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, sera remis cette année à Murray Brewster, journaliste à la Presse canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension par le public des enjeux de défense et de sécurité qui affectent le Canada. Le prix est accompagnée d'un prix en argent de 2 500 \$.

L'an dernier, les deux programmes ont connu un succès retentissant. J'ai le plaisir de dire que l'appui accordé aux deux programmes par l'industrie, les organisations et les individus canadiens est très encourageant.

Au cours de l'année passée, le gouvernement fédéral a permis aux citoyens canadiens de concentrer leur attention sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Bien que nous fassions bon accueil à cette initiative, il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés sur les enjeux majeurs des opérations militaires, de l'acquisition d'équipement pour les Forces canadiennes et des manques à gagner continus dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour s'occuper des besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. L'Institut de la CAD va quand même continuer à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse réfléchie des événements et des enjeux qui ont un

this country.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation \$75 or at a higher level, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months following your donation:

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Thank you. ©

impact sur la défense et la sécurité de notre pays.

En terminant, j'aimerais remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patron, compagnon, et officer pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD ; sans leur contribution il nous serait très difficile de bien nous acquitter de notre mission.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau supporteur, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

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Merci. ©

## Correction Notice

In the first photograph that appeared in 'Celebrating Canada's Naval Aviation Heritage' (page 20 in *ON TRACK* Volume 15, Number 2) the carrier depicted embarking the Seafire in 1946 is HMCS Warrior. In the caption that accompanied the photograph the carrier was incorrectly identified. The Editor sincerely regrets the error.



*Sea Fire landing on HMCS Warrior during flying trials, 23 March 1946.*

*DND photo.*



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## More Boots on Deck, on the Tarmac and on the Ground: 70,000 Target Fails the Test

by The Hon. Hugh Segal

Naval, air, land and Special Forces have been involved in a range of different combat, humanitarian, relief, air-to-ground bombing, drug interdiction, anti-piracy and sovereignty patrols in recent years. The Canadian Forces (CF) have also given aid to the civil power in support of special security, events like the G8/G20 meetings, the Vancouver Olympics and in response to natural disasters at home and abroad. Over the past decade, our standing in the world with respect to our army, navy and air force personnel has advanced immensely and with good reason. Despite being over extended, the CF has performed superbly, holding the line in Kandahar, hitting the ground quickly in Haiti, interdicting drug-laden ships and repelling pirates off

*Captain(N)(Hon)Senator Hugh Segal chairs the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism, and is a Member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.*

the coast of Somalia while patrolling the Gulf of Arabia in anti-terrorist due diligence. With a total complement of just under 70,000 members, there is a mismatch between the many required missions and actual capacity of our forces. In fact, when one assesses how frequently some soldiers returned for repeated deployments in Afghanistan and the many officers at all ranks that are double and triple-hatted in their roles in all of the services, it is apparent that an increase in total force to 100,000 regular with 50,000 reserves needs to be given active consideration. Recent reports of the CF being too stretched to offer a few more soldiers to help in the pre-election period last spring in Afghanistan, or being unable to fully operate all naval assets because of staff shortages, underlines the need for a fresh discussion. It is not that recruiting has not gone well: targets have been well met in recent years. Rather, it is that the targets themselves are too modest for our country.

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Some in Treasury Board, Finance and even the civilian side of Defence may be looking to cut reserve capacity and regular force depth. That would be a disastrous mistake, unconscionable in terms of our national interests.

Greater global complexity requires more, not less, military flexibility. The notion of one superpower, the United States, easily or competently managing a new world order on its own is long past. The notion of international robust engagement to sustain values and humanitarian norms (such as democracy in Afghanistan) that we, as Canadians, have judged to be vital is very much now with us. But so too are the non-state actors, like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Hamas and the Janjaweed, to name but a few.

According to December 2009 figures, there are 67,756 active personnel in the Canadian military in a country of 33 million, or about 0.20% of our population. This would rank Canada as 58th in the world in *per capita* military presence. In comparison, there are 35,000 police officers in the city of New York, population 8 million or a percentage of 0.44%. Our 2010-2011 budget for defence is pegged at 21.8 billion dollars, putting Canada's percentage of GDP relating to defence at 1.36%. This percentage of GDP number would rank Canada at 111th in world, behind the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Denmark and Italy, just to name a few. Our Australian allies, who have 54,000 under arms in a population of 21 million, are at 0.26% or almost a third stronger.

Former rules of engagement, doctrines shaped by a measure of civility and decency, seem elusive in today's dynamic situations. The advent of the suicide bomber, for whom their own death and those of innocent or targeted civilian or military, is all part of the cause that makes any normative rules of engagement impossible.

The Canada First Defence Strategy, put in place by the current government in 2006, outlines six core missions for the Canadian Forces. The CF must be able to support all of the following operations and, if necessary, support them all simultaneously: conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Winter Olympics; have the ability to respond to a major terrorist attack; support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster; lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and, deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods, such as the recent earthquake in Haiti. Such ambitions require manpower. Some 4,500 CF personnel were present at the Olympic Games in February 2010, while 2,000 members were still deployed in Haiti and a further 2,800 were stationed in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this was immediately preceding the G8 and G20 meetings in Toronto, which required incredible security manpower.

Canada's foreign and defence policy must be a realistic mix of our own core interests and the values that underline them. Military capacity sustains diplomatic interests and the leverage a middle power needs on global issues that matter. Inadequate capacity dilutes national sovereignty and reach. Using constrained military capacity

as an excuse for disengagement is simply abdicating our responsibility to have more robust military capacity befitting a nation of our population and size.

The Canadian Reserves--Army, Navy and Air Force--exist as units of "double citizenship" in a myriad of communities across this country. They date back historically to the beginning of Canada, the defence of Canada in 1812-14, and the very foundation of community life. Today they are there to train, support the Regular Force and provide aid as necessary to the Civil Power under the National Defence Act. They are made up of citizen soldiers who take time from their private, student and working lives to acquire the skills that make our defence and strategic capacity as a country more robust and competent. As much as twenty percent of the CF in the field in Afghanistan have been Reservists from all three services. Reserve forces in theatre have not been spared the casualties other Regular Force members have tragically faced.

As I said earlier this year in a speech on Reserves at the annual Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) conference in Calgary, in February we saw Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, no doubt trying to deal with fiscal pressures in the best of faith, then Commander of the Army, begin the Reserve reduction process. While the annual Army budget is 1.6 billion dollars, 80 million was moved out of this budget to "higher CF priorities" requiring "funding adjustments." This of course, is code for reductions spread across the board. Some of these included: the reduction of planned activities and training for soldiers not immediately preparing for action; the delay of non-urgent maintenance and repair of infrastructure and equipment; the delay of procurement of non-essential items; the reduction in administrative travel, conferences, computers and cell phones; and the reduction of the number of full-time Reservists.

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*"...the growth in the military's strength repeatedly promised by both the Liberals and the Conservatives is all but frozen."*

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Some intense lobbying from many on both sides in both Parliamentary chambers, and rapid action by Defence Minister Peter MacKay, diluted some of this negative thrust. But it is utterly wrong to assume we do not face further and similar threats, however devoutly the Minister of Defence would wish it otherwise.

Historian Jack Granatstein pinpointed the problem in a thoughtful piece for the CDFAI in April 2009: "In 2010-2011 the regular force will increase by less than 800 to 67,742 and the reserves will stay the same. In 2011-2012, the projection is for a regular force of 68,000, no figure is provided for the primary reserve, and the Rangers are expected to reach 5,000. In other words the growth in the military's strength repeatedly promised by both the Liberals and the Conservatives is all but frozen."

We cannot, of course, be insensitive to fiscal realities as we rebalance our budgets after the G8 agreed to stimulus spending to countervail the liquidity and credit crisis of 2008. Nor do I, as a citizen and Senator, underestimate how much the activities of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and two defence ministers (O'Connor and MacKay) relating to procurement and increasing numbers have meant to the viability and effectiveness of the CF.

But the task has just begun. As Paul Martin said when he visited National Defence Headquarters directly after being sworn in as Prime Minister, investment had fallen far behind because of his mid-1990s cuts and we had to reinvest anew; and he too tried during his brief tenure. But we are still behind where a nation our size, with our economic and global geopolitical interests should be.

Our capacity to project, protect, advance and engage as a modern and technologically advanced country is undermined and weakened without a strong Armed Forces and Armed Forces Reserve. We need a full debate in Parliament on Canada's foreign and defence priorities including the case for a serious complement expansion. The government has so far chosen not to invite the kind of debate, and nor has the majority opposition chosen to demand it.

We do not have enough troops *now* to meet the Canada First Defence Strategy. We need to deal with it by having an open debate on the strength necessary. "What kind of Armed Forces, in support of what kind of foreign policy, in support of what kind of world?" is the question we need to ask. The time for a coherent plan with accompanying action has arrived. The time has come to ambitiously aim for a robust, 150,000-strong CF. ©

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## Doing Governance Work in Iraq

by David Pratt

There are many adjectives that could be used to describe doing governance work in Iraq these days. Boring is not one of them. Over the last year, I have spent about five months in Baghdad working on the Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program (ILSP). I was employed by an American company based in Washington which is contracted by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the American equivalent of the Canadian International Development Agency.

The ILSP is a multi-year initiative that started in 2008 and is designed to support Iraq's Parliament, also known as the Council of Representatives (COR). The primary goal is to buttress efforts at reform and institutional strengthening with a view to enhancing the oversight, legislative and representational capabilities of Iraqi members of parliament. The program was established at the request of the COR's senior leadership and has several components.

A central aspect of the ILSP program is the establishment of a Parliamentary Centre to organize training and build capacity to improve the effectiveness of the COR. A team of international and local professionals resident in Baghdad also works with Members of Parliament and staff as advisors, trainers and mentors to assess current practices and operations and help implement agreed upon reforms.

Two of the areas to which resources are targeted include the all-important standing committees and the COR Secretariat, which administers all parliamentary activities.

Within the COR Secretariat, the focus of efforts has been on the media and public affairs operations and the research section. Underlying all of these efforts is the objective of establishing a "parliamentary culture."

What is a parliamentary culture? One way to define it is the creation of a political ethos which supports the institution of parliament as a means of holding the executive accountable. Through debate and compromise, parliaments seek to peacefully broker the interests of various factions so that violence is not an option for those seeking political change. By its very nature, it also eschews "strong man politics" and the concentration of power that that entails.

One might well ask how foreigners would have anything useful to pass on to the Iraqis at this moment in their history. After all, they are emerging from decades of upheaval and violence--the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, the war with Iran, the first and second Gulf Wars, and a period of intense internecine conflict. While post-conflict Iraq continues to be a highly charged political environment with many trenchant issues, the basic governance challenges faced by Iraqis are not significantly different from those in other parliamentary democracies.

Governing is all about power and who wields it. Many prime ministers and presidents, left to themselves, would dearly love to rule unfettered by the constraints placed upon them by parliaments or the judiciary. Finding the right balance between executive power, legislative power and judicial power is something with which all polities struggle.

Whether Canadian or Iraqi, the challenges faced by parliamentarians are strikingly similar. This was driven home to me very clearly as I listened to Iraqi MPs talking about how difficult it was to obtain accurate and timely information from the bureaucracy and the reluctance of ministers to appear

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*The Honourable David Pratt is an independent consultant and writer. He was an elected representative at the municipal and federal levels for 16 years and served as Chair of the Defence Committee and Minister of National Defence. He is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.*

before standing committees. The more I heard, the more I became convinced that the gulf between Baghdad and Ottawa was not so large after all.

One of my first tasks when I arrived in July of last year was to write a couple of research papers. The first, "A Model Committee Operating Manual," reviewed the various types of committees, dealt with terms of reference, powers and committee membership, addressed the roles of the various presiding officers and committee staff, and provided general guidance on how to hold hearings, special studies and consultations. The document was intended not only to be a primer for new MPs, but also to serve as a reference document for those with more experience.

Adapting Canadian knowledge to the Iraqi experience was not difficult since parliamentary committees, if properly structured, are similar the world over. Their mandate is to allow for the detailed scrutiny of complex matters (such as legislation) which is more easily done in a small group rather than a plenary session of Parliament. Committees also provide an opportunity for MPs to hear from experts and average citizens on subjects of national concern and to have these representations placed on the public record. Finally, they furnish a means for MPs to initiate proposals and probe more deeply into the details of specific policies and programs to further develop their expertise in specific areas.

The second document I prepared, "Parliamentary Law, Privilege, Order and Decorum: Enhancing the Respect for Parliament" dealt with the basics of parliamentary law. It outlined the legal environment in which the proceedings of parliament operate and provided general information on the special legal status of parliament and the rights and responsibilities parliamentarians possess as office holders. Among the issues addressed in the paper was the concept of "parliamentary privilege," which exempts MPs from prosecution for statements made in the conduct of their duties, but which does not exempt them from criminal law. In a relatively new parliament such as Iraq's COR, the concept of privilege can be both open to interpretation and subject to abuse.

In addition to the research papers, PowerPoint presentations were prepared for both the operating manual and the parliamentary law document. All training material is, of course, translated into Arabic, which is a challenge since many parliamentary terms of British origin are not easily translatable.

As the fall of 2009 progressed, the ILSP directed its



*The Hon. David Pratt (right) with Deputy Chief of Party colleague Kevin Gash in Baghdad.*

attention to the national parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2010 and the professional development needs of the new crop of Iraqi MPs. Working very closely with the COR Secretariat, and in particular the Secretary General, my task was to assemble a program which would provide basic information to new MPs about their work and introduce them to their responsibilities as legislators.

The program required considerable consultation and the involvement of COR staff and non-government organisations such as the American based National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute and the UK-based Global Partners. All have been very active in the field of institutional strengthening. My plan was to draw upon the knowledge and experience of as many of the key players as possible in developing this introductory program. As it turned out, the parliamentary elections were delayed until March and the outcome of the negotiations to form a new government (at the time of writing) still had not been concluded. When the new parliament convenes, one of the first items on the agenda, however, will be this introductory professional development program.

While the governance work of the ILSP was always interesting and challenging, so too was living in Baghdad. The security situation required that all expatriates involved in the program be housed in a walled compound with machine gun posts and blast walls topped with razor wire. Some of the buildings in the compound also had chain link fencing up over windows to pre-explode rocket-propelled grenades. All local staff and any other visitors were typically searched upon entry. In all, the guards probably outnumbered the expats by about two to one.

Life in the compound was nothing if not routine. Our work week was six days, starting on Saturday and ending

on Thursday. Friday, the Muslim holy day, was our day off. The work day normally started at 8:30am and finished around 5:30 or 6:00pm. Meals were served buffet style at the dining facility, and the food was generally very good. There were several well-equipped exercise facilities within the compound. Beer and wine were also available and could be purchased by local staff at nearby shops. Evenings were often spent watching movies or catching up on emails from home.

While most work was done within the compound, it was not uncommon for us to travel to the Green Zone or International Zone (IZ) several times over the course of a week. Most often, the meetings were with senior COR staff, but regular meetings were also held with officials from United States Agency for International Aid. Periodically, our work also took us to the US and British embassies.

Travel to and from the compound was done by convoy with armoured vehicles. A helmet and body armour

were mandatory. The security providers for the company I worked with were excellent. Although private security companies such as Blackwater have come in for some well deserved criticism for their “cowboy” approach, our personal security details were calm, cool, professional and well trained in every aspect of their jobs. The security situation was a constant reminder to us that the only way things would improve would be through building enduring political institutions representative of the views of all Iraqis.

It is probably too early to tell whether or not the roots of democracy will be driven far enough into the political landscape to firmly take hold over the long term. What is clear, however, is that without programs like the ILSP, the path toward a functioning parliamentary democracy in Iraq would be slower and more arduous. While USAID and others can provide some of the tools and the resources, ultimately it is up to the Iraqis to make their democracy work. ©

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## Helping Afghans Secure a Brighter Future ROSHANA SABAH<sup>1</sup>

by Dr. Howard G. Coombs and Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Cotton

### Introduction

Canada's current military mission to Afghanistan will come to an end during the summer of 2011. Despite that cessation much must be accomplished during the upcoming months to build upon the gains that have been made in Kandahar province over the last years. In order to contextualize Canada's military activities during 2010-2011 one must examine Canadian objectives in southern Afghanistan, the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission since 2001 and how Canada's involvement in that effort has changed, and continues to change in response to regional, national and international influences.

### *The Government of Canada's Vision for Southern Afghanistan*

“A more secure Kandahar that is better governed and can deliver basic services to its citizens, supported by a more capable national government that can better provide

for its security, manage its borders and sustain stability and reconstruction gains over the longer term.”<sup>2</sup>

Since 2008 Canada has implemented six priorities and three signature projects which support this vision. The priorities range in scope from endeavours designed to address regional challenges to those oriented towards national issues. These include:

- 1) Increasing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity and assisting with implementation of the rule of law in Kandahar province.
- 2) Augmenting basic services available to the people of Kandahar and enhancing regional growth.
- 3) Providing humanitarian aid to those in need.
- 4) Facilitating an augmentation in border security by encouraging bilateral discussion between Afghan and Pakistani officials
- 5) Promoting democratization through public accountability of national institutions and transparent electoral processes.
- 6) Encouraging Afghan-led political reconciliation.

Canada's three concomitant signature projects are reconstruction of the Dahla Dam and its associated irrigation system, significant investment in regional education capacity and support to polio eradication across Afghanistan.

With the purpose of facilitating Canadian efforts towards development and governance in Afghanistan through security assistance the Manley Report recommended prolongation of the Canadian military commitment beyond

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*Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Cotton is an officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons currently serving as the J5 (Plans) for the Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10. He is also deployed in that capacity from September 2010 to June 2011.*

2009. Parliamentary approval was given to extending Canadian Forces involvement until end 2011.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the Canadian military strategy until 2011 includes training the Afghan National Security Forces, providing security for reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar and the continuation of Canada's responsibility for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).

### *The ISAF Mission*

Initially the ISAF mandate was limited to the provision of security in and around Kabul. During October 2003, the United Nations (UN) approved UN Security Council Resolution 1510 and extended this mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan, paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country.<sup>4</sup> By December 2003 ISAF had moved beyond Kabul and assumed command of the Kunduz PRT. In 2004 ISAF took control of another four PRTs in the north. These were located at Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad, and Baghlan. By 2006 ISAF expansion moved west with PRTs in Herat and Farah, as well as, one in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and another in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Baghdis province. Furthermore, a logistics base was established in Herat.

Canada's current involvement in southern Afghanistan resulted from ISAF enlargement in that region in 2006. At that time the NATO mission took over from United States-led coalition forces in the region thereby moving into the provinces of Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, and Zabul along with assuming the responsibility of four additional PRTs. Since then ISAF moved to eastern Afghanistan and became responsible for security assistance in the entire country. During this time Canadian Forces elements that had been supporting ISAF in the area of Kabul were moved to Kandahar, where for a period they were part of the American coordinated OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), before returning to ISAF control.

### *Canada's Military Mission in Southern Afghanistan*

While Canada initially deployed a Battle Group to the Kandahar region for a limited period during 2001-2002 the large scale engagement of Canadian Forces personnel commenced in 2006 with deployment of a Canadian Battle Group along with command of the Multi-National Brigade, as well as responsibility for Regional Command (South) (RC (S)). The latter role has rotated amongst a number of NATO nations since that time, being currently held by the United Kingdom and will be taken over by the United States in October. 2006 also marked the implementation of the comprehensive Canadian intergovernmental approach to addressing the complex dilemmas of the contemporary environment. This process included the Canadian Forces, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), as well as since then other government departments like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Corrections Services Canada (CSC).

With significant increases of American military personnel in the region since 2009 Canadian military forces have been able to focus efforts and resources on increasingly smaller areas – most recently the districts of Panjwai, Dand and Daman. At this time the Canadian-led Task Force (TF) Kandahar has an American unit, who adds significantly to the military capabilities of the TF.

### *Canada's Current Military Activities*

The Canadian Forces has learned (and re-learned) a great deal through its involvement in Afghanistan. When examining recent Canadian operations in Afghanistan one can discern that combat operations, like counterinsurgency, assist with setting the conditions for successful stability. It is just one piece of a complicated puzzle and makes no sense without the context of the other parts.

In fact the continuity of approach across successive deployments has achieved levels unprecedented in recent decades. While it may seem intuitive, building on the successes of previous Canadian task forces requires constancy of vision, directives and plans that arise only from practice. Our operations in southern Afghanistan have all been oriented towards achieving a secure environment for the population and the most recent iteration of ISAF Commander's guidance reiterates this theme. General David Petraeus emphasizes the need to protect and serve the Afghan people as "Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail."<sup>5</sup>

In a similar vein, Dr. Douglas Bland, of Queen's University, argued in 2007 that the Canadian Forces were in effect conducting the operations so recently contained in Petraeus' guidance.:

"Canadian 'whole-of-government' operations in Afghanistan are part of what can best be understood as a 'stability campaign,' in which military operations conducted under warfare doctrines and experiences aim to create 'harmonious law-based conditions' in which legitimate governments (aided or directed by the UN) can develop in turn a more peaceful, liberal-democratic, consensual and self-sustaining national, regional, or international order."<sup>6</sup>

These perspectives have directly underpinned Canadian regional strategy for the last two years with operations initially designed to stabilize key villages on approaches to the city of Kandahar. These activities involve our Canadian field partners, members of the international community as well as Afghan authorities at all levels. By increasing these "areas of security" into "zones of security" one can make the region safer, village by village, and district by district.

### *Canada's Security Legacy*

Overall there are a number of positive conditions that will be established as Canada's security legacy in the

region. In general, one can argue that conditions are better than those that existed prior to Canadian involvement in the region. These are an increase of security in some regions of Kandahar, including the city, an increase in freedom of movement in these areas, an augmentation in ANSF capabilities, an increase in the capacity of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to meet the basic needs of their people, as well as better communications between Kandaharis and their government.

However, notwithstanding the surge of American troops and increased Afghan National Army (ANA) and to a lesser extent Afghan National Police (ANP) capabilities it must be acknowledged that the forces detracting from a secure environment remain strong and levels of violence are still high. The credibility of the Afghan government is still coalescing and the insurgents exercise low-level “shadow” governance. Also, development is constrained by sometimes uncertain security levels.

Despite these challenges, the last year in Afghanistan will see Canadian military activities designed to accomplish a number of interrelated goals. Firstly, efforts will be made to reinforce the gains that have been made to date in establishing a secure environment. Secondly, support will be provided to increase capacity of local, regional and national security forces. Thirdly, there will be continued assistance to establish and maintain the rule of law and governance in the

districts of Panjwaii, Dand and Daman. Fourthly, wherever possible lead responsibility will be transferred to Afghan civil authorities and security forces. Lastly, and encompassing, the Canadian Forces will continue to be focused on supporting and increasing governance, development and security.

## Conclusion

Since its beginning, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan has been characterized by a level of combat operations not seen since the Korean War. Such missions have become more prominent in the post-Cold War era because international interventions take place in failed and failing states. The need to understand the role that must be played by all participants in such an environment is incredibly important, but no less so than achieving a common understanding of what must be accomplished and the establishment of a shared intent, as Canada is attempting to do through a comprehensive intergovernmental approach. Without these pre-conditions unity of effort cannot be attained and the resources, human and otherwise, applied to the problem will not be as efficaciously used. Great strides have already been made in Afghanistan and during 2010-2011 the Canadian Forces will continue military operations that will increase conditions necessary for Afghanistan’s lasting success and a positive legacy for Canada.

## (Endnotes)

- 1 This article is based on a presentation given by Brigadier-General Dean Milner, OMM, CD Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10 to the Conference of Defence Associations in Ottawa, Ontario on 18 June 2010.
- 2 For details regarding Canada’s current participation in Afghanistan see “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan,” available at [www.afghanistan.gc.ca](http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca); internet, date accessed 05 August 2010. Quote from [http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r01\\_10/appendix-annexe.aspx](http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r01_10/appendix-annexe.aspx)
- 3 The report of the “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan” was known as the “Manley Report” after its chair, The Honourable John Manley. See Canada, “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan” (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008); and also, Canada, House of Commons of Canada, *39th Parliament, 2nd Session Journals*, no. 53 (Monday, February 25, 2008, 11:00 a.m.), available at <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=Journals&doc=53&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2>; internet, date accessed 05 August 2010.
- 4 See United Nations, “S/RES/1510 (2003) Resolution 1510 (2003) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 4840th meeting, on 13 October 2003, ” available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf?OpenElement>; internet, accessed 05 August 2010.
- 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters ISAF/United States Forces – Afghanistan, 01 August 2010), 1, accessible at <http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2010/08/02/general-petraeus-issues-new-comisaf-coin-guidance.aspx>; internet, accessed 10 August 2010.
- 6 See Dr. Doug Bland in “Canada’s Contributions to Peace Operations, Past, Present and Future,” Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee,” n.p.; internet, available at <http://forum.peacebuild.ca/content/view/13/27/> , accessed 29 August 2007. ©

## Any Mission, Anywhere, Anytime (TF 3-09 BG's motto)

by Major Ryan Jurkowski

*The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not represent the policy or position of the Army or Department of National Defence.*

*Major Ryan Jurkowski recently deployed on his second tour to Afghanistan with the Task Force 3-09 Battle Group from September 2009 to May 2010 in command of A Company Combat Team (A Coy Cbt Tm), First Battlaion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI), and was also assigned the role of Officer Commanding the Operation Coordination Centre-District Panjwayi (OCC-D(P)). His first tour to Afghanistan was in 2006 as a Company Second-in-Command with 1 PPCLI's Task Force Orion where he was awarded a Mention in Dispatches.*

During work-up training, the Task Force 3-09 Battle Group (TF 3-09 BG) focused on what was described as "dispersed mobile operations" in an attempt to continue taking the moral and physical fight to the insurgents. Based on a variety of reasons, this approach has been adopted by numerous Battle Groups of all nationalities since the re-emergence of the Taliban as a viable military threat in 2005. 1 PPCLI was also quite familiar with this approach after having served throughout southern Afghanistan since 2006, first with Task Force Orion under Operation Enduring Freedom and as the mission transitioned to the current North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) tasking.

Our BG's emphasis on dispersed mobile operations enjoyed widespread support among the troops. Moreover, it was reinforced by routine coordination between theatre and Ottawa, thereby ensuring that our tour was well prepared. As our training developed, we adapted to the conditions emerging from theatre given the success of Operation Kalay

and the substantial gains made by our predecessors, the Second Battalion Royal 22e Regiment BG. In addition to our operational readiness, we maintained a critical focus on the population and identified our partnership with the emerging Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as vital.

Upon arrival in theatre we continued to develop how we trained and within weeks received a narrow scope of terrain that would be ours for the majority of the tour. We were to operate in Panjwayi and Dand districts to "deepen

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*Major Jurkowski was recently posted from 1 PPCLI in Edmonton to Toronto as a student on the Joint Command and Staff Programme.*



*Feb, 2010, at a Patrol Base in Panjiway, with the Operation Centre District, Panjiway Canadian / U.S. Team. Major Ryan Jurkowski (left) and Andy Golda (second from the left), along with other members of the Team, plus the Governor and the Chief of Police, both of Panjiway District.*

*Photo: courtesy Andy Golda*

hold" on the population, capitalising on the new and highly successful Operation Kalay model as we brought stability to regions far from the verges of Kandahar City. What followed saw A Company Combat Team (A Coy Cbt Tm) and the TF 3-09 BG as a whole live up to its motto, "Any Mission, Anywhere, Anytime."

### *Living With, Not Within the Local Population*

Although certainly dispersed, the BG and A Coy Cbt Tm tended to be less mobile than envisioned in our original concept, as we adapted our planning to "live with the locals," which soon took on the addendum, "but not within them."

The Cbt Tm moved into small combat outposts throughout Panjwayi, where the patrolling spirit and offensive combat action flourished. We continued to define, detect and interdict insurgents while simultaneously attempting to gain the support of local nationals.

Among the small patrol bases, there was one located outside of Salavat in an abandoned school the Taliban had captured from the population years prior for their own forward operating base. It had recently been taken over by B Coy Cbt Tm, Second Battalion Royal 22e Regiment BG prior to our arrival and would become Patrol Base Folad ("steel" in Pashtun and the call sign of the Afghan National Army (ANA) company operating with us). The second was Patrol Base Mohejerin, named after the village it protected. This smaller outpost was a 60 by 60 metre Hescoe (a prefabricated, multi-cellular system, made of Alu-Zinc coated steel welded mesh and lined with non-woven polypropylene geotextile)-walled compound set along a route leading into Patrol Base Folad.

Both were within visual contact with the communities they protected, which we soon found expedient in facilitating routine *shuras* with locals who had inherited us as their new neighbours. This relationship quickly grew as both ourselves and the locals shared meals, discussions and concerns with one another on a very routine basis. To remain mobile and manageable, I retained my third platoon (pl) and Cbt Tm HQ in reserve, both operating primarily from Patrol Base Folad. Both patrol bases were within visual contact of one another, with the Cbt Tm's entire Area of Responsibility (AOR) of no more than 15 by 10 kilometres—a far cry from 1 PPCLI's highly dispersed experiences in 2006.

## *From Partnership to Integration*

Our Cbt Tm was in a relatively unique position within the BG's AOR. As a result of our predecessor's hard work, the tactical infrastructure was already fully partnered with the ANA in our patrol bases, with the exception of one location which did not have their Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) members living with them. With priorities shifting around us, after two months our OMLT was re-tasked with the expanded challenge of conducting routine combat operations in a fully integrated, rather than partnered, capacity. The remaining five months of our tour saw the Cbt Tm living, planning and fighting side-by-side with Afghan forces from our small patrol bases as we both worked through our own differences to make the mission work. The dividends were enormous.

Despite my personal reservations about being locked to terrain, let alone in such a small footprint, I quickly became



*Major Jurkowski in a rare meeting with all of his platoon commanders, New Year's Day, 2010, at Patrol Base Mohejerin. (l to r): Captain Cole Peterson, Major Ryan Jurkowski, Captain Dan Gregoire, and Captain Bryce Talsma.*

*Photo: courtesy of Captain Talsma*

a staunch supporter of the concept. From our joint bases in close proximity of the villages, we enjoyed near-immediate gains with the local population and our integrated partners. From this vantage, we could truly develop and "fight the white (local) situational awareness battle" as aggressively as the "red (insurgent)." Through this marriage, the Cbt Tm was able to relentlessly protect the local population through persistent presence, posture, discussions and with appropriate force when necessary, to dissuade and destroy localized threats.

Despite the physical and mental challenges this manner of operations presented, our soldiers enthusiastically embraced the mission for the same reasons I had—namely, the dividends in information collection from locals. Our integration with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) meant that we jointly accepted responsibility for and protection of the local population as well as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops and ANSF members. Moreover, a close relationship developed between the Afghans and our integrated team, despite the insurgents' constant attempts to attack us, dislodge the ANSF from the population and intimidate local nationals with brutality.

## *Security or Governance?*

Around the same time we lost our OMLT, Commander Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) introduced another evolution to the fight that had unfolded over the past four years—it was time to establish robust, capable and heavily supported district-level coordination centres. This would prove to be a key component in furthering the BG's efforts to deepen our

hold through the conduct of governance-led operations.

Although coordination centres at different levels had existed in various forms and names since being established in Kandahar City in 2006, resources would now be assigned to strengthen them. The small Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) detachment was responsible for the herculean task of coordinating whole of government efforts in Panjwayi, an extremely hostile and unforgiving environment where improvised explosive devices (IEDs), assassinations and routine ambushes stymied their best efforts. This role was now passed to the BG by Commander TFA to provide unity of command within Panjwayi (i.e., one unit, the BG, executing a joint plan vice two units, the KPRT and the BG).

On very short notice and within a matter of days, collective BG, KPRT and Operation Coordination Centre-Provincial Kandahar (OCC-P(K)) planning established the requirements for the newly named Operation Coordination Centre-District Panjwayi (OCC-D(P)). The new centre would now be in a position to achieve what Joint District Coordination Centres had found so challenging—to enable district governance through the close coordination of the District Governor (DG), Afghan ministries, ANSF, government organizations, Coalition forces and non-governmental organizations, ensuring synchronicity between security, governance, reconstruction and development while also building Afghan capacity.

The newly established node now enjoyed 24/7 coverage from the district to the provincial level and saw an inflow of several types of resources: highly skilled and experienced Canadian-US (CANUS) civilians from the US Department of Defence, the US Agency for International Development, and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; access to larger amounts of money; a continued Police Mentoring Team (P-OMLT) supporting the Afghan National Police (ANP); a reduced, yet crucial, PRT footprint with their civil-military cooperation capability that still supported operations throughout the district; eventually a Canadian civilian police advisor to further support the ANP; a series of liaison officers from all aspects of the ANSF; and, a district-level security advisor and team provided by A Coy Cbt Tm.

The new team would support the Director General's (DG) office, held by the colourful Haji Baran. OCC-D(P) was operating with a cohesive plan, focused priorities and clear objectives. It also served as a central hub for all lines of communications while remaining a decentralized tactical node of information exchange, cooperation, monitoring and reporting of all activities throughout the district. The OCC-D(P) acted as the critical, and timely, catalyst for ISAF support to Afghan governance and planning. Indeed, the TF 3-09 BG CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh, and his integrated partner, Lieutenant-Colonel Bariz, would discuss tactical problems

with the DG from small combat outposts throughout Panjwayi, jointly identify desired outcomes and then work as a team to execute them.

The OCC-D(P) successfully coordinated these hitherto disparate lines of communication through tremendous support from the BG, the OCC-P(K), the PRT and the DG himself. In so doing, we operated along three distinct yet symbiotic lines of communication: governance, led by the civilian CANUS team; reconstruction and development, also lead by the civilian CANUS team; and security, lead by the A Coy Cbt Tm HQ assets. The latter proved to be the easiest to manage while the reconstruction, and (even more so) the governance piece absorbed much of our time. Efforts in the last two domains were made in tandem with security planning and operations alongside the under-staffed and under-resourced DG's office. However, the critical change was that the DG's office now enjoyed undivided attention from civilian experts in the field of "country building" from the incredibly gifted team assigned to Panjwayi, who brought



*A Canadian CHINOOK helicopter re-supplies Patrol Base FOLAD, outside of Salavat, Panjiway.*

*Author's photo*

with them vast operational field experiences ranging from Georgia to Iraq to Bangladesh.

## *Any Mission, Anywhere, Anytime*

Throughout the establishment and evolution of the OCC-D(P), our Cbt Tm continued relentless combat patrolling and security operations in support of local nationals while participating in numerous diverse BG-, cbt tm- and pl-level combat operations throughout our relatively small AOR. The soldiers remained wholly focused on our mission to prosecute the fight against the insurgents while simultaneously building bonds and trust with both civilian and government Afghans. Although there were a few more footprint changes for the Cbt Tm and an expanded role to assist the ANSF in securing

the major population centres in Panjwayi and Bazaar-e-Panjwayi, the overall activities of our Cbt Tm did not alter from the first few weeks of the tour. Our soldiers deepened the hold throughout their assigned terrain while supporting the opportunity for BG assets to continue fighting the counter-insurgency at the political level. Attempting to turn “bullets into ballots” was a laborious, yet crucial component of our operation method.

The gains made by our Cbt Tm and OCC-D(P) reflect only a very small portion of the activities of TF 3-09 BG. Our primary focus on governance and localized security during the insurgent-induced winter lull was intended to give our replacement BG, based on First Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment, the opportunity to take their fight to the enemy during the summer months, which traditionally experience a rise in insurgent tempo. Moreover, we worked to create the foundation that will enable a continued focus next winter on the gains made by our short seven months in theatre. ©



### Today's Canadian Soldier and the Mission in Afghanistan

by Master-Corporal Justin Lupichuk

In March, 2010, I was asked by my professor, Dr Randall Wakelam, to take part in the Kingston Military Conference. These conferences are hosted by the Laurier Centre of Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, which publishes the *Canadian Military History Journal*. Presented in the last session of the conference was a panel consisting of veterans who have recently returned from active duty. It happened that Dr. Wakelam, who was the primary organizer of the Kingston conference, needed a veteran to represent the Canadian Army. Humbled by the offer, I graciously accepted. This article is a summation of what I presented at the conference, and its content is a reflection of my observations and experiences during my work-up training and deployment to Afghanistan.

I began my work-up training at Petawawa in May 07, and was among the first reservists to arrive on base in preparation of Roto 3-08. I was initially placed in rear party, along with the majority of Reservists that were in the first stream. Six months later I was given a position in Signals

Platoon, which, being an infantry soldier, was about the last place I thought I'd end up in. My initial role within the platoon was to provide force protection for the signallers while they established and maintained communications, and provide security for radio relay broadcast stations situated throughout Kandahar Province. Being a typical Canadian soldier, I wasn't satisfied with learning only my specific role. With the guidance and help of the signals operators, I began to familiarize myself with all the radio equipment and fine tune my radio voice procedure.

Role diversification is a key characteristic of the Canadian Army. Very rarely will you find a trade-qualified soldier without some alternate form of training. For example, a modern Canadian infantry company in Afghanistan contains soldiers that can treat gun-shot wounds, drive LAVs, operate and troubleshoot sophisticated radio equipment, call in air strikes, direct artillery, and even assume opportunities of leadership when they are tragically made available. The military concept of the “strategic corporal”<sup>1</sup> is neither an optimistic theory nor an ideal, but a proud reality in today's Canadian Army. It has fostered a degree of operational flexibility and professional expertise rarely found in any other military across the globe, and has truly made our soldiers in Afghanistan a force to be reckoned with in theatre, and admired internationally.

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*Master-Corporal Justin Alexander Lupichuk is a twenty-four year old member of the Princess of Wales Own Regiment (PWOR). He is currently in his third and last year of studies at RMC.*

Prior to my deployment I had participated in countless ranges and exercises, including a week of escape and evasion and fighting in built up areas (FIBUA). After completing company-level exercises, the entire Battle Group was pulled together to do a series of exercises in Texas where we got a chance to work with our American counterparts and operate in an environment much the same as Afghanistan. The last major exercise was held in CFB Wainwright, which has devoted most of its enormous training area to housing a giant mock-Afghanistan complete with small towns manned by professional, fulltime role players. These role players were not just composed of military personnel, but of ethnic Canadian citizens who volunteered their time and energy to provide our soldiers with much needed exposure to the Afghan culture.

The emphasis of these exercises seemed to be placed on using an appropriate level of force to engage a variety of threats, while simultaneously meeting the demands of the "Three Block War."<sup>2</sup> In other words, a soldier operating in Afghanistan may engage in a firefight with the Taliban, treat wounded civilians, search compounds for contraband, or distribute aid to the impoverished, sometimes all in a single day on the job. Although Canada has trained and deployed many of the finest soldiers in the world, we have provided Afghanistan with much more than just troops to fight the Taliban.

The Canadian soldier in Afghanistan is a police and military mentor, a builder of roads, schools, wells, hospitals, and essential state infrastructure, a provider of food, water, and much needed medical attention; they are humanitarians, enforcers of international law, and guardians of human rights and freedom. Never before has the Canadian Army been called upon to assume such a vast array of roles and tasks. We have answered that call by successfully training our soldiers how to conduct full spectrum operations and meet the ever-changing demands of today's "Three Block War".

While the excellent training we received before deployment was key to our success overseas, equally important was the support we received from our fellow Canadian citizens back home. While on route to Trenton Air Base to fly out to Afghanistan, the buses carrying the entire battle group had stopped at a few towns along the way where people from all over the area had come to see their proud soldiers off to war. Children, government officials, veterans, and people from all walks of life had chosen to put their lives on hold that sunny Monday afternoon to make sure their soldiers were sent off properly and with the true Canadian spirit.

Once the first tan uniformed soldier stepped off that bus, the crowd would go wild and rush forward just to be the first person to shake one of those soldier's hands. Kids had the opportunity to meet and talk to real soldiers just before they deployed. The people were humbled by our bravery, and their concern for our safety was somewhat alleviated by our calm, confident and professional demeanour. The veterans would beam with pride at seeing how fine were the latest generation of Canadian soldiers, and never missed a chance to tell us so. As the veterans looked on, you could almost know

for certain that they were seeing themselves twenty, thirty, or forty years ago on that fateful day before they boarded that train, plane, or boat that would take them off to war.

Words cannot describe how utterly exalted I felt that day. The dread of having to say good bye to my family at the airport seemed to have been lifted away and replaced with a sense of national duty that took precedence over everything else. It was one of those rare moments when I knew exactly who I was, what I had to do, and recognized the profound importance behind our mission.

At the end of the day I felt I had learned something profound about the Canadian Army. When we give our soldiers the best training possible, arm them with state of the art equipment, and put the respect, confidence, and admiration of an entire nation behind them, its little wonder how such a few good Canadian men and women in uniform can accomplish so much. So long as we arm our soldiers with the right tools, the best training, and public support, the Canadian Army will remain, as it always has been, a unique organisation.

Landing in Afghanistan was like nothing I'd experienced before in my life. In a matter of 24 hours I found myself on what seemed to be a completely different planet. I was suddenly in a land without trees, grass, or anything green. Scars from the Russian occupation and from continuous civil war were everywhere. The landscape was littered with burnt-out armoured vehicles, mines, and undetonated ordinance. It was as if I couldn't go anywhere without treading on what seemed to be one gigantic graveyard of war and conflict.

Nothing in Afghanistan seemed to be functioning properly, be it the Afghan police, army, economy, government, or essential state services. The decades of destruction had left much of Afghanistan in shambles, yet there was one thing that remained intact: the pride, dignity, and determination of the Afghan people. Every Afghan I met desired a better life than what they have had up until now and were determined not to take a backseat in the state-building process while International Security Assistance Force did all the work.

Everywhere you found destruction, you found construction, and it was the Afghans who were doing the brunt of the work. It was the same Afghans who endured the slow decay and disintegration of their country who were now rebuilding it. It was quite clear that the vast majority of Afghans were looking for a hand-up, not a hand-out.

It seemed to me that what the general population wanted the most was security, and this was demonstrated by the amazing degree of cooperation we received from the Afghan people. Almost every North American has endured the slow and frustrating process of airport security. Now imagine if you were subject to the same agonizing process everyday you went to work. That is the daily reality of the typical urban Afghan. The Afghan people I met rarely complained about the stiff security, and they were utterly grateful for the presence of coalition forces in their neighbourhood. Most importantly, the Afghans understood that their daily struggle and our fight with the Taliban were one and the same.

*(continued p. 25)*

## THE RECIPIENT OF THE VIMY AWARD

The Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson, PC, has been unanimously selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2010. The award will be presented by His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor General of Canada, on Friday, 19 November, at a mixed gala reception and dinner in the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa.

Madame Clarkson is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout her career of service to Canada and to the Canadian Forces (CF), as Commander-in-Chief. During her tenure as Canada's 26<sup>th</sup> Governor General Madame Clarkson gave recognition to the duties carried out by members of the CF by her visits with Canada's troops in Kosovo, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, and moved and educated Canadians on the role of the CF with her tributes to the Unknown Soldier and Canada's war Veterans, and their families. In 2007, she became third Colonel-in-Chief of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). She was appointed as the Patron of the PPCLI Association later that year.

The Award honours the bravery and sacrifices of the Canadian soldiers who were victorious at the Battle of Vimy Ridge in April 1917. The Institute is the sponsor of the Vimy Award. Since 1991, the Award recognizes one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

## LA RÉCIPiendaIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

La Très honorable Adrienne Clarkson, CP, qui a été choisie à l'unanimité comme récipiendaire du prix Vimy pour 2010. Le prix sera présenté par Son Excellence le Très honorable David Johnston, Gouverneur Général du Canada, le vendredi 19 novembre lors d'une réception et d'un dîner de gal mixtes offerts au Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa.

Madame Clarkson est une Canadienne distinguée qui a fait preuve des plus hauts standards de leadership tout au long de sa carrière au service du Canada et des Forces canadiennes (FC) alors qu'elle en était le commandant en chef. Pendant son mandat comme la 26<sup>ième</sup> gouverneur général du Canada, Madame Clarkson conféré un statut de reconnaissance envers les tâches accomplies par les membres des FC par les visites qu'elle a faites des troupes canadiennes au Kosovo, dans le golfe Persique et en

Afghanistan, et elle a ému et éduqué les Canadiens concernant le rôle des FC dans notre grand pays par les tributs qu'elle a payés au soldat inconnu et aux anciens combattants du Canada et à leurs familles. En 2007, elle est devenue le troisième colonel en chef du Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Elle a été nommée "Patron" de la PPCLI Association plus tard cette année-là.

Le prix veut honorer la bravoure et les sacrifices des soldats canadiens qui remportèrent la victoire lors de la bataille de la crête de Vimy, en avril 1917. L'Institut est le commanditaire du prix Vimy. Depuis 1991, le prix reconnaît un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.



If there was one thing that has helped the Afghan people the most, I believe it was our daily presence patrols. These patrols kept us constantly in-tune with the needs and concerns of the local Afghan people. Once we proved that we are here only to provide for they're safety and for the overall benefit of Afghanistan, we received their trust and confidence in return. This is the core objective of the hearts and minds campaign, which is key to ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban threat.

We cannot delude ourselves into thinking that the latest counterinsurgency technology will be enough to bring down the Taliban. The vast majority of valuable intelligence does not come from satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other forms of surveillance technology, but from local Afghans themselves. We are literally operating in their backyard. The Taliban's greatest advantage is their ability to move among the local populous, only exposing themselves for brief periods to plant improvised explosive devices or launch small ambushes. The Taliban also exploit information from the local population regarding our movement patterns and standard operating procedures. However, these advantages are sustained so long as the Taliban's living camouflage, the Afghans, remain complicit of their activities.

Not only does winning the hearts and minds of Afghans create a positive working relationship with coalition forces, it serves as a double blow to the Taliban. It denies them their only major source of intelligence, and makes it exceedingly more difficult for them to move about undetected.

During my tour there were several cases of the Taliban resorting to force or coercion to extract information or acquire provisions from the local population essential to their survival. I perceived this as a sign that the wide local support base, which Taliban so desperately rely on, was beginning to crumble as a result of ISAF winning the support and favour of the Afghan people.

President Karzai once said to General Hillier, "You know, General, the greatest threat to Afghanistan is us – our own lack of capacity to do anything. The greatest way to help us overcome the threat to us is to help us build our ability to govern ourselves: not just build our army and police, but a functioning government structure."<sup>3</sup> Note how the president is not blaming the Taliban for the nation's troubles. This is because Afghanistan is not the victim of an elaborate terrorist plot destined to preclude the nation's realization of statehood. Rather, non-state aggressors and terrorist organizations,

such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, are manifestations born out of any territory with a critically weak government and a dysfunctional state security apparatus.

The insurgency in Afghanistan is a unique case. There remain other countries around the world plagued with similar paramilitary organizations threatening to destabilize their host nation, and still more countries at serious risk of degenerating to the point of collapse and becoming the next 'Afghanistan'.

It is absolutely necessary for the Canadian Forces to continue to serve admirably in Afghanistan for as long as required. We may continue to learn from our experiences and develop the best means of ensuring that failed states have a fair opportunity to realize statehood. I state this out of abject certainty that Afghanistan will not be the last nation in dire need of a massive international intervention capable of establishing the conditions necessary for state building. Given our vast accomplishments throughout our commitment to Afghanistan, you can rest assured that Canada will be among the first of nations to be called upon in future to support North Atlantic Treaty Organisation missions.

Today, Canadian soldiers who trained to fight a modern and conventional war with the Soviet Union, and who went on to participate in peacekeeping and peace-support operations, are now fighting a war against an enemy that is, by no stretch of the imagination, modern or conventional. The 9/11 attacks revealed the new and emerging threat of global terrorism born out of Islamic revolutionaries, the most famous being Al Qaeda's Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban's Mullah Omar.

What many Canadians are not fully aware of is that this new threat sparked another revolution, that which has been occurring in the Canadian Forces. The dawn of the twenty-first century brought about a series of gradual changes in Canadian military doctrine, engineered and implemented by our nation's finest. New concepts such as 'full spectrum operations', the 'strategic corporal', and 'the three block war' were coined to address the exceedingly complex battlefield our soldiers face today.

Our statesmen must acknowledge today's calibre of soldiers, their vast capabilities, their socio-political and security contributions to state building, and the profound consequences of 'bringing our troops home.' With all that we have achieved in Afghanistan, we mustn't leave the international community and our NATO comrades wondering how they can continue rehabilitating failed states and remedying destabilized regions without us.

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Gen. Hillier, Rick. *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats, and the Politics of War*. Toronto: HapperCollins Publishers, 2009.

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## (Endnotes)

1 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*. (Marines Magazine, Jan 1999).

2 Gen. Krulak, "...the three block war – contingencies in which soldiers may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks."

3 Gen. Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats, and the Politics of War*, (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), pp. 293. ©

## AFGHANISTAN: GETTING OUT

by Monsieur Louis Delvoie

In earlier issues of *On Track* and of the *Canadian Military Journal*, I have argued that (a) Afghanistan's history and its inherent social, cultural and religious conservatism and traditionalism mean that it is highly unlikely that it can be converted in a matter of a few decades into a thriving liberal democracy featuring respect for human rights, the rule of law and gender equality; (b) Pakistan's assessment of its national interests in relation to Afghanistan means that Pakistan's security establishment will continue to support the Afghan Taliban, more or less covertly; and (c) the nature and ubiquity of Al Qaeda mean that its ability to regain a foothold in Afghanistan will not significantly alter the threat that it poses to the West and Western interests. If these propositions are essentially correct, then the time is long past due for Western countries to begin planning their exit from Afghanistan.

Some such as the Netherlands and Canada have already made a start with decisions to withdraw their combat forces in 2010-2011. The Western enterprise as a whole, however, seems bogged down in a thoroughly inconclusive military campaign and development effort with a plethora of political, security and humanitarian objectives, and above all no end in sight. After nearly ten largely fruitless years on the ground, it is not defeatism but realism to start an open discussion of end games and exit strategies.

It will certainly not be easy for NATO and its member states to withdraw from Afghanistan with a minimum loss of face, as the United States is now finding out in Iraq. The internal and external forces which have bedeviled the war effort will all be present in spades in any attempt to craft a political solution as a prelude to Western disengagement. The number of contending regional, national, ethnic, tribal and religious interests which will have to be conciliated, if not reconciled, is simply enormous. It will require sustained and subtle diplomacy of the highest order to pull it off, and that over a fairly prolonged period of time.

Contrary to the views which frequently appear in media reports, there is more to achieving even a wobbly political solution in Afghanistan than quietly co-opting a few "moderate" Taliban to join the government of President Hamid Karzai. If only life were that simple, but nothing is ever simple in Afghanistan, as the history of the country has repeatedly demonstrated. Before going to its internal contradictions, the external dimensions of the problem must be addressed.

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### *The External Dimensions*

Afghanistan is deeply linked by ethnic and religious ties to four of its neighbours, neighbours which have never hesitated to interfere in Afghan affairs whenever they felt that their interests or those of their Afghan allies were threatened. Writing some 15 years ago, the distinguished American expert on Afghan affairs, Dr. Barnett Rubin, put it this way:

"The region around Afghanistan is itself going through the turmoil of revolution and state building. Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, (and) Tajikistan – all are to different degrees insecure states, warily eyeing each other. Any power shift in Afghanistan disquiets some and pleases others. The resulting security dilemmas render extraordinarily difficult the construction of a demarcated domestic political arena in Afghanistan, let alone a stable one."

Little has occurred in the last 15 years which would tend to invalidate this judgment.

Indeed, if anything, the situation has in recent years become even more complicated. There are now at least seven countries playing their own "funny games" in Afghanistan – Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

For Pakistan, the presence of a friendly and well disposed Afghan government in Kabul is essential to the preservation of its national unity and territorial integrity, given the Pachtun separatist tendencies in both countries and given the still unresolved issue of the border between the two countries, the so-called Durand line. But Afghanistan also plays into the Pakistani calculations in its long standing conflict with India. Pakistani strategic thinkers see Afghanistan as a potential asset in providing them with some strategic depth in the event of a prolonged war with India.

Their Indian counterparts see it as being in their interest to deny that asset to Pakistan, and indeed to use Afghanistan as an intelligence gathering outpost from which to monitor developments in northern Pakistan. The two countries are thus at present engaged in a sharp competition to increase their presence in Afghanistan and to enhance their influence with the Afghan government.

Revolutionary Iran has had long-standing ties to the Shia Hazzara community of Afghanistan and has provided it with considerable support over the years. Iran has been involved in a variety of efforts to curb the spread of radical Sunni Muslim movements, many of which are viscerally

hostile to the Shiites. Saudi Arabia for its part has come to see Afghanistan as yet another theatre in its ongoing competition with Iran for influence in the Muslim world at large. Saudi Arabia has provided generous financial and material support to Afghan Islamist organizations such as the Jamiat I Islami and the Hezb I-Islami, and it is no accident that Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime which ruled Afghanistan from 1995 to 2001. The Saudi-Iranian competition carries on apace and both countries continue to operate clandestinely in support of their allies and interests in Afghanistan.

One of the reasons which motivated the Soviet Union to invade and occupy Afghanistan in 1979 was to prevent the spread of radical Islam to its then Muslim republics. Such a potential development was seen as a threat to the political stability and territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. Much the same factors motivate Russia's current interest in Afghanistan. It does not wish to see the neighbouring republics of Central Asia destabilized by Islamist forces, and most especially it does not wish to see Afghanistan become a training ground for jihadists likely to make their way to Chechnya and Dagestan and to fuel the separatist movements there. The Russian government is also probably not impervious to reports of important mineral resource discoveries in Afghanistan. All in all Russia can be expected to maintain an active interest in Afghan affairs for many years to come.

Finally, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which have two abiding interests in matters relating to Afghanistan. The first is to ensure that their ethnic minorities in northern Afghanistan are not totally dominated, marginalized or discriminated against by an Afghan government primarily representing the interests of the far more numerous Pachtuns. The second is to avoid the spread into their countries of radical Islamist ideologies and movements emanating from Afghanistan; in this they make common cause with the Russians. In short, these two countries will want to see emerge a broadly based Afghan government dominated neither by Pachtuns nor Islamists.

Those charged with finding a way to extricate NATO and the Western powers from Afghanistan will have to enter into serious negotiations with all of these external actors. Given the often contradictory interests and purposes in play, it may prove impossible to achieve general support among them for any proposed solution. The best that may be achieved may be undertakings not to sabotage the process. Even this will prove extremely difficult.

The United States might usefully anticipate events by exploring possibilities for a somewhat less confrontational relationship with Iran and by stimulating a more productive dialogue between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. It is not too early to begin laying the foundation stones.

## *The Internal Dimensions*

Coming to grips with the internal dimensions of the conflict as part of an effort to craft an exit strategy will in the

first instance require taking on board some hard realities, on the part of both Western governments and publics.

The first and most obvious of these realities is that there will be no "victory" in Afghanistan. The history of wars against insurgencies in the twentieth century suggests that few, if any, end in decisive battles, unconditional surrenders or VE/VJ days. Such conflicts tend to end not on the battlefield but in far removed conference rooms with diplomats thrashing out compromises and face-saving deals. Selling such an outcome to Western publics which have sacrificed so much blood and treasure in Afghanistan will be challenging indeed.

The second harsh reality is that the negotiating partner in bringing the conflict to an end will be the Taliban. This will not be the Taliban of media wishful thinking – Taliban "foot soldiers" whose loyalty can be bought with offers of money and jobs, Taliban "moderates" who can be co-opted. It will in fact be the hard core leadership of the Taliban, notable for their brutality, their religious intolerance, their authoritarianism and their misogyny. This will be a hard pill to swallow for Western governments and publics alike, especially given the demonization of the Taliban which has been fostered in an effort to sustain public support for the war. (General Hillier's reference to "scumbags" comes to mind).

Here again the history of twentieth century insurgencies is instructive. The British government swore that it would never compromise with the Mau Mau terrorists in Kenya, but it did and some years later the Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta was an honoured guest at Buckingham Palace. For years the French government categorically refused to negotiate with the FLN in Algeria, but eventually it did and twenty years on the President of France sat on the dais of the Algerian National Assembly with one of the original leaders of the FLN at his side. Successive Israeli governments refused to recognize or deal with the PLO, but eventually they did, culminating in the iconic photo of Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands with Yasser Arafat on the lawn of the White House. No matter how distasteful, the Taliban in their turn will have to be accommodated. The only saving grace in this case is that it may be possible to leave most of the negotiating with the Taliban to the Afghan government and to Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency.

Another unpalatable reality which must be borne in mind is that whatever dispensation is put in place to permit the withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan may have a very short shelf life. The quintessential example of this phenomenon is the painstakingly negotiated agreement between the United States and North Vietnam which came into effect in 1973 and which won Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho the Nobel peace prize. In less than two years it was rendered meaningless as the army of North Vietnam invaded and took over South Vietnam.

In its two hundred year history as a more or less recognizable political entity, Afghanistan has proved to be a remarkably volatile and unstable country, prone to tribal uprisings, army mutinies and palace coups; only a handful of

Afghan leaders have died peacefully in their beds. Whatever government is left in place by the retreating Western powers could quickly fall victim to an outbreak of tribal unrest or religious fanaticism, or both.

Beyond reaching an agreement with the Taliban on the cessation of hostilities, the problem of creating a more or less viable Afghan government looms large. This government will almost by definition have to include elements of the Taliban in order to consolidate the peace. This will prove to be a very mixed blessing. On the one hand, it will mean the entry into government of a group of inflexible politico-religious zealots, ever on the lookout for opportunities to seize power completely. On the other hand, it may help to solidify support for the government among Pachtuns, many of whom are hostile to the Karzai regime and who support the Taliban, not out of sympathy for their ideology, but as an expression of self-interested ethnic solidarity and of strong distaste for the presence of foreign military forces on their soil.

The entry of the Taliban into government will provoke reactions of suspicion and hostility on the part of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazzaras and other smaller ethnic groups. In the formation of a government of national unity, their interests and demands will have to be taken into account and met to the greatest extent possible, as will those of powerful (albeit somewhat unsavoury) regional chieftains such as Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan. The allocation of cabinet posts and governorships in a new government will require the diplomatic skills of a Talleyrand and the wisdom of a Solomon. And even then certain ethnic groups and tribes will feel short-changed, aggrieved and ready to seize the earliest opportunity to change the system.

This leads almost inevitably to another question: is Hamid Karzai the man best suited to form and lead a new government? His present government is singularly unpopular among Afghans because of its well deserved reputation

for corruption, mismanagement and ineffectiveness. Even among his fellow Pachtuns he is widely regarded as little more than a reviled tool of the western powers. He would indeed seem to carry too much baggage to be regarded as a credible leader of a future Afghan government. This means that those charged with devising exit strategies for NATO and the West should turn their attention to identifying, and discretely bolstering the prospects of a new candidate for the leadership of Afghanistan. Now is not too soon.

### *Conclusion*

All of this may cause dismay among those who have supported the war in Afghanistan, and particularly those who have made sacrifices there. And well it should. It should not, however, be allowed to obscure a clear view of two interconnected realities. On the one hand, the Taliban are inspired by an unsavoury but powerful ideology; they are for the most part Afghans fighting in Afghanistan for the control of their own country. If defeated on the battlefield, they will retire to their lairs, lick their wounds, reconstitute their strength and wait for an opportune time to strike again. They will not disappear. On the other hand, the Western armies in Afghanistan are fighting to counter an otherwise manageable and anything but existential threat (Al Qaeda is not the Soviet Union equipped with thousands of nuclear armed missiles). What is more, the goal posts in the campaign have shifted so many times that they are now barely discernible.

Western soldiers are thousands of miles away from their home countries, in a thoroughly inhospitable and often hostile land, at great expense to their taxpayers. And public opinions in the Western democracies show little inclination of a willingness to contemplate another Hundred Years War.

Under the circumstances it seems a safe bet to suggest that the Taliban will outlast the Western armies in Afghanistan. Better to recognize the inevitable now rather than to postpone it at great cost in lives and money. ©



## Pakistan's Sponsorship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: A Threat to International Peace and Security

by Chris Alexander

The international effort to stabilize Afghanistan has so far relied mainly upon state-building programmes and counter-insurgency operations inside Afghanistan. Some results have been impressive and substantial. A government, which in 2002 barely collected \$40 million in revenue, will have over \$1.2 billion in revenues this fiscal year. The militias that fuelled the civil war of the 1990s have been fully disarmed. Army, police and security forces now comprise over 250,000 officers, NCOs and soldiers. The school system is serving over 6.5 million students. Clinics and new roads blanket the countryside. Agriculture and rural development are thriving. Opium cultivation has fallen sharply from its post-Taliban peak in 2007.

Counter-insurgency operations have also begun to bear fruit. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has reached a strength of 140,000, with tens of thousands more deployed under US command in training and other specialized roles.

An effective presence of Afghan forces—with much stronger US support—has been established in many districts of the south, where the Taliban previously had free reign to suborn and intimidate. As a consequence, the reliance of infantry on air power has been reduced: there were 64 percent fewer civilian casualties due to aerial bombardment in the first six months of 2010, compared to 2009. In fact, the proportion of civilian casualties for which Afghan and international forces are responsible has fallen to an all-time low, under 12 percent, while both the absolute number and proportion of casualties incurred by the Taliban has risen dramatically. From January to June 2010, 3,286 Afghans were killed or injured in the conflict, a 31 percent increase over the first half of 2009. But fully 76 percent of these civilian casualties were caused by the Taliban and its allies—mainly through IEDs and suicide attacks—compared to 53 percent in 2009.

In short, the Afghan state and Afghan society are now stronger than at any time in the past decade. Moreover, security forces are meeting the Taliban threat and protecting civilians more effectively. But the human cost of the insurgency is still growing. Moreover, the scale of the insurgency—the number and sophistication of IED and suicide cells in the field, as well as efforts to subvert the institution-building project in Afghanistan—is also expanding. Finally, efforts to reach out to more tractable

Taliban through a wide variety of reconciliation initiatives have been comprehensively rebuffed or derailed by the same players who seek to prevent Afghan institutions from gathering strength. In other words, in spite of a major troop surge, the tidewaters of insurgency are still rising; in spite of concerted efforts to launch high-level talks, peace remains elusive.

*Why is this so?*

Just as state-building has taken place inside the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 2001, the exiled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has been strengthened on the territory of Pakistan over the same period.

*What is the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan?*

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is, in effect, the Taliban-led government that was deposed in 2001 after five years of tumultuous, repressive rule in Kabul, and seven years in Kandahar. It is a leadership council under Mullah Mohammad Omar, a man who has not been seen in a decade. It is a coalition of terrorist networks, including Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Tribal Organization, who agreed to work towards a restored Islamic Emirate as early as late 2001. It is the leaders of Al Qaeda who set up shop in Waziristan and elsewhere after fleeing Nangarhar, Paktika and other parts of Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. It is the military and political leaders of the Taliban's consultative, military and leadership bodies who set up shop in Quetta and other towns in Pashtun north-eastern Baluchistan, where they have commanded and controlled planning, targeting, training, logistics and operations for the insurgency ever since. It is also allied groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Lashkar-i Taiba, who have played major roles in destabilizing countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and India, including through attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and on Mumbai in November 2008.

According to estimates made by ISAF and other respected analysts, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan now has over 20,000 commanders and soldiers in the field across Afghanistan. They use some of the most sophisticated light and heavy weapons. Their bomb-making techniques continue to improve in response to Afghan and ISAF tactics. Their ammunition supply lines rarely, if ever, run dry. Their command structure is ruthlessly horizontal, with commanders killed quickly replaced by younger, often more extreme, subordinates.

*(continued p. 31)*

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*Chris Alexander was Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan (2003-05) and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (2006-09). His book on Afghanistan since 2001, entitled 'The Long Way Back: The Case for Afghanistan', will be published by HarperCollins in 2011. He is now the Federal Conservative Candidate for Ajax-Pickering. He has contributed this article in his personal capacity.*



*Conference of Defence Associations Institute's*

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## ***CANADA'S SECURITY INTERESTS***



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Their lines of command and communication consistently run back to Baluchistan, Waziristan or other agencies in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), or to obscure addresses in densely-populated cities with large Pashtun populations such as Karachi and Peshawar. The leadership, logistic and training centres on which they rely have never been subjected to Pakistan army action, and the drone attacks to which these groups are occasionally subject in Waziristan and other agencies have not been extended to Baluchistan.

In effect, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a creation of Pakistan's army, and in particular its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. Its political leaders are invisible, its political message vacuous to the point of caricature. It is primarily a military organization.

In 2001 and 2002, key members who sought to reconcile with Kabul were assassinated or intimidated back into line. From 2003 to 2007, dissidents within Pakistan were threatened, arrested, or simply turned over to US authorities as "members of Al Qaeda" until they recanted their anti-Taliban views.

Since 2008, Taliban members who reached out to Afghan authorities to explore reconciliation have been systematically arrested, including most notoriously the commander of the southern front Mullah Baradar, who was picked up in Karachi early in 2010 after several months of exploratory talks with key advisors to Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

In other words, the Taliban's return to the field has been no accident. It has been a carefully orchestrated project of Pakistan's army and ISI, under the direction of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, current Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani and their key associates responsible for policy in Afghanistan.

The re-launch of the insurgency has come at a terrible cost for Pakistan. At least 30,000 Taliban commanders and foot soldiers have been killed since 2001. Since 2007, the Taliban has been engaged in a parallel campaign against Pakistan itself, prompting a series of operations to re-establish government

control in Swat, Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai and elsewhere. But none of this has changed the growth trajectory of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which remains the main threat to international peace and security in South and Central Asia, and one of the most serious threats to the world as a whole, given its links to attacks elsewhere in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America.

Pakistan no longer makes even a pretence of hiding these facts. In an article in *The New York Times* on August 23, Dexter Filkins quoted a "Pakistani security official" as saying the following: "We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us." The official went on: "We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians."

After Baradar was arrested the message to the others was clear: no flirting with the Afghans, United States or United Kingdom without direct Pakistani involvement. Pakistan's sponsorship of the Taliban has also been borne out by Matt Waldman's June paper for the London School of Economics, entitled "The Sun in the Sky: the relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents."

Afghans have been painfully aware of this predicament for years. Their disillusion with the United States and the international community has stemmed principally from a perception that we have uncritically backed Pakistan at precisely the moment when that country had become the greatest obstacle to nation-building and stability in Afghanistan. Bilateral relations between the two countries will require sustained attention to overcome a treacherous legacy, a journey that business and civil society will eagerly embark upon, if they are given the chance. In the meantime, the world must now choose between the legitimate Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its misbegotten, violent and illegitimate rival. Cross-border interference has no place in a stable Afghanistan. The future of this region and the credibility of the current international system now depend upon our choice.

©



## Militaries and Modernization in the Developing World: Lessons from the Past

by Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Kilford

*The comments expressed in this article are the opinion of the author.*

On the western edge of Kabul, near Lake Qargha, is a vast construction site that will soon take shape as the new Afghan Defence University (ADU). Construction began in April 2010 and the site will eventually bring together eight Afghan training and education schools currently located throughout Kabul. For example, the ADU will include the Afghan equivalent of the Royal Military College (the National Military Academy of Afghanistan), a Senior Non-Commissioned Officers' Academy and the Counter Insurgency Training Centre. In late 2012, when the final phase of the \$205 million (USD) construction effort is over, almost 6,000 students will attend classes each day supported by approximately 1,000 faculty and support staff.

The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)-led construction effort, given its scope and scale, cannot fail to impress visitors to the site. As Dr. Jack Kem, Deputy to the Commander of NTM-A has said on many occasions, the ADU will be the "crown jewel" of NATO and Afghan Government efforts to rapidly modernize the Afghan National Army (ANA) through sustained high-quality training and education.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the Afghan military modernization drive includes basic literacy training for newly enrolled soldiers, who are almost all unable to read and write.

The impact that the ANA's forced march towards modernization will have on Afghan society is one important aspect of the ANA's growth that has somewhat been overlooked by the media and international community. For the media the focus often falls on issues such as the ANA's ineffectiveness.

The international community, largely through NATO, concentrates much of its attention on achieving recruitment targets and improving the combat effectiveness of the Afghan military so that one day foreign military forces can depart. However, and if the history of foreign military assistance to developing countries is taken into account, the widening modernization gap between the Afghan military and other Afghan government ministries should give ample reason for concern. Indeed, the creation of modernization gaps between military and civilian institutions in developing countries has often led military leaders into thinking that they are far better

qualified to run their respective countries than politicians.

The political involvement by military forces in the developing world during the Cold War, for example, was an unexpected by-product of foreign military assistance programs. Through such programs armies in the developing world embarked upon major expansions and were the recipients of new equipment. Moreover, educational opportunities abroad resulted in the development of a political consciousness in the military, especially amongst the officers. This political consciousness, factored in with the high regard that the civilian populations typically viewed their militaries, proved, more often than not, a decidedly volatile combination that frequently ended in the ouster of corrupt civilian governments.

Of course, when developed countries offered military assistance to the developing world during the Cold War, it was not with a view to promoting military takeovers. In fact, Western policy makers had been heavily influenced by several prominent American political scientists who argued in the 1960s that military assistance to developing countries was the best means to drive economic development by unifying diverse populations, stimulating literacy and creating a group of well-educated people. In 1962 Edward Shils suggested that the military in a developing country was best placed to "widen horizons beyond village and locality."<sup>2</sup> John Lovell and Eugene Kim added that militaries had a key role in rejecting old values and beliefs and introducing Western ideas instead.

Military officers receiving training from the United States, they wrote, could be viewed as one of the key means available for disseminating "signals" such as "ideas, values, skills, techniques, and strategies of political change," from the external environment.<sup>3</sup> Without doubt, such thinking greatly influenced the foreign military assistance policies of the United States, Canada and Great Britain at the time.

The idea that military assistance could play an important role in modernizing developing countries had not been drawn out of thin air—opinion on the subject was strongly influenced by the efforts of the Joint American Military Aid Mission to Turkey, which fell under the umbrella of the Marshall Plan after 1945.

Turkey, despite Ataturk's reforms, had remained a rural nation and much of the population was illiterate. As for its armed forces the army still relied on horses as the primary means of transport. However, in 1950, the Turkish government retired many senior officers, replacing them with younger men. American "Field Training Teams" were

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*The ADU construction site encompasses 105 acres with a total of 1500 acres set-aside for ranges and training areas. Besides classrooms and offices, there will be several gymnasiums, a central library, family housing for instructors and apartments for visiting faculty. In the foreground, new buildings for the National Military Academy of Afghanistan can be seen under construction – about one-tenth of the construction currently underway with more buildings to come.*

*Author's photo*

then assigned from Army to Battalion level. New technical training schools were opened and in 1955 women were allowed to enrol in Turkey's War Academy.

In order to address the matter of wide-spread illiteracy, uneducated draftees were sent to one of sixteen specially constructed army education centres located throughout the country--a considerable effort as usually 50 percent or approximately 120,000 men of the annual draft intake were illiterate on entry. Inside one of the new centres, soldiers faced an eight-week curriculum that included reading and writing, basic mathematics and personal hygiene.<sup>4</sup>

The impact that larger modernizing militaries had on societies in general was captured by Richard D. Robinson in 1963. In the case of Turkey he observed that living standards in the Turkish Army were far better for young soldiers than anything previously experienced in civilian life. More important, "many young discharged soldiers found their traditional society inadequate to sustain their new

level of expectations." This, he continued, often led families to collapse as young men left their villages for the cities and towns to which they had become accustomed. In 1959, a high-level Turkish government planner believed that this phenomenon was likely behind accelerating urbanization in Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

What academics in the 1960s often failed to see, however, was what might happen if militaries in the developing world began to out-pace efforts to modernize civilian institutions.<sup>6</sup> There appeared, for example, to be little concern that Western trained military forces would want to play a political role given they had been largely indoctrinated in the Western model of military-civilian relations in which the military was subservient to the governing party. But as Brian Loveman pointed out, once officers in developing countries, "became more attuned to [Western] professional norms and expectations, they more vociferously and vigorously denounced inept, short-sighted civilian politicians who

[failed] to create political stability or promote economic development.”<sup>7</sup>

Consequently, politicians in the developing world repeatedly found their grip on power under pressure from a new elite drawn from the lower classes--the military officer. In fact, entry into the armed forces was often the only means of upward social mobility for much of the general population.

In Ghana, said William Gutteridge in 1961, “a peasant cocoa farmer or a post office clerk is more likely to be the father of an army officer at present than a member of one of the professions who will probably have educated his son for the Bar of the Civil Service or similar occupation of established prestige.”<sup>8</sup> In the Middle East, said Shils, officers were often “the brightest and most ambitious young men of the small

towns and countryside. These young men often come from the families of petty traders, small craftsmen, and cultivators of small holdings. Like their fathers, they are aware of the distance separating them from the rich and the political elite. Thus, there is brought into a potentially powerful position a body of intelligent, ambitious young men, equipped with a modicum of modern technical education but with little sense of identity with politicians and big businessmen.”<sup>9</sup>

In 1969, the Canadian Interdepartmental Military Assistance Committee, in their report, “Canadian Military Assistance to Developing Countries” added that officers were often drawn from lower and middle classes and not from the families of the political elite.

Military education, often carried out in the developed world, coupled with an introduction to advanced technology contributed, in their opinion, to “an innovating outlook in the context of a tradition-oriented society.” In many countries, the report continued, “the military are also less concerned by traditional forms of religion and therefore less likely to let religious conservatism serve as a barrier to change.”

Notably, the Committee also concluded, “even in countries where the military do not aspire to or attain political control, they are apt to form one of the

‘core institutions’ of national life to a degree unknown in the majority of modern developed countries.”<sup>10</sup>

As for Afghanistan, the vast majority of the population still lives in small, isolated villages where livelihoods are based on subsistence farming and animal husbandry. There is virtually no modern industry and the basics of military life such as discipline, routine and personal hygiene are completely foreign to ANA recruits. Most have never seen a dentist or doctor. However, the focus of international military assistance in Afghanistan has not been with a view to encouraging social and economic modernization but instead on fighting a growing insurgency. Nevertheless, as the ANA continues to expand it will have an impact on Afghan society.

New educational opportunities, especially overseas for officers and the chance for impressionable Afghan recruits to see who and what lies beyond their villages will undoubtedly raise the political and social consciousness of the Afghan military.

Plans to strengthen and reform civilian institutions by the Afghan Government in conjunction with the international community, on the other hand, have not been on the same scale as the ADU effort. The good news is that something is being done to address this issue. For example, the US-funded Afghan Civil Service Support program holds some hope that civilian government ministries will modernize on par with the ANA. The two-year, \$84 million program will train 16,000 civil servants in such areas as financial and project management, procurement, human resources and strategic



On a recent visit to Kabul, Major-General Alain Parent (DComd CEFCom) had an opportunity to be briefed by Dr. Jack Kem (Deputy to the Commander NTM-A and on the left) and visit the ADU construction site. Currently, Canada provides instructors and support to the Junior Officer Staff Course for Captains and Majors at the existing Afghan Command and Staff College in Kabul.

Author's photo

planning. The Afghan Civil Service Institute has also received international funding and support with a view to improving its efficiency and expanding its presence throughout the country.

From a Canadian perspective, the Canadian Governance Support Office in Kabul is another, albeit small, example of the international community working hard to build capacity within the Afghan government. Such efforts lessen the possibility and consequences of a modernization gap developing between the military and other ministries in Afghanistan.

Indeed, the future economic and social modernization of Afghanistan will only be successful if the international investment in civilian capacity development continues. Every dollar invested will be money well spent.

## (Endnotes)

- 1 In June 2010, the author was able to visit the ADU construction site on two occasions with Dr. Kem. Dr. Kem noted that while the ADU is an ANA institution, there will be vacancies where appropriate for the police and civilians from all Afghan ministries. The other five schools that will be co-located at the ADU site are the ANA Command and Staff College, the ANA War College, the Religious-Cultural Affairs School, Legal School and a Foreign Language Institute. The ANA currently has a strength of approximately 134,000 with a view to reaching a final establishment of 171,600 in late 2011.
  - 2 Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. by John J. Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 33.
  - 3 John P. Lovell and C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Military and Political Change in Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 1 / 2, Spring – Summer, 1967, 118.
  - 4 Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *The Military Intervenes – Case Studies in Political Development*, ed. by Henry Bienen (Hartford, Connecticut: Connecticut Printers, 1968), 128.
  - 5 Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic – A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), 250.
  - 6 The Turkish military had overthrown the government in May 1960 but returned power to civilian politicians 17 months later in October 1961. See: Andrew Mango, *The Turks Today* (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004), 57.
  - 7 Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 69.
  - 8 William F. Gutteridge, *The Place of the Army in Society in Commonwealth African Territories* (R.M.A. Sandhurst: Unpublished Study, 1961-62), 17.
  - 9 Shils, 17.
  - 10 Canada, Library and Archives Canada, *Canadian Military Assistance to Developing Countries – A Review by the Interdepartmental Military Assistance Committee*, 9 July 1969, 4. ©
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## The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence

by Dr. James Fergusson

Since former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin's February 2005 "no," ballistic missile defence (BMD) has disappeared from the Canadian defence agenda. While the Harper government initially hinted that it might re-visit the decision, and many expected the Conservatives to act quickly to reverse the decision, they too have remained silent.

For all intents and purposes in Canada, BMD does not exist. The same cannot be said, however, for Canada's allies, and developments in Europe and NATO promise to put missile defence back onto the Canadian agenda.

Despite some expectations that the Obama administration, following its Democrat predecessors, Clinton, Carter and Johnson, would put the brakes to US BMD efforts, the multi-faceted US programs have continued to move forward. The US ground-based mid-course defence system, located at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg, California, now consists of 22 and 3 interceptors respectively, with another 5 to be deployed by the end of this year. The sea-based Aegis and ground-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) are now operational, joining the Patriot tactical system.

Integration of missile defence systems are underway, centered upon the Missile Defense Integrated Operations Center at Schriever Air Force Base outside Colorado Springs. The first satellites of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) have been successfully tested in space, and the airborne laser has successfully completed its first test under operational conditions.

Across the Atlantic, movement towards a NATO missile defence system continues, albeit at a somewhat slower pace. At the 2009 NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, and in direct contrast to the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit communiqué, the alliance spoke of the need for further work on missile defence, albeit noting the importance of a future US architectural contribution.

In September 2009, the Obama Administration cancelled the Bush-era agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy ground-based, mid-course interceptors and an x-band tracking and cueing radar on their respective territories—a decision seen as a means to placate Russian opposition and improve overall American-Russian strategic relations.

However, the decision to cancel these agreements did not mean an end to US-led alliance missile defence efforts. Instead, the Administration announced a "phase-adaptive approach."

Next year, the US will forward deploy mobile radar

and sea-based Aegis missile defences. This is to be followed in 2015 by additional Aegis defences, and a ground-based variant of the Aegis Standard Missile-3. No decision has been made on the location of the ground-based variant, but Romania, among others, has indicated an interest in supporting future deployments. Alongside these developments, the Group of Experts report on a new NATO Strategic Concept, released on May 17, recommended that NATO "recognize territorial missile defence as an essential mission of the Alliance." In so doing, the Group of Experts emphasized the importance of a strategic defence for Europe against growing missile threats from the Middle East (Iran) that simultaneously will not "threaten the Russian strategic deterrent," promote security cooperation with Russia, and enhance NATO's deterrent and the indivisibility of transatlantic security.

Given these developments, missile defence will be a central component when the alliance confirms its new Strategic Concept in the near future. For Canada, this represents a major conundrum. It is highly unlikely that the Harper government will take issue with missile defence in the new Strategic Concept, which would prevent an alliance consensus. To do so would be inconsistent with previous Canadian acceptance of the missile defence phrases in previous communiqués. As a result, Canada will find itself a participant in an evolving NATO strategic missile defence, but a non-participant in North America. Moreover, Canada will also likely find itself funding the NATO system, assuming that the allies agree to use common infrastructure funds.

If this were another country, the government might fear a public backlash to a situation in which its allies are defended from a ballistic missile attack, but Canada is not, a fear expressed within the Pearson cabinet during the initial stages of the US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) effort in the 1960s. Being Canada, however, the government is more likely to be concerned about charges of duplicity, as occurred following the Mulroney decision in 1985 not to participate officially in the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research programme, but to allow Canadian companies to do so. In this case, these concerns revolved around the development of guidelines for government support to industrial research linked to SDI through the Defence Industrial Productivity Programme (DIPP) and for military involvement through North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in areas linked to SDI.

In not distancing itself from the Martin decision, the Harper government is vulnerable to the charge of participating in missile defence through the NATO "backdoor," and thereby becoming involved in the current US-only North American system. Of course, this assumes that the opposition parties are

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cognizant of NATO developments, and seize the opportunity to make it a political issue. Nonetheless, for a government apparently sensitive to the missile defence question, the potential for political fallout, even if the issue is relatively marginal to the Canadian public, cannot be entirely ignored. Even more important, however, future NATO developments may significantly alter the missile defence dynamic in Canada-US defence relations.

From the perspective of North America, the NATO missile defence effort and the planned US European deployments reside in the category of “theatre” defences. Designed primarily to defeat medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the Middle East, and thereby eliminate Russian concerns that a US-led NATO effort would threaten its strategic (inter-continental) forces, the ability of the Aegis systems to provide a North American defence contribution is open to question.

The current layered missile defence system for threats from the Far East (North Korea) entails Aegis and the ground-based, mid-course system, as well as THAAD for the defence of Hawaii. As Aegis is designed as the first defence layer, depending upon the ship locations, it will be capable of taking an early shot, likely up to the late boost phase, at an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Fort Greely and Vandenberg systems provide a second intercept layer, developed specifically to deal with ICBMs.

Similarly, Aegis interceptors in Europe should also be able to shoot at such missiles launched from the Middle East, again depending upon location. However, the speed of an ICBM as it moves through the mid-course limits the effectiveness of Aegis theatre interceptors, depending of course on the speed specifications of the future ground-based variant. Moreover, there is a relatively short intercept window for the European systems, again depending upon where the ground-based variant is to be deployed, before the ICBM bus/warhead pass overhead. This reduces the number of intercept opportunities, and thus system effectiveness. If the speed of the ground-based variant is similar to the existing ground-based mid-course interceptors and located further north in Europe, then a second layer behind the Aegis systems would exist. But, this would create a similar architecture to the cancelled Bush deployment, and generate a negative Russian response.

As such, the Obama European missile defence architecture does not provide a true second layer of defence as in the case of the Far East. The Fort Greely interceptors may be able to shoot at an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the Middle East and tracking over the eastern Arctic towards targets on the eastern seaboard of North America, but they are not optimized for such an intercept. In addition, the sea-based x-band tracking and cueing radar is also not positioned for ICBM launches from the Middle East. As the current Obama/NATO plan proceeds, demands are likely to emerge in the United States to deploy interceptors and an x-band radar somewhere in the northeast.

Implicitly, the Obama’s administration’s response, as echoed in the Group of Experts’ report, is to frame the Iranian ICBM threat as a distant one, reminiscent of the Clinton Administration’s 1995 National Intelligence Estimate, which placed the threat of ballistic missile proliferation at least fifteen

years into the future. However, that estimate quickly collapsed following the release of the Congressionally-sponsored Rumsfeld Commission Report and the North Korean test launch of a three-stage rocket in 1998.

In the case of today, Iran has already tested an intermediate range ballistic missile with a range between 3,000 and 5,500 kilometres and is developing an ICBM capability. Like North Korea, Iranian ballistic missile developments, alongside its nuclear programme, may put paid to current estimates sooner, rather than later. If so, political pressures to develop a second layer in the northeast are likely to grow. Regardless, prudence suggests that US missile defence planners have already examined future options for a second defence layer to deal with the Iranian threat, and one of these will be the northeast.

The northeastern option makes Canada valuable strategic real estate for the defence of the United States. This is different than previous missile defence iterations. In the ABM case, Canadian territory was of little value because it was a terminal point defence with limited range, rather than a long-range mid-course defence. Canadian territory was also of little value for meeting the North Korean missile defence priority, and if another site was needed, the Americans initially envisioned a return to the old Safeguard ABM site in North Dakota. However, North Dakota is not an optimal location for the defence of the northeast United States from Middle East missile launches. The most northerly US location is Maine, but it does not provide the range for early engagements as Fort Greely does for missiles launched from North Korea. The US thus faces two other North American choices: Canada or Greenland (Denmark).

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*Canada has a much closer defence relationship with the United States, primarily through NORAD, and such cooperation in the defence of North America is a pillar of Canadian defence policy.*

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Greenland has long hosted a key radar of the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning Network at Thule, which has been upgraded for missile defence purposes to an x-band. Whether co-located interceptors at Thule would be optimal for US defence is difficult to estimate, and whether the Danish government relative to the politics of its relationship with Greenland would be willing to agree to an interceptor site is difficult to predict. In contrast, Canada has a much closer defence relationship with the United States, primarily through NORAD, and such cooperation in the defence of North America is a pillar of Canadian defence policy.

Historically, Canadian policy deliberations have viewed the deployment of interceptors on Canadian soil as extremely problematic. However, Canadian territory for radars with some degree of missile defence function has been regularly perceived as a possible and meaningful Canadian contribution. In addition, there is already an indication of US interest in an x-band tracking and cueing radar at Goose Bay, Labrador. Shortly following the Martin no, Raytheon, one of the prime missile defence

contractors, publicly enquired whether the decision necessarily prohibited the possibility of such a site. In so doing, one could imagine its role in support of a US interceptor site in Maine, for example.

Despite fears that the Martin no would significantly undermine Canada-US North American defence cooperation, marginalize NORAD and increase US unilateralist proclivities, little harm appears to have been done to the relationship, at least on the surface. Regardless, Canada remains outside of the US missile defence equation, and it is difficult to judge the extent to which the United States has been willing to provide some degree of Canadian access to US missile defence developments and planning for the defence of North America. There is little evidence that the fallout from the 1985 SDI decision has been replicated. Then, Canadians found themselves barred from

access not only to SDI-related developments and planning, but also to wider elements of North American defence legitimately within NORAD's purview. This, in turn, partially underpinned the reversal of Canadian policy in the 1994 White Paper, which opened the door to potential Canadian participation.

If the current or a future administration concludes that a Canadian territorial contribution is vital to the defence of the United States, the failure of the Canadian government to respond will likely have significant ramifications for the relationship, thereby undermining Canada's longstanding strategic interests. Developments in NATO provide the opportunity to re-visit Canadian policy and bring it in lock step with the allies. Above all else, it is one thing to prevaricate and then say no when Canadian territory is little significance to the defence of the US homeland. It is another thing to prevaricate and say no when Canadian territory is vital. ©



### The Role of Canadian Soldiers in International Peace Operations After 2011

by Dr. Douglas Bland

*The following article is adapted from remarks made by Dr. Bland to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence on May 6, 2010, during its review and study of the role of Canadian soldiers in international peace operations after 2011.*

My main point for the committee is that a study of "the future of peace operations" that begins from the premise that peace operations or peacekeeping are military operations distinct from war-fighting sets up a false dichotomy that may diminish the study's influence in the formulation of Canada's future defence policies.

Peace operations and peacekeeping operations are forms of warfare in which—as in all the various forms of warfare—means and tactics are adapted to meet the needs of particular circumstances. To set these operations outside the realities of warfare confuse policy and defence planning and raises unrealistic expectations in our community.

As we have seen in the Afghanistan campaign these confusions can hinder the operations of the Canadian Forces (CF) in the field and harm Canada's national interests.

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Scholars have for a very long time described warfare as occurring along a spectrum of violence. At the lowest end one might place "unstable peace" or ceasefires during conflicts. At the high end we find "total war" with few limits to the scale or ferocity of combat.

Examples of operations conducted at the low end of the spectrum include the earliest large-scale United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Middle East (1956 and continuing) and in Cyprus (1964 and continuing), when lightly armed forces were deployed in situations where the likelihood of armed conflict seemed low. At the higher end of the spectrum we find the world wars, and along the spectrum we find so-called "limited wars," for instance, in Korea (1950 and continuing), the Middle East (1956, 1967, 1976) and in Lebanon more recently. All wars, as defined by their particular characteristics, can be placed here and there along the low-high conflict spectrum.

Wars that share particular characteristics often assume particular modes of conduct and tactics. For instance, urban warfare, guerrilla warfare, revolutionary warfare and civil warfare have their own defining characteristics and thus often their own defining modes of combat. However, they are all wars by general definition: "they have their own grammar,

but not their own logic.” In other words, they are identified by their particular means and modes, not as operations set aside from the general circumstances and demands of warfare.

Thus peacekeeping and peace operations too are not distinct from warfare; rather, they are another form of military operations and have their own grammar, but not their own logic.

When we assume in our modern circumstances that these are peace operations because they occur in particular circumstances, under the direction of international authorities, and use particular tactics and modes of operations and are, therefore, not wars, then we make a significant error. Moreover, when we assume that all future peace operations must be stuffed into the configuration of 1950s-1960s UN peacekeeping operations, then we make a dangerous error as well.

Let me support these remarks with two illustrations from CF military operations conducted between 1990 and 2010. The CF were deployed into the former Yugoslavia in 1991 under a UN blue flag and equipped for that mission on the assumption that it was a “peacekeeping operation.” The combat units arrived in theatre with a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition for each soldier. They almost immediately came under fire from well-equipped local forces. For ten years these units attempted to conduct peacekeeping operations inside a conventional war. The Liberal government of the day refused to acknowledge this fact and sacrificed the lives of 25

soldiers and created scores of seriously wounded casualties.

Today, the CF are involved in a war in Afghanistan; at the unit level it is as deadly a war as any we have fought across the world, and it is conducted with every conventional weapon the CF owns. Yet in the midst of this war CF soldiers and Canadian public servants are conducting complex peace operations—development and humanitarian missions. Our Afghan mission cannot be labelled as a war or a peace operation; rather, it is a conflict mission we are waging with the means and methods appropriate to its particular circumstances.

The questions this Committee is addressing and the recommendations that this Committee will make are important. But a study that reaches conclusions aimed at influencing future defence policies based on the notion that peace operations are separate and distinct from warfare will be less credible.

The international environment in which the CF can expect to operate in the future will not allow for the deployment of peacekeeping forces not prepared at the outset for the rigours of combat among the people in disintegrating states and communities.

I would hope this committee will break with the past and be the first to boldly alert Canadians to the operational realities and the limitations of third-generation peace operations and the dangers they present to the men and women of the CF. ©



### On Change and Transformation: Unsolicited Advice for the new Canadian Forces Chief of Transformation

by Lieutenant-général (ret) J.O. Michel Maisonneuve

History shows that change has always come as a result of incredible pressure from events or leaders.

#### Events

In certain cases, the pressure from events resulted in transformation. For example, the fall of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw Pact in 1989 dissolved the initial *raison-d'être* of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These events

forced the Alliance to redefine itself and look for a role in international security. NATO continues to change to this day as a result of this event.

Another example of an event that caused change was the deficit faced by the Canadian government in the early 1990s. The deficit resulted in the search for efficiencies in the Department of National Defence (DND), leading to: the Programme Review, the relocation of the three environmental headquarters to Ottawa, the Management, Re-engineering Command and Control Team (MCCRT), and many other initiatives. At the same time, private industry was also going through significant change as a result of the same resource and efficiency pressures; remember the terms “change management”, “re-engineering”, and “continuous improvement”?

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At the time, hundreds of books and articles focused on different approaches to improving efficiency. Concepts from Japan and Europe were being touted in North America as the way of the future.

The turn of the millennium in 2000 was an event that created an entire set of “business continuity” and “workaround” professionals and companies that profited from preparing private and public institutions for Y2K. At DND, the approach was to set up a team led by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to plan for the aftermath of Y2K. In this case, the Canadian Forces (CF) could not afford to “under-plan.” For example, if nothing happened, the CF might have been criticised for allocating resources towards planning and preparing. However, if disaster struck and insufficient resources had been devoted to the necessary plans and preparations, DND would have been blamed for being unprepared.

Eventually, 1st Canadian Division headquarters deployed to Ottawa to manage the changeover at midnight on December 31, 1999. In any case, while hindsight reveals that Y2K was not the disaster forecasted, the event forced organisations to consider and develop plans to continue operating in the event of total information technology malfunctions.

Without a doubt, September 11, 2001 forced change everywhere, but especially within security organisations. The terrorists of that day engendered a global change in everything from transport protocols, information handling, border regulations, etc. If their aim was to force the world to re-allocate scarce resources (including billions of dollars) on new security arrangements, they certainly achieved it!

## Leaders

In other cases in Canada’s history, change was the result of pressure from a compelling and powerful leader. Former Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer was one such leader. Whether he was right or wrong, he had the conviction of his ideas and would suffer no detractors from his plan to reform the services and the administration of the military in the late 1960s.

Similarly, former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier was an unstoppable leader who convinced his political masters that changes were needed in the way the CF planned and carried out operations. This led to a major change in the way the CF was organised, trained and equipped.

Over three years, Hillier fought naysayers and obstructionists of his plan. He expended enormous amounts of energy developing his ideas, creating a cadre of supportive subordinates who would manage the change for him, and getting the message out to superiors, subordinates and the public. The most visible of these changes was the very rapid stand-up of the four operational headquarters.

For all his energy, three years of constantly breaking down doors tired out Hillier. He was content to hold the change there and retire having accomplished more than many of his predecessors.

## *Change management becomes transformation*

The difference between change in the 1990s and today is significant. In the 1990s, change was a reactive activity, a response to events or leadership pressures. It was seen as negative and temporary, leading to an end-state. Normally, organisations would set up temporary “change management” teams that would react and manage the change until the end-state was reached, then would be disbanded. Examples in DND include the MCCRT, Red Tape Action Team, Y2K Action Team, etc.

Today, there is a realisation that change can be good; that it is not temporary, but a permanent and positive action (not reaction); that it need not *always* be forced from outside pressures; and, that it requires not temporary “change management” offices, but permanent line organisations to not only react, but promote change. This is what the overused word “transformation” means: a cyclical, permanent process of positive change that enables organisations and individuals to anticipate and shape the future.

All significant organisations—private and public—should set up an Office of Transformation at the highest level that thinks about, promotes and, if necessary, forces change. If the Office of Transformation is internal to the institution, its chief or director will need the authority of the commander to implement change.

NATO created Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in 2003 with this exact mandate of promoting and managing change. When the strategic command was created, its commanders and staff saw themselves as “forcing agents” for change and questioned everything. After more than 50 years and enormous change in the geopolitical situation, it was time for NATO to evolve.

ACT rapidly realised that one of the things that has not changed is the *reaction* to change or transformation. Most people thrive on routine. Change forces people out of their comfort zone, and most people dislike that. So the usual reaction will be negative and uncooperative. The solution is to communicate and to be completely honest in justifying the need for change. Eventually there still may be a need to force change, but the communication effort must continue throughout the process.

The reaction to change is amazingly elastic. Hellyer disestablished the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force; he started calling Admirals “Generals”; and, he put all services in green uniforms. He had to deal with a mini-revolt (the Admirals’ revolt).

After he had left, it was realised in 1974 that there was no longer one officer responsible for all air forces. Air Command was thus created, effectively bringing the CF back to three services. Today, the elastic properties of the reaction have brought back admirals, three distinct environmental uniforms, and *de facto* commanders of the navy, army and air force. Has the pendulum swung too far?

## Re-energising transformation of the Canadian Forces

Today, we need to continue the change process begun by Hillier. This is why the appointment of Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie as Chief of Transformation is compelling and a positive step forward.

There is much to be happy about Lieutenant-General Leslie's appointment. In the absence of a catalyst event, and given the proper authority, Leslie is well suited to be the new unstoppable leader of transformation. He is the most senior of the three-leaf generals and admirals still serving.

The CDS ought to provide him with all necessary authorities to—without regard to the colour of his uniform—implement necessary change in the CF. Leslie is also extremely intelligent, strategic and erudite, and has lived the Hillier era as a two-leaf General and as Chief of the Land Staff (Army Commander). He is an excellent communicator and will require this skill in his new job.

Now, he gets to work on the CF as a whole in a period of post-Afghanistan operational pause. He has many current priorities and he should concentrate *inter alia* on issues

of jointness, interoperability (with allies and non-military agencies), force generation versus force employment, the need (or not) for three-leaf environmental chiefs, command of forces in the Canadian Joint Task Force geographical areas, and the development of efficient management processes in Ottawa. To be sure, Chief of Transformation should also become a permanent position within the CF, vested with the authority of the CDS.

To this day, there are many who promote the idea of a return to separate Canadian Forces and Departmental HQs and to three services. The military will make anything work. However, certain questions need to be asked: Is the coordination of our operations better now than it was in the days of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff? Have we achieved the necessary efficiency in the operational commands? Do we still need three environmental commanders at the three-leaf level? Who should own the forces in Canada? All of these questions are issues for the Chief of Transformation.

Andrew Leslie has a full plate, but he is well-positioned and well-qualified to make a definite impact, provided he is given the authority and the tools to do so. ©



## The Profession of Diplomacy

by Paul H. Chapin

In the gallery of the National Assembly in Lisbon, there is an allegorical sculpture by Maximiano Alves entitled *Diplomacia*. The figure gazes down at a pile of learned books, holding in one hand the sprig of an olive branch and, in the other, the hilt of a sword hidden in the folds of her gown. *On Track* has featured articles by Dr. John Scott Cowan and Lieutenant-General (retired) Michel Maisonneuve about the sword, the “profession of arms.”<sup>1</sup> This essay is about the books and the olive branch, and how together with the sword they constitute the “profession of diplomacy.”

True professions, Cowan and Maisonneuve observe, have three incontrovertible characteristics: the pursuit of a higher public purpose, a measure of self-regulation, and a definable and substantial body of higher knowledge relevant to the profession. The profession of arms, they argue rightly,

qualifies on every count. They note also how unique is the military profession: “It is the only profession in which members have a nearly absolute obligation to look after the well-being of the other members of the profession ... a duty

of care (which) extends far beyond the narrower issues of bodily harm. In some respects, this is the *quid pro quo* for the contract of unlimited liability within the profession ... where a person may be required to undertake a task which has a very high probability (or even a near certainty) of injuring or killing that person.”

### Practising diplomacy

Public understanding of diplomacy is often as tangled and confused as it is of military



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matters. Diplomacy is routinely portrayed as the antithesis of the application of force, its practitioners characterized as champions of peace, morality and reason; or as unprincipled schemers, cringing appeasers, and pettifogging dilettantes. What the public knows is largely limited to what it sees and reads in the media, and that picture is neither accurate nor flattering.

In fact, the profession of diplomacy is as hard-edged as the profession of arms. It has a lofty public purpose akin to that of the profession of arms, an elaborate legal regime and rules to govern its conduct, a body of knowledge whose complexity continues to grow, and special skills of a high order. Unlike the profession of arms, however, the practice of diplomacy is not confined to members of the profession, wherein lies a tale.

### *Public purpose*

Diplomacy is the management of relations with the outside world, and it is as old as time.<sup>2</sup> Since the first clan made contact with the second, there have been individuals whose function has been to provide a trusted medium between peoples.

The purpose of diplomacy is to protect and promote the national interest abroad. To this end, the responsibilities of diplomats have not changed much over the years:

- To bring international realities to bear on national decision-making;
- To develop strategies for achieving national objectives abroad;
- To ensure coherence in the state's international operations;
- To represent the government in its dealings with other states and international organisations;
- To negotiate solutions within rule-bound international regimes; and
- To promote acceptable norms and rules for addressing issues when international regimes are deficient or non-existent.

In brief, diplomats serve as the state's frontline resources in understanding and dealing with the outside world.

### *Rules*

The first diplomats were heralds assigned to plead one clan's cause to another, the main qualifications being a loud voice and expendability. Later, the realisation set in that inter-clan communications would probably benefit from knowing the other's language, observing how foreign conditions might impact one's own plans, and resisting the impulse to impale, burn or shoot the messenger—unless you wanted to send a message.

But diplomacy as a profession is of more recent origin. It was only during the Middle Ages, among the Italian city states, that the first permanent representatives were appointed; and it was only at the Congress of Vienna at the close of the Napoleonic Wars that rules of diplomatic procedure began to be developed (the *Règlement* of March 19, 1815). These rules, expanded and codified in various international conventions, notably the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and on Consular Relations (1963), were a pragmatic response to the need for generally accepted rules for how states should conduct business with each other. As Churchill once observed, “the reason for having diplomatic relations is not to confer a compliment, but to secure a convenience.”

Among other things, the conventions provide for the continued health of the messenger; in other words, protection and immunity from local jurisdiction of foreign representatives doing their state's business on the territory of another.<sup>3</sup> They also stipulate what functions foreign missions may perform, how privileges and immunities are to be exercised, and when the receiving state may discriminate in its treatment of foreign representatives.

The core principle of diplomatic relations is reciprocity: no state is required to accord more favourable treatment of another state's representatives than its own representatives receive from that state. If you restrict the operations of my embassy, for example, I have every right to restrict the operations of yours. Conversely, we can agree to waive both our embassies' immunity from local jurisdiction in respect of staff paying their parking fines.

### *Knowledge and skills*

The classic subject matter of diplomacy has been the security of the state. With the Reformation, Europe retreated from the idea of a universal state (the Holy Roman Empire, Christendom), accepted *raison d'état* as sufficient cause for a state to take action, and embarked on a long hunt for security through a balance of power.

Only in the 20th century was there a return to the concept of “common international interests,” embodied in purpose-built treaties and institutions promoting universal standards of behaviour.<sup>4</sup> By that time, diplomats were also struggling with a second set of issues, as the growth of international trade, investment and financial flows began to have a significant impact on the welfare, economic strength and power relationships of states.

As the 20th century progressed, diplomats were confronted with a third set of “global” issues which borders could not contain: mass population movements, health pandemics, transnational threats to the environment, international organized crime, and terrorism with a global reach.

Today, there is little useful distinction to be made any more between “domestic” and “foreign” affairs. Domestic policy must take account of the impact decisions may have on partners abroad and on international rules the state

has agreed to, while foreign policy must try to manage international issues and negotiate rules that protect and promote the state's security and prosperity at home.

The functions and skills of diplomats have had to keep pace. At the outset, diplomats had to be adept at prevailing upon others to respect the integrity of their state's borders, at making and unmaking alliances, and at employing inducements and threats; in other words, making learned arguments, offering the olive branch, and wielding the sword. In due course, they also had to become adept at developing international law, constructing international institutions, negotiating multilateral agreements, and working with domestic agencies to control immigration, manage health, protect the environment and combat crime and terrorism.

Meanwhile, advances in transportation, communications and information technology dramatically compressed space and time, and immersed governments and their diplomats in a single international agenda requiring 24/7 decision-making, without such luxuries of the past as time for reflection or confidential consideration of options, thanks to the "CNN effect" and the invasion of the government's privacy through access to information legislation.

## *The new diplomacy*

As the international agenda has expanded, as the subject matter has become more complex and technical, and as the pace of decision-making has accelerated, the impact on diplomacy has been profound.

First, foreign ministries no longer enjoy an exclusive preserve over international policy. Many other departments of government are now involved, lending their knowledge and advice, participating in negotiations, and sometimes trying to pursue their own foreign policies.

Second, the foreign minister is only one of many ministers playing an international role. Ministers with "domestic" portfolios routinely meet with their counterparts in other countries. Heads of state and government now travel so freely that a country's chief diplomat is more often the president or prime minister than the foreign minister.

Third, ambassadors no longer exercise the powers their predecessors once did when communications were rudimentary and governments had to trust their "man in Moscow" to do the right thing without instructions.

While still sporting the official title *ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary*, heads of mission today are mostly ordinary public servants with few powers, their scope for independent action largely gone, and their missions serving mostly as regional offices of the central government.

At issue is whether foreign ministries still have a role. Some have written them off as an anachronism, institutions with a vocation to tend the dikes of national sovereignty as the tide of globalization washes over them. Others have argued they can continue to serve a useful purpose by "coordinating" the international activities of other departments, if they refrain from meddling in the substance of issues about which they know little.

In fact, a foreign ministry can be the state's most effective instrument in adapting to global change. Operating at the intersection of national and international affairs, the foreign ministry is uniquely positioned to assist political leaders, central agencies and "domestic" departments understand and deal with global developments. To serve as the state's civilian frontline, it need only make effective use of assets not found elsewhere in government:

- A worldwide infrastructure to generate the information, contacts and methods for pursuing national interests abroad, i.e. missions in the major decision-making centres and at the seat of international organizations whose deliberations affect national interests;
- A robust global communications system providing secure links between missions, travelling ministers and negotiators, and decision-makers at headquarters;
- A capacity for staying on top of global events, identifying when and where national interests are exposed or opportunities exist, developing timely policy advice, and implementing decisions; and
- People with the knowledge and skills to do the work.

The quality of the diplomats is key. Diplomats, it is often argued, are too versed in the affairs of other countries and not enough in their own to contribute constructively to national decision-making, their principal contribution being to point out why something cannot be done at home because people abroad might object. The argument is one to be taken seriously for it accurately captures the attitudes of too many diplomats today.

In the 21st century, what a foreign ministry needs is not "internationalists" but "globalists."

Globalist diplomats possess many of the characteristics of traditional diplomats, but they shine in three areas:

- A command of the many dimensions of global affairs (political, military, economic, social, religious) and how these interact, i.e. *the ability to put together the big picture*;
- Skills in such fields as gathering information and intelligence, building networks and lobbying effectively, whatever the linguistic, cultural or other obstacles may be, i.e. *the ability to work the global system*; and
- The self-confidence, entrepreneurship and resilience to be able to function largely on their own or in small groups, in alien, sometimes hostile and frequently dangerous environments, i.e. *mental and physical toughness*.

These are the new diplomats the Canadian Forces are encountering more frequently in places like Kabul, Kandahar and Khartoum. It is a development we should all applaud.

## (Endnotes)

- 1 Dr. John Scott Cowan, "The Profession of Arms: What makes it a profession, and how may those criteria evolve?", *On Track* vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 34-36; LGen (ret) Michel Maisonneuve and Dr. John Scott Cowan, "The Profession of Arms: A Unique Calling," *On Track* vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 28-30.
- 2 Diplomacy has sometimes been called the second oldest profession.
- 3 The term "diplomat" evolved from the diploma or pass (*laissez-passer*) one carried attesting to the right of the sending state's representative to proceed unmolested to and from the receiving state.
- 4 Henry Kissinger offers a superb treatment of the modern history of diplomacy in his aptly titled study, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994. ©

## WAR POSTERS?

by Gertrude Kearns

*From post cold war Balkans to current national security concerns*

*Editorial in nature, propaganda like in energy and attitude, with a bias towards chivalry and a hint of the devious, this series is about the nature of command perspectives in modern operations. From Lieutenant-Commander to Colonel to General and Defence Analyst this group of four Canadians creates a cross section of platforms spanning post cold war Balkans, Canadian security, and the current Afghan counterinsurgency.*

This article is in part an artist's statement, the term used in current art practise whereby the visual arts practitioner explains the intentions, ideas and contexts of his / her work, in general, as regards his / her practice, or as here specifically in relation to a particular body of work.

This series of (four) posters (2004-2010) is a war art documentation of sorts using Canadian Forces individuals as

subjects. These expanded portraits function on three levels: military portraiture, editorially tinged commentary, quasi historical records, inasmuch as each subject's Canadian defence career is represented in the context of a specific yet verbally abstracted mission type. The one exception is the Col Brian MacDonald piece which is about the nature of defence analysis.

It is equally imperative that these works function in the contemporary art forum, establishing another viable credibility. This age of irony with a penchant for nihilistic predisposition seeks integrated message and can be as crucial as any visually technical prowess. These posters seem to appeal to civilians even if the message remains somewhat unclear. Even when they function as 'just guys in uniforms', and by association the military in general, there is an existential ring of sorts which bridges civilian and defence interpretations.

These posters are the antithesis of traditional war posters, which targeted specific audiences for immediate results in the 'war effort'. They were highly emotional sales devices via propaganda, not reliant on symbolism, humour or metaphor. "They were not meant to be archival or historical documents,..." *McGill University Canadian War Poster Collection.*

My intentions are contrary in every sense. These 'posters' are not made to be reproduced in quantity, understood easily, or sell anything. They need to be interpreted, and gradated through an inherent understanding of the concern in question. In other words 'they are meant for a sophisticated audience'; these words came in response to a recent informal presentation I made of this group in a Toronto think tank environment. They cannot even hint at 'real' propaganda as they are not selling defence, not even questioning it. Rather they aim to express the hinge

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*Gertrude Kearns of Toronto has worked both officially and unofficially as a Canadian war artist for nearly two decades. She had a 2006 contract with TFA Roto 0 embedded in theatre in Kandahar and Kabul under Colonel S P Noonan. A Royal Canadian Military Institute commission in 2007 and 2008 realized two large portraits of Chief Tecumseh and General Isaac Brock. She shows large abstract paintings with Angell Gallery, Toronto. Work is in private, public and corporate collections in Canada; currently in the 2009-2012, eight venues across Canada "Brush with War: military art from Korea to Afghanistan", under DND and the Canadian War Museum. With the support of General Andrew Leslie, she is commencing a second Afghan counter insurgency series in late fall 2010. She is the 'unofficial' war artist in residence at the RCMI and a SSC member, on the SITREP Boulter Award jury for 4 years.*

in operations via apparent oxymoron. However they are intended to 'look' like propaganda, to suggest some campaign is being waged as they are responding to the urgency of the times. Because these portraits are heroic in nature, they are meant to command attention and impart military ethos and the psychological and strategic rationale of modern defence sensibilities.

Suggested paradox and the general aesthete of each work are points of departure from historical military art into modern expressions of 'social commentary' it has been said, but more significantly from my perspective, an attempt to make 'defence commentary'. If they do not function in this respect, they are not successful.

Each poster idea evolved slowly, in the midst of other related work. My intention was to say as much as possible with the fewest words. A 1942 war poster study by

the Toronto agency Young and Rubicon showed emotional appeal to be the most effective, whereas humour and symbolism were ineffective sales tools/methods. Relying on dry humour and contained emotion, these would have fared poorly in 1942!


The four subjects all agreed to sit for me and each has completely supported my decisions after the fact. None were commissioned drawings and I have retained all originals. Two of the final paintings based on the drawings are in collections. The Department of National Defence, or technically TFA Roto 0, owns the final canvas work of BGen Steve P Noonan as Colonel in Afghanistan titled *Real Deal*, 2006 48 x 36 inches. The Canadian War Museum acquired the portrait of General Lewis MacKenzie *MacKenzie/Sarajevo/1992*, 2004, a large canvas painting 78 x 56 inches plus a small version of *Peace/Kill*.

## IMAGE #1 *Peace Kill*--MacKenzie 2004


*"Fracture aptly describes contemporary life. We are fractured - nationally and internationally - along many socio-political and cultural fault lines. Conversely we are bound by our shared experience of difference.....Toronto artist Gertrude Kearns engages an aesthetic of conflict.... Kearns visualizes the processes of mediation and negotiation of "self" and "other" that we experience in contemporary life.'* (Hudson's words (from a co-written article for ARS MEDICA vol. 1 no. 2, 2005) were also responding in part to two bodies of work, the 2002 *UNdone:Dallaire/Rwanda* and the 2005 *United States of Being: the John Bentley Mays Portraits*, both series studying the depression and conflicted states of a general in theatre and a cultural writer). She continues in relation to the MacKenzie poster, *'Kearns's painting demonstrates the tragedy of the flesh that peace and kill can be suspended in such vivid contradiction.'*

In the same article General MacKenzie's words qualify the reality presented in the poster as reflecting in a basic sense the required post-Cold War approach to realize results *"when there is no peace to keep and innocents are being slaughtered"*. His emphasis on strength of leadership at command level did relate to perspectives discussed around the Rwanda mission.

One copy was printed shiny and slick at 6 x 3 feet, suspended on a black panel with heavy silver bolts and black rubber washers. It hung for a month in 2004 highly visible in the window of a contemporary Queen West gallery, Propeller. It garnered attention, and "Cool!" was the typical comment. It is interesting to evaluate that reaction from a generally speaking non-defence oriented arts audience. Before analysing it further it was often assumed I was "anti-military" and by extension anti Canadian Forces. When I explained the meaning and context with enthusiasm, sometimes there was a backing off, as if I the artist was complicit in the very evil being represented. ©



## Book Review



## Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North

by Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William R. Morrison,  
and Greg Poelzer

Reviewed by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William R. Morrison, and Greg Poelzer.

*Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North*. Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers 2008, 260 pages, \$29.92, ISBN 0-88762-355-7

*Arctic Front* is a topical and comprehensive account of Canada's efforts to claim the Arctic. An accessible read, this book parsimoniously illustrates the key themes that characterize Canadian Arctic policy.

The authors begin with a historical overview of Canada's attempts to establish sovereignty in the North. This review illustrates a central theme: Ottawa's Arctic policy is frequently reactive, with occasional resource grabs and security dilemmas acting as drivers that shift Canada's attention to the Arctic.

They compellingly argue that Canada has been mostly indifferent and neglectful of the Arctic and has consistently failed to control the region. As a result, Canada's northern claims have been moot because, for much of history, its sovereignty has been merely symbolic. The Arctic has been a long-term problem for Canada, yet the authors note that leaders only respond with short-term solutions.

The authors also illustrate that, regardless of their differing opinions, American and Canadian authorities regularly cooperate on matters related to the Arctic.

They argue that, even though bilateral Arctic relations are characterized by cooperation, hypersensitive Canadian nationalists never fail to overreact about perceived threats to Canadian sovereignty. This theme is illustrated historically through Canada-US cooperation on the DEW line, *Manhattan* and *Polar Sea* issues. Through these contentious examples they contend that hypersensitivity over sovereignty is the result of a "long history of inaction and underdevelopment" in the Arctic.

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The running theme of sovereignty sensitivity begs the reader to question the contemporary commentary presented by some sources, including renowned historian Jack Granatstein.

In the wake of the Danish claim of Hans Island, Granatstein is quoted saying that, "The Danes are trying to get Hans Island, and do not accept our claims in the Arctic—they claim the North Pole. The protection of the Arctic is a key to national interest."

The authors demonstrate that such a comment is symptomatic of Canadian sentiment, but they later ask the reader to question this hyperbole. The reader is thus left to speculate if this type of contemporary anxiety is merely hypersensitive nationalism and if the ongoing Arctic apprehension is all for naught.

A considerable strength of the book is its successful articulation of the source of Canadian-American contention over the Northwest Passage—put simply, nobody doubts Canada's Arctic water claims; however, the Americans believe that an international strait runs through them. While the authors are able to expose the difference in opinion very clearly, they fail to ask essential normative questions about this debate.

The authors argue that Canada *should not* seek control over the Northwest Passage because it is costly—both financially and politically on the international stage. This is a compelling argument, but they fail to analyse the added value of a national Northwest Passage. One can speculate based on the examination in this book, yet the answer remains unclear.

Perhaps the value of a Canadian Northwest Passage is that it avoids an environmental tragedy of the commons that is too often the case in international shipping lanes; or, perhaps a Canadian Northwest Passage would better secure North America. In any case, the reader is left wondering over some of the nuances, rationales and implications of the ongoing Canada-US Arctic debate.

Although a strong point of *Arctic Front* is its exposure of the hardships that Inuit—especially Inuit women—faced during the Arctic conquest, the book misses a key historical detail: the forced relocation of Inuit from Quebec to the High Arctic. This is a disappointing omission on the authors' part.

*Arctic Front* is not simply a book about defence policy, which plays to its strength as a compelling, refreshing and topical book. It is a call to Canadians to start becoming an Arctic nation.

The authors ask for leaders to diversify Arctic policy, to push for more growth in the Arctic, to establish an Arctic university, and to stop symbolically believing the Arctic is inherently Canadian.

The critical tone of the book, especially in the conclusion, calls on the reader to start celebrating their

Northern climate and stop rejecting Canada's dominant season: winter. The underlying criticism here is that every other Arctic nation acts like an Arctic nation, while Canada is unprepared for, and uninterested in, the responsibilities that come with having a cold climate.

Canadians, they suggest, need to stop “wrapping themselves in northern symbolism” while never venturing north of the tree line. Indeed, they note there are very few connections between northern and southern Canada.

What is most refreshing about *Arctic Front* is that, although it is clearly written by Canadians for Canadians, the authors do not simply embrace Canada's predominant national narrative, which assumes that the Arctic is inherently part of our heritage. Instead, the reader is encouraged to critically reflect on the future of Canada's Arctic claims. ©

***ON TRACK***



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