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2010/2011

Volume 15, Number 4



The Vimy Award Recipient

Sustaining Funding for Defence

No Mountain Too High

China in the Arctic

What next for the Canadian Forces?



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COVER PHOTO: 19 November 2010 - His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, with the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson, 2010 recipient of the Vimy Award. Photo by: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le 19 novembre 2010 - Son Excellence le très honorable David Johnston, Gouverneur général et commandant en chef du Canada, avec la très hon. Adrienne Clarkson, Récipiendaire, Distinction Honorifique Vimy 2010. Photo: le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe.

From the Executive Director

Mot du Directeur exécutif

At the CDA Institute we are working hard to find policy solutions to the many defence and security challenges that Canada faces. We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policymakers, politicians, academics and the public, we promote change in the policies of our federal government for the betterment of our country.

ON TRACK, the CDA Institute's quarterly journal provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters. This winter edition features articles on the Arctic, Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces, the UK Armed Forces, the Soldier On Fund, defence funding, the Vimy Award recipient's address, war art and book reviews.

The CDA Institute was honoured on November 19 when His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presented the Vimy Award on behalf of the CDA Institute to the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson. The presentation was made at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum. With her acceptance of the Award, Madame Clarkson addressed the guests at the dinner. We are pleased to include the text of her address in *ON TRACK*.

I am pleased to report that the 13th Annual Graduate Student Symposium was an unqualified success. The Symposium was presented by the CDA Institute, in collaboration with the Royal Military College of Canada, the Queen's Centre for International Relations, the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and the Defence Management Studies Program at Queen's University, with the financial support of the Security and Defence Forum, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), Honorary Captain (N) Hugh Segal and Dr. John Scott Cowan. The symposium featured two keynote speakers, Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Principal of the Royal Military College, and Dr. Dean Oliver, Director, Research and Exhibitions of the Canadian War Museum. A number of the papers that were presented at the Symposium can be viewed online at www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai. Meghan Spilka O'Keefe was the principal organizer of the symposium, and has provided a report on the proceedings.

The NATO summit in Lisbon in November saw the approval of a new Strategic Concept for the alliance. However, as Paul Chapin notes in his review, *'Canada in the rearview mirror:*



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

À l'Institut de la CAD, nous travaillons fort pour trouver des politiques qui offrent des solutions aux nombreux défis auxquels le Canada doit faire face en matière de défense et de sécurité. Nous croyons que les politiques de défense et de sécurité efficaces doivent être fondées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et présenter des options raisonnées. En partageant les résultats de notre recherche et nos recommandations avec les responsables des orientations politiques, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous faisons la promotion du changement dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour le mieux de notre pays.

ON TRACK, le journal trimestriel de l'Institut de la CAD, offre un support au débat informé et non partisan sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Ce numéro d'hiver présente des articles sur l'Arctique, l'Afghanistan, les Forces canadiennes, les Forces armées du Royaume-Uni, le fonds « Sans limites », le financement de la défense, l'allocation de la récompense du Prix Vimy, l'art de guerre et des comptes rendus de lectures.

L'Institut de la CAD a été honoré, le 19 novembre, quand Son Excellence le très honorable David Johnston, gouverneur général et commandant en chef du Canada, a présenté le Prix Vimy à la très honorable Adrienne Clarkson, au nom de l'Institut de la CAD. La présentation a eu lieu lors d'un dîner de gala tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre. En acceptant le prix, madame Clarkson s'est adressée aux invités présents au dîner. Nous sommes heureux de vous communiquer le texte de son allocution dans *ON TRACK*.

J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que le 13^{ème} Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés a connu un succès sans réserve. Le Symposium était présenté par l'Institut de la CAD en collaboration avec le Collège militaire royal du Canada, le Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's, le Centre for Military and Strategic Studies de l'Université de Calgary et le programme de Defence Management Studies de l'Université Queen's, avec le soutien financier du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense, de l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE), du Capitaine honoraire (M) Hugh Segal et de M. John Scott Cowan. Le symposium présentait deux conférenciers invités, M. Joel Sokolsky, recteur du Collège militaire royal et M. Dean Oliver, directeur de la recherche et des expositions au Musée canadien de la guerre. Un certain nombre des dossiers présentés lors du symposium peuvent être visionnés en ligne à l'adresse www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai. Meghan Spilka O'Keefe était la principale organisatrice du symposium et elle a produit un rapport des délibérations.

Le sommet de l'OTAN tenu à Lisbonne en novembre dernier a vu l'approbation d'un nouveau Concept stratégique pour l'alliance. Cependant, comme le note Paul Chapin

NATO charts an eastward course at the Lisbon Summit, it failed to address issues of real importance to Canada over the longer term. Paul Chapin was the principle author of the recent CDA Institute-CDFAI study, *'Security in an Uncertain World: A Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept'* (www.natoconcept.ca).

In *'The Financial Crisis Hits the UK Defence Budget'*, CDA Senior Defence Analyst Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald provides us with an analysis of the UK defence budget. He examines the potential outcomes resulting from the UK government's decision to remove inflation protection from its defence budget in each of the next four years.

Kyle Christensen writes in his article, *'China in the Arctic: Potential Developments Impacting China's Activities in an Ice-Free Arctic'* that the prospect of the Arctic becoming increasingly navigable during summer months, the potential for shorter shipping routes between Asia and other regions, and access to natural resources has prompted China to devote more attention to Arctic research and activities. Mr. Christensen is a strategic analyst at the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Defence Research and Development Canada.

Brigadier-General Dean Milner and Dr. Howard Coombs have provided us with their article, *'Canada's Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan'*, detailing the counterinsurgency challenges facing the CF in Afghanistan. Brigadier-General Milner is Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan, and Dr. Coombs is a civilian advisor to Brigadier-General Milner.

Louis Delvoie writes that there are those who advocate using the Canadian Forces to defend civilian populations at risk in civil war situations around the world and that the main focus of these proponents seems to be the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In *'What Next for the Canadian Forces? Not the Congo'*, he posits that the Canadian government's policy response to the situation now prevailing in the Congo must begin with an assessment of Canada's interests in the matter, which he outlines for us. Louis Delvoie is Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, and is a former Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan.

Following consultations with the thirteen member associations of the CDA, a CDA Position Paper, *'Sustaining Funding for Defence'*, was submitted to the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. The paper emphasizes the need for defence funding to remain high and for recovery in military capabilities to continue.

In March 2010 Master Corporal Jody Mitic and Corporal Andrew Knisley of the Royal Canadian Regiment speculated that if they entered the 2010 Targa Newfoundland, a five-day 2,200km high-speed tarmac rally on the back roads of Newfoundland, they might be able to raise some money for

dans son compte rendu *Canada in the rearview mirror: NATO charts an eastward course at the Lisbon Summit*, le sommet n'a pas réussi à se pencher sur les questions qui ont une réelle importance pour le Canada à long terme. Paul Chapin fut l'auteur principal de la récente étude conjointe de l'Institut de la CAD et du CDFAI, *La sécurité dans un monde d'incertitude, Un point de vue canadien sur le nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN* (www.natoconcept.ca).

Dans *The Financial Crisis Hits the UK Defence Budget*, l'analyste principal de la défense de la CAD, le Colonel (ret) Brian MacDonald nous offre une analyse du budget de la défense du Royaume-Uni. Il examine les résultats possibles découlant de la décision du gouvernement britannique de supprimer la protection contre l'inflation de son budget de la défense dans chacune des quatre prochaines années.

Kyle Christensen écrit, dans son article, *China in the Arctic: Potential Developments Impacting China's Activities in an Ice-Free Arctic*, que la perspective que l'Arctique devienne de plus en plus navigable pendant les mois d'été, la possibilité de voies d'expédition plus courtes entre l'Asie et les autres régions du globe, ainsi que l'accès aux ressources naturelles, a incité la Chine à consacrer plus d'attention à la recherche et aux activités arctiques. M. Christensen est analyste stratégique au Centre d'analyse et de recherche opérationnelle de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada

Le Brigadier-Général Dean Milner et M. Howard Coombs nous ont donné leur article intitulé *Canada's Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, où on trouve un détail des défis de la contre-insurrection auxquels doivent faire face les FC en Afghanistan. Le Brigadier-Général Milner est commandant de la Force opérationnelle interarmées Afghanistan et M. Coombs est conseiller civil auprès du Brigadier-Général Milner.

Louis Delvoie écrit qu'il y a des gens qui préconisent l'utilisation des Forces canadiennes pour défendre les populations civiles à risque dans des situations de guerre civile autour du monde et que le foyer principal de ces promoteurs semble être la République démocratique du Congo. Dans *What Next for the Canadian Forces? Not the Congo*, il postule que la réponse du gouvernement canadien, en terme de politique, à la situation qui prévaut actuellement au Congo doit commencer par une évaluation des intérêts du Canada en la matière, qu'il nous décrit. Louis Delvoie est Senior Fellow au Centre for International Relations de l'Université Queen's et ancien haut-commissaire du Canada au Pakistan.

Suite à des consultations avec les treize associations membres de la CAD, un exposé de principe de la CAD intitulé *Soutien du financement de la Défense*, a été soumis au très honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale. Le document souligne la nécessité que le financement de la défense reste élevé et que le rétablissement des capacités militaires continue.

En mars 2010 le caporal-chef Jody Mitic et le caporal Andrew Knisley du Royal Canadian Regiment ont calculé que, s'ils s'inscrivaient au rallye 2010 Targa Newfoundland, une course sur route à haute vitesse de cinq jours et 2 200 kilomètres qui se déroule sur les routes secondaires de Ter-



Recipients of the Vimy Award and Dr. John Scott Cowan with His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada. L – R: Dr. John Scott Cowan; Colonel the Hon. John Fraser (2002); Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie (1993); General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, Past President of the CDA Institute (2003 Vimy Award recipient); Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel David Bercuson (2004); His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston; the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson (2010); General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain (1992); Lieutenant-général (ret) Charles H. Belzile (1999); Général (ret) Ray Henault (2007); Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray (1998); and Major-General David Fraser (2006).

Photo by: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Les récipiendaires de la Distinction honorifique Vimy et M. Dr. John Scott Cowan avec Son Excellence le très hon. David Johnston, Gouverneur général et commandant en chef du Canada. G – D: M. John Scott Cowan; le Colonel l' hon. John Fraser (2002); le Major-général (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie (1993); le Général (Ret'd) Paul Manson, ancien président de l'Institut de la CAD (récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy en 200); le Lieutenant-colonel honoraire David Bercuson (2004); Son Excellence le très hon. David Johnston; la très hon. Adrienne Clarkson (2010); le Général (Ret'd) John de Chastelain (1992); le Lieutenant-général (ret) Charles H. Belzile (1999); le Général (ret) Ray Henault (2007); le Vice-amiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray (1998); et le Major-général David Fraser (2006).

Photo: le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe

the Soldier On Fund. In *'No Mountain too High'*, Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie tells us how this speculation turned into a truly inspirational story.

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe writes, in *'The Challenge of Regulating the International Private Military Industry'* that there are a number of reasons why efforts to regulate the employment of mercenaries have failed, and outlines ongoing regulatory initiatives that attempt to address the legal vacuum concerning the private military industry. Ms. Spilka O'Keefe, a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum intern, is the CDA Institute's Project Officer.

Gertrude Kearns is a Toronto-based artist who has executed four portraits of Canadians serving and who have served on various missions. In *'War Posters?'*, Ms. Kearns explains the rationale behind her work and provides a commentary for the second of four portraits that we are featuring over the next while in *ON TRACK*.


re-Neuve, ils pourraient peut-être recueillir des fonds pour le fonds « Sans limites ». Dans l'article *No Mountain too High*, le Major-Général (ret) Lewis MacKenzie nous dit à quel point ce calcul s'est transformé en une histoire qui est vraiment une source d'inspiration.

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe écrit, dans *The Challenge of Regulating the International Private Military Industry*, qu'il y a un certain nombre de raisons pour lesquelles les efforts visant à réglementer l'emploi de mercenaires ont échoué et elle souligne les initiatives de réglementation en cours qui tentent de combler le vide législatif concernant l'industrie militaire privée. Mme Spilka O'Keefe, stagiaire du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du Ministère de la Défense nationale, est agent de projet de l'Institut de la CAD.

Gertrude Kearns est une artiste de Toronto qui a exécuté quatre portraits de Canadiens en service et de ceux qu'ils ont servi dans différentes missions. Dans *War Posters?*, Mme Kearns explique le pourquoi de son travail et offre un commentaire pour le deuxième des quatre portraits que nous présenterons prochainement dans *ON TRACK*.

We are also pleased to include reviews of four books that should be of interest to our readers. The first is from General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, who reviews General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier's second book, *Leadership*, a companion to his autobiography. General (Ret'd) Manson concludes that the book needs to be read by those who seek to develop their leadership skills. General (Ret'd) Manson is a former President of the CDA Institute and was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989.

Natalie Ratcliffe reviews *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà vu All Over Again*, by Dr. James G. Fergusson (see also his article, 'The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence', in the previous edition of *ON TRACK*). She notes that Dr. Fergusson chronologically divided his study into five



L-R: His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston and the Hon. Bill Graham / G-D: Son Excellence le très hon. David Johnston et l' hon. Bill Graham

Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

time periods and includes an outline of each. Ms. Ratcliffe is an Analyst with The SecDev Group.

In his review of George Friedman's book, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*, Arnav Manchanda outlines the basic analytical assumptions of Mr. Friedman's company, Strategic Forecasting, and details the often-unconventional themes of the book. Mr. Manchanda is a defence policy analyst at the CDA Institute, and a business capture and analytics specialist with The SecDev Group.

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Jim Bryce provides a candid review of Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Brian A. Reid's book, 'Named by the Enemy'. The book traces the history of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and its soldiers. A vivid and very readable encapsulation of much of Canadian military history, the book includes the explanation of why the unit earned its

Nous sommes également heureux d'inclure des comptes rendus de quatre livres qui devraient susciter l'intérêt de nos lecteurs. Le premier nous vient du Général (ret) Paul Manson, qui nous parle du deuxième livre du Général (ret) Rick Hillier, *Leadership*, un livre compagnon à son autobiographie. Le Général (ret) Manson conclue que le livre doit être lu par ceux qui cherchent à développer leurs compétences en leadership. Le Général (ret) Manson est un ancien président de l'Institut de la CAD et fut chef de l'état-major de la Défense de 1986 à 1989.

Natalie Ratcliffe a lu pour nous *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà vu All Over Again*, de M. James G. Fergusson (voir également son article, *The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence*, dans la dernière édition de *ON TRACK*). Elle note que M. Fergusson a chronologiquement divisé son étude en cinq périodes et elle inclue une description de chacune de ces périodes. Mme Ratcliffe est analyste chez The SecDev Group.

Dans son compte rendu du livre de George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*, Arnav Manchanda souligne les hypothèses d'analyse de base de la société de M. Friedman, Strategic Forecasting, et donne un détail des thèmes parfois non conventionnels du livre. M. Manchanda est analyste des politiques de défense à l'Institut de la CAD et spécialiste de la saisie d'affaires et de l'analytique chez The SecDev Group.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel (ret) Jim Bryce nous donne un compte rendu franc de sa lecture du livre du Lieutenant-Colonel (ret) Brian A. Reid, *Named by the Enemy*. Le livre retrace l'histoire des Royal Winnipeg Rifles et de ses soldats. Encapsulation vivace et de lecture facile d'une grande partie de l'histoire militaire canadienne, le livre comporte l'explication de la raison pour laquelle l'unité s'est gagnée sa devise « Named by the Enemy ». Le Lieutenant-Colonel (ret) Bryce a servi dans les Forces canadiennes jusqu'à sa retraite, en 1995. Il est un ancien président de l'Association de l'Artillerie royale canadienne.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD continue à s'impliquer dans un certain nombre d'initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes, comme le Prix Vimy, le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, la Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité, ainsi que dans de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

- Au nombre des personnalités présentes à la plus grosse soirée du Prix Vimy, le 19 novembre, tenue au Musée canadien de la guerre, on comptait de nombreux leaders d'entreprises canadiennes qui soutiennent les buts de l'Institut de la CAD, de sensibiliser le public à la contribution importante et exceptionnelle d'un.e Canadien.ne à la sécurité du Canada et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques.

La soirée, sous la présidence de M. John Scott Cowan, a été rehaussée par la présence de Son Excellence le gouverneur général et commandant en chef du Canada, de la très honorable Beverley McLaughlin, juge en chef du Canada, et de M. Frank McArdle, de la très honorable

motto, 'Named by the Enemy'. Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Bryce served with the Canadian Forces until his retirement in 1995. He is a former President of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute continues to be involved in a number of initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces, such as the Vimy Award, the Annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, and numerous round table discussions.

- Amongst those in attendance at the largest Vimy Award evening on November 19 at the Canadian War Museum were many of Canada's corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of the CDA Institute to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the security of Canada and the preservation of our democratic values.

The evening, under the presidency of Dr. John Scott Cowan, was dignified by the presence of His Excellency the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada; the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLaughlin, Chief Justice of Canada, and Mr. Frank McArdle; the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson, this year's Vimy Award recipient; Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, and Mrs. Gina Donaldson; the Hon. Laurie Hawn, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence; previous recipients of the Vimy Award; Officer Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada and Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean; members of the Canadian Forces; and many other distinguished guests.

The Vimy Award gala was filled with colour and ceremony, generously provided by the Regimental Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards, the Regimental Pipes and Drums of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the Spitfire Brass Quintet and the Percussionist from the Central Band of the Canadian Forces.

The valuable support of our corporate sponsors and CDA members contributed to a very significant event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors appears elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Included with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award. Mr. Rob Russo, Ottawa Bureau Chief for The Canadian Press, accepted the Award on behalf of the recipient, Mr. Murray Brewster, who was on assignment in Afghanistan. The Award was presented by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Bob Millar, President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The Award was initiated by the CDA in collaboration with the CDFAI, to recognize annually one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of Canada's defence and security issues.

- The CDA Institute and CDA will present their annual

Adrienne Clarkson, récipiendaire du prix Vimy de cette année, du Vice-Amiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-chef de l'état-major de la Défense, et de Mme Gina Donaldson, de l'honorable Laurie Hawn, secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de la Défense nationale, récipiendaire passé du prix Vimy, des élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, de membres des Forces canadiennes, et de nombreux autres invités distingués.

Le gala du Prix Vimy fut haut en couleurs et en cérémonies généreusement offertes par la Musique régimentaire des Governor General's Foot Guards, les Regimental Pipes and Drums of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, le quintet de cuivres «Spitfire» et le percussionniste de la Musique centrale des Forces canadiennes.

Le précieux appui de nos entreprises commanditaires et de membres de la CAD a contribué à cette très importante manifestation qui a été appréciée de toutes les personnes présentes. Nos remerciements publics à nos commanditaires apparaissent ailleurs dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK*.

À l'intérieur du dîner du Prix Vimy a eu lieu la présentation du Ross Munro Media Award. M. Rob Russo, chef de pupitre de la Presse Canadienne Press pour Ottawa, a accepté le prix au nom du récipiendaire M. Murray Brewster, retenu par une affectation en Afghanistan. Le prix a été présenté par le Brigadier-Général (ret) Bob Millar, président du l'ICDAE. Le prix a été instauré par la CAD en collaboration avec le ICDAE pour reconnaître chaque année un.e journaliste canadien. ne pour sa contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la compréhension par le grand public des questions de défense et de sécurité.

- L'Institut de la CAD et la CAD présenteront leur séminaire annuel, *La Conférence d'Ottawa (2011) sur la défense et la sécurité*, les jeudi et vendredi 24 et 25 février 2011 à l'hôtel Faimont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Cette conférence annuelle est la tribune la plus importante du Canada depuis laquelle les questions de défense et de sécurité sont explorées. Parmi les conférenciers, on trouve le très honorable Stephen Harper, premier ministre du Canada (invité), M. John Hamre, président du Center for Strategic and International Studies, l'Amiral James Winnefeld, commandant de NORAD/NORTHCOM, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, secrétaire général de l'OTAN (invité), l'honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale (invité), le Général Walter Natynczyk, chef de l'état-major de la Défense, le Général Mieczyslaw Bieniek, commandant adjoint, Commandement suprême allié Transformation de l'OTAN, et le Général Keith Alexander, Commander US Cyber Command. On trouvera l'ordre du jour et on pourra s'inscrire à l'adresse www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai.

En terminant, j'aimerais remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux *patron*, *compagnon*, et *officier* pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent

seminar, *The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security*, on Thursday and Friday, 24-25 February, 2011, at the Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa. This annual conference is Canada's most important platform from which defence and security issues are explored. Speakers will include the Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada (invited); Dr. John Hamre, President, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Admiral James Winnefeld, Commander NORAD/NORTHCOM; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary-Secretary-General (invited), the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence (invited); General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff; General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, Deputy Commander, NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation; and General Keith Alexander, Commander US Cyber Command. The agenda and registration is available at www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfil our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation of \$75 or higher, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months:

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Thank you. ©

au travail de l'Institut de la CAD ; sans leur contribution il nous serait très difficile de bien nous acquitter de notre mission.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau *supporter*, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

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- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription au séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD.

Une copie du formulaire de donateurs est imprimée ailleurs dans ce magazine. Également disponible en ligne, à www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai.

Merci. ©

Coming event

The Vimy Foundation, with the kind cooperation of His Excellency Francois Delattre, will be hosting the inaugural 2011 Vimy Gala Reception on Thursday April 7th during Vimy Week celebrations, at the French Embassy on Sussex Drive here in Ottawa. Please circle this date in your calendars with details to follow in the New Year.

Avis

La fondation de Vimy, avec la coopération de son excellence Francois Delattre, accueillera la réception inaugurale du gala de Vimy le jeudi 7 avril prochain à l'ambassade de France situé sur promenade Sussex ici à Ottawa dans le cadre des célébrations la semaine de Vimy. Je vous invite à réserver cette date dans vos agendas. De plus amples détails sur ce gala seront communiqués dans la nouvelle année.



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The Vimy Award

by The Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson

Je vous remercie, votre excellence, pour vos bons mots à mon égard. La délicatesse de votre intention et la pleine appréciation de l'histoire conviennent parfaitement au cadre de cette soirée et à la présentation de ce prix Vimy. Vous le faites dans le contexte de la Conférence des associations de la défense, un organisme qui fait tant de choses remarquables pour la communauté des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui se préoccupent de nos forces armées et de nos intérêts dans la domaine de la défense. Vous qui participez à cette conférence veillez sur une certaine partie de notre sensibilité collective; c'est une sauvegarde à l'écoute de nos besoins nationaux. Le moins qu'on puisse dire, c'est que nous avons besoin de vous,

The Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson was Canada's 26th Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada's military, from 1999 to 2005. In 2007, Madame Clarkson was appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

de vous tous – soucieux et fiers – pour maintenir en nous le sens de notre engagement – afin qu'il demeure dans notre conscience pacifique d'intention, prêt à l'action.

[I thank Your Excellency for your kind words about me. The sensitivity of your intent and the sense of history are perfectly appropriate for this event and the presentation of the Vimy Award. You do this in the context of the Conference of Defence Associations, an organisation that does so many wonderful things for the community of Canadians who are the custodians of our armed forces and our defence interests. You, as part of this Conference, care for a part of our collective sensitivity, a safeguard attuned to our national needs. The least we can say is that we need you, all of you – caring and proud – to give us the sense of our commitment – which is maintained in our conscience, peaceful in intent and informed for action.]

I was proud to be at the 90th anniversary of the battle of Vimy Ridge on April 9th, 2007. Looking towards

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A gift provided under your will means a great deal to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

Planned gifts are commonly referred to as deferred gifts, such as bequests, life insurance, charitable remainder trusts and similar undertakings, whereby the commitment is made now, but the funds do not become available to the Institute until a set time in the future.

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For further information or to advise the CDA Institute of your intentions, please contact Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe at 613-236-9903 or treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. All inquiries will be handled and discussed in a strictly private and confidential manner.

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Un legs à l'Institut de la CAD est une des façons les plus simples de faire un don planifié.

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour aviser l'Institut de la CAD de vos intentions, veuillez communiquer avec le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe en composant le 613 236-9903 ou courriel treasurer@cda-cdai.ca. Toute demande d'information sera traitée de manière personnelle et strictement confidentielle.

that magnificent monument sculpted by Walter Allward, bracketing the sky of northern France, we as Canadians remembered that this battle, two and a half years after the war began, was the first that Canadians fought together as a combined force.

A week ago I attended the ceremony of the 11th of November in a small farming village in the south of France that I have known intimately for nearly thirty years. As in every village in France, the monument aux morts, is centrally placed and the words Morts Pour La France are engraved in the stone. The mayor, wearing his tricoloured sash, read out the names of the fallen alphabetically with the surnames first as is the custom in France. The villagers at the ceremony carried some of the same surnames as they have since the 14th century when the village was founded. At the time of the First World War, the village numbered just over four hundred people. Thirty-nine names were read out; thirty-nine men in their prime were killed, ten percent of the population, twenty percent of the males.

As we slowly dispersed, one of my acquaintances in the village asked me why Canadians had come to France to fight when our territory wasn't threatened and we had nothing to gain but everything to lose. I said, "They came because they were called, and they did what they could."

We had an army of volunteers coming from a country with almost no military tradition, distinguished not only by their guts but by their identity with each other. Pierre Berton writes in his definitive book *Vimy*: "The men spoke a common idiom. There were certain things that were theirs and nobody else's, certain things they knew about that others did not know; Eaton's catalogue and Marquis wheat...Labatt's Ale... and Louis Riel...this was the glue that held them together and made them proud."

The unspeakable horror of trench warfare, of mud, and blood, and foul water has been captured for us all by the movie *Passchendaele*, whose creator, Paul Gross, is here with us tonight. This film shows us for all time what it was really like. It was in 2007 for the second time in my life, that I went through the restored tunnels and trenches of Vimy where officers of my regiment, the Princess Patricia's, lived, existed, did their best, as all soldiers do. As my own father, Lance Corporal Billy Poy, did as a dispatch rider with the Royal Hong

Kong Volunteers on Wong Nai Chai Gap Road, as my father-in-law Captain William Saul, then with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, did on June 6, 1944 landing on Juno Beach in the first wave. The lance-corporal had left his wife and two small children fleeing Japanese bombardment from basement to basement; the captain had left his English wife pregnant in London. They are the people deserving of being remembered this evening with this Vimy Award.

As former Commander-in-Chief and now as Colonel-in-Chief of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, I have committed myself totally to our Armed Forces, the men and women who serve in them, to those in the past who "with courage, with a sense of duty...laid at their country's feet the most glorious contribution they could offer...[leaving] behind them not their fear, but their glory." My commitment is not onerous; my commitment is a privilege as a Canadian; my commitment is a tribute to being a human being. I believe human beings have a primary instinct to protect each other so the maximum number can survive to assure the continuance of the human race. Giving out Bravery Awards for six years gave me so many examples of strangers risking their lives to save others- from drowning, from being burned alive, and most amazing of all, from committing suicide.

Ultimately, to be a warrior is to offer oneself freely in what society has created through the evolution of competition and the attempts to channel aggression. The organizational structure of armies, even more than the hierarchies of religion and politics, reflects the most sophisticated understanding of leadership and its responsibilities, of triumph and its rich rewards, of defeat and its humiliating consequences. I respond to this and wish that our education taught us and our young the meaning of caring for others in circumstances where danger can bring disaster immediately and where self-preservation involves looking after others.

We must respect the people who have chosen this as a way of life. We ask them to meet challenges, danger and death for us. We must support them, not by facile sentimentality but by informed understanding of what it is they do because we as a nation have asked them to do it.

Vimy, for Canada, signifies the magnitude of suffering, the enormity of loss and the meaning of sacrifice. I thank you for giving me this award in its name and I accept it with the deepest humility and the most radiant pride. ©



13th Graduate Student Symposium

by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

The 13th Annual CDA Institute Graduate Student Symposium, held in Currie Hall at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) on 28-29 October 2010, was enormously successful. The Symposium contributes annually to education and dialogue on security and defence issues, which is core to the CDA Institute's role. The Symposium is a popular and established gathering that showcases the best of a growing body of graduate-level research.

This year's Graduate Student Symposium received the most submissions to date (62), and provided 40 graduate students from across Canada, approximately half of which were doctoral students or candidates, with an opportunity to present their research and network within the security and defence community.

A significant accomplishment of this year's symposium was the CDA Institute's efforts towards increasing gender diversity in the field of security and defence. While only nine women were accepted to present their work this year, this represented 21 percent of the participants, and mirrored the 26 percent of women who submitted proposals. Additionally, members of the Women in Defence and Security organization were present in the audience; and, concerted efforts in designing symposium-related literature - including the agenda and banners - were made to represent gender diversity in the Canadian Forces.

Geographic and linguistic diversity were also considered when determining successful submissions. Fifteen academic institutions were represented from six Canadian provinces. In the coming year, the CDA Institute will make a concerted effort to solicit submissions from all Canadian provinces.

Regarding linguistic diversity, approximately 15 percent of presentations were conducted in French, while many questions and feedback were also presented in French. We were amazed to find out that so many Anglophone presenters effortlessly fielded questions in both official languages, making the CDA Institute's Graduate Student Symposium a truly bilingual event!

Cash prizes were awarded to the top three presenters at \$3,000, \$2,000 and \$1,000 respectively. These individuals, along with those placing fourth and fifth place were complimented by a signed copy of J.L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver's *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military*

History. Individuals who placed sixth and seventh place were awarded a signed copy of General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier's book, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*.

Keynote speakers included Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada, and Dr. Dean Oliver, Director General of the Canadian War Museum.

Presenters:

University of Calgary: Vincent Topping, Tushna Soonawalla, Geoffrey Adair, Matthew Sutherland, Rachel Bryson, Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, Michael Kuzik;

Carleton University: Eric Jardine, Todd MacDonald, Paul Piasko, Mark Williams, Simon Palamer, Jeffrey Bernstein;

Concordia University: Philippe Villard;

Dalhousie University: Navid Pourmokhtar, Matthew Gillis;

Université Laval: Irving Lewis, Richard Garon, Jean-Luc Plourde, Frédéric Margotton;

University of Manitoba: LCol (Ret'd) Kawser Ahmed;

University of Ottawa: Susan Khazaeli, Adam Kochanski, Adam Tereszowski;

Queen's University: Matthew I. Mitchell, Philippe Roseberry, Paul Hillier, Michael Kocsis, Deborah Bayley;

Royal Military College of Canada: Krystel Carrier-Sabourin, 2Lt. Donovan Huppé, Capt. Robert B. Watts;

Simon Fraser University: Nancy Teeple;

L'Université du Québec à Montréal: Carline Leprince;

University of British Columbia: Adam Coombs;

University of Waterloo: Geoff Keelan;

University of Western Ontario: Steve Marti; and,

York University: Jay Joshi.

First place went to **Deborah Bayley** of Queen's University, for her presentation, "Of Law, Politics, and Detainees: Canadian Liability for Afghan War Crimes."

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is a DND Security and Defence Forum-sponsored intern employed as the Project Officer at the CDA Institute. She received her Master's from the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Her focus was on defence policy and security studies.

Second place went to **Matthew I. Mitchell** of Queen's University, for "Rethinking the Migration-Conflict Nexus: Insights from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana."

Third place went to **Paul Hillier** of Queen's University, for his presentation "Supply Chain Risk Management: Regulation or De-Regulation of the Procurement Process for a More Secure Canada?"

Fourth place went to **Frédéric Margotton** of Université Laval.

Fifth place went to **Eric Jardine** of Carleton University.

Sixth place went to **Geoff Keelan** of Waterloo University.

Seventh place went to **Jeffrey Bernstein** of Carleton University.

The top presenters were chosen by a three-person selection committee. This year, the selection committee members were Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations; Dr. John Young, RMCC-CMCR; and Dr. Pierre Jolicœur, RMCC-CMCR.

Papers and presentations will be accessible online on CDA Institute's website at:

<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia.htm> ©



Canada in the rear-view mirror: NATO Charts an Eastward Course at the Lisbon Summit

by Paul H. Chapin

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held one of its most successful summit meetings in Lisbon on November 19-20, 2010. The alliance approved a new Strategic Concept with a vision to guide its future decisions, endorsed important structural reforms, moved forward on missile defence, launched a new beginning with Russia, and agreed on a transition plan for Afghanistan. These were remarkable achievements which stand in stark contrast to the sterile deliberations and empty outcomes so often associated with other international summit meetings.

But the Lisbon Summit may also come to be seen as the moment when NATO began to change from a trans-Atlantic organization to a Eurocentric one, pursuing the vision of a greater Europe, and little interested in the world beyond. At Lisbon, the European members set an eastern course for the Alliance. The United States can keep pace or not, as it chooses; Canada is already in the rear-view mirror.

Paul Chapin is a 25-year veteran of the Canadian Foreign Service and has served at NATO as the Canadian representative on the Political Advisors Committee. From 2003 to 2006, he was Director General for International Security at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa, responsible inter alia for the operations of the Canadian delegation to NATO, Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, and security and defence relations with the United States. He is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Active engagement, modern defence

The Alliance deliberated for a year and half to produce an update of its principal guidance document, the Strategic Concept, last issued before 9/11. The work was done well and delivered solid results, although there was little evident Canadian involvement.

Entitled *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, the Strategic Concept of 2010 affirmed that NATO's fundamental purpose remains "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means." It described NATO as an alliance that should be able to (a) defend its members against the full range of threats, (b) manage even the most challenging crises, and (c) work with other organizations and nations to promote international stability. That vision required NATO to further develop its capacity to defend against terrorism, cyber attacks, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles, and to enhance its capacity to conduct expeditionary operations with suitable doctrine, military capabilities, civilian-military planning, and capacity to train local forces in crisis zones.

Notably, leaders agreed to develop "an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability at NATO headquarters" and to accord operational partners "a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute," i.e. the campaign in Afghanistan, counter-piracy operations, and the like. They did not, however, address the issue of burden-sharing, leaving untouched the archaic practice of the costs of international

operations being allowed “to lie where they fall.”

In addition to agreeing that the Alliance should invest in new military and civilian capabilities, leaders endorsed organizational reforms as consequential as any that NATO has ever undertaken. Three are particularly noteworthy. First, a new effort is going to be made to streamline operations at NATO headquarters where some 20 subordinate committees now report to the North Atlantic Council; however, this was done without dealing with the vexed issues of decision-making by consensus and decisions not being backed by resources.

Second, there is to be a “rationalization” of the military command structure, reducing the number of high-level headquarters from 11 to 7 and the number of military personnel from 13,000 to 8,950.

Third, the number of NATO support agencies will decrease from 14 to 3. It is not clear, however, that the new military command structure will necessarily dispose of the chain-of-command problem General Rick Hillier identified when he commanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or invest in theatre commanders with the authorities they require to be fully effective.

Missile defence

The decision on missile defence was noteworthy from two perspectives. First, it represented a commendable determination on the part of the European members of the Alliance not to be swayed by Russian objections into foregoing defences of the kind the Russians themselves have had since the 1960s and have recently been upgrading. Following a decade of work on the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system to protect NATO deployed forces, the Lisbon decision to expand coverage to include NATO territory and populations was a logical one. A plan of action for implementation is to be ready for discussion in June 2011.

Second, the decision taken at Lisbon was explicitly to defend *Europe*. With the United States having already deployed its own system, this means that 27 of 28 members of the Alliance have now decided on ballistic missile defences for their territory and population. Canada remains the only holdout. One wonders what the peace movement in Canada makes of this, including Russian President Medvedev agreeing at Lisbon to a “comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation.”

Russia

There have been other “new beginnings” with Russia, but the one at Lisbon looks promising. A year ago, the Russians agreed to a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges and it may be that the findings of that review convinced at least some in Moscow that NATO poses no threat. Clearly the two sides do face common security challenges, and the Russians have cooperated on issues where interests are shared such as piracy and the protection of sea lanes, terrorism, the clandestine market in WMD, and

the proliferation of medium and long-range missiles.

The Russians have also provided material support to NATO forces in Afghanistan, and at Lisbon agreed to important revisions in the current support arrangements to further facilitate railway transit of non-lethal ISAF equipment through Russian territory. Henceforth, Russia will allow greater quantities of NATO supplies into Afghanistan and now also permit removal of equipment from Afghanistan through its territory. The Russians have also agreed to the development of a NATO-Russia helicopter maintenance trust fund for Afghanistan and to open a second counter-narcotics training centre (in St. Petersburg). Pakistan will now be included in the training along with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Afghanistan

At Lisbon, the world finally got a good answer to the question “Does NATO have an exit strategy for Afghanistan?” The answer may not have satisfied everyone, but the strategy was endorsed by the 28 heads of state and government of NATO and by 20 other leaders from countries and organizations helping out in Afghanistan who had been invited to Lisbon for the Afghanistan discussions. What those leaders put their signatures to was the following:

- A declaration that reminds people that NATO is fighting in Afghanistan because that country’s security is directly linked with our own;
- A new phase in the NATO-Afghanistan joint effort whose goal is to create the conditions for an irreversible transition to full Afghan responsibility and leadership on security in four years. The new phase is to begin in some provinces and districts in early 2011, with the objective of having the Afghan National Security Forces leading and conducting security operations in all provinces by the end of 2014;
- An undertaking to ensure better coordination of the military and civilian dimensions of operations, and to better align international assistance with Afghan priorities;
- An expression of support for Afghan-led efforts to reconcile and reintegrate those members of the insurgency who renounce violence, cut links with terrorist groups, and accept the Afghan constitution;
- A warning to Afghan leaders to abide by the Afghan constitution, respect human rights particularly the rights of women, implement electoral reforms, improve governance, and fight corruption;
- A long-term partnership agreement between NATO and Afghanistan.

From the Atlantic to the Urals

Lisbon represented the culmination of a great deal of work commissioned at the previous NATO summit held jointly in Strasbourg and Kehl on opposite banks of the Rhine. Fifty years earlier, in 1959, General Charles de Gaulle delivered a famous speech in Strasbourg in which he outlined his vision for Europe: "Oui, c'est l'Europe, depuis l'Atlantique jusqu'à l'Oural, c'est toute l'Europe, qui décidera du destin du monde."

De Gaulle's vision was vividly at odds with that of the Atlantic Community espoused by the United States and Canada and one that seemed utterly unrealistic at the time. Europe, Germany and Berlin were all divided by an iron curtain, right-thinking people everywhere believed the division to be permanent, and European integration was in its infancy, confined to the economic affairs of a handful of West European states.

But it is a vision now on the threshold of being realized, whose consequences for NATO and for its two non-European members their governments have not much cared to explore. The Lisbon summit suggests the time has come for Ottawa and Washington to do so.

The Strategic Concept of 2010 said the right thing. NATO "remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies." But defence against what? Not Russia it would seem - in the view of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "We pose no threat to each other." If it is other states, the Strategic Concept made no mention of them. If it is terrorism and/or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, NATO has devoted relatively little effort to these threats, leaving the task of dealing with them to individual states and to cooperative efforts among their intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

An essential forum for consultations? Maybe an important one, but not essential, unless it is to firm up support for decisions negotiated beforehand between groups of states or within the European Union (EU), whose constitution compels its members to seek agreement first among themselves.

The EU now looms very large at NATO. The Strategic Concept devoted a great deal more space to the EU than to

any other outside organization including the United Nations, insisting at length that "an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area."

The Strategic Concept saw no irony in noting that NATO and the EU share a majority of members while "welcoming" the entry into force of the recent agreement among EU members (the Lisbon Treaty, no less) strengthening "the EU's capacities to address common security challenges." Why two organizations with such overlapping membership would both require such capacities has only one explanation: the EU sees its interests as primary.

Hence the language in the Strategic Concept expressing support for the goal of "a Europe whole and free" and the "eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures." It may well serve EU interests to have all European states join, but it would be hard to argue that NATO's interests would necessarily be served by the same "open-door policy."

In some cases, extending an offer of membership would undoubtedly undermine international peace and security. Fortunately, the Strategic Concept does suggest that some conditionality would be in order: "The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability."

The conclusion is that Canadian and US strategists are going to have to get used to a new future. The European members of the Alliance are exercising greater influence in NATO than ever before, making effective use of the institutional leverage the EU provides. Their interests are largely confined to the European continent and they are looking eastward, to Russia and to the states not yet fully integrated into de Gaulle's Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

For now, NATO still plays an important role in the defence of Europe, but they see the day when it will no longer serve their purposes. Meanwhile, the defence and security of the North American members of the Alliance concern them little and, with luck, they will be able to avoid involving themselves in future US schemes for politically contentious and financially taxing "out-of-area" operations such as Afghanistan.

This is a picture that may disturb US policymakers, but the United States will always be large and powerful enough to protect its security interests no matter what direction its European allies may take. Canada faces fewer options. If trends continue, Ottawa could face some difficult decisions. It is already in Europe's rear-view mirror. ©



Monument to de Gaulle in Moscow



The Financial Crisis Hits the UK Defence Budget

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

In a move to cope with its ongoing financial crisis and the rapid escalation of its budget deficit, the United Kingdom government has announced an ambitious plan to reduce its Total Managed Expenditure by £81 billion by 2014-15. These cuts amount to an overall reduction in real government departmental spending of 8.3 percent on average. Significantly, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) cut was announced as 7.5 percent.

The UK Defence Budget

The UK Defence Budget is now under acute pressure from four major budgetary factors. The first has been the cost of providing adequate resourcing for the operation in Afghanistan, including the provision of new equipment better suited to cope with the unpredictable and changing combat environment found there.

The second has been the requirement to deal with the impacts of overstretch as a consequence of the previous Iraq operation and its wear and tear on MOD equipment holdings.

The third is the requirement for the MOD to contribute to the government's deficit reduction targets, which will be done by essentially holding the defence budget constant in nominal terms while allowing inflation to eat away its value in real terms.

And the fourth is, perhaps, the most difficult of all—that of coping with the unfunded liability inherited from previous governments amounting to £38 billion, which is a sum larger than the annual MOD budget. That “unfunded liability” figure includes £20 billion for “unaffordable plans for new equipment and support.”

The following table shows the planned UK MOD budget over the next five years (*all figures in billions*).

Category	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	Total
Resource DEL	£24.3	£24.9	£25.2	£24.9	£24.7	£124
Capital DEL	£8.6	£8.9	£9.1	£9.2	£8.7	£44.5
Total DEL	£32.9	£33.8	£34.4	£34.1	£33.5	£168.5
Department AME	£2.8	£2.8	£3.1	£3.3	£3.4	£15.4
DEL + AME	£35.7	£36.6	£37.7	£37.4	£36.9	£183.9

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(UK budget terminology is a bit different from that used in Canada. Their Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) represent a longer term multi-year base line projection whereas the Annually Managed Expenditures (AME) represent funds which are difficult to control within fixed budgets because of their size or volatility. Capital spending makes up about 26% of the Total DEL. Resource DEL includes Personnel, Operations and Maintenance expenditures and accounts for about 74% of the DEL. This 25/75 split remains constant throughout the reduction period.)

Making the cuts

The necessity of eliminating the “unfunded liability” at the same time as coping with an inflation-derived decrease in purchasing power has forced the MOD to make drastic cuts in force structure and force capabilities.

The Navy loses HMS *Ark Royal* plus either HMS *Illustrious* or HMS *Ocean*. Four frigates will be cut. A Landing and Control Ship will be placed at extended (or low) readiness and a Bay-class amphibious support ship will be decommissioned. Additionally, 5,000 naval personnel will be cut as the Navy shrinks to 30,000 by 2015, with a further 1,000 to go by 2020.

The Army will lose a brigade. Its Main Battle Tank fleet will be reduced by 40 percent and the AS90 SP howitzer fleet by 35 percent. The four regional divisional headquarters will be cut to a single UK Support Command and two of the ten regional brigade headquarters will be eliminated. The 20,000 military and civilian personnel of the British Army of the Rhine will be withdrawn from Germany and relocated in the United Kingdom. Army strength will decrease by 7,000 to 95,000 by 2015 and by a further 1,000 by 2020.

The Air Force will lose all of the Harrier fleet immediately and will see the Tornado fleet reduced to zero strength by the end of the transition period. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) purchase will be reduced and converted to the naval rather than the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) version. The Nimrod

MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft will be cancelled. The TriStar and VC-10 fleets will be gone by 2013 as the new A330 fleet comes on strength to take over the refueller and transport

roles. The C130J Hercules transports will be withdrawn once the A400M transports arrive. The Sentinel surveillance aircraft will be withdrawn once the Afghanistan operation is concluded. Air Force strength will drop by 5,000 to 33,000 by 2015 and a further 1,500 by 2020.

The MOD Civil Service will be cut by 25,000 to 60,000.

What's left?

The Navy will retain the Trident force, though its replacement will be delayed and the number of warheads reduced. Funding for the replacement has not been committed at this date. It will have seven Astute-class nuclear submarines, and a carrier strike force built around a single new operational carrier. The surface fleet will include 19 frigates and destroyers, a Royal Marine commando group with a helicopter platform ship, and landing and command ships. Other ships will include 14 mine counter-measure ships, resupply and refuelling ships, and six Ro-Ro ferries for strategic transport.

The Army will have five multi-role brigades, with about 6,500 troops each, plus an Air Assault brigade. Precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System missiles will be added. The core of the Army's combat vehicle fleet will be based on medium weight armoured vehicles, though

some heavy armour will be retained to deal with high-threat situations. The Army plans also to reduce non-deployable headquarters and administrative elements.

The Air Force fast air fleet will be based on two fleets: Typhoons and naval rather than the STVOL JSF. The strategic and tactical airlift will be based on 7 C-17s, 22 A-400s, and 14 converted Airbus 330s for strategic and air tanker capabilities.

Will it work?

The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is a budget-driven document designed to enable the United Kingdom to cope with the financial crisis still facing it and the European Union. As such it contains assumptions about the degree to which MOD costs can be reduced. Given the size of the "unfunded liability" which has so critically impacted the SDSR's work, the question remains as to whether the document recognizes the impact of the ever-shortening technology cycle which drives defence equipment cost increases at a rate of between 7 and 12 percent annually, according to two recent RAND Corporation studies done for the US Navy and US Air Force.

The failure to recognize the true costs of equipment capabilities at the beginning of the procurement cycle guarantees "cost overruns," something that everyone condemns but seems always destined to repeat. ©



China in the Arctic: Potential Developments Impacting China's Activities in an Ice-Free Arctic

by Kyle D. Christensen

The opinions and conclusions contained in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, Defence Research and Development Canada, or the Government of Canada.

In recent years, China has been paying increasing attention to the potential consequence of melting sea ice in the Arctic. The prospect of the Arctic becoming increasingly navigable during summer months, the potential for shorter shipping routes between Asia and other regions of the world, and access to untapped natural resources – particularly hydrocarbon resources – has prompted China to devote more attention to Arctic research and activities.

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At the same time, there appears to be a discussion going on in China over the country's future involvement in the Arctic, and about how best to position itself for an ice-free Arctic. This discussion is largely strategic in nature, is taking place amongst Chinese academics, researchers, and officials, and is aimed at influencing government decision makers. In essence, some Chinese researchers have encouraged the government to take a much more active role in Arctic affairs, and be prepared to take advantage of an ice-free Arctic.

The possibility of a major non-circumpolar power with global interests and aspirations entering the Arctic has the potential to affect not only the circumpolar balance of power, but also the strategic thinking of circumpolar states. Within this context, this article reviews Beijing's

current thinking on the geopolitics of the Arctic, as well as developments that have the potential to influence China's future interests and activities in the region.

Beijing's Current Thinking on the Arctic

China currently does not have a formal strategy or policy on the Arctic. As a rising power though, it is well aware that its size and activities in the region might be cause for alarm among circumpolar states. Decision makers in Beijing, therefore, have advocated taking a cautious approach to China's involvement in the Arctic.¹

What can be gleaned from China's interest in the circumpolar region usually comes from statements made by government officials and the participation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials at international conferences. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue's remarks while attending an Arctic conference in Norway in June 2009, forms one of the most up-to-date and comprehensive statements of China's thinking on the geopolitics of the Arctic.

Hu stressed that China's Arctic research activities remain primarily focused on the scientific, environmental and climatic consequences of melting sea ice, as well as the commercial and economic benefits of melting Arctic sea ice in terms of potential access to resources and transit routes. Hu also noted that Beijing looks on the Arctic Council as the most important regional organization in the Arctic, and hopes that its application to be granted permanent observer status will be decided in its favour as soon as possible.²

While Hu's statements are generally reaffirming, there are some areas for concern. For instance, Hu's remarks about commercial, economic, and scientific interests in the Arctic are accompanied by distinctive statements about China's "rights" in the region. Hu acknowledged that while the Arctic is mainly a circumpolar regional issue, there were wider international issues at stake. Thus, Beijing would like to see Arctic states recognize the interests and rights of non-Arctic states, such as China, in the region.³

Hu also expressed China's support for Arctic countries' sovereign rights in the circumpolar region, but noted that some articles in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) may need to be updated due to the impact of climate change and increasing levels of activity in the Arctic. Hu, however, did not elaborate as to which articles of UNCLOS Beijing felt required updating. Nevertheless, it can be expected that Beijing will continue to affirm its rights in the Arctic, and persist with the notion that circumpolar issues require non-circumpolar state involvement.⁴

Future/Evolving Research Thrusts and Interests

There appears to be a discussion going on in China about how best to pursue its future interests and activities in the region, including how best to position itself for the potential of an ice-free Arctic. This discussion is strategic in nature, in that it is largely absent of any party rhetoric, and

appears to be aimed at influencing the decision-making of senior leaders.

For instance, some Chinese researchers have encouraged the government to position China to take advantage of the commercial and strategic opportunities of an ice-free Arctic. Guo Peiqing of Ocean University of China notes that China should not remain neutral or stay clear of Arctic affairs. According to Guo, "Any country that lacks comprehensive research on Polar politics will be excluded from being a decisive power in the management of the Arctic and therefore be forced into a passive position."⁵ Guo has even raised the possibility that Arctic states may one day form an alliance, thereby limiting China's access to the region.

In another example of this type of strategic thinking, Li Zhenfu of Dalian Maritime University, along with a team of other specialists, conducted an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of China successfully entering the Arctic.⁶ Of particular note is that their assessment assumes China's access to and use of Arctic sea routes. In other words, it is not a question of *if* China should be active in the Arctic, only *how* it should be active in the region.

Li also points out that the Arctic has significant military value, but that China's research on the Arctic has not been conducted in a comprehensive or strategic manner. Therefore, China's ability to speak out and protect its rights in the region is limited. As Li asserts, "Whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world economics and international strategies."⁷

Chinese officials have, therefore, started to think about what kind of policies, strategies, and capabilities would benefit China best in a seasonally ice-free Arctic. In September 2007, for example, the CCP Central Committee requested an examination of Arctic issues of importance to China. Although reports by the Arctic Issues Research project were not made public, expert scholars and officials from around China involved in the project – including Guo Peiqing and Li Zhenfu – identified ten areas relevant to China's future interests in the Arctic. These areas included Arctic and human society; Arctic resources and their exploitation; Arctic scientific research; Arctic transportation; Arctic law; Arctic politics and diplomacy; military factors in the Arctic; China's Arctic activities; the Arctic's geostrategic position; and, China's Arctic policy and recommendations.⁸

A review of these topics suggests that Beijing is viewing the Arctic in largely strategic terms. Of the ten areas identified by the Arctic Issues Research project, nine can be considered "strategically" oriented.⁹ In other words, the research conducted in those areas can be geared toward maximizing China's position in the Arctic vis-à-vis other circumpolar states.

While it is unclear whether China's future Arctic research interests will focus on the strategic elements of the research areas, the recommendations and advice contained in the Arctic Issues Research project reports have the potential to influence the highest levels of CCP leadership (and consequently the scope and direction of China's future Arctic activities). Specifically, two events will take place in China



Xuelong, the Chinese icebreaker.

Photo courtesy of the author

over the next two years, both of which will have the potential to define and/or alter China's future Arctic activities.

The first is the scheduled release of China's 12th Five-Year Plan in March 2011. Not only will the Plan guide China's economic development from 2011 to 2015, but it may also include targets for polar research and expedition activities, including for the Arctic.¹⁰ Although the actual content of polar research and expedition targets is not expected to be controversial or concerning for circumpolar states, this will be the first time that a Five-Year Plan may contain targets for Arctic and/or Polar activities. This suggests that the Polar regions have increased in importance for the Chinese, and this should be of interest to circumpolar states.

Second, the leadership change at the 18th National Congress of the CCP, scheduled for October-November 2012, has the potential to influence China's evolving Arctic research interests and activities. Due to term restrictions, Hu Jintao must step down as the current General Secretary of the CCP. While the 18th Central Committee will likely elect an identified successor into power as Hu's replacement,¹¹ most of the rest of the Politburo Standing Committee members, their party and state positions, and their political views are not clearly known at this time.

As a result, the leadership change provides an opportunity to develop and/or shift the focus of China's Arctic interests and activities. This is even more likely if the statements made by Guo Peiqing and Li Zhenfu are any indication of the type of recommendations and advice

contained in the Arctic Issues Research project reports. As China's leaders set the various goals, objectives, and ambitions for the country – including for the Polar regions – they may be influenced by the advice contained in the Arctic Issues Research project reports.

More importantly, while most statements about the future direction of China's Arctic activities have been made by academics, some People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers have echoed similar sentiments. Senior Colonel Han Xudong, for instance, has warned that due to the complex sovereignty disputes in the Arctic, the possibility of the use of force in the region cannot be ruled out.¹² Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo has also noted, "The current scramble for the sovereignty of the Arctic among some nations has encroached on many other countries' interests." China, therefore, "must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world's population."¹³

Thus, there exists in China a distinct group of academics and officials trying to influence leaders to adopt a much more assertive stance in the Arctic than has traditionally been the case. This could ultimately bring China into disagreement with circumpolar states in a variety of issue areas, and alter security and sovereignty relationships in the circumpolar region.

Conclusion

The Arctic region is growing in strategic importance as a result of the potential impact of climate change. These developments raise the likelihood that non-circumpolar states such as China will become increasingly active in the region. Although China's current activities remain focused on the scientific, environmental, and climatic consequences of melting sea ice, it is thinking about the region in strategic terms. The CCP Central Committee's examination of Arctic issues highlights the extent to which China is thinking about the region in strategic terms.

There is no question of whether China will be more active in the Polar regions. The likely inclusion of polar research and expedition targets in the 12th Five-Year Plan will guarantee that. The issue for circumpolar states will be to gauge whether the remarks made by academics, researchers and other officials are a reflection of the broad ambitions shared by China's leaders. This is because the remarks appear to be aimed at influencing discussions in China about its level of involvement in the Arctic, and about how best to position itself in the region.

(Endnotes)

- 1 To date, China has not been militarily involved in the Arctic, nor is it anticipated that it will become militarily involved in the Arctic for the foreseeable future. Thus, China currently does not pose a significant threat or challenge to Canadian Arctic security or sovereignty.
- 2 Beijing had not been granted permanent observer status yet. The next time its request can be considered will be at the Ministerial Meeting of the Council in spring 2011, in Nuuk (Greenland).
- 3 L. Jakobson. China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic. *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*. No. 2010. Vol. 2. (Solna, Norway: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2010). pp.9-10.
- 4 According to Jakobson, "The notion that China has rights in the Arctic can be expected to be repeated in articles by Chinese academics and in comments by Chinese officials until it gradually begins to be perceived as an accepted state of affairs." *Ibid.*
- 5 *Ibid.* p.7.
- 6 *Ibid.* p.6.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 *Ibid.* p.5.
- 9 Only Arctic and human society does not appear to have a significant strategic focus to it.
- 10 Jakobson. China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic. p.11.
- 11 Li Keqiang was touted as the likely successor to Hu until the 11th National People's Congress in 2008. At the 11th National People's Congress he was elected Vice-Premier. This position makes him more likely to succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. Alternatively, Xi Jinping's current positions as the country's Vice President, the sixth ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Principal of the Central Party School, makes him the more likely successor to Hu. This is supported by Xi's election to Vice President of the PRC at the 11th National People's Congress.
- 12 Jakobson. China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic. p.7.
- 13 G.G. Chang. China's Arctic Play. *The Diplomat*. (March 9, 2010). <http://the-diplomat.com/2010/03/09/china%E2%80%99s-arctic-play/> (Accessed: October 14, 2010).



Glacier in Croker Bay, which lies on the southern coast of Devon Island, Nunavut. Croker Bay is an arm of Lancaster Sound and the Barrow Strait.

Photo courtesy of the author

Over the next two years – the release of the 12th Five-Year Plan in 2011 and the upcoming leadership change in 2012 – will signify the most important developments in China in terms of determining its future interests and aspirations in the Arctic. If circumpolar states are unprepared, the outcome of these events have the potential to create and/or alter security challenges in the region.



Canada's Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan¹

by Brigadier-General Dean Milner and
Dr. Howard G. Coombs

The first and most important rule to observe ... is to use our entire forces with the utmost energy. The second rule is to concentrate our power as much as possible against that section where the chief blows are to be delivered and to incur disadvantages elsewhere, so that our chances of success may increase at the decisive point. The third rule is never to waste time. Unless important advantages are to be gained from hesitation, it is necessary to set to work at once. By this speed a hundred enemy measures are nipped in the bud, and public opinion is won most rapidly. Finally, the fourth rule is to follow up our successes with the utmost energy. Only pursuit of the beaten enemy gives the fruits of victory.²

- Karl von Clausewitz (1780 -1831)

While this statement by nineteenth century military theorist Karl von Clausewitz described what he believed were the fundamental principles necessary for victory in the sanguinary conflicts of the Napoleonic wars, they also contain elements that assist with defining Canada's counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

Firstly, the requirement to prosecute this current conflict with vigour and perseverance is difficult in a setting where the opposing forces are not easy to discern, define and defeat.

Secondly, the need to coordinate and concentrate power - physical, psychological and cybernetic - is well understood, but extremely complicated in an environment that embraces a huge number of influences. These pressures include the activities of numerous military and non-military actors who are attempting to stabilize Afghanistan and build national capacity in a host of areas. There is also the impact of a population divided and fractured by over three decades of constant violence, lacking confidence in themselves and central governance. On top of this are a whole host of disintegrating influences, both domestic and international. At the local level this ranges across multiple challenges - from malign actors of all types, through illicit activities to insurgents; this in turn combines to fuel the lack of assurance exhibited by the rest of the world in the ability of Afghans to administer their own affairs.

Thirdly, the appetite of both Afghans and contributing NATO nations for the seemingly never-ending

and inconclusive struggle that is currently taking place in southwest Asia has resulted in a public desire to diminish military contributions and achieve a positive conclusion rapidly. This has focused the efforts of both the international community and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to accomplish as much as possible in the short time remaining in various western mandates.

Finally, any military victories gained must be immediately followed up with persistent security - both military and police, in the form of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), some type of functioning governance, as well as reconstruction and development efforts designed to support national and sub-national economies. In order to deal with this complexity the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan fights the insurgent and, more importantly, addresses the insurgency. While the former is mostly a security problem, the latter is much more challenging and requires a concerted effort in the areas of governance and development; otherwise, any military success will be illusory.

Canadians should be justly proud of their soldiers, air personnel and sailors currently serving in Afghanistan. Warriors, one and all, they meet the security challenges of this complicated region with decisiveness and vigour in a multitude of ways, but at all times focused on protecting and sustaining the local Afghan population.

Threats to military and other forces, as well as the population are confronted directly and indirectly in a manner that destroys, neutralizes or disrupts them. The activities carried out by Canadian, and other coalition forces, include combat operations, normally in partnership with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), countering improvised explosive devices, establishing enhanced security in populated regions, and also implementing procedures designed to restrict the movement of insurgents throughout the Canadian area of responsibility. These control measures include checkpoints on major routes in conjunction with barriers designed to limit the transport of people and materials away from these primary roads with their restricted access points and enhanced security.

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Dr. Howard G. Coombs is an Assistant Professor of the Royal Military College of Canada and a serving army reserve officer, affiliated with the Princess of Wales' Own Regiment. He is a civilian advisor to the Task Force Commander.

As a result of the requirements of this complex contemporary environment, Canadian military activities in southern Afghanistan are conducted in a manner that reflects the recent evolution of counterinsurgency theory and practice. Western forces have moved from operational designs aimed at countering Maoist interpretations of armed struggle to supporting present whole-of-government efforts aimed at creating regionally tailored solutions along multiple and focused lines of effort. These actions are also in keeping with the doctrinal precepts of CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD (and ENABLE) articulated in recent American and nascent Canadian doctrine.

In accordance with these ideas, practitioners like David Kilcullen have suggested that, (1) it is necessary to develop a fulsome understanding of the reasons behind the conflict in a specific area or population, and (2) in conjunction with this knowledge one must put the welfare of the local people ahead of any other consideration, even killing the enemy. In this fashion, by partnering with the people and developing genuine and respectful relationships one convinces populations that the counterinsurgent will be victorious and, thus, is able to separate the insurgent from their population base.³ In that vein, Task Force Kandahar's efforts to fight the insurgent have been successful, but in that process it is well understood that while fighting the insurgent is relatively easy, defeating the insurgency is much more challenging.

The successes of Canadian military operations, in combination with the surge of American forces across Kandahar (and elsewhere), have created the space necessary to permit the GIRoA and its allies to address the roots of the insurgency.

...we assist with the ongoing processes of professionalization and increasing Afghan facility with security operations.

Subsequently, for Task Force Kandahar, information gathering and analysis consumes a great deal of effort. This is necessary in order to understand the constantly evolving political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructural dimensions of the local environment. In turn that permits the types of capacity building efforts aimed at strengthening and stabilizing the local districts.

By partnering and mentoring the ANSF, both Afghan army and police, we assist with the ongoing processes of professionalization and increasing Afghan facility with security operations. The ANA is a rapidly expanding institution, seen by many local Afghans as representative of their nation, and viewed by some insurgents as an effective opposition.⁴ At the same time, the ANP has further to go before they are considered effective; however, they are slowly improving. This progress will continue as numbers grow and more police receive training in the fundamentals of being a peace officer and learning to support their jurisdictions through the rule of law.

In addition to the hard work being put into the ANSF, Task Force Kandahar works with our field partners, amongst whom the Department of Foreign Affairs and International



Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

His Excellency, The Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada talks with the troops at Canada House, at Kandahar Air Field on November 4, 2010. His Excellency visited the troops in Afghanistan as part of his first international visit as Governor General.

*Photo: Sgt Serge Gouin, Rideau Hall, OSGG
© 2010 OSGG-BSGG*

Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) are prominent in encouraging governance and development.

The Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), Mr. Tim Martin, is not only the senior Canadian civilian government official in the province, he is Director of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT). His group of American and Canadian representatives work to assist Afghan provincial and district officials with issues related to the establishment of comprehensive governance and development from the village to provincial levels. They also assist through the Head of Mission – the Canadian Ambassador – in linking these provincial concerns to the central government in Kabul.

Task Force Kandahar contributes by facilitating these issues within villages and districts inclusive to its assigned area of Kandahar – Panjwa'i, Dand and Daman. The net effect is that one is able to make a large difference in extending stability by unifying the actions of all involved agencies within an overarching security context. This approach addresses the disintegrating influences affecting the Canadian portion of southern Afghanistan in a regional and coordinated manner that enables the prioritization and allocation of resources. Furthermore, this approach brings sufficient resources to bear in the villages and village clusters, demonstrating to the Afghan people the commitment of the GIRoA and the international community vis-à-vis national reconstruction and state building.

This method of negating the insurgency is local in nature and strives to create functioning districts through

an integrated effort targeting specific villages and groupings of villages for substantial governmental and developmental intervention.

These locations are connected to national and provincial programmes, urban, market, transportation and trade development packages, and local security sector reform activity. This prioritization also permits security forces to allocate their resources in the best manner to create a secure environment for those involved with these governmental, reconstruction and development activities.

Consequently, Task Force Kandahar and its interagency collaborators are fighting the insurgency in a number of ways. Canadian military efforts are oriented towards removing destabilizing influences, and establishing and maintaining population (community)-centric security. This creates the conditions for an integrated interagency approach that generates and promotes local governance and development, mostly from the bottom-up.

As part of this the whole-of-government effort, wherever possible one reinforces and, where necessary, establishes partnerships that put Afghan officials and security forces in the forefront and the population's interests first.

Once appropriate conditions have been established - responsible and functioning governance, burgeoning local economies with a rural/urban interface, and a capable ANSF - those districts will be ready to transition to complete Afghan control. Indeed this will be Canada's true legacy in this province - that the service and sacrifices of military and civilian personnel have assisted with creating conditions for a stable and secure Kandahar.

(Endnotes)

1 This article contains the opinions and experiences of many - from that of our Afghan partners, particularly, Brigadier-General Ahmad Habibi, Commander 1 Brigade, 205 (Hero) Corps, Afghan National Army, to our civilian field partners from Canada and elsewhere, and most importantly those of the commanders, staffs, sailors, soldiers and air personnel from the various units and elements that are, or have been part of, the Joint Task Force Afghanistan.

2 Karl von Clausewitz, "Clausewitz Quotes/Quotations" [website], available at <http://www.military-quotes.com/Clausewitz.htm>; internet, accessed 17 November 2010, n.p.; and for the source reference see Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, paperback edition, 1989).

3 David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-4.

4 "Lunch with the Taliban: Recent hopes of a negotiated peace are overblown," *The Economist* [journal on-line], available at <http://www.economist.com/node/17363902>; internet, accessed 18 November 2010, n.p. ©



8 November 2010
Panjwa'i District, Afghanistan

A Canadian soldier with the Task Force Kandahar Combat Engineer Department observes an Afghan National Army student during the Afghan National Army heavy equipment course. Soldiers from Joint Task Force Afghanistan carry out a variety of mentoring and instruction tasks geared to increase the operation capability of the Afghan National Army.

*Photo: Corporal Shilo Adamson, Canadian Forces Combat Camera
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The impact of these efforts in assisting the Afghan people of this troubled region will far outlast our presence and contribute to an ultimate goal of securing Afghanistan's future as a functioning member of the international community.

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What Next for the Canadian Forces? Not the Congo

by Louis A. Delvoie

With the end of Canada's involvement in combat operations in Afghanistan now in sight, the media have begun to publish articles speculating on where the Canadian Forces might next be deployed. Without saying so explicitly, these articles seem to suggest that because Canada now has a well-trained, well equipped and battle hardened army, that army should be sent abroad *somewhere* once it has finished its Afghan mission. This is rather curious reasoning. It tends to ignore the fact that the Canadian Forces exist to protect and promote the security and interests of Canada and Canadians. In the absence of any threat to that security or those interests, the Canadian Forces should remain in their barracks against the day when such a threat may emerge. To deploy them abroad simply because of their capabilities is sheer nonsense.

This line of argument is, of course, totally lost on proponents of the so-called human security agenda who advocate using the Canadian Forces to defend civilian populations at risk in civil war situations around the world, even in the absence of any discernible Canadian interest. The main focus of these proponents at the moment seems to be the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where fifteen years of civil wars have produced some five million dead and hundreds of thousands of rape victims. It is undeniable that the situation in the Congo represents a humanitarian tragedy of epic proportions. This is not, however, sufficient reason to dispatch a Canadian contingent to join the United Nations (UN) force now thrashing around more or less hopelessly in the eastern regions of the Congo.

Any decision by the Canadian government on whether or not to deploy forces to the Congo should be informed by a cool and reasoned analysis of some historical facts and contemporary realities.

Historical Notes

The history of the Congo over the last fifty years is one of unrelenting gloom. On achieving independence from Belgium in 1960, the country quickly descended into anarchy. The Congolese government of the day appealed first to the United States and then to the Soviet Union to help it restore order. Fearing that the conflict might degenerate into a confrontation between the two superpowers, with its attendant risk of escalation to the global level, the Secretary General of the United Nations took the initiative to propose the creation and dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force. Showing

the same concerns as the Secretary General, the Canadian government eventually and somewhat reluctantly agreed to contribute a contingent to the UN force. This contribution proved to be one of the most frustrating missions undertaken by the Canadian Forces. In the words of Professor Andrew Cooper: "Canadian forces found themselves trying to keep the peace under extremely arduous conditions, featuring a breakdown of central authority, civil war and a proliferation of rogue military elements."

A degree of order was eventually re-established in the Congo thanks not to the activities of the UN peacekeepers but to the intervention of French and Belgian combat troops. This moderately successful outcome was, however, marred by the fact that it ushered in more than thirty years of rule by one of Africa's most notorious military dictators. Colonel Joseph Mobutu. To remain in office as long as he did, Mobutu made liberal use of his venal and brutal army and police to quash all political opposition. His government mismanaged the country's vast mineral resources and paid scant attention to the welfare of the people. And, of course, Mobutu emerged as the king of the kleptocrats, transferring an estimated eight billion dollars to personal and family bank accounts and properties in Europe. (Throughout most of the period of the Cold War, the West turned a largely blind eye to Mobutu's transgressions because he was resolutely anti-Communist in a region of the world in which Marxists had made great headway with the support of Cuban and East European troops and advisors.)

The legacy of the Mobutu regime was underlined in the most recent edition of the United Nations *Human Development Report*. The report, which measures human development in terms of income, health and education, shows that only three countries in the world actually regressed between 1970 and 2010, i.e. that they have a lower human development rating today than forty years ago. One of those three countries was the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Contemporary Realities

The demise of the Mobutu regime in the mid-1990's was followed by a long series of civil wars in various parts of the Congo. These civil wars have involved (a) a weak and corrupt central government; (b) a national army with a well-deserved reputation for ineffectiveness, venality and massive human rights abuses; (c) literally dozens of opposition parties and movements, many ethnically based; (d) numerous well-armed militias guilty of looting, raping and killing defenceless civilian populations; and, (e) the direct intervention of the armed forces of six neighbouring countries. These wars are taking place in a country of some 50 million people with an

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area roughly equivalent to the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan combined.

In his book *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (Philadelphia, 2009) Professor René Lemarchand very succinctly described the Congo as “the epitome of the failed state, whose descent into hell has set loose a congeries of rival factions fighting proxy wars on behalf of a half dozen African states... It is the most fragmented battleground on the continent. The scale of human losses is staggering”.

In 1999 the UN decided to inject into his maelstrom a peacekeeping force known as MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo). Over time the mandate of this force has been changed repeatedly and it has grown in size from 3,000 to 18,000. The history of the force is to say the least a chequered one. In December 2004, *The Economist* commented rather acidly but nonetheless accurately that “Since MONUC was first deployed in 1999, it has consistently failed to keep anyone in the region safe.” In more recent years it has had some modest successes in protecting civilians and in disarming small militias, but overall its record is one of failure in its attempts to curb or terminate hostilities.

MONUC's failures can in part be attributed to the mandate, nature and capabilities of the force. Still described as a peacekeeping force, it is anything but; its real roles are enforcement and protection, far more challenging tasks. Composed largely of contingents from developing countries, the force is short of highly trained and well-disciplined troops (Some contingents have been involved in a variety of scandals, including a child prostitution ring). MONUC is also short of modern equipment, including armoured personnel carriers and helicopters to facilitate rapid deployment in response to emergencies. More important, however, is the fact that MONUC has been totally overwhelmed by the dimension and complexities of the situation in the Congo. It has at best been able to operate as a fire brigade, extinguishing outbreaks of violence here and there, but certainly not as a military force capable of restoring peace, law and order on a regional let alone a national scale.

Canadian Responses

What should be the Canadian government's policy response to the situation now prevailing in the Congo? The answer to this question must begin with an assessment of Canada's interests in the matter, under a series of discrete headings.

Political: Canada has no long-standing historical ties to the Congo. The bilateral relationship is at best marginal to Canada's principal international engagements. The Congo plays no role in the major international organisations which are of particular importance to Canada. Indeed the paucity of Canada's political interests in the Congo was underlined by the fact that the Canadian government closed its embassy in Kinshasa for a period of five years during the 1990's.

Security: Canada has no treaty or alliance links to the Congo. The armed forces of the Congo pose no threat to Canada, since they are devoid of power projection capabilities. The Congo is not home to any terrorist movement which might constitute a threat to Canada or its allies. Although tragic in their domestic and regional consequences, the civil wars in the Congo have not, and will not, escalate to the point where they constitute a threat to international peace and security.

Economic: Canada's economic interests in the Congo are negligible. For the full year of 2009, the value of Canada's total two-way trade with the Congo stood at just under \$17 million. (To put this figure in perspective, it represents less than one half hour of Canada's two-way trade with the United States.)

Socio-economic: The Congo is not a traditional source of immigrants for Canada and there is no large Congolese community in Canada. The Congo is not a significant destination for Canadians travelling abroad, and relatively few Congolese tourists visit Canada. Finally, the Congo is not a country of concentration for Canada's development assistance programmes in Africa.

Thus on classical foreign policy grounds, there is no compelling reason why Canada should become involved in the situation in the Congo. That said, it is impossible for the government of an economically developed country like Canada to ignore the plight of millions of helpless civilians caught up in the civil wars of the Congo. The Canadian government has provided them with emergency humanitarian assistance, principally through international organisations and non-governmental organisations working on the ground. It should continue to do so and perhaps envisage increasing that aid. The Canadian government might also usefully consider making the Congo a particular focus of its recently announced work plan for the protection of women and girls who are victimised in conflict situations. It should also stand ready to respond positively to any request for its mediatory services in helping to end one/or other of the conflicts in the Congo.

What the Canadian government should *not* do is consider sending a contingent of the Canadian Forces to join MONUC. What advocates of this course of action seem to believe is that the addition of some well-trained Canadian troops, equipped with armoured vehicle and helicopters, will be sufficient to transform MONUC into a force capable of protecting all civilians and restoring peace, law and order in the Congo. This belief is at best naïve, at worst hubristic. It totally ignores the dimensions and complexities of the conflicts in the Congo.

By sending a contingent to the Congo, the Canadian government would be exposing its troops to an endlessly frustrating and thankless mission with no end in sight, and this in a country replete with dangers, corruption and disease. Coming on top of a ten-year involvement in an Afghan mission whose outcome is anything but certain, new commitments could sap the morale of the Canadian Forces involved. This would not be in the best interests of the Forces or of the country. ©

Issue: Sustaining Funding for Defence

Sujet : Soutien du financement de la Défense

Background

- The defence budget has grown significantly over the past five years. In addition to incremental funding received for deployed operations, the budget for National Defence has increased from \$15 billion in 2005–06 to \$19 billion in 2008–09 and will approach \$22 billion in 2011. These very positive increases have enabled the Canadian Forces to begin to rebuild capabilities after a decade of reductions in the 1990s.
- In Chapter 4 of the 2010 budget material (under “Restraining Growth in National Defence Spending”) the text states: “In recent years, the Government has made major, necessary investments in the country’s military capabilities in support of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, the Government’s long-term vision for the Canadian Forces”. It goes on to note that the Government “remains committed to continuing to build the Canadian Forces into a first-class, modern military. However, as part of measures to restrain the growth in overall government spending and return to budget balance in the medium term, the Government will slow the rate of previously planned growth in the National Defence budget. Budget 2010 reduces growth in National Defence’s budget by \$525 million in 2012–13 and \$1 billion annually beginning in 2013–14. Defence spending will continue to grow but more slowly than previously planned”.
- Continued support for defence funding has allowed the Canadian Forces to accomplish its mission in Afghanistan, support major events such as the 2010 Olympics and respond to other crises – including, for example, the Haitian earthquake and piracy activities off the Horn of Africa. The reduction in budgetary growth beginning in 2012 could potentially slow the restoration of capabilities currently taking hold and delay or defer the recovery or ‘reset’ of equipment being repatriated after lengthy deployments in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

Contexte

- Le budget de la défense a augmenté considérablement ces cinq dernières années. En plus du financement incrémentiel reçu pour les opérations déployées, le budget de la Défense nationale est passé, de 15 milliards de dollars qu’il était en 2005-2006, à 19 milliards de dollars en 2008-2009, et il approchera les 22 milliards de dollars en 2011. Ces augmentations très positives ont permis aux Forces canadiennes de commencer à reconstruire leurs capacités après une décennie de réductions dans les années 1990.
- Au chapitre 4 de la documentation relative au budget de 2010 (sous la rubrique « Limiter la croissance des dépenses de la Défense nationale ») le texte dit : « Ces dernières années, le gouvernement a effectué d’importants investissements qui s’imposaient dans les capacités militaires du pays pour soutenir la stratégie de défense *Le Canada d’abord*, la vision à long terme du gouvernement pour les Forces canadiennes. Cette stratégie désigne un engagement à long terme de moderniser les Forces canadiennes. » Il se poursuit en notant que « Le gouvernement demeure résolu à continuer de bâtir les Forces canadiennes pour qu’elles deviennent une force armée moderne de premier ordre. Toutefois, dans le cadre des mesures de limitation de la croissance des dépenses publiques globales et de rétablissement de l’équilibre budgétaire à moyen terme, le gouvernement freinera la croissance déjà prévue du budget de la Défense nationale. Le budget de 2010 prévoit donc une réduction de la progression de ce budget de 525 millions de dollars en 2012-2013 et de 1 milliard de dollars par année, à compter de 2013-2014. Les dépenses au titre de la défense continueront de progresser, mais à un rythme plus lent que prévu précédemment. »
- Le soutien continu accordé au financement de la défense a permis aux Forces canadiennes d’accomplir leur mission en Afghanistan, de soutenir des manifestations majeures comme les Olympiques de 2010 et de répondre à d’autres crises – dont, par exemple, le tremblement de terre d’Haïti et les activités de lutte contre la piraterie dans la Corne de l’Afrique. La réduction de la croissance budgétaire à compter de 2012 pourrait bien ralentir la restauration des capacités qui s’effectue présentement et retarder ou reporter la récupération ou le « réamorçage » de l’équipement qu’on rapatrie après des déploiements prolongés en Afghanistan ou ailleurs.

- The Government has maintained its support to the military even in light of the pressures caused by the global economic crisis and the resulting federal deficit. While sustaining appropriate levels of funding may prove challenging, a healthy defence budget is critical to continued success in maintaining viable, responsive armed forces.

CDA Position

- The need for defence funding remains high. Although a partial withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011 may reduce some demand, the ongoing training role there will require incremental funding and the CF is likely to face additional expenses associated with repatriation and post-deployment activities. Equipment will have to be refurbished or replaced. Other initiatives to introduce or maintain capabilities for domestic operations, held in abeyance, will need to be revisited. As new equipment is put into service, pressures on personnel will continue and support and training requirements will have to be met. Finally, the demands of the Government's directed mandate to increase the military presence in Canada's North will incur additional expenses over an extended period of time, for both acquisitions and operations.
- Although defence funding has increased significantly, the recovery in military capability needs to continue. There are many initiatives identified in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* which have yet to be implemented and investment must continue if major equipment is to be recapitalized. Many fleets are reaching – or have reached – the end of their useful lives. Projects such as the replacement of support and combatant ships, the F-35 fighter and new combat vehicles will all demand significant financial commitment by the Government. Continued investments in appropriate numbers of personnel, both Regular and Reserve, will be needed to ensure the Canadian Forces are ready with the necessary training to operate and maintain new capabilities.
- Throughout, it will be important for the Government to continue to provide positive support to the Canadian Forces by maintaining adequate growth in the defence budget. Without this support, capabilities may atrophy or disappear altogether. Increased capabilities – hard-won from many years in Afghanistan – will need to be maintained if they are to be ready for future directed deployments.

- Le gouvernement a maintenu son appui à l'armée même à la lumière des pressions causées par la crise économique mondiale et du déficit fédéral qui est résulté. Même si le maintien de niveaux appropriés de financement peut s'avérer difficile, un budget de défense sain est critique à la poursuite du succès dans le maintien de forces armées viables et prêtes à réagir.

La position de la CAD

- Le besoin de financement de la défense demeure élevé. Même si un retrait partiel de l'Afghanistan en 2011 peut réduire une partie de la demande, le rôle continu de formation, là-bas, nécessitera un financement incrémentiel, et les FC feront probablement face à des dépenses supplémentaires associées aux activités de rapatriement d'après leur déploiement. L'équipement devra être remis à neuf ou remplacé. D'autres initiatives ayant pour but d'introduire ou de maintenir des capacités d'opérations internes, tenues en suspens, auront besoin d'être revues. À mesure que le nouvel équipement est mis en service, les pressions sur le personnel continueront et il faudra répondre aux besoins de soutien et de formation. Pour finir, les exigences du mandat de commande du gouvernement, d'augmenter la présence militaire dans le Nord du Canada, encourront des dépenses supplémentaires sur un horizon temporel prolongé, tant pour les acquisitions que pour les opérations.
- Même si le financement de la défense a augmenté de beaucoup, la récupération en capacité militaire a besoin de continuer. Il y a beaucoup d'initiatives identifiées dans la stratégie de défense *Le Canada* d'abord qu'il reste encore à mettre en oeuvre, et l'investissement doit se poursuivre si l'équipement majeur est pour être recapitalisé. Plusieurs parcs atteignent – ou ont atteint – le terme de leur vie utile. Des projets comme le remplacement des navires d'appui et de combat, le chasseur F-35 et les nouveaux véhicules de combat vont tous nécessiter un engagement financier important de la part du gouvernement. Ces investissements continus dans des contingents appropriés de personnel, de l'armée régulière et de la réserve, seront nécessaires pour faire en sorte que les Forces canadiennes soient prêtes à jouer leur rôle, avec la formation nécessaire pour faire fonctionner et maintenir de nouvelles capacités.
- Pendant tout ce temps il sera important pour le gouvernement de continuer à dispenser un soutien positif aux Forces canadiennes en maintenant une croissance adéquate dans le budget de la défense. Sans cet appui, les capacités peuvent s'atrophier ou disparaître complètement. Les capacités accrues – durement gagnés par de nombreuses années en Afghanistan – vont devoir être maintenues si on veut

qu'elles soient prêtes pour des déploiements dont l'avenir décidera.

Messages

- The Government's support to funding the Canadian Forces over the past several years has been very positive. Capability renewal is well underway.
- A partial withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011 presents the Government with an opportunity to address other important defence priorities – continued capital investment, refurbishment of equipment, increased focus on domestic requirements and so on – within the current and projected defence budget.
- Although the 2010 budget made reductions to Defence funding growth, future budgets must sustain planned funding if the *Canada First Defence Strategy* priorities are to be met. The Government must remain committed to a strong and capable military force.
- Any pause in the operational tempo may allow a shift in focus to address other pending national defence programs and initiatives; it does not signal a decreased requirement for continued defence funding.

Les messages

- L'appui accordé par le gouvernement au financement des Forces canadiennes pendant plusieurs années passées a été très positif. Le renouvellement des capacités va bien.
- Un retrait partiel de l'Afghanistan en 2011 présente au gouvernement une occasion de s'attaquer à d'autres importantes priorités de défense – continuation de l'investissement en capital, remise en état de l'équipement, focalisation accrue sur les nécessités internes et ainsi de suite – au sein du budget de défense actuel et projeté.
- Même si le budget de 2010 a apporté des réduction à la croissance du financement de la Défense, les budgets futurs devront soutenir le financement planifié si les priorités de la stratégie de défense *Le Canada d'abord* doivent être respectées. Le gouvernement doit rester engagé au maintien d'une force militaire forte et capable.
- Toute pause dans le tempo opérationnel peut permettre un déplacement de l'attention et permettre qu'on s'attaque à d'autres programmes et initiatives de défense nationale présentement en suspens ; il ne signale pas une diminution de l'exigence de continuité du financement de la défense.

Approved 3 December 2010 ©

Approuvé le 3 décembre 2010 ©

The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security

24-25 February 2011

**Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel
Ottawa ON**

The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, on 24 February, 0900 – 1700 hrs, “**Canada-U.S. Interests – Ten Years After 9/11**”. Participants will include the Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper (invited), Dr. John Hamre, Colin Robertson, the Hon. Michael Wilson, Admiral James Winnefeld, James Blanchard, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (invited), John Adams, Ward Elcock, General (Ret’d) Michael Hayden, Ian MacDonald, Commander James Kraska, Dr. Andrea Charron, and Chris Alexander.

On 25 February, 0830 – 1645 hrs, “**The Canadian Forces Post-Combat Mission in Afghanistan**”. Participants will include the Hon. Peter MacKay, General Walter Natynczyk, General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, General Keith Alexander, Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Michel Maisonneuve, Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, Brigadier-General (Ret’d) Don Macnamara, Robert Fonberg, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, and Dr. Philippe Lagassé.

Registration Fees (includes reception 24 February):

• CDA Institute donors, Conference Sponsors, CDA Member Associations and Associate Member Associations	\$200
• full-time students (Captain/Lt (N) and below)	\$30
• all others	\$275
• luncheon - 24 February	\$25
• mess dinner - 25 February	\$90

Enquiries and individual registration online by 21 February at <https://www.eplyevents.com/cda-cdai2011>.

La conférence d’Ottawa [2011] sur la Sécurité et la défense

les 24-25 Février 2011

**l’Hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier
à Ottawa ON**

La conférence d’Ottawa [2011] sur la Sécurité et la défense, le 24 février, 9 h - 17 h, “**Les intérêts canado-américains en matière de sécurité - 10 ans après le 11 Septembre**”. Le très hon. Stephen Harper (invité), M. John Hamre, Colin Robertson, l’hon. Michael Wilson, l’Amiral James Winnefeld, James Blanchard, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (invité), John Adams, Ward Elcock, General (ret) Michael Hayden, Ian MacDonald, Commander James Kraska, Mme. Andrea Charron, et Chris Alexander, feront partie la conférence.

Le 25 février, 8 h 30 - 16 h 45, “**Les Forces canadiennes: Post-mission de combat en Afghanistan**”. L’hon. Peter MacKay, Général Walter Natynczyk, General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, General Keith Alexander, Lieutenant-général (ret) Michel Maisonneuve, Lieutenant-général Peter Devlin, Lieutenant-général André Deschamps, Vice-amiral Dean McFadden, Brigadier-général (ret) Don Macnamara, Robert Fonberg, Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, et M. Philippe Lagassé, feront partie la conférence.

Frais d’inscription (incluant la réception du 24 février):

• donateurs de l’Institut de la CAD, les commanditaires à la conférence, membres et membres associés de la CAD	200 \$
• étudiants à temps plein (équivalent du grade capitaine/Lt (N) ou inférieur)	30 \$
• les autres	275 \$
• le déjeuner - le 24 février	25 \$
• diner au mess - le 25 février	90 \$

Renseignements et enregistrement, avant le 21 février, à notre website: <https://www.eplyevents.com/cda-cdai2011>.



No Mountain Too High

by Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie

In March 2010, Master Corporal Jody Mitic and Corporal Andrew Knisley of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) participated in the opening ceremonies for the Para Olympic Games in Vancouver. Celebrating with a drink at a local bar later that evening they glanced at the television and caught a few minutes of coverage of the 2009 Targa Newfoundland, a five day, 2,200 kilometre high speed tarmac rally on the back roads of Newfoundland. They speculated that if they entered the event they might be able to raise some funds for the Soldier On Fund. They had both been helped by the fund during their recovery from combat wounds, very serious wounds, as Jody and Andrew only had one complete leg between the two of them and three good arms.

In 2007, Master Corporal Mitic was a sniper on patrol in Afghanistan when he stepped on a mine which removed both of his legs below the knee. Less than two years later, he completed a half marathon. In 2009, while Corporal Knisley was on patrol two artillery shells buried in a mud wall were detonated and took off his entire right leg and severely damaged his right arm. Less than a year later, he completed a five kilometre walk for charity.

Someone advised the two soldiers that I had yet to grow up and was still racing formula cars, and in 2004 along with my co-driver Nigel Mortimer we entered our first rally and won our category at the Targa. There are only three Targa (Italian for plate) events in the world: Tasmania, New Zealand and Newfoundland. There are two divisions, one for the technical time distance teams at modest speed and an Open division for the "faster you go the higher you place" teams. Naturally, race car drivers favour the latter, getting up to 200kph on the narrow and windy back roads of Newfoundland where a braking point mistake can (and has) deposit a car in the Atlantic.

Jody and Andrew paid me a visit, and based on their post-amputation accomplishments to date I had no doubt they could race in the open category or, at the very least, compete. Five minutes later I was managing the effort. Let's face it: how do you say no to a couple of truly outstanding role

models, even if they are RCR! We decided that it was too late in the year to be ready for the event in mid-September. There were a few things we needed and they would all take time to source or complete: a car prepared to the toughest safety standards demanded by the rules; rally computer; in-car communication system; race driver school; rally instruction; certified fire-proof driving suits; special wheels and tires for testing and race; transport to move the car; at least \$40,000 for expenses; accommodation and meals in Newfoundland for at least 10 days; airline tickets for the team to and from Newfoundland; a thousand "hero cards" that all the teams needed to satisfy the autograph seekers at each stop along the rally route, and a myriad of other minor expenses along the way. We agreed that we should be ready in 18 months for the 2011 tenth anniversary for the event.

The next day I prepared a proposal for supporters to consider and sent it to some racing contacts. When I came back to my computer an hour later I was shocked to see a week's worth of messages queued up waiting for a response. The Targa organization had waived the \$5,000 entry fee and was arranging as much free accommodation for the drivers as possible; Doug Metham, Targa's man on the mainland, had some ideas where we might source a car; the Motorsport Club of Ottawa (MCO) where I am a member waived the fee for the two soldiers to attend the race driver school at the new track at Calabogie outside Ottawa; the owners of the Calabogie race track offered free track time for practice; Glen Clark - also an MCO member and a past outright winner of the Targa - volunteered to provide rally instruction and offered free participation at his rally schools in Ottawa and Newfoundland; and, Country Racewear offered to make the expensive special driving suits and team jackets and shirts.

I called Jody and Andrew and said, "If I can arrange a car and expense money within the next month, do you want to forget 2011 and compete this year?" Jody's response was, "Andrew, get your driving shoe [singular!] ready, we're going racing!"

I needed help on the mechanical side if we were going to find and prepare the right car. That was easy. My friend and teammate at the 2004 Targa and the owner and crew chief of the formula car team I race with, Nigel Mortimer volunteered to take on the coordination of preparing the car. Nigel is also the Chief Instructor at the MCO driving school where I also instruct, so we would be able to personally deliver the race driving instruction.

Initially Doug Metham recommended we contact Toyota as they were getting a good deal of bad press regarding

Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie had a long career in the Canadian Forces and is credited with establishing and commanding Sector Sarajevo as part of the United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia in 1992. He is a lifelong automobile racing enthusiast, and a skilled race car driver. He won the 2007 Diamond Class Ontario championship for Formula Fords. Major-General (Ret'd) is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.



Leg 2, Gander NL

Photo: Gordon Sleight

multiple recalls. We knew they still had the race-prepared hybrid Toyota that participated in the Targa a few years back. I figured “hybrid” soldiers in a hybrid car would garner a lot of publicity. Toyota was keen for a couple of weeks and then backed out, allegedly because of their concern that isolating the onboard batteries in the event of an accident would be more challenging for multiple amputees. They obviously didn’t know Jody and Andrew.

Toyota’s turning us down was the best luck we had during the entire six month project, for it pointed us in the direction of Honda Canada (thanks again to Doug Mephram!). I called Richard Jacobs (retired US Army), the senior public relations officer at Honda and briefed him on what we were trying to do. Within hours, Honda Canada was fully committed as authorized by the President himself, Mr. Masahiro Takedagawa.

Now that we had the car, we needed money for expenses, and I did not want to spend a cent of tax-receiptable support as any such donations should go to the Soldier On Fund. I sit on a number of mining boards within the Forbes & Manhattan group led by Stan Bahrti. Stan has an annual golf tournament in Muskoka for the many Bay Street investors who finance his operations. In July after the tournament

dinner I gave a short presentation on Jody, Andrew and their plan to compete in this year’s Targa, and less than three minutes later I had every dollar I needed to do the project without cutting corners.

Over the next two months the Acura TL SH-AWD was race prepared in Toronto, including a modified roll cage with easier access. Jody and Andrew excelled at the race car driving school, did a couple of practice rallies, were fitted for driving suits and helmets, and managed to keep their day jobs.

A press conference was held at the Canadian War Museum in August to officially introduce the team, during which both soldiers demonstrated their ease with the media, which augured well for all the publicity they were about to get! Early on, CTV’s Tom Clark, my friend and reporting mentor on a number of trips to Somalia, Bosnia, Belgrade and Kosovo, promised W5 would cover the story from day one. *Inside Track*, Canada’s premier motorsport magazine offered constant support and gave the project lots of print.

Honda Canada provided us with two crew members, Rob Zarcone and Eric Vlasic who knew the Acura inside out and were great support to Nigel. Bearing in mind the beating the car would be subjected to at the Targa, a number of

modifications to brakes and cooling were made before the car was put on the trailer and sent off to Newfoundland.

On September 8 we all flew to St John's in time for a reception for Jody and Andrew hosted by the Lieutenant Governor, John Crosbie. The room was filled with Afghan veterans from The Rock. As everyone wanted a piece of our two drivers I had to exert my "mommy" role making sure they got a good night's sleep, as once the competition started they would get very little.

The competition started on September 13 and ended five days and 2,250 kilometres later. Each day there were eight special stages varying in length from five to 40 kilometres. Each stage had a very quick minimum time that had to be achieved, and if you made that time on all 40 stages you won a Targa plate. Less than half the 60 teams would

do so. The other time that had to be met was in many stages impossible to achieve, but the team who was quickest in each stage received the fewest penalty points and at the end of the week the team with the fewest penalty points was declared the winner.

Some days the weather was appalling (a hint of what was to happen a week later when the area of the competition was severely damaged by Hurricane Igor), and Jody and Andrew had 40 chances to make one driving error that would mean no Targa plate. Some teams were back for their sixth time without once winning a plate. Our team was in a strong second place on the third day and were putting pressure on the leading factory entry in their category, when its engine grenaded just in front of them. A piece of the piston embedded in the Acura's Michelin tire but it only caused a

slow leak and the car made it to the finish line - now in first place!

Late on the fifth day at the St John's harbour wharf the results were announced and Master Corporal Jody Mitic and Corporal Andrew Knisley not only won their Targa plate but also won their category (Modern-large displacement). Motorsport history was made and the Soldier On Fund was the beneficiary. One of the messages on my answering machine when I got home was a \$50,000 anonymous donation. A great start towards our \$150,000 target.

It was a true honour accompanying these two outstanding role models as they ticked off another box on their "Bucket list." I'll leave it to your imagination as to what comes next, although Jody did mention the Isle of Man motorcycle race, which just happens to be the most dangerous motorsport event in the world. Go figure. ©



L to R: Master Corporal Jody Mitic and Corporal Andrew Knisley


Photo courtesy Major-General Lewis MacKenzie

The Challenge of Regulating the International Private Military Industry

by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

In the past ten years, private military actors have become essential to the way in which Western militaries operate. Through trial and error, states now recognise some of the challenges the private military sector poses to the conduct of war; and, as a result, states have begun experimenting with regulatory mechanisms to better control

private military contractors. International organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), industry-led organisations and states have also approached the issue of regulatory frameworks or mechanisms that better control private military and security contractors. All of these actors are becoming more aware of the negative implications of an



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unregulated private military industry. States are becoming additionally aware of the threats of dependence and reliance on private actors.

All signs point towards an increased interest in better regulating the private military industry. Some scholars and practitioners argue for the state to regulate and control the contractors they hire, while others propose that the international nature of the private military industry makes it ripe for global regulation.¹ At both levels, there are a number of options available for regulation, but all options have certain limitations.

The state has a wide variety of mechanisms and tools available to regulate and control the use of force by the private security industry. Yet, while the most advanced state in regulating this industry—the United States—is developing some strong mechanisms, there are numerous barriers that states face in trying to develop robust regulation for a global industry. To date, many states are taking their own approach to managing and controlling this industry, but the result of these uncoordinated actions may be multiple frameworks that both overlap and leave gaping holes in oversight.² The state may be a principle actor on regulating the private military industry; yet, many NGOs and industry organisations, believe that the global nature of the industry makes it ripe for international regulation. While these actors may provide compelling reasoning, international regulatory attempts to date are weak, while current and emerging initiatives provide

little hope for robust regulation of this industry.

Past Attempts at Regulating 'Mercenaries'

During the 20th century, the international community actively worked to regulate and limit mercenary activity because of the adverse effects these actors had in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.³ This action resulted in the development of the 1968 and 1970 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolutions that condemned the use of mercenaries against movements of liberation and defined mercenaries as "outlaws,"⁴ and the 1977 *Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa* by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that declared that mercenaries are a threat to security and peace in Africa.

These UN resolutions inadequately defined the term "mercenary" and the 1974 OAU Convention did not specifically ban the employment of mercenaries. Consequently, OAU member states such as Angola and Zaïre (now Democratic Republic of Congo) were still legally allowed to hire mercenaries to fight against rebel forces. Though IOs continued to draft conventions that restrict mercenary activity, such as the 1989 UN *International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries*,⁵ these laws still continue to be ineffectual.⁶

There are a number of reasons why these international efforts to regulate the employment of mercenaries

were ineffective. First, when the original documents were drafted in the 1970s and 1980s, mercenaries did not pose a threat to the sovereignty of most states, so there was little will from powerful actors to pursue this issue.

Second, anti-mercenary laws were unclear and weak because states purposely created ambiguous laws so as to take advantage of mercenaries to enhance their security when necessary. Weak laws were developed so that states could protect themselves from mercenary attacks, while still maintaining the option of employing mercenaries.⁷ This was a particular reason for the ineffectiveness of the OAU Convention.

Third, when drafting these documents, disagreeing states were forced to agree on terms and definitions. Given that these states were in opposition of each other, the only way to make them agree on resolutions was to develop the lowest common denominator definitions of “mercenary” and “mercenary activity,” as well as diluted legislation. The result of this process was insubstantial and watered-down regulation that made these laws weak and ineffective. Hence, for much of the 20th century the private military industry lay outside the domain of existing international legal regimes. These three explanations for the failure of legal frameworks continue to have relevance. Weak definitions, mixed motives, and the lowest-common-denominator-effect continue to be behind the failure of many other regulatory mechanisms developed at the international and the domestic levels.

On-going regulatory initiatives

While previous international attempts have failed, the international community still works towards addressing the legal vacuum concerning the private military industry. Recently, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss Government led a campaign for the development and ratification of the Montreux Document, which affirms that states employing firms and private military contractors operating in conflicts must comply with all international humanitarian and human rights laws. The Document also “provides a toolkit for governments to establish effective oversight and control over private military security contractors, for example through contracts or licensing/authorisation systems.”⁸ More than seventy countries have now signed this agreement, including Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While a declaration like this is important, what clearly matters is the ability for the international community or states to regulate and sanction the behaviour of military contractors, and ensure that states can control the contractors they hire.

The primary utility of the Montreux Document is that it clarifies international law regarding private military actors and encourages states to develop and adopt regulations that ensure private military firms are respecting international law and human rights.⁹ The Swiss Initiative does not put forward any new regulations. Alternatively, it simply provides a series of guidelines for states to follow when hiring private contractors, and provides states with guidance on legal and

regulatory issues regarding private military actors.

Some of the guidelines presented by the Swiss Initiative include ensuring that states hire only reputable contracting firms that do not have employees with criminal records, and that these firms have operated lawfully in the past. This type of guideline is useful for states because it provides them with a check list when hiring a firm, but a guideline like this is weak because firms can constantly switch ownership and name, thus absolving itself of its corporate history. In such cases, although a firm may have operated unlawfully in the past, under a new name and with wrongdoers fired, the corporation can be hired lawfully. (A notable example here is the name change of Blackwater to Xe). The employee scapegoats or wrongdoers may go on to work for another company hired by a non-signatory of the Montreux Document, and the commanders who may have initiated unlawful behaviour may still work for the company that is newly approved under a new name.

Fortunately, the Swiss Initiative also highlights the need for accountability and internal investigations. It calls for signatories to hire firms that implement policies and guidelines that show a respect for the principles of international humanitarian law, as well as firms that have monitoring mechanisms which transparently investigate wrongdoings and discipline offenders. It also calls for personnel to file complaints and for them to be defended by whistleblower protection arrangements.¹⁰ It also calls for public disclosure of contracts and complaints.¹¹ Companies with these types of policies are more likely to be hired by signatory states; therefore, guidelines such as these are effective because they encourage companies to develop accountability and monitoring mechanisms.

The industry has also been working to regulate itself. It is moving in this direction so that other actors such as NGOs or states do not need to develop their own regulation to control the industry. But, the industry is also developing policy because regulations may benefit business. After receiving much criticism that has reputational risk for individual firms, the private military industry has moved toward engaging in some corporate social responsibility-type initiatives.

This industry is in a unique position to regulate itself. Traditional public policy development can be slow, and industry can often develop policy much faster than states.¹² This means that industry can respond quickly to issues that emerge and develop policies that fix or remedy the environment that fostered problems. Industry can develop forms of self regulation, such as a voluntary code of conduct. Two organisations that represent the private military industry, the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)—formerly the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)—and the British Security Industry Association (BSIA), have been active in the development of such types of regulation.

The ISOA has almost 60 members that have signed on to an established Code of Conduct that has been written and revised by NGOs, human rights lawyers, and industry representatives.¹³ The ISOA encourages firms to join their

industry organisation, but all members of the ISOA are required to abide by its Code of Conduct and be assessed by its Standards Committee. The ISOA is open to complaints from outside actors on the actions of all members, and firms can face expulsion from the ISOA if they violate the Code of Conduct and do not alter their behaviour.¹⁴

In contrast, BSIA has no formally articulated code of conduct.¹⁵ There have been many proposals for what a BSIA code of conduct would look like, and that an industry-led type of voluntary code such as this would need to have members reflect norms regarding human rights, international laws of war and humanity, and sovereignty. The code would also need to be transparent and accessible to external monitors.¹⁶ Proposed codes mirror that of the existing ISOA code, in that they argue for governments to primarily hire industry association members.¹⁷ Clearly, the development of Codes of Conduct is a direction that industry wants to move towards, however it may not be the most effective method of controlling this industry if current efforts do not learn from the failings of previous policy.

Traditionally, the state may have been a principle actor in the development of domestic and global policy; however, many international campaigns now emerge as partnerships between states and private actors, such as IOs, NGOs, and industry. There is clear evidence that solely domestic regulation fails to address the increasingly global reach of the private military industry.¹⁸ There are numerous challenges that emerge when policy is created

only by IOs, NGOs and industry. Therefore, an alternative proposal for regulating this industry is to foster public-private partnerships that can create frameworks beyond the state level that may be able to better address the global challenges militaries and states face. These partnerships should be exclusive to like-minded actors that are focused on creating strong mechanisms to regulate this industry. Partnerships should be composed of both public and private actors so as to create frameworks that go beyond the state level while working with the interests of the private sector in mind. What is evident from industry-led initiatives is that companies want to be regulated; and, states clearly want to regulate. Therefore, like-minded public-private partnerships may cultivate rigorous standards that please the necessary parties.

While this approach may result in more global cohesion and regulation of the industry, it must be noted that it will not help states more effectively reap the benefits of using these actors. If states want to keep using these actors—and all signs suggest that they do—problems of domestic oversight and accountability of private actors will continue to impact the state and its ability to develop and implement defence policy that is free from aggressive private interference. Domestic and global regulation is a positive step forward, but it does not ensure that states will be protected by the threats that these actors present to them. States, therefore, need to move forward both at the international and domestic levels to ensure that this industry continues to benefit the state when needed.

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WAR POSTERS?

by Gertrude Kearns

"Editorial in nature, propaganda like in energy and attitude, with a bias towards chivalry and a hint of the devious, this series is about the nature of command perspectives in modern operations. From Lieutenant-Commander to Colonel to General and Defence Analyst this group of four Canadians creates a cross section of platforms spanning post cold war Balkans, Canadian security, and the current Afghan counterinsurgency."

This article is in part an artist's statement, the term used in current art practise whereby the visual arts practitioner explains the intentions, ideas and contexts of his work, in general as regards his practice, or as here specifically in relation to a particular body of work.

This series of four posters (2004-2010) is a war art documentation of sorts using Canadian Forces individuals as subjects. These expanded portraits function on three levels: military portraiture, editorially tinged commentary, quasi historical records, inasmuch as each subject's Canadian defence career is represented in the context of a specific yet verbally abstracted mission type. The one exception is the Col Brian MacDonald piece which is about the nature of defence analysis.

It is equally imperative that these works function in the contemporary art forum, establishing another viable credibility. This age of irony with a penchant for nihilistic predisposition seeks integrated message and can be as crucial as any visually technical prowess. These posters seem to appeal to civilians even if the message remains somewhat unclear. Even when they function as 'just guys in uniforms', and by association the military in general, there is an existential ring of sorts which bridges civilian and defence interpretations.

These posters are the antithesis of traditional war posters, which targeted specific audiences for immediate results in the 'war effort'. They were highly emotional sales devices via propaganda, not reliant on symbolism, humour or metaphor. *(The first poster in this series can be seen in ON TRACK Vol 15 No 3, at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2008/12/ontrack15n3.pdf>.)*

My intentions are contrary in every sense. These 'posters' are not made to be reproduced in quantity,

understood easily, or sell anything. They need to be interpreted, and gradated through an inherent understanding of the concern in question. In other words 'they are meant for a sophisticated audience'; these words came in response to a recent informal presentation I made of this group in a Toronto think tank environment. They cannot even hint at 'real' propaganda as they are not selling defence, not even questioning it. Rather they aim to express the hinge in operations via apparent oxymoron. However they are intended to 'look' like propaganda, to suggest some campaign is being waged as they are responding to the urgency of the times. Because these portraits are heroic in nature, they are meant to command attention and impart military ethos and the psychological and strategic rationale of modern defence sensibilities.

Suggested paradox and the general aesthete of each work are points of departure from historical military art into modern expressions of 'social commentary' it has been said, but more significantly from my perspective, an attempt to make 'defence commentary'. If they do not function in this respect, they are not successful.

Each poster idea evolved slowly, in the midst of other related work. My intention was to say as much as possible with the fewest words. A 1942 war poster study by the Toronto agency Young and Rubicon showed emotional appeal to be the most effective, whereas humour and symbolism were ineffective sales tools/methods. Relying on dry humour and contained emotion, these would have fared poorly in 1942!

The 4 subjects all agreed to sit for me and each has completely supported my decisions after the fact. None were commissioned drawings and I have retained all originals. The Department of National Defence, or technically TFA Roto 0, owns the final canvas work of Brigadier-General Steve P. Noonan as Colonel in Afghanistan titled *Real Deal*, 2006 48 x 36 inches.


IMAGE #2 *Plan Lead*-- Noonan 2006

With a quasi war/movie poster look, *Plan Lead* turns the traditionally serious military slag 'lead from the rear' into a contemporary working concept as it is juxtaposed with the idea of 'plan from the front' in reference to our current Afghan mission. I heard the former bandied about at HQ at KAF, well...alright just once! Regardless, I realized its potential.


Gertrude Kearns of Toronto has worked both officially and unofficially as a Canadian war artist for nearly two decades. She had a 2006 contract with TFA Roto 0 embedded in theatre in Kandahar and Kabul under Colonel S P Noonan. Work is in private, public and corporate collections in Canada; currently in the 2009-2012, eight venues across Canada "Brush with War: military art from Korea to Afghanistan", under DND and the Canadian War Museum. She is the 'unofficial' war artist in residence at the RCMI and a SSC member, on the SITREP Boulter Award jury for 4 years.

It features a portrait of Colonel Steven P Noonan, Commander of Task Force Afghanistan Roto 0, 2005-6, punctuated above and below with large text in a distinctive font. The intention was to express a leadership reality, expressing what can appear a dichotomy but is to all intents and purposes the underpinning of contemporary warfare approaches in this particular theatre. And implies the question: What is the full extent of the notion of front.... and the resultant 'taking the war to the enemy' so we do not need to fight him at home....by extension what is the reality of our home front today?

The poster both challenges and applauds this foundation. In days of yore, when commanders could truly sit behind the lines, there is no behind the lines in any sense 'over there'. And when the term asymmetric warfare is the catch phrase, the rationale of the poster is if there is no 'front' how can there be a 'rear'? And as there is no understood rear, leadership cannot come from that perspective. It is therefore coming from a front of sorts. This reflects the flip take on things these days. 'Leading from the rear' today also means 'putting an Afghan face ' on things. And who knows where that will take us. In 2006 when I sent Col Noonan the finished poster I was very relieved that he appreciated the text, replying by email. *"You have created a working concept"*. ©



Book Review



Leadership

by General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier

Reviewed by General (Ret'd) Paul Manson

General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier. *Leadership*. Toronto: Harper Collins, 2010. 315 pages. \$32.99, ISBN: 9781554684939

At the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) there is an entire library dedicated to the subject of leadership, the study of which has preoccupied mankind from the earliest days. Ancient civilisations revered great leaders, and modern societies are fascinated by such questions as why relatively few individuals rise to the challenges of leadership while others fail or are content simply to follow. Can leadership be taught? Can it be learned? Is there some innate, instinctive quality that allows only certain people to lead effectively?

Retired General Rick Hillier, whose military career culminated in a highly visible and distinguished term as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) at a critical time in Canada's history, has chosen *Leadership* as the title and subject of his second book, hard on the heels of his autobiography entitled *A Soldier First*.

In this latest volume, he clearly demonstrates his conviction that leadership is teachable. He is not the first senior Canadian military officer to write on the subject. Back in 1973 General Jacques Dextraze, a former CDS with whom Hillier has often been compared in leadership style, wrote a monograph on the subject, which is still used in Canadian military schools. Whereas "Jadex" summarised his thoughts and experience in a brief handful of classical rules, Hillier lays out no fewer than fifty lessons, dedicating a chapter to each (the subtitle of his book is *50 Points of Wisdom for Today's Leaders*).

Although on the surface his fifty topics can hardly be termed classical – one chapter, for example, is titled "Being Decisive Means Pissing People Off" – in reality his conclusions rarely stray from orthodoxy. Yet, what gives the book its distinctive quality is his elaboration on each theme by means of a generous serving of his own personal experiences; and, in this it is genuine Hillier.

General (Ret'd) Paul Manson is a former President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989. General (Ret'd) Manson is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Thus, in many respects his latest volume is a companion to his autobiography. It is salted throughout with references to the many individuals who, in the course of his military life, exemplified the qualities of good leadership he extols. But it must be said that the leadership exploits most often quoted are those of the author himself, and he presents these in a convincing and interesting way. It is no coincidence that his principal message, reflected in many of his fifty rules, is that people come first. Indeed, the title of Part I is "Never Forget – It's All about People," a section which encompasses no fewer than eleven of the book's chapters.

In recounting his personal experiences, Hillier occasionally digresses into several of the prevailing themes of his first book, such as his utter disdain for the politicians, bureaucrats and organisations who made his own leadership such a difficult challenge, notably in regard to Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. Likewise, he pulls no punches in expressing his distaste for those who substitute management for leadership in positions of authority.

The writing style is characteristically personal. Hillier addresses his arguments directly to his readers as students of the art of leadership. Although in this he has his eye primarily on the military officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) who seeks to become a good leader, he does not miss the opportunity to emphasise from time to time, perhaps with an eye to reaching an expanded market, that his fifty lessons apply equally well to the business community. The extent to which this is true is an interesting question, but there can be no doubt that the fundamental principals underlying his approach to leadership are universal.

All things considered, the book deserves a place in the RMCC Leadership Library, and it needs to be read by those who seek to develop their leadership skills within the Canadian military. Beyond that, it is a good read for those who seek insight into Hillier's personal approach to a vital skill that he himself has demonstrated in such great measure.

©

Book review



Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà vu All Over Again

by James G. Fergusson

Reviewed by Natalie Ratcliffe

Fergusson, James G. *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà vu All Over Again*. Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2010. ISBN 9780774817516

James G. Fergusson, the director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies and a professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba, has masterfully coloured in a void in Canada's national historical narrative. A study in diplomatic and military history as well as contemporary analysis of Canada's national security policies, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again*, provides the first comprehensive account of Canada's hesitant stance on missile defence in the post-Second World War era.

Dr. Fergusson argues forcefully and convincingly that successive Canadian governments rehearsed the same scene with only marginally different scripts over a fifty-five year long debate on the merits and dangers of this recurrent issue. In a divisive, and it seems appropriate to say, explosive debate, Canada opted for a middle ground which escalated deferral to the level of national policy.

During the Cold War, the prevailing wisdom was that a good defence requires a lethal offence. In pursuit of this, the world's two protagonists created a counterintuitive global balance based on Mutually Assured Destruction. Even as the Cold War ended dramatically and unannounced, the debate over missile defence persisted. Throughout, Canada was forced to reassess its defence policy and its position on ballistic missiles in step with its powerful neighbour. The global scope of the Cold War, Canada's close relationship and geostrategic proximity to the US, as well as its own safety forced policy makers in Ottawa to wrestle with a heavily symbolic yet highly practical issue; an issue which it wished to ignore more than anything else.

The theatrical vernacular used above is in keeping with the author's approach. Dr. Fergusson has chronologically divided his study into 'five acts', characterized by a major American initiative in each period; "the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) era consisting of McNamara's 1967 Sentinel program and Nixon's 1969 Safeguard revision; Reagan's

1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, better known as Star Wars; George H. Bush's 1991 Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) architecture; Clinton's 1996 National Missile Defence (NMD) idea; and finally George W. Bush's Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system."¹

Each period represents a markedly different approach to missile defence. Some American initiatives aimed for the weaponization of space, while others opted for a more targeted defence against global strikes and still others sought a combination of the two. Dr. Fergusson provides the global setting for each scene, seamlessly weaving a broader story about the post-Second World War international structure and the various ways in which America tried to create stability.

Against this backdrop, it is the commonalities between each period that are most noteworthy. The continuous friction characterizing Canadian-American relations plays out dialectically over fifty-five years. Ottawa consistently demonstrated a bloated hubris, believing that its vote could influence American missile defence policy.

Dr. Fergusson maintains, quite convincingly, that Canadian politicians and bureaucrats repeatedly missed a golden opportunity to participate, and over time perhaps exercise considerable influence, in a continental missile defence program. Instead of recognizing its unstoppable trajectory and becoming an early participant, fruitless and ill-timed debates only served to exclude Canada from meaningful participation.

Most concerning to politicians and policy makers in Ottawa was the detrimental impact that missile defence would have on NORAD. The potential of Canada's close defence relationship with the United States through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and NORAD could have provided a vehicle for Canadian participation. Each time the issue was raised, Canadian politicians maintained the status quo while the field developed without them.

Dr. Ferguson rounds out his study by integrating an analysis of the domestic factors precluding a shift in Canada's static position. It becomes clear that an anti-American sentiment throughout Canada made it exceptionally difficult for any Prime Minister to stand firmly behind joint missile defence planning. Canada's self-described identity as an

Natalie Ratcliffe is an Analyst with The SecDev Group. She earned a Masters in History from the University of Ottawa and recently completed a Security and Defence Forum Internship with the CDA Institute.

influential middle-power, separate from the United States, rendered missile defence an emotionally and psychologically charged issue. Movement was further encumbered by entrenched bureaucratic cultures in the Department of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs and International Trade) and the Department of National Defence; cultures which have historically brought them into conflict.

Moreover, Dr. Ferguson has populated his play with a rich and colourful cast. He vividly describes the Canadian and American individuals who played a role in missile defence. While phenomena and events are pivotal in history, Dr. Ferguson does not neglect the critical influence of personalities and leadership (or at times the lack thereof).

This is a valuable contribution to the study of Canadian-American relations and to Canadian history generally. If history is not doomed to repeat itself, then Dr. Ferguson ably demonstrates that the Canadian government is. He offers valuable insight into decision making on defence policy in this country.

The inter-departmental infighting, coupled with ill-timed and short-sighted public pronouncements on missile defence, has inflicted damage on our special relationship


with the United States. Our coveted defence partnership through NORAD has at once created a sense of protection and a reluctance to upset the status quo. Yet technology and missile defence policy continue to develop. In the words of Canadian diplomat John Holmes, "Jumping off a ship can be a grand gesture, but one is apt either to drown or end up permanently on an atoll."² Dr. Ferguson maintains that Canada needs to get on board and break a pattern that has been institutionalized on the Hill and in our civil service. In the process he dispels some of the more romantic and moralistic currents that have previously framed the issue.

Each of the five acts can stand alone, but taken together they offer a comprehensive story of Canada's national ballistic missile policy. It would have been worthwhile to incorporate more American primary documents into the analysis, to give an even fuller account of the story from America's perspective. Nevertheless, he has mined through voluminous archival documents at Library and Archives Canada and has amassed a library of secondary literature. Dr. Ferguson has been publishing on the topic since 1995, and he is undoubtedly Canada's foremost expert on this topic and this book represents a dedication and academic rigour that will set the tone for further work in this field.

(Endnotes)

- 1 Ferguson, James. H. *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*. Pp. 2.
- 2 Qtd in. Ross, *In the Interests of Peace*, p. 258. ©

Book review



The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century

by George Friedman

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*, Doubleday, January 2009. Hardcover, 272 pages, \$30.00, ISBN 978-0-307-47592-3

George Friedman, head of the firm Strategic Forecasting, is sometimes considered an *eminence grise* of

the American intelligence analysis community. His company provides high-level strategic guidance to its readers on critical geopolitical issues. The firm's analysis can often be too focused on the United States and it often makes some very abstract and non-mainstream geopolitical predictions, but that is the nature of their business. Their principal methodology involves abstracting geopolitics from individual

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leaders and events, and examining events through the lens of geography, demographics and calculations of relative power and trends. For the academically inclined, one might say that they are traditional realists.

In a previous edition of *On Track*, I reviewed Fareed Zakaria's *The Post-American World*, whose thesis rested—somewhat shakily—on the assumption that relative economic growth effortlessly translates into hard, geopolitical power. Under this assumption, Zakaria predicted the rise of China and India and the decline of the West. In comparison, George Friedman has a much less forgiving approach to geopolitics and thereby comes to very different conclusions. In *The Next 100 Years*, Friedman outlines his company's basic analytical assumptions: political leaders are constrained in the choices, and international relations consist of a very restrained set of choices. He therefore focuses on a few critical themes and countries that will be the drivers of the next century.

Friedman makes some claims that could be considered controversial, at least to those who subscribe to Zakaria-type declinist thesis. China is not a rising power—rather, it can be treated as an island isolated from the rest of the world, surrounded by inhospitable terrain to the north and seas to the south and east. It also faces a myriad of internal challenges to its development. Friedman predicts that Russia will rise and then implode once again. Perhaps the most surprising predictions are that the United States will come into conflict with rising powers Japan and Turkey, and that a powerful Poland will play a pivotal role in Europe. Mexico is described as a dominant threat to the North American balance of power, especially demographically in the southern United States.

The book's strongest claim, however, is that the United States is not in decline. Friedman writes that civilizations go through phases of brutality, civilization and decadence. He contends that, as the United States matures in its exercise of power in the second (civilization) phase, the twenty-first century will be the "American century." It will face external and internal challenges and emerge stronger than before, more mature in its exercise of power. Individual readers can form their own judgment about this claim, but it is striking and compelling, and goes against conventional Canadian strategic thought, outlined, for example, in documents such as the Canadian International Council's *Global Positioning Strategy*.

The narrative is backed by strong geopolitical analysis (readers wishing to know more can visit the firm's website, stratfor.com). Friedman examines geography and demographic trends, and evaluates technologies and innovation as foundations of power. For instance he notes the importance of control of the Asia-Pacific and Atlantic sea routes, and the importance of electricity generation for armies and societies of the future.

To illustrate his points (especially the one about technologies and innovation), there is a fascinating chapter at the end of the book describing a future war between the United States and its coalition partners, and an opposing alliance of Japan and Turkey. The narrative features orbiting

"Battle Stars" and space-deployed hypersonic aircraft, Moon bases, killer asteroids, armoured infantry engaged in urban combat, all powered by electricity generated from space. The description often appears extremely far-fetched (and corny), but the point is to not take it literally. Rather, the reader is expected to appreciate the foundations of national power and the technologies that drive it, which are stated and described succinctly. Other conclusions are also critical. For instance, war will no longer be total or involve mass mobilization, but will be more lethal; at the same time, Friedman writes that inter-state conflict will remain the dominant form of conflict.


The narrative has several weaknesses. First, it is not really about the next 100 years—it's more about the next 50 to 75 years, with a brief preview of the lead-up to the twenty-second century. The narrative is also US-centric, focusing greatly on American politics, demographic trends, political cycles, immigration and other factors. While Friedman does say that the current century will be the "American Century," it may have been more interesting to conduct such deep analysis on other prominent powers described in the book. Some readers may also feel cheated by the focus on a few specific countries and themes.

Most critically, however, Friedman often simultaneously invokes the importance of vague and inexorable geopolitical forces, as well as broad concepts such as "national culture." For any student of political science, muddying levels of analysis and concepts and combining them to suit one's analytical purposes is a poor way to make predictions about international relations.

Moreover it is difficult to reconcile Friedman's emphasis on inter-state conflict instead of intra-state wars "among the people" that are currently consuming so much effort and resources in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Counterinsurgency does not elicit substantial coverage by Friedman, in comparison to counterinsurgency practitioner and theorist David Kilcullen, who in *The Accidental Guerrilla* outlines a very persuasive case for localized wars among the people amidst a larger global conflict. Reconciling these seemingly conflicting views would have been a useful exercise. In his defence, Friedman would likely view counterinsurgency and other geopolitical issues of today—such as cyberwarfare, Wikileaks, transnational gangs, climate change—as passing fads and distractions from the prime focus of international relations: states, power and geopolitics. Or, in Friedman's words, "Like the Spanish-American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time."

In conclusion, *The Next 100 Years* offers a striking, alternative picture of the future global security environment, in terms of the most important actors, trends and technologies. As with any strong predictive work it outlines its biases and assumptions quite clearly, although the author sometimes muddies concepts and terms to suit his analytical aims. Perhaps Friedman's work should not be considered as the *definitive* take on the twenty-first century, but it should definitely be on your reading list. ©

Book Review



Named by the Enemy: A History of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles

by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret'd) Brian A. Reid

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) James Bryce

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Brian A. Reid. *NAMED BY THE ENEMY A History of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles*. Robin Brass Studio Incorporated 2010. ISBN 978-1-896941-60-8

This excellent book is written in a style that makes it equally interesting to both the serious military historian and the general reader. Brian Reid's wide range of military knowledge, his ability to describe and interpret events, and his attention to detail all combine to make this book a memorable reading experience. It is well illustrated with photographs and maps which complement the narrative. The captions accompanying the photographs are insightful and bring the characters and events to life in a fashion missing in many other books of this genre. The book not only traces the history of this great Winnipeg regiment and its soldiers, it is a vivid and very readable encapsulation of much of Canadian military history from 1870 through to the present day.

It chronicles the 1870 rebellion in Manitoba and the situation that led to the formation of the Regiment in 1883, the first Reserve Unit on the prairies. The Unit's involvement in recruiting voyageurs for the Nile Expedition of 1884-1885 forms the subject of a short but very interesting chapter about Canada's part in this venture. There is a very full account of the North West Rebellion of 1885 where the Regiment was the first to deploy to the scene of the action. It was in this campaign that it got its nickname "The Little Black Devils". The Sioux in the area and rebel prisoners, familiar with red coated soldiers were puzzled about the identity of the rifle green clad soldiers and asked "who were the little black devils?" This was the derivation of the Regiment's motto, "Hosti Acie Nominati" which translates as "Named by the Enemy".

The Regiment's part in the South African War of 1899-1902, the Great War of 1914-1918, and the Second World War of 1939-1945 is dealt with in detail with acts of gallantry and sacrifice too numerous to mention here but it is worth noting that it was the first unit in the Allied Forces to take its D-Day objective.

The account of the part played by the Regiment in the expansion of the Army to meet the demands of the Korean War in 1950 and the formation of the 27th Canadian Brigade Group for NATO duty in Germany in 1951 portrays how, once again, Canada's Reserves formed the basis for a rapid expansion in the size of the Army. Little Black Devils served in both theatres as members of other battalions in a manner reminiscent of the creation of the CEF Battalions of The Great War. In the Epilogue we see the involvement of the Regiment's soldiers in the Balkans and Afghanistan. In these theatres too, the Regiment did not fight as a formed unit but provided individuals to augment the Regular Force units deployed.

The peacetime life of the Regiment and its place in the social fabric of Manitoba over the years is well documented. Many of its officers and men have been important figures in civil society at the municipal, provincial and national level, strengthening the bonds between the Unit and the society it serves. It has served it well in notable peacetime instances such as the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike and the Red River floods of 1950 and 1997.

In his interpretation and description of the political and military events of the times, Reid praises the heroes and identifies the culprits with the empathy of a soldier writing about soldiers. Soldiers reading the book will understand and identify with the Regiment and the events; everyone reading it will come away with a better understanding of Canada's history and the contribution this great Regiment has made to it in peace and war.

The book is available at Chapters and is listed online at \$46.16. ©

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Jim Bryce retired in 1995 from the Regular component of the Canadian Forces after 35 years of service with the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. He is a Past-President of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association.

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