

ON TRACK



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The 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security
La Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité



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COVER PHOTO: General Thomas Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, addresses the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. Phot by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe.

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Le général Thomas Lawson, Chef d'état-major de la Défense, s'adresse à la Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité. Photo par le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain M. Pellerin



We are pleased to begin our 18th year of the publication of the CDA Institute's *ON TRACK*. The year 2013 also marks the 26th anniversary of the CDA Institute as well as the 81st anniversary of the Conference of Defence Associations.

Effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policy-makers, politicians, academics and the public, we help promote change in the policies of our Federal government for the betterment of our country.

We have been busy since our last publication of *ON TRACK*: the 2013 Ottawa Conference on defence and Security was held on 21 and 22 February, and a number of major commentaries on issues related to defence and security have been released. The addresses delivered at the Ottawa Conference are available on our website at <http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/ottawa-conference>. The Institute's research studies, which provide a strategic outlook for Canadian defence and security, analyses of the F 35 JSF and a discussion on the federal budget, to name but a few, are also available on our website.

ON TRACK is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes significant value to the discussion of defence and security issues in Canada, with the presentation of articles by experts in those fields. *ON TRACK* provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters.

The 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security was held on 21 and 22 February, in the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa. The Ballroom in the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the conference was held, was filled to overflowing with over 500 attendees.

The conference luncheon address, held on Day One, was delivered to a packed audience in the Adam Room of the hotel by Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander U.S. Pacific Command. This year, for the first time, we featured a luncheon address on Day Two with Admiral William McRaven, Commander U.S. Special Operations Command.

We heard presentations throughout the conference from the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence; the Hon. John Manley, former Deputy Prime Minister; General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff; Amiral Édouard Guillaud, Chief of the Defence Staff of France; General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., Commander NORAD and Commander U.S. Northern Command; Lord Peter Levene, Chairman of the 2011 Report on *UK Defence Reform*. Other speakers included Ferry de Kerckhove, former Canadian diplomat; Thomas d'Aquino and

Nous sommes heureux d'entreprendre notre 18^{ème} année de publication du magazine *ON TRACK* de l'Institut de la CAD. L'année 2013 marque également le 26^{ème} anniversaire de l'Institut de la CAD, ainsi que le 81^{ème} de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Les politiques efficaces de défense et de sécurité doivent être fondées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et sur des options raisonnées. En partageant les résultats de notre recherche et nos recommandations auprès des auteurs de politiques, des politiciens, des universitaires et du public, nous contribuons à promouvoir le changement dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour le mieux-être de notre pays.

Nous avons été très occupés depuis la parution de notre dernier numéro de *ON TRACK*: la Conférence d'Ottawa 2013 sur la défense et la sécurité a été tenue les 21 et 22 février, et un certain nombre de commentaires majeurs sur des questions reliées à la défense et à la sécurité ont été publiés. Les allocutions présentées à la Conférence d'Ottawa sont disponibles sur notre site Web, <http://www.cdainstitute.ca/fr/ottawa-conference>. Des études de recherche de l'Institut, qui offrent un point de vue stratégique pour la défense et la sécurité canadiennes, des analyses pour le F 35 JSF et une discussion sur le budget fédéral, pour n'en mentionner que quelques-unes, sont également disponibles sur notre site Web.

ON TRACK est un important véhicule à travers lequel l'Institut contribue une valeur significative à la discussion des questions de défense et de sécurité au Canada, avec la présentation d'articles rédigés par des experts en ces domaines. *ON TRACK* offre un médium de débat renseigné et non partisan sur des enjeux de défense et de sécurité.

La Conférence d'Ottawa 2013 sur la défense et la sécurité a été tenue les 21 et 22 février à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. La salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, où la conférence s'est tenue, était remplie à déborder, avec ses 500 participants.

L'allocution prononcée lors du déjeuner du premier jour a été donnée devant un auditoire qui remplissait entièrement la salle Adam de l'hôtel par l'amiral Samuel J. Locklear III, commandant du U.S. Pacific Command. Cette année, pour la première fois, nous avons aussi eu une allocution lors du déjeuner du deuxième jour prononcée par l'amiral William McRaven, commandant du U.S. Special Operations Command.

Tout au long de la conférence nous avons entendu des présentations de l'Hon. Peter MacKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, de l'Hon. John Manley, ancien premier-



Ferry de Kerckhove sets the scene for the 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security / Ferry de Kerckhove donne une vue d'ensemble pour la Conférence d'Ottawa 2013 sur la défense et la sécurité

Photo par: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Chris Alexander, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence.

The Conference was attended by members of the Canadian Armed Forces, Ambassadors, Senators and MPs, military attachés, officer-cadets from the Royal Military College of Canada and from Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, and members of the Canadian public. There was also significant media interest in the seminar.

I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received in the days following the conclusion of the Conference. The 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security was truly successful, reflecting the general public's heightened interest in Canada's role in international security and national defence.

Our Defence Policy Intern, Josh Matthewman, presents a summary of the proceedings of the two-day conference in this edition. Ferry de Kerckhove follows with an analysis of the issues that were discussed at the conference and where they relate to Vimy Paper 6, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada*, which was released coincident with the conference.

The Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security is, indeed, now recognized as a world-class event. The presence of so many speakers from around the world was made possible through the generous financial assistance of corporate sponsors. We dedicate this edition as thanks to our supporters who have provided sponsorships for the conference.

This edition of *ON TRACK* includes articles by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Serge Labbé and Colonel Ian Hope, with an outlook on Afghanistan with the termination of Canada's mission looming there. We are pleased to include articles that touch on national security, by J.L. Granatstein and

ministre adjoint, du général Tom Lawson, chef de l'état-major de la Défense, de l'amiral Édouard Guillaud, chef d'état-major des Armées de la France, du général Charles H. Jacoby Jr, commandant du NORAD et commandant du U.S. Northern Command, de Lord Peter Levene, président du Report 2011 on *UK Defence Reform*. Parmi les autres conférenciers, on trouvait Ferry de Kerckhove, ancien diplomate canadien, Thomas d'Aquino et Chris Alexander, secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de la Défense nationale.

Ont assisté à la conférence des membres des Forces armées canadiennes, des ambassadeurs, des sénateurs et des députés, des attachés militaires, des élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean et des membres du public canadien. Les médias ont aussi démontré un intérêt significatif envers le séminaire.

Je suis heureux de noter les commentaires très positifs que nous avons reçus dans les jours qui ont suivi la clôture de la Conférence. La Conférence d'Ottawa 2013 sur la défense et la sécurité a connu un véritable succès, qui a été le reflet accru du grand public envers le rôle du Canada dans la sécurité internationale et la défense nationale.

Notre stagiaire en politiques de défense, Josh Matthewman, présente un sommaire des débats de la conférence de deux jours dans le présent numéro. Ferry de Kerckhove enchaîne avec une analyse des questions discutées à la conférence et où elles ont un rapport avec le Cahier Vimy numéro 6, *Les perspectives stratégiques du Canada*, dont la publication a coïncidé avec la conférence.

La Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité est, en fait, maintenant reconnue comme un événement de calibre mondial. La présence de tant de conférenciers de partout dans le monde a été rendue possible grâce à l'aide financière de sociétés commanditaires. Nous consacrons ce numéro en remerciement de nos supporteurs qui ont fourni des commandites pour la conférence.

Le présent numéro de *ON TRACK* contient des articles du brigadier-général (ret) Serge Labbé et du colonel Ian Hope, avec un regard sur l'Afghanistan avec l'arrivée à terme imminente de la mission du Canada là-bas. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure des articles touchant à la sécurité nationale dus à la plume de J.L. Granatstein et George Petrolekas. Parmi les essais présentés, on a la cybersécurité, par le major-général (ret) John Adams, les problèmes de sécurité en Afrique de l'Est, par David Collins, les capacités industrielles clés, par le major-général (ret) David Fraser, et le budget fédéral de 2013, par David Perry. Nous concluons ce numéro avec des comptes rendus de lecture sur *War in the St Lawrence* et *The Taliban Don't Wave*.

L'Institut de la CAD continue à participer à un certain nombre d'initiatives de promotion de la cause des Forces armées canadiennes, comme le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, le Prix Vimy, la Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité, et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs individuels, et particulièrement nos donateurs au Fonds de la défense et de la sécurité, et les donateurs du Fonds annuel



Panel II - Canada's Americas Strategy: Increasing defence and security interests in the Western Hemisphere / La stratégie canadienne vis-à-vis les Amériques: l'augmentation des intérêts de défense et de sécurité dans l'hémisphère occidental. L-R: Lieutenant-General Guy Thibault, Chairman of the Inter-American Defence Board; Vice-Admiral Joe Kernan, Deputy Commander U.S. Southern Command; Mr. Vinko Fodich, Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Chile; and Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command.

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe / Photo par le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe

George Petrolekas. Featured essays include cyber security, by Major-General (Ret'd) John Adams; security issues in East Africa, by David Collins; key industrial capabilities, by Major-General (Ret'd) David Fraser. and the 2013 Federal budget, by David Perry. We conclude this edition with book reviews on *War in the St Lawrence*, and *The Taliban Don't Wave*.

The CDA Institute continues to be involved in a number of initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Armed Forces, such as the Annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Vimy Award, the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, and numerous round table discussions.

In closing, I wish to thank our individual benefactors, particularly our donors to the Defence and Security Fund, and the donors of the CDA Institute Annual Fund, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfil our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation of \$75 or higher, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months:

- A charitable donation tax receipt;
- Four issues of the CDA Institute's quarterly magazine, *ON TRACK*;
- Advance copies of all other CDA Institute publications, such as the Vimy Papers; and,
- A discount registration rate at our annual conference.

Donor information and forms are available online at <http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/donate>.

Thank you. ©

de l'Institut de la CAD, pour l'appui financier accordé au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, sans lesquels il nous serait bien difficile de nous acquitter de notre mandat.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau supporteur, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

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- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription à notre conférence annuelle.

Les renseignements et les formulaires destinés aux donateurs sont disponibles en ligne à l'adresse <http://cdainstitute.ca/fr/donate>.

Merci. ©

Proceedings

The 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security

Josh Matthewman

The following is a summary of the proceedings of the 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security which was held on 21 and 22 February at the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa.

DAY ONE

Scene-Setter:

M. Ferry de Kerckhove, CDA Institute, former Ambassador to Egypt and Indonesia, former High Commissioner to Pakistan opened the 2013 Ottawa Conference by announcing the publication of the CDA Institute's 2013 Strategic Outlook for Canada. In many ways, the 2013 Strategic Outlook provided a basis for the Conference's discussions.

Keynote Speaker:

The Honourable John Manley, CEO and President of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives conducted a discussion with **Colin Robertson, CDA Institute and former Canadian diplomat**. Mr. Robertson led Mr. Manley in an examination of Canada's interests and role in the world.

Mr. Manley called for better management of the Industrial Regional Benefit obligations that are owed to Canada. He also asserted that subsidization of Canadian military industries is desirable, noting that industrial sectors such as shipbuilding and aerospace are subsidized all over the world. He concluded his talk by stressing that the modern global environment foster ever-evolving security threats, a comment which dovetailed very effectively into the first panel about a Canadian national strategy.

Panel I – Does Canada Need a National Security Strategy?

Moderator: Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Don Macnamara, CDA Institute

As a former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, **Dr. Ian Brodie** brought a unique perspective to the debate. Dr. Brodie was of the opinion that there is no need for one comprehensive document, or 'bible', outlining Canada's National Security Strategy. In any case, Dr. Brodie alleged, the volatility of the international security context would make such a document transient in nature and susceptible to becoming quickly outdated. Dr. Brodie posited that the present documents which address Canada's national security strategy are sufficient.

Joshua Matthewman works as a Defence Policy Intern and Project Officer for the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He is an MA candidate at The University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

Esteemed Canadian military historian **Dr. Jack Granatstein** offered one of the most discussion-provoking commentaries of the Conference. Dr. Granatstein offered a firm "yes" in response to the question of if Canada is in need of a national security strategy. Dr. Granatstein posited that Canada's aversion to producing a national security strategy stems from our history as a colony, and the historian went so far as to assert that, in the realm of national defence, Canada continues to behave like a colony.

Major-General (Ret'd) Richard Blanchette, former Senior Advisor to the Canadian National Security Advisor also advocated for Canada to draft a national security strategy. Major-General (Ret'd) Blanchette believes that a national security strategy would allow stakeholders, such as the Canadian Forces, to better plan and frame their actions.

Thus, the panel **Does Canada Need a National Security Strategy?** centred on a debate about whether a national security strategy should be written and comprehensive or more loosely defined and thus, potentially, more dynamic. This issue would crop up repeatedly throughout the Conference discussions, and proved to be a major theme of the event.

Luncheon Keynote Speaker:

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander U.S. Pacific Command spoke about the challenges and opportunities that are present within his area of command. Most of the political and media attention about the Pacific Command region is currently focussed on the Asia-Pacific. He asserted that the U.S. foreign policy 'pivot' to Asia is not a strategy of containment in disguise, and that the U.S. has strong interests on the Asian continent.

Panel II – Emerging Panels: Economic, Security and Foreign Policy Implications for Canada

Moderator: Senator Pamela Wallin, Chair, Senate National Security and Defence Committee

Mr. Thomas d'Aquino, CEO of Intercounsel and Chairman of the B20/G20 Canada Committee began the conversation by contending that more free trade will result in more innovation and growth for Canada. He was firm in his belief

that Canada needs a clear national strategy for building trade relations with emerging economies, and argued for ‘muscular engagement’ with developing countries.

Mr. Len Edwards, Strategic Advisor for Gowlings and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the most important step Canada can take to develop its economy is to do a better job of ‘selling’ Canada. Mr. Edwards concurred with the other panellists that it is important for Canada to develop trade relations with the world’s emerging economies. He believes that Canada can play a large role in the rise of Asia, by influencing nations there in a manner that the U.S. may find difficult to replicate, due to its status as a super-power.

Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Distinguished Fellow at Carleton University and Director of the Global Security Program of the Centre for International Governance Innovation situated his contribution to the panel within the theme of ‘geo-strategy’, commenting primarily on the national security implications of the world’s emerging powers.

He argued that a “global awakening” is currently underway, which will prove to be “the most important political movement of our time”. Dr. Hampson believes that many of the world’s emerging powers are facing strong internal pressures, which will make the changing political structures of the international community volatile in the near and medium-term future. Echoing recent predications that the 21st century will be a maritime century, he argued that Armed Forces will become more naval-based and rely increasingly on advanced technologies in the coming years, which will allow armies to become smaller. Dr. Hampson closed the panel discussion by calling for Canada to create a national security strategy.

Panel III – Thinking Strategically About Cyber

Moderator: Mr. Rafal Rohozinski, Principal, The SecDev Group

In what was perhaps simultaneously the most frightening and awe-inspiring panel of the Conference, **General Keith Alexander, Commander U.S. Cyber Command**, stated that “we can’t imagine the future of cyber.” The General argued that the government, the military, civilians and the private sector all have a responsibility for maintaining cyber-security. General Alexander imagines that in 50 years, the world will have greater productivity and more security due to cyber, and was confident in his belief that the West can deal with the risks posed by cyber-attacks.

Drawing on his experience as a former **Director of the Communications Security Establishment of Canada, Major-General (Ret’d) John Adams** stressed the need for a ‘whole of society’ approach to cyber-security. He considers that the major threats for the foreseeable future will be by cyber-crime and cyber-espionage. He stressed the need for everybody to be more proactive about online security – including cooperation between the private sector, the government and the Canadian Forces.

Perhaps the most important issue for future debate to emerge from this panel was the question of if the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) needs to establish a Cyber Command.

Panel IV – CF and the Public Service: Managing Canada’s Defence Policy

Moderator: Dr. Douglas Bland, CDA Institute, former Chair in Defence Management Studies, Queen’s University

Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) George MacDonald, CDA Institute and former Vice Chief of Defence Staff argued that a given defence policy can evolve in dramatically different ways depending on how it is implemented. That may go a long way towards explaining why defence policy is frequently a source of debate between the public service, government and the CAF. Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) MacDonald asserted that the CAF, the government and the public service need to do a much better job of communicating their policies and the rationale behind those policies.

Mr. Mel Cappe, former Clerk of the Privy Council asserted that the ministers, including those other than the Minister of National Defence, need to be more familiar with the defence portfolio. He also argued that it is incumbent upon the CAF to become more sensitive to the competing priorities that drive the actions of politicians and public servants. In particular, he stressed that the defence policy management structures will never work properly unless the Chief of Defence Staff offers the Prime Minister unvarnished military advice and the Prime Minister is prepared to hear and consider that advice.

DAY TWO

Keynote Speaker:

Chris Alexander, MP for Ajax-Pickering, provided a keynote address and introduced **the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence**, who delivered a keynote address by video link from the NATO Ministers meeting in Brussels.

Mr. Alexander asserted that there has been a restoration in pride in the CAF under the current Conservative government. In response to a question about Canada’s lack of a national strategy, Mr. Alexander asserted that any national strategy must flow from a government mandate, thus reigniting the conference-long debate on that topic.

The Honourable Peter MacKay stressed the need for an agile, multipurpose CAF, which is capable of partnering with its allies to act in Canada’s interests. Addressing the issue of procurement, the Minister acknowledged that the government needs to improve the process of buying military equipment.

Keynote Speaker:

General Tom Lawson, Chief of Defence Staff, used his speech to present his four priorities during his tenure as CDS, which are: delivering excellence in operations, caring for our



L'amiral Édouard Guillaud, French Chief of the Defence Staff, addresses the Conference. l'amiral Édouard Guillaud,, Chef d'Etat-major des Armées, France, adresse la Conférence.

Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

CAF members and their families, leading the profession of arms and preparing the CAF for the future. The CDS touched on the success of the CAF training mission in Afghanistan. He maintained that Canadian trainers are working themselves out of their jobs, and that the success of their mission must be measured over decades. The CDS touched on the issue of mental and physical healthcare for soldiers. Both speakers acknowledged that this is an area in which, although strides have been made, Canada should and must do better.

Keynote Speaker:

Admiral Édouard Guillaud, Chef d'état-major des Armées de la France, stressed his goal of delivering excellent operations and singled out the transformation of the French Armed Forces as a priority. Admiral Guillaud went into further detail about his desire to see greater burden sharing and coordination of capabilities between NATO countries. The Admiral singled out Canada's contribution of a C-17 jet to the French mission in Mali, and thanked our nation for its contribution. Adding fuel to the debate about the absence of a Canadian national strategy document, the Admiral Guillaud noted that France would be publishing just such a document in the weeks following the Conference.

Keynote Speaker:

The primary thesis of the speech by **General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., Commander NORAD and US Northern Command** was that meeting threats abroad helps ensure the security of Western states. The General singled out attributable and asymmetrical threats as the most dangerous events for Western nations. He also asserted that he is of the

belief that the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea is now serious.

Luncheon Keynote Speaker:

Admiral William McRaven, Commander U.S. Special Operations Command, focussed tightly on his area of Command: Special Forces. Admiral McRaven believes that the world is in an era of persistent conflict and that the West's enemies are increasingly adept at adapting to Western combat strategies. Additionally, they are making more and more use of digital media, ideology and communications to leverage their interests in a globalized world. His overarching theme was trust as the ultimate vehicle for transferring information between allies and building excellent.

Keynote Speaker:

Lord Peter Levene, Chairman of the Report on UK Defence Reform, June 2011 opened his address by stating that defence reform involves changing the behaviour of all actors involved in the procurement process. He advanced the somewhat controversial argument that defence procurement will not ever truly function smoothly unless it is run as a business, with military officials and civil servants largely removed from the process. He argued that the government must be more transparent to the public and the military about its future plans for investing in procurement.

When asked a question about Canada's shipbuilding plans, Lord Levene asserted that he believes Western nations should subcontract the construction of ship hulls abroad and focus on doing the high-tech work at home. Lord Levene also expressed the opinion that large-scale equipment sharing is not practical and that each nation should possess all the military equipment that it realistically expects to use.

Panel I – Governance and accountability in the acquisition and management of Defence Materiel

Moderator: Dan Ross, former Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel, DND

Rear Admiral (Ret'd) John Kelly, US Navy, received a standing ovation from the Conference audience for his comment that "Canada has the knowledge and the capability to write a national strategy in 30 days, and you should do so". The Rear-Admiral also received a positive response to his contention that Canada needs to quicken our procurement process. Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Kelly argued that, in times of fiscal struggle, defence spending is still very justifiable because the cost of preventative defence expenditures is much lower than the economic growth that is lost to unexpected and catastrophic attacks.

Mr. Barry Burton, UK Director Strategy Materiel Equipment and Supply Organization stressed that without a clear timeline, the budget for procurement will be eaten away by delays and the end user of the hardware will suffer because defence requirements can change very rapidly.



Panel I Day 2 - Governance and accountability in the acquisition and management of Defence Materiel. L-R: Mr. Dan Ross, former ADM (Mat), DND (moderator); Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) John Kelly, U.S. Navy; Mr. Barry Burton, U.K. Director Strategy Materiel Equipment and Supply Organisation; and Mr. Dan Fankhauser, Counsellor Defence Materiel, Embassy of Australia in Washington, D.C.

Photo by: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Mr. Dan Fankhauser, Counsellor Defence Materiel at the Embassy of Australia in Washington offered a perspective from a nation that is often compared to Canada in military affairs. Mr. Fankhauser said that key to reforming the procurement process in Australia was the realization that there was a need to clearly identify who was responsible for each stage of the procurement process. The reform of the Australian procurement system was accomplished through two review processes.

Panel II – Canada's Americas Strategy: Increasing defence and security interests in the Western Hemisphere

Moderator: Lieutenant-General Guy Thibault, Chairman of the Inter-American Defence Board and VCDS designate

Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, Commander, Canadian Joint Operations and Command opened the panel discussion by stating that, while Canada has serious interests and objectives in Latin America, the primary military responsibility for the region lies with other actors.

Lieutenant-General Beare stressed that Western countries acting in Latin America must find a common problem to rally around – such as transnational crime or disaster relief.

Vice-Admiral Joe Kernan, Deputy Commander US Southern Command, argued that there is a need for a Western presence in Latin America, as other actors will act in the region if the West does not do so in a persistent way. His comments applied in particular to increasing concerns that Iran may be acting against US interests in Latin America. Vice-Admiral Kernan stated that his biggest concern about Western action in Latin America is the lack of coordination between the Armed Forces of nations acting in the area.

Vinko Fodich, Ministry of the Interior and Public Security of Chile, stated that the biggest security concern for Chile is transnational crime, particularly as it pertains to the trafficking of drugs from Colombia and other countries through Chile. Mr. Fodich reflected the overall theme of the panel that the threats emanating from Latin America are primarily non-state and asymmetrical.

The full text of the proceedings can be read at <http://cdainstitute.ca/en/ottawa-conference>. ©

La conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité: un débat incontournable!

Ferry de Kerckhove

Les 21 et 22 février, la Conférence des associations de la défense et son Institut accueillait la conférence annuelle d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité. Celle-ci est le lieu de rencontre le plus important au Canada pour traiter de ces questions.

La conférence s'est donné comme point de départ à sa réflexion l'analyse qui lui était offerte dans le Cahier Vimy 6 de l'Institut de la CAD sur Les Perspectives stratégiques du Canada 2013. Ce document évoquait essentiellement les tendances qui domineraient à court et à moyen terme les processus décisionnels en matière de sécurité et défense, dont le rôle démesuré des considérations financières, l'Afghanistan aidant, l'émiettement de l'engouement pour les «aventures expéditionnaires lointaines», et le malaise social généralisé incitant les gouvernements à se pencher davantage sur les problèmes à domicile que sur les grandes opérations humanitaires à l'étranger. Pragmatisme, endiguement et atermoiement seront les leitmotivs des gouvernements occidentaux face aux crises internationales à moins que des intérêts vitaux ne soient en jeu. Le document n'en évoquait pas moins les scénarios les plus inquiétants dans le monde – Moyen-Orient, Corée du Nord, Mer de Chine, Afghanistan et Pakistan post-retrait, Sahel, cyberattaques et autres maux sans frontières.

Le Cahier interpellait de façon directe les participants à la conférence en posant brutalement la question de la vision du Canada – sommes-nous simples spectateurs ou voulons-nous être acteurs sur la scène internationale ? Avons-nous une politique définie et en avons-nous les moyens? De là découle une série de recommandations qui, à l'instar de nos alliés, font appel à un examen d'ensemble de nos politiques étrangère, de défense, de commerce et de développement. En outre, le document invite les responsables civils et militaires de la défense du Canada de prendre des mesures décisives pour répondre aux nouvelles contraintes financières du pays. Le saupoudrage ne suffit pas. Que ce soit le rapport Leslie sur la transformation ou toute autre étude, c'est une restructuration en profondeur qui s'impose tant face aux défis au-delà de nos frontières qu'à l'aune des impératifs financiers.

Le grand avantage de cette conférence tient au fait que les participants ont pour la plupart un rôle réel à jouer dans l'élaboration des politiques sur la sécurité du Canada et dans le monde. Car il ne s'agissait pas seulement de

Canadiens.

Au nouveau Chef d'État-major de la défense du Canada le général Tom Lawson se sont ajoutés des représentants de première importance pour le Canada comme les amiraux américains Locklear III, commandant des forces américaines dans le Pacifique, McRaven, commandant des quelque 65,000 forces spéciales américaines, et Kernan, commandant adjoint des forces américaines en Amérique centrale et du sud ou encore les généraux américains Alexander, commandant des opérations de protection de l'espace cybernétique, et Charles Jacoby, commandant de NORAD et du Nord. En outre, la présence du Chef d'État-Major des Armées de France, l'amiral Guillaud a servi à illustrer qu'il existe une vision occidentale commune sur les menaces, les risques et les enjeux de la défense de nos sociétés et nations.

À l'élégance de la présentation structurée du jardin à la française de l'amiral, a correspondu la leçon britannique magistrale, pleine d'ironie et de profondeur tout-à-la-fois, sur les grands projets d'immobilisations de défense, présentée par Lord Levene, responsable du rapport de 2011 sur la réforme de la politique de défense de Grande-Bretagne. Jonglant avec l'esprit d'un George Bernard Shaw et la désinvolture de Norman Ralph Augustine et ses lois de la saine gestion, Lord Levene devrait être écouté attentivement au Canada si nous voulons nous extirper de la Thébaidé de la succession du F-18.

Ces deux jours de discussions ont permis de dégager un consensus sur quelques conclusions fondamentales. D'abord, pour le Canada, il est impérieux de prendre en compte la directive du Premier ministre de réduire les dépenses administratives et donner plus de mordant aux Forces canadiennes, ce à quoi s'est engagé le général Lawson. Tous convinrent qu'une économie morose, une dette publique élevée et un déficit budgétaire constituaient une menace au même titre que celles qui nous assaillent de l'extérieur.

Tous ont reconnu l'importance de la zone Asie-Pacifique tant comme source de croissance que comme sujet d'inquiétude en raison des mouvances nationalistes exacerbées par la montée en puissance de la Chine et les différends dans la délimitation des frontières maritimes en Mer de Chine. Parmi les thèmes qui ont le plus retenu l'attention, la cybersécurité l'a largement emporté. Cette nouvelle guerre très froide vient occuper de plus en plus notre conscience collective. Tant mieux ! Les enjeux de la guerre cybernétique nous interpellent tous!

La présence d'un aéropage de chefs militaires américains nous a aussi rappelé le danger du « séquestre financier américain » qui, nous dit le Président Obama, va

Ferry de Kerckhove a été haut-commissaire du Canada au Pakistan de 1998 à 2001 et ambassadeur en Indonésie de 2001 à 2003. Son dernier poste au gouvernement a été comme ambassadeur en Égypte, de 2008 à 2011. Monsieur de Kerckhove est présentement membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD, chargé d'étude émérite à l'Université d'Ottawa.

frapper tout particulièrement les forces armées américaines. Il y a quelque chose d'irréel dans ce scénario d'incurie gouvernementale qui mine la confiance du monde envers « le pays indispensable ». Mais en même temps, au regard des responsabilités colossales des États-Unis pour la sécurité du monde, amplement démontrées par les chefs militaires présents à la conférence, on ne peut s'empêcher de frémir devant les conséquences éventuelles du maelstrom financier à répétition chez nos amis américains. Si la visite du général Guillaud a suscité des félicitations pour l'action française au Mali, celles-ci ne furent pas accompagnées pour autant d'offres concrètes d'aide additionnelle au-delà des maigres engagements déjà pris. L'expression gouailleuse de « Après vous Alphonse » n'est pas déplacée.

Le débat le plus vif a mis aux prises, d'une part, ceux qui appuyaient la recommandation du Cahier Vimy qui invitait le gouvernement canadien à prendre en compte les changements considérables survenus sur la scène internationale depuis la publication de la Stratégie de défense : le Canada d'abord il y a cinq ans. Il y a d'abord le fait que nous nous dégageons de l'Afghanistan, la guerre la plus importante dans laquelle le Canada s'était engagé depuis la guerre de Corée.

Viennent ensuite, sur la scène internationale, les perturbations au Moyen-Orient, le déplacement du centre de gravité vers l'Asie, et, à l'interne, la réalité incontestable des compressions budgétaires. Non seulement est-il indispensable de mettre à jour le document Stratégie de défense : le Canada d'abord mais le Canada se doit de définir une stratégie de sécurité nationale et pourrait le faire par

l'entremise d'un Livre Blanc sur la défense. Les opposants à cet argument soutenaient qu'il s'agirait d'un exercice inutile car, surtout dans le temps présent, loin de la stabilité de la guerre froide, dans ce monde fait d'insurrections et de conflits internes, il était impossible de prédire d'une semaine à l'autre de quoi serait fait le prochain danger. D'aucuns ont fait remarquer que nos alliés s'étaient non seulement engagés dans une réflexion sur les nouveaux impératifs de la sécurité nationale mais qu'ils y avaient englobé toutes ses dimensions, bien au-delà des simples questions de défense.

À ce jour, il est clair que le gouvernement canadien ne partage pas cette approche et estime qu'une simple mise à jour de la Stratégie de défense : le Canada d'abord suffirait parfaitement à prendre la mesure des coupes imposées au budget de la défense – même si cette Stratégie était inabordable dès le départ.

Pourtant, le climat d'incertitude qui règne de nos jours, tant au plan social, qu'économique ou de sécurité semble exiger une réponse politique, un cadre, une vision, de nouveaux repères à tous les niveaux, défense, développement, politique étrangère. Nous devons pouvoir définir dans quelles conditions, au nom de quoi, le Canada voudra s'engager ou non à l'avenir dans des opérations outremer.

Il faut donner à tout débat de cette nature un fondement, sans quoi la valeur profonde de nos réactions comme la qualité de nos décisions, qu'elles nous entraînent dans de nouvelles aventures ou non, seraient grandement sujettes à caution. L'absence même d'un cadre d'analyse feront de nous des observateurs en attendant que d'autres nous imposent d'être acteurs. C'est un débat qui doit mobiliser tous les Canadiens! ©



Une conversation avec l'Honorable John Manley, ancien Sous premier ministre (droit); et M. Colin Robertson, membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD / A Conversation with the Hon. John Manley, former Deputy Prime Minister, and Mr. Colin Robertson, Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

Photo par Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe

The More Enemy You Kill, the Faster You Lose

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Serge Labbé

The following article cautions that undue reliance on combat operations in Afghanistan, even led by the Afghan National Security Forces, has little chance of successfully terminating the insurgency.

Undue Reliance on Combat Operations

The sceptics concerned with the rapid pace of lead security transition in Afghanistan must have been very much alarmed by the accelerated timelines agreed by Presidents Obama and Karzai in Washington earlier this year. Rather than wait until mid-2013, Karzai wants the ISAF mission to shift from combat to support in the spring, coinciding with the announcement of the fifth and final tranche of transition, which would begin implementation in the summer. This will signal an end to most unilateral US combat operations and will focus ISAF on continuing to improve the quality of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

In a country where “the more you kill the enemy, the faster you lose,” giving the ANSF the operational lead is long-overdue. *Pashtunwali*—the Pashtun code—justifies ten times the retribution for the death of a single family member. Since 2001, civilian casualties suffered at the hands of ISAF/coalition forces have slowly been alienating those very forces from rural Afghanistan, one village at a time.

In 2005, a US Army Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commander claimed that heavy-handed special forces operations did more damage in “his” province in one night than he could fix in six months. When we lose a village, we lose it for a hundred years. Besides, counter-insurgencies are not won by killing or capturing insurgents—they are successfully concluded through political reconciliation.

Nevertheless, as the Afghan government reconciles with the insurgents, combat operations will continue to be necessary (the government must negotiate from a position of strength), but they must now be led by the ANSF, supported *in extremis* by coalition force multipliers. In addition to the provision of these enablers, the ISAF/coalition security effort must carry on focusing on training,¹ facilitating the synchronisation of security, governance and development in time and space at the community and district levels, where the insurgency will be disrupted.

Brigadier General (Ret'd) Serge Labbé was Commander Canadian Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan (2007-08). After nearly 40 years of service in the Canadian Army he returned to Afghanistan as Senior Outreach Coordination Advisor for the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. In October 2009, he joined the Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan. In September 2010, he was appointed Senior Strategic Partner to the four Agriculture and Rural Development Ministries. He was, until recently, the Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in Kabul.

We should not overlook the fact that lead security transition has been politically fast-tracked as opposed to event-driven (an unfortunate decision made in mid-2010); nor should we underestimate the importance of ongoing post-2014 troop ceiling discussions of allies and ISAF troop contributing nations. However, undue reliance on combat operations and focusing exclusively on the number of “boots on the ground” are simplistic scenarios – whilst numbers are important, it is *what* they will be doing and *how* that matter. It is their strategic effect that counts.

It is the judicious, integrated application of combat operations with good governance, development and the electoral process, together with pursuing regional cooperation and promoting reconciliation, which, collectively, has a chance of bringing about the heretofore-elusive peace. The *Joint Framework for Inteqal*,² unanimously endorsed by all delegates at the July 2010 Kabul Conference, recognised that irreversible security transition could only be guaranteed by all of the aforementioned. The problem has been trying to implement this integrated approach on the ground.

The Importance of Good Governance

We have always known that the key to defeating the insurgency was good governance. PRTs were established as a means of promoting stabilization and extending the reach of central government. General Stanley McChrystal used to say that good governance was as important as security; after all, the Taliban’s main effort is to undermine governance and dislocate the legitimacy of the Afghan government. However, it is the Afghan government that must extend its reach to the rural poor and win their hearts and minds, not the international community. Sadly, many international programmes and initiatives have directly undermined and delegitimized the authority of the government, thereby compromising the very counter-insurgency we have been waging.

In an attempt to improve local governance, the Afghan government has taken steps to institute a vetting process for district governors; however flawed it may be, it is a step in the right direction. In the aftermath of the July 2012 Tokyo Conference, the Mutual Accountability Framework calls on the Afghan people to “continue to build a stable, democratic society, based on the rule of law, effective and independent judiciary and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption.”³

(continued p. 16)

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Post-Tokyo, President Karzai issued Decree 45, holding all his ministers accountable for achieving key strategic objectives within demanding timelines aimed at curbing corruption within Government. The international community must tie their USD 16 billion Tokyo commitment to tangible steps taken against the corruption that is crippling the Afghan economy.

The National Priority Programme *Strengthening Local Institutions*, endorsed by the government and the international community last fall, gives cause for cautious optimism. The Programme will give existing grass roots, gender-balanced representational *development* entities at the district and village levels significant *governance* responsibilities as well.

These Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)-managed entities have been created through secret ballot with universal suffrage; 37% of their membership is women; they have marginalised the illegitimate power brokers, and they are trusted by the people. Implementation of this programme will, for the first time ever in the history of Afghanistan, empower the rural poor (80% of the population) to make decisions directly affecting their livelihoods and future through credible, representational bodies. This development alone has the potential to revolutionise the delivery of good governance to rural Afghanistan, thereby further stabilising the environment.

The international community must also do its part in strengthening local institutions. The *Joint Framework for Inteqal* called for PRTs to gradually hand over their responsibilities to the appropriate Afghan authorities and to focus more on capacity building of provincial/district governance institutions rather than to continue doing what Afghan development ministries do better. Thus far, they have failed to do so—after all, digging a well is much easier than engaging in the process of capacity building civil servants at the provincial and district levels. We must change this mindset and commit to enhancing meaningful, genuine, coherent and sustainable human capacity at all levels of government.

General David Petraeus understood this when he implemented the Strategic Partnering Concept, the ISAF version of the former Canadian Strategic Advisory Team. Capacity building will do much to shore up good governance as we enter Afghanistan's *Transformation Decade* (2015-2024).⁴

Afghan Inspired, Owned and Led Development

In the realm of development, the international community must cease the decade old practice of forcing its own flawed programmes upon the Afghan government. All of our governmental aid organisations are guilty of this practice but some have learned, albeit late in the game. Instead, they should invest in existing, high performing, and Afghan-inspired, owned and led programmes. They exist and they not only demonstrate the ability of the government to connect with rural Afghanistan (thereby pre-empting the Taliban main effort) but are also sustainable over the long term.

In this vein, the recent USAID Afghan Government Stabilisation Support Programme, inspired after the 2007 MRRD Kandahar Model,⁵ demonstrates a paradigm shift in thinking and attitude. Rather than impose a programme on MRRD, with unreliable, corrupt contractors, USAID will provide the ministry USD 70 million and allow Afghans to implement on the ground in a much more accountable and cost-effective manner. Other aid agencies should follow suit.

Economic development is the catalyst for longer-term peace and security in Afghanistan. Whilst the Afghan Government wrestles with the challenges of creating an enabling business environment and establishing regulatory frameworks, foreign investment should focus on two sectors – the extractive industries and agriculture, including rural development.

The US Geological Survey conservatively estimates Afghanistan's natural resources at some USD 1 trillion and agriculture continues to be the foundation of the country's economy, employing more than 70% of the population and accounting for over 30% of GDP. However, both sectors need reliable supplies of water and electricity. The private sector has identified this lack of availability of reliable electricity as the most critical impediment to its growth. And yet, absent any legally-binding trans-border regional water management agreements, the donors capable of funding the construction of dams (such as the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank and USAID), refuse to build dams that might alter water flows from Afghanistan into neighbouring countries. This *status quo* will compromise development and, ultimately, security.

Buttressing Genuine Regional Cooperation

The international community should exert what influence it can in the region with a view to ensuring that whatever negotiations take place between Afghanistan and its rogue neighbours⁶ result in protecting the fledgling Afghan economy for an agreed period of time (probably 8-10 years), providing preferential advantages until Afghan enterprises have established a modicum of capacity for free trade. Implementation of a genuine "Afghan first" procurement policy, as suggested by ISAF foreign ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 (but largely ignored in practice), would be an important first step in galvanising the Afghan economy.

We must start investing in Afghanistan rather than on Afghanistan. And there are clear security benefits: those nations that have tried local procurement have found that there has been a marked decrease in security costs when Afghan labour delivered Afghan products, and noted that local procurement often resulted in local support for the mission.

The Greatest Dissatisfier in Afghanistan Today

Some years ago, coalition soldiers jokingly defined a Talib as an unemployed 16 year old; there is some truth to this somewhat trite remark. In the Asia Foundation Survey released in late 2012, respondents identified the three biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole as insecurity (28%), unemployment (27%) and corruption (25%). At

the local level, the three biggest problems were cited as unemployment (29%), lack of electricity (25%) and poor roads (20%).⁷

As US and ISAF forces downsize and close their installations, unemployment will continue to rise, exacerbated by an ever-growing number of jobless high school and university graduates. An Afghan first policy must therefore also apply to employment opportunities provided through the extractive industries and labour intensive Afghan national programmes. The MRRD-managed National Area Based Development Programme currently has some 1,100 surveyed and approved labour-intensive projects awaiting funding in all 34 provinces of the country. Finding the USD 123 million necessary to implement these projects is a direct investment in security.

The Key to Terminating the Conflict

There will be no end to the insurgency without successful reconciliation. Although reintegration efforts have thus far produced muted results, the politically-driven peace and reconciliation process is key. Notwithstanding many false starts, the December 2012 Chantilly talks in France may have signalled the beginning of more substantive engagement between the Afghan government and the various insurgent groups. First of all, the meeting was Afghan-led and inclusive—in addition to the government's High Peace Council, all Afghan political parties were represented, as was civil society and members of parliament; three insurgent groups were also present: the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

It was also the first time that the Doha-based official members of the Taliban delegation publicly admitted to being the designated representatives of the movement, authorised to speak on their behalf with the Afghan authorities. Equally encouraging was the fact that, rather than refusing to accept the principle of an Afghan Constitution, they intimated it would have to be amended, and more closely aligned with Sharia Law. However, as is the case in all negotiations, it was what was said unofficially by the Taliban in the margins of the meeting that was the most telling—they described themselves as hostages of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and implored their Afghan colleagues to “liberate” them from Pakistan. Both parties agreed to meet again. In the last month, not a single day has gone by without some development in the realm of reconciliation.

Optimising the Transformation Decade

As the Afghan government and the international community “further consolidate their partnership from Transition to the *Transformation Decade*,”⁸ we must effectively engage all sources of insecurity in Afghanistan, not simply the prosecution of combat operations against an elusive and enduring enemy. In a country where lack of human capacity continues to be the single greatest impediment to progress, a pre-Tokyo World Bank analysis recommended the Afghan government make a strategic investment in developing human capital. The international community should support

such an investment, focusing on building genuine, coherent and sustainable human capacity at all levels of government, providing access to more scholarships abroad and promoting youth movements.

We must play a far more substantive role in encouraging constructive and meaningful regional cooperation, particularly in implementing fair trade and transit agreements with Afghanistan's neighbours. A priority must be to set the conditions for comprehensive negotiations leading to trans-border regional water agreements that will allow the construction of dams in Afghanistan. These dams will guarantee the reliable water supplies necessary to wean farmers off poppy cultivation and convince them to opt for licit alternative crops; they will also generate reliable quantities of electricity to power small and medium enterprises, and help prepare Afghanistan's world class agricultural produce for export.

We must also work with the Afghan government in attracting private sector investment, particularly for the extractive industries, thereby generating sustainable development and job creation.

The international community needs to send a clear message to President Karzai that it will support any tough measures he takes in attempting to curb rampant corruption. In this regard, how he deals with the Kabul Bank crisis, which directly implicates his younger brother and that of his 1st Vice President, will be telling. Now that he has set a date for the next Presidential and Provincial Council elections (5 April 2014), we will need to support his commitment to inclusive and credible elections, the only option for a peaceful political transition.

The importance of the successful outcome of these elections cannot be overstated—they constitute the single most important manifestation of whether 10 years of international commitment has been worthwhile or not. As for reconciliation, we should respect the fact that it must be an Afghan-led process and avoid repeating the mistakes of the last decade—undue interference by nations wishing to selfishly ‘cash in on victory’ will derail and compromise the very process which has the best chance of bringing peace to the region.

If we support the Afghan-inspired, owned and led integration of all the aforementioned strands of security there is still a chance of helping set the conditions for a reasonably stable Afghanistan wherein all Afghans have a right to self-determination, and an Afghanistan at relative peace with its neighbours.

Finally, the May 2012 *Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, together with the NATO-led mission beyond 2014, and the ever-growing number of bilateral agreements with nations (such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, France, Italy, Norway and India), should help reassure the sceptics that the *Transformation Decade* has the potential to be one of opportunities for Afghanistan.

That said, if Karzai refuses to release the results of the Kabul Bank report (which he is currently doing) and if the 2014 elections are a repeat of 2009, all bets are off.

(Endnotes)

- 1 At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, the international community reaffirmed its intention to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police during the *Transformation Decade* (2015-2024).
 - 2 The word ‘Inteqal’ was chosen as it means ‘transition’ in both Dari and Pashto.
 - 3 The Tokyo Declaration dated 8 July 2012, Paragraph 12.
 - 4 The *Transformation Decade* refers to the 2015-2024 timeframe during which the international community “commits to directing financial support, consistent with the Kabul Process, towards Afghanistan’s economic development and security-related costs, helping Afghanistan address its continuing budget shortfall to secure the gains of the last decade, make Transition irreversible, and become self-sustaining.” Bonn Communiqué, December 2011, Paragraph 22.
 - 5 The Kandahar Model was developed by MRRD in 2007 to synchronise in time and space development activities at community/district levels with ongoing security operations. Funded by the MRRD-managed National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP), the Kandahar Model was unique in that it empowered local officials through a new implementation modality, featuring decentralisation of procurement and financial procedures coupled with community contracting. Initial successes of this potential war winner were encouraging until CIDA was forced to cut funding to NABDP as a result of the 2008 Manley Commission recommendations.
 - 6 Particularly Iran and Pakistan – both fuelling the insurgency, both disingenuous on trade, both compromising economic development and both meddling in the internal affairs of the Afghan Government.
 - 7 *Afghanistan in 2012 - A Survey of the Afghan People*, the Asia Foundation, 2012.
 - 8 The Tokyo Declaration dated 8 July 2012, Paragraph 1. ©
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The Afghan National Army and the Canadian Contribution to Afghan Stabilization

Colonel Ian Hope

The Canadian contribution to the Afghan war shifted from a 2,500-soldier combat force in Kandahar (ending in July 2011) to a 900-soldier contingent working in the Kabul area as part of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. NTM-A is a 3,000 troop/38 country organization, activated in November 2009, tasked with providing support to Afghans in managing the institutional base for the recruitment, training, education, equipage, and sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), comprising the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Air Force, and the Afghan National Police.

Lieutenant-Colonel Habib addresses the 754 soldiers of his newly formed kandak (battalion). The soldiers know that within five weeks they will be in combat operations in eastern Afghanistan under his leadership. Habib has just come from that area, having served there as a battalion deputy commanding officer. The Army Staff chose him to take command of this new kandak and ordered him to report to the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC) to help form, equip and train the unit during a nine-week period before deploying with it to the eastern border. He has no delusions about what lies ahead, and is frank and open with his soldiers. They are seeing in him something that I noticed shortly after his arrival - from his mouth there comes soft-spoken but oft-stated concern for troops' well-being, but his eyes are that of a killer. All who take the time to drink tea with him soon feel his fierce desire to take this new instrument of war and throw it against the Haqqani network insurgents who are attempting to erase the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is technically competent, something I see every day here at CFC in older officers with Soviet training. However, he is a new breed of young professionals who balance technical skill with an intense desire to fight and win. When I speak with him, my confidence in the ANA soars. This is important; any speculation about Afghanistan's future must acknowledge that as goes the ANA, so goes the nation.

Canadians do not contemplate the role of Canadian Army in our national identity, never mind what might be the role of the ANA in Afghan society. Inheritors of a Whig tradition suspicious of military establishments and susceptible to late-20th century vacillations associated with a growing sense of moral relativism and decidedly ahistorical interpretations, Canadians are becoming incapable of seeing value in maintenance of armies. How then do we explain the latest effort of our soldiers in Kabul to create a viable ANA?

After the United States, Canada is the

second largest contributor to NTM-A, and has for three years provided its deputy commanding general. The scope of NTM-A's activities is vast, incorporating 70 training sites in 21 provinces, recruitment centres nationwide, the massive basic training centre, the national military academy, 12 branch schools, 72 ministerial and 121 general staff advisor/mentors, and my own CFC. It is within my command that individual officers, NCOs, and soldiers—arriving from a variety of places—come together to form new units, receive all natures of equipment, train upon this equipment (as well as in operational planning and combat skills), and deploy to their parent corps. Each day 400 Afghan and coalition partners train between 1,500-3,200 new unit personnel. More significantly, on any given day NTM-A oversees 4,000 Afghan instructors training 15,000 officer, NCO, and soldier trainees. The US Congress is spending USD 10 billion annually on this effort. Since the start of the NTM-A mission, CFC has fielded 206 units into the ANA's 6 corps, 22 brigades, 3 special operations brigades, 3 air wings, and 6 police brigades. The ANA has grown since my last tour in Kandahar (2006) from 39,000 to 184,000. Since 2009, they have received over 16,580 vehicles, 88,632 sets of communications equipment, and 92,400 brand new weapons. The largely infantry component of the army of 2006 has been balanced by signals units, construction and combat engineer units, military police, military intelligence companies, corps artillery, garrison support units, and motorized (mobile strike forces) brigades. Every month I witness three or four new units depart CFC for corps areas, each comprised of 400-700 soldiers, 50-200 vehicles and all natures of equipment. Almost every vehicle and piece of equipment that we issue here has been manufactured in the past 1-2 years. We have 42 more units to field into the army before our mission is done in 2014. Habib's is but one.

Skeptics will remain unimpressed by the generation of this incredible mass, believing it insufficient to defeat the shadowy Taliban that lurk omnipotent in their minds. Some will froth over the obvious lack of quality that such quantity betrays. Others will simply scoff that such numbers are irrelevant without political stability and legitimacy in governance.

But are they? Is it not possible that this mass, in and of itself, matters? And what of the conviction of the thousands

Colonel Ian Hope is on his third tour in Afghanistan and is serving as the Commander Consolidated Fielding Center in Kabul. He has 32 years of service in uniform. His operational experiences include tours in the Balkans, Africa, Kuwait and Afghanistan, and on domestic operations. Colonel Hope commanded the 1st Battalion PPCLI Battle Group (Task Force Orion) in Kandahar from January to August 2006, involving months of continuous combat engagement with Taliban forces.

THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2013 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the CDA Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include:

General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Rt. Hon. Brian Dickson, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Hon. Barnett Danson, Colonel the Hon. John Fraser, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Mr. G. Hamilton Southam, Brigadier-General David Fraser, General Raymond R. Henault, General Rick Hillier, Warrant Officer William MacDonald, the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson, and Major-General Jonathan Vance.

Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2013, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE
151 SLATER STREET, SUITE 412A
OTTAWA ON K1P 5H3

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 8 November 2013, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail pao@cdainstitute.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2013.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la CAD dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué(e) par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très hon. Brian Dickson, le vice-amiral Larry Murray, le lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Hon. Barnett Danson, Colonel l'Hon. John Fraser, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault, le Général Rick Hillier, l'Adjudant William MacDonald, la Très hon. Adrienne Clarkson, et le Major-général Jonathan Vance.

Tout Canadien ou Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen ou citoyenne pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par

écrit et doivent être accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2013, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
151, RUE SLATER, SUITE 412A
OTTAWA ON K1P 5H3

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 8 novembre 2013, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: pao@cdainstitute.ca; ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

of young Habibs that serve this army? My perspective on this issue is shaped by the incredibly able Afghans that I share my workday with, and by history, starting with knowledge of the historical role of armies in nation-building.

Despite what flags might fly at the United Nations, we must never think that the modern nation state is a natural occurrence. There is no political equivalent to Darwin's natural selection dictating the nation-state as an ultimate organizing structure towards which humankind progresses automatically. In the long view of history, city-states, tribal territories, feudal kingdoms, and empires are equally viable. An Afghan nation-state is therefore not inevitable. Its re-emergence and maturation is dependent upon several things that have been traditional in modern state-building, the first of which is the existence of some sort of state hegemony over the means for violence as a guarantor of social order and rule of law.

The modern form of the nation-state was created from the social upheaval caused by the Thirty Years War when strong impulses across Western Europe put centralized control upon those who wielded weaponry. Centralization of political and military authority after the Peace of Westphalia in France, Spain, the Netherlands, German principalities and England particularly, signified the emergence of what we have come to consider as the nation-state, with all of its inherent characteristics. Among these were different forms of central bureaucracy, representational agency of various estates, and standing armies dedicated to protection of the state from threats internal and foreign. It is impossible to separate the French, Spanish, English, Dutch, American, German, Italian and other emergent national political entities from the standing armies that they formed. The role of these armies in the creation of the nation-state is indisputable. It is within this context, and not some saccharine 21st century sensibility, that we must view the ANA.

Since the 17th century standing armies have reinforced internal political control, ensuring balances of power between sectional factions, providing constabulary forces, demolishing the competitive forces of spoiler nobles and warlords alike, and preventing secession of independently minded states. Sovereigns and governments have used armies to exert oppressive control, without doubt; but, standing armies have also been a stabilizing force when it was both needed and desirable, and have at times been a moderating factor in societies fomenting violent retribution upon internal and external factions. For purposes good and bad, armies have always been an integral part in the workings of the modern nation-state.

The rise of the modern standing army has also been inextricably linked to national economy. France's first national system of defence incorporated military frontiers with internal communications infrastructure and national industry designed to raise, equip, move and sustain troops. Louis XIV's army, and the bureaucracy required to maintain it, became France's largest employer and consumer. The ANA has this role in Afghanistan. The tiny US Army of the 19th century was instrumental in conducting the vast "internal improvements" that integrated much of America's economy, and set the conditions for bureaucratic work in Washington.

Royal engineers did some of the same in the Canadas in the decades before Confederation. The ANA are beginning to have similar effects upon Afghanistan. Its existence solidifies ministerial relations in support of the central governing authority and stimulates the economy. National armies have been an important factor in economic integration.

Armies also contribute to the formation of national identity and the achievement of national stability. When nations are in their emergent state, armies are often the only truly national institutions. It was thus with the small Continental Army at Valley Forge and Morristown, where George Washington realized that its disintegration would rob the united colonies of their only national institution and end of the Revolution. The French Army was the singular guarantor of national power before, during and after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. The Prussian Army was the core of new-bred German nationalism in the 1860s. Armies are also important in the creation and maintenance of national identity. Tensions between Scots, Irish, Welshmen and Englishmen were tempered by their inclusion in Great Britain's standing armies. Armies also facilitate social integration. It was the recruitment and performance of Black Union troops that substantiated and gave credibility to Lincoln's push for the Thirteenth Amendment. And so it is, and will be, with the ANA. They are the single biggest national institution in Afghanistan, and are truly representative of all Afghans: 45% Pashtun, 32% Tajik, 12% Hazara, and 7% Uzbek. Ethnic differences and tensions still exist and threaten, but so much less so because of ANA integration. They may well be the single national institution with resiliency and depth needed to weather political storms ahead.

While armies do stabilize internal turbulence, their *raison d'être* is defence of the realm. They protect borders and frontiers and their mere existence deters foreign aggression. It is the purpose of armies to prepare for war, and a mark of their professionalism is how well they perform the task of preparation. Of course their purpose is realized when war comes, and their performance is the largest single factor in determining how the nation-state fares at war's end. But their performance in war also serves purposes other than survival of the state: it contributes to state identity. The performance of the Canadian Corps during the First World War was the single biggest factor in Canada achieving recognition independent of the Britain. In terms of dedication for national defence, the ANA show all of the signs of emerging professionalism. They have the capacity now (technical expertise, materiel, experienced leadership) to stand on their own. They are close to being a self-sustaining institution (requiring less international finances). They routinely conduct activities (operational planning, brigade and corps operations, and institutional development) that I considered impossible for them in 2006. Conversations with NATO/ISAF commanders throughout Afghanistan reveal a positive impression of the ANA, and through them, Afghanistan itself.

I do not subscribe to the often-heard notion that the Taliban will prevail again in Afghanistan post-2014. Afghans have embraced crucial elements of modernization, including most aspects of a free-market economy and aspirations of a middle class. There are 29 different television channels in



*ANA .50 cal weapon range practice
Photo courtesy Colonel Hope*

Kabul broadcasting programs that we well recognize in the west. A public sphere has emerged that is actively engaged in political debate. While pundits claim that the Taliban “control” a large number of districts in the country, they actually exert no more control than they did in most districts in 2001, when the mere threat of resistance was enough to collapse their so-called control within a matter of weeks. The people of rural Afghanistan may accept coexistence with transient Taliban fighters now, but this should never be mistaken for control or even support. Without Pakistani assistance, the Taliban would be defeated within 12 months.

The ANA constitutes this country’s largest most potent means of organized violence, having supplanted warlord militias long ago, and being more than a match for the Taliban. The ANA NCO corps is good, patriotic and desires to fight and defeat the nation’s enemies. The ANA officer corps is experienced and technically competent. However, a great many officers lack selfless determination to fight and avoid postings to combat corps (Helmand, Kandahar, and the eastern border districts). They will not acquire the necessary determination until NATO/ISAF completes the handover of contested areas to the ANSF and we withdraw, forcing the ANA officers to accept responsibility for the war. The hundreds of Habibs that are rising in rank are willing to take up the torch. They, and the mass of soldiers, vehicles, and weaponry that I see passing through CFC are capable of defeating any Taliban that I ever fought. They possess that singular quality that is necessary of battlefield commanders—creative willpower. They have my confidence.

I do not subscribe to the often-heard notion that Afghanistan will fall back into civil war post-2014. Every month that has passed since the formation of the Interim Authority in 2001 has diminished the chance of a return to factional fighting. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) has robbed factions of their heavy equipment, and the monopoly of organized armed force is now squarely with the ANSF and not aligned to aging warlords. This is precisely why former warlord Ismail Khan desires to resurrect regional militias; he understands that his ability to control any ANSF is gone. The decisive event that will determine the political and military makeup of Afghanistan post-2014 will be how President Karzai behaves during the transfer of power before, during, and after the 2014 elections. If the practice of compromise that sustained Karzai continues after him, internal peace will be sustained.

Assuming that we will see a smooth transition of power in 2014 the largest threats to Afghanistan thereafter will be external—namely Pakistan and Iran. The ANA officers I train here have understood this for some time, and are committed to national unity in the face of current and future threats.

Canada, the United States and our NATO/ISAF partners have been true in our commitment to Afghanistan for over a decade. We must acknowledge the void of a US/ NATO strategy between 2002 and 2009. The sacrifices of our soldiers during that period bought the time that it took for American planners and leaders to craft a viable strategy that focuses on national institution building. Of greatest importance, we have since 2009 created a standing army of relevance. It is currently exercising its authority in the contested areas of the country and is managing its own large recruitment, training, education, and strategic logistics functions. The ANA are moving rapidly toward the tipping point where they can guarantee internal peace within the borders of this emerging nation state. It will take much longer for them to deter the external pressures that seek to spoil Afghan efforts at nation-building. As Canada ends its military mission in Afghanistan in March 2014, we must be prepared to engage in the next effort that allows this country a chance to join the society of stable and peaceful nation states. We must exert all measure of diplomatic, economic and informational influence and pressure upon those outside of Afghanistan’s borders who seek to reverse all that we have given so much here to achieve. ©

THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2013 Ross Munro Media Award.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Its purpose is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the general public's understanding of issues that relate to Canada's defence and security.

The recipient of the Award will receive a replica of the Ross Munro statue, along with a cash award of \$2,500.

The past recipients of this prestigious award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, Murray Brewster, and Adam Day.

Anyone may nominate a journalist for the award. Nominations must be in writing, accompanied by two letters of support, and include a summary of reasons for the nomination, a brief biographical sketch of the nominee, and samples of the journalist's work. Further details are available at [www. http://www.cdacanada.ca/en/ross-munro-media-award](http://www.cdacanada.ca/en/ross-munro-media-award). Nominations must be received by 1 September 2013, and should be addressed to:

ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
151 SLATER STREET, SUITE 412A
OTTAWA, ON K1P 5H3

The Ross Munro Media Award will be presented on Friday, 8 November 2013, at the Vimy Award dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations at: fax (613) 236-8191, e-mail pao@cdainstitute.ca, or telephone (613) 236-9903.



PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO

Nous invitons les nominations pour le prix média Ross Munro, 2013.

Le prix Média Ross Munro a été décerné pour la première fois en 2002 par la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), en collaboration avec l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères (ICDAE). Ce prix a pour but de reconnaître annuellement un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de manière importante et remarquable à la sensibilisation du grand public aux questions liées à la défense et à la sécurité canadiennes.

Le lauréat ou la lauréate du Prix recevra une reproduction de la statuette Ross Munro et un prix en argent de 2500 \$.

Parmi les lauréats des années précédentes, figurent Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, Matthew Fisher, Alec Castonguay, Brian Stewart, Murray Brewster, et Adam Day.

Toute personne peut nommer un (une) journaliste pour le prix Ross Munro. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et accompagnées par deux lettres du soutien, être aussi accompagnées d'un sommaire citant les raisons qui motivent votre nomination, d'une biographie du candidat et des exemples des travaux du journaliste. Pour les détails voir [www. http://www.cdacanada.ca/fr/ross-munro-media-award](http://www.cdacanada.ca/fr/ross-munro-media-award). Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 septembre 2013, et doivent être adressées au:

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DU PRIX MÉDIA ROSS MUNRO
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
151, RUE SLATER, SUITE 412A
OTTAWA, ON K1P 5H3

Le prix média Ross Munro sera présenté vendredi, le 8 novembre 2013, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour plus d'informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter la Conférence des associations de la Défense: télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cdainstitute.ca, ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

The Need For a National Security Strategy

J.L. Granatstein

"It is really vital that we develop a 'grand strategy for a small country' that integrates military, diplomatic and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad..."

- The Hon. Hugh Segal

We all know that Canada lives in a dangerous world—with famines, climate change, war and slaughter, intractable problems in the Middle East, and dangerous tensions in the South China Sea. And yet we have no national strategy to help us determine where we should gather our resources and how and when to use them. We need something better than the usual Canadian ad hocery to plan our responses to the challenges out there.

When Australians began to talk seriously about developing a National Security Strategy five or six years ago, their scholars and soldiers tried to look at the fundamentals. They understood why they felt relatively safe: "It is because Western countries not only do much to shape the modern security environment," Dr. Rod Lyon of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute wrote (it's interesting Australia has such a government-funded but independent Institute), "but that they have been doing it for five centuries. Australia feels at home in the modern world because it is principally a Western-designed world. If Western countries were not the world-shapers, or if authoritarian countries were to become militarily predominant in this world, then Australia's position would seem much different." This surely applies to us, sitting as we do in a North America protected by a superpower.

Lyon then went on to define his nation's strategic culture: "That culture," he said, "places a high value on Australia having: small standing armed forces, which are expanded only in times of emergency; an alliance with the dominant maritime power of the day; a capacity to defend forward to forestall the emergence of threats closer to our homeland; the ability to make meaningful, but finely calibrated, contributions to coalition or alliance engagements abroad; supportive multilateral arrangements for interventions in which we might be either a leader or a contributor.

That strategic culture," he continued, "tells us something about how Australia sees its own role: as a defensive, rather than an offensive strategic actor; as an ally which partners with others for common strategic purposes; as pragmatic in its choices about where and when to use force; and as willing to intervene as an order-defender rather than as an order-disrupter."

Dr. Jack L. Granatstein is a Distinguished Research Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, was Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum, and writes on Canadian military history, foreign and defence policy, and public policy. He was also a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

This is not a bad crack at the beginning of a definition of a national security strategy. And the Australian 2009 Defence White Paper proceeded much as Lyon had wanted. It defined the nation's strategic outlook, then its strategic interests, and then Australia's defence policy. I won't go into the details, but it is enough to say that Canberra saw the primacy of the United States as key to its security. Once again, it seems to me that the approach used by the Australians and their basic conclusions apply precisely to the Canadian situation. But I do not see any signs that Canadian scholars or, more importantly, government officials are thinking in this way.

The British too produced a National Security Strategy, in their case in 2008. Their document laid out objectives and plans for all departments, agencies and forces. Policy was to be based on eight principles: it was to be grounded on British values, to be hard-headed, to tackle problems early on, and their strategy said that the United Kingdom would deal with problems abroad in a multilateral way and at home with a partnership approach bringing all agencies together. Inside government, there was to be a more integrated approach, linking domestic and foreign policy and cutting across departmental lines. And, the paper said, the goal would be to maintain capabilities and continue to invest in national security. Those last two are likely the main elements of the UK strategy that have been devalued in the last five years, but the British do seem to be trying to implement their National Security Strategy. Canada could do worse than to emulate the United Kingdom's approach.

We are not totally without plans, of course. Canada does have a National Security Policy, "Making Canada Safe," issued by the Paul Martin Liberal government in 2004. This policy correctly defined the top three priorities: protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to Canada's allies; and contributing to international security. It also attached rather small amounts of dollars to tasks to be accomplished—\$5 million for cyber security seemed derisory even a decade ago. The next year the Martin government issued its International Policy Statement which was hard-headed and sensible and generated very good reviews. These were policy steps forward, but they certainly did not amount to a strategy.

Nor, despite its title, did the Canada First Defence Strategy, issued by the Harper government in 2008, amount to a strategy. It did lay down three major missions for the Canadian Forces, promised stable funding, and laid out a long, expensive list of equipment to be purchased.

The funding promise was quickly broken by the recession and the subsequent deficit, and the equipment procurements, in many cases, have been put off to the indefinite future. But whatever else it was, the CFDS was more of a shopping wish list than a strategy. It is as the Hudson on the Hill column in Frontline Defence noted, "out of date, unaffordable and impotent."

In another piece, this same columnist observed that policy is the "what," strategy is the "how," articulating a high-level plan to defend Canadian national interests, acknowledge our values, assign strategic objectives that support achieving our policy goals, set priorities, allocate resources and assign strategic responsibilities. No Canadian government has attempted to articulate a national security strategy, but this is what we need.

We need to recognize that we will and must depend on the United States for our security for the foreseeable future.

I believe that our strategy must affirm that Canada is a Western nation with core Western values.

We need to recognize that we will and must depend on the United States for our security for the foreseeable future. That does not mean that we should not strive to be independent, or as someone put it on Peter Gzowski's CBC morning programme some thirty years ago, be as independent "as possible in the circumstances."

We must protect our seaborne commerce in cooperation with our allies, and we must look increasingly to the Pacific. We need to watch over our borders and coasts as climate change and natural disasters increase the pressures on us. Our first aim must always be to protect our own people; the next is to be prepared to meet non-military challenges with the resources of the state. And we must be able to offer aid to the world when disasters such as earthquakes or tsunamis strike.

Senator Hugh Segal put it well a few years ago:

It is really vital that we develop a 'grand strategy for a small country' that integrates military,

diplomatic and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad. We need to shape a strategy that, as we learn from the experiences of East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Iraq [and now Libya and Mali], combines military, civil, private sector, democratizing, and post-conflict transition skills. These need to be built into real plans and models that maximize the ability of each to engage constructively on Canada's behalf, and that enhance the leverage of a combined application where appropriate and helpful.

In other words, let us think and plan so that decisions are not made on the back of a matchbook in pure adhocery.

Senator Segal is arguably the most thoughtful and forthright commentator on Canadian strategy. About Mali, he recently wrote that "We should...calibrate our foreign and defence policy to anticipate engagements...in support of our medium term strategic interests which always embrace repelling terrorist threats to democracy." I agree entirely, and I also share his comment that "If there is any lesson to draw from the Afghanistan experience and the challenges in Africa, it is that looking away always costs more in lives, treasure and security than facing evil head on and having the capacity to do so."

Not looking away but recognizing reality is what a Canadian National Security Strategy should aim for. It should not be, it must not be, a strategy that aims to replicate what critics on the left always refer to as Canada's "traditional" policies of peacekeeping and providing foreign aid. We have done peacekeeping well and given billions in aid not so well, but those have never been our major policies, and it is a total misreading of the history of the past 65 years to believe so.

It is not my task to define the priorities and allocate the resources and responsibilities to implement a Canadian National Security Strategy. That is the responsibility of government, and it is regrettably a responsibility that governments have shirked. The world is too dangerous, too unstable, for us to dally any longer. But, then, this is Canada, and we can be certain that we will continue to fiddle around while the world burns. ©

This article is derived from a presentation given at the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security this past February.

Are we being let down?

George Petrolekas

The issues facing Canada and its security interests are not inconsequential. Yet there is hardly any progress in ensuring these are handled in any systematic way.

This past February, the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security was held in Ottawa, one of the largest events of its kind in Canada. Keynote speakers included Admiral Locklear, the Commander of all U.S. forces in the Indo-Asia/Pacific region; Admiral McRaven, commanding all U.S. Special Forces globally, including the teams that neutralized Osama Bin Laden; General Alexander, Commander U.S. Cyber Command; General Jacoby, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and NORAD; and Vice Admiral Kernan, deputy commander of US forces in Central and South America. These officers represented four of the nine U.S. combatant commanders – akin in their own right to pro-consuls of Pax Americana. In addition, the conference heard from the French Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral Guillaud.

Echoing a prediction from the CDA Institute's latest Vimy Paper, *Canada's Strategic Outlook 2013*, the messages were clear and stark: while the world is no less dangerous and threats are emerging in new domains, budget cuts faced by almost every Western nation will leave them vulnerable.

While a good number of bureaucrats attended the conference, they had little of substance to say about the messages of these commanders and the broad strategic landscape. In the weeks that followed, parliamentarians equally had little to say, and much like their insistence on a debate on Canada's participation in Mali for which most did not show up, the Canadian national media equally appeared uninterested.

Yet, at \$20 billion a year, the defence budget forms the largest portion of the government's discretionary spending. Planned capital acquisition programs (the \$35 billion shipbuilding program and the \$9 billion fighter acquisition, to name the two most prominent) will have an impact on our finances and on Canada's role in the world for decades to come. And let us not forget that cyber defence, border security and air travel safety represent additional security-related spending in addition to what the government spends directly on defence. Recent media headlines seemed much more interested in Canada getting a "shout out" from

Best Picture Oscar winner Ben Affleck during the Academy Awards.

This Canadian political class, media and fellow citizen disconnect is but one of the trends predicted in *Canada's Strategic Outlook 2013*.

There is a deepening divide between aspirations of the governed and their governments. This is most manifest in the social upheavals of the Middle East, in the divided electorate in the United States, and even in the sense of frustration with Parliament in Canada. It is very much an issue of trust as people have lost faith in how they are governed and in who governs them, raising concerns about the general transparency of our political system. This social undercurrent is at the root of an almost helpless estrangement of citizens towards issues that should concern them.

The financial situation of most countries in the Western world, the waning self-confidence of their people, the downward spiral associated with fighting deficits, and the resulting austerity and resistance to pro-growth policies are not only the essence of domestic policies, they also eventually drive most foreign policy considerations. Pragmatism over principle has emerged not because nations made conscious decisions to alter their foreign policy approaches, but as a by-product of their fiscal conditions.

While the world has not become demonstrably safer and risks of conflicts or crises abound, citizen disengagement and challenging fiscal conditions have strengthened the resolve of nations not to become embroiled in conflict unless they have no other choice, in other words unless national interests are directly affected. Were a conflict to arise, intervening nations will want short engagements and will hope to avoid the weariness of decade-long commitments, which, for instance, characterized Afghanistan.

Of the possible conflict scenarios predicted in *Canada's Strategic Outlook 2013*, only in the case of a major failure of diplomacy, of channels of communications not being utilized and intentions not being clearly transmitted, could a conflict blow up. In almost all the cases reviewed - Iran, North Korea, China Sea maritime boundaries issues, Mali and the broader Sahel - conflicts would occur by accident rather than by design. There is a similarity with the pre-1914 environment: regional competition is on the rise, frictions abound, yet no nation truly wishes to go over the edge and the fear is all about avoiding another Sarajevo moment.

The issues facing Canada and its security interests are not inconsequential. Yet there is hardly any progress in ensuring these are handled in any systematic way. There is no real progress on the transformation of the Canadian Forces: procurement is a nightmare and, despite an overwhelming consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, there

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is no overarching Canadian policy. In fact, there is hardly any uptake of the issues and recommendations presented in *Canada's Strategic Outlook 2013*. It all boils down to a fundamental lack of strategic thought in producing a coherent, unified and symbiotic defence, foreign affairs, and trade policy, the need for which is even more pronounced in times of fiscal restraint.

The time for a national dialogue on what Canada wants and on how its armed forces are to be structured is now! ©

Cyber Security

Major-General (Ret'd) John Adams

Offensive cyber operations come in several forms: cybercrime, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, and cyber war. Of the 'big four' two, cybercrime and cyber espionage are today's threats. The potential to use cyber exploitation techniques that facilitate espionage to covertly target critical infrastructure and in so doing cause considerable disruption to economic, health or military-industrial capabilities is a game changer.

U.S. President Obama, writing in the Wall Street Journal on July 12, 2012, called the cyber threat “one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face.”

Threats from cyber espionage, computer crime and attacks on critical infrastructure will surpass terrorism as the number one threat facing the United States, FBI Director Robert Mueller testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 31 January 2012: “...down the road, the cyber threat, which cuts across all [FBI] programs, will be the number one threat to our country.”

In the past several years, there has been a growing list of complex computer breaches that highlight the wide array of threats:

- The high profile intrusions of Google's Gmail service in 2009, which also targeted as many as 30 other high-tech companies;
- China is believed to have hacked into computer systems run by NASDAQ-OMX, the parent company of the NASDAQ stock exchange;
- Last year, the IT security firm RSA suffered a breach of the firm's intellectual property, Secure ID, which provides encrypted authentication services to defence contractors and the US Government, including the FBI; and,
- In 2007, Russia is suspected of engaging in a Distributed Denial of Services (DDOS) attack against computer systems in Estonia and again in 2008 against Georgia.

Offensive cyber operations come in several forms,

Upon graduation from the Royal Military College of Canada a Rhodes Scholarship took Major-General (Ret'd) John Adams to Oxford University. Retiring as the Senior Serving Military Engineer in 1995, following a 35-year career with the Canadian Forces, he spent three years as an Assistant Deputy Minister with the Department of National Defence before becoming the Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard. Later, Major-General (Ret'd) Adams returned to the Department of National Defence as an Associate Deputy Minister and Chief of the Communications Security Establishment. He remained there until his appointment as the Skelton-Clark Fellow at Queen's University in February 2012. Major-General Adams is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

with cybercrime, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage and cyber war being ‘the big four’. All too often, they are discussed as a collective as though they were connected at the hip. And the reaction is one of “the sky is falling, the sky is falling, man the ramparts.”

This, quite frankly, is not helpful, and as Wesley Wark has pointed out,¹ we must disaggregate the four if we are to establish priorities and outline policy options.

Of ‘the big four’ two—cybercrime and cyber espionage—are today's threats and should be addressed with urgency. Cyber war and cyber terrorism, on the other hand, are tomorrow's threats and as such, while the state must remain wary and stay on top of developments, there is less urgency for the moment.

There is virtual unanimous agreement, in all quarters, that cyber warfare is a threat to be reckoned with but for the time being the jury is still out as to whether it will ever be a usable instrument of war; in that, once unleashed where does it stop? Will one ever achieve the necessary level of precision that it can be used as an active offensive weapon? And, if that precision is not attained, might it not prompt deterrence in kind thereby leading the protagonists to ‘mutual destruction’?

As Wark indicates,² as a threat cyber war to date has outpaced the laws of war; military doctrine, too, is running to catch up. These matters must be addressed, in conjunction with our allies, because cyber war is a threat that is not going away any time soon and we need to be in a position to deal with it.

Cyber terrorism, much like cyber war, is out there as a possibility but to date it has not manifested itself as a weapon that would instill terror in an adversary. Its use by terrorists has been in an enabling capacity and to date there has been no indication that the terrorists have the capacity, nor the inclination, to make it an offensive threat.

In contrast to cyber war and cyber terrorism, cybercrime and cyber espionage are offensive weapons that are doing considerable harm to our way of life today and their upside for harm is seemingly unlimited. Consequently they warrant increased attention on an urgent basis.

Cybercrime at the moment is a runaway freight train. How big is the problem? How do we even calculate the real cost to society of cybercrime? In a paper presented last June to the Workshop on the Economics of Information Security in the United Kingdom, a team of academics attempted to estimate the financial toll of Internet crime. Their conservative estimate was in the order of \$18 billion/year.

³ The authors observed that we are “extremely inefficient”

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at fighting cybercrime and offered a hardline solution: "Our figures suggest that we should spend less in anticipation of cybercrime (on antiviruses, firewalls, etc.) and more in response, that is; on the prosaic business of hunting down cyber criminals and throwing them in jail."

And cybercrime is about much more than money! Money is important but lives are quite another matter. Consider,

- The use of Internet chat sites to groom children as a precursor to real-life abuse, abduction and murder;
- Suicide sites which are said to be responsible for the self-inflicted deaths of hundreds of people each year; and,
- Online cannibals, estimated to number in excess of 800 participants.

And the situation in Canada is discouraging and getting worse. The number of malicious websites hosted in Canada has ballooned 239% since last year. Canada currently ranks 6th in the world in cybercrime.⁴

It is evident that the traditional rules and enforcement approach is not working. The reactive, police-based crime control model works for other crimes, but it has not worked for cybercrime. Why? In a nutshell, the empirical assumptions upon which the 'terrestrial model' is based do not hold for cyberspace.

It is suggested that a two-pronged approach will be needed. The first would be to improve the current reactive system. The second would be to devise a new cybercrime control strategy as a complement to the current system.

There are a number of initiatives that are in train with respect to improvements and enhancements to the current system, and Canada is a party to them. Regrettably, they are neither easy nor quick. The reception that greeted the tabling of Bill C30 in the House of Commons is proof positive of that. And time is of the essence.

Something more needs to be done, not as a substitute for the reactive model, but as a complement to it. In that regard Susan Brenner's "Distributed Policing Strategy" warrants serious consideration on an urgent basis.⁵

The idea would be to hold (through legislative change) the users and the system architects responsible for preventing much of cybercrime. It is an approach that warrants serious consideration given that the vast majority of network exploitation could be avoided with a combination of strong passwords changed regularly and a drastic reduction of hardware and software vulnerabilities.

Acts of espionage to clandestinely access the secrets of others is nothing new. The use of spies or various forms of intelligence to access a state's political, military and economic secrets or a company's industrial and business secrets have been practiced since time immemorial. Cyber espionage is ultimately the same as traditional espionage: the covert access of information of national interest belonging to others, only now it is accessed electronically.

The threat to Canada's security, and to the security of our allies, is much greater than it might appear to be at first glance. More than 100 countries are capable of conducting cyber operations against technologically advanced countries

such as Canada. The attempts are constant and relentless. Many countries are prolific, unconstrained by resource, legal or policy limitations. With our advanced economy, connected government services, important international role and our proximity to the United States, Canada is an extremely attractive target. And as we experienced in January and February 2011, in the case of Treasury Board and the Department of Finance, undetected compromises can be both expensive and time consuming to address, to say nothing of lost productivity.

Canada is therefore confronted with the age-old challenge of protecting secrets in the face of a new version of an old threat. Wesley Wark hits the mark when he states,

If the cyber version of the threat is new and potent, it remains the case that the traditional security requirements are still operable. In other words, there remains a need for adequate security vetting of personnel with access to sensitive data, for robust measures to protect physical and virtual data from unauthorized access and usage, for a culture of security consciousness, and for proactive capabilities to anticipate threats and to detect and follow intrusions—if possible to trace them to their point of origin. This may be a tall order in a world of cyber communications and 'big data' storage, but there is something reassuring about the fact that cyber-counter-espionage is merely a variant on past practices.⁶

There is, however, a new wrinkle that cyber espionage has introduced into the landscape, and that is the use of cyber exploitation techniques that facilitate espionage, in 'covert cyber offensive operations'. The potential to use these techniques to covertly target critical infrastructure and in so doing cause considerable disruption to economic, health or military-industrial capabilities is a game changer. And it can be done under the veil of plausible deniability while falling short of 'acts of war'. This is a defensive challenge that will demand much more thought. In addition, the policy question as to its use as an offensive weapon warrants immediate consideration. There is ample evidence to suggest that our adversaries are using it. Thus, should we continue to have one hand tied behind our backs in confronting this challenge?

Dr. Paul Cornish, Professor of International Security at the University of Bath, suggests that, "Technological strength and superiority has, unfairly though it might seem to its originators and beneficiaries, prompted what military analysts would describe as 'asymmetric vulnerability', where a fleet-footed and sharp-witted adversary can manoeuvre so fast and decisively that the strongest and most elaborate defences are turned into a cumbersome liability and a disadvantage."⁷

Is the situation we find ourselves in beyond the capacity of the nation-state to deal with it? Is it a strategic liability that demands a cooperative approach among nation-states?

The initial attempt to such an approach was the two-day conference of early November 2011, hosted by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague. Although the goal of

the conference was initially billed as a major advance in an urgent quest for a treaty to govern international conduct on the Internet, it finally settled on the goal of non-binding norms, which would set out the broad “rules of the road” for interactions in cyberspace. The hope is that such an approach would promote safe, predictable and consistent interactions while ensuring the Internet’s accessibility and openness. The idea would be to seek support for the concept that existing principles of international law (e.g. human rights law, the law of armed conflict) apply equally in cyberspace.

Mr. Hague, supported by the United States and Canada among others, pushed the concept forward but China and Russia would not be moved from their preference for a cyber arms control regime set up by the United Nations.

One could surmise that it is the difference between information security and cyber security that may underpin the conceptual impasse between Russia, China and the Western nations in cyberspace. Cyber security, the preferred focus of Western countries, centers on the technical security of hardware, software, data and its transmission. Information security includes all aspects of cyber security but also delves into the content of cyber data – usually for the purposes of

censorship. The conference chair addressed this issue head on in his concluding remarks:

The fourth message is that, while working together to defeat threats in cyberspace, you should not imagine for an instant that you can resist the growing force of the tide now flowing for transparency, open information, and the free exchange of ideas. Those governments that try to do so are in my view certain to fail.⁸

Even if “non-binding rules of the road” could be agreed to, one wonders if signatories would eventually be tempted to design a corresponding range of punitive actions. Were that to be entertained, it is unclear how such action would be instigated or endorsed, and what court of higher appeal would exist to ensure just and proportionate action.

Much work remains to be done in these matters, and discussion will continue to pursue a way forward. Hungary and South Korea accepted to host the next iterations of the conference in 2012 and 2013 respectively.

Canada is strongly encouraged to remain engaged in this initiative in the years ahead.

(Endnotes)

1 <http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/10/04/cyber-aggression-and-its-discontents/>

2 *ibid*

3 <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-02/the-cost-of-cyber-crime>

4 http://weis2012.econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf

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7 Cornish, Paul. “The Vulnerabilities of Developed States to Economic Cyber Warfare”, Working Paper, June 2011, available at <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk>

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Security Issues in East Africa

David Collins

There is a lengthy list of security issues affecting Africa that need to be addressed. Security Issues in East Africa provides an overview of the major security problems that are confronting the peoples of Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Rwanda.

The issue of security in Africa encompasses a large canvass covering a gamut of issues from the various forms of Arab spring in the north, to terrorism in the Maghreb, to border skirmishes in sub-Saharan Africa to conflict diamonds and to basic personal security for individuals. Despite the current cheer-leading that suggests that the twenty-first century belongs to Africa, there remain many fault lines that will inhibit the continent from achieving its full potential, and issues of security top the list. This article will focus on east Africa with reference to Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Rwanda.

The diversity of the security environment in Africa reflects the diversity of the continent. No one region is the same and no one can necessarily draw lessons from one country's experience to another. While the era of oppressive dictatorship is largely over, many leaders tend to stay in office for extended periods one way or another, witness Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Museveni in Uganda. This longevity is largely assured through suppression of political opposition or lack of press freedom. However, the use of social media and the prevalence of mobile telephones mean that information cannot be withheld from the people as it once was. Society is, perforce, becoming more open as a result. But how does this affect governance?

The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies tackles a number of security issues and I cite a number of these to give readers an idea of what is at stake on this broad canvass: combating organised crime; conflict prevention or mitigation; counter narcotics; countering extremism; democratisation; electoral security; identity conflict; irregular warfare; maritime security; natural resources and conflict; peacekeeping; piracy; post-conflict reconstruction; preventing and reversing military coups; regional and international security cooperation; security and development; security sector reform and stabilisation of fragile states. There is no shortage of work to be done.

Now, not every region or every country is bedevilled by all of these issues. But those familiar with Africa at all will

see that many apply more than not. There is an argument to be made that security and democracy do not always go hand-in-hand in Africa. Compare Kenya, just through a relatively peaceful general election, which has a very 'messy' democracy but where there are real issues of personal security and terrorist activity, and Rwanda, which in some ways is a Potemkin style African democracy where the capital is clean, there are no beggars, and with minimal corruption but where there is no political voice for dissent either.

On the issue of human rights writ large, a very key component of Canada's foreign policy, occasionally our policy goals come into conflict with local practice and custom such as on the issue of gay and lesbian rights in countries such as Uganda and Kenya where homosexuality is against the law. While we may agree to disagree on the detail we insist that no one be denied essential human rights in terms of how they are treated by the authorities including the police.

In the case of Kenya, a hugely important country to the economic well-being of East Africa there are challenges. As in many African countries there is a rising number of urban poor, many of whom have moved to cities from rural areas in order to find jobs. There are not enough good jobs available and coupled with a swiftly rising population it is difficult to feed and house people properly. The result is an increase in petty and not so petty crime. The police are of the 'shoot first and ask questions later variety' and are open to bribes, so their effectiveness is marginal.

In areas such as on the Coast, in and around Mombasa (a key port city) the rise in criminal and other activity has been immense in recent years. Criminal gangs control the movement of narcotics, and there is evidence of people smuggling and money laundering. Given the high number of Muslims in this area it is considered one of the refuges for Al Shabaab operatives in Kenya. And the Mombasa Revolutionary Council actively seeks to secede from Kenya in order to provide better economic opportunity for a large number of unemployed Muslim youth who, it is claimed, have been abandoned by central government.

More broadly Kenya is a haven for a variety of Somalis who have fled their war-torn country. From the refugee camps in the north, such as Dadaab, to the largely Somali district of Eastleigh in Nairobi there are a number of young Jihadists. Recent evidence points to the fact that young Kenyans are joining their brothers from Somalia in the fight against authority. It was in Nairobi in 1998 that an emboldened new terrorist group, called Al Qaeda, bombed the US embassy. The threat has not been extinguished and has manifested itself in recent years by tourist kidnappings and the odd bomb here and there. The threat has been exacerbated by the incursion

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of Kenyan troops in south Somalia in October 2011 to rid that area and particularly the port city of Kismayo of Al Shebaab terrorists. While the area is under garrison by African Union in Somalia (AMISOM) troops now, the bulk of the terrorists melted away to fight another day. So while democracy reigns in Kenya, there are real security threats.

But it is worth noting that Canada supports the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) hosted by the Kenyan defence forces in the Karen district of Nairobi. This centre supports a variety of training for regional civil and military forces including peace support operations and logistics. Canada funds the participation of two Canadian majors who act as trainers and has contributed to the infrastructure of the centre both through the Military Training and Cooperation Programme (MTCP, formerly MTAP) and the peace-building and support funds offered by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Much has been achieved and the challenge now is to ensure that the host nations with its partners can make the centre sustainable without support from Canada and other international supporters.

...most Africans have little respect for their politicians who they see as self-serving and corrupt.

Somalia was noted above as a country which exports terrorists to the region. The country had been without a functioning government since 1991, riven by various clans and warlords. The relatively fair election of a new president and parliament in 2012 augurs well for the future. But issues of governance and sustainability loom large.

The terrorist group Al Shebaab has not disappeared in the face of huge efforts against it not least in Mogadishu, the capital. During the 2011 humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa thousands of Somalis died whilst trying to flee the drought that killed their animals and devastated their pasture.

Aid offered by the international community and delivered by the World Food Programme was stolen by terrorists and other criminals and either not given to the affected people or was taxed before they could have it. The operating environment became so difficult that aid operations had to be suspended. And of course Somalia and its lawless coast was the haven for many pirates who highjacked ships and crews for ransom for several years.

While the incidence of these activities has diminished they are not over as many young Somalis with 'nothing to lose' try their luck at making money. It will take many years of concerted international effort and better governance by the new government of Somalia before that country is safe again.

It is not often that one has the privilege of being at the birth of a new nation, but I was at Independence Day in Juba, South Sudan on 9 July 2011. This is truly a country starting from scratch having finally negotiated its separation from Khartoum.

Capacity among the South Sudanese is low with a need to establish ministries, a proper justice system, health care and all the rest that a war weary population hopes for

from its peace dividend. But threats continue to exist from the north, borders have not been properly demarcated and there are disputes over the oil rich Abiye region.

Sudan has its own challenges (its president, General Omar al-Bashir, is an indicted war criminal). Insecure areas such as Kordofan make the whole region a tinderbox.

Both countries and their leaders will need to show much cooperation and forbearance moving forward. And both leaders are under pressure from their own people. Doing the right thing to ensure the human and other security for the population requires great leadership.

Lastly, let me mention Rwanda for several years the poster country of good behaviour under President Kigame. It is hard to believe at how far this country has developed since the genocide of 1994. While it would be naïve to suggest that tensions between the Tutsi and Hutu have completely disappeared, the country operates now on a non-tribal-identification. And memories are long. But Kigali is a city that works and the standard of governance in the central administration is high.

Corruption, by east African standards, is low. But there are huge discrepancies in prosperity between the capital and the rural areas. Health and education are not yet evenly available to all. But to the disappointment of many Rwanda (Kigame) supporters there is sufficient evidence that the role of Rwanda in nurturing uprising in the Eastern Congo has been far from benign. While the government has denied a direct involvement, evidence would indicate otherwise. This has placed much of the positive progress in Rwanda in jeopardy as the donor community reassesses its support to the country. In the meantime, the people suffer.

How are Africans combating these issues? The institutional security architecture is large and growing. The African Union based in Addis Ababa has a robust if not always effective defence and security policy. It is the AU which fields AMISOM in Somalia, largely populated by Ugandan and Burundian troops who are trained by the U.S. and U.K.

The AU tried to mediate the stand-off in the Ivory Coast two years ago when the presidential election results were hotly contested. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has done useful work on South Sudan and the problems in East Congo. Regional bodies such as South African Development Community (SADC), in southern Africa, and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) in western Africa all play a role. But the reality is that these mechanisms are only as effective as peer suasion can be.

In the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC) we have seen that many African nations view the court as "the West ganging up on Africa." President Bashir of Sudan moves about the continent freely, and Kenya now has a president-elect who is under ICC indictment: so much for the rule of law.

This short survey has tried to signal that the African continent remains diverse, exciting and potentially rewarding. But it also has huge challenges most of its own making although the colonial legacy of ill-drawn borders, land distribution and governing systems still cast a long shadow.

Despotic leadership has not yet been fully removed

and a culture of impunity reigns in many countries. In my experience, most Africans have little respect for their politicians who they see as self-serving and corrupt. While we in the West promote 'democracy' largely crafted in our form, much African governance depends on tribalism, family ties and, in some cases, religion. But the challenge is not the same for every country. Those like Mauretania (largely desert) will

have a tough road whatever happens. Others such as Kenya and South Sudan show great promise if the governance can be made right and security assured in the region.

We all have a role to play in taking an interest in the future of Africa and by working cooperatively with Africans to the betterment of their continent. It is not just about containing terrorism although that is part of it, but the people of the continent deserve better. ©

Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities – The Jenkins Panel

Major-General (Ret'd) David Fraser

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) need ongoing support in fulfilling its missions. The Jenkins Report contains recommendations to the Federal government on a strategy for developing key industrial capabilities (KICs) that meet the needs of the CAF while promoting innovation and growth. The six sets of KICs that are included in the report are outlined in this article.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are typically in the public eye during times of natural disaster or during operations like Libya, Afghanistan or Haiti. The CAF have distinguished themselves throughout Canada's history and have always been ready to serve. Their role has not changed much over the years, although the environment continues to change dramatically. What is not well known or understood is the role of the CAF in supporting and enhancing Canada's industrial base.

In the fall of 2012, the government commissioned a panel on defence procurement, chaired by Tom Jenkins, to make recommendations on a strategy for developing Key Industrial Capabilities (KICs) that meet the needs of the CAF while promoting innovation and growth. This panel took as its starting point the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), which provides stable long-term funding and a roadmap for the modernization of the CAF over a 20-year period. The CFDS commits to a total investment of \$490 billion in personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure. While budget cuts will probably affect this number, the panel recommendations offer options in support of defence requirements in this new fiscal environment. Irrespective of the exact number, the government intends to use the unique opportunity created by CFDS to support the competitiveness of Canadian industry. While a significant number of CFDS procurements have occurred or are currently in progress, many others are forthcoming and represent the potential for leveraging very substantial long-term economic benefit for Canada.

Along with four other eminently qualified people, I was asked to join this panel. Following thirty-plus years of service and many operational tours, I found myself engaged in a conversation that had everything to do with the military,

but not in the areas well known to me or most of my former brethren. I was used to writing statements of requirement, and whether in peace or at war, needed equipment to arrive for deployment in places like the Gulf, Libya and Afghanistan. (The only difference was the increased speed at which operational requirements were achieved during times of conflict.)

The CAF need ongoing support in fulfilling its missions at home and abroad, but there is more that we in uniform need to do in order to help promote sovereign capability and create jobs and growth. The CFDS represents an opportunity to achieve these objectives. Operational requirements are paramount and the panel's report acknowledges this. The report provides opportunities for the military leadership to become more engaged in the ongoing dialogue with their governmental brethren in meeting the needs of the CAF and our nation.

The Canadian defence industry represents approximately 2,000 companies, more than 70,000 employees and \$12 billion in annual revenues. This is an important part of the "system of systems" that supports the CAF. Working closely together we can achieve more, making Canada stronger and more globally competitive. Witnesses to the panel repeatedly pointed to the inter-relationship between industry and the CAF. This inter-relationship is not just for the procurement departments to manage; it is also of great importance to the chain of command.

Operations depend on secure lines of communication and support. Those secure lines cannot be guaranteed if they are all outsourced. As fewer service providers are needed in response to reduced defence spending by the United States and many of our NATO allies, it behoves the chain of command to engage with Canadian industry on satisfying our sovereign needs. This engagement will ensure that the CAF get the equipment and support when they need it most. We should base our decisions first and foremost on what is in the best long-term interests of our country and the men and women who stand on guard for us.

Evidence provided to the panel indicated that every dollar spent on defence generates 1.7 dollars in our economy. I am all for spending money at home to ensure that the CAF have what they need, while generating wealth that reinforces every aspect of our nation.

Major-General (Ret'd) David Fraser served as the Commander of the Multinational Brigade in Kandahar, Afghanistan, beginning in February of 2006. He was awarded the Vimy Award by the CDA Institute in the same year. Major-General (Ret'd) Fraser retired from the Canadian Armed Forces to the private sector, in 2011, where he works in raising capital and acquiring businesses as part of North America's leading producer of clean protein. He is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

The members of the CAF now have another role in serving their nation—supporting Canadian industrial capability.

Every company who presented to the panel was asked the following question: how were you created? In every case, it was through an initial government contract. The defence market is not a free market, and all governments use their defence organizations to support domestic industrial capability. It is time we do the same; we cannot rely on others to defend our nation.

We recommended to the government six sets of KICs where Canada is, or has the potential to be, world-class: Arctic and Maritime Surveillance; Protecting the Soldier; Command and Support; Cyber-Security; Training Systems; and In-Service Support. It is important to note that these areas of focus do not cover all of the CFDS procurement, but rather those activities that offer the best opportunity to create lasting jobs and wealth for Canadians. The proposed KICs encompass about a quarter of the value of Canada's planned defence procurement.

To ensure the best possible outcome for these investments, we recommend that the government adopt a KICs-centric approach to its defence procurement policies, as well as to complementary supply-side support programs. This may well require significant changes in procurement policies and programs for KICs-related areas.

Afghanistan demonstrated to me that the support the CAF took for granted was tested during this operation.

When we needed mine-proof vehicles we had to wait for production because everyone else was buying the same equipment. We bought many pieces of equipment offshore because no capability existed in Canada. While the equipment was received, it took time and risks were managed every day until equipment was obtained.

The government has decided to re-evaluate our industrial capability. As a former commander, I cannot think of anything more important than to have more Canadian-controlled capability that supports the CAF. The recommendations by this panel will do much to build upon the capability and reputation of our men and women in uniform who now have good reason to engage with their industrial counterparts in the name of enhancing national security.

The key takeaway for me is the opportunity to do more with Canadian industry. Investing at home to ensure that the equipment we need for operations is not a theoretical exercise; rather, it is the reality of today's complex environment. Having the capability in this country means not only the resources needed by the CAF, it also means ensuring that more options are open to the government. A strong Canadian industrial base that assures security of supply will enhance our operational capability throughout the entire system, and the recommendations of the panel will offer new opportunities for the senior leadership in the Forces to engage in a broader discussion of what all of us can do working together. ©

Budget 2013 – Good News for Defence Procurement?

David Perry

Budget 2013 was less immediately consequential for the Department of National Defence than its predecessors.

After three successive budgets focused on improving the federal government's fiscal position, Budget 2013 represents a break. The absence of further cuts to program spending appears to signal the end (at least temporarily) of the current round of fiscal austerity. While there had been significant speculation ahead of the budget that defence might be facing more cutbacks, post-budget media coverage almost completely ignored the implications for defence.

Despite this omission, Budget 2013 might ultimately prove to be even more consequential over the long term than the previous austerity budgets, due to its implications for military procurement.

Within its third chapter, "Supporting Jobs and Growth", and subsection 3.2, on "Helping Manufactures and Businesses Succeed in the Global Economy", Budget 2013 offers a four-page endorsement of the recently released report *Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities*, led by Tom Jenkins.

The Jenkins report, commissioned by the Government, was tasked with identifying key industrial capabilities (KICs), and recommended a number of changes to Canadian military procurement practices aimed at using it to "create jobs and economic growth, while enhancing Canada's ability to protect its sovereignty."¹ Recognizing that many other industrialized countries have strategies to promote their defence sectors, the Budget endorsed the Jenkins proposal to use KICs and stated that the Jenkins report's recommendations on selecting KICs would be expedited this spring.

In addition, the budget reiterated its pledge from Budget 2012 to reform procurement practices, to include "thorough and rigorous option analyses, a challenge function for military requirements, early and frequent industry engagement, and strengthened oversight with the use of third-party expertise."² According to Finance Department officials in the budget lock-up, these measures are not attached to any additional funding, but are indications of a new approach.

The change in approach was confirmed in the Department's Reports on Plans and Priorities (RPP) document. The RPP states, as the department's first step under an initiative to improve defence procurement, that:

"Defence will support the Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) in the development and promulgation of procurement strategy to optimize the economic impact of defence procurement and better position Canadian defence and security industry to be globally competitive by developing a strategy that is consistent with Departmental priorities and interests, while being supportive of the wider socio-economic goals of the Government of Canada."³

As a result of these measures, it is clear that maximizing the economic impact to the Canadian economy will be a major focus on the Harper government's approach to defence procurement. What impact this will have on DND at present, is not evident at this point.

On the one hand, as the Jenkins report acknowledges, "A KICs-centred defence procurement strategy would not be without cost,"⁴ citing both the potential for additional risk attached to domestic suppliers supporting sophisticated products or a price premium relative to the lowest cost globally. The latter case would be particularly problematic, as the budgets for the current slate of Canadian defence procurements were fixed in 2008, so any increase in costs associated with a changed procurement approach could erode fixed budgets. Similarly, any attendant delay associated with the review and process changes required to introduce this new focus might lead to further delays in a procurement process that is already facing significant delays.

On the other hand, such an approach might offer DND some significant advantages. If the economic benefits to Canadians of defence procurement increase, so too might the political benefits of ensuring its success. Leveraging procurement thus offers the prospect of increasing both Liberal and NDP support for the current slate of procurements.

If a greater emphasis is placed on economic benefits, otherwise contentious procurement files may face less public opposition. One of the reasons that the National Shipbuilding procurement Strategy has received cross partisan support is undoubtedly the clear domestic industrial benefits it affords. While replicating such support will not ease the passage of a procurement file through the bureaucratic process on its own, it might give it additional positive attention at the political level, and prevent the introduction of further possible delay if a file faces significant outside scrutiny, as with the case of the CF-18 replacement. (As the benefits to domestic industry appear to be relatively straight forward – a greater share of Canadian defence procurement budget for Canadian companies – they are not considered here in detail,

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but are obviously potentially consequential.)

Rationalizing this new approach will have to be done rapidly, as the RPP 2013-14 indicates that the magnitude of defence procurement will be increasing sharply. Multiple factors have resulted in procurement delays and a resulting significant under-spending, and re-profiling of defence capital acquisition funds over the last several years. As a result, spending on Equipment Acquisition and Disposal has been much lower than originally planned under the Canadian First Defence Strategy.


The RPP 2013-2014, however, indicates that this [equipment spending] will jump significantly, to just under \$4 billion in 2014-2015.

Final spending on this category in 2011/2012 was \$2.4 billion, much lower than the planned \$3.5 billion. Recognizing this problem, DND proactively adjusted its planned spending, initiating a multi-year re-profiling of capital funds in Budget 2012. As a result, the plan for equipment spending in 2013-2014 is for it to increase to \$2.9 billion. The RPP 2013-2014, however, indicates that this will jump significantly, to just under \$4 billion in 2014-2015.

Hopefully, the process of instituting the changes needed to refocus defence program spending will not jeopardize the plan to accelerate a significantly delayed procurement plan.

These changes would be problematic as the RPP indicates that delay in some projects remains endemic, as a number of projects are facing major project milestone delays of a year or more, relative the previous plans. These projects include Fixed Wing Search and Rescue, The Joint Support Ship, and the Tank Replacement Project. The latter in particular highlights the complexity of even those projects that do not dominate headlines. Despite the fact that the first tanks acquired under this project were fielded in theatre in August 2007, the project will not be completed until the purchased Dutch Leopards are fully converted to replace those acquired on loan from the Germans.

The Maritime Helicopter Project, on the other hand, which has been in the news of, is even more notable for facing



*Leopard tank
DND Photo*


delays of multiple years for some milestones, with the first delivery of a fully capable aircraft and final project delivery having slipped two and three years respectively. Finally, the project to replace the CF-18 is now in a state of flux pending the outcome of the New Fighter Secretariat review, and all of its project milestones have been removed.⁵

In sum, the Defence aspects of Budget 2013 are primarily oriented towards procurement. Although this file continues to face a number of delays, the plans for the next fiscal year indicate that progress will accelerate significantly. If the changes envisioned under the Jenkins report can increase the political support for this spending, than perhaps this aspect of the Harper government's defence program can get back on track.

(Endnotes)

- 1 Canada. Economic Action Plan 2013. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2013, 107.
- 2 Ibid., p. 108.
- 3 Canada, Report on Plans and Priorities 2013-14 Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 37.
- 4 Jenkins, et al. *Canada First* Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, February 2013, p. 3.
- 5 Canada, 2012-13 RPPs - Status Report on Transformational and Major Crown Projects. Ottawa, Department of National defence, 2012, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2012-2013/info/mcp-gpe-eng.asp#dnd>. Canada, Status Report on Transformational and Major Crown Projects. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2013. <http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/sites/internet-eng.aspx?page=15294>

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WAR IN THE ST. LAWRENCE

Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein

Roger Sarty. War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada's Shores. Allen Lane, 2012. \$34.00. ISBN 978-0-670-06787-9.

Revisionist history has earned itself a bad name. Holocaust deniers have regularly made fools of themselves, while others, equally silly, argue that Stalin loved dogs and children or Winston Churchill paid the price for not surrendering in 1940 by losing the British Empire. But good revisionism does what its name suggests—it revises our understanding of the past with new groundbreaking evidence and new interpretations of the old. In that proper sense, Roger Sarty's *War in the St Lawrence: The Forgotten U-Boat Battles on Canada's Shores* is the best kind of persuasive, compelling history.

Sarty has long been one of Canada's very best historians. He worked for many years at the Directorate of History at National Defence Headquarters where he wrote large sections of the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy histories of the Second World War and mastered the Canadian, Allied and German sources. Then he went to the Canadian War Museum (when I was Director and CEO) and took charge of developing the historical galleries in the very successful new museum on LeBreton Flats in Ottawa. Now he is the Professor of Naval, Military, and Canadian History at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo and the editor of *Canadian Military History*, the country's best military history journal.

He is well qualified to write on the Battle of the St Lawrence, the U-Boat war in the Gulf of St Lawrence that initially ran for five months in 1942 and then again resumed two years later for another five-month period in 1944. The received version is that the Germans, sinking eighteen merchantmen, the crowded ferry *Caribou*, a US Army transport, three RCN warships, and killing some 366 men, women and children, won the battle and forced the Canadian government to shut down ocean-going traffic in the Gulf in 1942.

How did they do this? Those losses in the Gulf, while serious enough, pale in comparison to the 2,772 merchant ships lost in the Battle of the Atlantic. The North Atlantic was the critical sector, the Gulf of St Lawrence a secondary one. But they were Canadian home waters and, the argument goes, the RCN and RCAF were ineffective in fighting the enemy submarines. Too often the stricken merchant ships were destroyed in sight of villages in the Gaspé, feeding Quebec's increasingly strident demands that more be done to protect the homeland rather than sending Canadian military resources overseas. Thus, historians have said, these attacks

led the Mackenzie King government to close the Gulf to shipping in September 1942. The enemy had forced Canada to abandon its major summer shipping route and to effectively shut down Montréal, the port that handled most bulk cargo for Britain. The nation's railways, already overburdened by wartime traffic, now had even more goods to carry. A huge victory for Hitler and the Nazis, a grave defeat for Canada and the Allies.

In very effective prose, carefully based on massive and recent research, Sarty blows this argument completely out of the water. First, he demonstrates that shipping began to be diverted from St Lawrence to Atlantic ports in 1941—before the U-Boat attacks. The reason was clear: its own shipyards unable to deal with all merchant ship repairs,

Britain was desperate to see more work done on the Canadian Atlantic coast, and this could only happen if a stable year-round workforce could be created and sustained in Halifax and Saint John. If the 750 ships that ordinarily loaded in Montreal in the shipping season could be serviced instead in Atlantic ports, workers in the shipyards could be assured of steady work, and that goal could be achieved.

Moreover, as Sarty notes, before the U-Boat attacks began, the Royal Canadian Navy had called for a substantial diversion of merchant shipping to ease its desperate shortage of convoy escorts. So great was the pressure on the ocean convoys that even before the German successes in September 1942, the RCN had urged the complete closing of the St Lawrence to ocean traffic in 1943.

And what led the government to act in the autumn of 1942 was less the U-boat attacks in the Gulf, serious though they were, than the urgent request of Winston Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the RCN send every available escort to help cover the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942. Closing the St Lawrence freed up escorts to help protect the critical invasion convoys. In other words, there were genuine strategic demands that required shutting down Gulf traffic. These are important points that somehow had largely escaped notice before.

Even more striking, Sarty looks at the Canadian naval and air effort and argues convincingly that they were in fact pretty effective. First, he notes that the Gulf waters were very narrow in places and layered with warmer water at the surface and colder water below. The narrow waters helped the U-boats pick their spots to lie in wait, and the layering made it very difficult for the defenders to use their


ASDIC to good effect. The U-boats had clear advantages, even if Gulf traffic, as it ordinarily did, moved in convoys, but with rather weak escorts of minesweepers or smaller vessels. But the convoy commanders soon changed their regular routes and varied their sailing times, complicating the submariners' tasks, and the RCAF stepped up its patrols substantially, the air presence forcing the U-boats to dive more frequently.

As the German records show, the U-boats abandoned the Gulf in late 1942 because of the effectiveness of the defences. There was no resumption of enemy attacks until 1944 when the new Snorkel breathing tubes let U-boats recharge their batteries without surfacing, a huge

technological and tactical advantage that was partially countered by the Canadians' better use of intelligence and effective air patrols. The German efforts in 1944 resulted in only one damaged merchantman and one naval vessel sunk and another damaged. The RCN and RCAF defenders, Sarty argues persuasively, in fact did their job well.

The only battle to take place within Canada's boundaries during the Second World War, the struggle in the Gulf of St Lawrence has been almost forgotten. When remembered at all, it has always been painted as a defeat. Sarty's research and his fine book has changed this for good. Done as well as it is here, revisionist history definitely has its place. ©

BOOK REVIEW



The Taliban Don't Wave

Reviewed by Arnav Manchanda

Semrau, Robert. The Taliban Don't Wave. John Wiley & Sons, Mississauga ON, Canada, © October 30 2012. \$17.52 (paperback) ISBN 978-1-11826-118-7 (print); 978-1-118-26160-6 (ebk)

In October 2010, Canadians learned that Captain Robert Semrau had been demoted in rank and kicked out of the Canadian Forces for the crime of shooting a severely wounded Taliban fighter on the battlefield in Afghanistan. My initial reaction was surprise that a so-called “mercy kill” was a crime, homicide on the battlefield. As I read more about his case, the outline of a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't scenario that must have faced Semrau that fateful day in October 2008 became clear: shooting the wounded fighter was against the rules, but leaving him out there to die a slow and agonizing death without any medical attention was wrong.

It was in this mindset that I picked up Semrau's *The Taliban Don't Wave*, hoping to understand the context behind which Semrau made his fateful decision. And context is something you get in spades with this book, which is about his experiences during his second tour of Afghanistan in 2008, as a member of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) charged with mentoring Afghan soldiers and their officers.

Semrau had previously served in Afghanistan in 2002 as a member of the British Army's Parachute Regiment. He does not delve into his experiences at this time, apart from describing a couple of extremely chaotic scenes in Kabul and writing that the “Paras' love of a good riot was almost matched by their love of putting down a good riot ... It was utter madness!” There is no explanation of how he moved from the British to the Canadian army, or any further details of his first tour. This is an odd omission.

Semrau's objective is to provide the reader with a deeper understanding of what happens in war, and he does this very effectively by communicating the sights, sounds and even the “stink of the Stan” through his extremely vivid recounting of events. The narrative is filled with campy dialogue laced with pop culture references (Star Wars, Aliens, Indiana Jones, Dungeons and Dragons, Lord of the Rings – I could go on), and Semrau's aw-shucks, small town boy from Moose Jaw, SK attitude shines through.

However, readers should not mistake the unrefined

writing for vapidness. Indeed, *The Taliban Don't Wave* is the most informative account of service in Afghanistan I've read, an intelligent, precise, and overwhelming portrayal of the heat, contradictions, and raw violence of war.

The reader experiences the war vicariously. We walk through Kandahar Air Field, a massive place where “the dark side of the Force was very strong”, constantly under siege from the Taliban but filled with western fast food and even a Chechen massage parlour. We experience “The Fear” from riding on IED infested roads and walking through ambush-laden villages. The microcosm of the war that Semrau and his team operated within is a petri-dish for scholars interested in actual practice of certain high profile aspects of the war in Afghanistan. We experience the chaos of battle: “PKM rounds, RPGs, C8s and C9s on full auto, M203 grenades firing: it was pure unadulterated madness!” We laugh at Afghan border guards high on drugs, dismantle IEDs with our bare hands, and shake our heads at Afghan soldiers who manage to set their own base kitchen on fire. We engage with two-faced village elders, spot the Taliban spotters, and chase Fighting Age Males dressed in man jammies through alleyways. We taste the dust from a speeding vehicle, feel the searing burn and backwash from an Afghan bazooka, and wince at the slam of a forehead into a low ceiling. We experience the rituals of soldiers' camaraderie, and the heartache of having to comfort but also command a comrade who has lost the will to fight in combat. We share a base with the Afghan National Army (ANA), deal with disgusting toilets on an epic scale, and laugh at the mis-interpreted conversations between Canadians and Afghans (including one unfortunate translation of “motherfucker”). We deal with risk-averse Canadian majors, know-it-all Afghan officers, and ridiculous rules of engagement that make us ponder the “deep mysteries of trying to fight a war in the age of political correctness”. We hesitate between saying “persons of interest” and “detainees” over the radio. We experience the difficulties of mentoring a schizophrenic ANA, who are at times “like a bunch of steroid-infected, rageaholic Rambos who couldn't wait to close with and kill the enemy, preferably with their bare teeth,” and at other times the mentoring experience being “akin to trying to teach university-level courses to small children with severe discipline issues who liked to bring knives to school.” We get a sense of Semrau the officer, firm, fair and humorous, with an eponymous guarantee that he “didn't hold anything back

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or whitewash over the scary parts” with his men, or that “any time you could quote Yoda in a war zone, it was a good day.”

And if anyone is wondering why the book has its unique title, let’s just say that if you’re in battle in Afghanistan under potentially friendly fire from the air, start waving your arms like crazy and smile really wide.

When it comes to the mercy kill incident in October 2008 that would change his life, Semrau abruptly and briefly switches to reprinting what is available in the public record from his court martial, deliberately declining to provide a firsthand account. In an interview with CBC in September 2012, Semrau asserted that some memories were difficult to deal with, and that that particular incident is something he was not willing to talk about. But at the same time, he writes that he felt he was unfairly not provided with a right during his court martial to recount what had happened. But neither does he do it in the book – and this is very odd.

Semrau holds the investigative process that led to his demotion and dismissal in extremely low regard. He

wonders if any of the five members of his court martial had “ever been shot at”, “heard a bullet” or “been literally soaked in another man’s blood, or held a fellow soldier as he was dying.” These are powerful words, but they lack explanatory power as to why he continues to not provide us with his side of the story. He does not provide the reader with the details of that particular incident, and thus the reader cannot fully ever – while perhaps wanting to – empathize with him and his actions. Perhaps he did not want to use the dead insurgent as an excuse for his behaviour in an issue that became so politicized, saying that the “truth of that moment will always be between me and the insurgent.” Or perhaps he invokes a battlefield exceptionalism, in line with those who believe that those who have experienced the reality of combat stand apart from those who have not.

But perhaps the deliberate, frustrating and frustratingly deliberate omission provides the best description of Semrau himself: intensely passionate, obstinate, and a tiny bit rebellious. ©



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