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ON TRACK

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COVER PHOTO: The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Peter Mac-Kay, addresses the 2012 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le Ministre de la Défense nationale, l'Honorable Peter MacKay, s'adresse à la Conférence d'Ottawa 2012 sur la défense et la sécurité. Photo: Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD



he CDA and CDA Institute have been busy since our last publication: the 2012 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security was held on 23 and 24 February, and the CDA Institute has released a number of major commentaries on issues related to defence and security. The addresses delivered at the Ottawa Conference are available on our website. Furthermore, the Institute's research studies, which provide a strategic outlook for Canadian defence and security, a discussion on the federal budget, a review of Operation Mobile, and a SITREP on Operation Attention, are also available on our website.

The past few months have also seen a change of command at the CDA Institute, whereby at a February board meeting the president's gavel was passed from Dr. John Scott Cowan to General (ret) Raymond Henault. We are grateful for the four years of leadership Dr. Cowan has provided and we are very pleased that he will continue with his valuable association with the Institute.

The CDA Institute is honoured with General Henault's acceptance of the presidency of the Institute. He has been recognized as an outstanding Canadian who has served his country proudly during his distinguished career of service culminating, first, as Chief of the Defence Staff followed by his appointment as Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO. In 2007 General Henault was presented with the Institute's Vimy Award by Her Excellency the Rt. Hon. Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, in recognition of his significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation, and towards the preservation of our democratic values.

The CDA Institute also welcomes Mr. Paul Chapin into the role of Vice President. Paul comes to the role of Vice President after working at the CDA Institute's Director of Research, and over 25 years in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade culminating as the Director General for International Security.

This spring edition of *ON TRACK* features articles focused on two themes: the 2012 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, and the impact of the 2012 Budget on Defence. In the first section, Colonel (ret) Brian MacDonald presents a summary of the proceedings of the Ottawa Conference, and Dr. John Scott Cowan provides a discussion on Canada's place in the international system. In the second section of this edition, Colonel (ret) Brian MacDonald and David Perry examine the Federal Budget and provide an insider's perspective on how this budget will impact defence spending in Canada.

This edition also includes a number of featured essays by Dr. Pierre Jolicoeur, Sophie Lamothe, Keith Mines, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, and Rob Roy. Respectively, these essays examine Russian-American relations, NATO-Canada relations, US-Mexico security, the changing roles of honoraries in army regiments, and engaging young leaders in the military. Lastly, this edition also features an interview with La CAD et l'Institut de la CAD ont été très occupés depuis notre dernière publication : la Conférence d'Ottawa 2012 sur la défense et la sécurité a été tenue les 23 et 24 février et l'Institut de la CAD a publié quatre commentaires majeurs sur des questions reliées à la défense et à la sécurité. Les conférences prononcées lors de la Conférence d'Ottawa sont disponibles sur notre site Web. De plus, on pourra trouver sur notre site Web des études de recherche l'Institut, qui donnent un aperçu stratégique pour la défense et la sécurité canadiennes, une discussion sur le budget fédéral, un examen de l'opération Mobile et un RAPSIT sur l'opération Attention.

Les quelques derniers mois ont aussi vu un changement de commandement à l'Institut de la CAD, par lequel une séance du conseil tenue en février a passé le maillet du présdient de M. John Scott Cowan au Général (ret.) Raymond Henault. Nous sommes reconnaissants pour les trois ans de leadership dont M. Cowan a gratifié la Conférence et nous sommes très heureux qu'il poursuive sa précieuse association avec l'Institut.

L'Institut de la CAD est honoré de l'acceptation du Général Henault, qui a fièrement servi son pays pendant sa distinguée carrière de service qui a atteint son point culminant comme chef de l'état-major de la défense, puis comme président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN. En 2007 le Général Henault a été récipiendaire du prix Vimy ... qui lui a été remis par Son Excellence la Très honorable Michaëlle Jean, gouverneure générale et commandante en chef du Canada en reconnaissance de sa contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre nation et vers la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

L'Institut de la CAD accueille également M. Paul Chapin à la viceprésidence. Paul arrive à ce poste après avoir travaillé comme directeur de la recherche de l'Institut de la CAD et plus de 25 ans au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, où il a atteint son point culminant comme directeur général de la sécurité internationale.

Cette édition du printemps de ON TRACK propose des articles qui portent sur deux thèmes : la Conférence d'Ottawa 2012 sur la défense et la sécurité et l'impact du budget 2012 sur la Défense. Dans la première partie, le Colonel (ret.) Brian MacDonald présente un sommaire des débats de la Conférence d'Ottawa et M. John Scott Cowan offre/présente une discussion de la place du Canada dans le système international. Dans la deuxième partie de ce numéro, le Colonal (ret.) Brian MacDonald et David Perry examinent le budget fédéral et présentent un point de vue de l'interne sur la façon dont ce budget aura un impact sur les dépenses de défense au Canada.

Ce numéro comprend/compte également un certain d'essais par Pierre Jolicoeur, Sophie Lamothe, Keith Mines, Meghan Spilka O'Keefe et Rob Roy. Ces essais examinent successivement les relations russo-américaines, les relations OTAN-Canada, la sécurité É.-U.-Mexique, les rôles changeants des honoraires dans les régiments d'armée, et l'engagement des leaders jeunes dans le military. Finalement, ce numéro présente aussi une entrevue avec le diplomate canadien Robert Fowler, ainsi que des comptes rendus de lectures sur A Season in Hell, The Patrol, DarkMarket, Shelldrake, et Seabound Coast.

Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, as well as book reviews on <i>A Season in Hell, The Patrol, DarkMarket, Shelldrake</i> , and <i>Seabound Coast</i> .	Je veux remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et particulièrement nos dona- teurs des niveaux patron, compagnon et officier, pour l'appui finan-
I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, compan- ions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work	cier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut. Sans eux, l'Institut aurait beaucoup de difficulté à s'acquitter de son mandat.
of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our mandate.	Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau supporteur, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau
If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation of \$75 or higher, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months:	plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don : Un reçu d'impôt pour don caritatif ;
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THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY / LA CONFÉRENCE D'OTTAWA SUR LA DÉFENSE ET LA SÉCURITÉ

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

The following is a review of the CDA and CDA Institute's Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, which was held on 23-24 February 2012 at the Fairmont Chateau Laurier.

n his keynote address during last year's Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, the Minister of National Defence pointed to the ever greater blurring of the distinction between domestic and international security and defence issues. Given this past year's Kandahar drawdown, the unforeseen Libya mission, domestic emergencies (floods and forest fires), billion dollar procurement announcements, and continuing Canadian Forces transformation efforts, the Minister's words were prophetic indeed.

Day one of the 2012 Ottawa Conference, titled "Canada and the World," was hosted by the CDA Institute which this year celebrates its 25th anniversary. Expert speakers provided indepth analysis on the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Libya, energy security, and other issues of importance to Canada. Day two of the conference, titled "The Canadian Forces – Capabilities Required for Home and Away Missions" was hosted by the CDA, which celebrates its 80th anniversary this year. In it, Canadian and allied military leaders provide us with updates on current and future challenges.

The Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security is the largest public defence and security conference in Canada. More than 600 political and military leaders, industry professionals, academic experts, members of the public and students attending this conference were treated to stimulating keynote presentations and informative panel discussions.

DAY ONE

Keynote speakers:

The Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the United States Navy, began by reminding us of the close cooperation between our two countries from the time of the creation of the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to the present day. He noted the impact that the financial crises have had upon defence budgets but declared that the United States still has and will continue to have the forces and the will to stay globally engaged, though with an increasing focus on the Asia-Pacific area, and on the Western Pacific particularly on the part of the Navy.

He called for greater transparency on the part of China, and reiterated traditional United States policy with respect to freedom of the seas especially in heavily travelled areas such as

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald is Senior Defence Analyst of the Conference of Defence Associations and a Director of the Atlantic Council of Canada. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute. Dans son allocution d'ouverture de la Conférence d'Ottawa de l'an dernier, le ministre de la Défense nationale affirmait que la distinction entre les questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada et sur la scène internationale s'estompait. Compte tenu, l'an dernier, du retrait de Kandahar, de la mission imprévue en Libye, des sinistres (inondations et feux de forêts), de l'octroi de contrats de plusieurs milliards de dollars d'approvisionnement de matériel militaire et des efforts continus de transformation des Forces canadiennes, l'affirmation du ministre était tout à fait juste.

La première journée de la Conférence d'Ottawa 2012, intitulée « Le Canada et le monde », était tenue sous les auspices de l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense qui célèbre, cette année, son 25e anniversaire. Des conférenciers experts offraient des analyses en profondeur sur le Moyen-Orient, l'Asie-Pacifique, la Libye, la sécurité énergétique et d'autres questions d'importance pour le Canada. La deuxième journée de la Conférence d'Ottawa, intitulée « Les Forces canadiennes – les capacités requises pour les missions au Canada et à l'étranger » était tenue sous les auspices de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense qui célèbre, cette année, son 80e anniversaire. Des dirigeants militaires canadiens et alliés nous parlaient des défis militaires actuels et à envisager.

La Conférence d'Ottawa (2012) sur la défense et la sécurité est la plus importante conférence en son genre au Canada. Plus que 600 dirigeants politiques et militaires, les professionnels de l'industrie, les experts universitaires et les étudiants qui assistent à la conférence ont eu l'heur d'entendre des présentations thèmes et des discussions en panel tout à fait stimulantes.

PREMIÈRE JOURNÉE

Conférenciers d'honneur

L'Honorable Ray Mabus, secrétaire des États-Unis à la marine, a commencé en nous rappelant l'étroite coopération entre nos deux pays depuis l'époque de la création de la Convention d'Ogdensburg et de la Commission mixte permanente de défense jusqu'à nos jours. Il a noté l'impact que les crises financières ont eu sur les budgets de la défense, mais il a déclaré que les États-Unis possèdent encore et vont continuer à avoir les forces et la volonté de rester engagés au niveau mondial, mais avec un accent plus prononcé sur la région Asie-Pacifique et sur le Pacifique occidental, particulièrement de la part de la Marine.

Il a réclamé une plus grande transparence de la part de la Chine et réitéré la politique traditionnelle des États-Unis à l'égard de la liberté des mers, particulièrement dans les régions où la circulation est dense, comme le détroit de Malacca, par où transite the Straits of Malacca, which accounts for some 40% of global seaborne trade.

Turning to North America, he observed that the security of the United States depends in major part upon secure energy resources and suggested that the United States is overly dependent on overseas oil and that since Canada now supplies over 25% of US oil consumption, Canada is part of the solution with respect to US oil supplies.

Dr. Uzi Arad, former Israeli National Security Advisor, stated bluntly that the most critical threat to Middle Eastern peace, and to global peace, is the potential for a nuclear Iran, and that the objective for the West must be the frustration of Iranian

quelque 40 % du commerce maritime mondial.

En se tournant vers l'Amérique du Nord, il a fait remarquer que la sécurité des États-Unis dépend en majeure partie de sources d'approvisionnement sûres et il a suggéré que les États-Unis étaient excessivement dépendants du prétrole étranger et que, puisque le Canada fournit maintenant plus de 25 % de la consommation de prétrole aux États-Unis, il fait partie de la solution en ce qui a trait aux approvisionnements pétroliers américains.

M. Uzi Arad, ancien conseiller israélien de sécurité nationale, a déclaré sans ambages que la menace la plus critique à la paix au Moyen-Orient, et à la paix mondiale, est la possibilité que l'Iran accède au nucléaire et que l'objectif de l'Occident doit



être la frustration des objectifs nucléaires de l'Iran. Il a traité explicitement du dilemme stratégique auquel l'Ouest fait face : tandis que l'Ouest ne veut collectivement pas aller en guerre contre l'Iran, le régime iranien n'est pas prêt à abandonner son programme nucléaire. et une fois ses buts atteints, il sera soumis à une pression interne considérable pour l'utiliser. Les sanctions pétrolières ne fonctionnent pas, l'action militaire n'est pas crédible et une stratégie de préemption n'est pas crédible sans être accompagnée d'une volonté de frappe.

Panel 1 at the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security: Dr. Roland Paris, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Dr. Anne Fitz-Gerald, and Ferry de Kerckhove.

nuclear goals. He explicitly tackled the strategic dilemma facing the West: while the West collectively does not want to go to war with Iran, the Iranian regime is not prepared to abandon its nuclear programme and once it has achieved its goals will be under considerable internal pressure to use it. Oil sanctions are not working, military action is not credible, and a strategy of pre-emption is not credible without a willingness to strike.

He stressed that Israel maintains its right of self-defence, and that Israeli pre-emption is a possible means of exercising that right to self-defence.

Panel I – Fragile, Failing and Failed States in the Arc of Instability

Moderator:

Ferry de Kerckhove, formerly Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, CDA Institute

Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director of the Cranfield University

Il a souligné que les Is-

raéliens maintiennent leur droit à l'auto-défense et qu'une préemption israélienne est un moyen possible d'exercer ce droit à l'auto-défense.

Panel I – Les États fragiles, défaillants et faillis dans l'arc d'instabilité

Modérateur : Ferry de Kerckhove, ancien ambassadeur du Canada en Égypte, Institut de la CAD

Mme Ann Fitz-Gerald, directrice du Centre for Security Sector de Cranfield University, a fait ressortir trois thèmes. Il y a d'abord la fluidité de sens de termes comme « fragilité », qui ont besoin d'un peu de décomposition supplémentaire pour assurer un vocabulaire commun. En second lieu, on doit regarder aux niveaux sous-nationaux et pas seulement au niveau westphalien, parce qu'une grande partie des conflits est interne aux États à revenu moyen. Troisièmement, il faut reconnaître l'impact des acteurs externes dans le context régional plus large.

Centre for Security Sector Management, stressed three themes. First is the fluidity of meaning of such terms as 'fragility," which need some additional parsing to ensure a common vocabulary. Second is a need to look at sub-national levels and not the Westphalian level alone, since much conflict is internal to middle income states. Third is to recognize the impact of external players in the wider regional context.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, Senior Fellow of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, observed that the Middle East has been unbalanced for a long time. While Arab society is increasingly fundamentalist and trending toward military fundamentalism, their economic future lies more within secularism. Iran's theocracy has lasted thirty years but dissent and the institution of elections has led to a democratic debate and a degree of Westernization among the elites. He suggested keeping a focus on women since the liberation of women changes the dialogue within fundamentalist societies.

Dr. Roland Paris, University Research Chair in International Security and Governance at the University of Ottawa responded most directly to statements made earlier by Dr. Arad, arguing against a preventive war with Iran or a pre-emptive strike, suggesting that such a move would create a pan-Islamic reaction, and the key question then would be *What happens on the next day?* While sanctions have not yet succeeded, there is a sense that they are, nonetheless, having an impact. Finally there is a need for us to become comfortable with Political Islam.

Luncheon Speaker: Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Commander NATO forces in Libya described a number of issues which he had to deal with as the Commander of Operation Unified Protector, the UN authorized and NATO led intervention in Libya. UN Resolution 1973 authorized member states to establish and enforce an arms embargo, a no-fly zone over Libya and "to use all means necessary, short of foreign occupation, to protect Libyan civilians." The wording of Resolution 1973 placed some difficult questions as the operation evolved as to whether the intent of the Resolution might be exceeded, and that regime change might be a hidden objective which was not a part of the UN Resolution.

Panel II – Energy Security Concerns

Moderator: Thomas d'Aquino, CDA Institute

David Collyer, President of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers noted that the United States imports 50% of its fuel supplies; and, Canada, its number one supplier, supplies 25% of US imports. Under those circumstances the maximization of Canadian supply to the US should be a "no brainer." However, the fumbling of the Keystone Pipeline proposal by the US administration sends a very negative signal to both Canada and the United States, and is pushing Canada to diversify oil sales to Asia. We hope reason will prevail, but the need for Canada to diversify our oil markets is now a given and drives the need for a better integrated energy strategy for Canada.

David McLaughlin, President and CEO of the National Roundtable on the Environment and Economy, attested to the high profile international energy security concerns with most NATO countries that are supplied by pipelines from abroad, including twenty-six bills on energy security tabled in the US Congress in 2011 as well as Prime Minister Harper's **Reuel Marc Gerecht, Senior Fellow de la Foundation for the Defense of Democracies,** a fait l'observation que le Moyen-Orient est en déséquilibre depuis longtemps. Pendant que la société arabe est de plus en plus fondamentaliste et qu'elle tend vers un fondamentalisme militaire, son avenir économique se situe plutôt au sein de la laïcité. La théocratie iranienne a duré trente ans, mais la dissension et l'institution d'élections a mené vers un débat démocratique et à un degré d'occidentalisation parmi les élites. Il a suggéré de rester concentré sur les femmes puisque la libération de la femme change le dialogue au sein des sociétés fondamentalistes.

M. Roland Paris, de la chaire de recherche universitaire en sécurité et gouvernance internationales à l'Université d'Ottawa a répondu de la façon la plus directe aux affirmations faites plus tôt par M. Arad, en s'opposant à une guerre préventive avec l'Iran ou à une attaque préemptive, en suggérant qu'un geste comme celui-là créerait une réaction panislamique et que la question clé deviendrait alors Que se passera-t-il le lendemain? Même si les sanctions n'ont pas fonctionné, on a le sentiment qu'elles ont néanmoins un impact. Finalement, nous avons besoin de devenir à l'aise avec l'Islam politique.

Conférencier au déjeuner : Le Lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard, commandant des forces de l'OTAN en Libye a décrit un certain nombre de questions avec lesquelles il a eu à voir comme commandant de l'opération Unified Protector, l'intervention autorisée par l'ONU et menée par l'OTAN en Libye. La résolution 1973 de l'ONU a autorisé les États membres à établir et à faire appliquer un embargo sur les armes, une zone d'exclusion aérienne au-dessus de la Libye et « d'utiliser tous les moyens nécessaires, sous réserve d'une occupation étrangère, pour protéger les civils libyens. » Le texte de la résolution 1973 a posé quelques questions difficiles à mesure que l'opération a évolué, à savoir si l'intention de la résolution pourrait être dépassée et si un changement de régime pourrait être un objectif caché qui ne faisait pas partie de la résolution.

Panel II – Préoccupations en matière de sécurité énergétique

Modérateur : Thomas d'Aquino, Institut de la CAD

David Collyer, président de la Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers a noté que les États-Unis importent 50 % de leurs approvisionnements de combustibles et que le Canada, son premier fournisseur, fournit 25 % des importations étatsuniennes. Dans ces circonstances, la maximisation de l'approvisionnement canadien vers les États-Unis devrait être « tout à fait logique ». Toutefois, le tâtonnement de l'administration américaine entourant la proposition du pipeline Keystone envoie un signal très négatif à la fois au Canada et aux États-Unis et pousse le Canada à diversifier ses ventes de pétrole vers l'Asie. Nous espérons que la raison finira par prévaloir, mais le besoin, pour le Canada, de diversifier nos marchés pétroliers est maintenant une évidence et commande le besoin d'une stratégie énergétique mieux intégrée pour le Canada.

David McLaughlin, pdg de la Table ronde nationale sur l'Environnement et l'Économie, a attesté des préoccupations de sécurité énergétique internationale de haut profil chez les pays de l'OTAN qui sont approvisionnés par des pipelines venant de l'étranger, y compris vingt-six projets de loi sur la sécurité énergétique déposés devant le Congrès des États-Unis en 2011, ainsi que l'intervention du Premier ministre Harper dans la dis-

intervention in the Keystone pipeline dispute. At the same time, climate change and a warming Arctic opens the potential for mineral exploitation and a potential clash between the needs for energy supply and the environment.

Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics commented on the high degree of energy interdependence between Canada and the United States, though noted that the increase of new energy sources such as shale oil and shale gas is making the United States less dependent generally on foreign sources of supply. He stated that the Keystone issue had been handled poorly by US politics but predicted that the issue would be resolved by end 2012. He approved of the pipeline from Alberta to the Pacific since it would increase supply to the Asia-Pacific area generally.

Panel III - Asia-Pacific Security Concerns

Moderator: Rear-Admiral (ret'd) Tyrone Pile, formerly Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific

Dr. John Blaxland, of the Australian National University, described Australia's dilemma as the "Insecurity of distance." Concern regarding the sharp increases in China's military spending, lack of transparency and aggressive actions has led the Australian debate and government to favour stronger ties with the United States. In addition, Australia is developing closer ties with regional states including India, as well as with regional organizations such as ASEAN whose dynamics are changing. Bilaterals and tri-laterals involving Australia, Japan, South Korea and the United States are also developing.

Captain(N) (ret'd) Raul Pedrozo, of the International Law Department of the US Naval War College, reminded us that the United States has had an enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Second World War, with concerns such as the One China Policy, the security of Taiwan, security guarantees of states such as Japan and Indonesia, Iran's nuclear programme—which is developing along North Korean lines and boundary disputes in the region. In 2009, China declared the South China Sea to be a "core issue," a status which allows for no compromise in the Chinese position. The United States countered with a declaration that the South China Sea is an "important issue" for the it. China further objected to a US presence in the Yellow Sea and increased its military and naval exercises to its highest level and made a number of other provocative statements and actions.

Dr. Jim Boutilier, Special Advisor (Policy) to the Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific, bluntly stated that the global centre of gravity has now moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific and that the Maritime dimension of Asia will ensure that the 21st century will be a maritime century. Analysts now also have to deal with the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, with the latter now the most important in the world in terms of energy security for China, Vietnam, Japan and Korea. Simultaneously, we are seeing a steady decline in front line navies globally, including a cataclysmic decline in the Royal Navy, but an increase in the Asia-Pacific region, especially on the part of China, whose naval objective seems to be that of a "blue water" navy. China's naval "reach" is extending to include relations with South American navies and an interest in the Arctic as climate change (which is a major threat to China) offers potential opportunities for China. The United States has recognized these changes in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment with the shift of forces to the region.

pute au sujet du pipeline Keystone. En même temps, le changement climatique et le réchauffement de l'Arctique ouvrent la possibilité d'exploration minérale et d'un conflit entre les besoins d'approvisionnement énergétique et l'environnement.

Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow du Peterson Institute for International Economics a fait des commentaires sur le degré élevé d'interdépendance énergétique entre le Canada et les États-Unis, bien qu'il ait noté que l'augmentation des nouvelles sources d'énergie, comme l'huile de schiste et le gaz de schiste, rend les États-Unis moins dépendants, de façon générale, des sources d'approvisionnement étrangères. Il a dit que la question de Keystone avait été mal manipulée par la politique américaine, mais il a prédit qu'elle trouverait une solution d'ici la fin de 2012. Il a approuvé l'idée du pipeline reliant l'Alberta au Pacifique puisque cela augmenterait l'approvisionnement vers la région de l'Asie-Pacifique, de façon générale.

Panel III – Préoccupations de sécurité en Asie-Pacifique

Modérateur : Vice-amiral (ret.) Tyrone Pile, ancien commandant, Forces maritimes du Pacifique

M. John Blaxland, de l'Australian National University, a décrit le dilemme de l'Australie comme « l'insécurité de la distance ». Une préoccupation à l'égard des fortes augmentations des dépenses militaires, le manque de transparence et les actions agressives de la Chine a mené le débat et poussé le gouvernement australiens à favoriser des liens plus forts avec les États-Unis. En plus, l'Australie développe présentement des liens plus étroits avec des États régionaux dont l'Inde, ainsi qu'avec des organisations régionales comme l'ANASE, dont la dynamique est en train de changer. Des accords bilatéraux et trilatéraux entre l'Australie, le Japon, la Corée du Sud et les États-Unis sont aussi en train de se développer.

Le Capitaine (M) (ret.) Raul Pedrozo, du International Law Department au US Naval War College, nous a rappelé que les États-Unis ont eu une présence persistente dans la région de l'Asie-Pacifique depuis la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. avec des préoccupations comme la politique d'une seule Chine, la sécurité de Taiwan, les garanties de sécurité d'États comme le Japon et l'Indonésie, le programme nucléaire de l'Iran – qui se développe selon des lignes nord-coréennes et les disputes frontalières dans la région. En 2009, la Chine a déclaré que la mer de Chine occidentale était un « enieu central », un statut qui ne permet aucun compromis dans la position de la Chine. Les États-Unis ont répliqué avec une déclaration que la mer de Chine occidentale était une « question importante ». La Chine s'est de plus objectée à une présence étatsunienne dans la mer Jaune et a augmenté ses exercices militaires et navals à leur plus haut niveau et fait un certain nombre d'autres affirmations et actions provocatrices.

M. Jim Boutilier, conseiller spécial (politiques) au commandant des Forces maritimes Pacifique, a affirmé carrément que le centre de gravité mondial s'est maintenant déplacé de l'Atlantique vers le Pacifique et que la dimension maritime de l'Asie fera en sorte que le 21e siècle soit un siècle maritime. Les analystes ont maintenant aussi à s'occuper de l'océan Indien et le détroit de Malacca, ce dernier étant maintenant le plus important du monde en termes de sécurité énergétique pour la Chine, le Vietnam, le Japon et la Corée. Simultanément, nous voyons un déclin régulier des marines de première ligne au niveau mon-

DAY TWO

Keynote Speaker: The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, reflected upon the great achievements of the Canadian Forces over the past few years. They included the successful operation in Kandahar where the CF was deployed in the front lines of the war against terrorism, while at the same time undergoing a defence culture change driven by transformation as well as the equipment regeneration necessary to support both the Afghanistan commitment as well as transformation. Fortunately the CF made it through the crucible and emerged as one of the most respected institutions in the Canadian social structure. But the challenge facing the CF does not end there, for significant changes in the strategic landscape and the impact of technology require continuing re-investment in capital renewal which will be challenging in times of tight fiscal policy. Yet, he emphasized that the government remains committed to key programmes such as air force investments and the development of the specifics of the national shipbuilding strategy.

Keynote Speaker: General James Mattis, Commander of the **US Central Command**, spoke of the ongoing requirement for transformation. He presented a taxonomy which began with the problem of "reactive transformation"—those changes which are forced upon forces during war by the encountering of unexpected moves on the part of opponents. The second constitutes theological transformation-the adoption of often unproved "bumper sticker" catch phrases such as "the Revolution in Military Affairs" or "shock and awe" or "effects based operations." Third is that of "anticipatory transformation" where the first step must be to define the problem which must be resolved and then to rely upon experimentation as a tool for progress. He noted that successful commanders of all ages have initiated such transformational changes when necessary and cited the decision of Alexander the Great to reorganize his army before undertaking the battle of Persepolis. In this transformed strategic environment. one cannot foresee the future, and "we cannot wait on change" nor "adopt a singular approach to war." We will have to develop a system dependent upon a Commander's intent and vigorous leadership by junior officers.

Keynote Speaker: General Walter Natvnczvk. Chief of the **Defence Staff**, began by reminding us of the key current needs of the Canadian Forces: transformation, equipment, military family support and the connection with the Canadian public. He then reviewed the key events of the current year which is drawing to its close. They included, in the "away game," the stand-up of the Afghan training mission, and the deploymentwithin 18 hours-of the forces for the Libva mission, with overall command of the ultimately successful mission given to Canadian Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard. In the "home game" of domestic operations the CF responded to such emergencies as floods, a major air disaster in Resolute Bay in the high Arctic where prompt response by a CF medical team assigned to Op Nanook saved the lives of the three survivors and to a successful Search and Rescue (SAR) operation which also saw the tragic death of a SAR Technician engaged in it. Resource challenges are the new reality but transformation will continue with the shipbuilding strategy as the key priority. Finally, we shall continue to address the need for long-term care and psychological support of our wounded.

Keynote Speaker: General Sir David Richards, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom, opened his presentation with a *grand tour d'horizon* of the strategic environment noting that while the greatest risk is financial rather than military threat, the world remains highly

dial, y compris un déclin cataclysmique de la Royal Navy, mais une augmentation dans la région de l'Asie-Pacifique, particulièrement de la part de la Chine, dont l'objectif naval semble être celui d'une marine « d'eau océanique ». « L'envergure » navale de la Chine est en voie de grandir pour inclure des relations avec les marines de l'Amérique du Sud et un intérêt dans l'Arctique alors que le changement climatique (qui est une menace majeure pour la Chine) offre des possibilités envisageables pour la Chine.. Les États-Unis ont reconnu ces changements dans l'environnement stratégique de l'Asie-Pacifique avec le déplacement de forces vers la région.

DEUXIÈME JOURNÉE

Conférencier d'honneur : L'Honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, s'est livré à une réflexion sur les grandes réussites des Forces canadiennes ces quelques dernières années. Des réussites comme l'opération menée à Kandahar, où les FC avaient été déployées aux premières lignes de la guerre contre le terrorisme, tout en subissant un changement de culture de la défense mené par transformation ainsi que la regénération d'équipement qui était nécessaire pour soutenir à la fois l'engagement en Afghanistan et la transformation. Heureusement, les FC ont réussi la traversée du creuset et en sont sorties comme l'une des institutions les plus respectées dans la structure sociale canadienne. Mais le défi auquel font face les FC ne s'arrête pas là, car des changements importants dans le paysage stratégique et l'impact de la technologie exigent des ré-investissements continus dans le renouvellement des immobilisations qui seront un défi dans des périodes de politique de restreinte fiscale. Malgré tout, le ministre a souligné que le gouvernement demeure engagé à des programmes clés comme des investissements dans la force aérienne et le développement des points spécifiques de la stratégie national de construction navale.

Conférencier invité : General James Mattis, Commander of the US Central Command, a parlé d'une nécessité constante de transformation. Il a présenté une taxonomie qui a commencé avec le problème de « transformation réactive » - ces changements qui sont imposés de force aux Forces pendant une guerre par la rencontre de mouvements inattendus de la part des opposants. La seconde constitue une transformation théologique - l'adoption d'expressions fourre-tout aux « affichettes de parechoc » souvent non éprouvées comme « la révolution dans les affaires militaires » ou « martèlement et stupeur » ou « opérations basées sur l'effet ». La troisième est celle de la « transformation anticipatoire » où la première étape doit être de définir le problème à résoudre, pour ensuite se fier à l'expérimentation comme outil de progrès. Il a noté que des commandants qui ont eu du succès dans toutes les époques ont lancé de tels changements transformationnels quand c'était nécessaire et il a cité la décision d'Alexandre le Grand de réorganiser son armée avant d'entreprendre la bataille de Persépolis. Dans cet environnement stratégique transformé, on ne peut pas prévoir l'avenir, et « nous ne pouvons pas attendre que le changement arrive » ni « adopter une approche singulière à la guerre ». Nous allons devoir développer un système qui dépend de l'intention d'un commandant et du leadership vigoureux d'officiers juniors.

Conférencier invité : Le Général Walter Natynczyk, chef de l'état-major de la Défense, a commencé en nous rappelant les principaux besoins actuels des Forces canadienes : la transformation, l'équipement, le soutien aux familles des militaires et la

unpredictable. Key developments include the United States increasing focus on the Pacific rather than the Atlantic, declining European defence budgets, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear programme, the Arab Spring and the role of Islamic fundamentalism, the Sunni-Shia split in Syria, the future plans of China and the response to piracy. Responses include the reduction of capabilities during finance-driven defence reviews, the realization that alliances are vital and that NATO remains a key building block of security, with increased bilateral cooperation between France and Britain, though there are still problems with the modalities with respect to shared assets. In such an environment a state without a national strategy is nothing more than a security day trader.



General Sir David Richards, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom,

Panel IV- CF Environmental Updates

Moderator:

Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Michel Maisonneuve, Academic Director of Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean

Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Commander, Royal Canadian Air Force, declared the Royal Canadian Air Force to be in good shape. In Libya we used JDAM for the first time and the CF-18 modifications worked well. Among the lessons learned from the Libya operation were the need for rapid data transmission and fusion and the need to maintain multipurpose platforms. The Aurora upgrades, together with the use of UAVs in a surveillance role, will provide more flexible and multi-function capabilities to continue to operate until the 2020 timeframe. The C-17s and Herc-Js have opened new doors for us and will be reinforced by the new C-47s which will be arriving in the 2016 frame. The F-35s will provide a key stealth capability and the ability for over the horizon capabilities. And finally the

connexion avec le public canadien. Puis il a passé en revue les événements clés de l'année en cours, qui tire à sa fin : dans les « opérations ailleurs », le début de la mission d'entraînement afghane et le déploiement - en moins de 18 heures - de forces destinées à la mission en Libve, avec le commandement d'ensemble de la mission en bout de compte réussie confié au ieutenant-général canadien Charles Bouchard. Dans les « opérations chez nous » des opérations internes, les FC ont répondu à des urgences comme les inondations, une catastrophe aérienne majeure dans l'Extrême-Arctique, où une réaction prompte de la part d'une équipe médicale des FC affectée à Op Nanook a sauvé la vie aux trois survivants et à une opération de recherche et sauvetage réussie qui a aussi vu la mort tragique d'un technicien de SAR qui y était engagé. Les difficultés en matière de ressources sont la nouvelle réalité mais la transformation va continuer avec la stratégie de construction navale comme priorité principale. Finalement, nous continuerons à répondre aux besoins de soins à long terme et de soutien psychologique pour nos blessés.

Conférencier invité : General Sir David Richards, chef de l'état-major de la Défense du Rovaume-Uni, a ouvert sa présentation avec un grand tour d'horizon de l'environnement stratégique, en notant que, tandis que le plus grand risque est une menace financière plutôt que militaire, le monde reste hautement imprévisible. Les développements clés sont notamment les États-Unis qui mettent de plus en plus l'accent sur le Pacifique plutôt que sur l'Atlantique, la diminution des budgets de défense européens, le retrait de l'Afghanistan, le programme nucléaire iranien, le printemps arabe et le rôle du fondamentalisme islamique, la fracture Sunnites-Chiites en Syrie, les plans futurs de la Chine et la réponse à la piraterie. Les réponses sont notamment la réduction des capacités pendant les révisions de la défense pour des motifs financiers, la réalisation que les alliances sont vitales et que l'OTAN demeure un bloc de construction clé de la sécurité, avec une coopération bilatérale accrue entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne, même s'il subsiste des problèmes quant aux modalités des actifs partagés. Dans un tel environnement, un État sans stratégie nationale n'est rien d'autre qu'un spéculateur en sécurité à très court terme.

Panel IV – Mises à jour environnementales des FC

Modérateur : Lieutenant-général (ret.) Michel Maisonneuve, directeur des études du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean

Lieutenant-général André Deschamps, commandant de **l'Aviation rovale canadienne.** a déclaré que l'Aviation rovale canadienne était en bonne forme. En Libye, nous avons utilisé JDAM pour la première fois et les modifications aux CF-18 ont bien fonctionné. Parmi les leçons apprises de l'opération Libye, il y a eu le besoin d'une transmission et d'une fusion rapides des données et la nécessité de maintenir des plateformes polyvalentes. Les mises à niveau faites aux Aurora, ainsi que l'usage des UAV dans un rôle de surveillance, vont offrir des capacités plus souples et multifonctionnelles pour continuer à opérer jusqu'au cadre temporel de 2020. Les C-17 et les Herc-J ont ouvert de nouvelles portes pour nous et seront renforcées par les nouveaux C-47 qui arriveront dans le cadre temporel de 2016. Les F-35 offriront une capacité stealth clé et l'habileté de fonctionner au-delà de l'horizon. Et, finalement, l'Arctique offre un nouveau point focal à l'ARC.

Vice-amiral Paul Maddison, commandant de la Marine royale canadienne, a souligné l'importance des océans pour l'économie canadienne et a noté les changements dans le système international, qui créent de nouvelles demandes sur la

Arctic provides the RCAF new focus.

Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, Commander, Royal Canadian Navy, stressed the importance of oceans to the Canadian economy and noted the changes in the international system, which are making new demands on the RCN and the CF. The new environment increasingly involves littoral operations in addition to the traditional sea control operations of "blue water" navies and requires us to respond to "swarming attacks" in those littorals. The frigate mid-life refit programme is proceeding successfully and we expect, as well, to have three submarines available by 2013. This will leave the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, the Joint Support Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants as tomorrow's projects.

Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Commander of the Canadian Army, declared that while the experience of the Afghanistan operation has led to the integration of new technologies, the primary weapon system of the Army is the individual soldier. Among the other lessons learned is that firepower now must be precise. Simulators are a new training source and their integration has contributed to the success of the Force Generation system. We are developing a new Air/Land operational doctrine.

Panel V - Canadian Forces and Operations

Moderator:

Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Michel Gauthier, formerly Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command

Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw, Commander, Canada Command, noted that the scope of Canada Command's responsibilities, which had been restricted to North America at its inception, has now been extended to the entirety of the Western Hemisphere which has added a new complexity to what was already an extremely complex environment. Canada Command's domestic security responsibilities are shared with the Department of Public Safety, which has the lead role but Canada Command, nonetheless, must be able to launch response forces within a 24-hour window. And recent public polling has indicated that the Canadian public would prefer to see the CF deployed at home. As we look to the future we thus see a greater role for peace and security operations within a context of a changing domestic threat environment. And we must be prepared to operate within five different domains—air, land, maritime, cyber and space—with the maritime domain becoming increasingly important.

Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, spoke of 2011 as a Year of Transition with the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan requiring a re-deployment of 1,000 vehicles, 1,105 containers and sixteen helicopters as part of the return to Canada. Nonetheless, Expeditionary Command remained engaged with fifteen separate missions involving 1,269 members of the Canadian Forces, including the 900 involved in OP Attention, the mission involving the training of the Afghanistan security forces. Moreover, Expeditionary Command remained subject to the unwavering unpredictability of the international security environment as the events of the Arab Spring led to the need to deploy forces as part of OP *Mobile* to Libya.

MRC et les FC. Le nouvel environnement implique de plus en plus des opérations littorales en plus des opérations traditionnelles de contrôle en mer des marines « océaniques » et exige de nous que nous répondions aux « attaques par essaims » dans ces littoraux. Le programme de réaménagement des frégates à la moitié de leur cycle de vie procède avec succès et nous nous attendons, pareillement, à avoir trois sous-marins disponibles d'ici 2013. Cela laissera les navires de patrouille extracôtiers de l'Arctique, les navires de soutien interarmées et les bâtiments de combat de surface comme projets pour demain.

Lieutenant-général Peter Devlin, commandant de l'Armée canadienne, a déclaré que, même si l'expérience de l'opération en Afghanistan a mené à l'intégration de nouvelles technologies, le système d'arme primaire de l'Armée, c'est le soldat individuel. Parmi les autres leçons apprises, il y a que la puissance de tir doit être précise. Les simulateurs sont une nouvelle source d'entraînement et leur intégration a contribué au succès du système de mise sur pied d'une force. Nous sommes en train de développer une nouvelle doctrine opérationnelle Air/Terre.

Panel V – Les Forces canadiennes et les opérations

Modérateur : Lieutenant-général (ret.) Michel Gauthier, ancien commandant du Commendement de la force expéditionnaire du Canada

Lieutenant-général Walter Semianiw, commandant du Commandement Canada, a noté que la portée des responsabilités du Commandement Canada, qui avait été restreinte à l'Amérique du Nord à ses débuts, a maintenant été étendue à tout l'hémisphère nord, ce qui a ajouté une nouvelle complexité à ce qui était déjà un environnement déjà complexe. Les responsabilités du Commandement Canada en matière de sécurité intérieure sont partagées avec le ministère de la Sécurité publique, qui a le rôle de direction, mais Commandement Canada doit néanmoins pouvoir lancer une réponse à l'intérieur d'une fenêtre de 24 heures. Et un sondage public récent a indiqué que le public canadien préférerait voir les FC déployées ici même. En regardant vers l'avenir, nous voyons donc un plus grand rôle pour les opérations de paix et de sécurité dans le contexte d'un environnement de menaces intérieurs changeantes. Et nous devons être prêts à opérer dans cinq différents domaines - l'air, la terre, la marine, cyber et espace – avec le domaine maritime qui devient de plus en plus important.

Lieutenant-général Stuart Beare, commandant du commandement de la force expéditionnaire du Canada, a parlé de 2011 comme de l'année de transition, avec la fin de la mission de combat en Afghanistan, qui exige le redéploiement de 1 000 véhicules, 1 105 conteneurs et seize hélicoptères comme partie du retour au Canada. Néanmoins, le Commandement Expéditionnaire est resté engagé dans quinze missions séparées impliquant 1 269 membres des Forces canadiennes, dont 900 impliqués dans OP Attention, la mission qui touche l'entraînement des forces de sécurité de l'Afghanistan. De plus, le Commandement Expéditionnaire est resté sujet à l'imprévisibilité inébranlable de l'environnement de sécurité international alors que les événements du Printemps arabe ont mené au besoin de déployer des forces dans le cadre de OP Mobile vers la Libye.

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Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2012, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE 151 SLATER STREET, SUITE 412A OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 9 November 2012, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2010.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la CAD dans le but dereconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué(e) par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très hon. Brian Dickson, le vice-amiral Larry Murray, le lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Hon. Barnett Danson, le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, Colonel l'Hon. John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadiergénéral David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault, le Général Rick Hillier, l'Adjudant William MacDonald, la Très hon. Adrienne Clarkson, et le Major-général Jonathan Vance.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2012, et doivent être adressées au:

> COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE 151, RUE SLATER, SUITE 412A OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 9 novembre 2012, à un diner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le diner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

CANADA AND THE WORLD

Dr. John Scott Cowan

The following text draws from Dr. Cowan's introduction section of Vimy Paper 2012, and was intended in part as his opening remarks for the first day of the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, 23 February 2012, the theme of which was "Canada and the World".

C anada and the World sounds like a big topic to handle in one day, so the program is, in a way, a sampler. But we went rather broader than usual this year because right now many of Canada's key challenges relate to worldwide political and economic volatility, and to the changing nature of the strategic decisions we must make.

The very word "strategic" is an uncomfortable one for Canadians, and oft misused. Rarely has Canada had real involvement in developing grand strategy, letting others lead and then demonstrating our sovereign status by deciding whether or not to join initiatives launched by others, and, when doing so, by retaining a degree of control over the form and extent of our participation, and the attendant constraints. In the first twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Canada had not vet reached even a modest consensus on a cohesive vision of its contemporary interests, let alone a grand strategy to further them. Indeed, it is only very recently that it has become somewhat fashionable to acknowledge that Canada has interests. The previous pervasive mythology was that, not being a former colonial power, Canada had no interests, and its role in the world was exclusively to promote "Canadian Values", which were somehow to be preferred over the values of the other liberal democracies. This self-aggrandizing view that Canada was an important, selfless, unique beacon of civilized understanding, and beloved by all, made many Canadians feel good, and it was only slightly more loopy than the competing view, a very old reality that had become a myth. That other extreme was the pessimist/pseudo-realist colonial view that Canada was a semi-autonomous bit player that had to slavishly follow in every respect the lead of the great power or powers with which it was allied. These myths militated against serious discourse about where our real interests lie.

But it seems change is in the wind. The government now speaks easily of our "interests". At the same time, many historically oriented writers have re-analyzed our actions of the past six decades and made a telling case that even when we took on apparently selfless tasks, we were also usually furthering our interests. Indeed, some foreign policy experts have argued, to

Dr. John Scott Cowan is the past President of the CDA Institute and Chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors. Dr. Cowan was Vice-Principal at Queen's University before becoming Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada in 1999, where he served until 2008. He has been President of the Canadian Federation of Biological Societies, the Canadian Physiological Society, and the Canadian Association of University Business Officers. He is the Chair of the Defence Science Advisory Board of Canada and Principal Emeritus of RMC. Dr. Cowan is the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the Princess of Wales Own Regiment. good effect, that the two competing ideas of Canada's involvement in the world may not be all that much of a dichotomy, in that there have been a multitude of situations in which the international projection of liberal democratic values has been very much in our interest.

In trying to make sense of the issues surrounding defence and security today, one must accommodate various new facts of life. Increasingly, a number of the key issues don't stay confined regionally. Globalization in trade and finance has tied together the economic realities across the entire developed world as never before. Some physical threats are also not easily confined geographically or attributed to specific nation states either, from militant jihad, sometimes expressed as terrorism, to the ripple effects from failed and failing states, as exemplified by piracy concerns extending from East Africa across the Indian Ocean. And regardless of one's take on climate change and the scale of anthropogenic contributions to its rate, it also has no borders, and neither do all the related energy issues.

To a greater extent than ever before, political decisions on issues of defence and security also rest on an underpinning of complicated and uncertain science, whether that science is economics, climate science, nuclear engineering, biological sciences, medicine or information technology. But science and politics are uncomfortable traveling companions, and always have been.

Distortions of science by the political process are inevitable, even in the most open and democratic systems, because they are inherently different processes and reach conclusions or decisions by entirely different methodologies. Ideally, in science, there is a process of continuous refinement, building on past established data and facts, with experimentation, confirmation, open verification and civil discourse. In politics, with all the best will in the world, the competition for media attention and popular support produces tactical exaggeration, incomplete discourse, huge oversimplification, transient effects, short memory, intense partisanship and convergence only when absolutely necessary, and not always even then. Overlaid on all that are the complications of secrecy, sometimes needed, especially where issues of national defence, security or even general well-being of the state are concerned, and sometimes merely desired by government to avert complexity and embarrassment in the political arena. So it is unsurprising that plenty of lawyers and relatively few scientists end up in parliament, and that the political sphere may unintentionally abuse science for political purposes.

And that's the best of it. Worse yet, history is replete with wellknown examples of repressive regimes making bad science serve ideological purposes.

Sometimes the public is fed bad science for a good reason, as during the Second World War, when the biochemically plausible but untrue link between consuming carrots and improving night vision was widely circulated by UK authorities as a security ruse to explain away the success of British night fighters, by then secretly equipped with airborne radar, against German bombers. How many of us were brought up being told, "Eat your carrots, it's good for your vision"?

And even "good" governments can have their favourite scientists and their preferred science. Churchill's preference for the views of Lord Cherwell over those of Sir Henry Tizard may well have complicated wartime policy. And 60 years on, the US intelligence failures over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq underscore how, in a necessarily secret environment, evidence and opinion link arms so tightly that they are hard to disentangle. more extensive than those being seen now, and how will our defence and security postures be affected by these instabilities?

4. What pandemics are on the horizon? What preparations, both scientifically and in the policy and legal domain, do we need to be reasonably prepared for pandemic risks in general?

5. Can we predict future economic patterns? How much budget cutting is needed, and for how long? Can the dismal science keep up with the inventive minds of those who package investments in weird forms?

6. Do we have a correct threat taxonomy? Are there substantial threats we have not foreseen?

Some questions are nearly answerable now, but most will need years of work to be answered adequately, and possibly years

more to fully penetrate our political consciousness. Some-

times that work falls upon those

who do not expect it. For exam-

ple. defence procurement abuts

against these science-based

Clearly a good part of the uneasy fit between science and government hinges upon the occasional need for, and the rather more frequent desire for, secrecy by government. China's delays and lack of candour over SARS, and simi-

Today Canada faces a broad range of near-term questions and potential challenges that bear hugely on defence and security, and a goodly number are underpinned by the sort of scientific complexities that tend to befuddle governments.

dle governments. yroblems every day, with all of the inherent uncertainties. It was always thus, when setting out to buy a thing which does not yet exist, but technological ut intensification now just makes it harder.

lar temporizing and understating during nuclear accidents by the Soviet Union at the time of Chernobyl, and to a lesser but non-zero extent by Japan over Fukushima Daiichi were doubtless intended in the first instance by those governments to protect them from embarrassment and perhaps to be ameliorative by preventing panic, but objectively did harm by delaying the appropriate full-scale responses.

But inability of most governments to cope with science is not only about delay and under-reaction; political overreactions, while less frequent, do occur as well, especially with anything which sounds scarey, whether it is or not. For example, in the nuclear energy field, a venting of a trivial amount of a relatively short lived and weak beta-emitter like tritium is often spun and then reacted to as if it were a near-meltdown.

Today Canada faces a broad range of near-term questions and potential challenges that bear hugely on defence and security, and a goodly number are underpinned by the sort of scientific complexities that tend to befuddle governments. Some examples are:

1. The risks associated with proliferation of weapons of mass effect. Iranian progress and vile intentions dominate the news, but the potential for flow of technologies from Iran, Pakistan or North Korea to non-state actors are worrisome, as are evolving technologies for dirty bombs and chemical and biological weapons. How do we calibrate these unknowns?

2. How do we counter cyber threats? What legal changes and new research are needed for active, as opposed to merely passive measures?

3. To what extent have the early extreme opposing views on rates of climate change converged on a middle ground? What are the best estimators of time scales for dealing with sovereignty issues in a more open arctic? To what extent and how quickly will climate change issues produce human migrations Still and all, in the end, government must and will decide both the level and the emphasis of its support for Canadian capabilities in defence and security. And it will need to do so with an

imperfect grasp of what is also imperfect science and imperfect prediction. But certain underlying verities ought to encourage government to stretch itself, even in times of economic constraint, to keep those capabilities robust.

It is an immutable truth that the first purpose of government is the defence and security of the state and of its people. Fail in that, and no other duty of the state retains meaning. So this is one insurance premium it is unwise to skimp on.

But government will be sorely tempted to do just that. Canada and Canadians have performed admirably in recent conflicts abroad, and we have been fortunate as well in avoiding or countering certain threats at home. In expeditionary operations the Canadian Forces have been seen to be amongst the most effective, and have been hugely praised by our allies. Domestic operations have also gone well, with smooth cooperation between the CF and a wide range of first responders or other agencies tasked with various security and risk mitigation roles. It would not then be surprising if, within government, there developed a certain tendency to rest upon our laurels. It is only natural.

But even in the face of our successes, those who achieved them in the field invariably observe that we have, to a degree, been fortunate in our opponents. Those in the know have pointed out that, when we have faced human opponents, however determined, courageous or ruthless, those opponents have been inconsistently expert, poorly trained, poorly equipped and poorly supplied. A wise Canada will understand that it cannot rely forever on the incompetence or poverty of its opponents.

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS: LESSONS FOR CANADA FROM AUSTRALIA?

John Blaxland

This article provides a Down Under view on Asia-Pacific security developments. The Australian perspective provides some useful pointers for Canada as it considers its own security posture in response to the rise of Asia.

Grappling with the implications of the rise of China

In recent years the 'tyranny of distance,' which traditionally left Australia far from its major trading partners and security guarantors, has been turned on its head, at least economically. With China emerging as Australia's number one trading partner and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) group of nations aggregated as number two, this has been a cause of considerable relief as Australia has passed largely unscathed through the profound effects of the global financial crisis. But China's assertive actions in such places as the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea in 2009 have had an unsettling effect on regional powers concerned to avoid being straitjacketed strategically by China's economic and growing military might. For Australia and others, this equates to a conundrum of economic prosperity coupled with strategic uncertainty. One measure taken so far is to seek bilateral engagement with China using a range of search and rescue, naval gunnery and disaster relief exercises complimenting the annual bilateral meeting of the chiefs of defence of China and Australia.

Beyond these measures, there has been considerable debate in Australia on how to respond to China's rise. At the hawkish end of the spectrum, Professor Ross Babbage has advocated building up the Australian Defence Force to be able to "rip an arm off any major power" (read: China) that might consider directly threatening Australia. He has argued that Australia needs a force of 300-400 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs), and a beefed up naval force with 20 or more submarines. At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Hugh White has called for an accommodation with China that allows for a concert of powers to emerge.

Australia's ties with the United States

With polling showing strong and enduring support for the alliance with the United States, the Australian government has chosen to hedge its bets, embarking on a strategy that recommits to and invests further in this alliance, including the stationing of 2,500 US Marines in Australia). China's *People's Daily* responded by saying, "Australia surely cannot play China for a fool" warning that Australia "risked being caught in the crossfire." But China's patronising and ominous reaction, if anything, has reinforced the sense of urgency in making such commitments. Australia's approach also has generated public reactions from Indonesia's foreign minister; and, while behind

John Blaxland is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. His publications include Strategic Cousins (2006), Revisiting Counterinsurgency (2006), Information Era Manoeuvre (2002) and Signals: Swift and Sure (1999). His forthcoming book, The Australian Army: from Whitlam to Howard is due out in 2012. closed doors, virtually all the southeast Asian powers (let alone traditional US allies South Korea and Japan) warmly welcome deeper American engagement in the region.

Australia and Asia

The second part of Australia's strategy involves investing in regional security ties. India is no one's patsy, but it has always been in opposite camps to China and the two countries have tended to balance encirclement with counter-encirclement. Bilateral ties between India and Australia are not about to turn into a security alliance, but there is appetite on both sides for the relationship to diversify and grow. Encouraged by the US relaxation of its hub-and-spokes approach to Asia-Pacific alliances, Japan and South Korea have welcomed closer interaction with Australia as well.

In the countries that make up ASEAN, the durability of American alliances has been on display, particularly in light of the nervous-

Bilateral ties between India and Australia are not about to turn into a security alliance, but there is appetite on both sides for the relationship to diversify and grow.

ness about China's intentions. A number of them, notably the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand as well as Vietnam, have taken steps to bolster security ties with the United States. The apparent emergence of Myanmar from its pariah status taking on an active role in ASEAN—points to ASEAN's future being more cohesive than in the past. The target for economic integration is 2015, and security measures likely will follow.

Australia is taking bilateral and multilateral steps to assist in bolstering regional security, participating in a range of security related forums including the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. Critics may decry the utility of these talk shops; but, in Asia, where appearance matters as much if not more than the substance, engagement is proving invaluable to Australia. As a result, remarkably enough, incremental but substantial progress is being made in strengthening the region's security architecture as well as building additional confidence and trust between participants.

Beyond such engagements, Australia also participates in a range of military exercises. In the years since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has proven to be an incredibly useful realm for engagement between militaries that would otherwise avoid engagement for fear of compromising their perceived security interests. Exercises that take up this theme provide invaluable opportunities

to engage, become familiar with and help bolster capabilities– all of which contribute to regional stability.

In the South Pacific, a number of smaller states remain fragile and Australia (working closely alongside its key partner and ally, New Zealand) remains committed to assisting in the face of political instability, natural disasters and the effects of global climate change.

Beyond strengthening regional security and alliance ties, Australia is set to significantly bolster its maritime and air capabilities with the imminent introduction into service of two amphibious landing helicopter dock ships, three air warfare destroyers and up to 100 JSFs. For Australia, the experience in East Timor in 1999 and subsequent operations in the Pacific and elsewhere have made clear that Australia needs to be able to project force as the lead nation in its immediate region. To do so requires a number of enablers that, for many years, have been left to allies to provide instead. The acquisition of these additional capabilities look set to give the Australian government the ability to take decisive action in the region in support of friends and allies and as the principal security guarantor of the South Pacific.

Reflecting on what all this means in terms of Australia's 'grand strategy,' it is clear that Australia is friends with China as it is with the United States: but, Australia is an ally of only one. Still, Australia is eager to avoid allowing either China or the United States to overplay their hands as China's military power grows to match its economic power. Engagement with both powers and with other regional security partners therefore is seen as crucial.

Implications for Canada

As Canada reflects on the so-called US pivot to Asia and the

shifting of Canada's economic centre of gravity westwards towards the 'far east,' it is worth reflecting on Australia's experience and place. The Mercator projection's misleading eurocentricity (with Germany at the centre of the map and Australia on the periphery) has unwittingly led Canadians to think they are closer to Europe than Asia. But both Australia and Canada are equidistant to the hot spots of northeast Asia and both have residual obligations to the defence of South Korea. If Canada genuinely cares about security in the Asia-Pacific region and wants to bolster its credentials as a serious actor there, it may care to consider closer engagement with Australia and the United States, as well as China.

If Canada is serious about wanting to be engaged in the security of the Asia-Pacific region, then it needs to be a more active participant. Canada could seek participation in a number of exercises including the multilateral (but US and Thai-led) exercise Cobra Gold, the multilateral and Australian-led naval exercise Kakadu, as well as seek participation in the ADMM Plus and other such forums. It also needs to be more serious about developing and maintaining capabilities that could be employed there. Australia, like Canada, has a significant requirement for a submarine force. Australia is on the cusp of developing and building 12 submarines to replace the ageing six Collins Class submarines built in the 1980s and early 1990s. Perhaps a collaborative project could be entered into.

In my book entitled *Strategic Cousins* (2006), I argue that there may be scope for a Canadian-Australian Defence Arrangement. Perhaps this could take the form of the bilateral ministerial meeting arrangements entered into with Britain (AUKMIN) and the United States (AUSMIN). Whatever Canada decides, with the global centre of gravity shifting to the Asia-Pacific, the imperative for Canadian engagement in the Pacific can only grow; better to act now rather than be dragged in unprepared later.



MAKING SENSE OF DEFENCE BUDGET 2012/13

Colonel (ret'd) Brian MacDonald

This article provides insight into the impact of the 2012/13 federal budget on the Department of National Defence.

The Budget in Brief

On 29 March 2012, the Government of Canada tabled the Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012/13, which was titled Jobs Growth and Long Term Prosperity. The Budget had been preceded by the tabling of the Main Estimates on 28 February. The Main Estimates had shown that the Department of National Defence budget for FY 2012/13 would decrease by \$1.494 billion, or 7%, from \$21.293 to \$19.799 billion.

In fact, the real figure was less than that, since the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), whose budget had been included within the Defence budget in prior years, has now been given departmental status with its budget now stated separately from the defence budget. As a result, even though CSEC continues to report through the Minister of National Defence, its budget of \$387 million appears independently and the Defence budget is reduced accordingly.

Within the figure of \$19.8 billion, the Capital Budget (Vote 5) will decrease by 12% to \$4.104 billion, or 21% of the total budget. The Operating Budget (Vote 10) will be cut 6% to \$14.1 billion.

Planned Reductions in Future Years Operating Budgets The Budget included a table containing the forecast reductions in Departmental Spending over future years. That for the Operating Budget (Vote 1) may be seen in the following table:

Fiscal Year	Reduction
2014/15	\$1,119.8 bn
Ongoing	\$1,119.8 bn

The Budget states that, "Going forward, defence contracting will be streamlined to achieve savings. However, Canadian Forces regular and reserve will be maintained at 68,000 and 27,000 respectively, preserving the balance across the four Canada First

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald is Senior Defence Analyst of the Conference of Defence Associations and a Director of the Atlantic Council of Canada. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute. Defence Strategy [CFDS] pillars upon which military capabilities are built – personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure."

No mention was made of the fact that the promised strength levels will continue to be 5,000 below the stated goals of the CFDS of 70,000 regulars and 30,000 reserves. And no mention was made of the fact that a significant number of Class B (full time) reserves will be converted to Class A (part time) reserves. Some media sources have projected the Class B reductions could reduce the Department's full time (regulars and Class B reserves) by as much as 5,000.

And no mention is made of the reductions in the civilian staff of the Department including such bizarre proposals as the elimination of as many as 40% of the senior academic staff of the three military higher education institutions—the Royal Military College, Collège militare royal de Saint-Jean, and the Canadian Forces College.

Updating Defence Capital Funding

At first glance things appear to be more optimistic on the Capital side as the Budget declares that:

The Government will continue to replace key equipment, including purchasing new ships built in Canada through the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, as well as by acquiring an affordable replacement for Canada's aging CF-18 fleet to better equip Canada's men and women in uniform. In order to ensure funding for major capital equipment procurements is available when it is needed, the Government is adjusting the National Defence funding profile to move \$3.54 billion over seven years into the future period in which purchases will be made.

Fiscal Year	Updating Defence Capital Spending						
2011/12	+\$0.4 bn						
2012/13	+\$0.5 bn						
2013/14	+\$1.3 bn						
2014/15	+\$0.7 bn						
2015/16	+\$0.3 bn						
2016/17	+\$0.1 bn						

No mention is made of the meaning of this new term "affordable replacement" for the CF-18 fleet, though we suspect that the vision of Defence Minister Peter MacKay, perched on top of Snoopy's dog house complete with an aviation helmet and a long white silk scarf billowing in the slipstream, crying "Curse you, Red Baron!" is probably not what the government had in mind. However, the re-profiling of capital money into future years is an encouraging development since the Department has experienced serious slippages on a number of capital projects which has resulted in significant sums of capital money being returned to Treasury Board each year.

On to the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP)

As we have noted before, the RPP is the key document for understanding what is actually going on in the Defence Department. We would normally have expected to see it following the Budget and Main Estimates quite closely but it appears that it may be delayed, according to some media reports to about the end of May.

BUDGET 2012: DOING LESS WITH LESS

David Perry

This article explores how the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces will operate given the budgetary cuts articulated in Budget 2012/13.

Budget 2012 marks an important turning point for the Canadian Forces (CF). After years of sustained funding increases, the military will see its budget shrink progressively over the next three years as the government balances the federal books. The impact of Budget 2012 will see an ongoing reduction of \$1.12 billion by 2014/2015. This 7.4 percent cut to the Department of National Defence's (DND) operating budget will have a substantial impact, especially since it takes effect at the same time as the 5 percent, \$1 billion Strategic Review reduction. Together, these measures will result in a cut of \$2.1 billion, or roughly 11 percent of the total defence budget (see Table 1). Even this total does not capture the full financial hit to DND, since the department is also subject to a wage freeze that means it must 'pay' for contractual wage increases for civilian employees and any military raises by reallocating operating funds towards personnel expenditures.

At the time of writing, the full impact of these combined reductions has not been revealed. According to Treasury Board President Tony Clement, it will be some time before they are made public, as detailed plans for these cuts await the release of the Reports on Plans and Priorities for FY 2013/2014 in the spring of 2013.¹

In the meantime, however, the details provided in the Budget Plan, media reporting and government discussions since the Budget's release provide some preliminary outlines of the impacts for the CF. Despite the pre-budget rhetoric about improving efficiency and making the department more effective, the details currently available reveal that the financial reduction will eliminate some capabilities and reduce the readiness levels of others.

As Brian Macdonald details in his article, Budget 2012 specified that military personnel strength and the capital equipment

program will be preserved. These two decisions are highly consequential. On one hand, it means the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) goal of reaching a targeted strength of 70,000 regular and 30,000 reserve forces by 2028 is still possible and that capital equipment replacement programs will still go forward. On the other hand, exempting these spending areas from the budget knife means that the combined cuts will fall disproportionally on the rest of the department's expenditures, because military personnel and capital equipment account for over half of DND's spending. By default, then, the Operations and Maintenance budget will be disproportionately impacted.²

The most significant financial saving outlined to-date is a targeted reduction of \$500 million in contractor services. This would see spending in this area reduced by almost 20 percent.³ If realized, cuts to this budget line will actually exceed those recommended in the *Report on Transformation 2011*. That document, which was highly supportive of reducing contractor spending, suggested maximum cuts in this area of \$445 million. The current planned reduction is likely larger in part because DND has broadened its classification of service contracts to include aircraft maintenance, information technology and lease arrangements.⁴

At the same time, the department is also looking to save money by removing some platforms from service entirely, and recouping their operating costs. To date, these moves include the accelerated phase out of the Army's air and anti-tank defence vehicles. The army will also sell off its TOW missile inventory.⁵

The second largest source of savings announced so far will be a 4,200 reduction in the number of Class B reservists.⁶ This will accompany the elimination of a number of defence civil service positions, albeit on a much smaller scale. To date, the CBC estimates that roughly 1,500 civilian positions have been

Table 1:									
\$(1,000s)	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015						
Total Base Budget	20,000	20,000	20,000						
Strategic Review (5% of	-525	-1,000	-1,000						
SOR (7.4% of \$15B oper-	-327	-706	-1,120						
Total Cut	-852	-1,706	-2,120						
% Of Total Budget Base	-4%	-9%	-10.6%						

targeted for potential elimination at DND.⁷ Combined, these two moves could save up to \$400 million a year. Although Finance Minister Jim Flaherty has stated that the civil service redundancies will focus on back-office operations, the vast majority of potential job losses announced to date will fall outside of the National Capital Region. While some of the targets are administrative positions, ammunition and weapons technicians as well as heavy mechanics are in line to lose their jobs.

Finally, several other smaller measures have been announced. By withdrawing its contribution to the NATO AWACs and Alliance Ground Surveillance program, the department hopes to save up to \$90 million annually. It will also close up to 10 recruiting centers across the country and shutter the Area Support Units in London, Chilliwack, North Bay and Moncton.

Together, all of the announcements made to-date would save the department around \$1 billion a year, or only about half of the total reductiontarget, so there are clearly several major announcements still to come. Even the announcements already made, however, make it clear that there will be tangible consequences for the CF's capabilities. Canada will play a reduced role in NATO, the Army is shedding capacities and the substantial reduction in service contracting will

withdrawn, the current policy clearly no longer matches the fiscal reality.

A final concern relates to the capital program. While Budget 2012 stated that equipment projects will be protected under the cutbacks, it also announced a major re-profiling of the assigned funding. Totalling \$3.5 billion over seven years, this shift is worrisome. To date, DND has already experienced significant slippage in this area as the department struggles to spend the procurement money it received in the 2005 and 2006 budgets. As Table 2 illustrates over the last four two pro-

budgets. As Table 2 illustrates, over the last four years, almost \$3 billion in capital funds have been re-profiled because the department could not spend it on schedule. Even worse, in 2010/2011 the department permanently lost \$500 million through a residual lapse due to problems with the Maritime Helicopter, UAV, Light Howitzer and Armoured Personnel Carrier projects. The announced re-profiling may be beneficial if it prevents DND from permanently losing future funding in a similar manner.

At the same time, however, Budget 2012 confirms a continuation of a problematic trend. Cumulatively, over \$6 billion will go unspent in the year originally intended. As defence inflation averages seven percent annually, this persistent inability to move the capital program on schedule could see DND lose a significant degree of its purchasing power.

In sum, Budget 2012 presented a mix of good and bad news. The CF end strength will be maintained, they will retain most of their current capabilities and the planned capital equipment acquisitions will still proceed. On the other hand, there will be significantly less money for operations and a number of procurements appear set to slide further into the future. If the

reduce equipment_	Table 2: Re-profiled Capital Funds (\$B)													
availability rates,		Actual										Cumulative		
particularly for the F	iscal Year	07/08	08/09	09/10	10/11	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16	16/17	17/18	Total	Total
Royal Canadian Air								-1.30						-6.32
Force. Much of the														

remaining cuts will presumably come from a "rationalization of readiness."⁸ Thus, for all the discussion of the department saving money by becoming more efficient, it will also clearly have fewer capabilities and be less operationally ready.

At the same time that these cuts are being implemented, the department has also been keen to mention that, paradoxically, although its budget will be reduced over the next three years, it will also continue to grow. This is because DND will continue to benefit from the 2 percent escalator introduced under CFDS. So, bizarrely, while the department will see annual reductions, it will also see annual additions to its accrual budget envelope. However, since the most recent estimates show that the escalator will provide the department with only \$334 million in new funding in FY 2012/2013, there will clearly be sizable net losses over the next three years. This means that the CFDS target of expanding the defence budget to over \$30 billion a year by 2027/2028 will not be met under current plans. As the *Report on Transformation 2011* highlighted the fact that the CFDS was inadequately funded *before* \$2 billion a year in funding was

operational funds are restored when the books are balanced and equipment is actually procured, the military will emerge from this period relatively unscathed. Until then, however, it faces the prospect of doing less with less.

(Endnotes)

¹ Bill Curry, "'Handcuffed' Tories won't reveal full details of cuts till next spring," *Globe and Mail*. April 18, 2012

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Nominations are invited for the 2012 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, Murray Brewster, and Rosie DiMano.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Nominations must be received by 1 September 2012, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS 151 SLATER STREET, SUITE 412A OTTAWA, ON KIP 5H3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 9 November 2012, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cda-cdai.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.

PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2012.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Etrangères (ICDAE). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Au nombre des lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, Murray Brewster, et Rosie DiMano.

Toute personne peut nommer un (une) journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par deux lettres du soutien, être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des examples des travaux du journaliste. Pour les détails voir www.cda-cdai.ca, click: Ross Munro Award. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2012, et doivent être adressées au:

> COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE 151, RUE SLATER, SUITE 412A OTTAWA, ON KIP 5H3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 8 novembre 2012, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour plus d'informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cda-cdai.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

ÉLECTION DE VLADIMIR POUTINE À LA PRÉSIDENCE RUSSE; QUEL AVENIR POUR LES RELATIONS RUSSO-AMÉRICAINES?

Dr Pierre Jolicoeur

Cet article explore les relations russo-américaines et les politiques du Traité de réduction d'armes strategiques, Bouclier anti-missiles et de la guerre au terrorisme international.

La réélection de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence de la Russie le 4 mars 2012 inquiète les puissances occidentales. À quelques jours de l'élection, le candidat Poutine avait en effet prononcé un discours de politique étrangère anti-occidental, et plus spécifiquement anti-américain. Ce discours s'inscrivait certes dans un contexte électoral et visait à joindre une frange de l'électorat russe. Vu ainsi, on pourrait assumer que, une fois l'échéance électorale passée, Poutine adopte une position plus pragmatique et plus ouverte envers les intérêts occidentaux. Il ne faut cependant pas oublier que Poutine exerce le pouvoir depuis 1999. On peut donc s'attendre à ce que le mandat qui s'amorce se situe dans la continuité. Or le discours prononcé en février constitue en fait un reflet fidèle de la pensée du chef de l'État russe qui a forgé la position russe en matière de politique étrangère de la dernière décennie. Le texte qui suit illustrera cette position à travers les exemples du nouveau traité START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), du Bouclier antimissiles et de la guerre au terrorisme international.

Le nouveau Traité START

Le nouveau traité START (NTS) signé en avril 2010 a souvent été évoqué comme preuve d'un nouveau départ qu'entendaient entreprendre les États-Unis dans leurs relations bilatérales avec la Russie. Il est cependant douteux qu'il s'agisse d'une tentative sérieuse de faire de la Russie un partenaire stratégique des États-Unis. Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de constater la méfiance du Kremlin à l'égard du projet de bouclier anti-missile.

Le contenu du NTS explique à lui seul pourquoi la Russie a accepté de s'y plier. Essentiellement, ce traité limite à 700 le nombre de vecteurs (missiles et bombardiers à long rayon d'action) d'ogives nucléaires que chaque pays peut détenir. Or, en raison de l'âge avancé de l'arsenal russe, hérité de la période de la guerre froide, au moment de signer la Russie maintenait déjà un équipement en deçà de ce plafond. Ainsi, ce traité lui laisse la possibilité d'augmenter le nombre de lanceurs de missiles.

Par ailleurs, le NTS n'améliore aucunement la coopération russo-américaine au sujet de la défense anti-missile. Dès avril 2009, une déclaration conjointe russo-américaine a clairement indiqué que le Traité ne concernait que les armes stra-

Dr. Pierre Jolicoeur est professeur de science politique, Collège militaire royal du Canada.

tégiques offensives. Pour accommoder Moscou, Washington a accepté d'indiquer, dans le préambule de l'accord, l'existence d'un lien entre les armes offensives et défensives, ce qui a permis de ratifier l'entente à la Douma. Par contre, cette dernière a immédiatement adopté une résolution indiquant que

le Traité ne pourra être honoré que si le dossier de la défense antimissile n'érode pas la capacité nucléaire russe. Quoique non contraignante pour les États-Unis, cette résolution indique toutefois que ce Traité pourrait devenir l'otage de la volonté de la Rus-

Le discours prononcé en février constitue en fait un reflet fidèle de la pensée du chef de l'État russe qui a forgé la position russe en matière de politique étrangère de la dernière décennie.

sie de faire plier les États-Unis sur le dossier antimissile.

Ce jeu entourant le NTS constitue également une diversion d'un autre dossier bien plus pressant du point de vue des États-Unis : la réduction des armes nucléaires tactiques russes. En 1991-1992, les présidents George H. W. Bush et Mikhaïl Gorbatchev – ainsi que Boris Eltsine – ont tous indiqué leur intention d'entreposer ou d'éliminer les têtes nucléaires des armes tactiques. Toutefois, il n'existe aucun régime pour en limiter le nombre ou de mesures de vérification. Selon des estimations, la Russie en posséderait 2000 et les États-Unis 240.

Occasionnellement, la Russie a soulevé la question des armes tactiques américaines en Europe, mais surtout à des fins de propagande. Les armes américaines en Europe ont été réduites de 90 % depuis 1991. Ce geste n'a pas connu la réciproque de la part de la Russie et il existe maintes indications que la Russie continue de percevoir ses armes tactiques comme un moyen d'intimidation en Europe.

L'Administration Obama a certes qualifié le NTS comme une étape importante dans la marche vers un monde dénucléarisé. Cette vision des choses semble plutôt rester de l'ordre du vœu pieux puisqu'il restreint les armes stratégiques américaines à un niveau où la Russie, avec ses capacités économiques, sera en mesure de maintenir la parité avec les États-Unis. En fait, ce traité reconnaît la Russie comme l'égal des États-Unis en matière de limitation des armes stratégiques, un statut dont ne jouit aucune autre puissance nucléaire. À la Russie, cela procure un certain prestige international et un levier de pression sur les États-Unis, particulièrement dans le dossier antimissiles.

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Le dossier du bouclier antimissiles

Parallèlement aux négociations entourant le NTS, la Russie travaillait activement pour contrecarrer les plans de Washington au sujet de l'installation d'éléments de son système antimissiles en Pologne et en République tchèque. Ces équipements, considérés comme une menace à la capacité de dissuasion nu-

cléaire russe, sont au centre d'une furieuse campagne anti-occidentale dans les médias russes. Cette campagne est en grande partie orchestrée par les autorités russes qui n'ont pas la capacité d'établir un tel bouclier et qui considèrent le bouclier américain comme une première étape vers une plus grande militarisation des voisins de la Russie nouvellement membres de l'OTAN. Cette

crainte persiste, même si le bouclier antimissiles n'a jamais représenté une menace à l'endroit des missiles russes intercontinentaux, conçus pour frapper l'Amérique en survolant le Pôle Nord. Les missiles déployés en Pologne sont non seulement trop lents pour les intercepter, mais ont été développés à d'autres fins, ce que même les experts russes reconnaissent.

L'explication la plus plausible serait que Moscou ne craint pas tant pour ses missiles stratégiques, que pour ses missiles tactiques, des armes qui n'ont peu d'utilité défensive, mais qui servent à garder les alliés des Américains en Europe sous une menace constante. Ceci a déjà été démontrée dans le passé, par exemple en novembre 2011 lorsque la Russie a menacé de déployer des missiles nucléaires de courte portée de type *Iskander* dans l'enclave de Kaliningrad. La Russie agit de la sorte tantôt pour protester contre le bouclier antimissiles, tantôt pour chercher à éviter un élargissement de l'OTAN à d'anciens alliés du défunt Pacte de Varsovie.

La guerre au terrorisme international

Après les attaques du 11 septembre 2001, la Russie avait donné son soutien aux États-Unis dans leur réponse contre Al Qaeda et leur volonté de chasser les Taliban du pouvoir. La Russie a notamment fourni des cartes et des renseignements ayant aidé les équipes d'intervention américaines à pénétrer dans ce terrain hostile. De plus, Poutine a encouragé les dirigeants des États d'Asie centrale à offrir aux États-Unis d'établir des bases sur leur territoire.

Après la défaite des Taliban, la coopération des autorités russes s'est toutefois tarie. C'est ainsi que Moscou a plusieurs fois tenté de faire fermer les bases aériennes utilisées par les États-Unis dans la région. En 2005, le gouvernement ouzbek a cédé aux pressions russes et procédé à la fermeture de la base aérienne en Ouzbékistan. Désormais la dernière base américaine en Asie centrale est celle de Manas, au Kirghizstan, qui sert de principal point de transit pour l'opération militaire en Afghanistan. En 2005, après la Révolution des tulipes, que Moscou interprétait comme un autre exemple de changement de régime promu par les États-Unis dans les anciennes républiques soviétiques, Moscou a fait pression sur les autorités kirghizes pour faire fermer les installations militaires sur leur territoire. Cette tentative a échoué, mais, quatre ans plus tard, le gouvernement kirghize a plié, après que la Russie eut offert un prêt de 2 milliards et un effacement de dette de 180 millions de dollars, conditionnel à la fermeture de la base de Manas. Les États-Unis ont pu prolonger leur location de la base, mais seulement après avoir accepté de verser 60 millions de dollars annuellement, une hausse significative, en plus d'offrir une aide substantielle au gouvernement de Bichkek. Néanmoins, le 1 novembre 2011, le Premier ministre Almazbek

Le « nouveau départ » que le Président Obama a voulu Atambaïev a annoncé la fermeture de la base américaine pour 2014.

Conclusion

Le « nouveau départ » que le Président Obama a voulu insuffler dans les relations américano-russes au début de son mandat n'a pas apporté les dividendes escomptés. Poutine n'a jamais digéré la volonté de

l'OTAN de s'élargir aux anciennes républiques soviétiques, s'introduisant *de facto* dans ce que la Russie considère son « étranger proche », à savoir une zone où la Russie s'attribue l'exclusivité dans la gestion des questions sécuritaires. La guerre en Géorgie de 2008, un allié des États-Unis, s'explique ainsi par l'ouverture de l'OTAN à cette dernière. Plus récemment, Poutine a fortement critiqué l'action militaire de l'OTAN en Lybie, considérant que celle-ci a outrepassé son mandat défini dans la résolution 1973 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, à savoir d'assurer une simple zone d'exclusion aérienne pour protéger les populations civiles.

Vladimir Poutine semble réellement avoir une perception binaire du monde, où la Russie serait entourée d'ennemis et où l'opposition travaille pour l'Occident. Pour lui, la puissance d'un État se mesure en moyens militaires. Ainsi, il ne faudrait pas s'étonner de voir la Russie poursuivre les réformes militaires et augmenter son budget de la défense au cours des

prochaines années. La Russie continuera d'être intraitable au sujet de la gestion de son étranger proche et on peut s'attendre à ce qu'elle dénonce tout encouragement à la démocratisation, que ce soit dans le monde arabe ou dans l'ancien espace soviéti-

Vladimir Poutine semble réellement avoir une perception binaire du monde, où la Russie serait entourée d'ennemis et où l'opposition travaille pour l'Occident. Pour lui, la puissance d'un État se mesure en moyens militaires.

que, comme une intrusion occidentale dans les affaires internes des États concernés.

Ainsi, il ne faut pas compter sur la coopération de la Russie dans des dossiers sensibles comme celui du nucléaire iranien ou celui de la crise syrienne. Les expériences entourant le NTS, le bouclier antimissiles ou la guerre au terrorisme international montrent que les gestes d'ouverture de la Russie aux intérêts sécuritaires occidentaux constituent des épisodes de courte durée qui finissent toujours par céder au sentiment anti-américain traditionnel.

AWACS AND CANADA-NATO RELATIONS

Sophie-Marie Lamothe

This article evaluates Canada's recent political decision to cut funding to NATO's AWACS and Alliance Ground Surveillance programs through the lens of the economics-based joint product model of defence.

The Government of Canada has officially reneged on previous commitments to fund key NATO military programs, leaving us wondering how this decision will affect NATO's operational capabilities and, perhaps more pointedly, if this is reflective of a political decision to distance Canada from the alliance, with the eventual aim of limiting our involvement in NATO missions altogether. By applying the joint product model for defence, this article argues that budgetary retrenchments are often windows of opportunity for nations to focus on defence specialization and collaboration with allies and as such recent cuts will not compromise NATO's ability to engage in military interventions. With regards to Canada's future with NATO, using J.L. Granatstein's article "Does Canada Still Need NATO?" as a point of departure, this article will challenge some of the main arguments advanced by critics.

Information derived from Access to Information and Privacy requests indicate that Canada will save annual totals of \$90 million by withdrawing funding from two NATO programs financed through the alliance's commonly funded military budget. It is estimated that \$50 million will be saved by reneging on commitments to help fund NATO's Airborne Early Warning aircraft program (AWACS) and another \$40 million by halting funding to the Alliance Ground Surveillance Program, a new initiative seeking capital to purchase NATO's own fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles.

In recent news reports, the success of NATO's last military intervention in Libya is often described as having been heavily contingent on the use of the NATO owned and operated AWACS. Deployed immediately following NATO's decision to engage in the conflict, they were soon in operation 24 hours a day, managing and directing allied fighter jets and interceptors and relaying key reconnaissance reports back to allies.

This being said, Canada's decision to withdraw funding for these programs is founded in purely economic reasoning. The current global economic crisis is bound to have unfavourable impacts on governments' abilities to fund existing programs. As Dr. Craig Stone explains, significant reductions in public spending in Canada necessitated a government decision to revisit spending abroad. NATO itself, being a European-based collective defence alliance completely dependent on the monetary and resource-based contributions of its member states, was

Sophie-Marie Lamothe is a MA student at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, at Carleton University, studying in Intelligence and National Security. She also works as a Junior Program Officer, War Crimes for the Canada Border Services Agency's National Security Screening Division. undoubtedly aware that this economic and financial downturn would result in a drop in funding. Instead of perceiving these inevitable reductions in common funding as a hindrance to NATO's ability to continue functioning, however, it is perhaps more useful to consider how governments' reinvestments in *national* defence and security-related programs will ultimately, albeit more indirectly, result in a stronger alliance.

Firstly, it is important to recognize that while the programs financed through NATO's common funding initiative are important, the shared budget represents a minuscule portion (roughly 1%) of the alliance's total defence expenditures. Of course, NATO's AWACS program will likely suffer in the shortterm; however, the military capabilities of each individual member state are far more significant to the Alliance's overall capacity to both deter threats and defend against aggressors. As the financial crisis is pushing NATO member states to reevaluate the ways in which they contribute monetarily to the a, any shift that enhances or encourages members to invest ad-

ditional funds in country-specific defence and security activities will only strengthen the alliance, as its core functions are dependent on those very military forces and defence technologies.

This being said, Canada's decision to withdraw funding for these programs is founded in purely economic reasoning.

When NATO transitioned from the Cold War's Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine to one of Flexible Response, the alliance's reliance on the deterrence effect of strategic nuclear weapons was replaced with a return to more measured responses to real and perceived threats. The use of conventional military techniques began to regain primacy, as member states were encouraged to invest in their respective military forces. Defence economists were quick to note that this transition marked a significant change in the public good aspect of defence.

The MAD doctrine epitomized the concept of defence as a *pure public good*: nuclear deterrence is both non-rival (the capacity to deter enemy aggression did not diminish as a function of the number of allies protected under its umbrella) and non-excludable (nuclear deterrence is enjoyed by all allies). A return to conventional weaponry, however, transformed defence into a joint product, comprised of both pure public and country-specific goals. Investing in country-specific activities can benefit exclusively the country (such as enhanced search and rescue capacities) or it may have a 'spill-in' effect for the Alliance (such as a better trained and equipped military force available for NATO deployments). With this policy shift, NATO members

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who carry more than their proportion of the burden, markedly the United States, have benefitted from a significant decrease in free ridership amongst member states.

The logic of the model indicates that the Canadian security and defence community, or at least those members who still see merit in maintaining a strong relationship with NATO, may rest assured that concerns that Canada's funding cutbacks signal a larger, more longterm plan to distance itself from the alliance are fundamentally misplaced. Embodying the very definition of a middle power, Canada needs to continue to align its security and defence interests with a group of allied countries which both share those same interests, and are willing to work collaboratively to maintain and preserve them.

NATO critics often claim that the alliance has become, and should remain, a *European* defence alliance and that Canada should both pursue policies which strengthen bilateral relations with the United States and invest in building and improving relations with our 'new' global partners—markedly those in South America and Asia-Pacific. Granatstein, for one, writes that operations in Afghanistan and Libya, both major 'tests' for NATO, have prompted even the Americans to reconsider the value and effectiveness of the Alliance. Tired of bearing the burden of NATO's operational costs and feelings of resentment has catalyzed the rise of, as Granatstein states, "Washington's [and Ottawa's] wholly justifiable belief that Europe should now be capable of defending itself." threats; but, Canada has diverged from American positions on certain issues in the past (notably Iraq) and there is reason to believe that the two countries will clash on future issues (namely Arctic sovereignty claims, especially considering that tensions that have already emerged). Granatstein is convinced that NATO would leave us in "cold soup" if ever Canada found itself at odds with the United States (or any other major power, for that matter). Despite the fact that this is somewhat of a counterfactual argument, Canada would bode no better if were to sever ties with the Alliance altogether. In fact, post-Afghanistan and post-Libya NATO may be moving in the direction of

condoning the rise of 'coalitions of the willing.' As Richard Cohen maintains, allowing member states more latitude in determiningwhich interventions they would like to support operationally should be deemed a "perfectly normal and pragmatic development in NATO's continuing evolution." If such a change in doctrine were to become more institu-

In today's global security and defence environment laden with new threats, new aggressors and new weapons—it would be difficult to imagine any country, let alone a middle power like Canada, to secure safety and stability without 'friends.'

tionalized, Canada would certainly garner even higher benefits from maintaining membership.

Fortunately, as Martin Shadwick maintains, it does not appear as though Canada has any intention of severing ties with NATO. Granted, the Harper government has moved towards strengthening bilateral relations with the United States, but these are in areas that clearly require greater cohesion between the two neighbours. The Beyond the Border initiative, for instance, will seek to ensure and enhance border security, economic competitiveness and unhindered trade relations



A NATO E-3A takes off from NATO Air Base Geilenkirchen.

between both nations. Even the proposed Combined Defence Plan, although still in its final stages of negotiations, will address security and defence issues which are distinctly North American, as this bilateral alliance seeks to draw on each country's military capacities to collaboratively protect the region from a variety of threats (for example, terrorism, cyber, arctic security).

It would be imprudent of Canadians, however, to believe that such bilateral arrangements will surpass NATO's capacity to invoke collective security through deterrence and defence anytime soon. Furthermore, Canada has learned in the past that it must avoid becoming too dependent on the United States.

Canada's security interests are often defined, or at least largely influenced, by what the United States interprets to be risks or

For many years now, Canada (much like other member states) has contributed less than the desired 2% of GDP to defence spending requested by NATO. Today, Canada regretfully pulls out of common funding commitments due to recent austerity measures. Did these political decisions hurt Canada's reputation within the Alliance? Certainly not fatally. But both Canada and NATO can (and should) perceive this relatively short period of retrench-

short period of retrenchment as an opportune time

for Canada to make strategic reinvestments in its own military forces and technologies. As the joint product model predicts, the public good that Canadians will derive from enhancing domestic defence capabilities will end up being advantageous to the alliance in the long run.

Granatstein questions whether nations can truly go after their national interests and maintain 'friendships' simultaneously. In today's global security and defence environment—laden with new threats, new aggressors and new weapons—it would be difficult to imagine any country, let alone a middle power like Canada, to secure safety and stability *without* 'friends.' NATO is certainly a friend that Canada will keep in this consistently unpredictable, somewhat treacherous, and always changing global neighbourhood.

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: A NEW APPROACH TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

Keith W. Mines

This article provides readers with a the current status of us-mexico security concerns, and relection on the author's time as the merida initiative coordinator and narcotics affairs section director.

A fter four compelling years covering law enforcement cooperation and inter-parliamentary affairs from the US Embassy in Ottawa, I drove down to Mexico City for my next posting as the Merida Initiative Coordinator and Narcotics Affairs Section Director in 2008, passing blissfully through Ciudad Juarez on the way after dropping a son off in New Mexico for university. I would spend a good deal of time in Juarez over the next four years, as violence increased there to the point that it was responsible for up to a third of Mexico's organized crime killings, and the United States and Mexico worked increasingly closely to try to staunch the violence and establish the rule of law.

During the drive we became turned around in Juarez and a local citizen, sensing our confusion, had us follow him until we were on the right track again, going out of the city. We were experiencing one of many paradoxes in Mexico, a society of incredible human warmth and generosity, with small parts of the country locked in an anomalous battle between rival gangs. I

The challenge, from the beginning, was also acknowledged as hemispheric, even global in nature, as drugs produced in South America move through Central America, into Mexico and then are distributed to markets in the United States, Canada and Europe. use the word anomalous because drug violence in Mexico is not the historic norm. In her 1992 book Children of Cain, aboutviolence in Latin America, Tina Rosenberg does not even give Mexico a chapter. And even in the throes of high lev-

els of violence in some areas, other parts of the country maintain constant calm – one public official from the Yucatan was insulted when someone said his province had "European levels of security," pointing out that most of Europe would be hardpressed to lower its murder rate to match cities like Merida.

It was to be as unique and rewarding an assignment as I have

Keith Mines currently serves as US Senior Civilian Representative and Principal Officer in Mazar e-Sharif, Afghanistan. He has served with the US Foreign Service in Tel Aviv, San Salvador, Port-au-Prince, Budapest and Ottawa, and done short tours in Mogadishu, Kabul, Al Anbar (Iraq) and Darfur. He is a former US Army Special Forces officer and graduate of Brigham Young University and Georgetown University. had in 21 years of diplomatic service, as I watched security relations between the United States and Mexico develop and the operating space of drug trafficking organizations slowly begin to be rolled back. As I leave Mexico for a posting as US Senior Civilian Representative in Mazar e-Sharif, I can look back on three key bi-national achievements over the last four years of Merida. First, we have a bi-national team that can effectively administer a program of this size and complexity. Second, our law enforcement agencies work much more closely together and have a greater ability to share and act on information. Third, there has been a significant transformation of law enforcement and judicial organizations in Mexico.

The Merida Initiative was first conceived in 2007 by Presidents Bush and Calderon and later re-affirmed by Presidents Obama and Calderon in May 2010, when President Obama discussed the "co-responsibility" that is at the heart of the initiative. He stated, "this is not just a problem in Mexico. It is a problem that the United States has to address. It is absolutely true that US demand for drugs helps to drive this public safety crisis within Mexico." US and Mexican officials from the start also emphasized the mutual respect for sovereignty, and the transparency that would become the hallmark of the new relationship. The challenge, from the beginning, was also acknowledged as hemispheric, even global in nature, as drugs produced in South America move through Central America, into Mexico and then are distributed to markets in the United States, Canada and Europe. Precursors and supplies from Asia are used in Mexico to produce methamphetamines, which are also widely distributed. Clearly the problem is not Mexico's alone.

The Merida Initiative was initially designed as a three year program supported by \$1.4 billion in US funding, which complimented Mexico's own massive infusion of new capital into the security and judicial sector, by most estimates some ten times the US contribution. The funding would touch every agency with a role in security and the rule of law, as well as some funding for civil society organizations and demand reduction. Merida's programs and our cooperation were organized around four pillars: 1) disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate; 2) institutionalize the capacity to sustain the rule of law; 3) create a 21st century border structure; and, 4) build strong and resilient communities. Some seven program areas, covering information technology, border security, aviation, training, judicial transformation, demand reduction and culture of lawfulness, make up the programmatic focus of Merida, which includes hundreds of individual projects. A late addition was the

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resilient communities program, in which we work together on the socio-economic and community-building aspects of reducing violence.

The first several years were heavy on equipment since these had the longest lead times, as Bell and Blackhawk helicopters were delivered to the Mexican Army, Navy and Federal Police, and CASA surveillance aircraft were delivered to the Navy. These and a significant infusion of Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment helped extend the mobility of the security forces and the security of the border. The first several years also saw a large transformation of the information technology sector in the security forces and the judiciary, as new case tracking systems were implemented, one of the largest criminal databases in the hemisphere (Plataforma Mexico) was supported, and communication and data management extended more broadly and securely throughout Mexico. Support was provided to new forensics labs in the Federal Police and the Attorney General's Office and training of new investigators (with the help of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) was offered as a wave of younger and better-educated police officers took to the streets. There were parallel programs for the penitentiary service, special units of the police and immigration, prosecutors and judicial officials at the federal and the state levels, as the initiative began to shift from equipment deliveries to training and institution building. In short, no area was untouched, all in support of Mexico's national security strategy.

The yield to date has been impressive and could be divided into three categories. First, we have built a dynamic bi-national team that can manage this and similar large programs. After a slow start in 2009 and 2010, the Merida joint team delivered over \$500 million in equipment and training in 2011, an achievement that could be almost equalled in 2012. Bi-national project teams design and plan programs, contract for equipment and services, and monitor and evaluate outcomes, shifting resources as new needs and opportunities arise. Perhaps the most visible example of the depth of our cooperation is the Bi-national Implementation Office, opened in August 2010 to allow US and Mexican officials working on Merida to share office space, enhancing both the capacity of the team, and the level of transparency. This is the first such office of its kind that the State Department has opened anywhere in the world.

Second, is the security relationship between the United States and Mexico. Security relations between the two have traditionally been cordial but cool. Our security forces and judiciaries cooperated broadly and consistently and had well-established channels of communication; but, it was a sometimes distant embrace, and that distance benefitted no one but our common enemies. Under Merida, thousands of US and Mexican security forces have now trained together, sharing their common understanding of the threat, and comparing new techniques and methods for confronting that threat. Judicial officials have gathered in dozens of forums to develop joint strategies for tackling such issues as arms trafficking, money laundering and extraditions. Civil society has joined hands to reduce the demand for drugs and divert youth from criminal gangs. Throughout all of these encounters a respect for human rights and aversion to corruption has been a core theme. The previous distance between our institutions has been replaced by trust and understanding that leads to a quicker and fuller sharing of information, the ability to more rapidly act on that information, and sharing of evidence that will allow for the prosecution of criminals apprehended on both sides of the border.

The third transformation has been of the judicial institutions and security forces in Mexico itself. The changes occurring in Mexican institutions are stunning, a reflection of the demands by the Mexican people for security institutions that are trust-

worthy, capable, and close to the citizens they serve, and for judicial institutions that are fair and efficient. These demands have required an entire new generation of leaders and officials, new legislation and procedural codes, and training and equipment that is equal to the task. All

Criminal gangs who once used Mexico's difficult terrain to hide and operate, now find their impunity contested as Mexican security forces can move rapidly on the world's most advanced helicopters to confront them.

of this is underwritten by the immense sacrifice of hundreds of police, soldiers and judicial officials, who have given their lives for their country in the fight against organized crime.

The Merida Initiative has supported this transformation since its inception and the results are beginning to bear fruit across Mexico and our shared border. Information that would once have been sent to police stations by fax is now available through Plataforma Mexico, a mega criminal database that links the entire country and allows immediate access to fingerprint and other data. Criminal gangs who once used Mexico's difficult terrain to hide and operate, now find their impunity contested as Mexican security forces can move rapidly on the world's most advanced helicopters to confront them. Four of Mexico's federal prisons and the national penitentiary academy have now been certified to international standards and others are on the way to certification, while Mexico now leads the new Latin America chapter of the International Corrections and Prison Association. Mexico now has 17 certified vetting centres that are helping to build increasingly trustworthy institutions through background checks and polygraphs. And there are over 8,000 college-educated young professionals who are now part of the federal police, filling the roles of investigators, analysts and leaders.

Support for the Merida Initiative has continued from the US Congress, which has added to the initial tranche of funding from 2008-2010 with fresh funding in 2011 and 2012, bringing the total appropriated for Merida to some \$1.8 billion. This and any future funding will be utilized to shore up the new era in security relations in the hemisphere, solidifying the gains President Calderon described in his May 2010 address to the US Congress when he stated, "we have moved from the suspicion and mutual recrimination of the past to the cooperation and mutual understanding of the present." The Merida Initia-tive has been at the forefront of that transformation.

TO HONOUR, NOT BE HONOURED: THE REBRANDING OF HONORARIES

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Though the role is being redefined and budgets have been cut, this article explores the important role of that honoraries of reservist units continue to play.

Sir Robert Borden described the tradition of honorary positions in the military "of greatest advantage to the Militia to be able to enlist the interest and sympathy of gentlemen of position and wealth by connecting them to Regiments."

Despite a redefined role, recent budget cuts and generational clashes within the community, these positions remain as important today as in the early 20th century when Borden highlighted the significance of these individuals.'

Background: a militia tradition

Originally a British military custom, the practice of granting honorary titles and ranks in the Canadian military also has roots in the militia system. In 1857, militia units were encouraged to appoint prominent community figures of "exceptional nature" and in "high standing of the state" who could mobilise forces if the militia was called upon. Decades later in 1895, the Honourable J.M. Gibson, a Provincial Secretary in the Ontario Government, received the first appointment as the honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the 13th Battalion of Infantry.

Honorary appointments have always acted outside of the military's operational chain-of-command, and have served primarily in a ceremonial capacity. In the past, honorary ranks have been filled by individuals who have seen prior service or relations with the regiment.

For all army units, honoraries act as guardians of a unit's history and heritage and as advisors to the unit's Commanding Officer. However, as budgets tighten, reserve units need that can provide much needed access to resources.

A new breed of honoraries

Army regiments have traditionally appointed retired senior officers to act as honoraries. However, with the appointment of Blake Goldring as Honorary Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Canada in 2006, a new generation of honoraries was born honoraries who by Goldring's own characterization, have never fired guns or marched into battle.

Since 2006, these new honoraries with extensive business connections, community networks, and financial resources have marched into the drill halls of reserve units all across Ontario.

New honoraries believe that their role needs to be redefined.

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is a Defence Policy Analyst with the CDA Institute, the Vice-President (Communications) for Women in Defence and Security, and an Army Reservist. Darrell Bricker, HCol of the Queen's York Rangers, contends that "the job of the honorary is to honour, not to be honoured," while one of the most recent additions to the community, HCol Chiko Nanji of 30th Field Regiment, believes that "the military at the honorary level does not need more military. The military at the honorary level needs a catalyst of change." Bricker agrees by pointing that the military does not necessarily need "more military," it needs more energy and more connections, two things that former officers cannot always bring in.

This new role does not mean that the older generation of honoraries have necessarily lost their place. John Goudreau, former CO and now HCol of the 2nd Irish Regiment in Sudbury, simply sees his role differently: "I feel that my role is to be a guardian of the regimental tradition and history. That's the best thing I can offer. My contribution is my background and the length of time that I have spent as a member of the regimental family."

Yet Goudreau's perception of his position does not negate the important role he thinks new honoraries play. "It's important to get a strong representation in the business community, since units need them to help them maintain qualified people working in the community," he says.

It is in this vein that HCol Bill Leach of 33 Service Battalion argues that, "Many of the 'new breed' are incredible people with respect to what they have achieved in a business sense," however he cautions these new honoraries by suggesting that, "Sometimes age gives you certain smoothness. In the end, it's all about people and we all want what's best for the regiment."

The re-defined role of honoraries: inexperienced, but eager

As the role of honorary moves away from primarily acting as a 'guardian of history and heritage,' the re-branded job description remains vague, undefined, and subject to personal interpretation. "A lot of what an honorary is supposed to be is passed by word of mouth or someone else's impressions of what they are supposed to do based on their own background," says HCol Leach, himself a highly decorated retired Lieutenant-General.

Within this ambiguity and lacking support from the unit, exposure to the troops may at first be a foreign and uncomfortable experience. Furthermore, since many contemporary honoraries have very little previous exposure to the military, many of the details of military etiquette such as dress and deportment need to be taught. However, if units take the time to orient and educate their new honoraries, and properly articulate their expectations, new honoraries without military experience can excel and bring a lot to their respective regiments.

Many of the honoraries have embarked on significant projects greatly improving the welfare of their regiments and the soldiers who serve within them, while others have ventured beyond the regiment with aspirations of shaping the way the nation interacts with the reserves.

Examples of initiatives that directly benefit individual regiments include Queen's York Rangers HCol Bricker's efforts to establish an emergency fund available within 48 hours to help any soldier in the unit that may need financial resources to pay rent or help with a family emergency. Additionally, HCol Paul Hindo of the Cameron Highlander's of Ottawa has raised money for a regimental history book, care packages for deployed soldiers and the subsidization of dress uniforms for troops and officers—costs which are prohibitive to student reservists. For his part, HCol Nanji is making efforts towards developing a program at McGill University for students who want to study supply chain management and logistics, while receiving employment with the Reserves and mentorship in the private sector. Many other HCols, such as HLCol Dr. John Scott Cowan of the Princess of Wales Own Regiment play a role in mentoring and have established scholarships or credits for entrepreneurial ventures, all in an effort to replicate the programs the federal government established for veterans after the Second World War.

These efforts go a long way to directly help troops parading on weeknights, but other honoraries interpret their role in a much broader context. Among this group of honoraries, HLCol Justin Fogarty of 33 Signals Regiment, HLCol Tim Hogarth of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, and HCol Golding have been leaders in raising the national profile of the military, particularly the reserves, through Canada Company: Many Ways to Serve, True Patriot Love Dinner, and other major initiatives. These efforts have helped to raise over \$2 million to support solders and their families. Most significantly, it was efforts of honoraries who participate in Canada Company that led the federal government to include a plan for fair compensation for employers of Canada's reservists in its Economic Action Plan 2012.

The impact of these well-connected honoraries transcends the soldier's experience. Honoraries measurably influence the local community's perception of the military. HLCol Fogarty notes that attitudes towards the reserves and the military in general have recently become more positive in urban centres, however "the biggest challenge honoraries have to face now is to ensure that we keep supporter momentum high now that the mission in Afghanistan is coming to a close."

Commanders cannot replicate these tangible results themselves. Honoraries are willing to engage with troops outside the chain of command, they can facilitate mentorship and civilian connections and are capable of ensuring a level of welfare beyond that of a commander. As Colonel Howard Coombs, the Commander of 33 Brigade notes, "Honoraries provide a great deal of connection to service the community and assistance to the soldiers that commanders couldn't otherwise provide."

For the soldier on the drill hall floor, the role of HCol appears comfortable and undemanding; however, honoraries work extremely hard to support their units. For HCol Hindo, there are times when he is working with his regiment up to four or five days a week. Hindo says that his role as an honorary is equally as demanding as the time he spent as the chair of a hospital board, "between the brigade, the regiment and the community, this role is always on my mind."

The new generation of honoraries are also playing a more visible role. HCol Bricker recently appeared on Global News in uniform to discuss his regiment's legacy in safeguarding York during the War of 1812, and HCol Goldring's profile has received considerable media attention.

Significantly, the new generation is also starting to reflect the diversity of Canada's demographics and reservists. This diversity is something that the retired military community will not necessarily reflect for at least another few generations.

The future of honoraries

Undoubtedly, the role of honorary is redefining itself. In the past, the role has had a limited sphere of influence and has been contained to the regiment and its history and heritage. Now, as regiments face increased fiscal constraints, the army is deliberately approaching prominent individuals with money with considerable financial clout for honorary appointments.

However, at the same time, expense allowances for honoraries have been cut. These individuals are no longer provided funding to cover the costs of participating in unit exercises or visiting bases. These funding cuts have resulted in a certain degree of confusion among honoraries. They know they are wanted, but there appears to be little institutional commitment from the military.

This confusion is compounded as honoraries come up against with COs in a chain-of-command that is unfamiliar and appears convoluted for new honoraries. In the eyes of regimental COs, flag officers at NDHQ are empowering honoraries where they should not be. Generals are bypassing the chain-of-command to interact directly with honoraries to enhance their leverage, but this can cause coordination and communication concerns for COs who can find themselves caught off-guard about the commitments and plans of their honoraries.

However, all of these challenges are merely growing pains for continuously cash-strapped reserve regiments who desperately crave increased funding and community outreach. The ideal is for units to attempt to find a balance, perhaps appointing one honorary who is a business leader and another with longstanding military ties to the unit.

As HCol Goudreau notes, "On occasion the regimental senate has been asked about honorary appointments, and I think that it is possible to have one of each type of honorary. But two distinguished people from the community would be able to do the job, given that the senate is able to act as a guardian of history and heritage in place of an honorary."

Major Neil Newlands, 33 Brigade's Staff Officer to Honoraries, believes these clashes are to be expected for an institution that is in the midst of rebranding and redefining itself. As Newlands argues, "Honoraries are an institution that has developed with time. [This institution] has a foot in the past and has a foot in the future. The direction it is taking with a mix of military experience and business leaders can only be healthy for Canadian Forces."

INTERVIEW

ROBERT FOWLER ON CANADA'S APPROACH TO HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS, AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Three years before Mali's President Amadou Toumani Touré was overthrown by rebels, he personally oversaw negotiations that saved Canadian diplomat and then-CDA Institute board member Robert Fowler's life. Now in what appears to be a *coup de théatre*, Robert Fowler is safe in Canada, while President Touré's position remains precarious in the hands of questionable characters amidst a backdrop of anarchy.

After being held hostage for 130 days in the Sahara by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Fowler gained rare access into the minds of al Qaeda and the West's enemies. This insight, along with considerable frustration about the response by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) prompted Fowler to write memoirs of his time in captivity. *A Season in Hell: My 130 days in the Sahara with al Qaeda*, is somewhat of a therapeutic effort by Fowler to come to terms with his experience. General (ret'd) Paul Manson provides a review of *A Season in Hell* elsewhere in *On Track*. What follows here is a condensed interview with Fowler about his book, his experience with DFAIT and the RCMP, and his perspectives on international affairs.

O'Keefe: I enjoyed A Season in Hell, and was impressed with your ability to find humour in the extreme stress and adversity you faced. Did you find this humour at the time at all, or did it emerge in hindsight?

Fowler: A little bit. Louis [Guay] and I had a conversation at one point, and one of us said something funny and we were laughing—not roaring, but laughing. I remember asking, 'should we be laughing? Is this a good thing? These guys don't have fun, but should we be making light of anything. There were glorious ironies in the whole experience, and you can't not see them. I spent most of my time simply terrified, and therefore to leaven that with moments of humour, at least recognizing the preposterous situations somewhat helped.

O'Keefe: In the back-end of A Season in Hell, while you are very thankful to Canada for bringing you home alive, you are also highly critical of how DFAIT and the RCMP engaged with each other, your wives, and with you. Has either department responded to the book at all?

Fowler: No. Not at all.

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is a Defence Policy Analyst with the CDA Institute, the Vice-President (Communications) for Women in Defence and Security, and an Army Reservist. I spent a lot of time thinking about those words at the end and hoping that people like you would read it the way I wrote it. That is, [they] would hear the fact that I said some very nice things about the Canadian government in addition to the bad things I said, and knowing that journalists will automatically gravitate towards the bitchiness and forget all those thankful things [I wrote] about the big effort.

The criticisms of the RCMP, in my view, are totally different than the criticisms of DFAIT. They have a totally different quality and nature. I've worked with the RCMP most of my professional life, and anyone who knows me wouldn't be surprised about what I am saying about the RCMP. They are fine policemen, and as long as they stick to policing in the context they know—which is Canada—they are fine. But, are they good spy catchers? I don't think they ever were. ... The African context is so far... that they were babes in the woods. The RCMP is divided strictly between white hats and black hats; [they see] good people and bad people. I don't think there's a policeman in Africa who can live on his salary. So, they develop shades of grey. And, if the RCMP was only looking for white hats to save us, we were going to die. You know, how many people would wander 14 times in to al Oaeda land in the middle of the Sahara?... People who probably know those guys pretty well. My criticism of the RCMP is pretty basic. It's an issue relating to their skills set, their training, and, yes, their naivety.

Whereas Foreign Affairs...this was [our] home for 75 years between us. The fact that Foreign Affairs would not have debriefed us...would not have debriefed me, well, okay. But, Louis showed up for work for the next two and a half years, and as he walked through those corridors no one said [whispers] 'what where they like?' ...This is al Qaeda! According to the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, they [may be] the greatest threat to us there is. It sounds like it's about me, but in days of yore if we had had somebody like me who had had this experience, [everyone would be asking us about it].

I have been extensively debriefed by all kinds of other people. The [New York Police Department], was one of the best debriefings I've had, and the [United Nations] gave me an incredibly professional debrief over two days. However, it was remarkable that RCMP and DFAIT did not debrief me.

So, it is unfortunately, and yes of course I would love to think that when the next person like us is kidnapped, that the government will be in better shape to deal with it, but frankly I don't believe it. I know of no lessons learned exercise. In [the Department of National Defence], we never had an operation of any size that was not followed by a lessons learned. And, they tended to be pretty hard-edge. People would say, 'you really screwed up here, and we didn't have support from you guys there'

O'Keefe: You talk extensively with your past relationship with the President of Burkina Faso and your efforts to shame him for his relationship with Angola and the illegal trade of diamonds.

Fowler: It was a huge deal. ...When I found out the only one in our corner was Blaise Compaoré, the President of Burkina Faso, a man I had branded an international criminal...and I knew from meeting him a number of times that he was not happy [with me] and yet I doubt without him we would be having this chat.

O'Keefe: In addition to your concerns about Compaoré, did you question your career and the people you have worked with who are now in influential roles directly related to portfolio that impacted your life at the time?

Fowler: I didn't question them. I worried a bit, if you will. I thought 'would the government of Canada be prepared to do whatever was necessary to get us out?' Because obviously if these people were not dealt with, we were going to die. So yes, I worried a lot about that. Thankfully, the [Canadians working on my file] were pragmatic.

O'Keefe: One of the most interesting themes in your book is the dichotomy between the West's and your captor's perspective on time. You highlight that your captors and their allies are not impatient, and you contrast this to how impatient our society is to see results. You call our lives "attention disordered" and informed by "visionless politicians" and "shallow media." Based on your experience in the hands of AQIM, are we countering Islamic extremism and al Qaeda the right way? What should be we be doing differently?

Fowler: To me this is was the most interesting observation I had. These guys are patient. I draw that Obama parallel at West Point, where he says [in one sentence] 'we're gonna surge in Afghanistan' and [then in the next breath] says 'but, we'll come home in two years.' I mean, these guys would be laughing themselves sick if they had a sense of humour. Two years? What's two years [to their millennium-long jihad]? Nothing!

There's a real issue [here]. We just don't have that staying power. We aren't able to do it. Our media, our politics, have all got shorter and shorter fused. And, we're ever less capable of dealing with that type of a threat. In addition to that, we keep screwing up.

I've been saying it for a long time, but Afghanistan is a disaster and we will not prevail in Afghanistan. We just don't have the will. We're not prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure to get it done. And we are not willing to pay the humanitarian price and the price to our own soul of what it would take to do it, which would be very messy. Therefore, we have lost sight of what it is we are doing. Is it about little girls in school? That is a very unconvincing narrative. Going into Afghanistan in 2001 to exact a price, to degrade al Qaeda's capabilities, and to send out the message that 'you bring this to us and we will attack you wherever *vou are, anywhere in the world, without warning' struck me as an* excellent idea and [a compelling campaign]. It started well, but then we got distracted. And suddenly the politicians got control and began building this governance, anti-corruption, democracy, development, triple D [defence, diplomacy, development] efforts ... all this strange stuff that had absolutely nothing to do with a military mission that made sense.

After 10 years we will slink away from Afghanistan proclaiming some kind of tattered victory, which no one will believe. The jihadists will get a big hit. They will have defeated us in Iraq and then again in Afghanistan. Recruitment will go up, money will flow in, and we will be in worse shape than when we started. By the way, we've also kicked over some serious hornet's nests in Pakistan along the way, and then we get to Libya [and the on-going situation in Mali].

The bottom line is: acknowledge the law of unintended conseauences. We have caused the most unstable region in the word to become awash in weapons, weapons both in terms of quality and quantity that are game changers in that region, and that region is a 7,000 kilometre band [across the continent]. Every single point along that band is parlous. The most parlous being Nigeria by far. If Nigeria goes, it will take West Africa with it, and these are the issues I think Canadians should be concerned about. But. so whatever it is we did in Libva for whatever reason, I think it behooves us to acknowledge that we have created some very serious problems. The situation in Mali today, where the upper half of the country has been lost to a combination of Tuaregs and al Oaeda in a very strange marriage, is a direct result of Libya. This was the darling of Western development agencies. No, of course we didn't intend that to happen, and I don't want to give any suggestion that it was an eyes-wide open sort of thing—it wasn't but the core of Gaddafi's African mercenaries being Tuareg was known, as was known that the fact that the core of his Islamic legions were Tuareg as well. [We knew] that Gaddafi had been playing footsies with the Tuareg in Mali and Niger for years. That was knowable. The people in the region certainly knew it. Did we bother to find that out? ... Everything was knowable. If we are sending soldiers and risking their lives and causing a lot of deaths in the process, do we not have an obligation to exercise better due diligence? I would think so.

O'Keefe: Is it about empowering African states then?

Fowler: Empowering them and to an extent arming them too. They lost Timbuktu yesterday [April 1, 2012]. [They also lost]Goa City, [a city] of 90,000 people. These losses are hugely significant. What is it that we have lost [these cities] to? Potentially very scary [organizations]. We were helping to train the Malian armed forces until we came home because nobody was there to train, they were all off fighting with no bullets ... so we could make sure they have bullets, we could provide them with good logistic support, intelligence, and lots more training. But we will have to have people to train. And, I am not sure what's left of the very rudimentary Malian armed forces. I talk in the book quite a bit about our utterly unrealistic expectations of what they could have accomplished, these 14,000 very ill-equipped ill-trained guys, dealing with a counterinsurgency, which is never never easy - ask 120,000 Soviets and 110,000 coalition partners in Afghanistan.

O'Keefe This brings us to Kabul and the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan [NTM-A] and Canada's Operation Attention. Is it going to work?

Fowler: [NTM-A] is just about the exit strategy and everyone knows it, except the people who keep proclaiming it to be otherwise. Is there anybody left who really thinks that we are going to leave behind an armed force that is capable of beating the Taliban? I don't know anyone who I respect that would say that. I do know some people who can't say it. But, it is the reality.

REVIVING THE CITIZEN'S CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY

Rob Roy

This article highlights Breakout Educational Network efforts to revive military training in civilian universities.

A hundred years ago this year, a military training program was launched at McGill University to help students develop the initiative, self-discipline, and sense of citizenship they would need to become leaders in the military, business and politics. In due course, the program spread across the country. At its height in the mid-1950s, it had approximately 3000 officercadets undergoing training in some 60 reserve units at 35 universities.

The program was known variously as the Canadian Officer Training Corps or COTC, the University Naval Training Division or UNTD, and the University Reserve Training Program or URTP. When it was abolished in 1968, leadership, citizenship and service were no longer part of a university education.

The reason for the demise of the program had nothing to do with its merits. Mostly, it was a short-sighted effort to economize. But the program's abolition was not cost-free. One of the consequences was the progressive disconnect between the universities and the Canadian Forces – and, inevitably, between citizens and the men and women in uniform who serve and defend them. That disconnect led directly to a decline in general knowledge about the role of the Canadian Forces in society, to lower defence budgets, to a decrease in military capabilities, and to what General Hillier once described as "the decade of darkness".

Now a unique public policy organization called the Breakout Educational Network is organizing a citizen-based effort to relaunch the training program under the name of the Canadian National Leadership Program or CNLP. It is an effort that has been meeting with interest and success, largely due to two considerations which have driven Breakout's approach.

The first is that Breakout is committed to putting ideas into action. In Canada, too much public discussion of policy issues that matter to Canadians never gets beyond illuminating prob-

Robert Roy is a documentary filmmaker who has covered international conflict, organized crime, intelligence, defence and security subjects over the course of a thirty year career. He is currently producing a documentary BRIDGING THE GAP on civil-military relations in the United States and the return of the ROTC to Columbia University. As part of the investigative team that started Stornoway Productions he works with its partner the Breakout Educational Network. lems. The second, as Dr. Douglas Bland often reminds people, is that responsibility for the defense of Canada ultimately rests with the citizens of Canada.

The Seven Year Project

This initiative is the culmination of seven years of work by Breakout, whose motto is "policy you can see." Breakout uses "video research" to investigate policy, and to inform and influence Canadians. And it is through video research and development that Breakout's 7 Year Project was set-up to re-connect Canadians with the military as a national institution. See www. sevenyearproject.com

The venture began with a five-part documentary series "A QUESTION OF HONOUR" which took a critical look at "the decade of darkness" through the eyes of those who were there. The series was nominated for two Gemini Awards in 2004; for Best Documentary Series and for Best Director.

The work on the series produced the insight that the largest and most important problem facing the Canadian military was its disconnect from the Canadian public. To bring the issue to wider public attention, Breakout produced television documentaries on Canada's whole-of-government campaign in Afghanistan, on defence procurement, and on the role of the Reserves. The initiative benefitted greatly from the support of an advisory board of prominent Canadians led by Senator Pamela Wallin, currently the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and such notables as William Rompkey, Hugh Segal, John Fraser, Bill Graham, John Rankin, Jean Thérèse Riley, John Scott Cowan, Jack Granatstein, and Neville Poy. Doug Bland is a member of Breakout's Board of Directors.

Students of strategy are familiar with Clausewitz's observation that the "remarkable trinity of the people, the army and the government" forms the essential basis of military operations and the nation's center of gravity. So Breakout set out to rectify the civil-military disconnect, not through urging the government or the military to fix the problem, but through undertaking a citizen-based initiative in the citizen's own interests. The initiative took two forms: the Canadian National Leadership Program and the Garrison Community Councils.

The Canadian National Leadership Program (CNLP)

The CNLP targets universities and students, Canada's future leaders, with a revived and contemporary version of the earli-

er university-based training programs focusing on leadership, citizenship and nation-building.

What would an officer training program on university campuses look like today? When Breakout set out to find the answer, it turned out that the experience of the earlier programs wasn't shrouded in the mists of time. A large number of today's most prominent Canadians in business, academia, politics, the arts and the military point to their formative experiences with the COTC, UNTD and URTP at university to help explain the successes they achieved in life and the contributions they were able to make to Canada. Breakout's film "NO COUNTRY FOR YOUNG MEN" traces the rise and fall of the earlier programs, in the words of people instantly recognizable to most Canadians. "A Canadian success story that was thrown away."

Also, it turned out that programs like the COTC in other countries, begun around the same time, continue to thrive today. Breakout's second film in this series, "FOR QUEEN & COUN-TRY", tells the story of the highly regarded leadership program at Cambridge University in the UK. This film was based on original research by Dr. Neville Poy, the internationally renowned surgeon and Hon. Colonel Emeritus of the Queen's York Rangers. The film follows students in the British Army's university officer training program, and speaks with graduates, leaders in industry and government, and military officers about the remarkable achievements of the program.

A third film is due to be completed shortly on the role that the university-based Reserve Officers' Training Corps program in the United States has played in advancing civil-military relations in that country. Banned from some Ivy League colleges since the era of the Vietnam War, ROTC has recently returned to campus at Harvard, Yale, Columbia and other "elite" institutions.

In Canada, the films have been generating a good deal of support for the idea of returning a COTC-like training program, with suitable updating, to Canadian universities. Renamed the Canadian National Leadership Program (CNLP), Canadian universities are becoming aware of the leadership training potential of the program and beginning to look at how to bring it on campus.

In the lead is the University of Alberta which has committed to running a four-year pilot project on a cost shared basis. Breakout has also received expressions of interest from several other universities and endorsements from university presidents at Guelph, McGill, UNB, Brock and Dalhousie.

As Breakout has drawn attention to the benefits which university-based leadership training could generate across society, interest is clearly on the rise – from the highest levels of government to Parliament, business, the military and the media. In December 2011, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence recommended action. In its interim report Answering the Call: The Future Role of Canada's Primary Reserve, the Committee wrote: The Reserves' longstanding role as the Canadian Forces' link with Canadian communities should be formally and more clearly defined. As part of this, DND/CF should consider reestablishing a military presence on the campuses of educational institutions, as used to be the case with the Canadian Officer Training Corps. The Canadian National Leadership Program provides a private-public partnership model for he training of Canada's future leaders.

In January 2012, the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) applauded the Senate report. In February, CDA provided Breakout an opportunity to air a short film on the CNLP and GCC initiatives at this year's Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security.

The Garrison Community Council

The Garrison Community Council initiative also promotes the enhancement of ties between Canadians and their military through the parallel objective of reinforcing grassroots connections between local communities and Canadian Forces establishments and personnel present in those communities. The intent is to offer citizens avenues for expressing their interest and support for the military in very practical ways.

The GCC concept first took root in London, Ontario, where civic and community leaders took the initiative to connect with local military garrisons and units in the region. In just a few years, the concept has been successfully transplanted to half a dozen other communities and interest is now being shown from Victoria to Pictou and places in between such as Edmonton, Medicine Hat, Regina, Winnipeg, Montreal, Hamilton and the Niagara Region.

Each GCC is autonomous, organized locally, with programs to match local requirements. Most reflect interest in one or more of three areas of activity:

Enhancing and sustaining cultural and historical links between the civilian and military communities;

- Providing visible and tangible means of support to military families;
- Developing, promoting, publicizing and coordinating events, projects, celebrations, and educational programs for the mutual benefit of both communities.

GCCs have hosted military appreciation days, reintroduced military levées, restored historical monuments, constructed community park and recreational facilities, launched service programs for military families and veterans, funded Military Family Resource Centres, opened up educational opportunities, and the like.

Conclusion

As Canada's mission in Afghanistan winds down and fiscal conditions impose their constraints on Canadian defence budgets, it is more important than ever that relations between citizens and the Canadian Forces remain strong. The CNLP and GCC can help ensure that Canada will have the leaders it needs in future generations, that civilians and their military will understand how important is the role each plays in the fortunes of the other, and that Canada remains the secure democratic society it is today.

BOOK REVIEW

A SEASON IN HELL: MY 130 DAYS IN THE SAHARA WITH AL QAEDA

Reviewed by General (ret) Paul Manson

Fowler, Robert R.: A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the Sahara with Al Qaeda. Harper Collins Publishers Ltd. 342 pages. ISBN 978-1-44340-204-0. 2011. \$32.99.



Canadians were shocked in December 2009 when diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay were kidnapped with their African driver while on a high-level UN mission to Niger in sub-Saharan Africa. The shock turned to despair when it became known soon after that their captors were Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Little hope was held for their eventual recovery, given their captor's reputation for militancy and the Canadian government's solemnly declared

policy of not dealing with Al Qaeda. Nor was there much hope that the United Nations, widely despised in the region, could negotiate their release.

The eventual return of Fowler and Guay to freedom 130 days later was therefore a surprising and happy development. The circumstances of their release remain shrouded in mystery. Although the Canadian government declared that it had not paid a ransom, a deal was obviously struck with some agency, whether for cash or an exchange of prisoners, or both. Much as the reader of his remarkable account would like to know the full story, Mr. Fowler clearly states at the outset that he is not able to give it.

He likewise emphasizes that the book is his alone. Because Louis Guay remains an active diplomat with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade he is constrained in his ability to speak publicly about his experience. It must be said, however, that both individuals emerge equally as heroes, thanks to Fowler's unstinting recognition of Guay's part in the story. Indeed, it becomes clear that these two remarkable individuals survived the ordeal because of their constant mutual support.

In telling the story, Fowler gives the reader a truly fascinating account of survival under the most difficult of circumstances. The result is a book that reads like a Clive Cussler thriller. More important, it offers an intriguing and rare insight into the radical Islamist culture and mindset. In that regard alone it is a valuable contribution to an understanding of the principal challenge facing the Western world in the early 21st century.

Robert Fowler is an old Africa hand, in a career that began at age 19 as a teacher in Rwanda. Rising quickly up the bureaucratic/ diplomatic ladder, he became confidante of prime ministers

Paul Manson served as Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989. He also served as CDA Institute President in addition to currently serving on the Board of Directors.

and Deputy Minister of National Defence before becoming Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, and later to Italy. In this book, with his impressive powers of recall and his deft command of English (and incidentally of French, which was the exclusive medium of communication with his captors), Fowler tells a story of indomitable courage on the part of two individuals suddenly thrust into a truly awful situation. He and Guay overcame unimaginable stress by exercising discipline and ingenuity in dealing with a wide range of physical problems related to climate, geography, health, hygiene, sleep, diet and clothing. At the same time, they faced numerous emotional pressures, including worry about their families, the constant fear of summary execution by beheading, isolation and taunting.

Fowler also paints an intriguing portrait of the radical Islamist mind, as exemplified by the dozen or so AQIM members involved in their abduction and captivity. What emerges is a troubling picture, revealing the huge gulf that separates their way of thinking from our own. In their very narrow world, Islam (or their version of it) is everything; nothing else matters. Freedom and democracy, in their eyes, are despicable concepts. Fatalism— "God willing"—excuses all outcomes, and the Qu'ran can be interpreted to justify the most horrible excesses. Occasional courtesies invariably had one objective: to help secure the conversion of their hostages to Islam. The reader comes away with the disturbing impression, that so fervent is their hatred of the West, that any sort of reconciliation is a long way off.

To be sure, the author does not tread lightly in expressing his dismay at what he considers the West's own misbehaviour in its dealings with the Islamist enemy, and there is a certain sympathy with what his captors see as a culture of debauchery and indignity in our society.

In recounting the circumstances of their eventual release, Fowler gives full credit to the presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso, who were clearly instrumental in whatever process led to the release of the two Canadians. He is careful not to touch on the Canadian government's involvement beyond repeating Prime Minister Stephen Harper's assurance that Canada paid no ransom or released any prisoners. He is scathing, however, in his criticism of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) role in the affair both during the period of captivity and postrelease. Much of his bitterness stems from what he sees as the RCMP's failure to keep his and Guay's families in the picture as the situation evolved, adding greatly to the anguish they felt through the entire episode.

In a curious omission, there is no mention of the ultimate fate of Soumana, the African driver, last seen by Fowler and Guay near the end of their captivity.

There will likely be more such kidnappings across the relatively lawless Sahara and Sahel regions of Africa, where Al Qaeda is attempting to expand its influence, of which we hear so much these days. Perhaps Fowler's account will be of value in mitigating this trend. Certainly it needs to be read by western politicians, officials and bureaucrats having an interest in the region, as a useful sourcebook.

The book is also a compelling adventure story that conveys, as its dominant message, the power of the human spirit in the face of adversity.

BOOK REVIEW

SHELLDRAKE: CANADIAN ARTILLERY MUSEUMS AND GUN MONUMENTS

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel (ret) Jim Bryce

Major (Retired) Harold A. Skaarup iUniverse, Shelldrake: Canadian Artillery Museums and Gun Monuments. Bloomington Indiana, 2/15/2012 ISBN 978-1-4697-5000-2 (sc) ; ISBN 978-1-4697-5001-9 (e)



This useful book is far more than just a reference book listing the locations of artillery monuments and museums across Canada. Its chapters contain the historical background and narrative which give the reader the context and relevance of the guns displayed at the various locations. Its scope is very wide ranging, from the Penetang Gun on display at *Sainte-Marie among*

the Hurons, (believed to be the gun mentioned in Jesuit documents as the one taken there in 1648), to

today's M777 (the latest gun to enter Canadian service). The historical narrative and listings are not limited to Canadian guns but deal with related equipment used by the artillery such as the aircraft used by artillery air observers, and 'war trophy' guns captured from the enemy and on display in many Canadian museums, military bases and towns across the country. The author also includes naval guns in his listings and narrative, in view of the strong link between naval guns and land-based artillery. Many naval guns were used for coastal defence on the east and west coasts, in fortresses such as La Citadelle and in some cases, modified to serve as field, medium and heavy guns in land service.

The level of detail in the book is such that no one person could have completed the research alone. In addition, Major Skaarup is not a Gunner but an Intelligence Officer and as such has very much relied on

input from a great many people to provide him with artilleryspecific information. The prodigious amount of work that he has done in collecting, collating and putting this information into a useful, readable and informative book, is readily evident in the three pages of acknowledgements and the extensive list of footnotes and in-text mentions of contributors. A commen-

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret) Jim Bryce retired in 1995 from the Regular Force after 35 years of service with the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. In 2003 he was named as Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of 1st Air Defence Regiment (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish) RCA and served in that capacity until 2009. He is a Past-President of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association. dation appears in the introduction written by Lieutenant-General (ret) Andrew Leslie, praising Skaarup for capturing and reflecting the passion that Gunners have for their guns. Major Skaarup has demonstrated that passion himself in completing such a valuable book.

The book will not only be of interest to Gunners but to the wider community of all those interested in military equipment and military history. If you have ever stood at a gun monument from any era and wondered about the gun's type, provenance and history, then this book is one you will find valuable.

The book would clearly have benefitted from a more thorough final editing before publication as there are typographical and structural errors that would have been caught. Beyond that, it contains some factual errors that cannot be attributed to the author. As was noted above, he relied on many outside sources for his information and the breadth of scope is such that Major Skaarup could not be expected to catch all such errors. There are also by his reckoning many monuments and museums that are not included. He is, for example, aware of the number of captured German guns brought to Canada in 1920. During the Second World War many of these were cut up to provide metal for the war effort. He can account for all but a dozen of



Gunners from X Battery, 5e Régiment d'artillerie Légère du Canada (5 RALC) at Patrol Base Wilson

the remainder and would like to know where they are. Major Skaarup is maintaining this book as a living document and will be updating his records based on readers' input; he plans to publish another edition in a few years.

The advantages of this book more than compensate for the deficiencies noted in the paragraph above. I strongly recommend it as being very worthwhile to those interested in our military history.

BOOK REVIEW

THE SEABOUND COAST: THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY, 1867 - 1939 (VOLUME 1)

Reviewed by Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Ron Buck

Johnston, William, William G.P. Rawling, Richard H. Gimblett and John MacFarlane. Dundurn. The Seabound Coast: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1867 – 1939 (Volume 1) 1014 pages. ISBN-10: 1554889073 ; ISBN-13: 978-1554889075. 2011. \$70.00



This publication is volume one of the Royal Canadian Navy's (RCN) modern of-

ficial history series and is quite a weighty tome at 980 pages. That said, for the reader who has a genuine interest in the subject this is a relatively easy read. However by perforce of reality it is a complicated story. The story of the RCN is

intertwined with Canada's growing awareness of itself as a nation with four interrelated but differing naval challenges (Atlantic, Pacific, Great Lakes/ St. Lawrence and the Arctic), Canada's role and that of her leaders on the then-world stage, and the realities of both national and international politics of the day.

It must be pointed out that there is also an earlier official history covering much of the same time period in two volumes entitled *The Naval Service of Canada*, published in 1953. The earlier volumes have more of an organizational flavour but have very limited First World War operational content. In comparison, this new volume is much richer in operational RCN First World War content (particularly in the Atlantic).

The story timeline is broken down into three discrete areas of focus which coincide with a chronological telling: A National Navy (1967-1914), the First World War and the Interwar Years. In addition, the prologue gives a very good overview of British/Canadian naval operations during the War of 1812. *A National Navy.*

This section is further sub-divided into the Naval Defence Question (1867 -1901), toward a National Navy (1902-1909) and the Naval Debates (1909-1914). The authors do an excellent job highlighting both the national and international complexities of the time. These include Canada as an emerg-

ing nation and the desire of Canadians to control their own maritime destiny and sovereignty. The counterpoint was the imperial view of the need for colonial contributions in return for dedicated regional squadrons (of and under command of the Royal Navy), but which could be redeployed as required by Great Britain to meet the exigencies of imperial defence. The evolution of Canadian politics and the international geopolitical situation are well outlined including the roles that the key players including but not limited to Laurier, Borden, Prefontaine, Brodeur, Spain and Kingsmill played in the establishment of the Canadian Naval Service in 1910 and of the RCN in 1911. The establishment of the RCN was, one could argue, one of very few national strategic decisions that have ever occurred in our history. Sadly as is often the case, Canadians quickly lost interest and appetite because of our privileged position both geographically and of our generally common view with Great Britain and the United States.



"HMCS Niobe at daybreak" First World War (1914-1918) Peter Rindlisbacher.

The First World War.

The authors provide the first comprehensive official Canadian government overview of the RCN during the First World War. This overview clearly shows that the RCN lived a hand-tomouth existence throughout the war, struggling to build its capability and capacity generally in the absence of any coherent Canadian naval policy either from the Canadian government or from the British admiralty, which also continued its unwelcome habit of seeing Canada as junior partner even within its own borders.

The story of the RCN in the First World War is not about combat in an operational sense (there were scares but virtually no contact with the enemy as RCN forces were largely operating in or near Canadian waters). Rather, it was a story of the building of a basic naval and trade (maritime) protection organization, the recruiting of retired Royal Navy personnel in Canada, the establishment of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, and the acquisition of various vessels. The authors clearly also outline two other consistent themes: the need for the RCN to defend itself from being subsumed by the Royal Navy particularly in Halifax; and, trying to convince a largely

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VAdm (Ret'd) Ron Buck served 39 years in the Canadian Forces in various commands including the role of VCDS from 2004-2006. He currently provides senior mentorship support to the Canadian Forces College and has worked with several major firms providing strategic advice and in identifying potential government procurement opportunities. He is also Vice-Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations.

lethargic and parsimonious Canadian government to develop a cohesive policy and then deliver to it.

The authors show that the work of the RCN in the First World War was important in laying the foundation for the future of the navy and in asserting national control of Canadian ports and establishments while beginning the struggle to gain appropriate operational responsibility.

The Interwar Years.

As the war ended, questions remained about the peacetime role of the RCN and whether it was needed as a permanent national institution. Despite post-war demobilization, initial government decisions through 1920 were reasonably positive, with a number of decisions to keep a force in being including a light cruiser, two destroyers, some submarines, limited naval aviation and a mix of minor vessels.

As the authors show, support did not last long as by 1921 government decisions largely based upon an isolationist world view were taken to reduce the naval budget from \$2.5 million to \$1.5 million. The newly appointed Director of the Naval Service, Walter Hose, fought unrelenting battles to ensure the future of the RCN. Faced with the 1921 reduction he pared to the bone retaining an operational training capability (approximately 500 regulars and two destroyers) and just as importantly created the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, which provided the foundation for later spectacular wartime growth. His efforts cemented the foundation from which would grow the RCN of the Second World War.

This volume provides the long missing official history of the early years of the RCN, particularly in operations during the First World War, and is of major importance as part of the fabric of Canada's naval and defence history. It, in combination with Tucker's previous work, provides a comprehensive history of this period of the RCN's history.

I do however also make two observations. The first is that initially I worried that this volume was going to be largely East Coast focused (because of the popular title, *The Seabound Coast*). I am pleased to report that it is not. My second observation is the lack of appendices, which for an official history I find surprising; these would have been very useful for research and references purposes.

These observations made, I highly commend this to students of Canadian history in terms of military history but also in the broader context of Canada's development as a nation and the impact of domestic politics on the Canadian decision making process.



BOOK REVIEW

THE PATROL: SEVEN DAYS IN THE LIFE OF A CANADIAN SOLDIER IN AFGHANISTAN

Reviewed by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Flavelle, Ryan. The Patrol: Seven Days in the Life of a Canadian Soldier in Afghanistan Collins Publishers Ltd. 272 pages ISBN: 9781443407175. 2011. \$29.99



In 2008 Ryan Flavelle, a 24-year old Signals Reservist and university student, spent seven months in Afghanistan attached to the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Flavelle is not the first Reservist to document both the tediousness and stress of combat; however, through *The Patrol: Seven Days in the Life of a Canadian Soldier in Afghanistan*, Flavelle is one of the youngest Canadian soldiers to author an account of the Afghanistan war. Flavelle's

youth is the most distinct theme in *The Patrol*, separating him from other mature Canadian reservist-cum-authors, Captain Ray Wiss and Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad.

The Patrol's first-person reflections provide civilians with a rich insight into the reservist experience. Flavelle takes readers through a seven-day patrol from Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sperwan Ghar to Combat Outpost Zangabad to Strongpoint Mushan and back. It is a hard and heavy walk for Flavelle, who with recrementitious detail lists every item in his overweight rucksack. His description of the route is substantive, and cultivates empathy as readers come to share the anxiety and stress of walking through IED-infested grape fields and the exhaustion and heat of walking beneath the Afghan sun.

The very nature of his account is its most distinguishing strength. He is correct to highlight that the majority of popular narratives about Afghanistan have been produced by journalists. Other accounts have been technical and excessively military-centric, making them less accessible to the majority of Canadians. Flavelle's youth, rank, and relative education, therefore, offers something unique.

Through his honest and plainly written perspective on what it feels like for a young man to go on a presence patrol in Afghanistan, Flavelle provides Canadians with access to what their son, brother, buddy, or boyfriend may have encountered on tour. Though he frequently admits to feeling fear, the author also notes how common his experience comes to feel: "[t]he glamour associated with patrolling has lost a lot of its lustre, and walking the fields of Afghanistan has become a relatively commonplace, yet too dangerous, pastime." In what is most decidedly a strength, Flavelle's colloquialisms and raw reactions make *The Patrol* read more like a blog entry than a typical novel.

These strengths aside, it is the character of Flavelle himself and

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is a Defence Policy Analyst with the CDA Institute and an Army Reservist. his lengthy dramatic monologue that may turn readers off of *The Patrol.* His efforts to conform and fit in with those around him dilute the genuine convictions of this young man who chooses to serve, making it difficult for the reader to connect with the author. Early in the book during the company 'smoker' at the end of a training exercise in Shilo, Flavelle joins in a game of joust-meets-chicken whereby soldiers kneeling on stretchers are hoisted by others and fighting commences. The result is the loss of two teeth by a soldier. Flavelle participates because he wants to fit in with the infantry.

For some, Flavelle's constant complaints and concerns about 'fitting in' with the infantry could be read as a public insult towards infanteers and a false elevation of his status. What these comments really expose is the deep-seated uncertainty of a reservist and the profound insecurity of a coming of age adolescent who admits to having long experienced being an outcast. Flavelle's admission of these concerns is honest, but his subsequent quest to conform—evident each time he refers to fixation with cigarettes—feels forced and disingenuous. Even his portrait on the book jacket, with a well-placed cigarette dangling from his mouth, has a 'trying too hard to be cool' look to it.

The interwoven theme of Flavelle's existential musings seems to better illustrate a Generation Y quarter-life crisis than a reflective, mature soldier's experience. It is here where The Patrol is at its best, most distinct from Captain Wiss or Lieutenant-Colonel Conrad, and should be read by all leaders. Flavelle's account may be less about the life of a soldier and more about a 20-something caught between newfound adulthood and the infantilising world of the junior ranks. If you consider this theme in another context, possibly replacing 'junior ranks' with 'interns' or 'junior bureaucrats', Flavelle shows readers that the modern 24-year old reservist has much in common with the modern 24-year old civilian: entitled, insecure, and lacking the mentorship to gracefully and professionally grow into adulthood and responsibility. It is a shame that Flavelle never served under Captain Wiss, who in FOB Doc and A Line in the Sand extensively details episodes where he mentors young troops.

In *The Patrol*, Flavelle seems to crave connection and is highly critical of arms-length leadership. He resents a Kandahar Airfield-based senior officer who attempts to enforce grooming standards through a particularly "moral-shattering email." In this experience, the author illustrates how removed leadership is from troops on the front line. Though this position is not profound or unique, it is exceptionally telling that Flavelle feels enabled to publicly criticize senior leadership in this medium.

All Canadians who know someone who has served in Afghanistan should read *The Patrol*, as the author's frank and accessible description of the monotony and nervousness of combat enables readers to better understand their loved one's experience. However, those who do not know people who have served should read *The Patrol* through a wider sociological lens; otherwise, it may be hard to tolerate Flavelle's tedious grumbles and insecurities.

Flavelle's early perspective on the war in Afghanistan is reactive, not reflective. In his 20s, he writes in a personal self-indulgent tone. Readers should look forward to a reflective piece from a more mature Flavelle in 20 years time. For now, *The Patrol* is not just a raw and accessible account of a young man's experience as a Reservist in Afghanistan, but the latest chapter in the off-repeated story of a 20th century generation coming of age against the backdrop of war.

BOOK REVIEW

DARKMARKET: CYBERTHIEVES, CYBERCOPS AND YOU.

Reviewed by Paul Hillier

Glenny, Misha. DarkMarket: Cyberthieves, Cybercops and You. Knopf. 304 pages. ISBN-10: 0307592936 ; ISBN-13: 978-0307592934. 2011. \$26.95



In a recent talk at the Rideau Club in Ottawa, Misha Glenny spoke with a self-deprecating charm about the challenges of writing about cyber issues: 'Fundamentally they're perceived as being about computers,' he jokes, 'and computers aren't sexy.' So how does an author make computers and anything to with 'cyber' interesting? Glenny emphasized, as he does in the prologue of *DarkMarket: Cyberthieves, Cybercops and*

You that, "the core of the story lies in the personalities involved and their actions." If readers are left with one message, it is that cyber security is not necessarily about computers: it is about people.

A gifted story-teller, Glenny captures the evolution of cyber crime through a wide breadth of interviews, telling the story from the perspective of criminals, local police, and federal agents. He sets the stage by highlighting how important the internet has become to people's everyday lives and just how vulnerable this has made us. If cyber crime targets individuals, cyber warfare targets states, and cyber espionage targets companies, then Glenny's book not only covers all three, but shows how inseparable they really are.

His reporter's style breaks down the large narrative into a vast compendium of small anecdotes, each depicting schemes, cons, and crimes made available by new technology. While this makes each story easy for the reader to latch onto, it can at times feel either wearisome or choppy. Perhaps Glenny is trying to convey the sense of just how overwhelming this can be, and if this is the case he succeeds in so doing.

Added to this are his lengthy descriptions of the exact character and flavour of the sketchy underworlds of many Eastern European cities from Odessa to Tallinn. These not only show his understanding of and passion for Eastern Europe, but also set the stage for the culture that is then mirrored in cyber space by hackers in those cities. This is a fascinating process to describe, though at times Glenny can drag on, such as a lengthy discussion of Kemalism and the secularism within Turkey.

One of the most remarkable comparisons he makes is in showing both the similarities these individuals have with other criminals, but at the same time their striking differences. The similarities are in choices they make to break the law for great financial gain; their differences are in their personalities. "They were not natural-born killers, but were natural-born survivors."

The coordination of networks of cyber criminals—from hackers to fraudsters, more generally known as *carders*—is what strikes the reader most about Glenny's book. At length he paints a fascinating picture of the first ever Carder's Conference hosted in Odessa, wherein carders could operate in a sanctuary protected by the Russian government. The agreement was that so long as hackers did not target Russian institutions, the Russian government would not interfere with them. He returns to this point many chapters later when considering the cyber warfare conducted against Estonia in 2007. "In exchange [for this amnesty], of course, should the Russian state require the services of a hacker for launching a crippling cyber attack on

a perceived enemy, then it is probably best for the hacker to cooperate."

Despite both of these—the anonymity and the systemization of cyber crimes—Glenny does not let the reader forget the most important part: cyber is still about people.

The book is built around many of the key players involved

in DarkMarket, which—during its period of operation—was the largest website of its kind, wherein criminals could purchase everything from credit card skimmers to computer viruses. For many chapters Glenny portrays a detective's pursuit of a criminal as he tracks the Turkish Inspector Bilal Sen and the criminal Cha0. And while the story ends with more than two dozen arrests, as Glenny writes, "this being DarkMarket, though, the story wasn't quite so simple."

The illusion of this Valjean-and-Javert pursuit gives way, revealing that Cha0 may in fact have been a network of carders, any number of whom may have escaped capture. Glenny masterfully elucidates two key themes for the reader by telling the story in this manner. First, as is characteristic of cyber crime, there is a large degree of anonymity with which these crimes are conducted. Second, the progression of cyber crime over the past two decades has moved from a series of uncoordinated actors towards an intricate network of organized crime.

Despite both of these—the anonymity and the systemization of cyber crimes—Glenny does not let the reader forget the most important part: cyber is still about people.

Paul Hiller is a Project Officer and the SDF Intern with the CDA Institute. He is also and an Army Reservist.





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