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AUTONOME ET RENSEIGNÉ

ON TRACK



The Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense

Autumn 2011 • Volume 16, Number 3

Automne 2011 • Volume 16, Numéro 3

REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION: A leaner NDHQ?

**Afghanistan:
Combat Mission
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VOLUME 16 NUMBER 3: AUTUMN / AUTOMNE 2011

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ON TRACK is published by the CDA Institute. The views expressed in *ON TRACK* are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute. The publication of *ON TRACK* was made possible in part through a grant from the Department of National Defence.

ON TRACK est publié par l'Institut de la CAD. Les points de vues exprimés dans *ON TRACK* reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'Institut de la CAD. La publication de *ON TRACK* est rendue possible en partie grâce à une subvention du Ministère de la Défense nationale.

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
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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

ON TRACK, now in its sixteenth year, has become more widely read with each succeeding edition. We attribute *ON TRACK*'s increasing readership to the excellent quality of the material that is provided by members of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and by members of the Canadian Forces, academics and researchers who are the acknowledged experts in their respective fields.

The intent of *ON TRACK* is to provide a medium of informed and *non-partisan* debate on defence and security matters of importance to the interests of Canada. We will continue to publish credible, informed research as well as opinion which we believe will provide Canadians with insight to the concerns of the defence community. The articles that are published express the views of the authors – and may not necessarily coincide with those of the CDA Institute.

This autumn edition of *ON TRACK* features articles of current interest in the areas of the Canadian Forces, Afghanistan, remembrance, the naval impact on history, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a review of a Canadian War Museum exhibit, and three book reviews.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Andrew Leslie's Transformation Report was first leaked to the media, and after it had made headlines was released by the Department of National Defence in early September. It became doubly controversial when former Chief of Defence Staff, General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier, told a media interviewer that implementing subject report would "destroy the Canadian military." Leading off the autumn issue is Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Leslie's Report in which he flags what he sees as the key findings and recommendations of his report. This is followed by analysis from two of Canada's foremost defence experts, Dr. Doug Bland and Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald.

For this edition's second theme, we look back on Canada's role in Afghanistan from a number of very different perspectives. Brigadier-général Richard Giguère was Deputy Commander of Task Force Kandahar during its final mission, Colonel (Ret'd) Mike Capstick led the first Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul; British Major General Nick Carter commanded ISAF Regional Command (South); and Dr. Howard G. Coombs, served as a civilian advisor to the Commander JTF-A from September 2010 to July 2011.



Colonel (Ret) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM,

ON TRACK, qui en est maintenant à sa seizième année de publication, ne cesse d'accroître le nombre de ses lecteurs à chaque nouvelle parution. Nous attribuons cette croissance à l'excellente qualité du contenu fourni par les membres de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (Institut de la CAD) et des Forces canadiennes, des milieux universitaires et de la recherche qui sont des experts reconnus de leurs domaines respectifs.

Le but visé par *ON TRACK* est de servir de support à un débat informé et *non partisan* sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui ont de l'importance pour les intérêts du Canada. Nous continuerons à publier des recherches crédibles et informées ainsi que des opinions qui, selon nous, donneront aux Canadiens une idée des préoccupations qui ont cours dans les milieux de la défense. Les articles publiés ici expriment les points de vue de leurs auteurs – et ne coïncident pas nécessairement avec ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

Ce numéro d'automne de *ON TRACK* présente des articles d'intérêt courant dans les domaines des Forces canadiennes, de l'Afghanistan, du souvenir, de l'impact de la marine sur l'histoire, et du chasseur *Joint Strike Fighter F-35*, un commentaire de visite d'une exposition présentée au Musée canadien de la guerre et trois comptes rendus de lectures.

Le Rapport sur la transformation, du Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Andrew Leslie, a d'abord fait l'objet d'une fuite aux médias puis, après avoir fait les manchettes, il a été rendu public par le ministère de la Défense nationale au début de septembre. Le document a prêté à une double controverse quand l'ancien chef de l'état-major de la Défense, le Général (ret.) Rick Hillier, a déclaré à un journaliste que la mise en œuvre du rapport en question pourrait « détruire l'armée canadienne ». En tête de ce numéro d'automne, un article du Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Leslie lui-même signale quelles sont, selon lui, les principales constatations et recommandations de son rapport. Suit ensuite une analyse de deux des experts de la défense les plus en vue du Canada, M. Doug Bland et le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald.

Comme deuxième thème de ce numéro, nous repassons en revue le rôle du Canada en Afghanistan sous un certain nombre de points de vue différents. Le Brigadier-Général Richard Giguère a été commandant adjoint de la Force opérationnelle à Kandahar pendant la dernière mission de celle-ci. Le Colonel (ret.) Mike Capstick a dirigé l'équipe consultative stratégique à Kaboul, le Major Général britannique Nick Carter a été à la tête du Commandement régional (Sud) de la FIAS et M. Howard G. Coombs, professeur adjoint au CMR, a servi de conseiller civil de la FOI-A, de septembre 2010 à juillet 2011.

Commander Jeff Agnew reports on the Wreaths Across Canada (WAC) initiative to place a wreath on the headstones of the quarter of a million Canadian veterans buried in cemeteries across Canada, while Tom Caldwell writes movingly of a recent visit to Canadian battlefields and military cemeteries in Europe.

Commander (Ret'd) Richard Archer provides an essay on the importance of naval power in history. Alan Williams writes a commentary on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter cost articles we published in the summer edition of ON TRACK, and Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald provides his rejoinder. Meghan Spilka O'Keefe reviews the exhibit, *War + Medicine*, on display at the Canadian War Museum.

We close with book reviews by Paul Chapin on the recently published *Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History*; by Arnav Manchanda, on *Counterstrike*; and Brigadier-général (ret) Pierre Sénécal, on *Churchill seigneur de guerre*.

We are very pleased to welcome to the CDA Institute Paul Hillier as the DND Security and Defence Forum-sponsored intern. Paul recently attained his MA in political studies at Queen's University. Last year's Project Officer, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, will be staying with the Institute, becoming our newest Defence Policy Analyst.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute has been and will be involved in numerous initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces and Canadian security and defence interests, such as the annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Vimy Award Dinner, as well as the annual seminar, and numerous roundtable discussions. For more information on any of these events, please visit our website: www.cda-cda.ca.

Within the past year the federal government has provided Canada's citizens with a focus on the defence and security needs of this country. While we welcome such an initiative, there still exist elements within Canadian society that are not well informed on the major issues of military operations, the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Forces, and the continuing shortfalls in the resources that are required to address long-standing defence and security requirements of this nation. The CDA Institute will continue, however, to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country.

In closing, let me note that the CDA Institute is embarking on a new phase of its already august history. The plan is to grow the organization so as to enhance its value to members and increase its influence on national debates surrounding defence and security issues. Canada needs more informed discussion on these issues, and with help from its partners and friends the Institute is well positioned to provide balanced and experience-based opinion on a vital field of public

Le Commandant de frégate Jeff Agnew fait rapport de l'initiative *Wreaths Across Canada* (WAC) fondée dans le but de déposer une couronne sur la tombe du quart de million d'anciens combattants enterrés dans les cimetières d'un peu partout au Canada, tandis que Tom Caldwell décrit de façon touchante une récente visite des champs de bataille et des cimetières militaires canadiens en Europe.

Le Commandant de frégate (ret.) Richard Archer nous donne un essai sur l'importance de la puissance navale dans l'histoire. Alan Williams écrit un commentaire sur l'avion d'attaque interarmées F-35 et le Lieutenant-général (ret) George Macdonald donne sa réplique. Meghan Spilka O'Keefe présente un compte rendu d'une visite à l'exposition sur la *Guerre et médecine* présentement en montre au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Nous terminons avec des comptes rendus de lecture par Paul Chapin, sur le nouveau *Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History* qui vient de sortir, Arnav Manchanda, sur *Counterstrike*, et le Brigadier-général (ret.) Pierre Sénécal, sur *Churchill seigneur de guerre*.

Nous sommes très heureux d'accueillir à l'Institut de la CAD Paul Hillier à titre de stagiaire parrainé par le Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du MDN. Paul vient tout juste de recevoir sa maîtrise en sciences politiques à l'Université Queen's. L'agente de projet de l'an dernier, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, restera à l'Institut, où elle deviendra notre toute dernière analyste des politiques de défense.

En plus de produire *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD continuera, comme il l'a fait par le passé, de s'occuper de nombreuses initiatives de la promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes et des intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité et de défense par le biais de son séminaire annuel et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde. Pour en savoir plus sur l'une ou l'autre de ces activités, visitez notre site Web à l'adresse www.cda-cda.ca.

Au cours de la dernière année le gouvernement fédéral a présenté aux Canadiens des mises au point sur les besoins de ce pays en matière de défense et de sécurité. Si nous accueillons d'un bon œil une telle initiative, il existe encore des éléments de la société canadienne qui ne sont pas bien informés des grandes questions entourant les opérations militaires, l'acquisition d'équipement pour les Forces canadiennes et les continus manques à gagner dans les ressources qui sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins de longue date afin d'assurer la défense et la sécurité de ce pays. L'Institut de la CAD continuera toutefois à offrir aux Canadiens une analyse mûrement réfléchie des événements et des enjeux qui ont un impact sur la défense et la sécurité de notre pays.

En terminant, permettez-moi de noter que l'Institut de la CAD entreprend une nouvelle étape de son histoire déjà auguste. Le plan projette de faire croître l'organisation de façon à augmenter sa valeur pour les membres et à accroître son influence sur les débats nationaux entourant les questions de défense et de sécurité. Le Canada a besoin de discuter de ces questions de façon plus informée et, avec l'aide de ses partenaires et amis, l'Institut est bien positionné pour

policy.

The Institute is a registered charity almost entirely financed out of private contributions, and we cannot thank too often our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions and officer-level donors, for their financial support. Without them, the Institute would be hard-pressed to fulfil its mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and to recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter Level with a donation \$75, or at a higher level, you will receive the following benefits during the following 12 months:

- A charitable donation tax receipt;
- Four issues of our quarterly magazine, ON TRACK;
- Advance copies of all other CDA Institute publications, such as the annual Vimy Paper; and
- A discount registration rate for the Institute's annual Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security to be held at the Fairmont Chateau Laurier hotel in Ottawa, February 23-24, 2012.

A copy of the donor form is printed elsewhere in this journal. Donor forms are also available on our website.

Thank you. ©

offrir une opinion équilibrée et fondée sur l'expérience dans un domaine vital des politiques publiques.

L'Institut est un organisme caritatif inscrit, presque entièrement financé par des contributions privées, et nous ne pouvons pas pécher par excès quand il s'agit de remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patron, compagnon et officier, pour leur appui financier. Sans eux, l'Institut aurait beaucoup de difficulté à s'acquitter de son mandat.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau supporteur, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

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- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription au séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD sur la défense et la sécurité, qui se tiendra à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa, les 23 et 24 février 2012.

Une copie du formulaire de donateur est imprimée ailleurs dans ce magazine et est également disponible sur notre site Web.

Merci. ©



REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION

by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Andrew B. Leslie

The Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Forces (CF) transformation team - a blend of military and civilian professionals whose remit was to tackle difficult and complex issues - was established in 2010 to develop ideas to increase efficiency and effectiveness, and to act as

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Andrew Leslie's family has a tradition of military service going back to his grandfather, General A.G.L. McNaughton. During the course of his career in the Canadian Forces Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Leslie held senior command and staff appointments, including Chief of the Land Staff from 2006 to 2010. His last appointment prior to his retirement in September 2011, was Canadian Forces Chief of Transformation. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

the driving force behind organizational changes needed to reposition DND/CF for the future. During the last ten months the team took a comprehensive look at the structures, people, money and areas of growth that have occurred within the organization, in order to track outputs and to think about what the future may hold. The transformation team saw tens of thousands of people working hard in the service of their country, be they regulars, reservists, civil servants, rangers or cadet instructors. A key observation was that the CF has matured in the crucible of combat, and DND has produced results in acquiring urgently needed and life-saving equipment into service in record time. Together, DND/CF is an organization that is growing increasingly responsive and focused, that has a great deal of self-confidence, and which

has become a world class military. Supported by the civil servants who see themselves as part of a winning team that has earned the respect of its citizens, the CF is admired by its allies and those we have been assigned to help.

The triumphs of today do not, however, guarantee the successes of tomorrow. The international economic climate is grim, and what happens out there has an impact at home. Resources are finite, and DND/CF can expect to contribute a proportional share to better ensure our financial security as a nation by helping to reduce the deficit. Not only is the CF going to have to continue to live within its means and balance the books, but careful reallocation from within will be required to meet the new and emerging defence demands of tomorrow (including the Arctic, more part-time reservists on the armoury floors, cyber, space, special forces, human intelligence, aircrew for the new helicopter squadrons and more sailors going to sea) that will drive the CF to be even more agile, more deployable and more ready to respond.

The vital ground of the CF is its people, their equipment and their training, all of which are increasingly expensive and have to be focused on producing capability for wherever the government chooses for deployment. Reductions in overhead will be necessary to be able to invest in output. The CF will have to become slimmer, to trim the top and middle while protecting and investing in the various systems that result in the people, ships, battalions and squadrons of aircraft doing the tough and often dangerous work that Canadians are so proud of. In short, we are going to have to reduce the tail of today while investing in the teeth of tomorrow.

The report contains an unprecedented level of research into and around DND/CF, based on facts and numbers made possible by new information technologies. This led the transformation team to consider new ways of blending similar organizations so as to achieve potential efficiencies, to streamline while maintaining the required operational focus, ultimately identifying areas that could lead to significant yearly administrative savings. At the same time, there are recommendations for reducing overhead while protecting deployable forces (both regular and reserve), along with their associated equipment, training and infrastructure needs from potential reductions. At the core is identifying how to make the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) more achievable within the resources available.

The following are the broad and most compelling findings of the trends that took place within DND/CF from 31 March 2004 to 31 March 2010:¹

- Overall the number of people grew (regulars, reserves, civilians) by a total of 18 percent, and overall funding has increased by a nominal 51 percent;
- Regulars grew by 11 percent or 6,524 people, about half of which went to the Army, most of the remainder

to non-Army headquarters. Reservists grew by 23 percent or 6,651 people, most of who are full time reservists in headquarters and administrative positions. Civilians grew by 33 percent, or 7,318 people, most of which went to headquarters;

- The 'tail' has increased by about 40 percent (personnel in headquarters and in non-operational jobs);
- The 'teeth' has increased by about 10 percent (personnel in operational and/or deployable jobs);
- Consultants, contractors and professional services contracts consume about \$2.7 billion annually, and that figure is growing (with at least 5,000 people, many of whom are in Ottawa);
- The DND/CF employs about 9,000 full-time reservists (class C, class B and full time class A) mainly in headquarters and support functions at an approximate cost of \$1 billion annually; and,
- The executive leadership, as defined by Treasury Board, grew at a rate higher than that of overall growth of lower ranking personnel within DND/CF: regulars (2%), reserves (75%) and civilians (25%), for a cumulative increase of 19 percent.

In terms of recommendations, the overall intent of the CFDS can be better achieved - as well as catering to emerging requirements - if the following high-level measures are implemented:

- Cross-sectional administrative efficiencies in the amount of about \$1 billion for either reinvestment or to pay whatever reductions are assigned to DND as part of the overall government intent to pay down the deficit;
- Reduce overhead and reinvest in the future:
 - reducing the numbers of headquarters and staffs by grouping like functions or accepting risk in the entire elimination of certain organizations;
 - identifying and reallocating approximately 3,500 regular force personnel into those areas identified for future growth or investing the funds elsewhere;
 - demobilizing the number of full-time reservists back to a baseline of approximately 4,500, and converting these back to part-time service working at units, in armouries and investing the funds elsewhere;
 - reducing by up to 30 percent over several years the \$2.7 billion spent on contractors, consultants and private service providers and investing the funds in future capital programs as outlined in CFDS; and,

¹ Financial data for 2011 has not been included as all the various returns and books had not been closed off at the time of the report's publication, though initial returns for 2011 personnel data are consistent with the 2010 figures.

- reinvesting approximately 3,500 civil servants into higher priority activities or investing the funds elsewhere.
- Minimize duplication and inefficiencies in support services and systems by establishing a centralized Joint Support Command with a dual civilian/military structure catering to the diarchy of command responsibilities and financial accountabilities;
- Refocus the corporate military (Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and Chief of Military Personnel) and civilian organizations on strategic management and policy, and parsing out their service delivery activities to other organizations better suited to do so where efficiencies can be realized;
- Group the strategic and common enablers within the existing services or within Joint Support Command to achieve efficiencies and to act as a forcing function for a more joint approach; and,
- Adopt a leaner and more focused command structure such as the one outlined in the report.

All of these ideas will take time to implement, as the organization is big, complicated and members need to be trained and prepared so they can understand where they will fit in the future.

Very few of the recommendations of the report will be easy, popular or risk-free. All of the recommendations need a transparent second and third order consequences study, with input and discussion from and amongst the various stakeholders to flesh out the many details that the transformation team could not resolve with the caveats, time and resources available.

Whatever decisions are eventually made will require a unified and coherent defence team pulling in the same direction under firm and dynamic leadership at all levels. Not everybody will agree - indeed, the report's historical review has revealed that in previous transformation efforts there has always been significant resistance to change; in the past some have looked at themselves as individuals who may lose status, resources or power. Alternately, many have delayed making the hard choices, passing the issues on to their successors.

The key is leadership. Leaders at all levels must have their say, and compromises and common sense alterations must be adopted. However, eventually people have to be told what to do. Whether under current or subsequent command, transformation will occur. The times are changing and the CF must change with them. If it does not, the history of previous transformation efforts shows that front line output will suffer while the overhead continues to grow. Canadians deserve better. The great news is that we have leaders at all levels, military and civilian, regular and reserve, to move us forward and to embrace the demands of the future by making the hard calls today. ©



THE LESLIE REPORT IN CONTEXT

by Dr. Douglas Bland

The central finding in (now retired) Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie's *Report on Transformation 2011*, his examination of the public administration of national defence policy, is this: "... the headquarters and other overhead [in the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces(CF)] grew while ships were decommissioned, regular and reserve battalions were disbanded and whole aircraft fleets cashed in." His observation is not surprising. That the probability is near zero that this report alone will result in significant redistribution of resources from the Ottawa bureaucracy to CF units in the field should not surprise anyone either.

Dr. Douglas Bland is the former Chair of the Defence Studies Program at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University and author of The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada and Chief of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

In the early 1960s the government appointed the Royal Commission on Government Organization, the Glassco Commission, to recommend ways to promote "efficiency, economy, and improve service in the dispatch of public business." Glassco singled out for detailed scrutiny DND for reasons that remain valid today. "The most obvious," he wrote, "are its size, the range and costs of its activities, and the impact of Western defence alliances." In a supporting study (the McGill Report) researchers emphasized that while finding economies in defence administration might be important, "it is an objective secondary to the one of having enough to carry out [military] tasks." McGill advised Glassco that "the ultimate waste and irresponsibility would be to allow the defence forces to become ineffective due to obsolete equipment or incompetent personnel."

Glassco highlighted what ought to be the central concept governing any defence reforms contemplated today: “[Canada’s defence organization] ... should be so designed that it will, *without change*, operate as efficiently in the emergencies of war as in peacetime.” The idea, as obvious as it may seem, reflected Glassco’s findings of a deep rift and near permanent divide between senior federal public servants, guardians of ‘efficient public administration,’ and senior military officers, guardians of ‘operational efficiency.’ The friction between the two groups is evident today in Leslie’s report and in the public service’s reaction to it.

The “diarchy”

Other ‘efficiency studies’ followed Glassco. In 1970, defence minister Donald Macdonald created the Management Review Group (MRG), composed of civilians from outside government. His main objective was to eliminate what Macdonald mistakenly saw as a confusing ambiguity of responsibilities in the DND organization directed (he assumed) by two separate leaders, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the deputy minister. He was mistaken because such an ambiguity could only exist if the CF and DND were one entity. They were then and remain today, however, two separate entities as defined in the *National Defence Act* (NDA) each with distinct sets of responsibilities and two separate leaders appointed by order-in-council.

...given the MRG’s severe condemnation of DND officials, the MRG recommended amending the NDA to subordinate the CDS and thus the CF to the deputy minister as the most effective means of improving defence administration.

The MRG, nevertheless, aided by public service ‘advisors,’ attacked vigorously this perceived ambiguity as the central cause of the “five basic inadequacies” they found in the management of the Department. Chief among these public service failures, they noted, were: “a failure to articulate a clear and credible rationale for the Department’s existence; a failure to manage human, materiel, and financial resources efficiently; and an abdication of [administrative] responsibility by those within the Department.” Incredible, given the MRG’s severe condemnation of DND officials, the MRG recommended amending the NDA to subordinate the CDS and thus the CF to the deputy minister as the most effective means of improving defence administration.

Rather than risk the possibility of a public outcry such an amendment to the NDA might have created, the Liberal government simply created a diarchy, the joint rule by two individuals, by placing the CDS and the deputy minister in the same organizational box in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). Where in law no ambiguity of responsibility and accountability between the CDS and the deputy minister had existed, this sleight-of-hand created the imagined ambiguity Donald Macdonald and the MRG had set out to eliminate.

From 1972 until 1996, when the diarchy concept was formally repudiated by the government as a result of the findings of the *Commission of Inquiry Into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia*, the distinct responsibilities of the CDS and the deputy minister were routinely ignored by ministers, members of parliament, the public service, and the media. After the collapse of the formal diarchy, the duality reappeared under a new concept. Ministers, officers, and officials argued against organizational reform by declaring: “We are ‘a defence team’ all collegially accountable for the decisions taken within CF/DND.” Collegial management like the 1972 diarchy means, of course, that no one is accountable for anything.

These confusions continue to inhibit serious reforms in defence organization and administration. In no important matter can the CDS or the deputy minister act on their own initiative; nor can either be held accountable for decisions taken by the “defence team.” Moreover, as collegial management is now the dominant organizing principle at all levels of NDHQ, no subordinate official or military officer has authority to act on anything without consulting their public service or military colleagues. The effect is defence by committee.

Because no one has authority, committees, even at the level of the CDS and the deputy minister, must seek compromises – a sure recipe for policy inertia and bureaucratic expansion rather than contraction. Thus, neither the CDS nor the deputy minister can lead the reform agenda Leslie has set out, though left to their own interests either one could disrupt or negate any or all of the study’s recommendations.

The critical role of the Minister

The history of defence administration reform in Canada is clear – meaningful reform occurs only when it is driven personally by a resolute, tenacious defence minister free of military and public service special interests. Only four ministers since the Second World War have, for better or worse, effectively exhibited these characteristics: Brooke Claxton (1946-54), Paul Hellyer (1963-67), David Collenette (1993-96), and, briefly post-Somalia, Doug Young (1996-97).

These ‘active ministers’ conceived, largely from their own consideration of the defence circumstances of their time, the policies, plans, organizational structures and distribution of defence resources necessary to ensure the effective use of national defence funds. None was particularly popular with senior officials or senior officers. Indeed, other ministers who sought popular support from the establishment inevitably came under the sway of charismatic generals or were ignored by domineering deputy ministers. Brooke Claxton best captured the atmosphere in which an active minister can expect to work: “I met,” he remarked, “bitter and biased opposition to everything I did.” Yet he, not the establishment, prevailed.

(continued p. 12)



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Leslie's recommendations for the transformation of the national defence establishment will not succeed or perhaps even be considered seriously in the present circumstances at NDHQ.



Combat Camera

The environment there is hostile to meaningful change. Early in the joint CF/DND study process, senior DND public servants allegedly withdrew their support from the project.

The final report presented to defence minister Peter MacKay sat unattended on the minister's desk until it was forced into the open by media attention.

Effective change will only come to the present defence establishment if Mr. MacKay takes charge of the process. He should order the CDS and the deputy minister to provide immediately and independently for his approval their comprehensive action plans and early deadlines for bringing Leslie's recommendations into effect.

...meaningful reform occurs only when it is driven personally by a resolute, tenacious defence minister free of military and public service special interests.

Specifically, they must provide timetables for the elimination of redundant public service branches and directorates in NDHQ; a redeployment timetable to move CF personnel from headquarters and administrative duties to field duties; and a fundamentally revised defence budget aimed at strengthening today's CF field units while delivering from freed funds urgently needed defence equipment.

Once the minister has taken control of the transformation process in this manner, despite whatever "bitter and biased opposition" he may meet from the military and public service leaders, he must remain in control of the whole process if he is determined to transform the defence establishment system of "too much management and too little command" into the recommended establishment Leslie presented to him at his request. ©

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TRANSFORMATION: BY THE NUMBERS

by Brian MacDonald

Defence Budget Background

Over the six years, since the beginning of the Transformation Process in Fiscal Year 2004/5 to the end of Fiscal Year 2009/10, the Defence Budget has increased from \$13.2 billion to \$19.8 billion, a total Nominal increase of 51 percent, which reflects the annual Nominal and Real increases shown in the following table, using the civilian inflation rate.

Thus the governments of Paul Martin and Stephen Harper can legitimately claim that they have delivered a very substantial increase in the Real Defence Budget during that period.

However, the global financial crisis has led the Harper government to seek to establish significant real decreases in government as part of the programme to reduce and eliminate the federal deficit and to begin to reduce the level of the national debt.

The point, then, of the 2011 Transformation Report submitted by LGen Andrew Leslie, is to identify efficiencies which would allow DND to make an appropriate contribution to deficit reduction as well as to transfer resources within the Department to higher order requirements.

The Report's Initial Findings – Comparative Growth Rates

The Report's examination of comparative growth rates during the Transformation Period (which was also a period of which saw changes driven by the very real needs of the CF commitment to the Afghanistan war—which were separate from the Transformation effects) revealed a series of patterns suggested that, broadly speaking, Headquarters and administrative functions had benefitted the most from Transformation, whereas the operation levels at the “sharp end” benefitted the least. The Media, of course, given such clear sets of numbers as those in the following boxes, leapt quickly aboard the “wasteful spending” bandwagon and proceeded to savage both the Conservative government as well as the Senior Leadership levels within the Canadian Forces and civilian Department of National Defence.

One of the drivers of growth in the Army during the period was, of course, the result of fighting a war and the necessity to increase force levels to deal with multiple rotations through

a lengthy pre-deployment training period. The equally high growth rates among Headquarters personnel, civilian personnel, and Senior Executives seems unlikely to share the same driver, however.

In any event, the media and the “chattering classes” have had a good time with the numbers made available so far and are likely to continue to do so. This is a pity given that the other two areas of modifications to the organizational model of the Canadian Forces and the Department, and the financial implications of the Transformation Review recommendations are at least as important as to the populist case that the possibility of whether organizational nepotism is at hand.

The New Organizational Model – “The 5Fs” Concept

According to the Report, the evolution of the 5Fs represents an attempt to group activities within the department by function so as to be able to determine activities carried out in various parts of the CF and the Department which are effectively identical and which could be amalgamated. The 5Fs represent an iterative model which allows for evolutionary growth.

AT A GLANCE

Total Nominal Increase –	51%
Average Annual Nominal increase –	8.6%
Average Annual inflation rate –	2.0%
Average Annual Real Increase –	6.6%
CFDP Promised Real Growth –	0.6%

DND Total Personnel Growth ↑18%

Navy Growth	↑3%
Army Growth	↑28%
Air Force Growth	↑4%
HQs & Static Jobs growth	↑40%
Operational Units growth	↑10%
Senior Executive Growth	↑25%
Civilian Growth	↑33%
Reserve Force Growth	↑23%
Regular Force Growth	↑11%

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald is Senior Defence Analyst of the Conference of Defence Associations and a Director of the Atlantic Council of Canada. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

ON TRACK

The **5Fs** are: “Force Development” under the control of the VCDS; “Force Generation,” under the control of the three Commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force; “Force Employment”, under the control of the new Chief of Joint Operations (under which both international and domestic operations would be placed); “Force Support,” under the new Chief Joint Force Support Command, which would add a domestic support function in addition to its previous role in supporting international operations; and Force Management, which deals with the increasingly complex set of accountability and management relationships between the CF under the CDS and the Department under the DM.

And this brings us to the wiring diagrams of the model proposed in the Report. These are shown down to the Level 2 structure in most cases and include a proposed personnel count for regulars, reservists, and civilians. The VCDS group is shown at the beginning in order to visually place him as the driver of the Force Development. He, of course, continues to report to the Deputy Minister for Departmental things as well as to the CDS for CF matters. Level 0 (CDS and DM and certain specialists) is not shown.

Financial Transformation

The Report’s financial analysis began with the assumption that the Government’s Strategic Reviews, and the Strategic and Operating Review would require the Department to pay a proportional share of deficit reduction, and that on top of those reductions there remained the need for the CFDS to be made more affordable. The Report’s conclusion is that the “Tail” will, therefore, have to be rationalized to protect and invest in the “Teeth.”

	Regular	Reserve	Civilian	TOTAL
FORCE DEVELOPMENT				
VCDS/Forces Manager	900	50	650	1,600
Chief of F Development				
Strategic Plans & Tasks				
Chief Military Personnel				
Chief Reserves				
Director General Canadian Forces Grievance Authority				
FORCE GENERATION				
CMS/Comd Royal Canadian Navy	9,100	3,600	3,500	16,200
MARLANT				
MARPAC				
Training & Readiness				
NAVRES				
CLS/ Comd Canadian Army	23,200	21,300	2,300	46,800
1 CDN Div Land Regular				
2 CDN Div Land Reserve				
Training & Readiness				
CAS/ Comd Royal Canadian Air Force	11,900	1,400	1,300	14,600
1 CDN Air Div				
2 CDN Air Div				
FORCE EMPLOYMENT				
Chief Joint Operations/CanadaCOM	2,750	100	500	3,350
Regional Joint Task Forces				
Deputy Comd Operations				
Deputy Comd C4ISR				
Global Engagement				
CANSOFCOM				2,000
FORCE SUPPORT				
Chief Joint Force/ Support Command	15,100	3,600	10,700	29,400
Operations Support Division				
Recruiting & Education				
Garrison Support Division				
Health				
Military Police				
Pers & Family Support				
SUB-TOTAL CANADIAN FORCES	62,950	30,050	18,950	113,950
THE DEPARTMENT				
ADM (Policy & Communications)	100	50	250	400
ADM (Acquisition & Materiel Mgmt	1,300	100	2,800	4,200
ADM (Financial Services & CFO	40	10	650	700
ADM (Corporate Services)	5	5	890	900
Administration				
Civilian Mgmt				
ADM (Science and Technology)	30	20	1,450	1,500
ADM (Infrastructure (ITAE) Mgmt)	400	50	1,850	2,300
SUB-TOTAL DEPARTMENT	1,875	235	7,890	10,000
FORCE MANAGEMENT				
Level 0				512
SUB-TOTAL MANAGEMENT				512
TOTALS*	64,967	30,054	26,233	121,156
DND Status Quo	67,968	33,972	29,641	131,591
Personnel Re-Investment Potential	3,001	3,928	3,408	10,435

Estimates within the Report suggest that in the Short Term (one year) cross sectional administrative efficiencies could generate as much as \$1 billion to cover the Department's proportional share of deficit reduction.

Looking out to the Short to Medium Term (1 to 3 year term) the proposed reductions in full time reserve personnel might generate as much as \$350 million annually. The implementation of the Joint Support Command could generate savings of 4% annually for total savings over the Short to Medium Term of \$300 million. Further a 30 percent reduction in Professional Services Contracts could account for \$900 million more in savings. And a variety of smaller Short to Medium Term administrative savings could generate an additional \$200 million, for total Short to Medium Term savings of \$1.75 billion.

Beyond the three year horizon the key challenges that the CF and the Department face are those of how to increase efficiency, reduce overhead, and find the people from within to invest in the future. Here the requirement is to identify and re-allocate 3,500 Regular Force personnel and 3,500 public Servants from overhead and Headquarters, reducing Headquarters and staffs by grouping like with like, and focusing NDHQ/Corporate HQ on corporate policy and strategic man-

agement and parse out service delivery to Joint Forces Support Command.

Conclusion

In the same vein as the traditional statement "In battle no plan ever survives first contact with the enemy" we can say that in the world of Organizational Development no consultant's report ever survives first contact with Senior Management which commissioned it, particularly if sacred cows are getting gored.

The sharp-eyed will have noticed that a number of the existing set of Level Ones seem to be missing from the wiring diagram above. ADM (Policy) is to be merged with ADM (PA). ADMs (Information Management) and (Infrastructure and Environment) are combined into ADM (Infrastructure Management). But the position of ADM Financial Services/Chief Financial Officer is established as a new standalone. On the CF side CanadaCom and CEFCom are combined in the new Joint Operations Command.

The Report itself, whatever the ultimate disposition of its recommendations will be, contains in its Annexes and Appendices a wealth of research material which has the potential to enrich the field of Canadian Strategic Studies enormously and on that basis alone deserves high praise. ©

**Note: The "Total" figures shown do not match the "Summation" figures since CANSOFCOM figures and Level 0 (CDS/DM) figures are not broken into Regular/Reserve/Civilian figures in the Report. We accept the "Total" figures as correct.)*



The Mission Closure Unit (MCU) begins closing Canada's presence in Kandahar. The War in Afghanistan has led to exceptional growth at NDHQ.



LA FIN DES OPÉRATIONS DE COMBAT CANADIENNES À KANDAHAR: RÉFLEXIONS À CHAUD

par le Brigadier-général Richard Giguère

Les Forces canadiennes ont terminé leurs opérations de combat dans la province de Kandahar en juillet 2011. A mon deuxième tour en Afghanistan et en tant que Commandant-Adjoint de la dernière Force opérationnelle interarmées – Afghanistan de septembre 2010 à juillet 2011, permettez-moi, après quelques semaines de recul, de faire le point sur certains éléments qui m'ont paru importants dans la planification et l'exécution de nos activités militaires.

A notre arrivée à Kandahar au tout début septembre 2010, il nous est rapidement apparu évident que les missions de combat dans un cadre contre-insurrectionnel devaient se poursuivre et même s'accélérer dans notre nouveau secteur d'opérations englobant les districts de Dand, Panjwai et Daman. Il nous fallait continuer de contrer les insurgés qui étaient encore fort présents et actifs dans certains secteurs. Parallèlement, nous savions aussi qu'il nous fallait planifier un dégarnissage et une relève sur place sous contact avec une autre formation afin de quitter le théâtre opérationnel en bon ordre et selon les directives reçues de nos commandants supérieurs. À terme, dégarnir nos positions, effectuer une relève sur place avec une formation alliée sous contact au niveau de brigade, tout en maintenant et améliorant nos acquis tactiques dans un contexte contre-insurrectionnel fort dynamique et complexe. Bref, bien du pain sur la planche pour l'élément de commandement et le quartier-général de la Force opérationnelle Kandahar!

Dès le début de notre planification, notre commandant, le brigadier-général Dean Milner, a été clair sur un principe qui allait nous guider tout au long de notre mission : les Forces canadiennes évoluant dans le sud de l'Afghanistan allaient être agressives et poursuivre les opérations de combat jusqu'au tout dernier moment, jusqu'à ce que le dernier soldat de notre contingent quitte l'aéroport de Kandahar. Il n'était pas question pour nous de permettre un ralentissement de notre tempo opérationnel dans les mois et semaines précédant notre départ définitif de la région en raison d'un dégarnissage ou d'une relève sur place.

L'image qui nous guidait était celle d'une course à relais. Quand un coureur participant à une course à relais passe le témoin au prochain coureur, il ne ralentit pas, il est encore au maximum de ses efforts, c'est ainsi que nous avons l'intention de passer le flambeau à la formation alliée qui allait nous remplacer dans notre secteur de responsabilités. C'est exactement ce que nous avons fait. Nous le devons à la

population afghane, aux soldats canadiens qui ont tellement contribué aux efforts militaires dans cette région, et à nos alliés de la coalition.

Nous pouvons être fiers de nos réalisations et de nos accomplissements. Ils ont été accomplis à la sueur de notre front et souvent au prix du sang et d'immenses efforts. En rétrospective, je crois que les éléments suivants ont fortement contribué au succès de notre mission :

- Une pression constante exercée sur les insurgés. Malgré nos efforts supportant la gouvernance et la reconstruction, nous n'avons jamais relâché nos opérations visant à déstabiliser et vaincre les insurgés. L'objectif était d'oblitérer l'insurrection et convaincre la population afghane que la solution se trouvait chez les forces gouvernementales, non pas chez les talibans. Nous avons travaillé sans relâche à limiter l'espace de manœuvre des insurgés en les surveillant et les frappant sans répit par le biais d'opérations conventionnelles et par l'utilisation judicieuse de nos forces spéciales;

- La promotion de la légitimité du gouvernement afghan. L'attitude de la population étant le centre de gravité dans un contexte de contre-insurrection, il fallait être en mesure d'offrir un choix adéquat à la population locale. Il fallait bien démontrer que le gouvernement afghan et ses diverses manifestations représentaient bien une alternative efficace et efficiente aux méthodes des talibans. Nous avons donc ardemment appuyé nos collègues du naissant appareil gouvernemental afghan dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, au niveau de la sécurité comme de la gouvernance. Il nous est également apparu évident que l'appui aux plus bas niveaux (villages, districts), était davantage porteur. Même si l'appareil gouvernemental officiel afghan est lent à s'installer et à faire sentir ses avantages dans des endroits éloignés comme le district de Panjwai, il ne faut pas voir là l'absence de gouvernance. Nous nous sommes donc appuyés sur la gouvernance locale déjà bien présente et respectée pour faire avancer, petit à petit, la mise en place de l'appareil étatique officiel. *Small is beautiful* dans un contexte contre-insurrectionnel...;

- L'emploi optimal des forces de sécurité afghanes. Nous avons eu le privilège de travailler étroitement avec des forces de sécurité afghanes qui progressaient jour après jour. Dirigée fort effectivement par le brigadier-général Habibi, la Première Brigade du 205^{ème} Corps afghan s'est avérée avec le temps une force des plus compétente. Les dernières opérations de brigade lancées dans notre secteur ont d'ailleurs été planifiées et exécutées largement par le leadership militaire afghan, alors que nous étions clairement

Brigadier-général Richard Giguère est le Commandant du Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre et de la Force opérationnelle interarmées (Est).

en support. En termes de forces policières, nous avons réussi à doubler le recrutement des policiers dans les districts de Dand et Panjwai et à faciliter la formation des recrues. Il reste encore beaucoup à faire de ce côté, et la mise sur pied de forces policières compétentes, efficaces et efficientes doit encore faire l'objet d'une attention toute spéciale. Au bout du compte, la stabilité de l'Afghanistan reposera sur les forces policières, une force du dedans crédible qui assurera le bon ordre, alors que l'armée, comme force du dehors, pourra se concentrer sur les risques et menaces militaires au lieu de s'affairer à des tâches policières comme c'est encore aujourd'hui trop souvent le cas. L'avenir sécuritaire de l'Afghanistan appartient aux forces de sécurité nationales bien encadrées par un régime politique démocratique. Elles ont prouvé hors de tout doute qu'elles méritaient notre appui;

- La mobilisation de la population. Nous avons travaillé en étroite collaboration avec la population locale, en établissant des maisons de pelotons dans des communautés, en patrouillant constamment de nuit comme de jour et en tenant d'innombrables shouras, ces conseils de village, ces discussions directes avec la population locale dans le cadre desquelles les tasses de thé sont consommées à profusion. Cette présence constante, ce dialogue soutenu, nous a permis de bien sentir le pouls de la population, de bien expliquer et rationaliser notre présence, et de favoriser des pistes de solution au diapason avec les réalités locales;

- Une force opérationnelle taillée pour la mission. La Force opérationnelle Kandahar était de loin la formation la plus robuste et la plus en mesure d'exécuter des missions couvrant tout le spectre des opérations militaires, en étant particulièrement bien adaptée au contexte contre-insurrectionnel. Nous avons profité de leçons apprises des contingents qui nous ont précédés et de la compréhension et de l'appui de notre leadership militaire qui nous a permis de nous déployer avec une formation si capable, dotée d'un état-major trié sur le volet et de nombreux multiplicateurs de forces qui faisaient l'envie de tous dans le Secteur Sud de la Force internationale d'Assistance et de Sécurité. Nous avons démontré à maintes reprises notre flexibilité et nos capacités exceptionnelles, nous permettant ainsi d'appuyer fort adroitement et efficacement les efforts de la coalition dans la province de Kandahar;

- Un état d'esprit adapté à la situation. Les forces canadiennes déployées dans Kandahar comprenaient parfaitement le caractère contre-insurrectionnel des opérations à planifier et exécuter. C'est quelque chose que de lire les doctrines contre-insurrectionnelles, c'est autre chose que d'en appliquer les préceptes. Les militaires canadiens ont clairement démontré une agilité d'esprit qui leur permettait de comprendre l'insurrection afghane et les moyens de la contrer. Toutes nos opérations ont été conduites avec à l'esprit la population comme centre de gravité, l'importance à accorder aux efforts de gouvernance et de reconstruction, l'appui que nous devions démontrer aux instances gouvernementales afghanes afin de

mousser leur crédibilité et l'approche pangouvernementale favorisée par le gouvernement canadien. Nous avons été des joueurs d'équipe, sensibles aux réalités tactiques, opérationnelles et stratégiques de notre mission.

Bien des ouvrages, bien des débats porteront dans le futur sur l'expérience canadienne en Afghanistan... Ces propos représentent les constatations à chaud d'une équipe à peine de retour des sables de Kandahar. J'espère cependant que ces quelques remarques contribueront positivement aux discussions professionnelles à venir.

J'ai été fier et honoré d'avoir pu participer à cette campagne militaire qui a permis de démontrer à nos alliés et à notre population le professionnalisme, la détermination et les compétences exceptionnelles des militaires canadiens. Et surtout, leur capacité d'adaptation et leur légendaire flexibilité. Bien des ouvrages, bien des débats porteront dans le futur sur l'expérience canadienne en Afghanistan... Mais au bout du compte, au terme de nos opérations de combat dans la province de Kandahar en juillet 2011, les militaires canadiens ont tenu le terrain dans le sud de l'Afghanistan avec courage et détermination; ils ont posé et amélioré des fondations qui, en terme de sécurité, de gouvernance et de reconstruction, permettent aujourd'hui à la population afghane et aux gouvernements de Kaboul et de Kandahar d'espérer un avenir meilleur; ils ont poursuivi leurs efforts et exécuté leurs missions jusqu'à la fin de leur mandat sans relâche et sans jamais baisser la garde; les efforts canadiens en Afghanistan ne sont pas terminés avec notre mission de transition présente à Kandahar jusqu'en décembre 2011 et notre mission d'entraînement à Kaboul qui se poursuivra jusqu'en 2014. Nous ne laissons pas tomber l'Afghanistan.

Il reste encore bien du travail à abattre en Afghanistan. Mais les progrès réalisés au cours des dix dernières années sont énormes. Il faut bien s'assurer de mettre les choses en perspective. Rappelons-nous que l'Afghanistan s'était mérité le titre de pire pays au monde (worst country in the world) en 2001 par la revue *The Economist*! Ce pays en fait n'existait plus en tant qu'entité politique après l'offensive de la coalition et le départ des talibans. Il a fallu littéralement repartir à zéro, réinstaurer un système politique démocratique, rebâtir les institutions gouvernementales, remettre sur pied des forces de sécurité policières et militaires crédibles, bref, tout était à refaire. Tout est loin d'être parfait aujourd'hui en Afghanistan, mais en perspective, ce pays est définitivement relancé sur la bonne voie.

Les Afghans, appuyés par la communauté internationale, doivent continuer de s'impliquer et s'assurer que les progrès réalisés demeurent et se bonifient. Mais les efforts des pays de la coalition, et plus particulièrement des militaires canadiens, appuyés de leurs collègues des autres ministères, ont été, en terme de sécurité, de gouvernance et de reconstruction, colossaux et ont définitivement permis aux Afghans, éprouvés par plus de trente années de guerres et de conflits, d'espérer un avenir meilleur. Un avenir meilleur qui semble maintenant à leur portée. ©



BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR: AFGHANISTAN A DECADE AFTER 9/11

by Colonel (Ret'd) Mike Capstick

Editor's Note: The following are personal observations on the current situation in Afghanistan from the point of view of an individual whose exposure to the inside workings of the Afghan government are unique in the annals of Canada's engagement in that country. Mike Capstick first arrived in Kabul just before Canada Day in 2005 to complete a recce for the deployment of the first Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan. He would celebrate five of the next six Canada Days in Afghanistan, serving first as the commander of SAT-A, then as a consultant in the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, and finally as the Country Director of an NGO in Kabul. He returned safely to Canada earlier this year.

This article was written before the complex attacks in Kabul on 13 September - attacks that essentially paralyzed the city. The Secretary General of NATO's comment that "... Transition is on track" and the US Ambassador's contention that the attacks were "... no big deal" can only be described as bizarre. The attacks were, in fact, a "big deal" that should raise serious questions about the effectiveness of Security Transition. Ambassador Crocker was correct when he described RPG fire at 800 metres as "harassment" but he misses the point. The fact that a handful of insurgents could hold off Afghan security forces for 21 hours, in the glare of Afghan and International media, can only be considered as a strategic coup and a body blow to public confidence.

Survival and recovery

Alternating periods of hope and despair have marked the international effort in Kabul over the last decade.

September and October 2001 were months of despair for Afghanistan and its people. On September 9, the Panjshiri fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by Al Qaeda-sponsored terrorists. Massoud had led the United Front (Northern Alliance) in the battle against the Taliban and had controlled the only part of the country not governed by the fundamentalists. He was one of two effective commanders in the Afghan resistance and his death threw the United Front into disarray. The other commander was Abdul Haq, a Pashtun commander and modernizer with a good battlefield record and well-honed political skills. Two days after Massoud was killed, the Al Qaeda terrorists launched their devastating attacks against the United States.

The American response to the September 11 attacks was both swift and violent, and the bombs started to fall on October 7. Then, the Taliban caught and executed Abdul Haq on October

26, eliminating one of the few remaining figures capable of unifying a fractious population, one that had no idea how all of the strife would end.

Two months later, the Taliban were in retreat everywhere and the jubilation that greeted the fall of the government in Kabul was real and palpable. Throughout the nation, hope replaced despair. As Afghans saw the situation, the international community had arrived with the will and the resources to help the country finally lift itself out of the devastation brought on by almost three decades of seemingly endless conflict. The sense of hope would prevail through the period of the Bonn Process, the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2002, the presidential elections of 2004 and the parliamentary elections of 2005. Kabul became frenetic with reconstruction, the presidential and parliamentary elections were deemed a success and, importantly, the London Conference of 2006 promised Afghans a long-term development relationship with the donor countries. For the most part, the worst violence was limited to a few provinces in the south and east, and a steady stream of educated Afghans from the diaspora was returning to make a positive contribution.

To be sure, there were moments of despair amidst the generally hopeful atmosphere. One was the murder of Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry in Kandahar in January 2006. Until then, suicide bombers had been relatively rare and the prevailing wisdom was that they were alien to Afghan culture. The worst moment came on May 29 of that year when Kabul was overwhelmed by a massive riot after the brakes failed on an American vehicle, killed one person and catalyzed youth leaders to orchestrate a looting and burning spree throughout the Shar-e-Naw and Wazir Akbar Khan districts in the heart of the city. The next day, our Afghan colleagues sat at their computer screens in absolute shock and openly voiced their fears about a return to conflict.

Despite these serious setbacks, however, most Afghans especially in Kabul remained optimistic and believed that

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peace, order and good government were real possibilities.

Back into the abyss

Not so today. Since 2008, Afghans have once again found themselves between hope and despair. The optimism evident during the first two elections has been replaced by almost universal cynicism about democratic politics in the wake of the corruption that characterized the 2009 presidential election, the still disputed 2010 parliamentary elections, and the government's ongoing failure to install a full cabinet. Meanwhile, conflicts between President Hamid Karzai and his international patrons have become legend and contributed to the strategic incoherence which has marked the development effort over the last few years.

Ominously, despite the American troop surge, violence is now commonplace, even in regions that were deemed to be 'Taliban free' as recently as 2008. Not only have civilian casualties continued to increase year over year, but Afghans blame the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for the bulk of them despite the evidence. Although the insurgents are responsible for almost 90 percent of civilian casualties, neither the Afghan government nor ISAF seem able to convince the public of this simple fact, a clear indication that the coalition's narrative is not selling well and that it has been unable to defeat the insurgents even on the information plane.

For example, take the massive explosion which rocked Kabul in July 2008. The explosion, which took place just as I was getting ready to go to work at the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, struck the entrance gate of the Indian Embassy across the street from the Ministry of the Interior. At least 50 Afghan civilians were killed, along with the Indian defence attaché and other embassy staff. Kabulis, however, refused to believe that the Haqqani Network were the likely perpetrators, instead blaming the Indians, their own security forces and ISAF.

Persistent and endemic corruption, ranging from the low-level bribes needed to complete almost any transaction with the bureaucracy to the massive Kabul Bank failure, has only increased the levels of pessimism.

The balance sheet

Often in the past, I've been asked, "how's it really going?" In 2006 I would respond with a great deal of confidence in the future of the mission and the country. Like Afghans, I was optimistic. Today, the situation is a lot more confused and contradictory. Again like my Afghan friends and colleagues, I generally answer along the lines of "not as badly as the media portrayals, but not as well as the political and NATO spin machines would have us believe."

Taken together, all of the trends (positive and negative) have created a very uncertain future in the minds of Afghans and long-term expatriates in Kabul.

Hope is manifest in the construction boom in the city, almost all of it driven by Afghans investing in Afghanistan. It is also evident in the thriving markets and in the development of the private sector. It is evident in the insatiable demand for education. The number of young Afghans in university or studying at the innumerable private academies in Kabul is staggering.

Yet the Afghan contradictions are many. There is reason for hope in the large number of young, educated members of parliament. But the continued political crisis that began with the 2009 presidential election has bred a cynicism among Afghans about politics and government that has caused them to become irrelevant to most ordinary people - not a healthy thing for any democracy.



Hope: *Shift change at a Kabul school*

Author's photo

The NATO training mission has made significant progress in fielding Afghan security forces that are far more effective than they were even a couple of years ago. But Afghans remain very worried about the ability of their security forces to protect them. The recent high-profile assassinations of Ahmad Wali Karzai and General Daud and the attacks on the Intercontinental Hotel and other soft targets have shaken people's confidence. More than one Afghan has asked me, "if the big men can't protect themselves, how can they protect us?"

On the development front, there has been progress in several areas. But the absence of a coherent strategy that has plagued the reconstruction effort since the beginning persists, and many of the pledges made at one international conference after another remain unfulfilled. This is a far cry from the "Marshall Plan for Afghanistan" promised by President George W. Bush in 2002. Meanwhile, most Afghans are now firmly convinced that donor countries, nongovernmental organizations and, especially, development contractors are the major source of corruption in the country, a perception



Despair: *An Internally Displaced Persons Camp on the outskirts of Kabul, April 2011.*

Author's photo

reinforced when the president and the minister of finance laid the blame for the Kabul Bank fiasco on the doorstep of the international technical assistants in the central bank.

The international community has always had its own lexicon in dealing with Afghanistan and it has not always been helpful. Recently the language of “population-centric counter insurgency” has been replaced by a focus on “transition.” But rather than viewing the shift as a genuine attempt to reinforce Afghan sovereignty and independence, the Afghan public sees transition as nothing more than the international community’s exit plan. Most Afghans today believe that we will all be gone in 2014 and that the inevitable outcome will be civil war. Those with resources are building their escape routes to Dubai and other regional neighbours. Others, in a position to benefit from corruption, are clearly getting whatever they can while the opportunity still exists.

Looking forward

The 10th anniversary of 9/11, the targeted killing of Osama Bin Laden and the ongoing decapitation of Al Qaeda’s leadership, have sparked any number of reflections on what has been achieved in the war on terrorism and in Afghanistan itself, including calls for a declaration of victory and departure from the region. This kind of rumination by politicians and pundits has served to reinforce President Karzai’s oft-stated belief that Western nations are involved in Afghanistan “for their own interests.” In the circumstances, it is no wonder he is seeking regional allies in Iran and China.

The reality is that a stable Afghanistan is in everyone’s interest and that the country will never be stable without a concerted state-building and development effort that has the support of regional powers. To accomplish this, it is essential that Pakistan be convinced to end the proxy war it has been fighting within Afghanistan’s borders since before the Soviet invasion.

To prevent another episode of state failure in Afghanistan after 2014, it is crucial that the international community and the Afghan government use the Bonn Conference scheduled for December 2011 to renew a long-term commitment to political engagement and development. Given political leaders’ focus on election cycles, especially in the United States, a fragile global economy and general war weariness, achieving this renewed commitment will be difficult. However, failure to do so will risk the enormous human and financial investment already made in Afghanistan. Most importantly, it will signal to the world that the promises we have made every year since 2001 were empty. Abandoning Afghanistan would only hand Al Qaeda and its allies the victory they sought in September 2001.

On the ground, the work continues. The security transition plan is, for the most part, working while ISAF has scored some important tactical-level successes, especially in the south. The Afghan government and the international community are developing the rest of the transition strategy in a very cooperative manner under the leadership of Ashraf Ghani. The new US country team in Kabul holds the potential to repair some of the serious rifts with Karzai and his administration. And the Bonn Conference will be an opportunity for Western states to renew their commitments within the context of an agreed road map for the future.

In the final analysis, however, the most important reason for optimism is that Afghans are a remarkably resilient people with a high degree of strategic patience. Although my own experience has been largely confined to Kabul, my impression is that the very young population of Afghanistan (with approximately 70 percent under the age of 25) will prove totally unwilling to submit to the kind of tyranny that characterized the Taliban regime. Education, access to information on the Internet, the ubiquitous cell phone and the amazing growth of private enterprise (led by young male and female entrepreneurs) are powerful instruments of modernization and will not be easily suppressed by fundamentalist ideologues. ©



DRAWING LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN

by Major General Nick Carter

We must be careful what lessons we draw from current campaigns, particularly in the case of Afghanistan where the political circumstances are complicated. But there are some pointers for future force design that are worth reflecting on. This is particularly true for manoeuvre and the environment in which it will likely take place, for how command and control will be exercised, and for the role that indigenous capacity building and upstream security assistance may play in generating the necessary mass, insight and understanding to ensure campaign success.

The role of HQ 6 Division

British interest in the Afghan campaign has been predominantly focussed on Helmand. But less well known is that during 2010 a British Divisional headquarters - HQ 6 (UK) Division, known as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 6 once deployed - was responsible for Regional Command (South), including not just Helmand but the key province of Kandahar. Following Operation MOSHTARAK in Central Helmand during February, Kandahar was to become CJTF 6's focus and the key battle in General Stanley McChrystal's plan to regain the initiative from the insurgency.

Understanding the term 'battle' in its modern sense

The term 'battle' needs to be used with care and the context thoroughly understood, because the problem in Kandahar is essentially *political*. Over the last 30 years of chaos the traditional tribal structures have been destroyed. The effect of this has been compounded by an insurgency that has intimidated or assassinated the village elders (*maliks*), leaving a political vacuum that in the rural areas has been filled by the insurgency. Formal governance structures are now too weak or not inclusive enough to compete.

A culture of impunity pervades in which power brokers and former warlords do as they please and exercise patronage over their vassals in a manner reminiscent of feudal times.

The millions of dollars injected into the economy through contracts by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the international community have benefited only a small minority. With corruption endemic in many of the institutions

that the population has to depend on, it is no surprise that this has caused a sense of disillusionment. Indeed most Afghans are simply waiting to see who will be in charge tomorrow.

Solving this problem in Kandahar required an essentially *political* approach. Success was likely to come only through delivering credible, inclusive and representative governance *connected to the population*. This adds a significant non-kinetic dimension to the concept of battle. The approach had to be delivered on four lines of operations:

- Effective governance and political engagement: build governance capacity, ensure representative and inclusive structures, and reduce parallel influences;
- Demonstrating intent to distribute wealth more evenly: regulating parallel structures, countering the culture of impunity, addressing the *causes* of insurgency. This would not be a quick solution, but turning heads and persuading people that things were changing would have a rapid and significant impact;
- Delivering stabilization effect through *Afghan* governance: to increase economic opportunity and employment and to address grievances; and,
- The kinetic element: bringing order and control to urban areas and asserting Afghan government authority over rural areas that were either self-governed or in the thrall of the insurgents.

The centrality of influence

Influence was the key factor that drove this process. Figure 1 lays out the important elements of that influence. The process must always be command-led and start with an appreciation of the target audience. The elements listed on the diagram are illustrative, but it should be noted that, for the operation in Kandahar, the target audience also included the outside world, allied capitals, Afghan partners on all lines of operation, the governor of Kandahar, Kabul-based ministries, President Hamid Karzai, power brokers, ex-warlords and the insurgents themselves, to name but a few. However, the key audience throughout was the local population, in particular the elders.

The next step must always be about identifying what *effect* needs to be imparted on the relevant audience. Again, the list in Figure 1 is simply illustrative. A range of tools was available to impart the effect, and Figure 1 lists some of these in the lozenge marked "method." This is an area where our understanding has developed significantly from what we used to consider simply as 'targeting' - the process we have

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used for many years to deliver predominantly kinetic effect on a target. Clearly none of this would be possible without good information and thorough understanding. It is no surprise that the nature of the problem described earlier required something rather more than just an analysis of the enemy (the 'red' picture). In this instance it was about 'white,' as in politics, people and their motivations; 'green' as in Afghan security partners; and, 'black' as in crime, corruption and the narco-economy.

Lastly, all sources need to be coordinated effectively to answer the key questions. This process is led in the traditional way by the commander's information requirements. But it is important that they be disseminated very widely and updated regularly so that they leverage not just 'task-able' sources, but also 'incidental' sources as well as - most frequently forgotten - what is available in open sources.

Police battalions working in partnership with the Afghan National Police. This was the first significant deployment of ISAF into the city since the intervention in 2001. It involved significant construction, including 2,500 bed spaces and 10,000 two-metre high concrete 'T' walls as blast protection and population control measures. Bearing in mind that battle is not just kinetic and that nothing is straightforward in southern Afghanistan, achieving this involved the development of a completely new manufacturing industry. Decisive was the requirement to connect the 800,000 or so residents of the city to basic governance through inclusive municipal structures.

Phase two, involving an Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade and a further US infantry Brigade Combat Team, started in July 2010 and was directed at the adjacent district




Figure 1 – Influence effects

The battle

To achieve the essential degree of security, operations were conceived in a framework of 'deep' and 'close,' with the 'close battle' in three tactical phases (see Figure 2). Each of these phases was a separate tactical battle determined by the need to sequence resources so as to enable brigades and task forces to achieve their objectives. Phase one in Kandahar City started in spring 2010 and involved a US infantry Brigade Combat Team with an infantry battalion and two Military

of Arghandab with its population of 80,000. Here the insurgency had created complex obstacle belts of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and defensive positions to control movement and allow maximum freedom of action to operate on interior lines so as to be able to intimidate and control the population.

Phase three in September 2010 focused on the districts of Zharay and Panjwa'i to the west and south west of the city



Figure 2 – A Close Battle in 3 Phases

with a total population of around 120,000. This was decisive, as Zharay had been the district whence Mullah Omar and the Taliban had come to power in the early 1990s. Unlike the other districts around the city, Zharay had not had Afghan government authority asserted over it for some years. Consequently, gaining and building lodgements in the area was a critical preliminary operation involving the construction of several combined bases.

Highway 1, the key artery linking western Afghanistan to Kandahar, passes through the area, and this provided a key source of revenue to the insurgency. The area was well defended with several belts of IEDs sited in depth between the river Arghandab and the highway, and well-fortified positions in the many compounds covered the obstacles. A US infantry Brigade Combat Team partnered with an ANA brigade and supported by the Canadian Task Force Kandahar, also partnered with a ANA brigade, were the key force elements in this phase.

Rarely could tactical surprise be achieved in any of these engagements as they were invariably preceded by a political process or by conversation between Afghan elders and the provincial governor. Thus *deception* was vital, retaining as many tactical options as possible, and then playing one's cards as late as possible. The deep battle was designed to

create the conditions for success in the close battle and ran concurrently throughout.

Figure 3 shows where its principal effects were applied. A US battlefield surveillance brigade with a range of task-organized capabilities screened the Pakistan border and enabled freedom of movement on Highway 4. To the northwest a US Stryker battalion interdicted insurgent ingress, and to the west predominantly special forces disrupted insurgent lines of communication by persuading villages to refute the insurgency, thus denying the insurgents freedom of action.

This was mainly an infantry fight, but the necessary mass to dominate the ground was only achieved through the application of indigenous Afghan forces fighting in partnership with ISAF. Small numbers of tanks were used in small combined arms teams, task-organized with infantry. Layered and integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) was the essential enabling capability, utilizing 20 or so different sorts of platform and capabilities as well as strategic level assets to achieve complementary effect.

Electronic warfare, involving both intercept and destruction as well as manoeuvre in the cyber and information domains, sought to give us advantage over our opponents. Switching

A concurrent deep battle




Figure 3 – A Concurrent Deep Battle

the balance from information collection to destruction of insurgent communication networks was carefully coordinated with the overall deception plan. Engineers were employed in a great many traditional roles, including: manoeuvre support with armoured assets and explosive breaching allowing manoeuvre in the enemy's depth; in construction of barriers to control population movement, of roads to allow freedom of movement, and of bases to dominate and provide presence; and, in design work to enable the letting of local construction contracts to complement military road construction.

Given the complex nature of the terrain and the proximity of people, precision fires offered the greatest utility. Although field artillery was used from time to time, it was high mobility artillery rocket systems and air delivered munitions (from both manned and unmanned platforms) that provided the most effective combat support.

Lessons had been learned about the management of airspace from the earlier action in central Helmand. The quantity of ISR assets and manned platforms, combined with the number of aviation sorties and fire missions, was one of the principal planning factors for phase three. The integration of air planners from the outset contributed to a ground plan that allowed for more effective concentration of force in direct support of tactical objectives. This joint integration increased

the agility of the forces, allowing unmanned platforms to be tasked dynamically from the division to the company level in direct support of combined arms teams in the close battle. Aviation was controlled at the divisional level, but regularly task-organized at task force and brigade level to support the manoeuvre of infantry over short distances across obstacles to gain positions of advantage in the enemy's depth.

The immense difficulty of clearing densely mined routes meant that aviation had a vital role to play in sustainment and medical evacuation, with the integration of precision air drops from C-130 Hercules aircraft providing additional capacity.

Figure 4 summarizes the capabilities involved. At its core is C3I (Command, Control, Cyber and Information), not yet a doctrinally accepted term, but probably a more accurate description of the emerging capability than the traditional term C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence).

The ability to share relevant and appropriate information in a timely manner between all the key interlocutors at the CJTF level is clearly essential. But it is the capacity to manage bandwidth, to establish the information functionality at every level within the CJTF as well as integrating the full range of




Figure 4 – The Capabilities Involved

enablers laid out in Figure 4 that is decisive. No longer is the business of 'bytes per second' the task of communication specialists alone, it is now a critical factor in the whole command process. This will come to require a new breed of 'warfare officers' and the specific training and education to produce them.

Deductions and lessons

There are a number of deductions that can be drawn from the experiences related above, which are worth debating so as to identify possible lessons for the future design of our forces.

The first set of deductions concern *manoeuvre* in the future:

- It will be multi-dimensional: in particular it will be seeking to achieve advantage in the information and the cyber space, not simply three-dimensional, kinetic 'fire and movement';
- It will be about people: it will take place where they live and amongst the infrastructure that sustains them. This means the terrain will be complex, almost invariably urban, as well as the spaces that influence the urban areas;
- Fire and movement will still be relevant, but the participating capabilities are evolving rapidly: the complexity of the environment will be more about

small combined arms teams than company squadron groups, still requiring tanks, but in fewer total numbers organized in larger troops; and,

- There are no absolute secrets any more: the key is to have multiple options up your sleeve, shroud them in deception and play your hand as late as you can.

The second set of deductions concerns *command*. The scale of operation, the multi-dimensional nature of manoeuvre and the complexity of the environment, all combine to require an essential level of command above brigade/task force where:

- Judgments are made about where to concentrate force and apply economy of effort;
- The tactical actions of brigades/task forces are enabled and sequenced in time and space (as was practiced in the three phases of the close battle for Kandahar) and planned from the finish back to the start;
- Joint and inter-agency capabilities are integrated;
- Command is exercised close enough to acquire enough understanding and situational awareness to allow influence to be wielded: for example, the role of the JTF commander in influencing key Afghans during the battle for Kandahar could not have been conducted from Kabul;
- Command is exercised through a span of command that allows both leadership and appropriate control to be

exercised over subordinates. The full potential of mission command is only realized if the JTF commander is able to confirm his intent - that is, his orders are understood - two levels down (i.e. battalion level). This means there is a finite number of task forces or brigades that a JTF can command and control. At the beginning of CJTF 6's tenure it commanded eight task forces/brigade combat teams and 24 manoeuvre battalions - a significant command and control challenge.

Thirdly, we have learned a good deal from our efforts to build the Afghan National Security Forces as they have been fielded in the counter insurgency campaign. We can deduce that indigenous capacity-building and upstream security assistance will play a key role in generating the necessary mass, insight and understanding that we will need in these environments in the future. This is particularly so when our own increasing personnel costs are taken into account.

A lesson to draw from this might be that we should be examining indigenous capacity-building with a view to deploying training teams strategically; to developing foreign service officers as a specific career stream; to conducting

our own training in countries and regions that might benefit from our influence; and, looking at how our force structure might be adapted specifically to utilize indigenous capacity in partnership.

Conclusions

Our experience in the battle for Kandahar reinforces the point raised by other contributors to this publication: the character of conflict is changing. Future conflicts will most likely not be just kinetic but will require us to have or to generate the capabilities and the capacity to affect the behaviour of both adversaries and other parties by means of a wide range of political, economic and social means. This in turn will demand deep cultural understanding, plus the ability to instrument and assess the operational environment so that appropriate lessons can be learned. It further requires that our forces be agile and adaptable so that lessons learned can be implemented on future campaigns.

We must be able to amend our education, organization and equipment to allow us to operate and to fight in a manner appropriate to the adversary and the environment. And we must invest in people who can innovate and manoeuvre instinctively in the multi-dimensional context that will be a feature of future campaigns. ©



CANADA'S CONTINUING LEGACY IN AFGHANISTAN¹

by Dr. Howard G. Coombs

*"Behind every girl now in a classroom, behind every healthy baby in its mother's arms, behind every farmer who can feed his family without taking up arms ... behind all of this progress, are innumerable acts of heroism and selfless devotion to duty by ... the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our aid workers."*²

- The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, 30 May 2011

During the last year, the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT), by then a combined Canadian-American effort, was a mission that included 62 Canadian civilians. This group worked closely with the office of the provincial governor, provincial ministries, and the Provincial Council in order to implement projects throughout the province. The Canadian contingent was comprised of diplomats, aid workers, corrections officers and civilian police who shared the mission of reconnecting Kandaharis with an effective, representative government. In support of these efforts the

KPRT worked closely with the Canadian Forces, as well as American civilian and military partners. However, the greatest effects achieved in Kandahar were in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

First, the KPRT worked intimately with Governor Tooryali Wesa and his office. As the appointed provincial executive officer, Governor Wesa's direction and leadership was important to Canada, and the KPRT worked closely with him on the planning, budgeting, and coordination of major projects. In this fashion, the KPRT aligned its work and organization to support the priorities of the government and people of Kandahar.

Second, the KPRT partnered with the Attorney General's

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Office and the Provincial Court on justice issues, with the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan National Army, and the Central Prison Directorate. In all projects and initiatives, the KPRT affiliated with provincial ministries to coordinate efforts, to deliver projects and outcomes that were in line with government plans, and to encourage better financial linkages with ministerial budgets.

Lastly, the KPRT had a strong relationship with the Provincial Council.³ As a body of elected representatives, the Provincial Council promotes participation of the people and of civil society in governance. The Provincial Council is best known as a place that Kandaharis come to seek help with their problems. The work of the Council in listening to the people, mediating disputes, and finding common ground is important. Consequently, the Provincial Council's oversight of government and service delivery remains important and was supported by the KPRT.

Canadian projects in Kandahar

When Canada came to Kandahar in 2006, engagement was mainly military with much fighting. At that time, it had become obvious that it was the insurgency that had control over many key districts. To confront these destructive forces and support the provincial government, Canada decided to expand whole of government contributions through the KPRT.

Following from that, in 2008 Canada promised to move 50 percent of its aid budget for Afghanistan to Kandahar and defined six priorities and three signature projects that served as overarching terms of reference for the civilian mission. Concurrently, Canada created a new, unique and larger whole of government civilian operational capacity for Kandahar, which enabled a more robust partnership with the provincial government, supported by programs financed by the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. To measure progress, clear benchmarks were established and progress reported to the Canadian parliament every three months. The initiatives include: (1) the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Program, (2) 50 signature schools, (3) polio eradication, (4) improvement of Sarpoza Prison, (5) police training, and (6) secure governance infrastructure.

Canada has worked to improve the Dahla Dam and the irrigation canals that bring water to farmers in Kandahar. In this \$50 million project, the gates of the canals were replaced and repaired, silt was removed from the irrigation canals, and farmers were trained in water management. The KPRT worked closely with the Ministry of Energy and Water on this project, particularly to improve the technical characteristics of the water system. Canadian work on the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system will be completed by the end of 2011, and GIRoA authorities will continue working with communities and mirabs⁴ along the canals to better manage the water system as well as manage the overall system through a new organization, the Sub-Basin Water Authority.

Canada has collaborated with the provincial Department of Education to build, expand, and repair 50 schools in Kandahar, and to improve the quality of education across the province. This close partnership has ensured that Canadian assistance has been directed to priority schools and that when they are built the requisite teachers and materials are available. The project benefits Kandahari students at the same time as it strengthens capacity of the government to deliver this basic service. Canada will continue this partnership in education at a national level.

Working with the Department of Public Health (DoPH), Canada supported the immunization of Kandahari children in an effort to eradicate polio. Unfortunately, while very close to eliminating polio in Kandahar, there are still a few cases. Nevertheless, this project has helped strengthen the provincial health system, and it is believed that this work will continue through the United Nations and the DoPH until polio is eradicated entirely in Afghanistan (estimated to happen in 2012). Furthermore, Canada in partnership with the DoPH has built, expanded and/or repaired a significant number of health clinics, many of which had been destroyed or severely damaged due to insecurity.

Additionally, the KPRT has cooperated very closely with the Central Prison Directorate (CPD) to make Sarpoza Prison a model facility that operates in accordance with international standards and Afghan law. The partnership will help ensure that institutional development and humane treatment of detainees is enduring.

Canada has assisted the ANP at the Police Training Centre over the past years by building and operating a facility, located at Camp Nathan Smith, home of the KPRT in Kandahar City. Training has been developed and delivered by Canadian civilian police in conjunction with ANP trainers. In 2011 the facility was formally and effectively transferred to the ANP, which will be supported by the NATO training mission.

Furthermore, Canada worked closely with Afghan authorities to improve the security and effectiveness of key government buildings. Over several years, the KPRT cooperated with the ANP to improve or build most police sub-stations throughout the city. The KPRT also supported a project to build the Government Media Information Centre - Kandahar, a state-of-the-art media facility, which is used frequently by government officials to communicate to citizens through press conferences, releases and statements. This year the KPRT will complete a project to build safe housing for government officials in Kandahar City to help improve security for senior officials. The flagship project is construction of the new Provincial Council, home of the only elected government body in Kandahar, which officially opened on June 19. As these projects were completed, the GIRoA took responsibility for their operation.

In addition to buildings, Canada also played a significant role in the construction and improvement of roads and in repairing

culverts and bridges, and other activities that will contribute to an improved way of life for the Afghan population.

As Canada's plans in Kandahar were achieved, the Canadian staff of the KPRT gradually relocated to Kabul or to Canada. Canada transferred leadership of the KPRT to the United States in January as part of this process of thinning out.

After 2011 - national projects

Canada's commitment to Afghanistan will continue beyond 2011. Canada and Afghanistan are entering a new phase of partnership and cooperation in a national program that will be based out of Kabul. This program will focus on four areas: investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through

projects in education and health; advancing security, the rule of law and human rights; promoting regional diplomacy; and, delivering humanitarian assistance.

In keeping with the spirit of Prime Minister Harper's thoughts on Canada's continuing legacy (cited at the beginning of this article), Kandaharis will not simply remember Canada's contributions in Kandahar because of the irrigation canals that were repaired or the schools that were built - although these accomplishments are important. They will remember the close partnership between Canada and the people of Kandahar, to help the latter build a better future for themselves and their children. It is a friendship that will continue in the foreseeable future and be strengthened through a national program of cooperation and assistance.

(Endnotes)

1 This article is derived from a speech given by Tim Martin to the Kandahar Provincial Council, Kandahar City, Afghanistan, 6 March 2011. Mr. Martin was the Representative of Canada in Kandahar, or RoCK, from August 2010 to July 2011. I thank him for his collegiality throughout our deployment in Kandahar and his assistance with verifying the details of this article. It was a pleasure to serve alongside him and his team, working together to assist Afghanistan achieve a brighter future.

2 The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, Address to Task Force Kandahar, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 30 May 2011.



A MOST PERSONAL ACT OF REMEMBRANCE

by Commander Jeff Agnew

What is left when honour is ignored? Almost a quarter of a million Canadian veterans are buried in military cemeteries across Canada, but many Canadians are unfortunately not aware of this. The honour owed to them unfortunately goes ignored. Wreaths Across Canada Incorporated is an organization that is determined to correct this omission.

After a visit to Arlington Cemetery in Washington, D.C. in December 2007, Canadian veteran Craig McPhee was moved by how Americans honour their military sons, daughters, fathers, and mothers buried there, by placing a wreath at the base of their headstones. After four years of hard work, Craig's dream of creating an organization to honour deceased Canadian veterans is being fulfilled, with the genesis of Wreaths Across Canada (WAC).

Commander Jeff Agnew is the Director of Communications for Wreaths Across Canada. A serving Naval officer with over 33-years in uniform, he has deployed to ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, where he was awarded the U.S. Bronze Star medal. He is currently the Deputy Director, Public Affairs Operations at NDHQ.

Rather than standing in the crowd while government and military leaders place wreaths on memorials, WAC will offer a unique opportunity for everyone to play a dynamic part in the act of remembrance. Canadians will be able to read the names of the buried veterans, touch their headstones, place a wreath, and be immersed in the reality of endless rows of symmetrical military graves. The hope is that participants will depart with a new sense of gratitude and understanding of the sacrifice that was made for them.

This act of remembrance is meant to be a natural continuation of Remembrance Day, taking place in December at a time of year when families come together and reflect on those not present.

"Three words - Remember, Honour, Teach - is the mission statement of Wreaths Across Canada," says General (retired) Rick Hillier, WAC's Honorary Chairman. "We will remember those members of the Canadian Forces who lie in military cemeteries across Canada; we will honour those who have served Canada as members of our military forces; and we will strive to teach Canadian youth the value of freedom."

(continued p. 30)

THE VIMY AWARD

Major-General Jonathan Vance has been unanimously selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2011. The award will be presented on Friday, 18 November, at a mixed gala reception and dinner at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa.

Major-General Vance is a charismatic individual, and a warrior. He joined the Canadian Forces in 1982 and was commissioned as an infantry officer in the Royal Canadian Regiment, in 1986, upon graduation from Royal Roads Military College. Throughout his career he served in both staff and command positions in Canada, Europe and, recently, in Afghanistan. As brigadier-general he was appointed Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan and Task Force Kandahar, in 2009, and, again, in 2010. Major-General Vance has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career in the Canadian Forces and has made an outstanding contribution to the defence and security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The Award honours the bravery and sacrifices of the Canadian soldiers who were victorious at the Battle of Vimy Ridge in April 1917. The CDA Institute is the sponsor of the Vimy Award. Since 1991, the Award recognizes one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation the the preservation of our democratic values.

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Le Major-général Jon Vance a été choisi à l'unanimité comme récipiendaire du Prix Vimy 2011. Le prix lui sera présenté le vendredi 18 novembre dans le cadre d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala tenus au Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa.

Le Major-Général Vance est un individu charismatique et un guerrier. Il s'est joint aux Forces canadiennes en 1982 et reçut sa commission d'officier d'infanterie dans le Royal Canadian Regiment en 1986, à sa graduation du Royal Roads Military College. Au long de sa carrière, il a servi dans des postes d'état-major et de commandement au Canada, en Europe et, récemment, en Afghanistan. Comme brigadier-général, il a été nommé commandant de la Force opérationnelle interarmées Afghanistan et de la Force opérationnelle Kandahar, en 2009, et à nouveau en 2010. Le Major-Général Vance a fait preuve des plus hauts niveaux de leadership tout au long de sa carrière dans les Forces canadiennes et a fait une contribution exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.



Le prix Vimy est ainsi nommé en l'honneur de la bravoure et des sacrifices des soldats canadiens qui ont remporté la victoire à la bataille de la Crête de Vimy, en avril 1917. L'Institut de la CAD est le commanditaire de prix Vimy. Depuis 1991, le Prix reconnaît un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a fait une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Families are encouraged to bring their children to our ceremony and we are approaching schools to have their students attend.

“All too often when the image of deceased Canadian war veterans comes to mind, we think of those buried overseas at places like Vimy, Normandy, Ortona, or Hong Kong,” says Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk. “But, thousands of veterans, many of whom fought in and survived those same battles, are buried in military burial sites throughout our nation. Wreaths Across Canada is giving Canadians of every age an opportunity to play a personal and significant role in the ceremony, it is a commendable undertaking.”

WAC is a registered charitable organization composed of a small group of volunteers who are mainly veterans. It has the full support of the Canadian Forces, Veterans Affairs Canada, the Royal Canadian Legion, the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force Veterans in Canada and numerous other veterans organizations, and Beechwood Cemetery in Ottawa. Local school boards are also enthusiastic about our program and there is a growing interest from other organizations and associations. Four full years have been spent planning the inaugural commemorative wreath ceremony, which is now less than six months away.

Beginning Sunday, December 4, WAC will debut its mission by placing almost 3,000 balsam wreaths on the headstones of every veteran buried in the National Military Cemetery at Beechwood Cemetery. Young and old, the public is invited to participate in this most personal act of remembrance. It is anticipated that this will become an annual tradition in Ottawa, and it is hoped that this ceremony of commemoration spreads to every military cemetery throughout Canada.

By the gracious permission of author Kathleen Mills, the beautifully poignant poem “Honour” is used by WAC to remember those who served, and now lie buried in military cemeteries across Canada. This poem stands both as our inspiration and our oath. It admirably spells out just what WAC seeks to achieve and inspire in others.

“I wrote this poem after attending a memorial service for fallen soldiers from the 3rd US Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia,” said Mills. “At the time, my husband, a Canadian PPCLI Lieutenant Colonel serving with the US Army, was in Iraq and I sat there wondering how I was going to get through those memorial services. My heart ached for the grieving families but I didn’t want to let it consume me.”

“I thought about all of the soldiers who got up and went to work, knowing they might never see home again. And they do this to protect us? How do we thank someone for that? How do we repay such a gift? That is when I wrote this



poem. I wanted in some small way to express my gratitude by honouring the memory of those brave heroes. As it happened, from that point on, I was asked to read the poem at the memorial services. It is still being read at services today,” she said.

“It is my wish that in our Services of Remembrance we set aside our sadness and replace it with gratitude,” said Mills.

Mrs. Mills has kindly agreed to read “Honour” at WAC’s inaugural wreath laying service in Ottawa. The poem will then be passed to a student to be read in French. This gesture will symbolically begin a tradition of “passing the torch of Honour” from generation to generation, which WAC hopes will become a yearly practice.

Fundraising for WAC is now in full swing. Funds have been received from Veterans Affairs Canada, the McCain Foundation, the True Patriot Love Foundation, the Harrison McCain Foundation and individual donors from the general public, but money is still needed to bring the organization to the level envisioned by its creator.

Wreaths Across Canada cordially invites you, your friends, and your families, to join us at the National Military Cemetery at Beechwood Cemetery in Ottawa, at 1:30 p.m. on Sunday, December 4, so that you may participate in honouring our fallen veterans. All serving members of the Canadian Forces are invited to attend in uniform and veterans attending are encouraged to wear their medals.

Honour

*On my honour,
We will stand at the place where you rest and remember you.
On my honour,
We will pick up the torch of freedom and carry it for you.*

*On my honour,
You will not be a silent memory; we will speak of you often so
the world will know what you have done.*

*On my honour,
As you reach the gates of heaven you will hear the voices of a
grateful Nation rise up and we will honour you.*

by Kathleen Mills

Promesse d'honneur

Sur mon honneur, je te promets que j'irai là où tu reposes
et je me souviendrai de toi;
Sur mon honneur, je te promets que je reprendrai l'oriflamme
de la liberté
et la porterai pour toi;
Sur mon honneur, je te promets que ton souvenir ne sera pas
silencieux,
je parlerai souvent de toi
afin que le monde entier sache ce que tu as accompli;
Sur mon honneur, alors que tu atteins les portes du ciel,
tu entendras la clameur d'un peuple reconnaissant
qui saura honorer ta mémoire.
De tout mon cœur, je te le promets!

par Kathleen Mills (traduit par Leo Regimbal)

For more information, log on to Wreaths Across Canada's website wreathscrosscanada.ca, or call (613) 435-4294. ©



NORMANDY AND FLANDERS

by Thomas S. Caldwell

I was recently honoured to be included in the 67th anniversary events of The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada ("QOR") in Normandy. Brigadier-General (retired) Garry Thomson conducted our memorable tour and acted as both historian and master of overall ceremonies.

On the June 6 anniversary, the walk up Juno Beach at low tide caused me to marvel at the distance covered under fire. I thought of Sergeant Freddie Harris, once a schoolboy from Harbord Collegiate in Toronto, who enlisted with his friend and our past defence minister Barney Danson. Freddie declined the opportunity to go for officer training in order to participate in D-Day. Freddie was hit on the beach and died at the sea wall. British signalman and veteran Cyril Crain accompanied our trip and talked of his friend Freddie. He was with him when he was hit and at the present time his poignant poem honouring his friend is displayed in the Juno Beach Memorial.

We visited Freddie's grave later in the journey.

As the Second World War veterans who were with us described that day in 1944, random events continually came

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into play. One of the landing craft lost control of its rudder and landed further up the beach. This enabled troops from the QOR to seize a pillbox from behind, which had been wreaking havoc with enfilade fire along the beach.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Fotheringham and Padre Captain John Niles conducted a service of remembrance at The Queen's Own Rifles house, one of the few beach houses to survive the bombardment and the battle. As a young boy, I remarked at pictures of this building still standing. Later, I would have coffee and cookies inside. A remarkable experience.

The background provided by veterans who were there (Bill Bettridge, Jack Hadley, Cyril Crain and others) literally made every square foot of beach seem like hallowed ground.

We then marched off to retrace the ground covered by the QORs on that day to Anisy, a distance of approximately ten miles. We stopped along the way (mercifully for me) to commemorate the actions that took place before day's end on June 6. I could not but think of the determination, courage and stamina needed to cover that distance, while facing and dealing with an intransigent enemy.

But the battle of Normandy took place over a wide front and many days, with numerous actions and many casualties, including those wilfully murdered by Nazi fanatics.

Jan de Vries of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion was part of a group securing Le Mesnil crossroads near Pegasus Bridge. Jan pointed out the exact location of his slit trench and remarked on a nearby farm shed, still standing. He said he felt

as long as that shed stood, after each artillery barrage, he had a chance of surviving. Nothing equates with hearing firsthand experience and standing on the ground where years before a young man put his life on the line.

The battle and the losses would continue on with events like the tragic attack near Le Mesnil-Patry and the capture of Carpiquet Airfield being etched into the collective memory of the QOR and other valiant regiments.

Our tour of the landing zones also took us to the American Omaha Beach. Being in the cemetery and walking the beach, one can see and understand the connection between the two. Omaha was clearly a very bad place to be on that day – a wide beach, overlooked at every point by high ground. One veteran described the opening scenes of the movie *Saving Private Ryan* as being fairly accurate. Many veterans cannot watch it.

We went back in time to 1942 and visited Dieppe. The beach itself does not have one grain of sand. It consists solely of smooth round rocks, which initially rise at approximately 45 degrees from the water's edge. It is like walking on, for those involved the day of the attack, running on wet ball bearings. Clearly, tanks would have no traction. The German positions had a clear, elevated view of the beach from all sides and even from behind. My only thought was: "What were the planners thinking of?"

Egos, momentum, lack of proper intelligence, impatience and poor timing can have a terrible human cost. Add to those factors the chaos and randomness of battle and all that is left is individual courage.

Outside Boulogne, we visited the Napoleonic Forte de la Crèche, which saw use and battle up to 1944. Conditions were relatively pleasant for soldiers, which reminded me that soldiering is so often about drudgery, being cold, wet and often tired beyond description. The old flying adage, "hours of boredom with moments of sheer terror" comes to mind.

Nearby, we visited the grave of Lieutenant-Colonel John McCrae, and Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel Brendan Caldwell (our son) read "In Flanders Fields." It was very moving.

We continued our journey back in time to the First World War and Ypres. The town, of course, was decimated and since rebuilt.

At the Menin Gate Memorial to the tens of thousands with no known grave, the QOR participated in the daily 8PM service, under the gaze of Canadian names etched in the wall. One of those names, Lance Corporal Herbert James Green – killed in action 23 April 1915 – was that of the great-grandfather of Corporal Graham Green, who laid a wreath accompanied by his father, Martin. Later, a toast was given to those QORs



Thomas Caldwell and his son, Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Brendan Caldwell at the Menin Gate, Ypres.

Author's photo

and other Canadians who perished in the inferno of the Ypres salient.

Nothing can really prepare one for the scope of events we bore witness to. Thousands of graves with their inscriptions remind us that every individual death was a monumental tragedy – a son, a brother, a father, a dear friend. The question remains: "What would have been had these men lived?"

The landscape is still pocked and marked by the roughly 50 million shells fired in the area, many of which failed to explode in the sea of mud. Today, the average farmer has about 20 or so percolate to the surface each year. They dutifully stack them at the end of their driveways for collection and demolition. Estimates are that it will be approximately another 100 years before these reminders cease.

The site of the battle of Beaumont-Hamel was particularly poignant and bore further witness to the carnage of the First World War. Of 801 Newfoundlanders who went into action, only 68 were able to answer the roll call the next day. This sacrifice for a matter of yards is a comment on leadership whose only strategy was attrition.

The majesty of the Vimy Ridge Memorial must be seen. The pockmarked ground and tunnels mark the events and preparation leading up to the battle. Awe can only approximate one's feelings of what Canada's sons accomplished here.

It is not possible to describe these places and the vents that took place. One can only say the opportunity to visit battle sites, with the veterans who were there, should be grasped. It is only then that those events move beyond history and become part of our life experience.

It was clear to me that the young QOR soldiers (some Afghanistan veterans) on the trip, such as Mark, Ben, Jason, Jansen, Graham and others were, I believe, made of the same stuff as those young men so many years ago. Our pride in Canada's young soldiers, and slightly older ones such as Colonel Richard Cowling, remains secure. ©



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236 9903



Les participants et les participantes doivent s'enregistrer
au plus tard le 7 octobre 2011 par courriel au
projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca ou téléphoner au (613) 236
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THE CORE OF HISTORY

by Commander (Ret'd) Richard Archer

How is it that Europeans came to settle in and dominate so much of the world when other peoples had more ancient histories and records of accomplishment in such fields as agriculture, science, technology and the arts? The reason was maritime power. And therein lies a lesson for Canada.

The rise of Europe

In *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*,¹ Jared Diamond argues that Europe's advantage was its proximity to the fertile lands surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates. Europeans abandoned some of their hunter-gathering pursuits to exploit the region's potential for agriculture. Success in agriculture freed much of the population of Europe from direct reliance on food production for survival. When the time was ripe, a significant portion of the population could then assemble in towns and cities, and begin to develop specializations such as architecture, military prowess and the arts.

This begs the question: why had sub-Saharan Africans, who had undergone a developmental process even earlier, not invaded Europe?

It was not due to biology - the peoples of Africa and the Americas had no less brainpower than the Europeans. Nor was it due to a shortage of natural resources or weak political and social structures - certainly not in the case of pre-Columbian Americans.

Diamond suggests that distance and territorial impediments discouraged movement and learning. Moreover, variation in climate hindered the domestication of livestock, which was such a critical factor in Europe's burgeoning agriculture and social development.

Freed from hunting and gathering for survival, Europe was afforded the luxury to experiment, innovate and expand in ways other societies could not.

Into China


By the 18th century, when Europeans settled in China in large numbers, the Chinese Empire had been in existence for more

than a thousand years. Why had the Chinese not long since subjugated and settled large swathes of Asia, east Africa and western North America? It is not as if they had not possessed the technology.

In fact, from 1405 to 1433, using known sea lines of communication the Chinese admiral Zheng He led seven expeditions as far west as the coast of Africa on behalf of his emperor. His objectives were to exert imperial control through showing the flag, exacting tribute, and suppressing piracy and local rebellions. His fleet included massive 120 metre 'treasure ships,' said to have as many as nine masts. Compare this with the puny ships of 27 metre that the Portuguese explorer Vasco Da Gama used in 1497-98 to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and establish a route to the riches of India. Unfortunately for China, Zheng He's initiative fell afoul of palace power struggles and was not repeated. Later emperors, still largely continental in their outlook, lacked the outward-looking global vision to take advantage of Zheng He's expeditionary acumen.

The Europeans on the other hand were relentless, even if their forays into China were not always successful. In 1793, British Lord Macartney, in an effort to jumpstart trade, presented the emperor with a wide range of British goods. "But the Emperor was not remotely interested. The gifts were regarded as items of tribute from a respectful liege."² Mercantile zeal drove governments to support private interests such as the Dutch giant *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* and the smaller British East India Company in their distant ventures, including authorizing such companies to arm their vessels and

raise their own standing armies to subjugate local populations, with all the excesses one might expect. In the interests of trade, the personal coffers East Indies as well as India became virtual commercial properties. Some of these practices lasted into the late 19th and early 20th centuries,



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with King Leopold II of Belgium assuming private 'ownership' of the Congo and its population, with all the riches from ivory and rubber going into his personal coffers.

In China, European practices led to the two Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-58. Their root cause was the British need to overcome Chinese governmental restrictions on the import of poppy derivative to supply the Chinese market so that the British could raise the cash to pay for and take home that other commodity required to slake their very own British addiction - tea. British gunships and troops overcame such Chinese defences as there were and treaties were signed, according the foreigners open access to "treaty ports" and ceding certain territories such as Hong Kong, which became a British crown colony in 1842. Iconic trading companies like Jardine, Matheson and Co. were ensconced. In due course, France, Germany, Russia and Japan secured their own concessions. Understandably, the Chinese call this period in their history the "century of humiliation."

Maritime expeditionary capability

Clearly, "guns, germs, and steel" do not tell the whole story. They were certainly important factors in European development and the proximate causes of early European successes. But European mercantilism - the penchant for seeking wealth and profits wherever they could be found - was the common factor in the subjugation of the Americas, Africa and China. None of this pursuit of global riches, however, would have been possible in the absence of a European maritime culture and ocean-going ships and their weapons, what we would call today maritime expeditionary capability. It is this capability that has been at the core of human history for the last 500 years or so.

So where did this expeditionary capability come from? Why did maritime capability arise in Europe rather than anywhere else? The geography of Europe provides the answer.

Unlike other continents, Europe is a mass of peninsulas. Counting southwest Asia, the peninsulas include the Anatolian, Greek, Italian, Iberian, Brest, Danish and Swedish/Norwegian. A number of inland seas result, and relatively large islands lie in proximity. So the quickest trade routes are by sea, and often out of sight of land. Coastal states, of which there were many, usually in competition with each other, would readily develop a maritime culture that enabled distant exploration, conquest, settlement and pursuit of wealth.

Such a culture was initiated by the explorers, conquerors and settlers *par excellence*, the Vikings. Hence the ultimate cause of European global hegemony, colonization and settlement was Europe's unusual, but human-exploited, geography.³

What lessons can we derive from this? One is that a nation's perceived power and influence is still measured at least in part in how well it can deploy its warships to the far corners of the world. When certain European nations cut back on their navies and hesitate to deploy overseas in harm's way, they are discovering a corresponding loss of influence. China, on the other hand, after securing its landward approaches through treaty and cooperation, is now overturning millennia of inward-looking continentalism and developing a maritime vision and expeditionary capability. The recent Chinese naval deployments to the Horn of Africa are only a start. Look out when they want to assert even greater control over their own sea approaches and ocean resources, even to the point of being able to keep US aircraft carriers at bay.

Where does this leave Canada, which today tends to have its own continental, non-maritime outlook? If we wish to have more influence in maintaining our prosperity, in safeguarding our three ocean approaches, in extending our security as far as possible out from our shores, in helping distant peoples in distress, and in exporting Canadian values to less developed places, then two things have to happen.

First, we must develop more of a 'maritime consciousness,' as opposed to the 'maritime blindness' of recent times. Even after the naval successes of the Second World War, Canadians did not develop much sense of the importance of the maritime domain to their prosperity and security. Changing a culture is difficult. The impetus and vision must come from the federal government. But if the Chinese can change their maritime culture, so can we.

Second, we must actively support the development and

(Endnotes)

1 Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

2 Simon Winchester, *The River at the Center of the World: A Journey up the Yangtze, and Back in Chinese Time* (Toronto: Harper Perennial, 2004) 49.

3 Diamond, 413-416. In *Guns Germs and Steel* Diamond does mention this factor, but only in passing in an epilogue added to a later edition. ©



F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER COSTS

by Alan Williams

In the previous edition of *On Track*, two articles were presented on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter acquisition, one by David Perry and one by Lieutenant-General (ret'd) George Macdonald. These articles raise a number of issues worthwhile to debate.

First, regarding the acquisition costs, none of us know for certain what the final acquisition cost will be for the F-35. David Perry concluded that the acquisition cost for each F-35 is likely in the order of \$115 million. This estimate is consistent with mine, but is still just an estimate that can change significantly by the time we make the purchase. Without a competition we also cannot know what competitors will charge for their product. As such the F-35 may or may not be cost competitive.

Second, with respect to the ongoing support costs, in the United States there is much angst over the trillion-dollar sustainment cost figure released in the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) report put out by the US Department of Defence. While there may or may not turn out to be economies of scale, today's reality is that the long-term sustainment costs are well beyond initial forecasts. The 2010 SAR report shows F-35A operations and sustainment costs as 22 percent higher than the F-16, while as recently as 2007, Lockheed Martin was claiming costs 20 percent lower than the older aircraft. The current costs (\$16,425 an hour, in 2002 dollars) are at least 80 percent more than was originally promised, according to the 2001 SAR. I agree with David Perry's conclusion that, "the money that DND is allocating to sustain the aircraft appears to be insufficient."

Third, the Air Force's determination that the F-35 is the only aircraft that could meet the Canadian requirement is certainly suspect. As everyone knows by now the statement of requirements (SOR) was finalized in 2010, four years after DND officials recommended the F-35 to the minister. Can

anyone doubt that the SOR was 'wired' or 'fixed' to reach the desired outcome? Furthermore, the air force did not have all the sensitive data from competitors to conclude that the F-35 was the only jet that could meet Canada's needs. On 4 November 2010, Kory G. Mathews, Boeing's vice-president for the F/A-18 program appeared before the House Standing Committee on National Defence. In his opening comments, Mr. Mathews stated that the Super Hornet incorporates the latest defence technology advancements, including an integrated display of fused data from a new wide array of sensors, making it the newest combat fighter attack aircraft in operational service today with US forces.

He then goes on to reveal that the Canadian Air Force never learned about the high technology of the aircraft. Here is what he told the committee:

"Although some preliminary discussions between Canadian Air Force and United States Navy officials took place in 2008 and early 2009, to our knowledge Canadian officials have not yet received the full complement of Super Hornet performance data from the United States Navy, including those about the aircraft's stealth characteristics."

"While security constraints preclude us from having even the most general discussion of this matter in this forum, I can assure you that the Canadian experts will find these briefings most informative and enlightening. I would respectfully suggest that you request this data from the United States Navy, if only to ensure that you make a fully informed decision as part of any next-generation fighter selection process."


Clearly, the Air Force did not have all the necessary data from Boeing. Quite possibly, the air force did not have the necessary data from other potential suppliers.

Fourth, there is still a lack of a clear understanding regarding industrial and regional benefits. In 2002, I signed the memorandum of understanding enabling Canada to participate in the System Development and Demonstration phase of the F-35 program. I did this because without joining the program, Canadian industry would have been excluded from any opportunity to win contracts in this multi-billion dollar program. As Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Macdonald noted in his article, Canadian industry has been very successful, winning contracts valued at about \$350 million with an opportunity to bid on about \$12 billion more. If Canadian industry were to win 40-50 percent of

Mr. Williams retired in 2005, as Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) at the Department of National Defence, following a 33-year career in the federal public service. In 2002 he signed the Memorandum of Understanding committing Canada to the second phase of the Joint Strike Fighter program. He is now President of The Williams Group and a Research Associate with Defence Management Studies at the School of Public Policies at Queen's University.

these opportunities (certainly not an easy target to achieve), \$4.8-\$6 billion would accrue to Canada. However, under the traditional competitive approach each bidder must guarantee benefits equal to or greater than the life cycle contract. In this case, using the government's estimates, \$16 billion in benefits would be guaranteed to Canada.

The F-35 may turn out to be the best aircraft to meet Canada's needs. However, given the five-year delay in the program and the cost uncertainty, shouldn't the government be exploring alternatives? The Australians and the US Navy are buying F-18s as a hedge against the F-35. The United Kingdom is deferring its decision until 2015. Surely, Canada should also have a contingency plan. ©



REJOINDER

by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald

F-35 costs

While it is premature to be definitive about acquisition costs of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and even more so regarding sustainment costs, the economies of scale to be exploited are unequivocal. The opportunity to benefit from a US-funded development phase and a common purchase price for all program members is unparalleled in aircraft programs. Moreover, Canada, as a partner nation, has a say in containing costs. Operating fighter aircraft is expensive, but the F-35 presents an opportunity to manage the risk for a leading-edge capability that is good value for Canadian taxpayer dollars.

New fighter requirement

To suggest that the Statement of Requirements were 'fixed' to select the F-35 is inappropriately critical of the extensive work done by the DND project team in developing the requirement, gathering information and substantiating their recommendation. I seriously doubt that they made any recommendation to the defence minister in 2006, as emphasized in the Williams article. Whatever interaction occurred, the key milestone was in spring 2010 when the government considered the conclusions of the three departments involved - Defence, Public Works and Government Services, and Industry. This, of course, resulted in the decision and announcement of Canada's decision to acquire the F-35.

While the Super Hornet is a very capable aircraft, it is unable to meet some key high level mandatory requirements for the next generation fighter - interoperability, survivability, and sensor and data fusion capabilities. The project team had access to all the data they needed, much of which is highly classified, to fully support their conclusion that the F-35 was the only aircraft to meet all of the requirements.

Industrial benefits

The current value of opportunities in the industrial participation plan for JSF work in Canada is about \$12 billion, well above the anticipated acquisition cost of the aircraft. Importantly, there will be further opportunities for Canadian companies for in-service support work. The jobs created and maintained through these contracts are in the high technology, aerospace sector with the potential to persist for decades. While there are no guarantees for Canadian companies, they have proven their ability to compete and win quality JSF work, even before the government made its decision.

Conclusion

We need to be committed to provide the Canadian Forces with the best capability possible that meets the requirement, consistent with the government's mandate. That said, this is a large, complex project not without risk of cost increases and schedule delays. The Canadian project team will need to continue to monitor the situation closely to ensure that there is no capability gap as the transition from old to new fighters is executed. ©

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald, a former fighter pilot in the Canadian Forces, retired as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2004. He is now a senior partner with an Ottawa consultancy which counts Lockheed Martin as a client. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Macdonald is a fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Exhibition review

**WAR + MEDICINE: IT'S NOT ABOUT WAR**

reviewed by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

The *War + Medicine* exhibit at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa powerfully portrays the impact of war through the lens of the medical experiences of both combatants and civilians. The exhibit personalises war for its audience in two distinctive ways.

First and most explicitly, war becomes personalised through the mementos and stories of soldiers. Boots pocked with shrapnel punctures once worn by a very fortunate Canadian reservist, and audio-visual displays of painful personal memories remind the audience that, for combatants, war does not end when the killing stops. Despite the best attempts by instructors to desensitise soldiers, it is clear that war is deeply personal.

Second and more implicitly, this exhibit personalises war through its relationship to the medical experience. While most Canadians will never encounter combat, almost all have experienced medical care. We know medicine from hospital visits for broken bones or high fevers, a prescription for a deficiency or caring for a sick loved one. While it cannot be presumed that the viewer knows war, it can be said that they know the experience of medical care - the concern for one's health, the fear of not knowing a test result, and the frustration and tediousness of healing. This simplicity is what makes the *War + Medicine* exhibit so powerful: it's not about war, it's about the medical impact of war.

The exhibit is organized along three broad themes: The System, The Body and The Mind. The System is a history of the relationship between war and medicine from pre-1850 to the modern era. The Body displays the health impact of war from infections to wounds. And, The Mind highlights the 'invisible injuries' of Operational Stress Injuries and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Each section independently tells its own story. This enables the themes to stand alone, but also makes them somewhat redundant. The viewer learns about the impact of disease and infections, public health propaganda, and the political relationship between war and medicine in both The System

and The Body. The angle of these topics is different in the two sections, but the value-added of revisiting these subjects is limited. The story might have been stronger if all three of these subjects had been comprehensively covered in The System section.

This thematic organization is also a departure from the temporally organized permanent collection of the War Museum. Each independent theme provides its own history and the viewer is told a different historical story. This choice of organization is neither a strength nor a weakness, but personal preference will determine the extent to which the individual is compelled by the thematic story.

Yet the story is nevertheless insightful, at least if the viewer can stomach some of the more nauseating artefacts and descriptions. In The System, some of history's more archaic methods of bleeding patients, extracting teeth and sawing bones can turn even the strongest stomach. In The Body, wounded brains, bones and limbs preserved in formaldehyde force keen viewers to divert their eyes. And, in The Mind, descriptions by family members and combatants about the aftermath of painful choices and experiences in war should make even desensitised viewers hang their head in empathic pain. The ability of *War + Medicine* to impact its viewers is a testament to its strength in personalizing the war experience.

So although death is often the dark centrepiece of the war experience, this exhibit highlights an often overlooked impact of war: the challenge of life after combat. While it may be unintentional, this theme is particularly significant in the context of Canada's returning Afghanistan veterans. Alarming personal stories of the mental and physical toll of combat coupled with an apt statement by a German First World War veteran, "I did this for you, what will you do for me?", are stark reminders of the implied lesson of *War + Medicine*: the uneasy relationship between medicine and war does not simply stop when the violence does. If one wants to better understand how war impacts society, this exhibit should be required viewing.

The War + Medicine exhibit is being presented at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa until 15 November. Entrance to the museum is free on Thursday evenings. Serving military members are not required to pay admission price. ©

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is the Vice-President (Communications) of Women in Defence and Security (WiDS) and an Army Reservist. She is a Defence Policy Analyst with the CDA Institute.



CHURCHILL, SEIGNEUR DE GUERRE

par Carlo d'Este

Une critique par le Brigadier-général (ret) Pierre Sénécal

D'Este, Carlo. *Churchill seigneur de guerre*. France: Perrin, 23 September 2010, 1046 pages. ISBN: 978-2-262-03113-8. Traduction de WARLORD a Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945.

(Cet article est reproduit avec la permission de la revue la Citadelle - rédacteur.)

En terminant la lecture de cette brique de 911 pages, on peut se demander si Winston Churchill était un génie ou un braqué de l'Empire britannique? Une question qui pourrait faire l'objet d'un bon débat. Il a sûrement été un immense chef de guerre; à la fois un politicien au gouvernement et un civil en uniforme au quartier-général des Forces britanniques. Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill né le 30 novembre 1874 était un homme brillant, un mélange d'assurance, d'arrogance, de sarcasme et de romantisme. Il était dépassé par la guerre moderne aussi bien du côté stratégique que pour les affaires de la logistique. Avec ces déficiences couplées à sa vision théâtrale de la guerre, on peut dire que Winston a fait baver tous les hauts gradés qui ont eu la chance ou la malchance de travailler avec lui. Néanmoins, chacun reconnaissait qu'il pouvait être relevé de son poste par Churchill mais tous le protégeaient dans ses fonctions de Premier ministre et ministre de la Défense. Éventuellement, tous ont aussi avoué que sans lui le monde libre aurait probablement perdu la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Winston Churchill est décédé le 24 janvier 1965 emportant avec lui l'auréole du sauveur du monde libre et deux amères défaites: celle de ne pas avoir su restaurer l'Empire et celle d'avoir subi l'ingratitude des Britanniques lors de son échec aux élections du 26 juillet 1945.

Dès le début de son ouvrage, l'auteur présente un homme fasciné par la guerre sans pour autant l'aimer. Toutefois, il restera seul, debout, face à un Hitler fou de joie à la suite de la réussite de ses armées dans les Pays-Bas, la Belgique et la France en mai et juin 1940. Mais qui était Winston Churchill? D'Este ne retrace qu'une facette de la vie de ce bulldog, celle de Seigneur de guerre. Il ne s'attarde pas aux menus détails, il insiste surtout sur l'effet Churchill face à la

situation de guerre créée par le fascisme d'Hitler. Churchill est né dans le palais de Blenheim, demeure ancestrale des ducs de Malborough, ce qui lui confère l'héritage de son père Randolph descendant de cette lignée aristocratique. Sa mère, Jennie Jerome, est américaine. Une nourrice remplace l'amour de ses parents et surveille le jeune espiègle jouer à la guerre avec ses 1500 soldats de plomb. Les manifestations de suffisance et de vantardise de l'adolescent, durant ses études primaires, lui valent des corrections par le fouet. Plus tard, son manque de talent et la rigueur du père mèneront le jeune Winston vers la classe militaire à Harrow puis à Sandhurst, à sa troisième tentative, plutôt qu'à Oxford faute de moyens financiers. Second-lieutenant au 4^e Régiment des Hussards en 1895 il recherche déjà l'action, la gloire, les médailles et les citations. Ce sont la Havane, les Indes et l'Égypte qui seront les premiers théâtres de ses désirs de prouesses. Ces périodes rudes et primitives lui enseignent la maxime de sa vie, à savoir: Ne jamais se contenter d'une réponse négative ni de jamais mépriser l'ennemi. Comme son père il aspire à une carrière politique et voit l'armée comme une voie royale pour gagner un siège au Parlement. Homme de l'Empire, il croit à son rôle d'élever les valeurs de la race humaine dans le monde. À la guerre des Boers avec la Royal Yeomanry de Buckinghamshire il rédige l'histoire de ses expériences. Il ne se gêne pas pour critiquer les tactiques des Britanniques ainsi que leur arrogance à prétendre que la victoire leur est acquise seulement dû au fait qu'ils soient britanniques. Fait prisonnier, il s'évade faisant fi de la solidarité avec ses camarades, ce qui lui vaudra plusieurs critiques. En revanche, le récit de son évasion lui rapportera aussi bien financièrement qu'en reconnaissance mondiale, aux États-Unis comme en Europe.

À son retour de la guerre des Boers en 1901, Churchill prononce son premier discours à la Chambre. Il s'oppose aux efforts militaires et lance ses critiques à gauche et à droite. Son mariage le 12 septembre 1908 à Clémentine Hozier lui apporte le bonheur de quatre enfants, trois filles et un garçon. Plus tard, le clan familial connaîtra de grands malheurs.

Brigadier-général (ret) Pierre Sénécal est du R22e R.

Au début du 20^e Siècle Churchill touche à tout. Entre autres choses, ses leçons de pilotage d'avions exaspèrent son épouse au plus haut degré. Nommé Premier Lord de l'Amirauté il harangue les Amiraux vers une modernisation des équipements ainsi que la restructuration de la Royale dont l'aviation aéronavale, son nouveau dada. Il ne manque pas de supporter les innovations de la Première Guerre mondiale, notamment: le char blindé, l'artillerie et les voitures blindées. Le roi George V n'aimait pas beaucoup Churchill, il disait de lui qu'il était un vrai danger public. En fait, durant les deux premières années de la Grande Guerre, en sa qualité de Premier Lord de l'Amirauté, il agissait comme s'il était commandant des troupes britanniques qui défendaient Anvers ou encore commandant les alliées menant l'offensive sur Gallipoli. Sa soif d'action le conduit sur le front dans la Plaine des Flandres où il commande le 6^e Bataillon Royal Scots Fusiliers. Après cinq mois et demi, il retourne à la vie politique et devient ministre des Munitions en 1916. Durant ce court épisode, l'idée qu'il se fait de la conduite de la guerre et de la carence des généraux restera marquée dans sa mémoire pour longtemps.

Le texte passe rapidement aux situations menant à la Deuxième Guerre mondiale: les pactes entre l'Italie, l'Allemagne et la Russie deviennent des avertissements au monde libre. À la déclaration de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale le trois septembre 1939, Churchill croit que son heure est venue. À cette date, Winston débute des années tout à fait épiques. Les mots: PAS CAPABLE et NON, fondation de sa maxime, sont exclus de son lexique et marqueront la direction de son leadership jusqu'à exaspérer au plus haut degré ses collaborateurs les plus intimes. De retour à l'Amirauté, il se soumet à une cédula de travail à crever un être ordinaire. Durant ces premiers jours, seulement la peur des sous-marins va le convaincre de ne pas envahir la Baltique. Il ne dort pas beaucoup, mange et boit bien whisky et cognac, tout en fumant de bons cigares. Il cultive quelques fantaisies dont: chambre à part avec son épouse avec qui il communique par des billets sous la porte, ses longues combinaisons de travail à "zipper", ses entrevues avec des visiteurs depuis son lit ou sa baignoire, sa distribution de billets À FAIRE AUJOURD'HUI qui donnent des spasmes à ses collaborateurs et son sens de la répartie parfois vulgaire. Rapidement, il est nommé ministre de la Défense en 1940 et de là, mesure la dérive de la Grande-Bretagne dans ses préparatifs à la guerre. Churchill devient commandant en chef des Forces armées en accédant au poste de Premier ministre tout en gardant le portefeuille de ministre de la Défense. Devant ses concitoyens déchirés entre la soumission à Hitler et continuer la bataille, il démontre une ténacité à toute épreuve et n'identifie que deux ennemis: l'Allemagne et ceux qui voulaient faire la paix avec Hitler. Homme de terrain, il est partout et lance ses idées souvent farfelues et aventureuses. Malgré la position


défensive que doit adopter la Grande-Bretagne à la suite de Dunkerque, Churchill prône l'offensive en ordonnant des attaques commandos. Il démontre un contrôle émotionnel exceptionnel face à des décisions douloureuses notamment son refus d'envoyer plus d'avions afin de soutenir la bataille de France et plus tard la destruction de la flotte française pour ne pas qu'elle tombe aux mains des Nazis. Durant ces premiers mois de guerre et cela durera jusqu'à la fin, il entretiendra sa méfiance envers les généraux mais n'en retiendra jamais rien de personnel.

La bonne étoile de Churchill reprend du lustre avec l'entrée en guerre des États-Unis. Ses relations avec Roosevelt seront bonnes et en bon demandeur Churchill respectera son Américain et ses généraux, surtout Marshall et Eisenhower. Tout comme les généraux britanniques Brooke et Ismay, les deux américains feront leur école à ne pas se laisser intimider par Churchill mais ils devront endurer les longues soirées de Winston. En effet, les décisions majeures se prenaient souvent durant ces interminables soirées où les désaccords au sujet des débarquements en Afrique, en Sicile, en Provence, à Anzio et même en Normandie étaient résolus pour le mieux. Sur un autre front, Churchill ne se laissait pas intimider par Staline qu'il considérait comme un allié sournois dont les objectifs futurs demeuraient incertains au mieux. L'auteur retrace la stratégie des bombardements aériens et les nombreuses protestations que cela a déchaînées. Pour ces discussions, le lecteur remarquera que c'est la première et seule fois où D'Este amène de Gaulle dans son texte. Pourtant, la tradition populaire faisait du chef de guerre français la Croix de Lorraine de Churchill. Pour ce dernier cependant, la guerre était devenue américaine.

Vers la fin du texte, le lecteur retrouve des acteurs fatigués. Winston est malade, les grands chefs sont vidés et appréhensifs des succès du grand Débarquement de Normandie. Une des idées de Churchill, la meilleure et le plus grand secret de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, assurera, dans une large mesure le succès de l'opération. Il s'agit des Mulberry, ces ports artificiels amenés des îles anglaises jusqu'en Normandie. D'autres mauvais jours viendront taxer le leadership de Churchill. Les combats opiniâtres des opérations en Normandie et le désastre d'Arnhem démontreront que les Nazis pouvaient continuer la bataille encore un bon bout de temps. Enfin, la capitulation des Armées allemandes est signée à 2 heures 41 minutes le 7 mai 1945. Sans Churchill pour endosser le rôle de Seigneur de guerre, Hitler aurait probablement gagné.

J'espère avoir rendu justice à l'ouvrage de Carlo D'Este. Je suis cependant convaincu que le livre mérite votre lecture pour découvrir un personnage que certains décrivaient 50% génie et 50% imbécile. ©

Book review



THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CANADIAN MILITARY HISTORY

by J. L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver

Reviewed by Paul Chapin

Granatstein, J.L.; and Oliver, Dean. *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History*. Oxford University Press, Don Mills ON, 2011, 528 pages. ISBN-10: 0195430883, ISBN-13: 9780195430882. \$70.00

The conflict in Afghanistan has accorded the profession of arms more attention in Canada in the last decade than for a generation. Yet great numbers of Canadians remain largely oblivious to the central role their armed forces have played in their history. If a single volume could ever correct this deficiency, it would be *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History*, which appeared earlier this year. It deserves a place on the reference shelf of every minister, MP, Senator, government official, journalist, professor and teacher in the country.

Authored by two of Canada's foremost military historians, *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History* succeeds admirably in making the difficult choices between what to include and leave out, laying out the materials in an accessible format, and entertaining the reader with sparkling prose and often startling observations – all leavened with plenty of maps, photos and war art. One finds the expected here: the stories of Canada's great military engagements including a succinct five-page account on Afghanistan; biographies of the soldiers, statesmen and assorted scoundrels who marched through; and intelligent commentary on complex and controversial issues such as Canada-US defence relations, Quebec and the Military, the role of Bomber Command in World War II and the Somalia affair.

But the volume also includes entries on lesser known events: the Sudan expedition of 1884-1885 during which the British employed Canadian boatmen to navigate the Nile's cataracts in the hope of rescuing "Gordon of Khartoum"; the Battle of the St. Lawrence during which German U-boats sank 21 ships and killed over 300 including the 137 passengers and crew of the Sydney to Port aux Basques ferry; the 1941 fiasco in which almost two thousand Canadian soldiers were sent to Hong Kong

in time to be captured and suffer four years of brutal treatment at the hands of Japanese prison guards, including the Canadian-born "Kamloops Kid" executed after the war; and the murder of 187 Canadians captured in Normandy by German troops under the command of Waffen SS General Kurt Meyer. Meyer was later sentenced to death but served only nine years in a Canadian penitentiary, and ended up a beer salesman with clients who included the Canadian military bases in West Germany.

The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History is no mere collection of war stories, however. There are entries on Canada's wartime political leaders up to Jean Chretien (his political success was "supreme" but his effect on the Canadian Forces was "all but disastrous") and Stephen Harper (he "supported the war in Afghanistan and skilfully managed to get parliamentary approval – working with the Liberal Opposition – to extend the mission there until 2011"). There are also entries on how life at home changed during the two world wars; on how military slang became part of our everyday language; on the training programs at Canadian universities "which prepared young officers for military service and strove to inculcate a sense of responsibility for national security"; and on the remarkable advances in medicine driven by the necessity of saving those injured on the battlefield.

The volume is not without some disappointments. One would have hoped for more on the War of 1812, a conflict Canadians love to talk about but understand little. The biographies of Canadian military figures do not include that of General Ray Henault, one of the few Canadians to have served both as Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. It would have been instructive for civilians to learn about military ranks and decorations – and about those who earned the Victoria Cross. There is respectful treatment of the casualties Canadians have suffered in the country's wars and on the war memorials erected in their honour; but the brief entry on the Commonwealth War Graves Commission notes there are 110,000 Canadians buried in 75 countries without indicating where their cemeteries are located. Finally, the next


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edition – and there should certainly be one – might consider more liberal use of the cross references at the bottom of several entries, the better to connect the reader to related stories.

A last note. *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History* represents a landmark in Canadian historiography, a wholly new

approach to the research and writing of our country's military history. Those interested in the subject would be advised to consult the authors' eight-page essay on the subject, as well as the entries for some of Canada's most renowned military historians: Terry Copp, Desmond Morton and C.P. Stacey. But c'mon: no entry for Jack Granatstein? ©

Book review



COUNTERSTRIKE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S SECRET CAMPAIGN AGAINST AL QAEDA

by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Schmitt, Eric; and Shanker, Thom. Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda, Times Books, 336 pages

The raid on the compound that housed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on May 2 of this year in Abbottabad, Pakistan brought to the fore strategic shifts and technological advancements powering the US fight against Al Qaeda since 9/11: the deep gathering of human and signals intelligence, the sharing of information and blurring of boundaries between US national security, military and law enforcement organizations, and the ability to rapidly exploit intelligence. Prior to and immediately following 9/11, this sort of operation would not have been possible, as divergent goals, policy and legal difficulties and institutional interests hampered the adoption of a common approach to the challenge of terrorism.

In *Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda*, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker - both senior national security correspondents for *The New York Times* - describe a revolution in the US government's strategic approach to Al Qaeda. Around 2005, America's fight against terrorism moved away from "kill and capture" towards deterrence and cultivating a true 'whole of government' effort.

This new model targeted terrorists and their supporting elements. In other words, the United States attacked Al Qaeda's network - its leadership, safe havens, communications, movement, weapons flows, financing, ideology and personnel. US planners also outlined key personal, familial and cultural

motivations driving individual terrorists in order to deter them at the micro (e.g. family, community) and macro (e.g. national) levels. These ideas eventually led to a set of key decisions in early 2006 endorsed by President George W. Bush, resulting in a substantial policy shift that achieved concrete results in Iraq and elsewhere.

The book explores discrete aspects of the new approach. One chapter examines the ability to rapidly collect and exploit captured intelligence. For example, an encounter in 2006 in Iraq led to a trove of electronic equipment (cellphones, computers, storage drives) that was subjected to forensic extraction, network analysis and rapid dissemination of the end results. Crucial victories were achieved when the skills of otherwise discrete groups - conventional and special forces, codebreakers, intelligence analysts, and sensitive-site exploitation experts - were combined.

Other chapters of the book address the challenges the United States faces in its relationship with Pakistan, the use of the Internet by jihadists, homegrown terrorism, and the expansion of US public diplomacy efforts. Throughout *Counterstrike* there are fascinating descriptions of how officials from varied backgrounds and billets came together to illuminate their adversaries' networks, neutralize their ability to communicate, attack their sources of financing and weapons, and even spoof and mislead them online and offline.

Overall, Schmitt and Shanker provide an illuminating *tour de force* of the shift in US national security thinking over the past five years. Their application of the overarching idea of deterrence

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is a useful plot device to bring together all the various elements. The narrative is populated with profiles of key personalities, be they warriors, thinkers, policy makers, or desk-bound analysts. There are revealing tidbits throughout, including details of key operations in Iraq and little known facts, such as the Bush administration's attempts to communicate with Al Qaeda after 9/11.

However, there are some glaring weaknesses to *Counterstrike*. The book focuses mainly on the period after 2005, and only cursory attention is given to the immediate post-9/11 period. This period saw the invasion of Afghanistan, the intelligence failure powering the invasion of Iraq, controversial interrogation techniques, and Guantanamo Bay. It deserved a more detailed exploration.

Furthermore, the book is mostly laudatory and does not focus on more critical or controversial issues. Was the 'attack the network' approach portable to other conflicts and challenges? For instance, General Stanley McChrystal's strategy in Iraq did not necessarily fare well in the Afghan theatre. This is even more relevant today as the US expands its 'shadow war' into Africa, with the requisite military and intelligence assets and methods.

In addition, the authors do not address the ethical and legal issues involved with the no-holds-barred sharing of intelligence and cooperation across military, intelligence, and law enforcement organizational boundaries. For example, it was recently revealed that the New York Police Department collaborated closely with the Central Intelligence Agency in monitoring specific ethnic groups. The movement of David Petraeus as commander of US military operations in Afghanistan to his current post as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the close cooperation between the Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA during the bin Laden raid, have raised concerns over the militarization of intelligence activities. The threat to civil liberties - especially with the expansion of activity by the National Security Agency - is not explored. Finally, the role played by private industry and contractors as providers of capabilities and ideas is ignored (for further reading, the *Washington Post* website features an interesting project called "Top Secret America" that explores the national security build-up in the United States since 9/11, including the agencies, contractors and contracts involved).

Despite these shortcomings, *Counterstrike* is a worthy read. Schmitt and Shanker leverage their considerable experience and connections to bring together an important work on the shifts in US national security policy in the past few years. ©



01 July, 2011, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN. From left to right, the Hon. Peter G. MacKay, the Minister of National Defence, (U.S) General David Petraeus, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, NTM-A's deputy commander in charge of police training and General Walt Natynczyk, Chief of Defence Staff, following Lieutenant-General Beare's promotion.

Photo by MCpl. Rory Wilson, Canadian Forces © 2011 DND-MDN Canada

1er juillet 2011, KABOUL, AFGHANISTAN. À la suite de la promotion du Lieutenant-général Beare. De gauche à droite : l'Hon. Peter G. MacKay, Ministre de la Défense nationale, le Général David Petraeus, commandant de la Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (FIAS), le Lieutenant-général Stuart Beare, commandant adjoint responsable de la formation de la police pour la Mission OTAN de formation en Afghanistan (NTM A), et le Général Walt Natynczyk, Chef d'état-major de la Défense.

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