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### DEFENCE POLICY ANALYST / ANALYSTE DES POLITIQUES DE DÉFENSE

Mr. Arnav Manchanda, MA

Conference of Defence Associations Institute 222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B Ottawa ON K2P 2G3

#### PHONE / TÉLÉPHONE

(613) 236 9903

e-mail / courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca

website / site web: www.cda-cdai.ca

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COVER PHOTO: 24 February 2011. The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. Panel 1 – Canada-US Relations – 10 Years Since 9/11. Photo by: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le 24 février 2011 – La Conférence d'Ottawa (2011) sur la défense et la sécurité. Panel 1 – Les relations entre le Canada et les É-U – 10 ans après le Onze-Septembre. Photo: le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe.

#### From the Executive Director

#### Mot du Directeur exécutif

We are pleased to begin our 16<sup>th</sup> year of the publication of the CDA Institute's *ON TRACK*. This quarterly journal is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes significant value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada, with the presentation of articles by experts in those fields. ON TRACK provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters.

We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations

ing the results of our research and our recommendations with policy-makers, politicians, academics and the public, we help promote change in the policies of our Federal government for the betterment of our country.

This spring edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of the 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, the way ahead for the CDA Institute, Arctic security, NATO transformation, Afghanistan, communications with the Canadian public, the Ross Munro Media Award, war art, and book reviews.

The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security was held on 24 and 25 February, in the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa. The theme of Day One was *Canada-U.S. Security Interests – Ten Years After 9/11*. The theme of the second day of the conference was *The Canadian Forces Post-Combat Mission in Afghanistan*. Both themes were timely, given the challenges that Canada faces both externally, in the war against terrorism and, domestically, with the government wrestling with the nation's financial deficit. The Ballroom in the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the conference was held, was filled to overflowing with over 500 attendees.

The conference luncheon address, held on Day One, was delivered to a packed audience in the Adam Room of the hotel by Mr. Thomas d'Aquino, Senior Counsel - Gowlings and Former Chief Executive, Canadian Council of Chief Executives. His address, "Canada-US Security Imperatives: The Economic Dimension," can be read at http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/daquino2011.pdf. Mr. d'Aquino is a member of the CDA Institute's Board of Directors.

We heard presentations from the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence; Dr. John Hamre, President, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff; General Mieczyslaw, Deputy Commander, NATO Supreme



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

Nous sommes heureux de lancer la 16° année de publication de *ON TRACK*, de l'Institut de la CAD. Ce journal trimestriel est un outil important grâce auquel l'Institut apporte une contribution significative aux discussions sur les questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la publication d'articles rédigés par des experts dans le domaine. *ON TRACK* offre un forum pour un débat informé et non partisan sur les questions de défense et de sécurité.

Nous croyons que des politiques de défense et sécurité efficaces doivent être fondées

sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et présenter des options raisonnées. En partageant le résultat de nos recherches et nos recommandations avec les décideurs, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous favorisons des changements dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour le bien de notre pays.

Cette édition printanière de *ON TRACK* vous offre des articles d'actualité sur la Conférence d'Ottawa – 2011 sur la Sécurité et la défense, la voie du futur pour l'Institut de la CAD, la sécurité de l'Arctique, la transformation de l'OTAN, l'Afghanistan, les communications avec le public canadien, le prix média Ross Munro et l'art de guerre ainsi que des comptes rendus de lecture.

La Conférence d'Ottawa – 2011 sur la Sécurité et la défense s'est tenue les 24 et 25 février à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier à Ottawa. Le thème de la première journée était Les intérêts canado-américains en matière de sécurité – 10 ans après le 11 septembre. Le thème de la seconde journée de la conférence était Les Forces canadiennes : Post-mission de combat en Afghanistan. Les deux thèmes étaient fort à propos étant donné les défis auxquels fait face le Canada tant au plan extérieur, avec la lutte contre le terrorisme, qu'au plan intérieur, avec un gouvernement luttant contre le déficit. La salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, où avait lieu la conférence, était pleine à craquer avec plus de 500 participants.

L'allocution du déjeuner lors de la première journée de la conférence a été prononcée par M. Thomas d'Aquino, avocat principal au bureau de Gowlings à Ottawa et ancien chef de la direction et président du Conseil canadien des chefs d'entreprise, devant un auditoire remplissant complètement la salle Adam du Fairmont Château Laurier. On peut trouver le texte de son allocution « Canada-US Security Imperatives: The Economic Dimension » sur le site http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/daquino2011.pdf. M. d'Aquino est membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

Nous avons entendu des présentations de l'honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale; de M. John Hamre, Président du Center for Strategic and International Studies; du Vice-Amiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense; du Général Mieczyslaw

Allied Command Transformation; General Keith Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency.

Bieniek, commandant adjoint, Commandant suprême allié Transformation (SACT) de l'OTAN; du Général Keith Alexander, commandant, US Cyber Command et Directeur, National Security Agency.



Panel: Future Challenges for the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence. L-R: Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara, CDA Institute; Dr. Philippe Lagassé, University of Ottawa; Dan Ross, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), National Defence; and Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of Transformation, Canadian Forces

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Panel: Les futurs défis pour les Forces canadiennes et le Ministre de la Defense national. G-D: Le brigadier-général (ret) Don Macnamara, l'Institut de la CAD; M. Philippe Lagassé, l'Université d'Ottawa; M. Dan Ross, Sous-ministre adjoint (Matériels); et le Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, Chef – Transformation des Forces canadiennes

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Other speakers included the Hon. Michael Wilson, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States of America: Lieutenant-General Frank Grass, Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command; James Blanchard, former U.S. Ambassador to Canada; General (Ret) Michael Hayden, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; Senator Colin Kenny, former Chair, Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence; Commander James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Andrea Charron, Carleton University; Mr. Chris Alexander, former Canadian diplomat; Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Chief of the Land Staff; Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Chief of the Air Staff; Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, Chief of the Maritime Staff; Mr. Dan Ross, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), National Defence; Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of Transformation, Canadian Forces; and Dr. Philippe Lagassé, University of Ottawa.

The Conference was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, Ambassadors, Senators and MPs, military

Les autres conférenciers incluaient l'honorable Michael Wilson, ancien ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis; Frank Grass, commandant adjoint, U.S. Northern Command; James Blanchard, ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis au Canada; le Général (Ret) Michael Hayden, exdirecteur, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; le sénateur Colin Kenny, ex-Président, Comité permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense du Sénat; le Commandant James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College; Mme Andrea Charron, Université Carleton; M. Chris Alexander, ex-diplomate canadien; le Lieutenant-Général Peter Devlin, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre; le Lieutenant-Général André Deschamps, chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne; le Vice-Amiral Dean McFadden, chef d'état-major de la Force maritime; M. Dan Ross, sous-ministre adjoint (Matériel), Défense nationale: le Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie, chef - Transformation des forces canadiennes; et M. Philippe Lagassé, Université d'Ottawa.

Les participants à la conférence incluaient des membres des Forces armées canadiennes, des ambassadeurs,

attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College of Canada and from Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, and members of the Canadian public. There was also significant media interest in the seminar.

I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received in the days following the conclusion of the Conference. Videos and electronic copies of the addresses that were delivered at the seminar are available online at http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/defence-seminars/seminar2011.

The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security was truly successful, reflecting the general public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and national defence. Our Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, presents a summary of the proceedings of the two-day conference in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

The presence of so many speakers from around the world was made possible through the financial assistance of General Dynamics Canada, General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada, General Dynamics Ordnance Tactical Systems - Canada, Irving Shipbuilding, Airborne Underwater Geophysical Signals, Pratt & Whitney Canada, ADGA Group Consultants, Boeing, Defence Management Studies of the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University , NATO, Colt Canada, DRS Technologies, DEW Engineering & Development, Royal Roads University, Bombardier, Raytheon Canada Limited, Allen Vanguard, and The SecDev Group. Coffee for the seminar was generously provided by CSMG of Ottawa and, following the conclusion of the seminar, General Dynamics graciously hosted a reception for the attendees.

Our President, Dr. John Scott Cowan, provides us with a look into the organisation and functioning of the CDA Institute today and with an outline of what the Institute should look like in the future. In 'What Next for the CDA Institute?, Dr. Cowan outlines the initial steps that have been taken and will be taken in the near future to achieve the goals that have been set out for the Institute.

Since 2006, members of Canada's Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Kandahar have been working in close proximity to their Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police counterparts. Captain Jamie Donovan outlines some of the challenges that are faced by members of the Team, in 'Building a Legacy: Canada's OMLT & the mentoring of the ANSF. Captain Donovan is a member of Task Force Kandahar Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.

In 'Review Essay – Afghanistan Redux', Dr. Howard Coombs edits a compendium of references, that pertain to Afghanistan and that were provided by Captain (N) Darren Hawco, Colonel Robert (Rob) Kearney, Colonel Paul Prévost, Lieutenant-colonel Michel-Henri St-Louis, as well as Dr. Combs. The compilation provides a palette of references from which interested readers can create their own perspective concerning Canada's involvement in South-West Asia, or act

des sénateurs et des députés, des attachés militaires, des officiers cadets du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean et de membres du public canadien. Les médias ont aussi fait preuve de beaucoup d'intérêt pour la conférence.

Je remarque avec plaisir les commentaires très positifs que nous avons reçus dans les jours suivants la fin de la conférence. Les copies vidéo et électroniques des allocutions faites lors de la conférence sont disponibles en ligne sur le site http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/defence-seminars/seminar2011.

La conférence d'Ottawa – 2011 sur la Sécurité et la défense a connu un véritable succès, ce qui reflète bien l'intérêt accru du public en général pour le rôle du Canada en matière de sécurité internationale et défense nationale. Notre analyste principal en matière de défense, le Colonel (retraité) Brian MacDonald, présente un sommaire des délibérations qui ont eu lieu lors des deux journées de conférence dans cette édition de *ON TRACK*.

La présence de tant de conférenciers venant de partout dans le monde a été rendue possible grâce à l'appui financier de General Dynamics du Canada, General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada, General Dynamics Ordnance Tactical Systems - Canada, Irving Shipbuilding, Airborne Underwater Geophysical Signals, Pratt & Whitney Canada, le groupe ADGA Consultants, Boeing, Defence Management Studies (School of Policy Studies, Queen's University), l'OTAN, Colt Canada, DRS Technologies, DEW Engineering & Development, Royal Roads University, Bombardier, Raytheon Canada Limited, Allen Vanguard, et le SecDev Group. Le café pour le séminaire a été généreusement fourni par CSMG d'Ottawa. Après le séminaire, General Dynamics a eu la gracieuseté d'offrir une réception pour les participants.

Notre Président, John Scott Cowan, nous offre un aperçu de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de l'Institut de la CAD aujourd'hui et esquisse ce à quoi devrait ressembler l'Institut dans le futur. Dans « What Next for the CDA Institute?, le docteur Cowan dresse un tableau des actions déjà accomplies et de celles qui seront entreprises dans le futur pour atteindre les objectifs qui ont été fixés pour l'Institut.

Depuis 2006, les membres de l'équipe de liaison et de mentorat opérationnel [ELMO] canadienne déployée à Kandahar ont travaillé étroitement avec leurs partenaires de l'armée et de la police nationale afghanes. Le Capitaine Jamie Donovan nous fait part de certains défis auxquels font face les membres de l'équipe dans « Building a Legacy : Canada's OMLT & the mentoring of the ANSF ». Le Capitaine Donovan est un membre de l'équipe de liaison et de mentorat opérationnel de la Force opérationnelle à Kandahar.

Dans « Review Essay – Afghanistan Redux », Howard Coombs édite un compendium de références relatives à l'Afghanistan fournies par le Capitaine de frégate Darren Hawco, le Colonel Robert (Rob) Kearney, le Colonel Paul Prévost, le Lieutenant-colonel Michel-Henri St-Louis, ainsi que M. Combs. Cette compilation offre un éventail de références à partir desquelles les lecteurs intéressés peuvent développer leur propre perspective concernant la participation

as a point of departure for further reading on Afghanistan. Dr. Coombs is deployed with Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10 as a civilian advisor to the Task Force Commander.

In 2010, Canada will assume the two-year Chairmanship of the Arctic Council – a high-level forum for cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states, indigenous communities and other Arctic residents. Dr. Andrea Charron reviews deadlines Canada faces and takes a brief look at a few questions for the reader to ponder, in *'Canada and the Arctic: 2013 and Beyond'*. Dr. Charron is Research Associate, Canadian Defence and Security Studies, Carleton University.

On 24 March our Project Officer, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, attended the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) award winners briefing. Meghan is a two-time recipient of SDF funding, and found this year's award briefing informative and engaging. In 'The SDF: Canada's Security and Defence Future?,' she reports on the compelling briefings of the day on the Canadian Forces and DND policy, and discusses the on-going need for an active and funded SDF.

Thomas S. Caldwell writes in his article, 'The Need for Direct Communication', of the need to address the "why" of our Canadian Forces' efforts and sacrifices and of the right of Canadians to receive a follow up report on big ticket or game changing acquisitions. Mr. Caldwell is Chairman, Caldwell Securities Ltd., and a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

In 2002 the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) initiated the Ross Munro Media Award (RMMA). Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Keple outlines for us, in 'Ross Munro Media Award', the rationale for its creation. Colonel (Ret'd) Keple is a Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Conference of Defence Associations.

The Ross Munro Media Award was most recently presented, last November, to Mr. Murray Brewster, Parliamentary defence reporter and senior war correspondent for The Canadian Press news agency. The presentation was made during the Vimy Award dinner while Mr. Brewster was on assignment in Afghanistan with our troops. In his absence he provided the dinner a very moving video accepting the Award. We are pleased to include the text of his address in *ON TRACK*.

The presentation of this prestigious award, this year, will be presented during the Vimy Award dinner in November to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of \$2,500. The notice of the call for nominations also appears elsewhere in this issue.

canadienne en Asie du Sud-Ouest, ou qui peuvent servir de point de départ pour d'autres lectures sur l'Afghanistan. M. Coombs est déployé avec la Force opérationnelle interarmées Afghanistan 5-10 en tant que conseiller civil du commandant de la Force opérationnelle.

En 2010, le Canada assumera, pour deux ans, la présidence du Conseil de l'Arctique – un forum de haut niveau pour la coopération, la coordination et l'interaction entre les pays de l'Arctique, les collectivités autochtones et les autres résidents de l'Arctique. Andrea Charron passe en revue les échéances auxquelles le Canada fait face et soulève quelques sujets de réflexion pour le lecteur dans « Canada and the Arctic: 2013 and Beyond ». Mme Charron est associée de recherche, Canadian Defence and Security Studies, Université Carleton.

Le 24 mars, notre agente de projet, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, a participé à la Séance d'information pour les lauréats du Forum sur la Sécurité et la défense (FSD). Meghan a bénéficié du financement du FSD à deux reprises et considère que la séance de cette année était très intéressante et regorgeait d'informations. Dans « The SDF: Canada's Security and Defence Future? », elle présente les séances d'information fascinantes sur les Forces canadiennes et les politiques du ministère de la Défense ayant eu lieu ce jour là, et discute du besoin continu d'un FSD actif et financé adéquatement.

Thomas S. Caldwell nous parle, dans son article « *The Need for Direct Communication* », de la nécessité de se pencher sur le « pourquoi » des efforts et des sacrifices des Forces canadiennes et du droit des Canadiens à avoir un suivi sur les acquisitions qui sont importantes ou qui changent la donne. M Caldwell est Président de Caldwell Securities Ltd et membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

En 2002, la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) et l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères ont lancé le prix média Ross Munro (PMRM). Le Colonel (ret) Charles Keple nous présente, dans « Ross Munro Media Award », les motifs de sa création. Le Colonel (ret) Charles Keple est Vice-président du Comité exécutif de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Le prix média Ross Munro a été présenté, en novembre dernier, à M. Murray Brewster, journaliste en matière de défense au Parlement et premier correspondant de guerre pour l'agence de presse La Presse Canadienne. Le prix a été présenté lors du Dîner Vimy alors que M Brewster était en Afghanistan avec nos troupes. En son absence, une vidéo émouvante, dans laquelle il acceptait le prix, a été présentée aux participants au dîner. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure le texte de son allocution dans *ON TRACK*.

La présentation de ce prix prestigieux, cette année, sera faite lors du Dîner Vimy (en novembre) à un journaliste canadien qui a fait une contribution significative à la compréhension, par le public, des questions de défense et de sécurité qui touchent le Canada. Le prix est accompagné d'un montant en argent de 2 500\$. L'avis d'appel de candidatures apparaît ailleurs dans ce numéro.

Brigadier-General Gary O'Brien has written, in 'Canada's Army Reserve – Post the Combat Mission in Afghanistan', that Canada's success in Afghanistan has shaped a new vision and confidence in its Army Reserve. He outlines the transformation of the Army Reserve that is under way. Brigadier-General O'Brien is Director General Land Reserves at National Defence Headquarters.

Gertrude Kearns is a Toronto-based artist who has executed four portraits of Canadians serving and who have served on various missions. In 'War Posters?', Ms. Kearns explains the rationale behind her work and provides a commentary for the third of four portraits that we are featuring over the next while in *ON TRACK*.

We are pleased to include reviews of two books that should be of interest to our readers. The first is from our Defence Policy Analyst, Mr. Arnav Manchanda, who provides a critical review of Robert Kaplan's *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*. He notes that Kaplan's writing is notable for its ability to get at both facts and esoteric details and impressions.

The CDA Institute's Project Officer, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, reviews Jack Granatstein's *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace.* Meghan's review pays particular attention to Granatstein's account of the Canadian Army from 1968 to the present. Her overall assessment of the book is that is provides a well-written, accessible, and comprehensive account of the broad role of the Canadian Army throughout its history.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson by the His Excellency the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Governor General and Commanderin-Chief of Canada, before some 670 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 18 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue, and go online at http://cdacdai.ca/cdai/.

The CDA Institute will continue to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country. Through the CDA

Le Brigadier-Général Gary O'Brien écrit, dans « Canada's Army Reserve – Post the Combat Mission in Afghanistan », que les succès du Canada en Afghanistan génère une nouvelle vision et confiance dans la Réserve. Il décrit la transformation en cours de la Réserve. Le Brigadier-Général Gary O'Brien est directeur général – Réserve terre au Ouartier général de la Défense nationale.

Gertrude Kearns est une artiste de Toronto qui a réalisé quatre portraits de Canadiens en service et ayant servi lors de diverses missions. Dans « *War Posters?* », Mme Kearns explique la raison d'être de son travail et offre un commentaire sur le troisième des quatre portraits que nous vous présenterons prochainement dans *ON TRACK*.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure des comptes rendus de deux livres qui devraient être d'intérêt pour nos lecteurs. Le premier est de notre analyste des politiques de défense, M. Arnav Manchanda, qui nous offre une revue critique du livre de Robert Kaplan *Monsoon : The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*. Il note que l'écriture de Kaplan se distingue par sa capacité à intégrer tant les faits concrets que les détails ésotériques et les impressions.

L'agent de projet de l'Institut de la CAD, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, fait un compte rendu de *Canada's Army : Waging War and Keeping the Peace* de Jack Granatstein. Son analyse porte une attention particulière sur la relation que fait Granatstein de l'histoire de l'Armée de terre du Canada, de 1968 à aujourd'hui. Elle juge que, globalement, le livre est bien écrit et décrit de manière accessible et détaillée le rôle important joué par l'Armée de terre du Canada tout au long de son histoire.

Un des événements importants dans le calendrier d'activités de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne ayant fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et la sécurité de notre nation et la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Le programme de l'année dernière a connu un succès exceptionnel, avec un nombre record de soumissions de haut calibre présentées au Comité de sélection du Prix Vimy. Le programme a culminé avec la présentation du Prix à la très honorable Adrienne Clarkson par Son Excellence le très honorable David Johnston, Gouverneur général et commandant en chef du Canada, devant quelques 670 invités, lors d'un dîner de gala tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

La présentation du Prix Vimy aura lieu cette année le 18 novembre lors d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala, encore une fois au Musée canadien de la guerre. Pour donner tout son sens au Prix, l'Institut a besoin de vos nominations pour le récipiendaire de l'année. Bien que nous ayons déjà reçu un certain nombre de candidatures, les associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les individus sont encouragés à soumettre leurs nominations pour un candidat. Veuillez référer à l'avis d'appel de candidatures que l'on peut trouver plus loin dans ce numéro et visiter le site http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/.

L'Institut de la CAD continuera de fournir aux Canadiens des analyses judicieuses des événements et des questions qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité de ce

Institute's research, roundtable discussions, annual seminars and symposia, and our collaboration with universities and other groups, we continue our focus on defence and security issues. Our aim is always to inform as well as support our government and policymakers in directions that will safeguard the defence and security interests of Canada and its citizens.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation \$75, or at a higher level, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months following your donation:

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pays. À travers notre recherche, nos tables rondes, séminaires annuels et symposiums, ainsi que notre collaboration avec les universités et d'autres groupes, nous continuons à mettre l'accent sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Notre but est de toujours informer et appuyer notre gouvernement et ceux qui conçoivent les politiques en vue de sauvegarder les intérêts du Canada et de ses citoyens en matière de défense et de sécurité.

En terminant, j'aimerais remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux *patron, compagnon,* et *officier* pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, appui sans lequel il nous serait très difficile de bien nous acquitter de notre mission.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau *supporter*, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

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Une copie du formulaire de donateurs est imprimée ailleurs dans ce magazine. Également disponible, en ligne, à www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai.

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#### Correction notice:

The article, 'Canada's Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan', which was published in the previous edition of ON TRACK was co-authored by Dr. Howard Coombs and Brigadier-General Dean Milner. The authorship of the article, as listed in the previous edition, was incorrect. The Editor regrets the error.



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## Proceedings of the 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security

by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

DAY 1 – Canada-US Security Interests: Ten Years After 9/11

First Keynote: Managing Our Shared Defence During A Time of Fiscal Austerity

**Dr. John Hamre**, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, began by noting that the United States was going through a great change, driven by the recession which represented a great financial wake-up call to the serious financial peril for individuals and also for government. Americans are worried about having a functioning government. In such an environment, defence will have to make do with fewer resources.

Colonel (Ret'd) MacDonald is Senior Defence Analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations. He is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

#### La Séance de la Conférence d'Ottawa 2011 sur la défense et la sécurité

par le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald

PREMIÈRE JOURNÉE - Les intérêts canadoaméricains en matière de sécurité: dix ans après le Onze-Septembre

Premier conférencier invité: Gérer notre défense commune pendant une ère d'austérité fiscale

M. John Hamre, du Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), de Washington, ouvre le débat en notant que les États-Unis passent présentement à travers un grand changement sous la poussé de la récession, qui représente un vibrant appel au réveil fiscal devant le grave péril financier qui menace les individus aussi bien que le gouvernement. Les Américains sont préoccupés d'avoir un gouvernement qui fonctionne. Dans un tel environnement, la défense devra se contenter de moins de ressources.

Le Colonel (Ret) Brian MacDonald est l'Analyste principal de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Il est Membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD.

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Hamre focused on four main themes. The first, reflecting on American concerns about Homeland Security, he cautioned against Americans demonizing themselves at the next incident through bi-partisan political condemnation which might result in greater punishments inflicted by them on themselves than those achieved by the terrorist act itself.

His second theme addressed the need to recognize that we are now in a time of genuine austerity, and that America needs to re-learn the value of alliances through consensus internationalism, coalitions of the willing versus formal alliances which are treaty based or structurally based. We need to clean up the UN rather than simply walking away from it, which is also the case with NATO.

The third was the need to understand that since we can't afford to do everything so we must determine what the <u>real</u> priorities are. We need to adopt a federated approach to security and defence. For example, we need to cooperate with respect to security in the High North.

The fourth is the need for an updated model of industrial cooperation and industrial security. The old model required us to invest to stay ahead in technology. We have since created a model in which we ship manufacturing to China. We need to discriminate on the basis of what is actually important to us.

Panel 1: Canada-U.S. Relations - 10 Years Since 9/11

Governor James Blanchard, former U.S. Ambassador to Canada, noted that the initial impact on Canada/US relations of the 9/11 terrorism attack was tempered by the supportive Canadian response to the incident. However, the longer term American response was excessive in terms of the resulting "thickening" of the border that had damaging effects upon U.S./Canada trade and economic relations which now involve highly coordinated manufacturing dependent upon "just in time" inventory practices. What are needed are improvements to a common U.S./Canada infrastructure.

The old phrase "Security trumps trade" must now be recognized as a cliché which misses the point that trade is now part of security. Together we will work out the problems but it will be a real educational challenge.

**The Honourable Michael Wilson,** former Canadian Ambassador to the United States, noted that attempts to

Sa présentation met l'accent sur quatre thèmes principaux. Dans le premier, en réfléchissant sur les préoccupations des Américains vis-à-vis la sécurité du territoire, il lance un avertissement contre la démonisation des Américains par eux-mêmes lors du prochain incident, par le biais d'une condamnation politique bipartisane qui pourrait avoir pour résultat des punitions plus sévères infligées par eux à eux-mêmes que les punitions résultant de l'acte terroriste lui-même.

Son deuxième thème répond au besoin de reconnaître que nous sommes maintenant dans une ère de véritable austérité, et que l'Amérique a besoin de réapprendre la valeur des alliances forgées grâce à un internationalisme consensuel, des coalitions émanant de la volonté des partenaires comparativement aux alliances formelles qui se font à base de traités ou qui émanent de structures. Nous avons besoin de nettoyer l'ONU plutôt que de simplement s'en détourner ; et c'est également le cas avec l'OTAN.

Le troisième touche à la nécessité de comprendre que, comme nous n'avons pas les moyens de tout faire, nous sommes obligés de déterminer quelles sont nos priorités réelles. Nous avons besoin d'adopter une façon fédérée d'approcher la sécurité et la défense. Par exemple, nous avons besoin de coopérer pour ce qui est de la sécurité dans le Grand Nord.

Le quatrième traite de la nécessité d'une mise à niveau du modèle de la coopération industrielle et de la sécurité industrielle. L'ancien modèle exigeait que nous fassions des investissements pour rester à la tête en matière de technologie. Nous avons depuis créé un modèle dans lequel nous envoyons la fabrication vers la Chine. Nous avons besoin de faire des discrimination sur la base de ce qui est réellement important pour nous.

Panel 1: Les relations entre le Canada et les E-U – 10 ans après le Onze-Septembre

Le Gouverneur James Blanchard, ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis au Canada, note que l'impact initial de l'attaque terroriste du Onze-Septembre sur les relations Canada/US a été tempéré par la réaction canadienne d'appui lors de l'incident. Mais la réponse américaine qui en a résulté à long terme a été excessive en terme « d'épaississement » de la frontière, avec les effets dommageables que cet obstacle a pu avoir sur les relations commerciales et économiques entre les États-Unis et le Canada, lesquelles supposent maintenant un secteur manufacturier hautement coordonné qui dépend de pratiques d'inventaire « juste à temps ». Ce qui est nécessaire, ce sont des améliorations à une infrastructure canado-américaine commune.

Le vieil adage « La sécurité l'emporte sur le commerce » doit maintenant être reconnue comme un cliché qui oublie que le commerce fait maintenant partie de la sécurité. Ensemble nous allons résoudre les problèmes, mais ce sera un véritable défi éducationnel.

**L'Honorable Michael Wilson,** ancien ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis, note que les tentatives de création

create a secure border started well but then deteriorated, resulting in a need for a new paradigm as to how to manage the border. A key point is that we are now trading inputs rather than final products.

He noted a number of delicate points relating to energy security and environmental concerns with respect to cross border pipeline development and the potential for such differences to cause Canadian companies to look elsewhere for second source energy demand markets.

He also mentioned the need to understand the impact of such measures as ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] in terms of outcomes rather than solely processes.

**Lieutenant-General Frank Grass**, Deputy Commander U.S. Northern Command, reviewed the overlapping relationships between NORAD, Northern Command, and Canada Command, and noted that the addition of the maritime surveillance mission is being dealt with successfully.

He noted that the newly developing aqua tourism business and the potential for an arctic cruise ship getting into trouble represented a developing Search and Rescue requirement which reinforces the need for improved arctic SAR capability in Canada.

Second Keynote: Canada-US Security Imperatives: The Economic Dimension

**Thomas d'Aquino**, Senior Counsel, Gowlings, and Former Chief Executive, Canadian Council of Chief Executives, recalled the impact of the 9/11 attack on the Canada/US border with tense security preoccupations resulting in long and unprecedented delays imposing serious economic costs on both sides of the border leading Canadian business leaders to raise the alarm that without a quick resolution the cross-border paralysis could lead to a catastrophic impact on trade, investment, and jobs.

The Canadian Council of Chief Executives pressed hard for a "smart border" that would keep the wheels of commerce rolling while safeguarding security. Achievements such as the 2001 Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration and the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership were extraordinary achievements but further development has not been as successful as was hoped. Consequently events of this year, including the joint statement by President Obama and Prime Minster Harper, A Declaration on a Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, and a commitment to create a Regulatory Cooperation Council, represent steps to re-energize the cross border process.

d'une frontière sûre avaient bien commencé mais qu'elles s'étaient ensuite détériorées, d'où a découlé un besoin de recourir à un nouveau modèle de façon de gérer la frontière. Un des points clés, c'est que nous échangeons maintenant des intrants plutôt que des produits finis.

Il note un certain nombre de points délicats ayant trait à la sécurité de l'énergie et aux préoccupations touchant l'environnement, en rapport au développement d'un pipeline interfrontalier et la possibilité de différences telles fassent que les entreprises canadiennes cherchent ailleurs des marchés de demande énergétique de seconde source.

Il mentionne également la nécessité de comprendre l'impact de mesures comme l'ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] en termes de résultats plutôt que seulement de processus.

Le **Lieutenant-Général Frank Grass**, Commandant Adjoint U.S. Northern Command, passe en revue les relations de chevauchement entre NORAD, le Northern Command et le Commandement Canada, et note que l'addition de la mission de surveillance maritime se déroule avec succès.

Il note que la nouvelle industrie de l'aquatourisme en voie de développement et la possibilité qu'un vaisseau de croisière arctique se trouve en péril représentent un besoin en développement de recherche et sauvetage qui renforce la nécessité d'une amélioration de la capacité de SAR arctique au Canada.

Deuxième conférencier invité : Les impératifs canadoaméricains en matière de sécurité : La dimension économique

Thomas d'Aquino, avocat principal chez Gowlings et ancien chef de la direction du Conseil canadien des chefs d'entreprise, rappelle l'impact de l'attaque du Onze-Septembre sur la frontière canado-américaine, avec les préoccupations tendues concernant la sécurité qui ont causé des délais prolongés jamais vus et imposé de graves coûts économiques des deux côtés de la frontière, ce qui a amené les chefs d'entreprise à sonner l'alarme en disant que, faute d'une résolution rapide, la paralysie transfrontalière pourrait mener à un impact catastrophique sur le commerce, l'investissement et les emplois.

Le Conseil canadien des chefs d'entreprise a fortement insisté pour la mise en place d'une « frontière intelligente », qui maintiendrait en mouvement les roues du commerce tout en sauvegardant la sécurité. Des réalisations comme la Déclaration sur la frontière intelligente entre le Canada et les États-Unis de 2001 et le Partenariat pour favoriser la sécurité et la prospérité de 2005 ont été des réussites extraordinaires, mais le développement qui a suivi n'a pas réussi aussi bien qu'on l'avait espéré. Conséquemment, les événements de cette année, dont notamment la déclaration conjointe du Président Obama et du Premier ministre Harper, Déclaration sur une vision commune concernant la sécurité du périmètre et la compétitivité économique, et un engagement à créer un Conseil de coopération en matière de réglementation,



Panel 1 - Canada-US Relations Panel 1 - Les relations canado-- 10 Years Since 9/11. L-R: -Lieutenant-General Frank Grass, Deputy Commander U.S. Northern Command; the Hon. Michael Wilson, Canadian Ambassador former to the United States of America; l'honorable Michael Governor James Blanchard, former US Ambassador to Canada: and Mr. Colin Robertson, CDA Institute and Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

américaines – 10 ans depuis le 11 septembre. De gauche à droite: - Lieutenant-Général Frank Grass, Commandant adjoint, U.S. Northern Command; Wilson, ancien ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis: Gouverneur James Blanchard. ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis au Canada; et M. Colin Robertson, Institut de la CAD et Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères

(Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel Photo par le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe

Going forward we will need to take action in three specific areas. The first is military cooperation. We need to enhance the interoperability of our armed forces, expand NORAD's command structure, and embrace ballistic missile defence. Second is the economic front: the North American Free Trade Agreement is no longer enough, for the competitiveness of both our countries is in decline. We need a Canada-United States Accord on Global Competitiveness served by a Council of our most creative private and public leaders. The third is in the area of Institutions, not in the European model of shared sovereignty, but rather a series of sectoral or issue specific joint commissions to better manage our bilateral affairs.

#### Panel 2: Canada-U.S. Security Interests

General (ret) Michael Hayden, former Director Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, noted that U.S. policy under the Obama administration remains pre-emptive, as it was under the Bush administration, and U.S.-conducted operations are not always consistent with international law.

A key question is whether Canada and the U.S. have a common view of what constitutes appropriate actions.

représentent des étapes qui peuvent redonner de l'énergie au processus transfrontalier.

En allant de l'avant, nous aurons besoin d'agir dans trois domaines particuliers. Le premier, c'est la coopération militaire. Nous devons améliorer l'interopérationnalité de nos forces armées, élargir la structure de commandement de NORAD et embrasser la défense antimissiles balistiques. Le deuxième, c'est le front économique : l'Accord de libre-échange nord-américain n'est plus suffisant, parce que la compétitivité de nos deux pays est à la baisse. Nous avons besoin d'un Accord canado-américain sur la compétitivité mondiale servi par un Conseil de nos chefs publics et privés les plus créatifs. Le troisième, c'est dans le domaine des institutions, pas suivant le modèle européen d'un partage de souveraineté, mais plutôt une série de commissions conjointes particulières à des secteurs ou des enjeux précis pour mieux gérer nos affaires bilatérales.

Panel 2:Les intérêts canado-américains en matière de sécurité

Le Général (ret) Michael Hayden, ancien directeur de la Central Intelligence Agency et de la National Security Agency, note que la politique des États-Unis sous l'administration Obama demeure préemptive, comme elle l'était sous l'administration Bush, et que les opérations menées par les États-Unis ne sont pas toujours en accord avec la loi internationale.

Une des questions principales, c'est de savoir si le Canada et les États-Unis ont un point de vue commun sur ce qui constitue des actions appropriées.

C'est là un domaine délicat parce que les actions canadiennes vont affecter les points de vue étatsuniens sur « l'épaisseur » de la frontière entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Par exemple, le Canada serait-il prêt à participer à une « zone d'exclusion aérienne » en Libye sans une résolution du Conseil de sécurité si les modalités d'une telle zone incluaient l'abattage d'avions libyens?

Les Canadiens acceptent les opérations secrètes moins bien que le font les Américains. Les Canadiens et les Américains regardent dans la même direction, mais les Canadiens ne sont pas prêts à aller aussi loin que leurs voisins.

Le Sénateur Colin Kenny, ancien président du Comité du Sénat sur la sécurité nationale et la défense, critique vertement ce qu'il voit comme l'apathie canadienne envers les questions de sécurité et demande pourquoi les Canadiens ont l'air aussi sûrs, en identifiant cette question comme un problème important.

Il fait remonter l'impact de ce sentiment de sécurité bénigne au manque d'intérêt qui découle de la réticence des politiciens canadiens à accorder un financement adéquat à la sécurité parce qu'ils ont compris clairement qu'il n'y a pas de votes dans un tel mouvement de leur part, avec le résultat

This is a sensitive area since Canadian actions will affect U.S. views of the "thickness" of the Canada-U.S. border. For example, would Canada be prepared to participate in the Libyan 'No Fly Zone' without a Security Council resolution if such a zone's terms of reference included the shooting down of Libyan aircraft?

Canadians are less comfortable with covert operations than Americans. While Canadians and Americans are pointed in the same direction, Canadians are not prepared to go as far.

**Senator Colin Kenny**, former Chair of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, sharply criticized what he saw as Canadian apathy in security matters and asked why Canadians seem so secure, identifying that question as an important issue.

He traced the impact of this feeling of benign security to the resultant lack of interest on the part of Canadian politicians to provide adequate funding for security since they clearly understood that there were no votes in such a move for them, with the result that the total spending on security of all federal security agencies—DND, CSIS, CSCE, RCMP, Border Agency—amounted to less than 2.0% of GNP.

Panel 3: Contemporary Security Concerns

**Commander James Kraska**, U.S. Naval War College, spoke about the strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific area. He noted that the region was essentially a series of bi-lateral links with the United States in a hub relationship with the other nations in the region.

Of late China's increasing economic and military power has made it a larger security concern than either Afghanistan or Iraq. The evolving Chinese approach is to emphasize area denial through anti-access capabilities up to the first island chain (essentially the line from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines) and eventually to the second Island chain (roughly the line from Japan through Guam). Central is the use of the concept of the Three Warfares: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare, and the establishment of the South China Sea Economic Zone. The U.S. has not responded substantially to these developments but other countries in the area have taken steps to increase their military resources with the result that there is now a developing arms race in the area.

Dr. **Andrea Charron**, Research Associate, Carleton University, spoke on Arctic Security, noting that Canada would chair the Arctic Council from 2013-15, followed by the United States in 2015-17, a sequence that needed careful coordination and cooperation between the two circumpolar states.

Though CFS Alert is actually physically closer to Moscow than to Ottawa, there seem to be, when examined through a military lens, few major security threats to the Canadian Arctic. The CF does not have the authority to control the North and must work with other government departments in such activities as the Sea Rider process which sees joint U.S. and Canadian crews for maritime vessels.

que la dépense totale sur la sécurité de tous les organismes de sécurité fédéraux – MDN, SCRS/CSIS, CSCE, GRC, Agence frontalière – s'élève à moins de 2 % du PNB.

Panel 3:Préoccupations contemporaines en matière de sécurité

**Commandant James Kraska**, U.S. Naval War College, parle des développements stratégiques dans la région de l'Asie-Pacifique. Il note que la région est essentiellement une série de liens bilatéraux avec les États-Unis dans une relation radiale avec les autres pays de la région.

Dernièrement, la croissance de la puissance économique et militaire de la Chine a fait d'elle une préoccupation de sécurité plus importante que l'Afghanistan ou l'Iraq. L'approche chinoise présentement en évolution consiste à accentuer le déni régional au moyen de capacités anti-accès jusqu'à la première chaîne d'îles (essentiellement la ligne qui va du Japon à Taiwan et aux Philippines) et éventuellement jusqu'à la deuxième chaîne d'îles (en gros la ligne qui va du Japon à Guam). L'idée centrale est l'utilisation du concept des Trois guerres : guerre psychologique, guerre médiatique et guerre juridique, et l'établissement de la Zone économique de la Mer de Chine occidentale. Les États-Unis n'ont pas répondu substantiellement à ces développements mais d'autres pays de la région ont pris des mesures pour augmenter leurs ressources militaires, avec le résultat qu'il y a maintenant une course aux armements qui est en voie de développement dans la région.

Mme **Andrea Charron**, associée de recherche à l'Université Carleton, parle de la sécurité de l'Arctique en notant que le Canada va présider le Conseil de l'Arctique de 2013 à 2015, suivi des États-Unis, de 2015 à 2017, une séquence qui a nécessité une coordination et une coopération attentives entre les deux États circumpolaires.

Même si physiquement SFC Alert est en réalité plus proche de Moscou que d'Ottawa, il semble y avoir, quand on l'examine sous la lentille militaire, peu de menaces majeures à la sécurité envers l'Arctique canadien. Les FC n'ont pas l'autorité de contrôler le Nord et doivent travailler avec d'autres ministères à ces activités comme le processus *Sea Rider* dans lequel des équipages américains et canadiens se retrouvent ensemble sur les vaisseaux.

Certaines des questions dont il faut traiter comprennent la soumission à la Commission de l'ONU sur les Limites du plateau continental, l'expansion possible du Conseil de l'Arctique pour inclure des États qui ne sont pas circumpolaires, le statut obligatoire de la zone du Système de trafic de l'Arctique canadien (NORDREG), le statut du passage du Nord-Ouest et l'examen quadriennal de NORAD en 2014 et l'expansion de son mandat pour inclure l'alerte maritime et l'addition possible d'un mandat terrestre.

**Chris Alexander**, ancien diplomate canadien et ambassadeur en Afghanistan, parle de Afghan Endgame en notant qu'il y a eu un changement substantiel sur le terrain, en Afghanistan, avec les Talibans qui contrôlent moins de villages, ayant souffert THE CDA INSTITUTE

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THE 2011 OTTAWA CONFERENCE ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY RECEPTION LA RÉCEPTION DE LA CONFÉRENCE D'OTTAWA (2011) SUR LA DÉFENSE ET LA SÉCURITÉ

Some of the issues to be dealt with include the submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the potential expansion of the Arctic Council to include states which are not circumpolar states, the mandatory status of the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG), the status of the Northwest Passage, and the NORAD quadrennial review in 2014 and the expansion of its mandate to include maritime warning and possible addition of a land mandate.

Chris Alexander, former Canadian diplomat and Ambassador to Afghanistan, spoke on the Afghan Endgame, noting that there has been a substantial change on the ground in Afghanistan with the Taliban now controlling fewer villages as they have suffered increasing causalities particularly among the level of commanders. The political setting has seen more dialogue and civilian casualties have been reduced such that Afghans now blame Taliban IEDs more frequently since only 15% of casualties are caused by ISAF and government forces and 85% by the Taliban.

However, Taliban in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan and Waziristan remain active though the size of the spring campaign this year will likely be reduced. There is a need to influence Pakistan to move against the Taliban since without a multi-lateral campaign there is probably still not enough momentum to achieve peace.

The Afghans still view the Pashtun areas in Pakistan as properly part of Afghanistan and Pakistan still believes it

des pertes de plus en plus nombreuses, particulièrement parmi le niveau des commandants. Le milieu politique a vu plus de dialogue et les pertes civiles ont été réduites à tel point que les Afghans blâment maintenant les IED talibans plus fréquemment, puisque seulement 15 % des pertes sont causées par les forces de la FIAS et du gouvernement et que 85 % sont le fait des Talibans.

Mais les Talibans, au Pakistan et particulièrement au Béloutchistan et au Waziristan, restent actifs bien que l'ampleur de la campagne du printemps sera probablement réduite cette année. Il faut influencer le Pakistan pour qu'il agisse contre les Talibans puisque, sans une campagne multilatérale, on n'a probablement pas encore l'élan qu'il faut pour en arriver à la paix.


Les Afghans voient encore les régions pashtoun du Pakistan comme faisant vraiment partie de l'Afghanistan, et le Pakistan croit encore qu'il a le droit d'interférer en Afghanistan. has the right to interfere in Afghanistan.

## DAY 2 – The Canadian Forces Post-Combat Mission in Afghanistan

First Keynote: Where we're at, where we're going

The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, noted that we are still part of a highly uncertain world. An example of that uncertainty lies in the so-called "Arab Spring," whose outcomes no one can predict. Another would be the ongoing impact of the financial crises and their impact on global security.

Within this context our security relationship with



The Hon. Michael Wilson, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States of America / L'honorable Michael Wilson, ancien ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis

Photo by / Photo par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

the United States remains of fundamental importance to Canada and has involved cooperation in NORAD, cooperation with American forces in Afghanistan, meetings between the Canadian Defence Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defence, the hemispheric JSF [Joint Strike Fighter – ed.] programme, the continuation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the developing relationship between Canada Command and U.S. Northern Command, and adjustments to the NORAD mandate to deal with maritime threats.

NATO, too, remains of fundamental importance to Canada and we continue to make plans in accordance with the new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2010 including NATO institutional reform and the NATO/Russia relationship.

## DEUXIÈME JOURNÉE - La mission post-combat des forces canadiennes en Afghanistan

Premier conférencier invité: Où nous en sommes et où nous allons

L'Honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, note que nous faisons encore partie d'un monde tout plein d'incertitude. On en trouve un exemple dans ce qu'on a convenu d'appeler le « printemps arabe », dont personne ne peut prédire l'aboutissement. On pourrait aussi mentionner l'impact actuel des crises financières et leur impact sur la sécurité mondiale.

Dans ce contexte notre relation avec les États-Unis au point de vu sécurité reste d'une importance fondamentale pour le Canada ; c'est elle qui explique une coopération dans NORAD, une coopération avec les forces américaines en Afghanistan, des rencontres entre le ministre de la Défense du Canada et le secrétaire américain à la Défense, le programme hémisphérique JSF [l'avion de combat *Joint Strike Fighter* – éd.], la continuation de la Commission permanente mixte de défense, la relation en développement entre le Commandement Canada et le U.S. Northern Command, et des ajustements au mandat de NORAD pour tenir compte des menaces maritimes.

L'OTAN, aussi, reste d'une importance fondamentale pour le Canada et nous continuons à faire des plans qui tiennent compte du nouveau Concept stratégique de l'OTAN adopté au Sommet de Lisbonne en décembre 2010, y compris la réforme institutionnelle de l'OTAN et la relation entre l'OTAN et la Russie.

Dans la mission du Canada en Afghanistan pour « tenir le fort » à Kandahar tire maintenant à sa fin et elle sera remplacée par une mission d'entraînement sans combat avant son pied-à-terre à Kabul.

Au pays, nous sommes à trois ans du début de la stratégie de défense de 20 ans *Le Canada d'abord* alors que nous poursuivons le processus de modernisation de la force des FC avec des projets comme les parcs de véhicules de l'Armée, des améliorations à l'infrastructure pour des choses comme le parc d'hélicoptères maritimes, la recapitalisation de nos combattants de surface majeurs de la Marine, l'acquisition d'appareils de recherche et sauvetage à ailes fixes et l'acquisition des remplacements des avions de combat.

Les F-35 vont répondre aux besoin du Canada en matière de souveraineté, remplaçant les CF-18 âgés de 40 ans, qui seront disparus d'ici 2020. Ce dont nous avons besoin, c'est d'un appareil de cinquième génération parce qu'aucun appareil de quatrième génération peut être mis à niveau pour fournir une capacité de cinquième génération. Le coût individuel de ces avions sera au milieu de la fourchette de 70 à 80 millions de dollars. Et les bénéfices retombant sur l'industrie canadienne seront de l'ordre de 12 milliards de dollars.

In Afghanistan Canada's mission to "Held the Fort" in Kandahar is now drawing to a close and will be replaced with a non-combat training mission centered on Kabul.

At home we are three years into the 20-year Canada First Defence Strategy as we continue the process of force modernization of the CF with such projects as the Army's vehicle fleets, infrastructure improvements for such as the Maritime Helicopter fleet, the recapitalization of our Navy's major surface combatants, the acquisition of Fixed Wing Search and Rescue and the acquisition of the fighter replacements.

The F-35s will meet Canada's sovereignty needs, replacing the 40-year old CF-18s which will be gone by 2020. Our requirement is for a Fifth Generation aircraft since no Fourth Generation aircraft can be upgraded to Fifth Generation capability. The individual cost of these aircraft will be in the mid \$70 million range. And the benefits to Canadian industry will be in the order of \$12 billion.

Second Keynote: "SITREP on the Canadian Forces"

**Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson,** Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, began with a review of the operational pace that the Department had experienced both at home and abroad including such missions as Task Force 150 (anti-Piracy) and 13 other operations with a total of over 3,000 CF personnel deployed at any one time; Afghanistan was the largest of these with an increasing level of operations as a consequence of the additional number of "boots on the ground" and a corresponding diminution of Taliban activities.

He then addressed the new training mission beginning in Summer 2011 and continuing to mid-2014. At strength of up to 950, it will be focused on the development of the Afghan security forces which would be Kabul-centric.

He then turned to the continuing process of the transformation of the CF, noting that the Afghanistan mission had changed the culture of the CF making it much more operations oriented. The focus of transformation reforms would include a reduction in overhead, the delivery of the Canada First Defence Strategy, the continuing recapitalization of key platforms, the integration of lessons learned from the Afghanistan operation into the corporate memory of the CF.

The mission of the Reserves will be reviewed as the end of the Afghan mission will see less demand for full-time Class B service and a renewed emphasis on the local armoury floors. The numbers of Class B reservists will be reduced as will the use of civilian contractors

Third Keynote: NATO's New Strategic Concept and the Transformation of the Alliance – ACT's Roles and Responsibilities

**General Mieczysław Bieniek**, Deputy Commander, NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, began with an overview of the new NATO Strategic Concept which puts forward collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security as the Alliance's essential core tasks.

Deuxième conférencier invité : « SITREP sur les Forces canadiennes »

Le Vice-Amiral Bruce Donaldson, vice-chef de l'étatmajor de la Défense, commence avec une revue du rythme opérationnel que le ministère a connu, tant au pays qu'à l'étranger, dans des missions comme la Force opérationnelle 150 (anti-piraterie) et 13 autres opérations, avec un total de plus de 3 000 hommes et femmes des FC déployés à un moment donné ; l'Afghanistan a été la plus importante, avec un niveau d'opérations augmentant en conséquence du nombre additionnel de « bottes sur le terrain » et d'une diminution correspondante des activités des Talibans.

Iltraite ensuite de la nouvelle mission d'entraînement, à compter de l'été 2011 et se poursuivant jusqu'au milieu de 2014. Dotée d'une force pouvant aller jusqu'à 950 personnes, elle va porter principalement sur le développement des forces de sécurité afghanes, qui seraient concentrées sur Kabul.

Il se tourne ensuite vers le processus continu de la transformation des FC, en notant que la mission de l'Afghanistan a changé la culture des FC en rendant cellesci plus orientées sur les opérations. Le point focal des réformes de transformation inclurait une réduction des charges indirectes, la livraison de la Stratégie de défense Le Canada d'abord, la continuation de la recapitalisation des plateformes clés, l'intégration des leçons apprises de l'opération Afghanistan à la mémoire institutionnelle des FC.

La mission des Réserves sera revue alors que la mission afghane verra moins de demande de service de classe B à plein temps et une nouvelle emphase sera mise sur les planchers des manèges militaires locaux. Les nombres des réservistes de classe B seront réduits comme le sera le recours à des entrepreneurs civils.

Troisième conférencier invité : Le nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN et la transformation de l'alliance – les rôles et les responsabilités du ACT

Le Général Mieczysław Bieniek, commandant adjoint, Commandement suprême allié Transformation de l'OTAN, commence par un aperçu du nouveau Concept stratégique de l'OTAN, qui met de l'avant la défense collective, la gestion des crises et la sécurité coopérative comme les tâches fondamentales essentielles de l'alliance.

Les directives politiques découlant du concept stratégique ont déterminé que les capacités spécifiques dont il fallait tenir compte étaient la stabilisation et la reconstruction, le CBRN [chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire – éd.], la planification nucléaire, l'établissement de capacité et la réforme de la défense, l'amélioration de la dimension maritime de l'alliance, les renseignements médiatiques militaires et les nouveaux défis, comme les menaces cybernétiques, les menaces à la sécurité énergétique, le contre-terrorisme et les menaces hybrides.

Il affirme que le succès de la transformation de l'OTAN repose sur une sensibilisation partagée aux risques,

The Political Guidance which flowed from the Strategic Concept determined that the specific capabilities to be addressed were stabilization and reconstruction, CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear – ed.], nuclear planning, capacity building and defence reform, enhancement of the Alliance's maritime dimension, military media intelligence, and new challenges such as cyber, energy security, counter-terrorism, and hybrid threats.

He stated that successful NATO transformation rests on a shared awareness of risks, challenges, solidarity, and burden-sharing and noted that NATO was revising its Command structure, reviewing its Agencies, and reforming the way business is conducted at NATO Headquarters. Within this process Allied Command Transformation will be NATO's leading agent for change: identifying, facilitating and advocating the continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance its military relevance and effectiveness.

Fourth Keynote: Collective Defence in the 21st Century

**General Keith Alexander**, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency, began by emphasizing the importance of the Canada-U.S. partnership and reminded the audience that both countries were dependent on it.

He then turned to the change in networks today and the explosion of volume they were handling and the resultant vulnerabilities of military as well as civilian networks and the evolving threat matrix that now included cybercrime accounting for over one trillion dollars per year, the evolution of cyber-espionage, and the development of distributed denial of service attacks directed against governments such as that against Estonia. He noted that the U.S. had discovered malicious software on classified nets which was delivered by thumb drive access. He predicted that we would see a move from disruptive attacks to destructive attacks within three years.

He declared that we must recognize cyberspace as a military domain and change the way we defend our networks. We must work with our allies and leverage our technological advantages. Unfortunately digital literacy lags as do policies and laws. Finally we must accept that we must protect civil liberties and privacy while maintaining cyber-security—we have to do both and we must do them right.

#### Panel 1: Armed Forces Updates

**Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden**, Chief of the Maritime Staff, began by describing the rate and complexity of change in the Maritime environment. While the traditional defence of the ocean commons remains a critical naval challenge we are seeing naval operations taking on a diplomatic role as well as the oceans continue to heat up in political terms—particularly in the Indian Ocean/Asia Pacific spheres as well as concerns about Sino-Japanese issues.

Crime has now emerged, particularly in the area of Somalia and piracy. Greater access is making the Arctic an

aux défis, à la solidarité et au partage du fardeau, et il note que l'OTAN est à réviser sa structure de commandement, à examiner ses Agences et à réformer la façon dont on fait les affaires aux quartiers généraux de l'OTAN. Au sein de ce processus le Commandement allié Transformation sera l'agent moteur de l'OTAN pour le changement : c.-à-d. qu'il devra identifier, faciliter et prôner l'amélioration continue des capacités de l'alliance de maintenir et d'améliorer sa pertinence militaire et son efficacité.

Quatrième conférencier invité : La défense collective au 21<sup>e</sup> siècle

**Le Général Keith Alexander**, commandant, U.S. Cyber Command, et directeur, National Security Agency (USA), commence en soulignant l'important du partenariat Canada-États-Unis et rappelle à l'auditoire que les deux pays dépendent de ce partenariat.

Il se tourne ensuite vers le changement dans les réseaux aujourd'hui, vers l'explosion du volume de données qu'ils traitent et les vulnérabilités qui en résultent pour les réseaux militaires autant que civils et vers la matrice de menaces en pleine évolution, qui comprend maintenant le cybercrime, qui compte pour plus d'un billion de dollars par année, l'évolution du cyber-espionnage et le développement des attaques distribuées de déni de services dirigées contre les gouvernements, comme celles qui ont été infligées à l'Estonie. Il note que les États-Unis ont découvert des logiciels malicieux sur des réseaux classifiés, qui avaient été mis là par accès à des clés USB. Il prédit que nous verrions un mouvement qui pourrait elle, d'ici trois ans, des attaques perturbatrices vers les attaques destructrices.

Il affirme que nous devons reconnaître le cyberespace comme un domaine militaire et changer la façon dont nous défendons nos réseaux. Nous devons travailler avec nos alliés et tirer profit de nos avantages technologiques. Malheureusement la littératie numérique traîne de l'arrière, tout comme les politiques et les lois. Enfin, nous devons accepter qu'il nous faut protéger les libertés civiles et la vie privée tout en maintenant une cybersécurité – nous devons faire les deux et bien les faire.

Premier panel: Le point sur les forces armées

Le Vice-Amiral Dean McFadden, chef de l'état-major de la Force maritime, commence par décrire la rapidité et la complexité du changement dans l'environnement maritime. Si la défense traditionnelle des étendues océaniques communes demeure un défi naval critique, nous voyons aussi les opérations navales pendre un rôle diplomatique à mesure que les océans continuent à s'échauffer politiquement parlant – particulièrement dans les sphères de l'océan Indien et de l'Asie Pacifique, ainsi que des préoccupation touchant les enjeux sino-japonais.

Le crime a maintenant fait surface, particulièrement dans l'aire de la Somalie et de la piraterie. Un plus grand accès fait également de l'océan Arctique une étendue océanique commune et a un impact particulièrement sur les cinq États



Keynote speaker – General Keith Alexander, Commander, US Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency – "Collective Defense in the 21st Century" / Conférencier invité – le Géneral Keith Alexander, Commandant, US Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency – "Collective Defense in the 21st Century"

Photo by é Photo par ieutenant-Colonel (Ret`d) Gord Metcalfe

ocean commons as well and impact particularly on the five Arctic coastal states and their rights and responsibilities including continental shelf boundary issues.

Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Chief of the Land Staff, described the Army as re-branding itself as a highly flexible organization based upon the lessons it has learned from its experiences in Afghanistan—lessons that include such items as the need for combined arms teams, "training to win," the use of enablers, joint capabilities with other services, and the need for interoperability with other coalition members. The Army has become more asymmetric in its organization as it has had to adjust rapidly to changes in terrain and in the responses of opponents.

**Lieutenant-General André Deschamps**, Chief of the Air Staff, stressed the need for the Air Force to maintain a state of agility and creativity and is accordingly re-evaluating its doctrines. The previous investment in people has paid off though there are shortages of people needed to cover all fleets as a consequence of demographic factors. Nonetheless the Air Force has been able to integrate seven new fleets over the last ten years.

côtiers de l'Arctique et sur leurs droits et responsabilités, y compris les questions de frontières du plateau continental.

Le Lieutenant-Général Peter Devlin, chef de l'état-major de l'Armée de terre, décrit l'Armée comme se refaisant une image de marque comme une organisation flexible sur la base des leçons qu'elle a apprises de ses expériences en Afghanistan – leçons qui comprennent des choses comme le besoin d'équipes d'armes combinées, « l'entraînement en vue de gagner », l'usage de facilitateurs, les capacités conjointes avec d'autres services et le besoin d'interopérabilité avec les autres membres de la coalition. L'Armée est devenue plus asymétrique dans son organisation à mesure qu'elle a dû s'ajuster rapidement aux changements dans le terrain et dans les ripostes des adversaires.

Le Lieutenant-Général André Deschamps, chef de l'étatmajor de la Force aérienne, souligne le besoin de maintenir un état d'agilité et de créativité auquel est confrontée la Force aérienne, qui est en conséquence en train de réévaluer ses doctrines. L'investissement précédent dans les ressources humaines a rapporté bien que, comme conséquence de facteurs démographiques, il y ait des pénuries de personnel nécessaire pour couvrir toutes les flottes. Néanmoins la Force aérienne a été capable d'intégrer sept nouvelles flottes au cours des dix dernières années.

Deuxième panel: Les futurs défis pour les FC et le MDN

**M. Dan Ross**, sous-ministre adjoint (Matériel) à la Défense nationale, affirme que le ministère fait des progrès considérables en livrant la marchandise concernant les capacités de combat essentielles, et que les achats actuels ne sont qu'un pas vers l'avenir.

La recapitalisation navale ira en parallèle avec la politique canadienne de construction navale vers l'acquisition de nouvelles plateformes majeures. Les nouvelles acquisitions de la flotte de l'armée de l'air ont fourni des catalyseurs clés pour des opérations conjointes comme les CC-17, les CH-47 et les nouveaux hélicoptères maritimes. Nous sommes très tôt dans le programme des F-35, qui ne sera finalisé encore que dans sept ans. L'Armée a été lourdement rebâtie bien qu'il reste encore une partie de ses parcs de véhicules principaux à traiter.

M. Philippe Lagassé, de l'Université d'Ottawa, pose la question à savoir si les FC évoluent vers le statut de fournisseur d'une niche de défense au sein d'une structure fédéralisée du Canada et de ses alliés. Il y a des restrictions budgétaires à l'horizon en même temps qu'il y a une hésitation à augmenter les impôts ou à comprimer d'autres programmes, et nous pouvons nous attendre à ce qu'un des effets de la question de la dette soit un ralentissement de la croissance du budget de la défense.

Le budget prévu actuel peut ne pas être adéquat, alors que les coûts de personnel composent maintenant plus de 60 % du budget de la défense. Le nouveau Concept de l'OTAN adopte un nouveau point de vue du partage du

#### Panel 2: Future Challenges for the CF and DND

**Mr. Dan Ross**, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) National Defence, affirmed that the Department is making considerable progress in delivering on the core combat capabilities, and that the current buys are only a bridge to the future.

Naval recapitalization will move in concert with Canadian shipbuilding policy to the acquisition of new major platforms. The air force new fleet acquisitions have provided key enablers for joint operations such as the CC-17s, the CH-47s, and the new Maritime Helicopters. We are very early in the F-35 programme with finalization some seven years away. The Army has been heavily rebuilt though some of its core fleets remain to be dealt with

**Dr. Philippe Lagassé**, University of Ottawa, posed the question as to whether the CF is evolving to the status of a defence niche provider within a federalized structure of Canada and our allies. There are budget constraints on the horizon at the same time that there is a reluctance to raise taxes or cut other programmes and we can expect that one effect of the debt issue to be a slowing of growth in the defence budget.

The current planned budget may be inadequate, with personnel costs now composing over 60% of the defence budget. The new NATO Concept takes a new view of burden sharing, but problems of "caveats," and reluctance on the part of some members to actually "share" burdens negates the credibility of the federalized approach.

**Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie**, Chief of Transformation, Canadian Forces, returned to the austerity theme first articulated during the initial Keynote address by Dr. Hamre noting that while the CF has been fortunate in the budget increases it has received in the recent past which collectively represented a 51% increase in the defence budget the realities of the global economic crisis have had serious impact on the direction of the Strategic Review underway.

Among the key questions is the balance between overhead and output, or to put another way between the numbers of persons in Headquarters and those in deployed and deployable units. The Navy, for example, has shrunk since 2004 while its personnel are populating HQs. Put bluntly, the Navy has to get back to sea and to be able to get back to sea. There is significant resistance to necessary change in the HQs, though younger personnel see the need for change and understand that the status quo is simply unsustainable. ©

fardeau, mais les problèmes de « caveat » et une réticence de la part de certains membres de réellement « partager » les fardeaux nient la crédibilité de l'approche fédéralisée.

Le Lieutenant-Général Andrew Leslie, chef – Transformation, Forces canadiennes, revient au thème de l'austérité d'abord articulé dans la conférence thématique initiale de M. Hamre en notant que, si les FC ont eu la bonne fortune d'augmentations budgétaires reçues dans le passé récent, qui représentaient collectivement une augmentation de 51 % du budget de la défense, les réalités de la crise économique mondiale ont eu un grave impact sur la direction de l'examen stratégique en cours.

Parmi les principales questions se trouve l'équilibre entre l'administration et le produit ou, autrement dit, entre le nombre de personnes aux quartiers généraux et celui des unités déployées et déployables. La Marine, par exemple, a fondu depuis 2004 tandis que son personnel remplit les quartiers généraux. Pour le dire carrément, la Marine doit retourner en mer et être capable de le faire. Il y a dans les quartiers généraux une résistance importante au changement nécessaire, même si les plus jeunes voient la nécessité du changement et comprennent que le statu quo est impossible à soutenir. ©

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#### What Next for the CDA Institute?

by Dr. John Scott Cowan

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But as think tanks go, it is a peculiarly efficient economic model. Most think tanks have the logical inherent inefficiency that comes from paying people to think. We usually don't. That's because the CDA Institute has unique access to an enormous pool of talent for free.

There are three principal groups of impressive individuals who, without economic incentive, participate in studies and events, write articles and engage in public commentary on our behalf.

The first resource group is our board of directors, a large body of about 40 persons. It is composed of distinguished retired members of the profession of arms, renowned academics, prominent former diplomats or senior public servants, semi-retired political figures (do they ever completely retire?) and prominent concerned and well-informed private sector figures. Interestingly, there is considerable crossover amongst these categories.

The second quite similar resource is the pool of former board members, as well as members of institutes with which we collaborate from time to time.

Look, for example, at "Security in an Uncertain World" (http://www.natoconcept.ca/). This impressive

Dr. John Scott Cowan is the President of the CDA Institute and Chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors. Dr. Cowan was Vice-Principal at Queen's University before becoming Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada in 1999, where he served until 2008. He has been President of the Canadian Federation of Biological Societies, the Canadian Physiological Society, and the Canadian Association of University Business Officers. He is the Chair of the Defence Science Advisory Board of Canada and Principal Emeritus of RMC. Dr. Cowan is the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the Princess of Wales Own Regiment.

publication, intended to have influence upon NATO's new strategic concept (we suspect it did) was undertaken as a collaboration with the Canadian Defence and |Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) of Calgary. Of its 26 authors, 19 were CDA Institute board members (including the lead author), and of the expert group from CDFAI, one was a former CDA Institute board member. There is cross-over in the other direction as well, as one author who is on our Board of Directors is also a vice-president with the CDFAI. These volunteers worked together seamlessly.

The third pool of willing experts is larger, and is called into play somewhat less frequently. It consists of the many hundreds of folk with special expertise amongst the membership of the individual member associations of CDA, and who are, in effect, part of the personal networks of our board and staff. There has never been a reluctance on their part to help out when called upon. Often, they are the people who are ideally placed to comment in a timely fashion to the press or media in venues far removed from our head office. But they are also often drawn into core studies and events.

To tap into these vast free intellectual resources requires coordination of many kinds. Event planning and coordination, publication oversight, responding to requests for commentary, seeking opportunities to be engaged in public discourse, and the mass of attendant administration and fundraising all falls on a very small staff. The five folk that we share with the CDA are not all full time, so it works out to about three full-time equivalents (FTE's), of which the CDA Institute probably utilizes two.

So all this output in so many domains is the result of only two FTE's of paid employment. And, clearly, much more superb volunteer output would be available, if only we had the capacity to harness it.

It was this essential observation that got two key board members musing about the future some months ago. Paul Chapin and Doug Bland then set about to interview various key players in order to sample the various views of what might be possible.

This led in turn to a gap analysis about what might be needed to make Canadian discourse on defence and security even more rational. And, despite some notable successes on the part of the Institute and its partners, more is most certainly needed. Indeed, some days it feels like we're running up the down escalator, as we struggle to counter and correct factual error, bad logic and sometimes outright anti-defence bias in public discourse.

There are ironies, of course. Our great success as a society has been to make most Canadians feel quite secure,

and to bring about conditions where most folk are seldom confronted with the realities of national interest or the threat environment, and so do not have to think deeply or often about defence and security issues. In such an environment, the public discourse may have difficulty sifting the real from the illusory, and, like on the internet, gold and dross can stand side by side as near equals, with very little by way of quality filters to tell them apart. The need for critical analysis and real expertise in public discourse and commentary has never been greater. So we concluded that Canada needs more CDA Institute, needs more of what informs the debate, as opposed to just debating.

But how much more, and how fast? As much as we might have wished to leap in one bound to the scale and effectiveness of operation of some think tanks elsewhere in the developed world, it seemed too risky. This is Canada, and, as we know, bigness is often viewed as unseemly, pushy and unwelcome. Furthermore, we are a frugal people, so it can be a near impossible struggle to find the funding to reach full potential. In this light, two ad hoc board committees, the Vision Committee and the Finance and Fundraising Committee concluded that the Canadian way was the safest, and that meant a gradual approach to increasing activity.

Thus at its meeting on 24 Feb 2011, the board of the CDA Institute authorized the first phase in what may become a two-stage transition to a much higher level of activity. Our decision, one that again is quintessentially Canadian, was to take some modest steps to roughly double our capacity, and then we would, some 3-5 years onward, look at whether the second and more dramatic increase might be feasible. But the first stage was certainly judged feasible, desirable and urgently needed.

For the moment, what we foresee is the addition of about two full time persons equivalent of paid effort (though this may well be spread amongst more than two persons). This would roughly double support capacity and, with modest other expenditure on space, activities and publication, would likely see output increases in parallel. To support this increase in expenditure, estimated at an additional \$150,000 a year, a modest fundraising effort has been authorized. Its target, over some 30 months, is \$1.5 million, with a view to endowing part (perhaps one million dollars, which invested would yield income of about \$50K per year) to offset future lean years, and to expending the other \$500K over the next 3-5 years as a way of increasing capacity, output and visibility, prior to revisiting whether phase two is possible.

Like all good Canadians, we hedge our bets. If the fundraising results are less good, a smaller portion will be endowed, but the plan can still proceed. If the results are better than the initial target, then more can be endowed, and future risk is diminished. In fact, we go into this growth exercise with reserves sufficient to support about two years of the higher activity anyhow, so an adjustment period while picking up steam is not a problem.

In growing the effort, we also need to make sure that:

- (a) our capacity to respond quickly to events, to get the discourse launched on the right foot, is improved, and
- (b) we need to be able to mount some events, including round tables, in venues other than Ottawa (though already one major annual event, the national graduate student symposium, is not in Ottawa).

I suspect that the board of directors will wish to modify its committee structure to reflect some of these kinds of concerns, and I would not be surprised to see a Public Affairs Committee and a New Projects Committee come into being fairly soon.

As to the fundraising itself, we are in the beginning phase. The ripples-in-the-pond approach seems the most cost and energy effective. First we will be ascertaining the extent to which the board members themselves can help. The early indications here are very good. Then we will try to tap into the networks that all of us on the board have, and only then, with hopefully a strong preliminary result, will we approach key potential donors in the broader community. The questions of campaign name, and of key campaign responsibility, will need to be resolved before summer 2011, but even as I write this, four days after our annual board meeting, we are already a few percent towards our target, even though no one has been approached formally. Of course, we welcome donations towards this goal from readers of On Track at any time, and will provide charitable donation receipts.

And increased visibility and activity of the CDA Institute will indirectly help the CDA itself. Since CDA shares quarters with the Institute, it will benefit from those quarters being somewhat improved and better located. While CDA itself will still utilize only about one FTE of staff time, it will have access to new forms of staff expertise. And, if the Institute can succeed in better educating various publics on the realities of defence and security, then, when the CDA undertakes its advocacy tasks, there will be a greater likelihood that it will be addressing well-informed folk. And that could be a big win for the nation as a whole. ©

#### THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2011 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the CDA Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include: Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H.Belzile, the Hon. Barnett Danson, Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, Colonel the Hon. John Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Brigadier-General David Fraser, General Raymond R. Henault, General Rick Hillier. Warrant Officer William

MacDonald, and the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson.

Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2011, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE CDA INSTITUTE 222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 18 November 2011, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.

#### LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2011.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la CAD dans le but dereconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué(e) par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le vice-amiral Larry Murray, le lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Hon. Barnett Danson, Colonel l'Hon. John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault, le Général Rick Hillier, l'Adjudant

William MacDonald, et la Très hon. Adrienne Clarkson.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2011, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY L'INSTITUT DE LA CAD 222 RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 18 novembre 2011, à un diner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le diner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel:

pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

#### Building a Legacy: Canada's OMLT & the Mentoring of the ANSF

#### by Captain Jamie Donovan

KANDAHAR – The task of mentoring a security force baselined in the top-down "Soviet" style military structure of command and control vice something more "enabling" and bottom-up is nothing short of difficult. On the outset, one might view the task as damned near impossible. Gains are measured day-by-day; the business of mentoring long, hard and tiring with often little immediate effect.

Cultural differences, language barriers, literacy (or lack thereof) make the task harder. Patience, if not previously acquired, is learned here. The challenges to getting the job done are omnipresent as are the dangers of the operating environment itself.

The task, however, is being accomplished with the results and successes nothing short of admirable.

"Canada's Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Kandahar is getting further ahead by the day in helping to successfully position elements of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take the security lead in Afghanistan; a lead in security provided by Afghans for Afghans," says Colonel Hercule Gosselin, Commanding Officer of the OMLT.

The OMLT programme itself is a key NATO contribution toward the development of the ANSF, improving the ability of Afghan Forces to conduct independent security operations on their own in Afghanistan. Programme success is contingent upon a unified team effort with coalition forces working shoulder to shoulder, as both mentors and partners, to advance the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

"The main component of team success is teamwork. All of the elements of Task Force Kandahar working together as partners and enablers to the ANA and ANP do so with a focus on increasing trust among the population and trust between the ANSF and coalition forces," says Col. Gosselin.

Throughout Kandahar Province, the members of the OMLT work professionally and diligently supporting coalition partners at all levels as mentors to their ANA and ANP "brothers in arms". It's in part due to their professionalism that the yardsticks are moving forward for the ANSF, albeit one at a time.

#### "A Shining Star" for the People of Afghanistan

The branding of the ANA is new, as is the ANSF itself. It represents hope and is a symbol of legitimacy and new governance post-Taliban oppression.

"The Afghans see the ANA as a solid institution, one well respected by the population and the professionalization

Captain Jamie Donovan is a Public Affairs Officer - Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT), Kandahar

of the ANA is something that the people are latching on to," says Major Guy Noury, head of the OMLT's Brigade Mentor Team and G3 Mentor for 1st Brigade of the 205th Corps of the ANA in Kandahar Province. Maj. Noury, having deployed on earlier rotations in Afghanistan as a mentor, is in the enviable position of seeing a change in attitude and admiration towards the ANA among the population. He sees firsthand the rate of growth and expansion relative to even just a short



Under the tutelage of CF Master Corporal Sylvain Dion, ANA soldiers get a run-through of the immediate action and handling drills of the C7A2 Assault Rifle at an ANA training camp in Southern-Afghanistan.

Photo credit: Corporal Tina Gillies, Task Force Kandahar, Afghanistan, Image Technician © 2011 DND-MDN CANADA

time ago and is impressed by the speed in which the ANSF is advancing.

"Many see the ANA as a shining star; a symbol of something better, rooted in the promise of security and development for the people and of a better way of life."

Tactically, the ANA are proficient. This has aided respect among the population, now looking upon its army as an effective fighting force. OMLT Regimental Sergeant Major, Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Alain Grenier touts that many of the soldiers within the ANA are advancing their own reputation and credibility.

"Some are leading change within the organization itself, working to motivate others to a stronger, better way ahead," says CWO Grenier. "The Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) especially are sharing knowledge among themselves on how to better manage, train and care for their own soldiers."

#### ANSF Expansion and Development

It's acknowledged that if the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is to assume complete responsibility for national and provincial security it must have a well-trained, well-led and well-equipped ANSF. With the substantial growth of both the ANA and ANP, members of the OMLT are working through a myriad of challenges as they push onward with the task at hand.

"With the ANA, we're seeing a growth of 70,000 to 170,000 soldiers within five years. All of the systemic issues such as doctrine, logistics and training are going to present challenges ahead of proficiency," says Maj. Noury. "These issues create friction inside this kind of expansion and it's understood that these issues, some more prevalent than others, will take time to sort. Not entirely unreasonable when you consider the growth and newness of the force itself."

It's largely because of the work of mentors that this friction is slowly dissipating.

"Most of our soldiers are mentoring (ANSF) one or two rank levels above their own to help solve problems at different levels. It's more than an indication of the level of professionalism of our soldiers and what they're working to accomplish here," says CWO Grenier, chomping at the bit for any opportunity to discuss at length the work that many of his OMLT NCOs are doing to mentor as well as bridge the gap between the ANA and their Canadian "partners" within 1 Royal 22e Régiment Battle Group.

He's proud, and it shows.

"Our soldiers are in a unique position as the 'go between' among the ANA and the Coalition soldiers at the front-end to make it work. Their expertise and intimate knowledge of the ANA make them communication enablers for the advancement of the mission," says CWO Grenier, speaking of OMLT's role in working closely with both the ANA and battle space commanders so that both sides of the partnership understand what is needed to achieve success.

Every step of the way, OMLT soldiers are in the "sandbox" alongside their ANSF counterparts. And while they will be the last to experience the "fighting season," the influence they're having on Afghans to provide security and conduct operations independent of coalition forces will be lasting, as will an appreciation for the contribution of the Canadian Forces (CF) here among the Afghan population.

As the ANSF advances and the yardsticks move forward, the ANA and ANP are taking ownership of their own issues and processes. This is a vital, leading facet of mentoring. Combat finesse, synchronization, and an understanding of battlefield enablers and effects each weighs in on getting the ANA and the ANP where they need to be to conduct operations on their own. This means that mentors must work toward instilling a planning culture within the ANSF if there is to be the promise of success.

"In Afghan culture, there is no real connection between planning and a view to a desired end-state," says Maj. Noury. "For the ANA, understanding what needs to take place ahead of operation, planning and setting out a timeline in reverse from the start of an operation considering what has



Every step of the way, OMLT soldiers are in the "sandbox" alongside their ANSF counterparts. "Through mentoring, Canadians are working to ensure that the security of Afghanistan and its people one day rests solely in the hands of Afghans", says Colonel Hercule Gosselin, OMLT Commanding Officer.

Photo credit: Corporal Tina Gillies, Task Force Kandahar, Afghanistan, Image Technician © 2011 DND-MDN CANADA

to happen to be successful, is new. Culturally it's a challenge, but the progress is palpable."

This new planning mindset and its related advances are equally prevalent in the ANP in planning for and setting conditions right to support a force growth unprecedented to now. Even a year ago you would not have seen new equipment in the pipeline for the ANP. They now have a national logistic supply chain working to ensure police have the right resources and enablers to succeed. Training and mentoring has increased exponentially as well. Canadian ANP mentors at 404 Maiwand Regional Command are part of a police effort responsible for providing security to no less than four Afghan provinces. Just as impressive is the work of Regional Training Centre (Kandahar) in conducting basic patrolmen courses and providing oversight of the ANP NCO Academy in order to ensure that the right mix and number of ANP are trained and ready. All is indicative of the work being done to change how the ANP think of and plan for security throughout Kandahar and its environs.



Captain Ross Franklin, a Canadian mentor with Kandak 4 of 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade of the 205<sup>th</sup> Corps is one of some 200 OMLT soldiers working together to build the capacity of the ANA.

Photo credit: Corporal Jean-Francois Carpentier, Task Force Kandahar, Afghanistan, Image Technician © 2011 DND-MDN CANADA

The influence of the Canadian OMLT, as well as the 53 others like it staffed by various nations operating in Afghanistan, is extensive. The cumulative effort of each intended to markedly increase ANSF capacity and resources. a willingness to share and to learn and to build a capacity together. In consideration of the ANSF, these relationships and processes are not unlike bricks and mortar in a towering effort to build not only a successful fighting force but also a CF legacy – the build itself a lasting example of teamwork and a cornerstone of success in Afghanistan.

"These soldiers strewn about the area of operations as mentors, some as partners, all brothers in arms with their ANSF counterparts, are working to ensure that the security of Afghanistan and its people one day rests solely in the hands of Afghans", says Col. Gosselin.

"Our objective remains the same: to leave Afghanistan to Afghans. A very significant part of that objective rests in the work of the OMLT from now until the close of the current mission in positioning the ANA and ANP for success in Kandahar. With the start of the fighting season on the horizon, the show is far from over, and our work continues." ©

#### Building a Legacy

Since 2006, members of the OMLT have been working in close proximity to their ANA and ANP counterparts. This is not, in the Canadian sense, a learning environment wherein teachers, well surpassed in number by those students before them, work to influence and shape understanding. Mentoring soldiers and police in Afghanistan is proximate. Mentors work mostly oneassembling on-one. and establishing vision and comprehension while identifying the hurdles one needs to overcome in order to succeed.

It's one thing to train en masse. It's quite another to have a mentor with you day and night where respect is shared and trust and confidence in each other paves the road to success. This is the foundation of the mentor relationship. It's one based on trust and



Mentoring of various combat arms and combat support trades and personnel - including Artillery - is vital to advancing the capacity of the ANA. Mentoring and supporting Afghanistan's army is a key military task of NATO and an integral enabler to future ANSF assumption of national security in the country.

Photo credit: Corporal Jean-Francois Carpentier, Task Force Kandahar, Afghanistan, Image
Technician
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#### Review Essay - Afghanistan Redux

edited by Dr. Howard G. Coombs

The contributors to this review essay were asked to provide their thoughts on books pertaining to Afghanistan that they found of utility during their preparations and deployment as members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The grouping of readings that resulted is not exhaustive, but reflects the individual needs

of Captain (Navy) Darren Hawco, Colonels Rob Kearney and Paul Prévost, Lieutenant-Colonel Michel-Henri St-Louis and myself. Despite that limitation, this compilation does provide a palette of references from which interested readers can create their own perspective concerning Canada's involvement in South-West Asia, or act as a point of departure for further reading on Afghanistan.

## Captain (Navy) Darren Hawco - Special Advisor, Commander ISAF Initiatives Group, ISAF Headquarters (Kabul)

When I found out that I, a naval officer, was leaving in six weeks for a one year land-locked posting to Afghanistan I realized that I needed to quickly build a knowledge base of the region. As a result, I carefully chose four books to read prior to joining the personal staff of General David Patraeus.

First, I knew that I would need to have a historical and contemporary understanding of Afghanistan and there is perhaps no better study than Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (2010). This book took me on a journey that started with Alexander the Great, flirted with the Persians and Mongols, and focused deeply on the last two centuries. By the last chapter, I had a grasp of the 'Great Game' and an understanding of how Afghanistan came to be peopled by a heterogeneous blend of tribes and peoples whose common denominator is honour.

As an added benefit, I also recommend Barfield and Neamatollah Nojum, "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability" (*Middle East Policy*, Winter 2010).

Second, to contrast the broader view employed by Barfield, I picked Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military* 

History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (2002). Tanner depicts a country that has been at war for nearly its entire existence, providing an excellent counterpoint to Barfield's political and cultural perspective. In addition to explaining Afghanistan's military history, Tanner provides an informed view of the Taliban movement.

Third, I considered it important to improve my understanding of Pakistan as a key interest for Afghanistan and as a strategic interest to the United States. Consequently, I chose Tariq Ali, *The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power* (2008), although a few years old it seemed current and dynamic. This is in part because Ali provides an 'insider' feel to his perspective on Pakastani politics, explaining both Pakistan/Taliban interrelationships and Pakistan's focus on India.

Finally, I decided to read Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (2010). While I fully appreciated the populist nature of the book, I found it very interesting as it focused on many actors that are still in place today, characterized relationships amongst them and provided subtext to the public diplomacy of our times.

## Colonel Robert (Rob) Kearney, Chief of Staff, Combined Joint Interagency "Shafafiyat" (Transparency), ISAF Headquarters (Kabul)

There are three references that I have found of particular relevance in my current duties - Paul Rexton Kan, *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* (2009), Justin Mankin, "Pakistan

Dr. Howard G. Coombs is an Assistant Professor of the Royal Military College of Canada and a serving army reserve officer, affiliated with the Princess of Wales' Own Regiment. He is deployed, currently, with Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10 from September 2010 to June 2011 as a civilian advisor to the Task Force Commander.

and Afghanistan: Domestic Pressures and Regional Threats: Gaming The System: How Afghan Opium Underpins Local Power" (Journal of International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2009), and After The Conflict: Reconstruction And Development In The Aftermath Of War (2010), edited by Sultan Barakat.

Kan is currently a special advisor to the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat. He has done intheatre assistance to understand the relationship between narco-trafficking, criminal patronage networks and the extensive corruption problem existing in Afghanistan. In *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* he links the drug trade

to global violent conflicts and their effects on key political leaders, military officers, community and ethnic leaders and academics. He examines prolonged conflicts such as the current clash in Afghanistan and the seeming inability of those involved to end that war. Consequently, this book is valuable for those working towards conflict resolution and/or studying global conflicts linked to narco-trafficking.

The next author, Mankin, has written extensively on narco-trafficking in failed or failing states. He is deployed in Afghanistan to assist Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat with refining the aspects of the counter-narcotics plan that reinforce counter-corruption. In "Gaming The System" Mankin discusses the powerful non-democratically appointed 'Warlords and King Pins' existing in Helmand and Kandahar and how they undermine the credibility of the Afghan government as well as a strong centralized influence.

Mankin brings forward a key factor in the Afghan conflict – no matter the degree of support provided by coalition forces and donor countries the political powers in Kabul cannot compete with the power brokers in the south who exert strong influence and control on the population through profits generated from the billion-dollar poppy crop.

Finally, in *After The Conflict* Barakat has put together an impressive and experienced group of chapter authors who analyze the situation existing in Afghanistan and Iraq. This edited volume uses a "you break it, you help fix it" approach to post-conflict activities and explores subjects related to reconstruction, development and economic growth, offering sound advice. As an example, this book culminates with a chapter entitled the "Seven Pillars for Post-War Reconstruction," which by itself is a must read for all dealing with international conflict.

#### Colonel Paul Prévost - Commander Joint Task Force - Afghanistan Air Wing (Kandahar Airfield)

A few years ago Major-General Duff Sullivan suggested that I read Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die* (2005), concerning Operation Anaconda, an early American-led military operation in southern Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> When I received that proposal I was a student at the Canadian Forces College and had been writing about failures of joint organizations. As an example of this, the opening of my monograph included the incident of fratricide that occurred in 2006 during Operation Medusa, when an A-10 Warthog strafed a Canadian infantry company. Sullivan had participated in the inquiry into this incident and he recommended that I read Naylor's book as there were similarities in both operations regarding the lack of integration of air assets during planning.

While not academically rigorous I found this book to be of utility. It highlighted that in land-centric operations aviators could not sit on the sidelines and wait for direction or inclusion in the planning process. As the Wing Commander, I would have to ensure that my staff and I emphasized 'air awareness' within our land formation headquarters. By understanding the lessons of *Not a Good Day to Die* we could facilitate the integration of air assets early in our joint planning.

Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (2009), was suggested to me by Major Jay Adair, a friend and skilled infantry officer, who has deployed to Afghanistan on three occasions. I enjoyed the book greatly. Initially, I decided to read this volume to gain greater understanding of the strategic importance of Afghanistan over time. Additionally, although I already knew the reasons behind the relatively recent Soviet intervention, I was hoping for a more detailed account of their activities to gather lessons that might be applicable to tactical aviation. This was because aviation had played a large part in the invasion and was, conversely, a reason for their withdrawal.

What I did not expect was Jone's clearly defined perspective on the lack of United States Foreign Policy regarding Afghanistan. However, by the time I had read the book, the Obama administration had provided a clearer strategic vision regarding Afghanistan.

I also enjoyed Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (2007), which I had obtained at Toronto Airport shortly after it came out. I ended up reading it a few months before I knew that I would deploy to Afghanistan. When I had purchased this book I was intrigued to attempt to discover how the Canadian Forces could have committed to 'pacifying' Kandahar.

In the end I was not very surprised by the contents, as I had just previously read While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (2003) by Andrew Cohen. The latter book details Canada's lack of vision regarding its foreign policy. In a similar vein, Stein and Lang laid out the process and events which detailed how Canada committed troops to this Taliban sanctuary. The Unexpected War provided food for thought in considering Canada's interests in South-West Asia and after pondering the material I came to the conclusion that regardless of the motivation (or process involved) our intervention in Afghanistan is a just cause and allows Canada to do what it does the best - be a good global citizen.

As well, Ian Hope, Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (2008), provided a Battle Group commander's analysis of the area of operations. While I had read Christie Blatchford, Fifteen Days: Stories of Bravery, Friendship, Life and Death from Inside the New Canadian Army (2007), which provides various individual perspectives of our deployment in 2006, I sought a field commander's viewpoint. Dancing with the Dushman gave that position. This is an enjoyable and readable monograph that, while somewhat concise, informed me as I reflected upon my mission analysis prior to deployment.

## Lieutenant-Colonel Michel-Henri St-Louis - Commanding Officer 1er R22eR Battle Group, Task Force 3-10, Joint Task Force - Afghanistan (Panjw'i District, Kandahar)

When asked if I was interested in contributing to a review article of Afghanistan–related readings it got me thinking on which books have truly influenced some of my day-to-day decisions, or the manner we are currently conducting our Battle Group operations in the District of Panjwa'i. Trying to narrow the field down to a few titles that I could readily recommend to others preparing to deploy to Afghanistan was not a simple task. I have nonetheless narrowed my list down to eight titles. The following works are useful studies in leadership, the nature of combat, strategy, counterinsurgency (COIN) and the history of Afghanistan.

As a cornerstone of any military studies, *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu³ is without equal and an essential tool in shaping any military action. The principles and maxims proposed in this timeless book have directly influenced our current operations. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (originally published 1968) is also very effective in using historical examples to underline the need for commanders to use an indirect approach when tackling opponents.

When training the unit for deployment to Kandahar Province, I re-read the works of Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Grossman *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (1996), as well as Grossman and Loren W. Christensen, *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace* (2007). We also sought

Grossman's expertise in the form of a live lecture to all of the leadership of the Battle Group. His ability to illustrate the challenges linked to commanding troops in combat and the stress this puts on one's psyche is informative and sobering.

There are an ever increasing number of books on COIN. Of these, James S. Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy* (2007), and the more definitive *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (originally published 1966) by David Galula. These two authors lay out most of the basic principles of any successful COIN fight.

While somewhat dated, Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (2002), is a remarkable read and has been quite valuable in my current interaction with the people of Panjwa'i.

Finally, I would be remiss not to mention a book that stands as a rarity in any bibliography on this field. Andy Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builder: Development and the Military in Afghanistan* (2009) is a solid narrative regarding the challenges of nation building and capacity development in any failed or falling state where the military operates. Tamas is a development expert who has much practical experience and is in the position to be able to suggest some ways by which current and future missions might succeed through a whole-of-government approach to failed and failing states.

#### Dr. Howard G. Coombs - Advisor, Commander Joint Task Force - Afghanistan (Kandahar Airfield)

One of my favourite books to date concerning Afghanistan is *My Life With the Taliban* (2010) by Abdul Salam Zaeef. It discusses the author's experiences as a Talib, a fighter and high ranking member of the Taliban movement, and prisoner at Guantanamo. This book offers perspectives into the Taliban insurgency that are unparalleled. Incidentally, there is a great deal of detailed discussion about Panjwa'i, where part of the Canadian Task Force is currently located.

Along with this is Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan* (2002), which examines the radical ideology of the Taliban.

Another recent book, which adds a great deal of context to current Afghan issues is Thomas Barfiel's Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (2010). Along with Barfield's work is an older book that I use for reference and is available through second-hand bookstores. It is the American University's Area Handbook for Afghanistan, Fourth Edition (1973). This text was part of a series of country studies originally intended for government use and is a complete (over 450 page) snapshot of a functioning nation state, with its history and current affairs, taken just prior to the coup led by then Lieutenant-General (and former Prime Minister) Mohammed Daud. It concentrates on delineating the social, political, military, and economic institutions of Afghanistan in the early 1970s.

For a different point of view one can better understand Pashtu culture through *Pashtun Tales from the Pakistan-Afghan Frontier* (2003) by Aisha Ahmad and Roger Boase. This collection of stories provides insight into traditional ways of life, as well as highlights concepts of honour and other values.

A recent Canadian perspective on our military activities in Afghanistan is Colonel Bernd Horn's, *No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan* (2010). Horn's book is a stirring account of Canada's military in action against a resourceful and determined foe. Along with *No Lack of Courage* is Lester W. Grau's and Michael A. Grass's, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost* (2002), which is both useful and sobering to review.

If one has the time to pursue this genre I recommend Ali Ahmad Jalali's and Lester W. Grau's, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters (2001). Afghan Guerrilla Warfare was first published as a United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command publication, The Other Side of the Mountain (1995).

One area that requires more study is whole-of-government operations in post-conflict regions. In that regard there is an important work, by Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework For Rebuilding A Fractured World* (2008), which gives an inkling

of the challenges facing those who become embroiled in the dilemmas of stabilizing fractured states. For those who serve

in Joint Task Force Afghanistan this book highlights some of the challenges that are encountered daily by those serving in the area of operations. ©

(Endnotes)

- 1 "Shafafiyat" is the newly-established Anti-corruption Task Force, commanded by Brigadier-General H.R. McMaster, US Army. It reports directly to the Commander ISAF and leads ISAF's counter-corruption fight.
- Operation Anaconda took place in 2002 and included 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, who at that time were deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
- Editor's note: There are many editions of this classic work, but my favourite is the version edited by James Clavell first published in 1983.



#### Canada and the Arctic: 2013 and Beyond

by Dr. Andrea Charron

When one writes about the Canadian Arctic, invariably one reviews the Cold War history to reinforce the point that the Arctic was a buffer between two superpowers and their nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, this alarm echoes into present-day needlessly. This article leaves this history behind and looks ahead to specific deadlines Canada faces in 2013 as well as a brief look at a *select* few questions to ponder.

#### Part I: Deadlines

#### Canada's Chairmanship of the Arctic Council

In 2013, Canada shall assume the two-year Chairmanship of the Arctic Council - a high-level forum for cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states<sup>1</sup>, indigenous communities and other Arctic residents<sup>2</sup> on issues such as sustainable development and environmental protection. The US shall follow Canada and assume the Chair in 2015 until 2017. The expectation is that the agendas set by the North American Chairs be complementary.

The Scandinavian Chairmanships agreed to set common priorities for their Chairmanships (first Norway 2006-2009, then Denmark 2009-2011, then Sweden 2011-2013). This cooperation allowed for sustained focus on five issues: 1) climate change; 2) integrated management of resources; 3) indigenous peoples and local living conditions; 4) management of the Council and 5) the International Polar Year (2007-2008³). The coordinated agenda allowed for more sustained attention and follow-up on initiatives and projects executed by the six Arctic Council working committees.<sup>4</sup>

Canada is in the initial stages of setting its agenda. The particular focus has yet to be outlined, but given the priorities listed in Canada's Northern Strategy document<sup>5</sup> it is likely to parallel them. Therefore, promoting social

and economic development, environmental protection, the human dimension and Arctic science and research are likely to feature prominently especially as they are in-line with the mandate of the Council and are not likely to be counter to US priorities.

Submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLSCS)

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is arguably one of the most nuanced and important international laws of the world given that it governs more than seventy percent of the world's total surface area. Within UNCLOS, Article 76 provides for states parties to the Convention (not just Arctic states) to submit information to obtain international recognition for the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 NM to a maximum of 350 NM or 2500 m isobar mark plus 100 NM $^6$  where it is demonstrated to be a natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal state in question.

The coastal state enjoys sovereign rights (i.e. exclusive control) to exploit mineral and non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf (for example, oil and natural gas). Coastal states also have sovereign rights over sedentary species (living resources "attached" to the continental shelf), but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).7 Therefore, fish caught beyond the EEZ are not subject to the sovereign rights of the coastal state, but are subject to a number of international conventions. The deadline for making a submission to the CLCS is based on the date a state became party to UNCLOS. As Canada ratified UNCLOS on 7 November 2003, its submission to delineate the shelf off its Arctic and Atlantic coasts is due to the Commission no later than 6 December 2013 (a ten-year deadline).8 Canada has been collecting the necessary data for

Dr. Andrea Charron is a Research Associate, Canadian Defence and Security Studies, Carleton University

several years, including jointly with Denmark and the U.S. given their geographic proximity. The Commission will not resolve disputes and possibly may not review submissions involving areas disputed by another state. In such cases, resolution lies with the coastal states by a manner of their choosing (either by seeking a judgement by the International Court of Justice, agreeing to a bilateral agreement or by some other means). Norway and Russia, for example, have agreed to settle a forty-year dispute over the Barents Sea by splitting the disputed area nearly in half.

As the Commission can only process a limited number of submissions simultaneously (three, sometimes four maximum), it is likely to be years, even decades before final decisions are reached if the Commission continues to work at its current pace. Canada is likely to continue to engage in dialogue with Denmark (because of potential overlaps in the Arctic and Atlantic oceans) and with the U.S. (for potential overlap in the Arctic) in the hopes of reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement. Note, however, that the US is not a party to UNCLOS (and not likely to accede given the Republican majority in the House of Representatives), which complicates matters. Given, however, that the U.S. views UNCLOS as customary law and given our propensity to create bilateral solutions to disagreements of principle with our neighbour, it is likely such an agreement will follow in the (near) future.

#### Part II: Issues to Ponder for 2013 and Beyond

#### The Health of the North

How will Canada tackle the living conditions of Northern residents? From leaking sewage, to crowded housing conditions, to the lack of employment and tertiary care services... When will the focus turn from strictly security concerns originating "from away" (which are neither imminent nor present) to health and security at home? The first ever Arctic Health Ministers' Meeting, which took place on 16 February 2011, in Nuuk, Greenland, is an important start. The meeting had three themes: Circumpolar partnerships, promoting healthy lifestyles and health care delivery. For Canada the challenge is always maintaining sustained attention given a myriad of competing financial priorities. Can Canada make health of the North a sustained priority?

#### The status of "observers" at the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council is made up of permanent participants (including the aforementioned eight states and six indigenous organizations) and observers (including non-arctic states<sup>10</sup>, global and regional inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations<sup>11</sup> and non-governmental organizations<sup>12</sup>). In order to ensure that the Arctic Council continues to function effectively and to ensure the voices of indigenous people are heard, the issue of the criteria for assessing applications for observer status is likely to fall

on Canada's watch. The EU (representing 27 states – many shipping states) and China (now the second largest economy measured by GDP in the world) have applied for observer status. Should Canada adopt the "more-the-merry" approach or the "fewer-more-efficient" stance? Or will Canada propose that the Council create a measurable criterion for observer status that balances these two models? And what is the role of an observer? Is it simply to sit and observe? Or should there be a process by which observers may participate in the Council's decision-making process? Are there important voices/organizations missing from the "table"?

## The Mandatory Status of Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG)

Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) has been extended from 100NM to 200NM (to match Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone). The AWPPA and its regulations establish a 'zero discharge' act, which states, no person or ship shall deposit or permit the deposit of waste of any type in the Arctic waters. Connected by virtue of the geographic area covered and purpose of the regulation (protection of marine environment), Canada's voluntary Arctic traffic system is now mandatory for vessels over a certain tonnage or if carrying dangerous goods entering the Arctic.<sup>13</sup> Masters operating vessels north of 60°N must provide the Coast Guard with information concerning the identity of the ship, destination and geographic positions. The NORDREG Zone, however, covers more than "arctic waters" as defined in the AWPPA. For example, NORDREG extends to all of Ungava Bay, Hudson Bay and James Bay, below 60°N.

The voluntary system, in place since 1977, worked well – most ships complied. From the Canadian perspective, NORDREG is in line with international law (specifically Article 234 of UNCLOS concerning ice-covered waters, which was developed following the adoption in Canada of the AWPPA). But from the perspective of other States, there remain two specific questions: 1) is Canada required to submit NORDREG to the International Maritime Organization for adoption? and 2) is NORDREG consistent with Article 234 or does it violate the notion of "due regard to navigation"?<sup>14</sup>

#### The Northwest Passage (NWP)

Do we continue to press the US specifically (as well as other states like members of the EU) to accept Canada's characterization of the NWP as "internal waters" by virtue of historic title? Should we support and advance the perimeter security concept (which would favor Canada's current characterization of the NWP)? Or do we continue to agree to disagree? Should Canada consider the benefits and costs of an alternate characterization? Have we the patrol capability for both passage scenarios? Will we ensure RCMP, Fisheries, Coast Guard, Territorial, Customs and Transportation personnel are on the (new) patrol ships (putting whole-of-government theory into practice and should this scenario include US, Russian and Danish officials similar to the Shiprider programme?<sup>15</sup>) or shall we promote

more DND presence (whose members do not have the power of enforcement of NORDREG or AWPPA and so would need to partner with other government agencies)? Do we see the NWP as simply a security bulwark or as a potentially lucrative shipping transit-way (similar to the St. Lawrence Seaway)? Have we consulted with Northern residents regarding the impacts of all scenarios? And will ships even choose to transit the NWP (with its extreme ice variability and drifting multi-year ice, lack of ports and services, high insurance costs, communication problems, emergency rescue options, the short shipping season, etc. all of which were raised in the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Survey) or will they (eventually) sail over the North Pole directly to their ports of call?

North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) quadrennial review in 2014 and expansion of mandate

With the inclusion of a maritime warning function for NORAD, what are the practical logistical and operational

implications of this expansion for the Arctic and its approaches (and if a land component is added in the future – what then?) This integration with the US at the command level has had benefits (eg. combined command structure, cost-sharing and increased fire-power) that an alliance (like NATO) cannot necessarily afford Canada. Can the current alarmist rhetoric square with this integrated and practical approach to the defence of North America? Should cooperation continue with the US in the Arctic (especially with regards to support for civil disasters) or will the alarmist rhetoric continue to insist it stop at the tree-line?

Based on just these few selected questions and considering the deadlines facing Canada in 2013, it has more than a full Arctic agenda in the coming years. Canada has many obligations to its citizens, especially in the North, to intergovernmental organizations and to allies. Alarmist language is singularly unhelpful; rather practical dialogue and informed debate needs to continue.

#### (Endnotes)

- The eight Arctic states include: Canada, Russia, US, Denmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands), and Norway (the so-called Arctic 5 or littoral states) and Finland, Sweden and Iceland.
- 2 Six permanent participants include: Aleut International Association (AIA); Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); Gwich'in Council International (GCI); Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); Saami Council and Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON).
- 3 Canada shall host the final event of the IPY a conference in Montreal in 2012 entitled: "From Knowledge to Action".
- The working committees include: i) Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); ii) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); iii) Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); iv) Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); v) Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and vi) Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).
- 5 Government of Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs), "Northern Strategy: Record of Achievement 2009-2010", (Ottawa, 2010). http://www.northernstrategy.ca/cns/rcns-eng.asp
- Article 76(5) states: The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) (i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. Note: nm is the internationally recognized abbreviation for nanometre. There is no internationally recognized abbreviation for nautical mile. NM or M is common and the latter is the one to be used in a submission to CLCS.
- The EEZ is defined as the water extending beyond the territorial seas to a distance of 200 nautical miles (NM). Within this area the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources.
- 8 The Convention provides for this ten year deadline. However, the meeting of States Parties to the Law of the Sea subsequently decided that the requirements of the Convention could be met in this respect by the provision of preliminary information signalling an intention to make a full submission at a later date.
- There are two levels to the Commission's dealing with disputed areas: the Commission has no power to resolve a dispute and does not even have authority to determine whether a dispute exists. They are made aware of the existence of a dispute by a state party. In making the Commission aware of such a dispute a state party may either invoke provisions to prevent consideration of the submission or choose not to do so, sometimes reinforcing this by advising the Commission that review of the submission is not objected to but is without prejudice to future delimitation.
- 10 Currently there are six non-Arctic observer states: France, Germany, UK, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
- There are nine including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and many UN organizations (but not the International Maritime Organization).
- There are eleven including the University of the Arctic.
- Vessels of 300 gross tonnage or more; vessels that are engaged in towing or pushing another vessel, if the combined gross tonnage of the vessel and the vessel being towed or pushed is 500 gross tonnage or more; and vessels that are carrying as cargo a pollutant or dangerous goods, or that are engaged in towing or pushing a vessel that is carrying as cargo a pollutant or dangerous goods.
- Article 234 of UNCLOS states: Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions

or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence." For an excellent review, see Ted McDorman, "National Measures for the Safety of Navigation in Arctic Waters: NORDREG, Article 234 and Canada", 2011. The paper was presented at the Conference on Globalization and the Law of the Sea, held in Washington, D.C. 1-3 December 2010, sponsored by the Korea Maritime Institute, the University of Virginia Center for Oceans Law and Policy and the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea. It will appear in the proceedings from the Conference to be published by Martinus Nijhoff.

15 Canada-U.S. Shiprider (Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO)) involves vessels jointly crewed by specially trained and designated Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers who are authorized to enforce the law on both sides of the international boundary line mainly in the Great Lakes. ©



## The SDF: Canada's Security and Defence Future?

by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Last month, as a recipient of the Security and Defence Forum's (SDF) internship, I attended a full-day of briefing on topical Canadian security and defence issues hosted by the Department of National Defence's (DND) Policy Group at Cartier Square Drill Hall.

There were ten award winners present. Two individuals were awarded internships; the remainder received funding for graduate studies at the MA, PhD, or post-doctoral level. Interestingly, four of the ten recipients—myself included—are Reservists. We may each pursue different career options in the future. But certainly, as a result of the opportunities provided by the SDF, all of us have all become stakeholders in Canada's security and defence future.

As stated in its annual report, the SDF is a grant program at DND designed to "develop a domestic competence and national interest in defence issues of current and future relevance to Canadian security." Officials suggest that the Department's "strategic review" aimed at trimming the DND budget may place the SDF program in jeopardy. Fortunately at the 11<sup>th</sup> hour the Deputy Minister of DND extended the funding to the SDF centres for one year until 31 March 2012. Yet, the funding for awards remains ambiguous and the long-term prospects for the SDF program remain in serious doubt.

The purpose of the SDF is to promote public dialogue and to encourage Canadian academic "competence" on issues related to Canadian defence and the Canadian Forces (CF). To meet this objective, the SDF provides some \$2.5

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is a DND Security and Defence Forumsponsored intern employed as the Project Officer at the CDA Institute. She received her Master's from the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Her focus was on defence policy and security studies. million in grants per year to universities across Canada and fund 12 regionally-based Centres of Expertise and a Chair of Defence Management Studies located in universities across the country. The program also invests in a Special Projects Fund that supports conferences, workshops and other events and by awarding internships as well as graduate-level scholarships and post-doctoral fellowships.

The Chair of Defence Management Studies receives \$165,000 annually to help fund a "research chair," a broad program of teaching, research workshops, and publications. The Chair has been located at Queen's University since late 1996. The annual grants to SDF centres, averaging some \$100,000 each, are used to fund public outreach, conferences and events, and publications.

While there are many who benefit from the program, critics of the SDF contend that it does not create incentives for the establishment of tenure-track academic positions in the field of Canadian defence studies. SDF centres focus on in-house publications and other outreach programs. For other than the Chair of Defence Management, they do not give money to create faculty positions for scholars who study Canadian security and defence issues. This criticism begs the question, 'why fund *universities* to host centres that are primarily concerned with publications and events?'

If the mandate of the SDF is to increase academic "competence" on issues related to the CF, then the argument suggests that a central goal should be to ensure that more academics are hired to research issues related to Canadian defence. Since the SDF seeks to increase publications and outreach events, these ends can be better achieved by non-academic organizations and private think tanks. This critique is fair and compelling and needs to be answered. The SDF needs a thorough review of the aims and objectives of the program that was created in 1967. Such a review may result in some re-structuring.

Calling for some detailed review and perhaps a wide re-structuring of the program is one thing – cancelling the program is altogether another matter. People of experience inside and outside the SDF, including many in DND and in the CF, believe that cancelling the program would be detrimental to the Department, the CF, and, ultimately to Canada's security and defence future.

SDF centres do produce individuals who better understand defence and security issues and the CF in Canada. Applicants to various federal government post-secondary recruitment programs often emerge from these centres and go into the bureaucracy with a better understanding of the place of defence and security in Canadian society.

A good example of the academic competence fostered by the SDF can be found in the CDA Institute's Annual Graduate Student Symposium that focuses on Canadian defence and security issues. Many of the students who present their research at this event are associated with these centres; some go on to work in government, the defence industry or non-governmental organizations, which only adds to the public discussion on Canadian defence concerns.

Some CF-literate journalists, such as Mercedes Stephenson, have also undertaken studies at SDF centres. Undoubtedly, this has helped these individuals develop an ability to understand defence requirements, the role of the military, and the opportunity costs associated with funding or not funding the CF. It also makes them better equipped to provide thoughtful critical assessment of defence-related issues.

SDF awards also contribute to fulfilling the program's mandate by exposing scores of students each year to the complexities of national defence policy and it training them to work in several areas of defence studies and administration after graduation. For example, last year, as a recipient of a SDF

funded MA scholarship, I was able to present my research on private military and security contractors and the CF at a number of academic conferences in Canada and the U.S. This year, as the SDF Intern at the CDA Institute, I am personally engaged in public discussion about Canadian defence policy through the media and at conferences and other events.


These SDF awards give me and others like me opportunities to expand our knowledge on Canadian defence policy and security studies. When I speak with friends, family, former students, and colleagues about issues that matter to the CF, I feel as though I am personally promoting the Canadian dialogue on these issues. I owe that to the SDF.

Going back to the ten award recipients at Cartier Square Drill Hall—you might see us as part of Canada's security and defence future. Some of the students in the room will go on to do post-doctoral research and apply for tenure-track academic jobs in defence and security fields. Others may look for work in the defence industry, perhaps at DND via the Policy Officer Recruitment Program. And even those who may formally leave defence and security behind will still carry a knowledge-base on Canadian defence and security issues.

Clearly, there are merits to the continued funding of the SDF program. For over forty years the SDF program, including during the so-called 'decade of darkness,' it has helped to produce CF-literate analysts, scholars and journalists. Without the SDF in the future, this legacy might well be lost. If looming cuts to the DND budget force the cancelation of program, the CF may find it has few members of the public who understand them, let alone support their civilian-directed mandates and resulting requirements. Hopefully Canada's political leaders and decision-makers at National Defence will recognize the importance of the program in Canada's security and defence future. ©

#### (Endnotes)

The Centres of Expertise are currently located at Dalhousie University, University of New Brunswick, Université Laval, Université de Montréal / McGill University, Université du Québec à Montréal/Concordia University, Queen's University, Carleton University, York University, Wilfrid Laurier University, University of Manitoba, University of Calgary, and the University of British



## The Need for Direct Communication

by Thomas S. Caldwell

Virtually every organization is in the communications business. This simple fact reflects the need for accountability, understanding and an intelligent basis for support.

Simply put, it is not enough for an organization to be good at what it does if people do not know about it.

Our Canadian Forces (CF) excel at the tasks they are given and in the theatres where they operate are seen as the "go to people". Anyone who has been to Afghanistan has witnessed the outstanding calibre of our troops, even relative to those of other nations in the area. This holds for other areas where Canadians serve such as Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sinai Peninsula, or the Horn of Afirca.

Canadians have a right to be proud the CFs efforts of making the world a slightly better place for Canadians. They also have the right to be informed. Frankly, this is not the case as often or as clearly as it should be. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk and others do a superlative job communicating on a speaker basis to exclusive groups, but the message requires wider distribution. That points to better use of media.

Frequently, media bias skews the message, the consequences and the results. Yes, Canadians see the sacrifice along the Highway of Heroes, but that message alone denies the reasons for our Forces' efforts and sacrifices.

It is generally left to government to communicate the service our Forces are providing Canadians and the world. That too acts as somewhat of a filter, as indeed it should in some cases – but not all.

It is common sense that the impact of what is being accomplished should be communicated, as directly as possible, by those doing the heavy lifting. Intervening organizations both dilute and diminish. There are also many claimants for jobs well done and even slightly different agendas.

Further, there is the element of accountability. Just as the CF is accountable to our political leaders, both are accountable to the Canadian public. A good example of this would be for Canadians to know the benefits of the C17 fleet for our Forces and their humanitarian efforts. We were all treated to the political debate. Now Canadians

Thomas S. Caldwell has been actively involved in the investment industry since 1965. Mr. Caldwell is Chairman of Caldwell Financial Ltd, President and a Director of Urbana Corporation, a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute, and is on the Board of Associates of the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research at MIT.

should be informed of its benefits in action.

I am not suggesting our Forces circumvent or undercut the political processes of procurement, although that might not be a bad idea, but rather the CF can help illustrate the benefits after the fact of purchase. Canadians have the right to receive a "follow up report" on big ticket or game changing acquisitions.

In a recent meeting with Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) ( I, as a non-military observer, was amazed to see the reach of Canadian Forces' efforts worldwide. The list includes, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Jerusalem, Golan, Egypt, Darfur, Sudan, Monuc, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Bahrain, Cyprus and the Gulf of Aden off the Horn of Africa.

The military communicates well within its own community and, indeed within the business community, but Canadians as a whole should also be aware of our efforts to help others and that story is not being adequately told to our country at large.

If the media cannot set aside their journalistic biases, then communication should be more direct. Both public media interviews and print ads are the means, with particular and continual emphasis on print.

Typically, CF ads relate to recruitment and, as a consequence, directed towards new additions. It would be a relatively easy task to slightly change the focus of these ads to what our Forces are doing and occasionally how new equipment is enhanced our capabilities. Our Forces' efforts, which enable education, disaster relief, infrastructure rebuilding and disease control should be part of any media campaign – Yes, other government agencies are also involved and that may present an opportunity for some cost sharing and additional exposure.

Young Canadians are coming forth in droves to serve their country and their world. They are ready and willing to serve. I am of the opinion a greater focus should be on information advertising versus one dimensional recruitment efforts.

It is a matter of focus and market. Canadians see, feel and appreciate the sacrifice of our young people. We also anguish for the wounded and maimed and we admire their courage and that of their families. What we need to address, and address with pride, is the "Why?".

Canada has again become a player on the world stage, as a result of our Forces efforts and that story should be told.

Again, it is not enough to be good at what we do if people don't know about it, understand the issues and appreciate the accomplishments.

Our young people are continuing the story of places like Ortona (a name not known by most young Canadians) where an Italian merchant recently said to one of my business

partners, referring to our large war grave there, "What we love about Canadians is that they came and fought and died for us and when it was over, they just went home and asked for nothing".

Our Forces' broader story needs to be directly told to all Canadians. ©



### Ross Munro Media Award

by Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Keple

In 2002 the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) initiated the Ross Munro Media Award (RMMA). The Award recognizes annually a Canadian journalist who made a significant contribution to the public's understanding of issues relating to Canada's defence and security.

#### The Evolution of Security Awareness

During the Second World War, Canadians relearned the lesson the hard way, that vital interests such as security and defence cannot be taken for granted, and for over a generation thereafter, governments enjoyed a relatively knowledgeable electorate with respect to defence issues. A few decades later, an increasingly shallow understanding of national security issues set in and a pre-occupation with other priorities contributed to "decades of darkness" for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

In every western nation, governments seek informed specialist advice. In Canada, a century ago, the Minister of National Defence chartered defence associations to serve as specialist advisors. While the Minister relied primarily on his departmental staff, and in the case of the militia, on serving officers, they were precluded from public debate of issues. Once policy was set, departmental staff and serving officers were expected to fall into line, even if their personal knowledge or professional experience suggested otherwise. Post-retirement such loyalty no longer applied and former advisors often gravitated to the appropriate defence association.

Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Keple was Director General Military Engineering Operations at National Defence Headquarters during operations in Pakistan, Croatia, Kuwait, Somalia, Cambodia, and Bosnia. In 1996 he was transferred to the Supplementary Reserve, and retired in 2007. Colonel (Ret'd) Keple is a Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Conference of Defence Associations.

Today, such mandates continue, and defence associations may offer advice directly to the Minister or other officials. The evolution of CDA in the 1930s facilitated the formulation of multi-disciplinary advice. Subjecting the position of one association to the scrutiny of other associations made the consensus CDA position even more valuable (and possibly compelling). The description of CDA as the "voice of defence" has never implied being the spokesperson for the MND, but rather the collective public voice of the broader national security and defence community.

The Government of Canada remains responsible for the defence and security of our nation, but governments reflect the will of the people and their understanding of the issues involved. By the turn of the century, the public had little interest or understanding of such issues. One explanation for that apathy was the dearth of media coverage.

CDA, in collaboration with the CDFAI, initiated the RMMA to encourage journalists to cover the forgotten subjects of defence and security. As such the RMMA identifies and commends those excellent journalists (and their publishers) whose reportage actually promotes Canadian *understanding* of national security and defence.

An increasing proportion of public knowledge is fostered on blogs and other social media. In fact, in recent years two blogs have been nominated for the RMMA, and were deemed competitive by the Selection Committee.

#### The Conference of Defence Associations

CDA is a conference of independent defence associations. Those associations do "attract" and welcome members from a broad spectrum of Canadian society. The shared interest in national security and defence tends to concern those who have dedicated most of their adult life to service of their country but also others who understand the importance of those issues that underlay Canadian values and interests.

CDA wants journalism that promotes Canadians'  $\it understanding$  of the issues. When applicable, journalism

that correctly identifies deficiencies, or neglect, or skewed priorities, or mismanagement can ultimately be far more valuable to Canada's vital interests than shallow accolades. Journalism which researches the truth, which promotes understanding of the pertinent issues, and which advocates for defensible policies and actions will be commended by the RMMA spirit whether or not they correlate to existing DND or CF or even CDA/CDFAI views.

The Media Award is an unsolicited but deserved distinction without obligation by the recipient. The RMMA monetary award is a tangible representation of that distinction, also without obligation. In the event that such an honorarium is unwelcome, the recipient may simply redirect the gratuity to a charity of their choice.

#### Responsibility Accepted

The RMMA encourages journalists to research and to understand national security and defence issues, and to report accordingly. It encourages publishers and broadcasters to recognize the relevance of such reportage, to commend it

as and when appropriate, and to nominate the journalists for national recognition. Neither CDA nor CDFAI nominates journalists. Anonymous nominations are not accepted, but nominators who request anonymity are respected. CDA and CDFAI do enfranchise a Selection Committee, administer the process, and orchestrate the formal award presentation.

RMMA Selection Committee members have been impressed by the number and calibre of nominees, and have attested to the fact that whether the journalism was favourable or not has never been considered relevant. Recipients of the Award have included Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, and Murray Brewster.

We should all strive to understand the basis and the interrelated components of our national security and defence, and when we observe journalistic excellence in those areas, we should express our appreciation to the author, or through letters to the editor. And of course we should consider nominating the journalist for national recognition of the Ross Munro Media Award. ©

#### Address



## The Ross Munro Media Award

by Murray Brewster

Ross Munro is considered the next best thing to a saint at The Canadian Press [CP]. Among his contemporaries and those of us who've followed, the veteran war correspondent epitomized everything it means to be a wire service reporter. He had guts. He was accurate, tenacious, curious, a swift writer and - I'm told - unfailingly kind to the young journalists whom he later mentored. His body of coverage, landing with troops in Dieppe, Sicily and Normandy, was unmatched by most of his peers, many of whom never achieved what one long-retired CP staffer described to me as the Triple Crown of war reporting. He was admired enough to have his name etched on the annual journalism award presented by the

Murray Brewster is the 2010 recipient of the Ross Munro Media Award. He is the Parliamentary defence reporter and senior war correspondent for The Canadian Press news agency. Mr. Brewster covered the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York as well as the crash of Swissair Flight 111, for which he was awarded a national Radio-Television News Director Association (RTNDA) award. Over the period of his career he received 11 RTNDA awards and two Atlantic Journalism Awards.

CDA and the CFAI. Just don't mention his name around some veterans in the Royal Regiment of Canada.

A few years ago, I had the privilege of accompanying survivors of the Dieppe raid on the 65th anniversary tour of the battlefields. When it was learned that I was CP reporter, Joe Ryan, one of the vets who spent over two years in a German POW camp, nearly tore my ears off over Ross Munro. His biggest beef with the man whom we idolized was that Munro didn't get out of the landing craft with them at Puys. He didn't share their burden to the fullest extent possible – something the survivors resented. Soldiers expect that of journalists who accompany them into battle. The notion that we should remain impartial in the face of slaughter; that our first duty was to the truth and our objective was to bear witness is something never easily appreciated, especially in war

"He never came around us much after the war and for good reason," Ryan said of Munro.

The soldiers who survived the horrors of internment were even angrier when years later they read Munro's account of the battle in old newspapers, Ryan said.

They believed he soft-peddled what happened to them.

A little later during that the anniversary tour, we were at Green Beach in Pourville and the veterans affairs minister at the time gave a speech in the rain. Greg Thompson trotted out the well-worn narrative: For every one of the lives sacrificed at Dieppe, 10 were saved at D-Day by the lessons learned. There was one old vet who seemed to be dozing in his wheelchair, but woke up when he heard the statement. His face went red and he banged his cane on the ground.

"Bull."

He hollered loud enough that some of Thompson's staff cringed, but the minister kept right on speaking and never missed a beat.

The reality of that vet's experience did not match the politically acceptable narrative of his time, which has been handed down to us through the years. The same might also be said for the soldiers who fought in the former Yugoslavia while everyone back home celebrated it as peacekeeping.

History has a way of sorting out of differing perspectives.

So it will be with Afghanistan.

As someone who has done six tours – traveling Kandahar both embedded and un-embedded – I will be the first to tell you that coverage of the war has been messy and imperfect.

If there has been a failure of the media it has been in the fact that there have never been enough of us on the ground. The war deserved more coverage, more analysis and more context.

Yet having witnessed the inner workings, both in Kandahar and Ottawa, I can tell you the system was never set up to support such close scrutiny.

The fact is, ladies and gentleman, I speak from deep well of experience when I say this war has been communicated top-down by committee, often turning what would be compelling – maybe even inspiring - stories into a blubbering, inarticulate mess.

The Canadian media embedding program has been among the best – if not the best – among the NATO countries, but it is structured to tell the individual stories of soldiers in the field. It doesn't do context or big picture very well, nor has it willingly helped reconstruct events where journalists may not have been able to bear witness. Where it has happened, it's only been through the enterprise or the begging, pleading and harassment of individual reporters.

It has always amazed me that I have had to read compelling details of heroic actions in Panjwaii and Zharey in press releases from the governor's general's office when I and my colleagues were on the ground and asking questions as the events took place.

There are those who say Canadians don't understand the Afghan war, especially some of the more complex aspects of governance and development. Yet, journalists in Kandahar during 2006 were directed to call either the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Canadian International Development Agency's media lines in Ottawa for comment when officials

from both departments were standing right in front of us at the provincial reconstruction base. It was absurd.

Interview requests of Canada's civilian agencies in sometimes languish for weeks on the ground. During 2008, I was told I wasn't able to speak with the federal government's representative in Kandahar because she was to appear via conference call at the weekly DFIAT briefing for the Ottawa media. The following week, it was the ambassador's turn and "we wouldn't want to trounce on his message" with any story I might produce. The following week; the RoCK was away on vacation and no one could answer questions.

In case you think these are isolated, historical experiences: A colleague of mine returned from Kabul in early November 2010 spitting bullets when a series of interviews were cancelled at the last minute with a terse email. Another journalist spent his whole eight-week tour asking to speak to the RoCK and was offered an interview the day he left.

Not many Canadians understand that the insurgency in Afghanistan is a multi-headed beast with various actors and interests that have a long history in the country. I undertook to write a piece in 2009 about the influence of the Haqqani Network and the Hizb-e-Isalmi on the Taliban movement. The Americans had reams of information in the public domain about both groups, but was interested in the Canadian perspective. A request for a briefing on the ground was ignored and when I filed an access to information request it was returned with a search fee bill of over \$53,000. I ended up writing about the Haqqanis and Hizb-e-Islami, but from Washington's perspective.

Sometimes, I wonder and ask myself: Do they really want us to tell the story?

If there has been another failing of the media in this war, I would suggest it has been that not enough of us have stood up to answer our critics; the ones who would question the integrity of those of us who've laid their lives on the line; or the ones who would say we have not done our level best to tell this story.

Just because we've stood a few paces behind soldiers in IED-laced fields that does not make us apologists, nor cheerleaders.

Just because we are skeptical and ask awkward questions, that does not make us rubes, nor the enemy.

Yet, by times, we have been painted as such.

There are those in the journalism community who've suggested that coverage of the war has been cast "through the narrow prism of the Canadian military."

Others at the opposite end of the spectrum have stated that journalists have confined themselves to Kandahar Airfield and the real story of what the military has accomplished remains untold.

I hear echoes of the past in some of those remarks.

The fact is that the vast majority of what has been written, published or broadcast about this war has been produced by embedded journalists who've chosen to leave the confines of the military, take their lives in their hands and travel unarmed into Kandahar city, as well as its outlying districts. They haven't blow through on short tours; they've gone in day after day with all of the associated risks.

There are too many names to mention, but I would point you to individuals such as Louie Palu, the photographer who has incidentally spent more time with Canadian and American troops than any other journalist.

Calgary Herald journalist Michelle Lang gave up her life covering Canadian soldiers last year.

With all due respect to the distinguished judges who awarded me the Ross Munro prize, I would suggest she was more deserving of the tribute. Her compendium of defence writing my not have been large, but the spirit which brought her here; the desire to bear independent witness while our fellow citizens shed blood was every bit was much deserving of recognition as the gallons of ink spilled in my copy.

At least three other Canadian journalists have been wounded in Afghanistan; many others have returned irrevocably changed by their experiences.

There have been so many gifted, honest people who've gone through Kandahar and given journalism a better name.

They didn't sit behind the wire.

Few of us do.

I'm confident history will find a way of reconciling the different viewpoints, but in the meantime I cling to something Edward R. Murrow once said:

"To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; credible we must be truthful."

Those are words for all of us to live by in war and in peace.  $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}$ 



## Canada's Army Reserve - Post the Combat Mission in Afghanistan

by Brigadier-General Gary O'Brien

Canada's success in Afghanistan has shaped a new vision and

confidence in its Army Reserve. The mission could not have been accomplished without the significant Reservist contribution at home and in theatre. At home, most Reservists were employed to ensure that all operational requirements to sustain efforts were delivered. The war has done much to shape the transformation plans within the Army and a substantial new realization about the depth of contribution of the Army Reserve is leading to a more Operational style Reserve, capability based, and actively engaged in the Army missions of the future.

Army Reserve Transformation—now linked and driven by the requirements of the Army through Army Transformation—is forging the roles of the Army Reserve in a focused manner. Clearly supporting the capabilities required by the *Canada First* Defence Plan, Reserve roles, missions, and tasks are being developed to deliver real capability and relevance within the Armys missions. It is important to understand that these new requirements of the Army Reserve are fundamentally changing the culture and essence of this proud institution and are shaping a new Reserve confidence that will be important in securing success. There

In March of 2006 Brigadier-General O'Brien deployed to Afghanistan where he served as the Deputy Commanding General, Political Military Integration, in the Coalition Headquarters of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan for nine months. Upon his return to Canada he was appointed Director General Land Reserve and is now Chief of Staff Land Reserve.

remain many challenges. Thoughtful and rigorous analyses will be help ensure that this institution is not broken through the process.

These new capabilities are focused to deliver effect in both the Domestic and Expeditionary realms. In addition to these operational requirements, a new focus on connecting with communities and Canadians will ensure that the Army Reserve is achieving the critical success the people of Canada expect.

#### Domestic

The Army Reserve has always been available for military response in a domestic crisis. In recent history almost all of the domestic operations have had substantial Reserve participation. In some cases, the Reserve has supplied all of the support. Soon the Army is standing up the remaining Territorial Battalion Groups (TBG) to bring this capability to ten battalions in total, one from each Reserve Canadian Brigade Group (CBG). These TBGs formalize the capability the Army Reserve will deliver for basic Domestic Operations. The TBG may be a Force Employment model, but it shapes how each CBG will organize and train its soldiers to conduct these operations. Every unit will contribute and it is designed to act as the follow on force after the Immediate Response Units have deployed or to deploy as the Army's first response to a domestic emergency. It will be structured to deliver capability across the military spectrum and its integral Command and Control will provide for the basic functionality required of an organization to conduct domestic operations. TBGs will be self-sustaining and

#### THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2011 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, and Murray Brewster.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2011, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD
SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE
ASSOCIATIONS
222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B
OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 18 November 2011, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai. ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.

## PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2011.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Etrangères (ICDAE). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, et Murray Brewster.

Toute personne peut nommer un (une) journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux

lettres du soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des examples des travaux du journaliste. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2011, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

222, RUE SOMERSET OUEST, SUITE 400B OTTAWA, ON K2P 2G3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 18 novembre 2011, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour plus d'informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

capable of operating in austere environments where civilian infrastructure has become severally degraded or overloaded. Fundamentally, the TBG is a significant step forward in ensuring that the Army Reserve delivers real capability in real time when required.

In addition to the Territorial Battalion Groups the Army Reserve makes further contribution in providing HQ capability and detailed liaison between the multi agency response organizations during any event. Significantly, as the military plans develop domestic readiness, the TBG concept will evolve to ensure the Army Reserve has an important role in defending Canada.

#### Arctic

The growing importance of the Arctic will have a significant effect on the Reserves. To provide capabilities for potential operations in the Arctic, the Army has stood up four specifically identified Arctic Reserve Company Groups (ARCGs). These groups are based on four Reserve units, each in the four Land Force Areas: The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, Les Voltigeurs de Québec, and the 1st Bn, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (Carleton and York). The purpose of these company groups is to provide additional soldiers specially trained in Arctic operations, and resources for these operations. Critical to this important and potentially dangerous task is that each of these Units are being resourced with appropriate equipment sets and special training to be able to provide follow on forces for Domestic operations. The Army has already seen successful training exercises with these new ARCGs and they will participate broadly across all tasks in the Arctic.

#### **Expeditionary**

The Army has recognised that future expeditionary missions will not succeed without significant inclusion of reservists, especially with the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) capabilities coming from the Reserve Force. To meet the evolving threats and to shape the Armys contribution to CF missions abroad the Army has developed the Affiliated Battle Group (ABG) concept. This concept delivers an integrated Regular and Reserve battle group, scalable by mission. Reserve Units will receive specific Force Generation tasks to augment both individually and in sub-sub-units to assist in building the ABG. The ABGs are shaped around the nine existing Infantry battalions and the specific linking of Reserve units in support of individual ABGs will greatly assist in identifying the readiness requirements and more predictable tasks for Reserve Augmentation. Every arm in the ABG will have a Reserve contribution whether that is a troop, gun detachments, or a rifle section. The fourth rifle company of every ABG will be a Reserve company and each of the rifle companies will receive additional Reserve soldiers to bring them up to operational strength. Overall the ABG will be 20% Reserve soldiers that are prepared and integrated long before the mission training begins.

The Army Reserve was very successful in supporting the Afghan mission and shared the terrible cost as well. This success contributes to the confidence the Army has with its choice for the way forward and the ABG approach. In addition to the tactical forces, the Army Reserve will continue to contribute select Reservists for roles in the higher HQs and potential capacity building organizations around the world.

#### Institutional Capabilities

The impact of these new tasks and a more operational focus for the Army Reserve is also putting pressure on the basic processes and policies for Reserve management in the Army. A maturing of the systems within the Army is allowing for more detailed examination of the Reserve dynamic and highlighting key policy changes required in supporting this new environment. The implementation of a Reserve Annual Military Occupational Review (RAMOR) will lead to a deeper understanding and more deliberate method of manning critical occupations across the Army Reserve. This process also allows for improved planning of individual training and training capacity. It will have a profound impact on Army Reserve Culture by enabling a deeper understanding of the make up of the force.

Key to sustaining this operational focus will be the establishment of a separate training capability that will leverage the success of many of the ad hoc training structures across the Reserve. The establishment of an effective management organization at the Brigade-level capable of coordinating the complex requirements of our individual training system is critical to sustaining the Reserve force today.

Lastly, within the institutional pillar, the Army is in the last stages of a fundamental review of its Army Reserve Establishment Model. This has been a bottom up review with the intent of revising the establishment model and subsequently, the actual establishment to correct and align the Army Reserve to the emerging new requirements. This review has been undertaken with participation from all components of the Army and will set the baseline foundation for a more disciplined management approach across the Army Land Force Areas.

#### **Summary**

The Army Reserve has matured in the last few years. We have learned and relearned many important lessons. Our Soldiers are proud and committed. It is also no secret that the operations in Afghanistan required the Army Reserve to do more than ever before. At the height of these operations in 2010, almost one in three Reservists was working full-time in the Army. A substantial number of these full-time Reservists were critically employed to back-fill the Army and reinforce the systems supporting and force generating for operations.

Reducing this dynamic is not an easy task as the effect of this large scale activation has been to reduce the leadership available on the Armoury floor. With the coming changes in the operations and commitments we need to address these positions and reconstitute the part time Army Reserve.

Each of the new capabilities discussed here strengthen the Army Reserves' place in the Army and greater

Canadian Forces capability. It demonstrates a greater commitment from the Army Reserve to our communities, the nation, and the people of Canada. Many challenges remain, but the confidence now exuded by the Army Reserve is proof of our acceptance of these challenges and tasks. We are reloading and ready for the future. ©

## **WAR POSTERS?**

#### by Gertrude Kearns

"Editorial in nature, propaganda like in energy and attitude, with a bias towards chivalry and a hint of the devious, this series is about the nature of command perspectives in modern operations. From Lieutenant-Commander to Colonel to General and Defence Analyst this group of four Canadians creates a cross section of platforms spanning post cold war Balkans, Canadian security, and the current Afghan counterinsurgency."

This article is in part an artist's statement, the term used in current art practise whereby the visual arts practitioner explains the intentions, ideas and contexts of his work, in general as regards his practice, or as here specifically in relation to a particular body of work.

This series of posters (2004-2010) is a war art documentation of sorts using Canadian Forces individuals as subjects. These expanded portraits function on three levels: military portraiture, editorially tinged commentary, quasi historical records, inasmuch as each subject's Canadian defence career is represented in the context of a specific yet verbally abstracted mission type. The one exception is the Col Brian MacDonald piece which is about the nature of defence analysis.

It is equally imperative that these works function in the contemporary art forum, establishing another viable credibility. This age of irony with a penchant for nihilistic predisposition seeks integrated message and can be as crucial as any visually technical prowess. These posters seem to appeal to civilians even if the message remains somewhat unclear. Even when they function as 'just guys in uniforms', and by association the military in general, there is an existential ring of sorts which bridges civilian and defence interpretations.

Gertrude Kearns of Toronto has worked both officially and unofficially as a Canadian war artist for nearly two decades. She had a 2006 contract with TFA Roto 0 embedded in theatre in Kandahar and Kabul under Colonel S P Noonan. Work is in private, public and corporate collections in Canada; currently in the 2009-2012, eight venues across Canada "Brush with War: military art from Korea to Afghanistan", under DND and the Canadian War Museum. She is the 'unofficial' war artist in residence at the RCMI and a SSC member, on the SITREP Boulter Award jury for 4 years.

These posters are the antithesis of traditional war posters, which targeted specific audiences for immediate results in the 'war effort'. They were highly emotional sales devices via propaganda, not reliant on symbolism, humour or metaphor. (*The two earlier posters in this series can be seen in ON TRACK Vol 15 No 3 and Vol 15 No 4, at http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/on-track-library* - ed.).

My intentions are contrary in every sense. These 'posters' are not made to be reproduced in quantity, understood easily, or sell anything. They need to be interpreted, and gradated through an inherent understanding of the concern in question. In other words 'they are meant for a sophisticated audience'; these words came in response to a recent informal presentation I made of this group in a Toronto think tank environment. They cannot even hint at 'real' propaganda as they are not selling defence, not even questioning it. Rather they aim to express the hinge in operations via apparent oxymoron. However they are intended to 'look' like propaganda, to suggest some campaign is being waged as they are responding to the urgency of the times. Because these portraits are heroic in nature, they are meant to command attention and impart military ethos and the psychological and strategic rationale of modern defence sensibilities.

Suggested paradox and the general aesthete of each work are points of departure from historical military art into modern expressions of 'social commentary' it has been said, but more significantly from my perspective, an attempt to make 'defence commentary'. If they do not function in this respect, they are not successful.

Each poster idea evolved slowly, in the midst of other related work. My intention was to say as much as possible with the fewest words. A 1942 war poster study by the Toronto agency Young and Rubicon showed emotional appeal to be the most effective, whereas humour and symbolism were ineffective sales tools/methods. Relying on

dry humour and contained emotion, these would have fared poorly in 1942!

The four subjects all agreed to sit for me and each has completely supported my decisions after the fact. None were commissioned drawings and I have retained all originals.

#### IMAGE #3 Waves Tides--Wong PAO 2009

I met Lieutenant-Commander Albert Wong (Navy) in Kabul when he was Public Affairs Officer for the Strategic Advisory Team in 2005-6 with Task Force Afghanistan Roto 0. I sketched him in theatre; the second sketch of him in Toronto the following year is utilized here.


Lieutenant-Commander Wong professionally, and still as a civilian continues to contribute to the Afghan cause, hence *Making Waves*. Waves can be big or small. I am not trying to qualify the extent of any successes. This poster also suggests not solely him but The Canadian Forces in general. Looking at history in progress however one needs to ask the question: *Turning Tides?* Is it just a reasonable question? Or does it suggest more subversively the very real positioning against the mission in general as regards winning at all in the face of huge obstacles. However the geo-politics of the region could alter any tides in progress, I suggest also with the tide text, and become new tides in due course.

There are other extenuating meanings. It intentionally begs some questions, following in my oxymoron bent though more ambiguously here. Should it already be an oxymoron? "A wave is a disturbance that propagates through space and time, usually with transference of energy..." Wikipedia. How real is the possibility of substantially transferring skills and outlook in Afghanistan? Cdr Wong told me recently after I had emailed him the final, that he had periodically asked himself whether he was making any difference in the long run and that the text did define his outlook at times... "....I'm sure there

will be lots of people wondering what this means, but that is good as that starts a discussion....." ©



#### Book review



## **Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power**

by Robert Kaplan

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Kaplan, Robert. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Random House, October 2010. 384 pages. ISBN 978-1-4000-6746-6

The main premise of Robert Kaplan's *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* is the importance of the Indian Ocean and its surrounding regions to regional and international trade and inter-state competition over influence, resources and power projection. Kaplan argues that it is high time for policymakers in the West to pay attention to this region, having focused on rivalries in the North Atlantic for much of the twentieth century.

Very few written works explore this part of the world from a truly strategic perspective. Kaplan's *Monsoon* takes on this challenge, but with limited success. While Kaplan provides a fascinating tour of the region, the unique approach of each of his chapters leaves the reader wanting something a little more rigorous. Nonetheless, as a tour guide Kaplan provides fascinating glimpses of developments on the ground in several exotic locations that are not usually featured in the average (Canadian) newspaper's International section, allowing readers to experience vicariously his travels and observations.

Kaplan's analytical microscope yields a heady and dense narrative as he mixes history, sociology, military science and political analysis. He cites a melange of sources, including ancient texts, contemporary historical narratives, colonial surveys, interviews with unique and interesting people, ground observations, juxtaposes old and new architecture, and makes sweeping claims about the future of the region and geopolitical trends.

Kaplan's writing is notable for its ability to get at both facts and esoteric details and impressions. He explores several countries and themes, including: Islam in Indonesia; race, culture and globalisation in Zanzibar; economic development in Baluchistan; insurgents fighting against the government in Burma; Chinese, Indian and American rivalries over the Indian Ocean domain; flooding in Bangladesh;

Arnav Manchanda is a defence policy analyst at the CDA Institute, and a business capture and analytics specialist with The SecDev Group. Arnav is a former Security and Defence Forum Intern with the CDA Institute.

post-civil war Sri Lanka; and, inter-communal violence and economic growth in the Indian state of Gujarat.

Some chapters are weaker than others by focusing too much on a mess of facts and opinions rather than on strong analysis. For instance in his chapter on the Indian city of Kolkata, Kaplan cites the successes (greater investment) and challenges (massive poverty) faced by the city, but then digresses, at length, about British colonialist Robert Clive's conquests in India in the eighteenth century, including discussion on Clive's personality and on atrocities committed by either side; these digressions make it difficult to see why he titled his chapter, "Kolkata: The Next Global City." In addition, the initial chapters on Oman read more like a history lesson than an overview of the strategic importance of the country. In another section on Islam in Indonesia, Kaplan describes Dutch colonialism and seafaring practices; while interesting vignettes in their own right, the level of detail is often too much and irrelevant.

Nevertheless, Kaplan does come up with some hard lessons for Western policymakers. Examining the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka between the government and the Tamil Tigers, Kaplan writes:

"it was the Chinese who had partly allowed this victory to happen, since for the West, to its credit, not even the most desirable of ends could justify certain means ... While we in the West scan the developing world for moral purity, decrying corruption in backward societies, the Chinese are content with stability, no matter how illegitimately conceived. Our foreign aid emphasis is on democracy, human rights, and civil society; theirs is on massive infrastructure projects and authority, civil or not."


These words ring true as we watch the growth of Indian and Chinese interests and competition in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, focused on competition over access to shipping routes, natural resources and influence, as these two

countries contend with the rise of their resource-hungry middle classes.

In conclusion, it often seems as if the editors of *Monsoon* tacked on analysis related to "national security" to *Monsoon*'s chapters (as well as the book's subtitle) to make it more appealing to the policy community. The reader

has to patiently explore Kaplan's jungle in depth in order to find the strategic discussions and insights hidden in the historical and sociological overgrowth. At its heart, *Monsoon* is a regional, quasi-geopolitical travelogue - a sophisticated *Guide Michelin* or *Fodor*, with context - that should be read as a set of discrete yet fascinating vignettes of developments in some of the less visible regions of the world. ©

#### Book Review



# Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (2<sup>nd</sup> ed)

by J.L. Granatstein

#### Reviewed by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

J.L. Granatstein. *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (2<sup>nd</sup> ed)*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. 467 pages. \$39.95, ISBN 9781442611788

ack Granatstein's *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed) is a three hundred year popular history of the Canadian Army. Just shy of 500 pages, Granatstein comprehensively covers the Canadian army from its origins in New France to the present, including vivid accounts of Canada's regular (permanent) and reserve (militia) forces during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the South Africa (Boer) War, the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s, and the present-day war in Afghanistan.

Not one to shy away from revealing opinion, Granatstein colourfully identifies a few central themes in Canada's tradition of civil-military relations. Using subtle language, Granatstein repeatedly characterises Canada's civilian leaders as using tactics to deliberately slow decisions about war or military investments. For Granatstein, Canada and its army are frequently at odds. This characterization is juxtaposed with frequent descriptions of the harried scramble to mobilize or equip the army. Early on it becomes apparent that Granatstein describes a recurring theme in his story of Canada's Army: Canadian civilian leaders are primarily reactionary, and the army suffers as a result.

Granatstein makes it known that Canada's civilian leaders customarily scramble to recruit, train, equip, and transport troops during times of expeditionary war. First in 1899, it was a scramble to train troops and then to transport them, packed like sardines into the converted cattle boat the *Sardinian* en route to Cape Town.

From the First World War onwards, there has been a rush to equip or train the troops. The result is that Canada's soldiers were issued ineffective equipment. The reader almost laughs out-loud at Granatstein's dry-humour description of the ineffective First World War-era MacAdam shovel that could neither stop bullets nor "be an effective implement for digging."

Through and through, Granatstein shows us that Canada never learnt to maintain institutional knowledge on capabilities or personnel readiness. It is demonstrated in Canada's Army that, at times, Canada's demand for madein-Canada or Canadianized equipment has left soldiers with ineffective means of doing their job. The contemporary result was felt as the Canadian Forces (CF) again scrambled to recruit, train, equip, and transport sufficient personnel and kit to Afghanistan. There is a lesson to be learnt from Granatstein as, in his conclusion, he contends that "a welltrained, well-equipped army remains the nation's insurance policy." This is not the first time Granatstein has made this claim, he does so in Who Killed the Canadian Army?. And this is certainly relevant again today as Canada considers the CF's role post-Afghanistan, especially as Granatstein repeatedly reminds the reader how little Canada values its armed forces during times of peace.

Granatstein also highlights another theme in the history of Canada's army—that of military leaders shirking their duty to abide by civilian direction. With examples of the

military pressuring civilian leaders into decisions, inflating ranks to achieve ends, dodging recommendations, or footdragging, Granatstein's precisely connotated lexicon displays praise for military shirking. This is something to consider when reading *Canada's Army*, as the army remains the armed servant of Canada's civilian leaders.

Very effectively, Granatstein does shred light on the nature of war. Particularly sobering and un-inflated accounts of the confusion and horrors of war make the reader feel an exceptional connection to those who fought and continue to fight on behalf of Canada. And, Granatstein's accounts of defining moments like the Battles of Paardeburg, Vimy, Normandy, and Panjwai compel the reader to believe in the amazing abilities of Canada's army—past, present, and future.


An exciting and accessible read, Granatstein's *Canada's Army* is certainly a popular and opinionated history of the Canadian military. It is *his* history, as Granatstein's distain for particular Canadian figures is exceedingly transparent and shapes the way the story is told. Regrettably, however, Granatstein does not examine the role of females or Aboriginals in Canada's Army. He discusses these topics very briefly without much critical analysis. This is a disappointing omission on Granatstein's part, as both groups have played a significant role in Canada's army—shaping it in the past and present.

Also, I was personally disappointed to find Granatstein discussing some of the most important battles of the North-West Rebellion, Boer War, and First and Second World Wars without one mention of the Governor General's Foot Guards (GGFGs)—the Ottawa Infantry Reserve unit that has over 30 battle honours since 1885. He makes a point to mention many Highland Regiments, and even the Grenadier Guards; however, by their contemporary name, the GGFGs are left out of his history of Canada's Army.

Along with the caveats I have included in this review, reading *Canada's Army* will shed light on the remarkable capabilities of an underfunded Canadian army. *Canada's Army* is well worth the read. It is an enjoyable and accessible book that forces the reader to question the relationship between Canada and its armed forces. The reader is left aware of how often Canada fails in equipping or enabling its army to do its job. And, it leaves the reader believing that since Canadian soldiers make significant sacrifices for their country, the military certainly requires more from Canada. It is remarkable what Canadian soldiers can do, and Granatstein displays their capabilities with honour and admiration.

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is the Project Officer at the CDA Institute. She has a MA in Public Policy and International Affairs with a focus in defence policy. She is a Reservist with the Governor General's Foot Guards. ©

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## The 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security / La Conférence d'Ottawa [2011] sur la défense et la sécurité



The Hon. Peter G. MacKay, PC, MP, Minister of National Defence, during his address at the 2011 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, noted that "we are still part of a highly uncertain world." / L'hon. Peter G. MacKay, CP, Député, ministre de la Défense nationale, pendant son discours à la Conférence d'Ottawa [2011] sur la défense et la sécurité, note que «nous faisons encore partie d'un monde tout plein d'incertitude.»

Photo by / Photo par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe



CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

222 Somerset Street West, Suite 400B, Ottawa ON K2P 2G3
PHONE / TÉLÉPHONE: (613) 236 9903 FAX / TÉLÉCOPIEUR: (613) 236 8191

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