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ON TRACK

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Canada's Strategic Challenges

ON TRACK
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COVER PHOTO: COVER PHOTO: The Canadian Forces Snowbirds Demonstration Team conducts a fly-past above Parliament Hill as part of Canada Day celebrations in Ottawa. Image by Master Corporal Pierre Thériault, CFSU(O) Imaging Services © 2012 DND-MDN Canada. PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Les Snowbirds, l'équipe de démonstration des Forces canadiennes, exécutent un défilé aérien au-dessus de la Colline du Parlement, à Ottawa, à l'occasion de la fête du Canada. Photo : Caporal-chef Pierre Thériault, Services d'imagerie de l'USFC(O), © 2012 DND-MDN Canada

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain M. Pellerin

This summer edition of ON TRACK features articles of current interest in the areas of Canada's strategic challenges, NATO, Afghanistan, the defence budget, defence policy, sovereign wealth funds, the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal, the National Wall of Remembrance project, and two book reviews.

Earlier this year, Honourary Captain (N), the Hon. Hugh Segal delivered his Louis St. Laurent Lecture, *'Our Central Strategic Challenge'*, at the Canadian Forces College. We are pleased to include an extract of his address in this edition of *ON TRACK*.

Canada has not seen a defence White Paper since 1994. The Hon. John McKay argues that it is time for another defence White Paper, in '*Contributing to Global Security and Justice – Canada's Role in the World Post-Afghanistan*.'

Paul Chapin examines the challenges that NATO faces, post-Chicago Summit, in '*NATO on hold: Waiting for Washington*.'

Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Justin Fogarty visited a number of countries in the Middle East where we have Canadian soldiers deployed, in the company of Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Commander of the Canadian Army. He provides us with his views on the impact that our troops, deployed abroad, make on Canada's reputation in the world, in '*Our Canadian Forces: A Broad Reach – a Dual Role*'.

David Perry recently returned from a whirlwind visit to Afghanistan where he toured, as a guest of the Department of National Defence, the training programme of the Afghan National Army. He relates his observations from his visit, in *'Afghanistan: We Shouldn't Stop Paying Attention'*.

Within the past year the Report on Transformation by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Andrew Leslie and the latest Department of National Defence budget have and will continue to have a lasting impact on the Canadian Forces. David Perry and Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald held an interview recently with Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson. We have included a transcript of their interview in this issue.

Paul Hillier examines some of the concerns that sovereign wealth funds pose, in *'Sovereign Wealth Funds: in whose interest?*'

On February 6, 2012, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II marked the 60th anniversary of her accession to the Throne as Queen of Canada. In celebration of this event, a

Nos lecteurs trouveront, dans cette livraison estivale de ON TRACK, des articles de fond traitant de l'Afghanistan, du budget de défense, de la politique de défense, des fonds souverains, du Jubilé de diamant de la Reine Elisabeth II, et aussi du Mur national du souvenir, ainsi que deux comptes rendus de lecture.

En sa qualité de Capitaine de vaisseau honoraire, l'Honorable Hugh Segal a prononcé plus tôt cette année au Collège des Forces canadiennes, sa conférence Louis Saint-Laurent intitulée *Our Central Strategic Challenge*. Nous avons le plaisir de vous en présenter un extrait dans ce numéro de ON TRACK.

Le dernier Livre Blanc sur la défense du Canada remonte à 1994. Dans son article *Contributing to Global Security and Justice – Canada's Role in the World Post-Afghanistan*, l'Honorable John McKay soutient que le moment est venu d'en publier un nouveau.

Dans sa réflexion sous le titre *NATO on hold: Waiting for Washington*, Paul Chapin passe en revue les défis auxquels est confrontée l'OTAN au lendemain du sommet de Chicago.

Le Lieutenant-colonel honoraire Justin Fogarty s'est rendu, en compagnie du Lieutenant-général Peter Devlin, Commandant de l'Armée de terre canadienne, dans plusieurs pays du Moyen-Orient où sont déployés nos soldats. Dans sa contribution *Our Canadian Forces: A Broad Reach – a Dual Role,* il nous dit sa perception de la façon dont nos troupes déployées à l'étranger influent sur la réputation du Canada dans le monde.

David Perry nous est récemment revenu d'une visite éclair en Afghanistan. Invité du ministère de la Défense nationale, il a consacré sa visite à l'observation du programme de formation de l'Armée nationale afghane. Il nous en communique les résultats dans *Afghanistan: We Shouldn't Stop Paying Attention*.

L'impact du rapport du Lieutenant-général (ret) Andrew Leslie sur la transformation, de même que celui du dernier budget du ministère de la Défense nationale sur les Forces canadiennes, ne sont pas près de s'atténuer. David Perry et le Colonel (ret) Brian MacDonald ont interviewé sur ce sujet le Vice-amiral Bruce Donaldson : vous trouverez dans ce numéro une transcription de l'entretien.

Dans son article *Sovereign Wealth Funds: in whose interest* ?, Paul Hillier analyse certaines des préoccupations que suscitent les fonds souverains.

Le 6 février 2012, Sa Majesté la Reine Elisabeth II a célébré le 60ème anniversaire de son accession au trône en tant que Reine du Canada. Afin de marquer cet événement,

commemorative medal, the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal, was created as a visible and tangible way to recognize 60,000 outstanding Canadians. The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), as a partnering organization, was invited to select candidates from its community for this national honour. Peter Forsberg reports, in *'The Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal'*, on the presentation of the Medal at a ceremony that was held in Ottawa.

The National Wall of Remembrance project owes its origin to a meeting at a Kingston Royal Canadian Legion branch three years ago. In time, the National Wall of Remembrance Association (NWORA) was born, and later incorporated. Terence Cottrell, Chairman NWORA Advisory Board, in "*The National Wall of Remembrance Project*", outlines for us the worthy objective of the project.

We are pleased to include two book reviews in this edition of *ON TRACK*: Paul Chapin's review of *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, edited by David McDonough, and Meghan Spilka O'Keefe's review of *A Thousand Farewells: A Reporter's Journey from a Refugee Camp to the Arab Spring*, written by Nahlah Ayed. *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World* offers analysis by Canadian thinkers on security and defence. In *A Thousand Farewells* author Nahlah Ayed struggles to portray the conflicts, politics and customs of the Arab world to Canadians.

The CDA Institute was very pleased to host Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, in Ottawa, May 24. Admiral Stavridis spoke to the Institute members on the comprehensive approach to 21st century security.

The CDA Institute is a non-profit charitable organisation with the mandate to promote informed discussion of the defence and security issues that are important to Canada and to provide its citizens with the information they need to understand these matters. We carry out the Institute's mission through research, roundtable discussions, annual seminars and symposia. Through collaboration with universities and other groups, we continue our focus on defence and security issues. We are pleased, now, to announce in this issue of *ON TRACK* the recent launch of the Defence and Security Fund which will provide the Institute the financial means with which it will be able to carry out and support the increasing demands of its mission.

In 2002 the CDA and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute initiated the Ross Munro Media Award. The presentation of this prestigious award, this year, will take place during the Vimy Award dinner on 9 November to one Canadian journalist who has made a significant contribution to the understanding by the public of defence and security issues affecting Canada. The Award comes with a cash prize of $2,500. The notice of the call for nominations appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website.

une médaille commémorative, la Médaille du Jubilé de diamant de la Reine Elisabeth II, a été frappée pour honorer de façon tangible 60 000 Canadiens parmi les plus méritants. La Conférence des Associations de défense, en sa qualité d'organisation partenaire, a été invitée à sélectionner en son sein des candidats dignes de cette distinction honorifique nationale. Vous lirez, sous le titre *La Médaille du Jubilé de diamant de la Reine Elizabeth II* le récit que consacre Peter Forsberg à la remise de la médaille lors d'une cérémonie qui s'est tenue à Ottawa.

Le projet de Mur national du Souvenir a vu le jour il y a trois ans, lors d'une réunion de la section de Kingston de la Légion royale canadienne, qui a débouché sur la constitution de l'Association du mur national du souvenir. Dans sa colonne intitulée *The National Wall of Remembrance Project*, Terence Cottrell, président du Conseil consultatif de l'Association du mur national du souvenir, explique à notre intention l'objectif qui sous-tend cette initiative.

Nous avons le plaisir d'insérer, dans cette livraison de ON TRACK, deux comptes rendus de lecture : celui, confié à Paul Chapin, de l'étude *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, publiée sous la direction de David McDonough, qui propose la réflexion d'experts canadiens sur l'équation de sécurité et de défense; et celui, sous la plume de Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, *A Thousand Farewells: A Reporter's Journey from a Refugee Camp to the Arab Spring* de Nahlah Ayed, laquelle s'efforce de présenter aux Canadiens une description des conflits, de la politique et des us et coutumes du monde arabe.

L'Institut de la CAD a eu le grand plaisir d'accueillir le 24 mai, à Ottawa, l'Amiral James Stavridis, Commandant suprême des Forces alliées de l'OTAN en Europe. L'Amiral Stavridis a choisi, pour sa causerie devant les membres de l'Institut, le thème de l'approche globale du 21ème siècle.

L'Institut de la CAD est une organisation caritative à but non lucratif dont le mandat consiste à promouvoir un débat documenté sur les questions de défense et de sécurité touchant de près les intérêts du Canada, tout en offrant à ses concitoyens les informations dont ils ont besoin pour comprendre ces questions. Les méthodes que nous employons pour accomplir la mission de l'Institut sont : la recherche, l'organisation de débats en tables rondes et la tenue de séminaires et de symposiums annuels. Grâce à la collaboration avec les universités et avec d'autres organismes, nous maintenons notre attention axée sur les problèmes de défense et de sécurité. Nous sommes heureux de pouvoir annoncer, dans ce numéro de ON TRACK, le lancement récent du Fonds pour la défense et la sécurité, qui fournira à l'Institut les moyens dont il a besoin pour s'acquitter d'une mission aux exigences croissantes.

En 2002, la CAD et l'Institut canadien de la défense et des affaires étrangères ont instauré le prix média Ross Munro. Cette année, la remise de cette récompense prestigieuse - assortie d'une somme de 2500$ - aura lieu le 9 novembre à l'occasion du dîner du Prix Vimy. Elle sera attribuée à un journaliste canadien ayant contribué de façon significative à la compréhension des problèmes de défense et de sécurité collectives qui affectent le Canada. Vous trouverez l'avis de mises en candidature pour le prix Ross Munro dans les pages

ON TRACK

Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, in Ottawa, May 24, addresses members of the CDA Institute on the comprehensive approach to 21st century security. L-R: Admiral James Stavridis, and General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault, CDA Institute President and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

NATO photo by U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Seth Laughter

L'amiral James Stavridis, commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe, à Ottawa, le 24 mai, s'adresse à des membres de l'Institut de la CAD sur la façon globale d'aborder la sécurité au 21e siècle. De g. à d., l'Amiral James Stavridis et le Général (ret) Raymond Henault, président de l'Institut de la CAD et ancien président du Comité militaire de l'OTAN.

Photo de l'OTAN par Seth Laughter, U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the Award to Major-General Jonathan Vance by the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin,

de notre revue de même que sur notre site Web.

L'une des principales manifestations du calendrier de l'Institut CAD est la remise annuelle du Prix Vimy à un citoyen canadien dont l'action a contribué de façon décisive à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays ainsi qu'à la préservation des valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a rencontré un immense succès, si bien qu'un nombre record de soumissions de grande qualité a été examiné par le comité de sélection du prix Vimy. Le couronnement de l'activité a été la remise du prix au Major-général Jonathan Vance par la très honorable Beverley McLachlin, Juge en chef du Canada,

Chief Justice of Canada before some 670 guests at a formal dinner in the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 9 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, in the Canadian War Museum.

The CDA Institute will continue to provide Canadians with insightful analysis of events and issues that impact on the defence and security of this country. Our aim is always to inform as well as support our government and policymakers in directions that will safeguard the defence and security interests of Canada and its citizens.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfil our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation $75, or at a higher level, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months following your donation:

- A charitable donation tax receipt;
- Four issues of the CDA Institute's quarterly magazine, *ON TRACK*;
- Advance copies of all other CDA Institute publications, such as the Vimy Papers; and
- A discount registration rate at the CDA Institute's Annual Seminar.

A copy of the donor form is printed elsewhere in this journal. Donor forms are also available on our website.

Thank you. ©

en présence de quelque 670 invités lors d'un dîner officiel qui s'est tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Cette année, le prix Vimy sera remis le 9 novembre à l'occasion d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala qui se tiendront, une fois de plus, au Musée canadien de la guerre.

L'institut de la CAD continuera de fournir aux Canadiens des analyses perspicaces des événements et des problèmes qui influent sur la défense et la sécurité de notre pays. Nous visons à informer et à appuyer avec constance notre gouvernement et nos responsables pour qu'ils définissent les orientations propres à sauvegarder les intérêts de défense et de sécurité du Canada et de ses citoyens.

En terminant, je voudrais remercier nos bienfaiteurs, et en particulier nos donateurs des trois niveaux - mécène, compagnon et officier -, de l'appui financier qu'ils apportent aux travaux de l'Institut de la CAD : sans leur aide, nous aurions bien du mal à nous acquitter de notre mandat.

Si vous ne faites pas déjà partie des donateurs de l'Institut CAD, je vous encourage à rejoindre leurs rangs et à recruter un ami. A partir du niveau de supporteurs avec un don de 75$, vous bénéficierez des avantages suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

- un reçu pour un don charitable déductible d'impôt;
- quatre numéros de la revue trimestrielle de l'Institut CAD, ON TRACK ;
- en distribution avancée, des exemplaires des autres publications de l'institut CAD, telles que les cahiers Vimy ;
- une inscription à frais réduits au séminaire annuel de l'Institut CAD.

Vous trouverez, dans les pages de cette revue, un formulaire de don. Les formulaires de don sont également disponibles sur notre site Web.

Nous vous remercions. ©

CDA Institute

Defence and Security Fund

The Defence and Security Fund (DSF) has been developed by the CDA Institute to enhance its capacity to inform and influence the debate on security and defence issues that matter to Canadians.

The program has two phases. The first phase is to raise $1 million for an investment fund to support the proposed research projects and a further $500,000 to be spent over three to five years. These expenditures will secure modest increases in staff and resources to roughly double output, broaden how the Institute's products are distributed, and improve visibility and impact.

In Phase 2, the Institute will seek to increase its investment fund beyond $1 million to expand its operations and extend its capabilities to enable it to fully take advantage of the unique experience and talents of the Institute's members and associates. The result will position the Institute in the company of established mid-sized security and defence institutes across the globe.

The goal is to raise $2.5 million by the end of 2014.

Donors to the DSF will be recognized annually in the category into which their total pledge is committed. The donors' names as provided on the pledge form will be listed in each category in alphabetical order without the amount of the pledge or donation. Donors may be identified as 'anonymous' if they wish. All donations are acknowledged with a receipt for an income tax credit.

Recognition levels have been established as follows:

President's Circle	$100,000 plus
Benefactor	$50,000 – $99,999
Platinum	$25,000 – $49,999
Gold	$10,000 – $24,999
Silver	$5,000 – $9,999
Bronze	$1,000 – $4,999
Partner	$500 – $999

The CDA-CDAI website has complete information on the Defence and Security Fund, including a pledge form to download and send with your payment. Go to www.cda-cdai.ca and follow the link to the Defence and Security Fund.

The CDA Institute is grateful for all the donations in support of the Defence and Security Fund. Thank you.

Institut de la CAD

Fonds pour la Défense et la Sécurité

Le Fonds pour la Défense et la Sécurité (FDS) a été constitué par l'Institut de la CAD afin de renforcer sa capacité à éclairer et influencer le débat sur les questions de sécurité et de défense qui affectent directement les Canadiens.

Cette initiative comporte deux phases : la Phase I, qui consiste à réunir 1 million de dollars à placer dans un fonds d'investissement destiné à financer les activités de recherche proposées, auquel s'ajoutent 500 000 dollars supplémentaires à débourser sur une période de trois à cinq ans. Ces dépenses permettront d'augmenter de façon modeste le personnel et les ressources, en vue d'obtenir un doublement approximatif du volume de la recherche et de ses résultats, d'en élargir la diffusion et d'en améliorer la visibilité et l'impact.

Au cours de la Phase II, l'ICAD s'efforcera de porter son fonds d'investissement au-delà du million de dollars, afin d'étendre ses opérations tout en renforçant son aptitude à tirer pleinement parti de l'expérience et des talents uniques des membres de l'Institut et de ses affiliés.

Objectif : lever des fonds pour un montant de 2,5 millions de dollars d'ici la fin de 2014.

Chaque année, la contribution des donateurs du FDS sera marquée officiellement, par l'insertion en ordre alphabétique de leur nom tel que communiqué dans le formulaire d'engagement. Le nom sera inscrit dans la catégorie correspondant au montant total de leurs dons, ou promesses de dons, mais sans que le montant en soit précisé. Tous les dons donnent lieu à l'émission d'un reçu ouvrant droit à un crédit d'impôt.

Les catégories de reconnaissance des contributions ont été fixées comme suit :

Le Cercle du Président	au moins 100 0000 dollars
Contribution Bienfaiteur	de 50 000 à 99 999 dollars
Contribution Platine	de 25 000 à 49 999 dollars
Contribution Or	de 10 000 à 24 999 dollars
Contribution Argent	de 5000 à 9 999 dollars
Contribution Bronze	de 1 000 à 4 999 dollars
Contribution Partenaire	de 500 à 999 dollars

Vous trouverez, sur le site web CDA-CDA Institute**,** des informations complètes concernant le Fonds pour la Défense et la Sécurité, y compris un formulaire d'engagement que vous pourrez télécharger et adresser avec votre règlement. Il suffit de vous rendre à www.cda-cdai.ca, et de suivre le lien « Defence and Security Fund ».

L'Institut CAD accepte avec gratitude tous les dons à l'appui du Fonds pour la Défense et la Sécurité, et vous en remercie.

OUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

Senator Hugh D. Segal

The following is an edited version of the Louis St. Laurent Lecture delivered by Senator Hugh Segal at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto on May 11.

The world was a different place and Canada was a different country in the decade after the Second World War. This is not about nostalgia for simpler times when the Iron Curtain divided the world between east and west, totalitarian and free. Back then, the threat we faced from the Soviet Block seemed very real and very serious.

The notion of a thermonuclear war from which few would survive seemed very complex and deeply troubling. Papers opened by the Kremlin a few years ago indicated that Soviet missiles would have hit Avenue Road and Eglinton (where a Canadian Forces Base used to be not so long ago)—ground zero for Toronto and less than a mile as-the-missile-flies from where we sit this morning.

Every generation faces its strategic and geopolitical challenges, which often seem more complex than the ones previously faced. That is, of course, the ultimate conceit and a historical indulgence of every generation of military, political, business, academic and community leadership—the assumption that what they now face is more complex, difficult and dangerous than what others faced before them. You can see that conceit in the way our media overstate problems, sensationalize disputes and magnify difficulties, often, by the way, aided by politicians of all affiliations at various points in their careers.

It is human nature, it is human frailty and it is an unavoidable intergenerational folly. And to quote Canada's 13th Prime Minister, John George Diefenbaker, when hunting big game, we should not be diverted by rabbit tracks. Most of the intrigues that occupy the daily course of strategic and defence issues, especially as they relate to the controversy du jour, and which attract the media in the absence of something more profound, are rabbit tracks.

None among us should be taken in. The big game of your task as senior officers and officials—and the vital broad purpose of the national security capacity of Canada, both at home and abroad—is the central authoritarian risk posed to Canada and our vital interests. It is to Canadians straightforward and serious.

Authoritarian regimes, authoritarian ideologues and extreme religious fundamentalism that would impose authoritarian regimes and ways of life are the threat we and our allies face together. It is not about the left or the right or about east and west. It is about the core threat of authoritarian oppression and those who would impose it.

In some parts of the world, this extreme and violent authoritarian threat is embodied in a particular government or a particular country that seeks to dominate its region, key trade routes or its neighbourhood with a mix of military power, terrorist outreach and extreme religious and political beliefs—which it seeks to impose on others.

The geopolitical risk that countries like Iran and North Korea can muster need not be exaggerated to be taken seriously. The risk does not necessarily come in any meaningful way from the people who live in those countries. They are often as oppressed themselves by the authoritarian excess of their regimes.

In Iran, democrats protesting an election result that was clearly contaminated were simply shot in the streets. Iran's present execution rate is the highest in the region, rivalling China's all-time high. The head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and present defence minister was responsible for blowing up a community centre in Argentina as part of a terrorist syndicate. He is on Interpol's most-wanted list for killing innocent civilians because of their religious faith. This is who was made the Iranian defence minister. This is authoritarianism with religious cover at its worst.

The authoritarian threat in the Middle East, which is as serious a threat to our Sunni Arab trade and diplomatic partners in the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan as it is to Israel, is made more complex by the multi-leader structure of the Iranian government and the cascading realms of authority. The linkage of that government's terrorist outreach to risks faced by allies and by us at home is real.

And while the same is not true of the authoritarian regime in North Korea, the opaque nature of that leadership structure makes advancing progress difficult. I have learned first-hand how experienced negotiators from the United States and South Korea feel that it is often impossible to know with whom it is worth actually negotiating. It is unclear who truly has the authority.

Recent events, where one part of the leadership negotiates a nuclear standstill in return for millions of tons of food on one day, while another piece of the leadership proclaims a new rocket launch and threatens incineration of a South Korean target, while rolling what is supposed to look like a reasonably sophisticated rocket-launch vehicle, which turns out to be a hoax, illustrates the challenge. The Six-Party Talks on North Korea actually fail to engage with North Korea seriously to some extent and, sometimes, as a result of the always enigmatic Chinese government.

I cite both Iran and North Korea not because they are the only authoritarian threats on the globe, but because the nature of the threat is so radical and unpredictable.

And while our Chinese friends deserve immense credit for economic progress, technological complexity and

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Senator Hugh Segal (Conservative, Ontario) is a former chair of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and a fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. He is a member of the CDA Institute Board. For over the past 23 years he has lectured on a pro-bono basis at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

the compelling reduction of poverty in their own country, an authoritarian capitalist country is still authoritarian. Democracy, human rights, the core freedoms we cherish and have defended at great cost for years, do not, in any recognizable form, exist within the DNA of the Chinese social structure and government framework.

It is not now a particular or acute threat to Canada and Canadians. But a shifting economic power balance in favour of an authoritarian state is never a good thing.

And, as I am aware of no country in the world that aspires to attack or invade China, we must view the endless Chinese build up of military capacity overall and naval capacity in particular with legitimate concern.

The "string of pearls" strategy to surround India, the world's largest democracy, is very much still being pursued by the Chinese. India—not only being the largest democracy in the world, but a vital Commonwealth ally of Canada—is the competing model in the region, that of a democratic, capitalist country. And where Chinese naval deployments in the South China Sea increase in a body of water bordered by Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, China and Indonesia, all of which have territorial water claims to fishing, oil, gas and associated economic zones and rights, we are witness to the kind of competing spheres of influence that can be easily inflamed. Confrontations and stand-offs have been going on for some time.

I use this example to make a point. Our national security and those of our allies, our trade routes and economic partners are not only held hostage to policy, tariff and market variables. The variable reflected by the actions of authoritarian states matters deeply and is the central challenge for Canada's geopolitics going forward, as it is for our allies and friends worldwide.

While China's interests are broadly economic and focused on resources and trade, and Iran's somewhat more aggressive and directly threatening, they represent two pieces on a spectrum about which we need to be concerned.

Our central challenge will need to be the deployable intelligence, special forces and naval capacity important to support our allies, values and core interests as the dynamics change.

We will need in Canada to be able to meet our domestic criminal intelligence and anti-terrorists needs so as to keep our own way of life safe. And while there are always debates about which plane, how many ships and how many regular, reserve and special forces are required, we need at some level to move beyond that. Not that these debates are not important; but, we obsess with them and get overtaken by them at the expense of serious considerations absolutely vital to the way ahead.

Intelligence—structured, creative, multi-source, real time and deeply integrated—is a vital requirement for national security, without which competent foreign and defence policy decisions fundamental to our national security and our shared global security with allies, cannot be carefully and accurately made.

The absence of that kind of intelligence—the kind used in our combat operations with allies in Afghanistan, where operations in theatre, surveillance from the air, key datasets in Ottawa and held by allies, appropriate electronic and communications analysis, were all linked in real time, subject to multi-agency collaborative analysis and deployed in support of operations both strategic and tactical—would be a hole in our capacity for which no amount of new ships, planes or special forces could properly compensate.

It is simply vital that whatever financial restraints defence has to share with other departments, this particular capacity not be diluted or diminished simply because one aspect of our combat operations in Kandahar has come to an end.

And for our friends from civilian life, other departments and international partners here today, let me offer this final point.

National security is not only about keeping one's own shores safe and one's own population free from intimidation and violent or terrorist threat. It is also about deploying the intelligence and collaboration between departments required to protect the core values that underpin our way of life. National security is not imposed upon civil liberties or our individual freedoms. It is deployed to defend them.

The values of democracy, rule of law and human rights are not outside the realm of national security strategies, plans or preparation. They are at the centre of what national security is all about.

Freedom from fear and freedom from want are the two core freedoms that lay the foundation for all the other freedoms. And the pursuit of those key freedoms requires not only a national security establishment that is competent, focused, broadly and liberally educated, disciplined and well-resourced, but also accountable to robust, if discrete, civilian and legislative oversight, as is the case in every one of our key allies.

We do not work closely enough with industry and non-governmental organizations in Canada to share core intelligence and understanding. We do not use intelligence advisory boards the way our American and other allies do so effectively.

National security, and the freedoms and rights it protects inside an open society, is the duty not just of the military, the police, the appropriate cabinet committee or our formal intelligence communities, but of all who share the benefits of an open society which promotes opportunity, tolerance, inclusion and core freedoms – which is why the work of this Canadian Forces Staff College National Security Course and its curriculum are so important.

I think if Louis St. Laurent were here today among us, he would join me in warmly congratulating all of you on your achievement and successful course completion. And, "Uncle Louis," as he was called, would remind us all, that freedoms that are not nourished, protected, tended and enhanced through engaged strategic intelligence and deployable capacity where necessary, will wilt very quickly. And that risk, in a world where authoritarian forces eagerly push to broaden their reach and deepen their ability to threaten and impose their bigoted biases upon us all, would be the most serious risk of all to genuine national security. ©

Contributing to Global Security and Justice – Canada's Role in the World Post-Afghanistan

The Hon. John McKay

The Hon. John McKay asks what are Canada's goals and how do we want to project our interests in the world? Here are a few of his thoughts.

The history of Canadian military engagements, whether in combat or in peacekeeping missions, demonstrates a unique characteristic of our nation. As a country, we take an ambitious approach to international affairs, not content to simply allow the events of the world to unfold and to deal with the consequences as they arise.

Great Canadians from Lester Pearson to Senator Romeo Dallaire have shaped global affairs and profoundly contributed to military and international doctrine. This in addition to our proud and outstanding legacy in battle: Vimy Ridge, Juno Beach, Kandahar Province. Ours is an enviable record of achievements that has contributed to global security and justice.

Many have raised the question, whither Canada's Armed Forces after Afghanistan?

There has been much discussion about procurement projects but little devoted to assessing the goals at which our defence spending are aimed. Few have pointed out the fact that it makes little sense to devote billions of dollars of taxpayer's money to procurement without a foreign policy objective to justify its purpose.

In other words, it makes little sense to put the procurement cart before the policy horse. At present that is what we seem to be doing.

So the question is, what are Canada's goals and how do we want to project our interests in the world? Here are a few thoughts.

In today's globalized context, instability in a state on the other side of the planet can result in insecurity here and among our allies. As Senator Dallaire noted recently in the Hill Times, today's threats are "increasingly diffuse and transnational." To deal with these challenges Canada will require a force that is "affordable, yet highly-deployable."

To wit, in this era, two important concepts have emerged – the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the importance of mitigating threats before they spill over national borders.

Some people have come to believe that R2P is an intervention strategy of sorts. The basis for the doctrine, however, is prevention. The major part of R2P is to do everything possible to avoid reaching the requirement for a military intervention, which makes the other two Ds, development and diplomacy, all the more essential.

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On the first score, the R2P doctrine is increasingly becoming the framework through which we judge the legitimacy and necessity of a military intervention. Intended as a doctrine to compel the international community to intervene to prevent atrocities, it has also become a sound framework through which to judge the wisdom of a proposed military excursion. For example, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's refusal to participate in the invasion of Iraq is a decision that appears wiser each day.

On the second point, that of state capacity building, Canada can and should be doing much more.

The Arab Spring has demonstrated that the concepts of democracy, freedom, equality and human dignity and not unique to the Western world. The nascent democratic movements in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere augur well for our national security, as no two democratic nations have ever fought a war against each other.

But there still exist barriers to this progress, one of the most serious being poverty. One need only take a cursory glance at demographic maps of areas where extremism, radical ideology and violence perpetuate to see that these are also the regions suffering from the greatest strife and deprivation. Often exacerbated by religious, linguistic, class, economic or other cleavages, these areas of insecurity can be improved and threats mitigated before the process of radicalization and conflict take hold.

Thus, development assistance, diplomatic engagement, trade, exchange of technology and business acumen are not only objectives in themselves but should be considered part of our national security interests as well as our foreign policy strategy and goals.

Sadly, we are today witnessing cutbacks in development assistance, coupled with a bureaucratic unwillingness and lack of political will to implement my Development Assistance Accountability Act, a law which I authored in 2008, the mandate of which is to ensure that all of our foreign aid is directed toward poverty alleviation.

Especially after the Afghanistan mission, it is clear that the 'winning the heart and minds' mission and improving the situation on the ground is as important as defeating an enemy in combat. At the same time, development and diplomatic assistance cannot take place in an environment without security.

The Canadian Forces is composed of talented and capable people who want to make a difference in the world on behalf of their country, and our multicultural society gives us a wealth of cultural knowledge to draw upon. Our armed forces are more than capable of helping to integrate

the three Ds, Defence, Diplomacy and Development, and the government should work to increase their coordination with the work of nongovernmental organizations, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In sum, it is in our national security interest to develop a real strategy not only for tackling existing threats, but also preempting new threats by working to alleviate the causes that exacerbate global insecurity. The Canadian Forces can and must play an integral role in such a strategy.

Therefore, Canada's interests are best served by establishing a cogent foreign policy, a policy for our military arising out of our foreign policy (not a procurement shopping list), a rationalization of procurement to ensure our purchases are on time and on budget, as well as a beefed up and integrated diplomatic and aid capacity.

Finally, it must be done within a framework in which we as a nation in concert with our allies assess what our priorities are within the realities of fiscal restraint.

We are fortunate to live in a country made up of citizens who care deeply for the world and its people, with an ambition to help and a record that proves we are more than up to the task.

For proof one need look no further than to the ranks of NGOs like World Vision, Engineers Without Borders, Development and Peace, Kairos, our diplomatic corps, and the Canadian Forces, many of whom still in their teenage years yet willing to put themselves in harms way, brought together by a common desire to make Canada and the world a more just and secure place.

All that remains is for us to unlock their potential. If we do, there is no limit to what they can achieve on behalf of Canada. ©

NATO ON HOLD: WAITING FOR WASHINGTON

Paul H. Chapin

There is a drift in international politics these days, which will end badly if Western democracies do not exert more control over events.

When the CDA Institute published Vimy Paper 2012: The Strategic Outlook for Canada six months ago, the international prognosis was not good. Little effective action was being taken to head off four dangerous conflicts that could lead to wars between states, wars from which North America, Europe and Australasia would not be able to absent themselves. After a decade of hard work, the future of Afghanistan remained in the balance; China's maritime ambitions were beginning to alarm allies and trading partners in Asia-Pacific; and democratic states felt so burned by the costs of expeditionary operations and so strapped financially that none had the stomach for going off to slay dragons not posing an immediate threat to their security. Since then, the situation has deteriorated across the board and the international leadership required to deal with it is lacking.

The last six months

It has been one of the most miserable six months in memory, reminiscent of the mid-1990s. In Syria, the civil war now ranks with Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) as a modern day massacre of the innocent while the world stands by and watches. If the Assad regime uses chemical weapons against its enemies, a holocaust would ensue. In recent weeks, the civil war has spread to Syria's neighbours. Turkey has moved troops to the border and provided a safe haven for insurgents including members of the Free Syrian Army which reportedly now controls the Syrian side of several border crossings. Iraq has had to close its border after insurgents reportedly killed Syrian border guards. In the south, Syrian border guards appear to have fought battles with insurgents trying to enter from Jordan. Israel has raised its alert level, worrying about refugees flooding the Golan Heights and about Hezbollah getting its hands on the Assad regime's chemical weapons stocks, which the regime denies having but has threatened to use. Lebanon is struggling to deal with the influx of tens of thousands of Syrian Alawite refugees and the civil strife this has caused.

In Iran, the ayatollahs' uranium enrichment program has proceeded apace. Having achieved 20% enrichment, the Iranians are 90% of the way to a bomb and the Israelis believe Tehran may already have enough material for five of them. Even 20% enrichment raises concerns. As CIA director David Petraeus told a US Senate hearing in January, there is no commercial use for enrichment to that level and the amount of enriched uranium the Iranians have produced exceeds any requirement for research purposes. Meanwhile the Russians smile from the sidelines, and the world is told to give sanctions a chance to work – though there has not been a case in history when sanctions have "worked".

In Egypt, the Islamists are moving into power after having finessed the military out of it. This is not necessarily the end of democracy in Egypt, or of Egypt's non-aggression pact with Israel. However there have been serious incidents between the two countries, reports of collusion between the Islamic Brotherhood and Hamas in these incidents, and Egyptian military deployments into Sinai to deal with them.

In North Korea, Kim Jong-un has taken steps to remove the military as an obstacle to his absolute rule. In July, he replaced the head of the army with someone of his own

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choosing. There are reports Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho did not go quietly and was killed in a gun battle. Kim then assumed supreme military command himself. The Chinese did not intervene, but they have reportedly supplied Pyongyang with missile launch vehicles. Why does this matter? Because Kim controls an armed force of five million, one million of whom are stationed along the demilitarized zone with South Korea; because North Korea has been trying to test a nuclear weapon; and because it is developing missiles able to deliver that weapon.

NATO on hold

NATO, meanwhile, is on hold. At their summit meeting in May in Chicago, NATO leaders had little to say about Syria or conflicts looming elsewhere. Their final declaration, 65 paragraphs long, included only brief references to their "growing" concern over the Syrian crisis and their "strong support" for the efforts of others (not NATO) to find "a peaceful solution." They were also "seriously" concerned about Iran and "deeply" concerned about North Korea. In a withering commentary, James Joyner of the Atlantic Council – traditionally NATO's firmest supporter among US think tanks – concluded:

The twenty-eight NATO heads of state just met for two days in Chicago and agreed that NATO was a very fine organization, indeed. They then kicked several cans down the road before posing for pictures and having a nice meal. The Chicago Summit Declaration was mostly boilerplate, declaring commitment to the transatlantic bond, the Washington Treaty, the troops and each other. It's sixty-five points of very dim light.

NATO's agenda today is pretty well limited to finishing up old business in Afghanistan, making the best of reduced defence budgets, and tinkering with its external consultative mechanisms.

Afghanistan

On Afghanistan, it is all about 2014. At Chicago, NATO leaders declared that Afghans will "be in the lead for security nationwide" by mid-2013 and reiterated that the International Security Assistance Force mission would terminate at the end of 2014. They promised "to continue to provide strong and long-term political and practical support" post-2014, including "a mission of a different nature to train, advise and assist" the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), but it would not be a combat mission. They then "called on the international community" to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF.

In fact, NATO's training mission in Afghanistan is on track to reach its goals for 2014 – the Canadian training contingent being one of the reasons. The quality of the security forces is also on the rise. Afghan soldiers and police are training two-thirds of the new recruits, and Afghan forces have assumed responsibility for security in areas representing more than half of the population. At issue is whether Afghanistan really needs security forces of the size being developed and whether they can be sustained financially. Two other issues also bear watching. The Afghan army is still being drawn mostly from the northern provinces, which will exacerbate tribal divisions rather than promote national unity. And without improvements in civilian governance, the army may come to be seen as the only institution which can be trusted.

Reduced defence budgets

Reduced defence budgets usually translate into reduced defence capabilities. In the last two to three years, NATO defence budgets have dropped between 10% and 30%, and military capabilities have declined alongside. To adress the issue, NATO leaders issued Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020, determined to ensure NATO retained the capabilities necessary to perform core tasks. But at Chicago the best they could offer was "Smart Defence," essentially looking for ways in which member states could do jointly what they cannot afford to do individually.

There is good sense here, and there are some notable examples already of states cooperating in their mutual interest. But the success of Smart Defence depends on multinational cooperation to develop military capabilities in areas where NATO as a whole is deficient – particularly the "enablers" backstopping coalition operations. Also, Smart Defence implies a degree of specialization among member-states and – crucially – a commitment on the part of those specializing in a particular capability to make it available when required. The Summit was silent on assured access and guaranteed availability.

The real answer, of course, is to hold the line on defence spending. But no one at Chicago even hinted at that. As important, there is little will among governments to participate in new peace operations. Not only are most governments in financial distress, but they are war-weary and revising their thinking about what national interests are actually at stake in places like Afghanistan, Libya or Syria.

Consultative mechanisms

NATO has taken its time acting on the realization that when it goes "out of area" it needs the support of others. Some 30 non-NATO countries have helped in Afghanistan, others in Libya. Counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations have involved a still larger group.

For several summits now, and again in the 2010 formulation of its Strategic Concept, NATO has said the right thing about the importance of working with partner countries, regional organizations, and the United Nations. At Chicago, leaders went over the same ground – and invited some 30 non-NATO heads of state and government to sit with them on the second day of the summit. But apart from expanding rather routine consultative arrangements, NATO has been reluctant to formalize its partnerships to the point of bringing other states into its decision-making processes and the management of operations.

At some point it is going to become clear that the

security interests of at least some NATO allies extend far beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and that informal cooperation with partners on security issues elsewhere will no longer suffice.

Conclusion

Meanwhile, the world waits for the Americans. But they will not be coming for several more months – and maybe not even then, if Barack Obama is re-elected as president. This is new. The time has arrived to rethink how we do international security in the 21st century. The global agencies in which we have invested so heavily to maintain international peace and security have proven to be largely worthless. And the one institution that does function well, if not as well as it could, is on hold. ©

OUR CANADIAN FORCES: A BROAD REACH - A DUAL ROLE

Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Justin R. Fogarty

Recently Honourary Lieutenant-Colonel Fogarty accompanied Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Commander of Canada's Army along with other businesspeople on a Middle East tour, namely to Israel, Palestine, Egypt and Afghanistan.

Earlier this year, I accompanied Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Commander of the Canadian Army, on a visit to Canadian Forces stationed across the globe. Along with a group of business people, we met with CF personnel and local representatives in the Middle East and Afghanistan. For a civilian with many ties to the military, it was nonetheless a revelation for me to learn about the work of our men and women in uniform – many of them very young indeed – who are engaged in peacekeeping and training missions in a wide assortment of places far from home.

Our visit took us first to Israel, where we spent time in Jerusalem and on the West Bank and travelled all the way up to the Israeli/Syrian border on the Golan Heights. We then flew to Egypt and on to Dubai, eventually ending up in Afghanistan.

In Jerusalem, Canadians have been assisting the Palestinian Authority to develop an independent and capable defence force. CF personnel are training the Palestinians in the best practices of the Canadian Forces, from designing operational procedures to instilling respect for human rights and the rule of law, bringing closer the day when a peace solution can finally be worked out. Unremarked in the media is the amazing level of cooperation which has been developing between the Palestinian and Israeli militaries, to the point of participating in joint missions with Canadians playing a role in the rapprochement.

On the Golan Heights above the Sea of Galilee, Canadian soldiers are helping to observe the fragile ceasefire which has prevailed between Israel, Syria and Jordan. The challenge for the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the demilitarized zone is even greater today than it was when I was there in April, as the civil war in Syria threatens to spill over into neighbouring states and ignite new conflicts. Including those serving elsewhere in the region, there are close to 60 CF personnel involved in five peace support operations in the Middle East.

In Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to meet with members of the 925-strong Canadian training mission, whose functions in helping to stand up competent and respectful Afghan national security forces will be critical to the future stability of Afghanistan after the winding down of the International Security Assistance Force in 2014.

We knew that our soldiers are proficient warriors; what struck us was what terrific diplomats they also are. They deal with people from other cultures in a tactful and diplomatic manner, more as coaches rather than instructors, more as friends rather than occupiers. They are noted for their compassion. From speaking with the troops themselves, I learned of their commitment to meaningful progress and their passion for building bridges and helping people. It is part of our uniqueness that our soldiers build bonds that create change in people's minds and hearts at a grassroots level, roots that eventually grow deep and endure. I witnessed this when a young corporal talked of training Afghans. He established trust and respect, he said, by imparting to Afghans that he was just like them; he too had a family and life goals he wished to pursue. Through this bond, he was able to make real progress in passing on what he himself had learned. Instead of telling his charges what to do, he explained, he mentored and he coached them.

What became evident to all of us on the trip was that the people who are receiving Canadian security assistance, whether Palestinians, Israelis, Syrians or Afghans, are all hugely appreciative of the work of our soldiers. I found it

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especially compelling that senior military commanders and government officials in the countries we visited, along with UN staff, held the same view and were uniform in articulating it. It was humbling to find oneself in different places and to hear the same message of appreciation for Canada and Canadians.

Since returning to Bay Street, I have extolled the virtues of our service members as an important extension of our foreign policy. Canada is a major player in the geopolitics of our time. Our place at the table was earned through great sacrifice and because governments were willing to support noble causes in Afghanistan, in Libya, and in dozens of UN peace support missions. We were not motivated by a political agenda or commercial gain, but rather by a determination to do what was right to protect the lives and freedoms of others, to alleviate suffering, and to help the disadvantaged.

We accomplished our goals in Afghanistan and in other war-torn societies because of our soldiers' ability to reflect and project Canadian values overseas. This is vital. Our strong stance on human rights, our democratic political system, and our stable economy are why Canada is now a global leader. As a business person, I can tell you that foreigners invest in Canada because of the values which underscore our national strengths. Through their military and diplomatic acumen, our warrior diplomats have not only allowed us to successfully navigate complex international waters, but they have also contributed directly to the sense of stability and solidity which the world has of Canada and thus to our economic prosperity.

I am concerned today that we risk losing the gains we have made through the blood and sacrifice of so many over the years. Because we face budgetary constraints, we are taking measures that will undermine our military efficiency and effectiveness, and diminish the ability of the Canadian Forces to play the international role which has been so beneficial to Canada as well as the world. Our engagement does not have to be expensive; the strategic placement of key personnel in important peace operations can achieve great effect. But we also need to be careful about restricting numbers and setting time limits on our engagements, if these compromise our chances of succeeding in achieving the conditions and objectives we seek.

After Afghanistan, there will be other places in the world where conflicts will arise and where people's rights and freedoms will be infringed. Canadians will undoubtedly choose to be engaged in some of these places. I strongly urge our Government and Canadians at large to support the Canadian Force's capacity to continue to participate in international missions which have had such a resounding impact on people's lives worldwide. ©

27 Aug 2012 Ottawa, ON. The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence introduces Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Lawson as the next Chief of the Defence Staff during an event on Parliament Hill.

Canadian Forces photo by : MCpl Marc-Andre Gaudreault Canadian Forces Combat Camera © 2012 DND-MDN Canada

27 août 2012 Ottawa, ON. L'honorable Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, présente le lieutenant-général Thomas J. Lawson, qui deviendra le prochain chef d'état-major de la Défense, lors d'un événement tenu sur la Colline du Parlement.

Photo des Forces canadiennes : Cplc Marc-Andre Gaudreault, Caméra de combat des Forces canadiennes, © 2012 DND-MDN Canada

AFGHANISTAN: WE SHOULDN'T STOP PAYING ATTENTION

David Perry

The following is based on the author's impressions of the Canadian training mission in Afghanistan, which he observed in June on a DND organized stakeholder visit.

For a first time visitor to Afghanistan, the disconnect between what you can observe on the ground and the official messaging is jarring. Racing past what appears to be crushing poverty in an armoured vehicle convoy that must clear multiple heavily defended checkpoints to move from one Canadian facility to the next is surreal. Being told how much the economy and security situation have *improved* once you've finally arrived at your fortified destination makes the experience unbelievable.

And yet, the message clearly imparted by official briefers was that by all measures, things in Afghanistan *have* improved remarkably. The economy has grown significantly, averaging 9% growth since 2001 and along with it Afghan employment. And because the government is now capable of capturing 10% of its GDP as revenue, more of that newfound wealth is being put to public use. Similarly, the security situation, and the ability of the Afghan forces to manage it, has also improved. Every single official briefing cited the April 15, 2012 insurgent attacks on Kabul, where Afghan forces effectively led the response, as an indicator of how much the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capacity to deal with the insurgency has improved.

Improving the ANSF's capacity to deal with the insurgency on its own though participation in the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) is currently Canada's single largest international military operation. Although the public and political attention paid to Afghanistan has waned considerably since Canadian combat forces withdrew from Kandahar, the Canadian Forces (CF) contribution to NTM-A is significant. While the United States dominates the training command with over 3,000 personnel, Canada's 686 strong training complement makes Canada by far the second largest national troop contributor (the United Kingdom is 3rd with 258 personnel), and Canadian officers occupy multiple senior NTM-A leadership positions.

By several measures, the dedication and commitment of Canadian and other coalition forces have already been highly successful. Quantitatively, the expansion of the ANSF to 352,000 personnel has been achieved ahead of the November 2012 schedule. On its own, this is impressive since the security forces numbered only 150,000 in December 2008. Furthermore, the ANSF training capacity has improved to the point that many CF members deployed to NTM-A have worked themselves out of their jobs. Since the Afghan trainers they were training are now proficient, CF members are rotating out to other positions or going home.

At the same time, the international coalition has substantively changed its goals for Afghanistan. Where the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) once sought to defeat the insurgency, the current aim is to create a Government of Afghanistan capable of defending its sovereignty and preventing insurgents from setting up safe havens that could once again make Afghan-based terrorism a threat to the international community.

A combination of improved economic and security indicators and the international coalition's more realistic mission goals leaves the impression that the West might plausibly leave Afghanistan without the country collapsing. And yet, with good reason, every official briefing came with admonishments about how tenuous these improvements are.

Afghanistan's revenue generation ability is only impressive relative to its total inability to raise funds only a decade ago. And since the nation's GDP is currently only USD 15 billion, 10% of it does not go very far for a country with such incredible security problems.[1] With the post-transition ANSF alone is estimated to cost USD 4.1 billion annually, Afghanistan will remain heavily dependent on foreign revenue for the foreseeable future. To that end, the pledged support for ANSF funding at the NATO Chicago Summit and the additional commitment to a further USD 4 billion annually in aid announced at the Tokyo Conference will be crucial to keeping the Afghan government fiscally solvent. Even this pledged support may prove insufficient though, if current circumstances change.

On the security front, NATO's official security statistics offer a mixed assessment of how much the security situation has really improved. While enemy-initiated attacks have decreased substantially over the last two years, they remain three times more frequent than in 2008, and the recent figures for May 2012 show a troubling increase over last year.[2]

Most significantly, all the improvements to date have all been based on economic and security inputs that are already starting to change for the worse as the ISAF mission begins drawing to a close in 2014. At the height of the 'surge' of American forces, ISAF troop levels peaked this year at 140,000. Combined with the ANSF, this meant Afghanistan had roughly half a million coalition troops on its soil in the spring of 2012.

By the end of this summer, however, the 30,000 American surge forces will be completely withdrawn, and France has indicated it will remove its forces by the end of this year. Furthermore, after 2014, ANSF troop strength will drop significantly as well, falling by more than 120,000 to roughly 230,000 under current plans.

The combined ISAF and ANSF troop reductions will probably see roughly 235,000 fewer coalition forces in Afghanistan within the next few years, depending on how many Americans stay after 2014.[3] The remaining ANSF will be incredibly hard pressed to make up for such a loss of troop strength.

The security force draw down will also have a severe negative impact on the Afghan economy as well, as NATO estimates that the economic spin off from the presence of every ISAF troop in theatre generates five Afghan jobs. This means that in addition to the 120,000 fighting age-Afghan men put out of work directly when the ANSF shrinks, more than half a million more could find themselves jobless as the international coalition draws down. It is difficult to believe that an unemployment problem so large would not adversely affect Afghanistan's economic prospects.

All of this means that Afghan institutions must try and compensate for a major reduction in quantity with improved quality. On this front, NTM-A has made significant gains but, again, from incredibly low levels. Literacy training is now a component of the ANSF training, for example, but only to grade 3 North American standards.

The ANSF are now reasonably proficient at basic combat skills, but are only just developing enabling functions like combat service support and engineering. Official briefings suggest that the administrative and logistics capacity of the ANSF has improved significantly. When asked unofficially, however, after tight smiles, several CF members acknowledged that this is a major problem that currently limits the ANSF's ability to do something as simple as conduct a live fire exercise.

To date, the ANSF has been dependent on ISAF for its enabling functions, but will need to develop them rapidly to become self-sufficient. With an annual attrition rate of 25%, this will be particularly difficult to achieve.

The ongoing quality problem brings Canada's future role in Afghanistan into question, given the ongoing need for mentoring and capacity building. At present, Operation *Attention* is slated to end on March 31, 2014 and, as a result, Canadian training programs have been designed to do what is achievable within that timeline. Thus, to cite one example, the unheralded Canadian mentoring of Afghanistan's Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences, the Afghan Army medical training establishment, has focused on what can be accomplished by the mission end date, rather than what level of training is actually needed or desirable.

The tailoring of the ANSF training to the exit schedule rather than need represents a huge liability, as some commentators believe that a strong Afghan Army is the only means of preventing a civil war when western forces withdraw.

At present, the planned Canadian commitment to Afghanistan post 2014 will be financial. At the NATO Chicago Summit, Prime Minister Stephen Harper pledged CAD 330 million in support for the ANSF from 2015-2017, and an additional CAD 227 million in development assistance from 2014 to 2017 at the Tokyo Conference. However, to date the Canadian government has not made any indication that the training mission will remain. While the money is vital, so too is increased Afghan capacity.

Although the current mission has been rarely discussed, Operation *Attention* appears to be motivated by the same set of factors that have prompted Canada's involvement in Afghanistan since 9/11: preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for international terrorism; enhancing Canada-US relations; supporting NATO; and assisting a population crippled by an incredibly low standard of living.[4] The first and last rationales remain extant today, while the second and third may be in flux as international forces withdraw.

However, Canadian policy makers should at least consider the possibility of retaining a scaled down capacity-building mission in Afghanistan in conjunction with our allies. As the training of front line combat forces appears to be progressing on target, this could focus on developing the administrative capacity of the ANSF, something Canadians in NTM-A are currently doing. Such a contribution would ideally be a whole-of-government commitment and sized according to the requirement in conjunction with our allies.

The previous efforts of the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan, or the current Canadian capacity building mission to the Palestinian Authority, Operation *Proteus*, suggest that even teams of less than 20 individuals operating inside secure compounds can make valuable contributions.

The international community has been involved in Afghanistan for more than a decade and the results to date have been mixed. Collectively, the coalition has determined that the time has come for us to let the Afghans chart their own path. Since the government has decided that another half a billion in assistance is a prudent investment, it should entertain the possibility of deploying a small training team after March 2014 that could help make sure that investment realizes a real return. ©

(Endnotes)

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Recorded interview

Interview with Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, June 19, 2012.

Interviewers: David Perry and Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald

Dave Perry and Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald held an interview with Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, in his National Defence Headquarters office, Ottawa, on June 19, 2012. The interview covered a number of subjects ranging the Leslie Report on Transformation, to the defence budget (including the Deficit Reduction Action Plan), and contracting. A transcript of the interview follows.

Q: I'd like to start with the discrepancy between planned expenditures and actual expenditures in recent years.

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: **B**udgets 06/07 and the details therein didn't have realistic acquisition dates so DND is making corrections right now to adjust to reflect more realistically the delivery schedules of the capital programs. This requires in-year movements of money.

Q: After these short-term funding reductions do you expect a return to long term growth in the defence budget?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: In terms of the cutbacks, there were two stages. The Strategic Review focused on the lowest performing five per cent of the program to recover for other priorities; these are efficiency of force generation, efficiency of management, and the re-alignment of core priorities. The DRAP [Deficit Reduction Action Plan] came about from the Government of Canada's view that the way DND does business is not as rigorously managed as it could be in terms of both processes and timelines.

While both the Strategic Review and DRAP adjustments are significant, at the end of the day, with the two per cent growth, there will still be an increase in the defence budget over time.

Q: What are the main priorities for the Canadian Forces (CF) when it comes to finding these efficiencies?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: First and foremost, the focus is on contracting. Over the past several years, the department resorted to a lot of this because we could—we had to move a greatly expanded budget, and had a lot of flexibility in terms of how we could do so; so contracting was an avenue to execute a lot of programs. Now we are looking at whether it makes sense to rely on contracting so much.

The CF turned heavily to the Reserves to accomplish its tasks. This was crucial, but at a certain point, this began to work against the operational health of the reserve component of the CF, although it was benefiting the overall organization. So there will be reductions in Class B [full time reservists] positions—with some of the money going to the Department's budget reduction, but most of the funds going to the Class A's [part time reservists].

Q: How does this compare with previous initiatives?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: To fix problems in the past, we used to add another layer of process to existing ones. We have since initiated a program to review project approvals, with the aim of cutting project approval timelines in half. This is a very significant challenge, as we are trying to take on a process that attempts to exclude all risk from the project approval process, to the extent that maintaining a zero-risk approach is effectively coming at the expense of actually receiving the desired end products in a timely manner.

Out of that process, we are hoping to achieve some significant savings as well as faster delivery. As part of our review process we don't intend to leave any stones unturned.

Q: Can the CF actually be re-capitalized with the resources currently allocated to it?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: Yes. Will it look exactly the same as we thought it would under CFDS [Canada First Defence Strategy]? Probably not and nothing will look exactly the same in 2035 as we originally thought it might.

In some areas, platforms may not exist to do what we want yet, but CFDS gave a very clear view of how the CF would be re-capitalized, but there are a lot of other areas to look at, too.

One way to approach future capability in general is to examine how we think we'll fight in the future. The Chief of Force Development has been doing that with a series of vignettes to challenge the organization in terms of what

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Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald is a senior defence analyst with the CDA Institute and is a member of the Institute's Board of Directors.

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald, Senior Defence Analyst, and David Parry, Defence Policy Analyst, interview Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff.

Photo courtesy DND.

forces will be needed in the future battle space, to help us determine the forces needed and what risk might be taken on and planned for.

Q: This seems particularly true when there is so much discussion surrounding procurement decisions.

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: Especially when there is a lot of talk about the cost of overall business. A key issue is that we can give a good view of the overall cost of the defence plan, and we are good at itemizing discrete costs of particular activities; but the trouble is getting between these two ranges.

Q: Is this exacerbated when you are asked to give point estimates of life cycle costs versus band estimates of the same?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: This applies across the board, but especially with aerospace. You cannot get a very a high degree of certainty about what you'll pay for things for their lifecycle beyond about 20 years, and you have to pay a substantial risk premium to get a commitment from industry that extends into that time frame.

At the end of the day – the full life cycle cost of Defence will be the full $21 billion-and-change budget of defence annually.

We need to make estimates based on known estimates and relatively certain costs, such as acquisition, and then things we have a pretty good handle on - like personnel. Then you get to the other likely incremental estimates for things that are far less certain, like what spare parts and fuel costs will be 25 years in the future.

Q: What about technological obsolescence and Moore's law that sees technological capabilities roughly double every couple of years?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: I'm uncomfortable with the idea that all the kit needs to be at the highest edge of technology, because that could then jeopardize the whole program. We need to be world-class in some places, but not everywhere, but these are decisions of government CFDS gave us the canvas for 20 years into the future and presented the right way at the right time.

The home game comes first, then defence of North America, and then we contribute to international security. It's on the international security component that you can make trade-offs and decisions about what you need that is good enough rather than world-class.

Q: Would you give us a sense of where the Department stands on acting upon the recommendations of Lieutenant-General Leslie's Report on Transformation?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: The Transformation team took a broad soup-to-nuts look to find areas where there was a high degree of commonality where we might find some efficiencies, creating a huge amount of data and distilling it out into recommendations.

Our team members now mostly work in our force development shop. The report itself was an analysis of the organization at a particular point in time. In fact, a number of the recommendations made in the report were already happening by the time the report was released.

Q: You have spoken recently about how a third of the recommendations were being implemented, a third were about to be implemented, and a third were under review. Where do you stand right now on this?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: Last fall when I spoke to the Senate [Standing Committee on National Defence and Security] a lot of ideas were still being teased out. Some items when acted on took, or are taking a very different form, than what was in the recommendation.

The gist of the report was predicated on the sense that there is an opportunity to separate policy from service delivery in a number of the functions being performed in NDHQ. The idea was to turn all aspects of service support delivery over to one new commander to achieve economies of scale and efficiency of staffing.

Q: It seems like most of the major recommendations have been announced: the single force employer organization Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and cutting back of full time, Class B reserves as well as service contracts. One of the big things we haven't seen is the recommendation to create a single organization to take care of support functions. Can you speak to that?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: One of the challenges is that a new headquarters construct would change many of the ways that we operate. It would change the operational reporting responsibilities for different service delivery providers and it would have an effect on readiness and the conduct of operations that is hard to predict.

To go that far would be a big upheaval, and right now we need to focus on the next five years.

We are still looking at service delivery, including maintenance, personnel management, real property, etc. We're looking at doing that in a different way, following the intent of the Report, but without the single Service Delivery organization that the Report recommended. In other words, we are trying to implement the intent to produce the desired effect.

In terms of the other recommendations, we've harvested as much as we can, using the Report's work and the Strategic Review process too. Both helped capture our actual business practices and give us a better sense of what's actually been happening in detail across the whole defence institution over the last three years.

That data and the analytics have better opened the department's eyes to what money actually is spent on and has pointed us in the areas where we can achieve some savings.

Our focus is to not to have transformation 'this' time, but rather have it be an ongoing process of making the department leaner, more effective and affordable and have the process re-orient itself to make the department better in an ongoing way.

"The key point is trading off between what we're doing today and what we need to be doing for the future;..."

Q: Can you give us a sense of where transformation stands right now?

Vice-Admiral Donaldson: First we're looking at the formation of CJOC as a step in the next phase of how to bring things together. We're looking around the functions at NDHQ and trying to figure out what should be done elsewhere and what should be done in different spots.

Second, there is an attempt to divest things from national level headquarters towards the fighting force and to look at future capabilities, which includes 3,500 positions that have been identified as required for future emerging capabilities.

The targeted attempt to harvest Regular forces won't be populated by NDHQ on its own, but combined with other changes—and with specified readiness levels, which will aim to get people ready to the point that is needed (and not go beyond what is required)—we will start learning processes and freeing people up to populate those areas.

The key point is trading off between what we're doing today and what we need to be doing for the future; getting the balance right is the challenge. It's like having a foot in two separate canoes, in the middle of a rough lake, with 33 million spectators. ©

Call for Papers

15th Annual Graduate Student Symposium - Canada's Security Interests

Currie Hall, Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario
Thursday & Friday, October 25-26, 2012

The CDA Institute's 15th Annual Graduate Student Symposium Canada's Security Interests will be held on October 25-26, 2012, and is currently accepting papers from Masters and Doctoral students.

The symposium is conducted in collaboration with the Royal Military College of Canada, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affair's Institute, Chair of Defence Studies Queen's University and Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy.

The acceptable range of presentation topics include contemporary and historical analyses of: national security and defence; insurgency and counter-insurgency; conventional warfare; campaign planning; Canadian military campaigns and operations; security and defence alliances, peace enforcement, and peace support operations; conflict resolution; security and defence related economics; intra-state conflict issues; and terrorism and other non-traditional threats to security.

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The deadline for submissions is September 21, 2012.

APPEL DE COMMUNICATIONS

15ième Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés - Les intérêts canadiens en matière de sécurité

Salle Currie, Collège militaire royal du Canada
Kingston, Ontario
Les jeudi 25 et vendredi 26 octobre 2012

Le 15ème Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, de l'Institut de la CAD, qui aura pour thème Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité, sera tenu les 25 et 26 octobre 2012; on accepte actuellement des communications proposées par des étudiants de maîtrise et de doctorat.

Le symposium est tenu en collaboration avec le Collège militaire royal du Canada, l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, la chaire d'Études en gestion de la défense et le Centre d'études de politiques internationales et de défense de Queen's.

Les exposés acceptables peuvent porter sur les thèmes (dimensions contemporaines et historiques) suivants: la sécurité et la défense nationales; les alliances de sécurité et de défense; les opérations d'imposition de la paix et de maintien de la paix; la résolution des conflits; l'économie liée à la sécurité et la défense; les enjeux des conflits intra-états; et le terrorisme et autres menaces non-traditionnelles constituant une menace à la sécurité.

Un prix de $1 000 sera offert à la meilleure présentation. Des prix de $ 500 et de $ 250 seront offerts aux deuxième et troisième meilleures présentations. En plus des prix en espèces, l'Institut de la CAD a l'honneur d'offrir une allocation de 2 000$ aux trois élèves qui remporteront la première, deuxième et troisième place. Le but de cette allocation est d'aider les élèves à transformer leur présentation en une publication de l'Institut de la CAD. Les élèves travailleront avec notre comité de rédaction afin de rédiger une publication de 5 000 mots en suivant le processus d'évaluation par les pairs.

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Les personnes intéressées sont invitées à soumettre leurs projets de communication au plus tard le 21 septembre 2012.

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: IN WHOSE INTERESTS?

Paul Hillier

While they seem to be an elementary economic concept, sovereign wealth funds come with a host of political and national security concerns for both the countries with sovereign wealth funds as well as the countries where significant stakes in private industries are being purchased by foreign governments.

With so many countries running systematic deficits and watching their national debts soar, investing budget surpluses appears to be an unfamiliar concept for many national governments. However, some states are capitalizing on these opportunities by investing in more than just bonds and foreign currency. Setting aside money into investment funds called Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), states are able to purchase international equity at an exponential rate.

Operating in a similar manner as hedge funds, they have a number of critical differences. First, at an estimated $5 trillion worldwide, SWFs hold nearly three times the amount of wealth as all hedge funds combined. Second, they may operate with much greater secrecy, not being bound by international and national laws requiring disclosure of hedge funds' investments. Finally, they are state-owned funds and, in the cases of some of the largest SWFs, belong to states potentially unfriendly to the West.

Originally developed by countries with resource-based economies, the logic underpinning the utility is SWFs is both simplistic and rational: when commodity prices are high, states invest excess capital in long-term investments and when commodity prices are, nations tap into their investments to meet budgetary shortfalls. For most commodity-based SWFs, long-term investment is in Western blue-chip companies. While it seems to be an elementary economic concept, it comes with a host of political and national security concerns for both the countries with SWFs as well as the countries where significant stakes in private industries are being purchased by foreign governments.

The vast proliferation of SWFs since 2007 has fostered a dramatic increase in the volume of literature on the subject. However, it is important to note that in almost every case, limited attention has been paid to the relationship between Western (predominantly U.S.) financial firms and developing nations' SWFs. By focusing on these strategic investment relationships, we may develop a better understanding of the interests that SWFs serve.

The table below represents some of the public holdings of SWFs, while the full extent of many investments by SWFs is entirely unknown.

Percentage of Ownership in Major Financial Firms

Sovereign Wealth Funds	Financial Firms
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority	Citygroup (USA) 4.9% stake; $7.5bn credit crunch bailout
China Investment Corporation	Morgan Stanley (USA) 9.9% stake; $5bn deal
Kuwait Investment Authority	Citigroup (USA) 6% stake; $6bn credit crunch bailout
Kuwait Investment Authority	Merrill Lynch (USA) 4.8% stake
Temasek Holdings Private Limited	Merrill Lynch (USA) 13.7% stake; $4.4bn for 9.4% stake deal
Qatar Investment Authority	Barclays Bank (UK) 6.4% stake
Korea Investment Corporation	Merrill Lynch (USA) 7.4% stake
Investment Corporation of Dubai	Nasdaq OMX Group Inc (USA) 43.6% stake; ADIC property

http://www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/

The above table bears a second important caveat: it captures only direct ownership, which is only one dynamic of the convoluted relationship between SWFs and investment firms. In addition to direct ownership, major U.S. investment firms

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may represent partners in joint ventures (such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Morgan Stanley's joint USD 11 billion investment into Chicago Parking Meters); U.S. firms may act as money managers for SWFs (such as Goldman Sachs managing and losing 98% of Libyan Investment Authority (LIA)'s USD 1.5 billion they invested with the firm), and in the case of the Goldman Sachs and the LIA, firms evidently are allowed to offer SWFs massive amounts of their own stock in compensation for losses.

The West's interests

Two key factors that make SWFs different from foreign private investments are a fundamental lack of transparency and the potential national security concerns entailed by foreign governments having the opportunity to buy into blue-chip companies that hold proprietary or other strategic information.

The crux of the issue lies in what the investment strategy for any given SWF is. The prevailing opinion amongst western analysts has been that so long as foreign countries use their SWFs to maximize profits and not to drive strategic national interests, then this influx of capital poses no national security concerns and should be welcomed.

There are, of course, SWFs owned by Western governments as well, including Alberta, some U.S. states, Norway, and France. However, in contrast to the blue-chip purchases by Chinese or Gulf state-SWFs that raise significant red flags for Western policymakers, Norway's SWF may buy up 4% of the FTSE 100 index,[1] and because of the transparency with which the fund operates and its market orientation rather than national strategic ambitions, the news is of economic interest, but not of political or national security interest.

Perhaps the single best contrast between two sides of the debate can be found at a 2007 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Banking Committee.

Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) sums up one side, saying:

> [W]e're short of capital because of the credit crunch, and in the longer run because of our own habits. We import more than we export; we consume more than we save…So they [financial institutions] raise capital from where it exists, and sovereign wealth funds are the most available form of capital right now.

On the other side of the debate, Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) warns:

> Just as the United States has geopolitical interests in addition to financial ones, so too do other countries. Just as we value some things more than money, so do they. Why should we assume that other nations are driven purely by financial interests when we are not?

To mitigate against such concerns, most Western countries have in place a number of laws regulating the foreign purchase of domestic assets. In Canada, it falls under the Investment Canada Act, 1985. Under the Act, non-Canadians seeking major acquisitions are submitted to a threshold test which weighs the net benefits of the investment to Canadians, with preferential treatment being given to countries who are members of the WTO.[2] Additionally, there are also provisions to review any "investments that threaten to impair national security. This type of national security review will be done separately from the net benefit review."[3]

Having witnessed in the past year some of the top generals and defence ministers from NATO countries citing the global economic crisis as the single largest national security threat, we should pause to consider the profound impact major financial firms have on national security, and the possible ramifications of increased control by potentially non-friendly states. This must be counterbalanced, however, against the potential for a domino effect. While many western countries do not have SWFs of their own (and those that do rarely invest in the developing world), developing nations may establish reciprocal protectionism on western private companies should the investments of their SWFs be met with western protectionism.

Developing nations' interests

This vast expansion of SWFs being a new phenomenon—the most significant increases happening in the past five years—leads us to question what the next five years will bring. Many recent reports have focused on nations making more conservative investments with their SWFs, and indeed dipping into these investments. However, while some have seen this as evidence of the diminishing power SWFs will have in the global financial market, it perhaps should be seen as evidence of their very success: invest when times are good, dip into savings in troubled economic times. Indeed, most Albertans will never have heard of "sovereign wealth funds," but will have heard of its more colloquial and self-explanatory name, the "rainy-day fund."

These investments are not without a great deal of controversy. In addition to the scandal of losing more than a billion dollars at the hands of Goldman Sachs, the very future of the Libyan economy relies on finding a way to unfreeze their USD 65 billion in assets held by the country's SWF. Conversely, convincing arguments in favour of SWFs include access for developing nations to see how to build their own domestic financial models, with information that would not otherwise be available to them except as major investors in western financial institutions. Regardless of which side one is arguing for, it becomes impossible to divorce SWFs in developing countries from these major Western financial institutions.

Perhaps the single most important unknown when it comes to the benefit of developing SWFs is whether the money would have been better invested in education, domestic infrastructure, or even domestic industry.[4] While some have tried to simplify the issue by arguing that SWFs

are only a smart investment once sufficient funds have been dedicated to domestic spending, one can disagree over what is "sufficient" in terms of domestic investments.

Further considerations: a shift from West to East?

Most have assumed that the rapid expansion of SWFs represents a shift in economic power from the West to the East. The table at the beginning of this article showing the control developing countries' SWFs exert over several major Western financial institutions could be a *prima facia* reason for accepting this argument.

However, the opposing argument that is less frequently presented in the literature on SWFs is that by depositing vast wealth into Western institutions rather than their local economies, these SWFs are actually strengthening western institutions by stabilizing them in times of capital shortages and having them participate in a global system of trade designed by Western countries. Indeed, many developing nations have prospered by buying into these rules and systems.

SWFs will provide an interesting barometer over the coming decade in measuring any kind of shift in economic power West to East. While investments by SWF into the developing world rather than into Western institutions may be a wildcard in this arena, the growth of SWFs may signal a shift in power away from major western financial institutions. Or this power may become more ingrained. ©

(Endnotes)

1 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/ftse100/9400629/Mighty-Norway-buys-up-FTSE-100.html
2 Marc LeBlanc, "Sovereign Wealth Funds: International and Canadian Policy Responses," Library of Parliament, February 2010, 5.
3 Ibid.
4 Chile's Sovereign Education Fund may provide an interesting counter example to many of the largest SWFs in Gulf States whose mandate is to explicitly invest overseas.

General Walter J. Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff / Le général Walter J. Natynczyk, Chef d'état-major de la Défense

DND photo / Photo MDN

THE QUEEN ELIZABETH II DIAMOND JUBILEE MEDAL

LA MÉDAILLE DU JUBILÉ DE DIAMANT DE LA REINE ELIZABETH II

Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg

The Conference of Defence Associations was invited to select candidates from its community for this national honour.

La Conférence des Associations de la défense a été invitée à sélectionner en son sein des candidats dignes de cette distinction honorifique nationale.

On February 6, 2012, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II marked the 60th anniversary of her accession to the Throne as Queen of Canada - an occasion marked only once before by her great-great-grandmother, Queen Victoria, in 1897.

In celebration of this event, a commemorative medal, the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal was created as a visible and tangible way to recognize 60,000 outstanding Canadians of all ages and from all walks of life who have built a caring society and country through their service, contributions and achievements.

The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), as a partnering organization, was invited to select candidates from its community for this national honour. 80 names were submitted and accepted by the Chancellery of Honours. A presentation ceremony was held on 2 May in the National Defence Headquarters Warrant Officers and Sergeants Mess, Ottawa, for 52 of those recipients, and their guests, who were able to be present for the event.

The Chairman of the CDA, Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, opened the medals presentation ceremony with a brief address on why the Medal was being presented. He then made the first presentation of the Medal to Général (ret) Raymond Henault, President of the CDA Institute. Général (ret) Henault next presented the Medal to Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Ron Buck, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Michael Jeffery, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald, Lieutenant-général (ret) Michel Maisonneuve and

The Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal / la Médaille du jubilé de diamant de la reine Élizabeth II

Le 6 février 2012, Sa Majesté la reine Élizabeth II marquait le 60e anniversaire de son accession au trône en tant que reine du Canada – un événement qui ne s'était produit qu'une seule fois auparavant pour son arrière-arrière-grand-mère, la reine Victoria, en 1897.

Pour célébrer cet événement, on a créé une médaille commémorative, la Médaille du jubilé de diamant de la reine Élizabeth II, comme façon visible et tangible de reconnaître 60 000 Canadiens et Canadiennes exceptionnels de tous les âges et de tous les milieux de vie qui ont bâti une société et un pays soucieux du bien-être de chacun par leur service, leurs contributions et leurs réussites.

En tant qu'organisme partenaire, la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) a été invitée à sélectionner des candidats de cette communauté pour recevoir cette distinction nationale. 80 noms ont été soumis et retenus par la Chancellerie des distinctions honorifiques. Une cérémonie de présentation fut tenue le 2 mai au mess des adjudants et des sergents du Quartier général de la Défense nationale, à Ottawa, pour 52 de ces récipiendaires, et leurs invités, qui pouvaient être présents à la cérémonie.

Le président de la CAD, le Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, a ouvert la cérémonie de remise des médailles avec une brève adresse expliquant pourquoi la médaille était présentée. Il fit ensuite la première présentation de la médaille au Général (ret) Raymond Henault, président de l'Institut de la CAD. Le Général (ret) Henault remit ensuite la médaille au Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, au Vice-amiral (ret) Ron Buck, au Lieutenant-général (ret) Michael Jeffery, au Lieutenant-général (ret) George Macdonald, au Lieutenant-général (ret)

Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg is the Public Affairs Officer for the CDA Institute.

Capitaine (ret) Peter Forsberg est Officier de relations publiques de l'Institut de la CAD.

General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault, President CDA Institute, is presented with the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman Conference of Defence Associations.

Le général (ret) Raymond Henault, Président de l'Institut de la CAD, reçoit la Médaille du jubilé de diamant de la reine Élizabeth II du Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Master Warrant Officer William MacDonald, Vimy Award recipient for 2009, is presented with the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman Conference of Defence Associations.

Adjudant-maître William MacDonald, récipiendaire du Prix Vimy 2009, reçoit la Médaille du jubilé de diamant de la reine Élizabeth II du Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Angus Watt. Lieutenant-général (ret) Evraire then presented the Medal to the remainder of those recipients present.

Throughout the ceremony, the Canadian Forces String Ensemble provided background music befitting of the occasion.

With the Medal, the CDA is presenting each of the 80 recipients with a copy of the book, *Commemorative Medals of the The Queen's Reign in Canada, 1952-2012*, written by Christopher McCreery. The book, filled with illustrations of commemorative medals, is a fitting accompaniment to the Medal.

The medal programme is one of the elements of the year-long Diamond Jubilee celebrations. ©

Michel Maisonneuve et au Lieutenant-général (ret) Angus Watt. Le Lieutenant-général (ret) Evraire présenta ensuite la médaille au restant des récipiendaires présents.

Tout au long de la cérémonie, l'Ensemble à cordes des Forces canadiennes a joué une musique de fond convenant à l'occasion.

Avec la médaille, la CAD a remis à chacun des 80 récipiendaires un exemplaire du livre *Commemorative Medals of the The Queen's Reign in Canada, 1952-2012*, de Christopher McCreery. Rempli d'illustrations de médailles commémoratives, est un accompagnement qui sied bien à la Médaille du jubilé.

Le programme de la médaille est un des éléments des célébrations du jubilé de diamant qui se poursuivront tout au long de l'année. ©

THE NATIONAL WALL OF REMBRANCE PROJECT

Terence Cottrell

This self-funding project will create a single place of remembrance for all of Canada's fallen heroes.

Why is it that great ideas seem to flourish whenever a group of old soldiers and friends gather round a table with suitable refreshments, and before the session is over they have solved most of the world's problems? It is probably because the modern military milieu does make—the old soldier, at least—"wonder why," in Tennyson's immortal words. Well, the National Wall of Remembrance project owes its origin to such an occasion at a Kingston Royal Canadian Legion branch three years ago.

As the amateur oracles left the site, they carried with them the idea of a truly novel memorial to Canada's fallen. Several more formal meetings took place and a rudimentary committee was formed to pursue the idea. Soon a formal constitution and by-law were drawn up, the objects clearly defined, a method worked out and a roster of patriotic volunteers mustered: the National Wall of Remembrance Association (NWORA) was born, and later incorporated.

This self-funding project will create a single place of remembrance for all of Canada's fallen heroes: a facility that families, friends and the people of Canada will want to visit. The National Wall of Remembrance will honour those who fell in all conflicts of record, starting with the earliest, from the time of the 1791 Constitution Act up to today. It will not, however, seek to replace local cenotaphs and memorials as a sacred place.

The physical part of the project will be a true monument. It will comprise ten panels depicting aspects of the various conflicts and taskings during which Canadians and others fell in the country's service. A selection of particular details to be artistically created on appropriate material will be submitted for NWORA approval by a professional researcher. The design, architecture and layout of the site will be dovetailed with landscaping designs submitted by competition involving several community colleges in the eastern Ontario area.

So why did we want to do it? Perhaps we hear the reason at the Cenotaph on every Remembrance Day. But no address on that honoured day has yet surpassed "The Funeral Oration of Pericles" (c. 490 B.C), saluting the Athenian fallen, as reported by Thucydides in The Peloponnesian War:

> The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise that grows not old, and the noblest of all tombs – I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the tomb of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men…. (Jowett translation)

We thought the time had come to do something new, to give a local substance and a name to airy nothing. We sought to go beyond the columns and inscriptions, worthy though they may be, to inscribe upon the hearts of men and women an authentic account of Canada's fallen through the magic of the computer, and to give substance in full to the, as yet, "unwritten memorial of them."

Using 21st century technology, the educational aspects of the installation will be of particular interest to schools. In addition to the physical monument, the project will have two components: a series of panels portraying the various conflicts and a digital wall with a search function.

An all-inclusive screen presentation of the name of each fallen hero together with biographies, photos and

The launch of the National Wall of Remembrance Project. L to R: Terence Cottrell, Chairman of the National Wall of Remembrance Association (NWORA) Advisory Board and Editor Remembrance Magazine; James Kingston, Treasurer NWORA; Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Carr, Deputy Base Commander, CFB Kingston; Debra St. Gelais, Secretary NWORA; Allan Jones, Chairman NWORA; Jack O'Brien, Director NWORA; Major Mike Jackson, Deputy Commandant CF School of Communications and Electronics; Phillip Osanic, Director NWORA, and his son Nicholas.

Photo courtesy TVCOGECO

Terence Cottrell is the Editor Remembrance Magazine, Chairman NWORA Advisory Board, and President Royal Kingston United Services Institute.

clippings will be augmented from time to time as new material comes to light.

Just imagine: old great-uncle Charlie's naughty postcard home from Paris at Christmas 1917 will finally be made available to the whole country—the whole world. His saucy remarks on the back that made Grandma blush will be revealed to all and sundry. Alas, Uncle Charlie never made it home. He lies somewhere in Belgium. But the National Wall of Remembrance will put flesh on his lost bones.

His name on the Menin Gate, which nobody in the family has ever been to see, will not be his only sterile memorial. We will be able to see what he looked like as a boy. We can see him with his sweetheart on their way to church. We can read one of his letters to her; she kept the rest, but through that one letter we can get to know something about Uncle Charlie as a young man in love. We might even have a few pages of the diary he kept and was picked up on the battlefield by a comrade and sent home by the padre with a few words of condolence. We might even see that letter of condolence and learn a little from a man who knew Uncle Charlie from an angle slightly different from that of his comrades.

Going back to the War of 1812, we might have miniatures of soldiers or their loved ones. We might have letters home—treasured and kept in special protectors, but which a generous and concerned family might consider having scanned and donated to the project, all the while keeping the family heirlooms safe.

The more than 118,000 names will thus not have to be chiselled into blocks of granite with the attendant difficulties incurred by other such worthy projects. Families will be able to lend their family treasures to the project to be scanned-in without giving up actual possession.

It is anticipated that eventually the massive database accumulated will be available to persons at home. Remembrance magazine, distributed across the country and focusing on the various conflicts with reviews, memoirs, stories, verse and memorials of those who served or fell for Canada, will be vital to the project.

The right location for the installation of the physical monument is crucial. NWORA believes that Kingston, Ontario is the right place. In 1673, under the French regime, Cataraqui became a defended trading post consisting almost entirely of Fort Frontenac and its garrison. In 1758 this fell into British hands. In 1783 it became the "King's Town" and the focal point of British Empire Loyalist settlement. The fort has had a military function ever since, first as Tête de Pont Barracks, home of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and then of the Canadian Army Staff College and its Canadian Forces' successors.

After the invasion scares of the War of 1812 and further occasional conflicts at sea between British and American vessels, disputes over both the Maine and Oregon boundaries and amateurish American invasions across the St. Lawrence River, Fort Henry, with its associated Martello towers, was built as part of Canada's defences in the 1830s on the site of an earlier wooden fort.

It is today one of the country's outstanding tourist attractions. A designated National Historic Site, it guards the entrance to the Rideau Canal, itself a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Planned in 1874, the Royal Military College was opened in 1876 on the site of the earliest Canadian civil marine and naval stations. HMCS Cataraqui, one of Canada's leading naval reserve units, carries on that fine tradition today.

In 1903, the Canadian Boer War hero of the Battle of Hart's River, Major Bruce Carruthers, established in Kingston the first independent school of military signalling in the British Empire. Today, the Kingston Signals School's Military Communications and Electronics (C&E) Museum is one of Canada's prime tourist, and a history buff's must-see, sites. A natural fit, it will also be the home of the National Wall of Remembrance.

To bring the National Wall of Remembrance project to fruition, a panel of mainly retired, senior military officers has stepped forward to form an advisory board. An executive board of seven directors is tasked with driving the operational aspects of the project.

The required funds will be raised through corporate sponsorships and advertising revenue from Remembrance magazine. Remembrance thus thanks our advisors, sponsors, the authors of articles submitted for publication, and ON TRACK magazine for their support.

Thanks to the courtesy and support of two successive base commanders and their staffs, the commandant of the C&E School and his staff, the director of the C&E Museum, and the entire Kingston signals establishment, the National Wall of Remembrance will be unveiled in November 2016 at CFB Kingston's Military C&E Museum. It will be a place for all Canadians to reflect upon who we are as citizens, as a people, and as a nation.

It will be a fitting place to distil the very essence of the notions of duty, service, love of country and sacrifice—the ultimate gifts of Canada's fallen sons and daughters, graven not upon stone but in the hearts of the men and women of Canada.

See our website at www.worassociation.ca and the C&E Museum website at www.c-and-e-museum.org ©

BOOK REVIEW



CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD: STRATEGY, INTERESTS AND THREATS

Reviewed by Paul H. Chapin

David S. McDonough, editor. Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats. University of Toronto Press 2012 ISBN 978-1-4426-1063-7 (pbk)

Every state has a character and history of its own, and that distinctiveness conditions its outlook on the world. If its past encompasses danger and strife, a state will tend to take its security rather seriously. It will have a keen appreciation of its interests and the threats posed to them, have developed plans to protect those interests, and set the necessary resources aside to implement those plans.

Over the generations, Canadians have rarely felt the fear that has driven Americans, British, French and others to devise national security strategies. Only periodically and for brief periods have Canadians not taken comfort from the protections offered by vast oceans, an inhospitable Arctic, and the military might first of Britain and then of the United States. In the final analysis, they have always risen to the challenge and prevailed. But Canadians' lack of foresight and preparedness has been costly, and will likely be even more so in confronting the new and emerging dangers of the 21st century.

The publication of *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats* constitutes a great leap forward in intelligent discussion of Canada's national security interests. Edited by David McDonough at the University of Waterloo, the volume offers analysis by an impressive array of Canadian thinkers on security and defence. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to identify many leading defence academics not represented in this collection. It is worth pondering, however, why such a volume appearing in the United States or United Kingdom would undoubtedly have included chapters by retired generals and admirals, policy advisors to government, and think-tank intellectuals, while this one does not.

The chapters are up-to-date, well informed, and written with a liveliness not normally associated with academic studies. As important, McDonough has succeeded in organizing the material so that the reader is conducted through an orderly appreciation of the issues including commentary and advice along the way.

The volume opens with three chapters dealing with how to think about the subject of national security: a dissertation on why Canada should have a "grand strategy" by Charles Doran and former defence minister David Pratt, an analysis of first principles by Don Macnamara (okay, he was a general), and a dose of reality about what is at stake from Senator Hugh Segal.

The next six chapters offer thoughtful analyses of the home and away dimensions of national security. Craig Stone looks at the industrial base supporting Canada's defence, Elinor Sloan describes how Canada's security structures have changed since 9/11, and Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky analyze the evolution of the North American continental defence system. Alex Moens writes about Canada's security interests in Europe, Tom Adams about Canada's shifting security interests in the Pacific, and Doug Gould about South Asia's growing importance to Canada.

Admirable as these chapters are, the most interesting in my view are those that follow—each in its own way breaking new ground in prescribing policies and strategies for the future. David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein provide a succinct review of Canadian expeditionary operations from the Boer War to Afghanistan and draw conclusions to serve as guiding principles for Canada's participation in any future military engagement. They also outline—too briefly in my view—proposals for an optimum expeditionary force structure. Two chapters later, Doug Bland and Brian MacDonald present a *realpolitik* analysis of why Canada's Cold War policy framework for defence and security is outdated, and they offer their own ideas for a future Canadian Forces expeditionary force and what it might cost. In between is a chapter by Ann Fitz-Gerald providing a clinical dissection of the myths and realities associated with "stabilization" and "whole of government" operations. Fitz-Gerald concludes that Canadian departments and agencies still have a lot of work to do both in policy and in planning.

In two final chapters, Jim Fergusson and David McDonough tackle the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Alex Wilner discusses terrorism. Especially noteworthy is that both restore analytical rigour to debates on subjects that have suffered from too little intellectual honesty. Canada's arms control policy, Fergusson and McDonough write, is a "conceptual hangover from the Cold War," essentially shirking responsibility for dealing with the question of what to do if non-proliferation fails.

Among the measures they recommend is "direct engagement in North American BMD [Ballistic Missile Defence]." Alex Wilner is no less blunt: "[o]f all the

contemporary terrorist threats, al Qaeda is Canada's primary security concern." To combat it effectively, he argues, requires diminishing al Qaeda's capability to organize and facilitate terrorism, and undermining its ability to motivate would-be supporters. Hence what Canada needs is both a "counter-capability" and a "counter-motivation" strategy.

The volume concludes with a wrap-up by the editor, which could serve as an agenda for the development of a Canadian national security strategy. Let us hope copies of this excellent book find their way onto the desks of those who sit on the Cabinet Committee on National Security. ©

BOOK REVIEW



A Thousand Farewells: A Reporter's Journey from a Refugee Camp to the Arab Spring

Reviewed by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Nahlah Ayed. A Thousand Farewells: A Reporter's Journey from a Refugee Camp to the Arab Spring. VikingCanada 2012. 356 pp. $32.00, ISBN 9780670069095.

There is a small exhibit at the Newseum in Washington, DC that sheds light on the immensely dangerous and challenging profession of being a war correspondent. Dating back to accounts of the Crimean War, the exhibit highlights the dilemma these journalists face: finding a balance between providing accurate, un-editorialized accounts of war while simultaneously censoring themselves so as not to adversely impact morale on the home front.

This challenge is less obvious when correspondents are dispatched to war zones where their own nation is not fighting. These foreign correspondents work to truthfully report about events on the ground, while trying to maintain professional objectivity. This challenge is surely complicated by public opinions and prejudices felt at home, especially when the correspondent has a particularly complicated personal relationship with the region in question.

Striking this balance is the litmus test of a journalist's professionalism, and this test sets the tone of Nahlah Ayed's *A Thousand Farewells: A Reporter's Journey from a Refugee Camp to the Arab Spring*.

Though technically a "foreign correspondent," Ayed's extensive coverage of (and submersion in) conflict makes her ostensibly a war correspondent. Murray Brewster once described Second World War correspondent Ross Munro as "accurate, tenacious, curious, a swift writer," and gutsy. Ayed is nothing less. Indeed, she aces the test: her account of the wars of the Arab world is both graceful and rich with nuance. Yet, with a tension that is implicit in her narrative, she struggles to objectively portray the conflicts, politics and customs of the Arab world to Canadians without encouraging any home front preconceptions or bias.

A Thousand Farewells is a chronological memoir of Ayed's personal and professional relationship with the Arab world. Beginning with her youth in Jordan, Ayed tells the story of the Arab Awakening through the eyes of its people. Her interviews, spanning between November 2001 in Pakistan to the present in Egypt and Syria, provide readers with an understanding of the underpinnings of recent and on-going violence and revolution in the Middle East and North Africa.

A Thousand Farewells begins with Ayed describing the traumatic experience of being uprooted as a young Canadian-Palestinian, moving from her Winnipeg home to a Palestinian refugee camp in Amman, Jordan. Here she spent years living on UN rations in squalor so that she and her siblings could learn a lesson in family heritage. Neither the reader nor a young Ayed are able to make sense of it:

> Dad repeatedly pointed out that this "repatriation" was for our sake, but even as a child I found that assertion illogical…no matter which way I turned it in my head, I could not fathom how brining us to a rat-infested, cockroach-ridden, and cramped refugee camp was for our own good. I concluded within days of our arrival that we kids must have done something terribly wrong that [this] was the only suitable punishment.

Meghan Spilka O'Keefe is a recent DND Security and Defence Forum-sponsored intern employed as the Project Officer at the CDA Institute. She is now a Defence Policy Analyst with the CDA Institute.

Ayed's troubled relationship with this region formally begins here. She describes her early life in Jordan as a "cauldron of discontent," characterised by archaic sentiments and lacking hope and humour. As she aged into her adolescence, Ayed describes becoming entangled in the rules and regulations that govern the decorum of females in Arab society. She was forced against her will to wear the *hijab*:

> I had a difficult time with it, and with everything else that restricted my behaviour. I complained endlessly: I got itchy, I couldn't hear, it obliterated my peripheral vision, and it was unbearable in hot weather. But I was told repeatedly that my family's reputation depended on it.

Yet, just as abruptly as the Ayeds relocated to Jordan, seven years later they suddenly moved back to Winnipeg. When the adolescent Nahlah left, she said goodbye to her best friend. In writing her friend a letter from Canada, she wrote that she happily gave up the *hijab* the minute she left Jordan. Her childhood friend—one of the few positive memories Ayed had from her time in Jordan—in turn responded in a terse tone of disappointment. Ayed reflects on this, concluding, "[i] t was her harsh rebuke that sealed my youthful bitterness with the Arab world and everyone in it." Ayed never forgave the region, which provides insight into her reporting of the Arab Awakening.

Though these early chapters provide a fascinating portrait of Ayed and how she came to know the Arab world, they also expose a painfully troubled individual caught between deep concern with the trajectory of its people and a substantial amount of distain for the region.

The process of writing can often feel like the creation of a self-portrait, and Ayed's uneasy relationship with the Arab world may shed light on why through *A Thousand Farewells* she often focuses on the sentiments of young Arabs and their political and religious leanings: she is trying to untangle her own beliefs that are confused with a bewildering and disconcerting experience.

Ayed's Arab world is a collection of personal accounts, as she takes the reader from Pakistan in 2001 to wars and violence in Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt. Since these wars are so contemporary, the reader (ideally) knows the story of these nations and does not require a history lesson. Ayed assumes this and does not bore the reader with known details. She does not tell this story as one of social movements or political trends; rather, Ayed's Middle East is made up of the individuals who provide the colour and flavour in daily life.

Just as war correspondents try to balance between detail and sentiment, Ayed uses individuals to humanize the conflicts she reports from and personalize the culture that is foreign to her Canadian audience. Though quite critical at a high level and no doubt aware that her big picture analysis can inform public opinion and policy, she connects readers to the region's politics through portraits of real people. And, in a testament to her professional nuance and interpersonal skills, she handles each individual story with grace and deep respect for the protagonists. Ayed also adds to her critical analysis by richly describing the culture and warmth of the locations she has reported from. Though this helps to provide a more human connection with the region, it feels as though this tactic is used to keep readers (and probably family and friends) at ease regarding her safety and sanity by diverting attention from insecurity towards a narrative focused on the weather, music, and food.

But, the Middle East's conflicts and concerns are not about the weather and music (although they may be about the lack of food, as has been the case in Egypt), and Ayed's real strength is in depicting in a compelling manner the origins of the Arab Spring with personal recollections from her time witnessing the Iraq invasion, the Israel-Lebanon war, and the events that led to the recent uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria.

As noted above, Ayed knows that her readers know the back story. But, she interprets the political revolution as one of Arab youth. And, she interprets these youth through her past, ascribing their devotion to Islam as a form of rebellion.

> For some of the young, Islam had also simply become the modern-day communism their parents had embraced as teens, the nationalism of their grandparents. In places like Jordan, it has become cool to be zealous about your faith—even rebellious. If your parents disapproved—which many of them did—then all the better.

Ayed notes a conversation with a young Shia Muslim who recalled that their mother was moderate, donning miniskirts and uncovered hair. It was the youth who returned to religion as something to "hold on to". In what is hardly a profound observation (but is nevertheless the most relevant and compelling comment about the future of the region) Ayed explains that religion became so rampant in the Arab world because it provided a panacea for poverty, displacement, insecurity, corruption, and authoritarianism.

As the Muslim Brotherhood resurrects and gains power in almost all states that have had an Arab Awakening, and as security and a prosperous future remain increasingly precarious, Ayed's portrait of this world and the critical policy options she implies have never been so relevant. And yet, amidst her assessment, she manages to balance the accurate presentation of this fact to Canadian readers, while subtly ensuring that her reporting does not encourage any preconceived opinions her readers may hold on the increasingly dominant role Islam will play in these states. ©

ON TRACK

The C1 and C5 105 mm Howitzers of the 30th Field Regiment, Ottawa, fire the Vice-Regal salute on the arrival of His Excellency the Rt. Hon. Dr. David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, on Parliament Hill on Canada Day, 1July 2012.

Photo courtesy Honourary Colonel E.M. (Ed) Pancoe

Les obusiers C1 et C5 de 105mm du 30e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne d'Ottawa exécutent la salve vice-royale en l'honneur de Son excellence le Très honorable David Johnston, gouverneur général et commandant en chef du Canada, sur la colline parlementaire, le Jour du Canada, le 1er juillet 2012.

Photo gracieuseté du Colonel honoraire E.M. (Ed) Pancoe

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