

# ON TRACK




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L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense  
Hiver 2013 / 14 • Volume 18, Numéro 2



## Asia-Pacific - Time for a Canadian Pacific Pivot?

- Can a security shift be far behind?
- Discussions between the CDA Institute and CISS



## Procurement - So defence procurement is broken again – or is this just normal?

- Procuring Canada's new fighter – what went wrong?







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ON TRACK is published by the CDA Institute.

**Mission Statement.** Through the pages of ON TRACK it is the goal of the CDA Institute to see the Federal government adopt and fund credible defence and security policies for Canada. It is intended that ON TRACK facilitate the development of such policies through informed discussion and debate of defence and security issues that have an impact on the strategic interests of Canada and on the safety of its citizens. The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.

ON TRACK est publié par l'Institut de la CAD.

**Énoncé de mission.** À travers les pages de ON TRACK, l'Institut de la CAD a comme but d'inciter le gouvernement fédéral à adopter et financer des politiques de défense et de sécurité crédibles pour le Canada. On souhaite que ON TRACK facilite le développement de telles politiques par le biais d'une discussion et d'un débat éclairés sur des enjeux de défense et de sécurité qui ont un impact sur les intérêts stratégiques du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

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## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (Ret'd) Alain M. Pellerin



At the CDA Institute we are working hard to find policy solutions to the many defence and security challenges that Canada faces. We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research with policymakers, politicians, academics, and the public, we promote change in the policies of our federal government for the betterment of our country.

*ON TRACK*, the Institute's journal, provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters. This winter edition features articles of current interest in the areas of the Annual Graduate Student Symposium, defence procurement, the Canadian Army, Afghanistan, Op HUSKY 2013, Canada's Arctic, the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, ballistic missile defence, Georgia, Asia-Pacific, RMC Saint-Jean's Wall of Fame, and the Abbottabad Commission Report.

**Rob Cook**, the CDA Institute's project officer, provides a report on the proceedings of the 16<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium, with the theme of *Canada's Security Interests*. The symposium showcased the high calibre of research being pursued by graduate students across Canada. The event was made possible with the outstanding financial assistance of Bombardier Aerospace and by the ongoing financial and in-kind support provided by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Dr. John Scott Cowan, and RMCC.

In the summer 2013 issue of *Canadian Naval Review* (Vol. 9, No. 2), **Dr. Eric Lerhe** discusses the Royal Canadian Navy's current "Three Ocean" posture and points out the constraints imposed by historic international political affiliations, naval resource limitations, and the requirements created through new Canadian international trade and political aspirations. We are pleased to include in this issue of *ON TRACK* a reprint of Dr. Lerhe's editorial, courtesy of the editor of *Canadian Naval Review*.

The recent deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces to provide humanitarian support to the Philippines, following a typhoon that hit the country on 8 November, has brought to the attention of Canadians the goodwill that we can demonstrate in Asia. In *Canada's Economic Shift to Asia: Can a Security Shift Be Far Behind?* **Len Edwards** writes that Canadian governments and businesses must be prepared to commit the time and effort to the Asia-Pacific region in order to, among other things, be counted on as a long-term economic partner.

**General (Ret'd) Ray Henault**, President of the CDA Institute, visited China recently, at the invitation of the China International Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS).

À l'Institut de la CAD nous travaillons ferme à trouver des solutions politiques aux nombreux défis auxquels le Canada fait face en matière de défense et de sécurité. Nous croyons que des politiques de défense et de sécurité efficaces doivent être fondées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et sur des options politiques raisonnées. En partageant les résultats de nos recherches avec les auteurs de politiques, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous faisons la promotion du changement dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour l'amélioration de notre pays.

*ON TRACK*, la revue de l'Institut, offre un support au débat éclairé et non partisan sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Ce numéro d'hiver des articles d'intérêt actuel dans les domaines du Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, du processus d'acquisition, de l'Armée canadienne, de l'Afghanistan, de l'Op HUSKY 2013, de l'Arctique canadien, du Avion de combat interarmées F-35 Lightning II, de la défense antimissile balistique, de la Géorgie, de l'Asie-Pacifique, du Mur de la renommée du CMR Saint-Jean et du rapport de la Commission Abbottabad.

**Rob Cook**, l'officier de projets de l'Institut de la CAD, propose un rapport sur les actes du 16<sup>ème</sup> symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, sous le thème *Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité*. Le symposium a mis en lumière le calibre élevé de la recherche en cours par les étudiants diplômés à travers le Canada. Le symposium a été rendu possible grâce à l'exceptionnelle aide financière de Bombardier Aerospace et au soutien continu en nature du l'Institut Canadien de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères, de M. John Scott Cowan et du CMRC.

Dans le numéro d'été 2013 de la *Canadian Naval Review* (Vol. 9, No. 2), **M. Eric Lerhe** discute de la position « *Trois Océans* » actuelle de la Marine royale canadienne et souligne les contraintes imposées par les affiliations politiques internationales historiques, les limites imposées aux ressources navales et les besoins créés par le biais des nouvelles aspirations internationales du Canada en matière de commerce international et de relations politiques. Nous sommes heureux d'inclure dans le présent numéro de *ON TRACK* une réimpression de l'éditorial de M. Lerhe, gracieuseté du rédacteur de la *Canadian Naval Review*.

Le récent déploiement des Forces armées canadiennes afin de dispenser un soutien humanitaire aux Philippines suite au typhon qui a frappé le pays le 8 novembre a porté à l'attention des Canadiens la bonne volonté dont nous pouvons faire montre en Asie. Dans l'article *Canada's Economic Shift to Asia: Can a Security Shift Be Far Behind?* **Len Edwards** écrit que les gouvernements et les milieux

He provides a summary of discussions held with CISS representatives, in *China's strategic concerns: discussions between the CDA Institute and CISS*.

**Colonel George Petrolekas** recently traveled to China on behalf of the CDA Institute to attend a conference on security cooperation in the Pacific. In *China - all that glitters is not gold*, he explores the non-military impressions he made of China during his visit.

Former ambassador **Marius Grinius** notes, in *North Korea: Now What?*, that it is timely to review the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and reflect on what Canada could do to contribute to a lasting peaceful resolution for Koreans divided at the 38th parallel.

Former ADM-Materiel **Dan Ross** provides an overview, in *So Defence Procurement is broken again - or is this just normal?*, of the challenges that project management staff face in handling defence procurement projects, and proposes some prescriptions.

**Richard Shimooka** and **General (Ret'd) Paul Manson** view the Conservative government's attempt to replace Canada's ageing fleet of CF-18 Hornets with the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter as an unmitigated disaster. In *Procuring Canada's new fighter - what went wrong?*, they examine seven factors that plague the project's progress.

Following his retirement as Commander of the Canadian Army, **Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Peter Devlin** provides us with his review of the activities of the Canadian Army under his command, in *Command of the Canadian Army*.

**Colonel Peter Williams** commanded the multinational Kabul Military Training Centre for a year. In his article, *Advising at the Kabul Military Training Centre*, Colonel Williams outlines the progress of the Afghan National Army in building up a national force of some 195,000.

On 10 July 1943, 160,000 troops from Canada, Britain, and the United States engaged in what was then the biggest invasion in history: the Allied landings in Sicily. In *Op HUSKY 2013*, **Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg** provides a background to the events that led to a modern campaign commemorating the Sicilian campaign that began 70 years ago.

Since 2007, the Canadian Armed Forces has conducted a series of increasingly sophisticated exercises in the Canadian Arctic. The largest and best known of these is Operation *Nanook*. The Institute's senior defence analyst **David Perry** writes, in *Operation Nanook - A Model for Contingency Response across Canada*, on the activities of this year's iteration.

Media coverage of threats being issued by North Korea has precipitated renewed discussion of ballistic missile defence (BMD). In a commentary in *FrontLine Defence* Issue 3, 2013, **Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald** posits that there is a strong case to be made that the deployment of a BMD system would actually contribute to stability without any real perturbation of the strategic nuclear balance. We are pleased to reprint Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Macdonald's commentary, courtesy of the Editor of *FrontLine Defence*.

**Pierre Jolicoeur** provides an assessment of the political competition between Russia and the nations of the

d'affaires canadiens doivent être prêts à engager le temps et l'effort qu'il faut vers la région de l'Asie-Pacifique, afin, entre autre, d'être compté comme un partenaire économique à long terme.

Le **général (ret.) Ray Henault**, président de l'Institut de la CAD, a récemment visité la Chine à l'invitation du CISS (China International Institute of Strategic Studies). Il donne un sommaire des discussions tenues avec des représentants du CISS dans l'article *China's strategic concerns: discussions between the CDA Institute and CISS*.

Le **colonel George Petrolekas** s'est récemment rendu en Chine au nom de l'Institut de la CAD pour assister à une conférence sur la coopération en matière de sécurité dans le Pacifique. Dans son article *China - all that glitters is not gold*, il explore les impressions non militaires qu'il s'est fait de la Chine durant sa visite.

L'ancien ambassadeur **Marius Grinius** note, dans *North Korea: Now What?*, que le temps est venu d'examiner la situation de la sécurité sur la péninsule coréenne et de réfléchir à ce que le Canada pourrait faire pour contribuer à une situation pacifique durable pour les Coréens divisés au 38<sup>e</sup> parallèle.

L'ancien SMA-Matériel **Dan Ross**, dans *So Defence Procurement is broken again - or is This Just normal?*, expose les difficultés que rencontre le personnel de gestion de projet dans le traitement des projets d'armement de la défense et propose quelques ordonnances.

**Richard Shimooka** et le **général (ret.) Paul Manson** voient la tentative de remplacer le parc vétuste de CF-18 Hornets par l'Avion de combat interarmées F-35 Lightning II comme un désastre monumental. Dans l'article *Procuring Canada's new fighter - what went wrong?*, ils examinent sept facteurs qui entravent les progrès du projet.

Suite à sa retraite comme Commandant de l'Armée canadienne, le **lieutenant-général (ret.) Peter Devlin** nous donne son examen des activités de l'Armée canadienne sous son commandement, sous le titre *Command of the Canadian Army*.

Le **colonel Peter Williams** a commandé le centre de formation militaire multinational de Kaboul pendant un an. Dans son article *Advising at the Kabul Military Training Centre*, le colonel Williams souligne le progrès de l'armée nationale afghane dans l'édification d'une force nationale de quelque 195 000 personnes.

Le 10 juillet 1943, 160 000 hommes du Canada de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis s'engageaient dans ce qui était alors la plus grande invasion de l'histoire : les débarquements en Sicile. Dans *Op HUSKY 2013*, le **capitaine (ret.) Peter Forsberg** nous peint le contexte entourant les événements qui ont mené à une campagne moderne commémorant la campagne de Sicile qui commençait il y a 70 ans.

Depuis 2007, les Forces armées canadiennes ont tenu une série d'exercices de plus en plus sophistiqués dans l'Arctique canadien. Le plus important et le mieux connu de ceux-ci est l'Opération *Nanook*. L'analyste principal de la défense, de l'Institut, **David Perry** nous décrit, dans l'article *Operation Nanook - A Model for Contingency Response across Canada*, on les activités de l'itération de cette année.

south Caucasus, in particular Georgia, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in *Le Caucase comme champ de compétition géopolitique entre l'Occident et l'Orient; l'exemple de la Géorgie*.

On 7 September, **Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire**, Chairman of the CDA, was named to the Hall of Fame of RMC Saint-Jean. Captain (Ret'd) Forsberg reports, in *RMC Saint-Jean's Wall of Fame*, on the occasion for the honour.

Following the May 2011 U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistan launched the Abbottabad Commission to investigate the facts of the event. **Adnan Qaiser** examines the report of the Commission and points out some of the more pertinent details critical to our understanding of the affair, and draws some conclusions, in *A Reluctant Accomplice: dissecting the Abbottabad Commission Report*.

To conclude this edition of *ON TRACK* we are pleased to publish **an interview with Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance**, Deputy Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples. **Ferry de Kerckhove**, Executive Vice-President of the CDA Institute, conducted the interview.

This past November, the CDA Institute held its annual **Vimy Award Dinner**, and was honoured when the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, presented the Vimy Award to Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara before some 700 guests at a reception and formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum.

The evening, under the presidency of General (Ret'd) Raymond Raymond Henault, was dignified by the presence of the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLaughlin, and Mr. Frank McArdle; General Thomas Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Mrs. Kelly Lawson; Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Macnamara and Mrs. Lee Macnamara; previous recipients of the Vimy Award and of the Ross Munro Media Award; Officer Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada and Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean; members of the Canadian Armed Forces; and many other distinguished guests.

The night was filled with colour and ceremony, generously provided by the Regimental Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards, the Regimental Pipes of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, and the Chamber Trio and the Jazz Combo of the Central Band of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The valuable support of our corporate sponsors and CDA members contributed to a very significant event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors appears elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Looking forward to events, the CDA Institute and the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) will present the annual **Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security**, on Thursday and Friday, 20 and 21 February 2014, at the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa. This annual conference is Canada's most important platform from which defence and security issues are explored, and attracts a range of high-level speakers and panellists from Canada and abroad. The event agenda and registration is available online at our website [cdainstitute.ca](http://cdainstitute.ca)

La couverture médiatique des menaces émises par la Corée du Nord a précipité une discussion renouvelée de la défense antimissile balistique. Dans un commentaire publié dans *FrontLine Defence* Numéro 3, 2013, le **lieutenant-général (ret.) George Macdonald** avance qu'il y a gros à plaider que le déploiement d'un système de bouclier antimissile contribuerait réellement à la stabilité sans aucune vraie perturbation de l'équilibre nucléaire stratégique. Nous sommes heureux de réimprimer le commentaire du lieutenant-général (ret.) Macdonald, gracieuseté du rédacteur de *FrontLine Defence*.

**Pierre Jolicoeur** nous livre une évaluation de la compétition entre la Russie et les nations du Caucase du sud, en particulier la Géorgie, depuis la dissolution de l'Union soviétique, dans son article intitulé *Le Caucase comme champ de compétition géopolitique entre l'Occident et l'Orient; l'exemple de la Géorgie*.

Le 7 septembre, le **lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire**, président de la CAD, a été nommé au Mur de la renommée du CMRC Saint-Jean. Dans son article *RMC Saint-Jean's Wall of Fame*, le capitaine (ret.) Forsberg fait rapport de l'occasion de cet honneur.

Suite au raid américain de mai 2011, qui a tué Osama ben Laden, le Pakistan a lancé la Commission Abbottabad pour faire enquête sur les faits qui ont entouré l'événement. **Adnan Qaiser** examine le rapport de la commission et fait ressortir quelques-uns des détails critiques plus importants pour notre compréhension de l'affaire et tire quelques conclusions dans son article *A Reluctant Accomplice: dissecting the Abbottabad Commission Report*.

Pour conclure ce numéro de *ON TRACK* il nous fait plaisir de publier **une entrevue avec le lieutenant-général Jonathan Vance**, commandant adjoint du Commandement des forces interarmées de Naples. C'est **Ferry de Kerckhove**, vice-président exécutif de l'Institut de la CAD qui a fait l'entrevue.

En novembre dernier, l'Institut de la CAD a tenu son **dîner annuel du prix Vimy**, et a été honoré par la remise du prix par la Très honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, au brigadier-général (ret.) W. Don Macnamara devant quelque 700 invités au cours d'une réception et d'un dîner formel au Musée canadien de la guerre.

La soirée, sous la présidence du général (ret.) Raymond Henault, a été relevée par la présence la Très honorable Beverley McLaughlin et M. Frank McArdle, du général Thomas Lawson, chef de l'état-major de la Défense, et Mme Kelly Lawson, du brigadier-général (ret.) Macnamara et Mme Lee Macnamara, de précédents récipiendaires du prix Vimy et du prix médiatique Ross Munro, d'élèves-officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, de membres des Forces armées canadiennes et de nombreux autres distingués invités. La soirée fut remplie de couleurs et de cérémonie généreusement dispensées par la musique régimentaire des Governor General's Foot Guards, des Regimental Pipes of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa et le Trio de chambre et le Combo de jazz de la Musique centrale des Forces armées canadiennes.

Le précieux appui de nos commanditaires et de membres de la CAD a contribué à l'importance de l'activité





L-R: General Thomas Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff; the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLaughlin, Chief Justice of Canada; Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara, recipient of the Vimy Award for 2013; and General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault, President CDA Institute / G-D: le Général Thomas Lawson; la très hon. Beverley McLaughlin, le juge en chef du Canada; le Brigadier-général (ret) W. Don Macnamara, récipiendaire du Prix Vimy 2013; et le Général (ret) Raymond Henault, le Président de l'Institut de la CAD.

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I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfil our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation of \$75 or higher, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months:

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- A discounted registration rate at our annual conference.

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très apprécié de toutes les personnes présentes. Nos remerciements publics que nous offrons à nos entreprises commanditaires paraissent ailleurs de ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Pour ce qui est des activités à venir, l'Institut de la CAD et la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) présenteront la **Conférence annuelle d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité**, le jeudi et le vendredi 20 et 21 février 2014, à l'hôtel Château Laurier d'Ottawa.

Cette conférence annuelle est la plateforme la plus importante du Canada à partir de laquelle les questions de défense et de sécurité sont explorées et elle attire une gamme de conférenciers et de panélistes de haut niveau venant du Canada et de l'étranger. L'ordre du jour et l'inscription se trouvent en ligne, sur notre site Web, à l'adresse [cdainstitute.ca](http://cdainstitute.ca).

Je veux remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux de patrons, compagnons et officiers pour l'appui financier qu'ils accordent au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, sans qui il nous serait difficile d'accomplir notre mandat.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau supporteur, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus

élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :

- Un reçu d'impôt pour don caritatif ;
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- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription à notre conférence annuelle.

Les renseignements et les formulaires à l'intention des donateurs sont disponibles sur notre site Web à l'adresse [cdainstitute.ca](http://cdainstitute.ca).

J'ai maintenant la tâche d'annoncer ma retraite, à la fin de février 2014, en tant que directeur général de l'Institut de la CAD. Je suis venu à l'organisation en juillet 1998 et, pendant la quinzaine d'années qui ont suivi j'ai été témoin

It is now my duty to announce my retirement, as of end-February 2014, as Executive Director of the CDA Institute, following a very rewarding experience fostering the growth of the Institute as well as the CDA. I joined the organization in July 1998, and for the past decade and a half have been witness to the growth of a remarkable organization. Despite the often-challenging financial times, the Institute's mission to provide research support to the CDA and promote informed public debate on national security and defence issues has been an unqualified success, and the Institute has established a solid credibility within the defence community for the quality of its research and public events.

Looking back over these past 15 years, I note the CDA Institute's success in the growth of all our activities, such as the annual Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, the Vimy Award and Dinner, the Graduate Student Symposium, roundtable discussions, the *ON TRACK* magazine, the Vimy Papers, and the many acclaimed research projects that have been undertaken over this period.

This growth has been tremendous. For instance, in 1999 the 17th annual seminar of the Institute was attended by some 250 participants; the 2013 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security (presented jointly with the CDA) drew over 600 participants and hosted prominent speakers and experts from across the nation and the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe. The Ottawa Conference has become the largest public defence and security conference in Canada, and in the words of board member Thomas d'Aquino, a "world class event."

In 1999, some 200 guests attended the Vimy Award Dinner, at which the award was presented to Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Charles H. Belzile by the Hon. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence. This past November, some 700 guests were present from across the defence community in the Canadian War Museum when the Chief Justice of Canada presented the Vimy Award to Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Macnamara. In the words of former CDS and President of the CDA Institute, General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, it has become the Canadian military community's signature annual event.

The first annual Graduate Student Symposium, in 1998, was held in Legion House on Kent Street in Ottawa, at which 8 papers were presented by graduate students. The symposium was attended by some 45 persons. Fast-forward to this past October, when the 16<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium was held at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, attracting 26 graduate presenters from a dozen universities, over 100 attendees from all levels of the defence community, and 3 keynote speakers; the event provided two days of unparalleled professional development for young defence and security scholars.

An initiative in recent years has been a series of roundtable discussion sessions in Ottawa – some 15-20 per year – that are conducted under the Chatham House Rule, where disclosure of the points of discussion are allowed but without attribution. This format has facilitated candid discussion of defence and security topics by policy experts and interested members of the defence community, including members and former members of the Canadian Armed Forces, scholars, Members of Parliament and of the Senate of

de la croissance d'une organisation remarquable. Malgré des moments financiers souvent difficiles, la mission de l'Institut, à savoir, d'offrir un soutien de recherche à la CAD et de promouvoir un débat public éclairé sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationales, a été un succès sans conteste, et l'Institut a établi une solide crédibilité dans les milieux de la défense pour la qualité de sa recherche et de ses activités publiques.

En revoyant ces 15 années passées, je note le succès de l'Institut de la CAD dans la croissance de toutes nos activités, comme l'annuelle Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité, le prix et le dîner Vimy, le Symposium des étudiants diplômés, les discussions en table ronde, la revue *ON TRACK*, les Cahiers Vimy et les nombreux projets de recherche salués par le milieu, qui ont été entrepris au cours de cette période.

Cette croissance a été énorme. Par exemple, en 1999, le 17<sup>ème</sup> séminaire annuel de l'Institut accueillait quelque 250 participants; la Conférence d'Ottawa 2013 sur la défense et la sécurité (présentée conjointement avec la CAD) a attiré plus de 600 participants et a reçu des conférenciers et experts très en vue de tous les coins du pays, ainsi que des États-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et d'Europe. La Conférence d'Ottawa est devenue la conférence publique la plus importante du Canada sur la défense et la sécurité, et, pour emprunter le mot d'un membre du conseil, Thomas d'Aquino, un « événement de calibre mondial ».

En 1999, quelque 200 invités assistaient au dîner du prix Vimy au cours duquel le prix fut remis au lieutenant-général (ret.) Charles H. Belzile par l'Honorable Art Eggleton, ministre de la Défense nationale. En novembre dernier, quelque 700 invités de tous les secteurs des milieux de la défense étaient présents au Musée canadien de la guerre quand la juge en chef du Canada a remis le prix Vimy au brigadier-général (ret.) Macnamara. Comme le disait un ancien CEMD et président de l'Institut de la CAD, le général (ret.) Paul Manson, ce dîner est devenu l'événement annuel signature du monde militaire canadien.

Le premier Symposium des étudiants diplômés, en 1998, s'est tenu à la Legion House, rue Kent, à Ottawa, et 8 communications y furent présentées par des étudiants diplômés. Un saut rapide à octobre dernier, alors que le 16<sup>ème</sup> Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés était tenu au Collège militaire royal du Canada, à Kingston, et attirait des présentations de 26 diplômés d'une douzaine d'universités, en présence de plus de 100 personnes venant de tous les niveaux de la communauté de la défense, et 3 conférenciers de marque; l'activité a offert deux jours de développement professionnel sans parallèle à l'intention des jeunes chercheurs dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité.

Une des initiatives des dernières années a consisté en une série de sessions de discussion en table ronde tenues à Ottawa – de 15 à 30 par année – qui se passent selon la règle de Chatham House, où la divulgation des points de discussion est permise mais sans attribution de source. Ce format a facilité la discussion candide de sujets de défense et de sécurité par des experts en politiques et des membres intéressés de la communauté de la défense, et notamment de membres et d'anciens membres des Forces armées



# ON TRACK

Canada, government officials, and members of the diplomatic corps.

Our *Vimy Paper* series, started during the presidency of General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, has resulted in more than a dozen quality analyses and publications covering critical issues such as defence procurement reform, the Arctic, Asia-Pacific, energy dependency, operations in Afghanistan, and many other topics. The annual edition of the *Strategic Outlook for Canada* has become a widely quoted publication in Canada and abroad.

One other area of success and growth for which we can be proud is the Institute's journal, *ON TRACK*. The Volume 3, Number 2 edition, in 1999, was an eight-page, black and white publication with no photographs. Volume 18, Number 3 is a 40-page, full colour edition that includes articles by many knowledgeable experts in the areas of defence and security.

We have been quick to embrace new technologies and methods for disseminating the results of our events and research, including to more than 3,000 individuals on our mailing list, and through our website and social media presence.

I am grateful for the guidance that has been provided to the Institute by those who have given their time freely, including Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Charles Belzile, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard J. Evraire, Brigadier-General (Ret'd) W. Don Macnamara, General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson, Dr. John Scott Cowan, and, our current President, General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault.

The Institute's Board of Directors, first revitalized during the presidency of General (Ret'd) Manson, has provided the Institute's executive with the benefit of the vast experience of its members, enabling the Institute to grow and gain the widespread credibility it now enjoys. I am also grateful to the dedicated and talented National Office staff, such as Gord Metcalfe, Peter Forsberg, Arnav Manchanda, Dave Perry, Brian MacDonald and Rob Cook, that the CDA Institute has been blessed with.

However, it is now time to step down. I am pleased that Colonel (Ret'd) Tony Battista will follow me as Executive Director of the Institute and of the CDA at the conclusion of the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. Tony has served for almost 40 years in uniform with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Armed Forces.

It has been a privilege for me to serve the defence community - a community that is a valuable contributor to the security of Canada and a community that supports preservation of our democratic values. I look forward to seeing you, our readers and supporters, at the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security.

Merci-bien; au revoir.



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canadiennes, de chercheurs, de députés et de sénateurs, de représentants du gouvernement et de membres du corps diplomatique.

Notre série des *Cahiers Vimy*, lancée pendant la présidence du général (ret.) Paul Manson, a produit plus d'une douzaine d'analyses et de publications de qualité couvrant des enjeux critiques comme la réforme du processus d'acquisition de la défense, l'Arctique, l'Asie-Pacifique, la dépendance énergétique, les opérations en Afghanistan, et de nombreux autres sujets. La publication annuelle des *Perspectives stratégiques pour le Canada* est devenue une publication très citée au Canada et à l'étranger.

Un autre domaine de succès et de croissance dont nous pouvons être fiers est la revue de l'Institut, *ON TRACK*. L'édition du Volume 3, numéro 2, en 1999, contenait huit pages en noir et blanc, sans photo. Le Volume 18, numéro 3 a quarante pages pleine couleur et contient des articles de nombreux experts connaissant bien les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité.

Nous avons su rapidement accueillir à bras ouverts les nouvelles technologies et les nouvelles méthodes de diffusion des résultats de nos activités et de notre recherche, avec plus de 3 000 personnes sur notre liste d'envoi et à travers notre site Web et notre présence sur les médias sociaux.

Je suis reconnaissant à des personnes qui ont librement donné de leur temps, comme le lieutenant-général (ret.) Charles Belzile, le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard J. Evraire, le brigadier-général (ret.) W. Don Macnamara, le général (ret.) Paul D. Manson, M. John Scott Cowan et notre président actuel, le général (ret.) Raymond Henault pour les conseils qu'ils ont prodigués à l'Institut. Le conseil d'administration de l'Institut, d'abord revitalisé sous la présidence du général (ret.) Manson, a donné à la direction de l'Institut le bénéfice de la vaste expérience de ses membres, ce qui a permis à l'Institut de croître et d'acquérir la grande crédibilité dont il jouit présentement. Je suis également reconnaissant envers le personnel dévoué et talentueux du bureau national, Gord Metcalfe, Peter Forsberg, Arnav Manchanda, Dave Perry, Brian MacDonald et Rob Cook, qui sont une bénédiction pour l'Institut.

Mais le temps est maintenant venu de céder la place. Je suis heureux d'annoncer que le colonel (ret.) Tony Battista me succédera comme directeur général de l'Institut et de la CAD à la conclusion de la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et la sécurité. Tony a servi pendant presque 40 ans sous l'uniforme dans l'Aviation royale canadienne et les Forces armées canadiennes.

Ce fut pour moi un privilège de servir la communauté de la défense - une communauté dont la contribution est précieuse pour la sécurité du Canada et une communauté qui soutient la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Au plaisir de vous voir, lecteurs et supporters, à la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et la sécurité.

Merci-bien; au revoir.



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## **With our thanks to the donors to the Defence and Security Fund**

The Defence and Security Fund (DSF) was developed by the CDA Institute in 2011 to support its capacity to inform and influence the debate on security and defence issues that matter to Canadians.

Thanks to the generosity of our donors, we have reached a total of \$457,115 in commitments of current gifts and pledges for future gifts.

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Grâce à la générosité de nos donateurs, nous avons atteint un total de 457,115 \$ d'engagements sous la forme de dons courants et de promesses de dons futurs.

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Pour ceux qui veulent faire un don au FDS, ils sont priés d'aller au site Web de l'Institut de la CAD, au [www.cdainstitute.ca](http://www.cdainstitute.ca), et de suivre le lien vers le formulaire de promesse de don au FDS.

# ON TRACK

## With our thanks to the donors to the CDA Institute Annual Fund

The generosity of our donors enables the CDA Institute to carry on its essential work on behalf of those who require our important research. These papers, which include the recently published Vimy Paper 6, 2013 *The Strategic Outlook for Canada*, the CDA Institute analysis, *Defence Austerity: The Impact to Date (March 2013)*, *Towards an International Model for Canadian Defence Procurement: An F-35 case Study (March 2013)* and papers from the 15<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium – *Canadian Security Interests: Looking Beyond* are circulated in the public domain, and provide factual information to Canadians about the realities and importance of defence and security issues. This means that the public has access to information prepared by the men and women who are in the forefront of defence policy and practice in Canada.

Our Annual Fund donors are listed here. Donors identified as “anonymous” have requested this listing.

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## Avec nos remerciements aux donateurs du Fonds annuel de l'Institut de la CAD

La générosité de nos donateurs permet à l'Institut de la CAD de poursuivre son travail essentiel au nom de ceux qui ont besoin de notre importante recherche. Ces communications, qui comprennent le Cahier Vimy n° 6, 2013 *Les perspectives stratégiques du Canada*, récemment publié, l'analyse de l'Institut de la CAD, *L'austérité a la défense : L'impact à ce jour, vers un modèle international pour les approvisionnements de défense du Canada? Une étude de cas sur le F-35*, et communications tirées du 15<sup>e</sup> Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés – *Les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité : Un regard au-delà* sont diffusées dans le domaine public et elles dispensent aux Canadiens des renseignements factuels concernant les réalités et l'importance des questions de défense et de sécurité. Cela veut dire que le public a accès à des renseignements préparés par les hommes et les femmes qui sont à l'avant-garde des politiques et des pratiques de défense au Canada.

Nous donnons ici la liste de nos donateurs au Fonds annuel. Les donateurs identifiés comme « anonymes » nous ont demandé d'utiliser cette désignation.

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*Report on proceedings*

## The 16th Annual Graduate Student Symposium

Rob Cook

*The following is a summary of the proceedings of the 16th annual Graduate Student Symposium which was held on 24 and 25 October at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario.*

As the year draws to a close, the CDA Institute is pleased to provide *ON TRACK* readers with a review of the Institute's Annual Graduate Student Symposium.

The 16<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium was once again generously hosted by the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston. The symposium ran from Thursday October 24<sup>th</sup> to Friday October 25<sup>th</sup>, with both days drawing crowds of over 100 people. The audience included a wide variety of members of the defence and security community from Kingston and Ottawa, including serving military from CFB Kingston, academics, students, government officials, industry experts, and a strong contingent of RMC officer cadets. 26 papers were presented over the two days of the symposium.

We are very grateful to the sponsors who helped to make the event possible. Attending on behalf of Bombardier Aerospace was their Vice-President Government Relations, Brigadier-General (Ret'd) David Jurkowski, who joined us for both days of the Symposium.

We are also extremely grateful for the ongoing financial and in-kind support provided by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Dr. John Scott Cowan, as well as RMC.

This year's three keynote speakers, M. Ferry de Kerckhove, Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Serge Labbé, and Mr. Michael Bonner, provided the symposium attendees with a compelling narrative on Canada's security and defence challenges, Canada's and the international community's experience in Afghanistan, and the importance of the historical context when considering these issues.

The opening keynote address by M. de Kerckhove examined the changing nature of security and defence challenges as our world becomes increasingly interconnected, and the steps we should take to ensure that we remain capable of dealing with these new challenges. To that end, it must become common policy and industry practice to look ahead to the conflicts of the future, rather than those of the past. Beyond an ability to adapt and evolve, M. de Kerckhove stressed the importance of systematizing whole-

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*Rob Cook completed his Honours B.A., at the University of Toronto in 2005. Following that, he attended Sir Wilfrid Laurier University and the University of Waterloo where he completed his Master's Degree, in History. Rob is the CDA Institute Project Officer.*

of-government operations, a sentiment echoed by the other two keynote speakers.

The dinner keynote address, delivered by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Labbé was an impassioned speech concerning the future of Canada and NATO's missions in Afghanistan, and the future of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Labbé elucidated eight key points that NATO and its member states need to address in order to help resolve the problems plaguing the Afghan mission, and similar future interventions. He noted that it is not enough to simply re-evaluate our understanding of security and development; these concepts must be synchronized, both in theory and practice in order to achieve a stable outcome.

Mr. Bonner's keynote address on the second day provided key insights into professional development for the assembled students as they prepare for a transition from the academic to the working world. As an expert on Ancient Middle Eastern history, Mr. Bonner then spoke on the long and rich history of Afghanistan, providing invaluable historical context for the issues plaguing modern Afghanistan, neatly complementing Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Labbé's keynote address from the night before.

As is our yearly tradition, we are very pleased to recognize the top student presenters, whose presentations demonstrated a calibre of analysis and research that was deserving of special recognition. We are grateful to Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman of the CDA, and his fellow judges, RMC professors Dr. Abdelkerim Ousman and Dr. Daniel Lagacé-Roy for their efforts in identifying the following presenters:

Standing in first place was Eric Thomson of the University of Ottawa for his presentation, "A Nuclear Iran: The Security Implications of Bipolarity in the Middle East."

Second place was awarded to Alexandre Léger of Concordia University for his presentation, "The Myth of the Nuclear Domino: The Case of North Korea and its Neighbours."

Third place was awarded to Shakir Chambers of Carleton University for his presentation, "The Rise, the Fall and the Middle Power: Canada's Role in an Era of Great Power Transition."

Fourth place was awarded by the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) to OCdt William Buss for his presentation,

“Lifting the Shadows: Media, Political Awareness, and Public Relations as Enablers for Special Operations Forces.”

Fifth place (honourable mention) was awarded to Christopher Radojewski of Queen’s University for his presentation, “The Politics of Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: From Trudeau to Harper.”

In addition to the cash prizes for the top three presenters (\$1,000, \$500 and \$250, respectively) that were awarded by the CDA Institute there was also a cash prize for 4<sup>th</sup> place, courtesy of the RCMI. This year we continue an initiative that will see the top three students awarded \$2,000 honorariums and the opportunity to develop their presentations into a CDA Institute publication under the Institute’s *Vimy Paper* series.

Ultimately, the goal of the CDA Institute’s Graduate Student Symposium is to foster critical research into all avenues of Canadian and international defence and security topics. A glance at the detailed agenda for the Symposium bears out the success of this process. The panels’ themes ranged from conventional military transformation to the human aspects of war; the importance of international law and terrorism and cyber war; geographic concerns from the Arctic to the Middle East; historical, contemporary, and potential futures of defence and security; evolution of the Canadian Armed Forces; the role of non-state actors; and many other themes. Perhaps the strongest indication of the overall success of the Symposium and the quality of the presentations was marked by the unprecedented level of participation in the Q&A sessions and during the meals



*Winning presenters, from left to right: Eric Thomson, University of Ottawa (1st place); Alexandre Leger, Concordia University (2nd place); General (Ret’d) Ray Henault, President CDA Institute; OCdt William Buss, RMC (4th place); Christopher Radojewski, Queen’s University (5th place); not pictured is Shakir Chambers, Carleton University (3rd place).*

*Photo credit: Eric Morse*

and breaks, by members of the audience including students and professors, RMC officer cadets, industry experts, government and military officials, and other presenters. The event offered an unparalleled opportunity for presenters to network both with both their peers and with defence and security professionals from business, government, the military, and industry.

This year was another truly successful Symposium, and I am tremendously grateful to all those who provided invaluable assistance. I encourage all of you to keep watch for the upcoming CDA Institute publication that will feature the above-mentioned winning presentations, and for next year’s symposium on 23-24 October 2014. ©



*Editorial, courtesy Canadian Naval Review*

## Time for a Canadian Pacific Pivot?<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Eric Lerhe

*This editorial raises a real dichotomy between what is no doubt desirable and what is possible, or, in today's financial climate, remotely likely. The Pacific, as the author notes, is vastly different from the Atlantic, the RCN's traditional and familiar operating locale.*

A country deploys its navy using any number of rationales. Certainly the perception of the threat plays a large role. In both World War II and the Cold War the dominant oceanic threat was enemy submarines cutting the Atlantic sea lanes to Europe. Alliance commitments reinforced Canada's Atlantic-dominant posture, and this led to the majority of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) being based in Halifax.

Trade has also guided naval deployments but until now this was not a significant determinant in Canadian naval basing. Under the government of Stephen Harper this may change. (former) Defence Minister Peter Mackay seemed to confirm this in Singapore this June, declaring that the Canadian military had "dialed up" its presence in the region as part of a wider plan to get the Canadian government admitted to critical Asian trade forums.<sup>2</sup>

Canada's trade is not the only new input to naval posture. It would be hard for Canada to ignore the recent US 'Pacific Pivot,' its just-released National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and other elements of what has become known as the 'Obama Doctrine.' Over 70% of Canadian trade is with the United States. Military strategy and trade are linked.

### *The Atlantic*

Given these new factors, the RCN's current 'Three Ocean' posture needs review. Despite recent efforts to conclude a Canada-European Union (EU) trade agreement, the government is concerned that Canada is too dependent on trade with slow- or no-growth economies, such as those in Europe. Unsurprisingly the Harper government wants a greater focus on trade with the rapidly growing, younger economies of Asia and the South.

Europe also suffers from being on the wrong side of the Obama Doctrine. This policy argues that the United States cannot do it all in the world and that it expects lead states in a region to take greater responsibility in meeting local security challenges. Declining European defence spending and a lack of will are problematic here. Initially only two European states joined the aggressive response to the 2011

Libyan civil war. A month later only seven of the 27 EU states had committed to combat missions.

However, Europe and North America are united in NATO – the world's only effective security organization. NATO leads the worldwide military interoperability effort to which Canada contributes significantly while also benefitting directly from it. Moreover, cutting commitments to Europe while expecting a new trade deal has been proven a bone-headed strategy.

The government of Pierre Trudeau attempted just that in the early 1970s by cutting its NATO Europe commitment while attempting to broaden Canada-European trade. The plan's rejection was summed up by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl telling Trudeau "No Tanks No Trade." All this suggests that cutting the ships that make up Canada's largest and most rapidly sent commitment to NATO must be done with skill.

### *The Pacific*

The government's trade logic and the US Pacific 'rebalancing' – 'Pacific Pivot' is no longer used – support calls for more naval forces. The government's foreign policy plan declares that "[t]he situation is stark: Canada's trade and investment relations with new economies, leading with Asia, must deepen, and as a country we must become more relevant to our new partners."<sup>3</sup> More specifically Defence Minister MacKay has made clear that Canada wants a seat at the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers' Meeting and the indications are that Canada's defence forces will be the key to getting that seat. It is expected that membership will then provide an entry to other forums that manage Asian trade. As Canada scrambles to get involved in Asia, the US Navy is moving 60% of its ships to the Pacific, half of which will be forward deployed.

The Pacific presents challenges for Canada. The distances are immense and this means that forces must be both forward deployed and supported by significant at-sea logistics capability to be credible. Canada has, by many reports, weak credibility in the region because it has none of this and because it has pointedly ignored the region until very recently.

The opportunities are certainly there for the RCN to play a role. The Pacific has always been a maritime theatre.

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*Commodore (Ret'd) Eric Lerhe retired from the CF in September 2003 and commenced his doctoral studies at Dalhousie. He graduated in 2012.*

Navies, amphibious forces and long-range aircraft dominated the Pacific War and they continue to dominate in the new US Air-Sea Battle doctrine. Canada could contribute CP140s and submarines to this mix but they will only be credible if they are permanently forward deployed – perhaps at Guam. Canada should also soon be able to send frigates to forward-deployed US carrier groups in the Indo-Pacific region, but they must be maintained permanently.

These deployments would also ensure that the RCN remains at the cutting edge of interoperability and provide a hedge should purely US tactical developments leave NATO behind. A Canadian task group cannot be permanently forward deployed but to be a credible response force, Canada requires a second supply ship there to cover availability gaps. In fact, a second supply ship is arguably more important to the Pacific fleet than the long-sought sixth frigate.

## *The Arctic*

The Arctic also calls out for naval attention although the concerns here have less to do with Canada's trade than that of others. Arctic warming has already increased shipping and fishing. These are not, however, Canada's greatest security problem nor is the Northwest Passage. The fact that some 30% of the world's oil and gas is in the Arctic presents the real challenge.

A recent editorial in the *Ottawa Citizen* states that “[t]he geopolitics of the Arctic melt requires Canada to join the Great Game. We either play the game, and play it well, or our nation will be the pawn of more assertive powers.”<sup>4</sup>

Again, it is worth examining the US response. While the US Strategy for the Arctic Region hopes for a peaceful outcome to disputes, advancing US security interests is listed as the first of its three pillars. The US Navy is currently planning to increase operational capabilities and infrastructure in the Arctic with a view to operating there routinely.<sup>5</sup> In parallel, the US Coast Guard outlined its extensive collaboration with the RCN in the north (so did the USN) and hinted at a potential opportunity to split responsibility – the United States covering the western Arctic and Canada the east.<sup>6</sup>

Given the lack of ship assets of both states, this is a good offer especially as both also lack the ability to detect and intercept problematic activity there quickly. The NORAD example is compelling. The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) will provide a significant contributor. Regrettably, it will only boost security if it is naval-crewed as progress in arming the Canadian Coast Guard is slow and will fall well short of need in any case.

As there may be a need for all our submarines in the Pacific, there will likely be a need for most if not all of the AOPS to be based in Halifax. This reflects the fact that it is only 2,800 miles to the central Canadian Arctic from Halifax,

where it is 4,600 miles from Victoria. This posture would also align with the option of dividing Arctic responsibilities with the United States. However, the distances to and within the Arctic are extreme, and a refueling facility at Nanisivik and at-sea logistics will be key. Thus the new *Berlin*-class supply ships will need some modest cold weather capability.

## *Conclusions*

The RCN's commitments go well beyond the three Canadian oceans. Canadian ships regularly support counter-drug operations in the Caribbean. At the same time, naval and air forces are called on to provide relief to natural disasters. These are increasing and are predicted to continue increasing because of climate change. Unless the hurricanes and earthquakes miraculously spare airports and rail systems, sea-based helicopters and over-the-shore delivery are likely to remain the surest route for relief supplies.

The government also recognizes that Africa and other parts of the South will not always be dominated by economic under-development, conflict and disaster. Indeed, some African countries have experienced remarkable economic growth in the past decade. It seems logical to expect that the RCN will be used to advance Canada's access to those markets.

The Canadian military has partially responded to the needs of the South with drug patrols, engagement in the regional security forums and training missions. But action by military forces must be undertaken with care – many in the region are wary of gunboat diplomacy and any whiff of colonialism. The Canadian navy must tread carefully, and not jeopardise the fact that it still enjoys a superb welcome in almost every state. To maintain this, it should participate in exercises and expand its junior officer at-sea training exchanges.

The government expects the navy to support its economic goals. When trade and security were not linked, policy failure was the result. The navy has always been uniquely capable of this diplomatic work – as some wag noted, “armoured divisions do not do courtesy calls.” Moreover, only naval units can forward deploy on a permanent basis without the need for a massive overseas base investment.

At the same time, some Asian states are aware of Canada's past unreliability and ‘drive by’ approach to a Pacific defence presence. A country seeking greater political heft in the region via an enhanced security commitment must assign the resources to the units that can achieve this. These will be naval. They are also the forces most needed in the Arctic and in a disaster response. This may not mean a bigger total defence budget but one must ask why the navy has the lowest priority in that budget and the fewest personnel of the three services.

## **Notes**

1. Much of the material here was obtained at the superb Naval Association of Canada conference on the Asia Pacific and its Impact on the Canadian Navy held in Victoria, BC, on 7 June 2013.
2. Campbell Clark, “Defence Minister Presses China to take Regional Disputes to UN,” *The Globe and Mail*, 4 June 2013, pp. A1, A12.



*USS Nimitz (CVN-68) demonstrates US strike power at Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012 off Hawaii.*

*Photo courtesy Canadian Naval Review (Vol. 9, No. 2)*

3. Greg Weston, "Harper Government Leaked Canadian Foreign Policy Plan, Secret Document Details New Canadian Foreign Policy," *CBC News*, 19 November 2012.
4. Editorial, "Our Arctic Rights," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 May 2013.
5. Rear-Admiral Jon White, the US Navy's director of Task Force Climate Change has stated "[t]he US Navy is currently engaged in strategic planning to increase operational capabilities and infrastructure in the Arctic in future years. Within the next decade. I believe we'll be operating entirely in the Arctic with an appropriate presence that includes more than just submarines." Cited in Bob Freeman, "New National Strategy for the Arctic Region has Implications for Navy," 15 May 2013, available at [www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story\\_id=74168](http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=74168).
6. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Coast Guard to Navy: Arctic's Covered; White House OKs Arctic Icebreaker," *breakingdefense.com*, 21 May 2013. ©



## Canada's Economic Shift to Asia: Can a Security Shift Be Far Behind?

Len Edwards

*Mr. Edwards points out that the mutually reinforcing conditions of stability and strong economic growth in the East Asia region, over the past three decades, cannot be taken as givens for the future. He provides four reasons for this state of affairs to watch and questions whether Canada's 21<sup>st</sup>- century strategic interests require greater investments of time and effort by our security, defence and foreign policy establishments.*

For the past 30 years, the image of the Asia-Pacific region has been one of remarkable growth, economic dynamism and rising living standards. Despite some downs and ups along the way, economic optimism has been the one constant. It has been a place where nations, businesses and individuals from all parts of the world have found opportunities for building more prosperous futures.

Canadians have been among those taking up these opportunities. Although we have been regrettably inconsistent in our efforts over the last decade and a half (which has been much noticed in the region), Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government has, over the past 3 years rightly turned its attention to the Asia-Pacific.

Federal ministers are now once again travelling regularly to the region, gradually rebuilding Canada's political profile and lending vital support to the efforts of Canadian business. Ottawa is pressing ahead with several trade and economic negotiations, headlined by the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks. Many provincial governments, particularly those from British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan have also upped their game.

Working together, Canadian governments and businesses must be prepared to commit the time and effort needed to recover lost ground, and to restore confidence within the region that Canada has the "staying power" to be counted on as a long term economic partner.

While its economic engine will continue to drive global growth (although at a slower rate, particularly as China's economy matures), there are ominous clouds on the horizon of a non-economic nature.

At this year's annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in early June, defence ministers, officials, military officers, and security experts from the region and elsewhere had no difficulty concluding that the Indo-Pacific world - as some now label it - is facing increasing security challenges. That is in addition to the persistent and recently heightened tensions created by the North Korean regime, and the instabilities on Asia's western flank in and around Afghanistan.

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*A former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Canada, and Ambassador to Japan and Korea, Len Edwards is currently a Strategic Adviser at Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.*

In the East Asia region particularly, the mutually reinforcing conditions of stability and strong economic growth over the past three decades cannot be taken as "givens" for the future.

Why is that? Firstly, the Asia-Pacific has become the main stage on which the new geopolitical order will be sorted out between the American superpower and a rising China.

Chuck Hagel's first keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue as US Secretary of Defense was a firm re-iteration of America's "re-balancing" to Asia in security terms. He emphasized the forces and equipment being stationed in the region, and noted that the United States was updating all of its defence partnerships in the region. He announced that the first-ever meeting between a US defence secretary and all ASEAN defence ministers would take place in Hawaii this autumn.

A senior Chinese General predictably made it clear to Secretary Hagel from the conference floor that her government remains far from assured that the United States is not following a deliberate policy to contain China.

Second, this geopolitical shift is accompanied by heightened tensions around historical maritime jurisdictional disputes involving a more assertive China and robust responses by Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam in particular. The risks of serious incidents at sea have increased substantially.

In the South China Sea the tensions have been stoked principally by the competition for increasingly sought-after hydrocarbon and fisheries resources. But the sea is also a major shipping route, the disruption of which would have serious impacts on the regional and global economies, and interrupt vital supply lines of energy, food and other trade.

The South China Sea dispute will also determine how a re-emergent China is perceived in the years to come: as the "bully" power determined to wrest full advantages from its return to great power status or as a "big brother" ready to take on the responsibility of leadership and curtail its own ambitions to accommodate the needs of its smaller neighbours.

A third factor is the military build-up in the region. While China's defence spending catches most of the attention and provokes alarm, many other Asian countries have launched military modernization programs, adding to both the sophistication and range of their military assets, such as the addition of submarines. As these nations move from developing to middle-income status, they are shifting

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priorities from the maintenance of internal stability and border defence to the ability to project power externally. Meanwhile, Japan's current government wants to change the post-war constitution to permit Japan to engage in collective defence arrangements and to end the convention that Japan's military are for "self-defence" purposes only.

Fourth, growing nationalism in many countries, including the most powerful among them - China and Japan - adds a further unsettling dimension. While nationalist outcries can be useful to a government wishing to send messages to countries with which it has a maritime boundary dispute or other differences, nationalism can limit the freedom of leaders to curb tensions and seek accommodation later.

In the meantime, non-traditional security problems, including piracy, human trafficking, drugs and crime, have not gone away. Indeed such issues have been joined by the serious new threat of cyber security.

If Asians are justified in worrying about heightened risks to peace and security in the region, should Canadians also be concerned? How should Canada respond?

In May this year, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada reported that a majority of the respondents in its annual opinion survey believe that a conflict among Asian countries is likely to occur in the next ten years. Although Canadians said they felt an Asian conflict would impact Canadian security, there was no clear opinion as to whether or not that justified greater Canadian engagement in regional security initiatives.

The issue is whether Canada's 21<sup>st</sup> century strategic interests - in economic, political and demographic terms - require greater investments of time and effort by our security, defence and foreign policy establishments in building a solid trans-Pacific dimension to Canada's security presence and activities outside North America.

For economic reasons alone, the answer should be yes. Of necessity, Canada's trade and commercial efforts are shifting from traditional partners towards higher growth Asia. Our primary economic partner, the United States is experiencing the same shift and through its "pivot" has moved firmly to re-energize its political and security presence in the Asia-Pacific as part of the package.

Asian businesses always seek the best deal, but chances of success will favour those foreign companies whose governments show political commitment to the region's future, including its security, and are not just there for economic gain. In Asia, relationships matter and government matters.

Canada has an economic stake in promoting security and effective dispute management in the region. So far no one has downgraded prospects for long-term regional growth as a consequence of the heightened concerns about security in Asia or the tensions over maritime jurisdictions. Yet, fears of negative economic consequences have not held back disputants from assertive positions. And China has not hesitated to use economic levers vis-à-vis both Japan and the Philippines.

Geopolitically, the shift in global power from the trans-Atlantic world (plus Japan) towards the Asia-Pacific has changed the political calculus. The rise of China and India obliges Canada to engage more effectively in a region where

decisions will be made, for good or ill, that will determine global outcomes.

If we do decide it is in our interest to develop a distinct trans-Pacific dimension to Canada's security policy, will Asians welcome it? Most countries will. Nations such as Australia, South Korea and some ASEAN countries, for example, will see Canada as a constructive partner on many issues, adding our weight to theirs in working to reinforce positive patterns of behaviour and cooperation, building more effective institutions in the security domain, and messaging to the biggest players.

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*If Asians are justified in worrying about heightened risks to peace and security in the region, should Canadians also be concerned? How should Canada respond?*

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The United States would also welcome it. We have a shared stake with many Asians in supporting a continued strong presence by the United States in Asian security. And our ability to speak frankly to our friends in Washington and elsewhere will be much enhanced if we have skin in the game.

It will, of course, take time for us to change Canada's reputation for inconsistent engagement in Asia. We will need patience in our effort to gain formal admission to the region's most important security grouping, the ADMM-Plus - ASEAN Defence Ministers plus those from the United States, China, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, India, and Japan. Canada can demonstrate its seriousness by participating in regional military and naval exercises (such as the annual Cobra Gold exercise hosted by Thailand) and offering training and exchange opportunities to regional militaries.

After years of neglect, cultivating ASEAN countries will be a key to success for Canada. We appear to be back on the right track with the recent announcements by foreign minister John Baird on funding for new development and other initiatives, and the promise of more steps to come. Within ASEAN, Indonesia is rightly getting renewed attention from Ottawa. That is a solid start.

Ultimately, building a meaningful security dimension to Canada's stake in the Asia-Pacific will require engagement not only by Canada's military and defence establishment, but by many others as well - foreign affairs and development, intelligence, immigration, border services, and police for instance. And it should extend beyond government to engage our defence industries, and independent policy shops.

Funds will be needed to develop practical linkages with Asian counterparts of both military and civilian nature, to engage in regional security institutions and policy work, and, most importantly, to contribute operationally from time to time in regional actions to deal with security threats, both of a traditional and non-traditional nature - to be there when it matters most to our regional partners.

There is a lot at stake for Canada in the Asia-Pacific, just as there was for Canada in post-war Europe. Important decisions are needed now, as they were needed then, to align Canadian security engagements with Canada's broad strategic interests, both economically and geopolitically. This time Canada must turn to Asia. ©

## China's strategic concerns: discussions between the CDA Institute and CIISS

General (Ret'd) Ray Henault

*General (Ret'd) Ray Henault's report of his recent visit to China at the invitation of the China International Institute of Strategic Studies focuses essentially on the roundtable discussions with the Vice-Chairman, Major-General (Ret'd) Huang Baifu, of the CIISS.*

## Les préoccupations stratégiques de la Chine: discussions entre l'Institut de la CAD et le CIISS

Le général (ret.) Ray Henault

*Le rapport du général (ret.) Ray Henault sur sa récente visite en Chine à l'invitation du China International Institute of Strategic Studies. Le rapport porte essentiellement sur les discussions en table ronde avec le vice-président du CIISS, le major-général (ret.) Huang Baifu.*

The CDA Institute was invited by the China International Institute of Strategic Studies (CIISS) to visit China in August 2013, to conduct a series of senior staff-level talks on issues of mutual interest. The discussions were wide-ranging, candid and in-depth, covering a number of strategic subjects such as the US rebalancing strategy to Asia, Japan and the East China Sea islands, Iran and nuclear weapons, cyber security, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy - to name a few. (As an aside, we had the opportunity to visit four major cities - Beijing, Nanjing, Sunzhou, and Shanghai - travelling by train, allowing us to see firsthand the major developments taking place in that country.)

Our CIISS interlocutors during the meetings were senior staff and personnel at the Institute. All had considerable experience in the Chinese defence establishment, some with time abroad as defence attaches. All spoke excellent English and in one case French, ensuring a candid exchange of views. The CDA Institute had had two previous meetings with the CIISS in 1997 and 1999.

By way of background, the CIISS has a permanent staff of 40, plus a number of volunteer fellows, mainly former ambassadors and defence attaches. It describes itself as an NGO and academic organization with the aim of conducting studies on the international strategic situation. It undertakes academic contacts and exchanges with relevant institutions and public figures, and conducts research for China's government and military leaders. Their most recent chairman was Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo, who was (at the time of the visit) one of the Deputy Chiefs of General Staff of the

L'Institut de la CAD a été invité par l'institut international d'études stratégiques de Chine (CIISS - China International Institute of Strategic Studies) à visiter la Chine en août 2013 pour y tenir une série de conversations de niveau supérieur sur des questions d'intérêt mutuel.

Les discussions franches et en profondeur ont couvert un vaste domaine portant sur un certain nombre de sujets stratégiques comme la stratégie de rééquilibrage des É.-U. vers l'Asie, le Japon et les îles de la mer de Chine orientale, l'Iran et les armes nucléaires, la cybersécurité, la diplomatie bilatérale et multilatérale, pour n'en mentionner que quelques-uns. (Parallèlement, nous avons eu l'occasion de visiter quatre villes majeures - Beijing, Nanjing, Sunzhou et Shanghai - par train, ce qui nous a permis de voir de nos propres yeux les développements majeurs qui sont en train de se produire dans ce pays.)

Nos interlocuteurs du CIISS pendant les réunions étaient des cadres supérieurs et des employés de l'Institut. Ils avaient tous une expérience considérable de l'établissement chinois de la défense, et certains avaient séjourné à l'étranger comme attachés de la défense. Ils parlaient tous un excellent anglais et, dans un cas, le français, ce qui a assuré un échange de points de vue franc. L'Institut de la CAD avait déjà eu deux rencontres avec le CIISS, en 1997 et 1999.

En guise de contexte, disons que le CIISS a un personnel permanent de 40 personnes, plus un certain nombre de chercheurs bénévoles, surtout d'anciens ambassadeurs et attachés à la défense. Il se décrit lui-même comme une ONG et une organisation académique dont le but est de mener

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*In June 2001, Gen Henault was promoted to General and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff, a position he held until February 2005. In June of that same year, he assumed the position of Chairman of the Military Committee at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. General Henault retired from the Canadian Forces in 2008. He is Chairman of the Board of Directors of ADGA and is President of the CDA Institute and Chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors.*

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*En juin 2001, le général Henault était promu au rang de général et nommé chef de l'état-major de la Défense, poste qu'il a occupé jusqu'en février 2005. En juin de la même année, il a assumé au poste de président du Comité militaire au Quartier général de l'OTAN, à Bruxelles. Le général Henault a pris sa retraite des Forces canadiennes en 2008. Il est président au conseil d'administration de l'AGDA et est président de l'Institut de la CAD et président du conseil d'administration de l'Institut.*

People's Liberation Army (PLA). The CIISS is financed through contributions from the Chinese government, the PLA, and other institutions. It has a wide-ranging academic exchange programme with some 100 institutions in 50 countries, and the CDA Institute is the only Canadian NGO in contact with CIISS. The organization also conducts two annual conferences as well as an annual trilateral Russia/United States/China meeting.

Senior CIISS staff stressed that their views were personal, but in light of some of the comments made by the Chinese defence minister Chang Wanquan during his recent visit to Washington, one is left with the clear impression that the views expressed during our visit reflected those of the Chinese government.

Senior CIISS personnel voiced concerns about the US rebalancing strategy to Asia, noting that they hoped the US strategy would bring peace to the Pacific region instead of seeking to weaken China.

There was also some concern expressed that, by trying to curtail China's rise, the US strategy had emboldened some US allies, particularly Japan, to challenge China by breaking the *status quo* on some maritime territorial issues such as the status of the East China Sea islands. It was made clear that China would not give up sovereignty of the East China Sea islands, although it would prefer to solve these problems by political means.

The feeling was that rebalancing was taking place because of the economic growth of China and Asia; and, that this growth could also bring about opportunities for involvement not only by the United States but also by the European Union and Russia - Asia-Pacific is big enough for two major powers, and the United States and China can live with each other in the same neighbourhood. It was also noted that the United States has plenty to do to convince the region and China that its strategic rebalancing is not detrimental to peace and development, and posited that one country cannot run the world forever. While changes in the past have often occurred through war, it is the Chinese view that world peace in the modern age should be maintained through consultative negotiations.



*General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault with Major-General (Ret'd) Huang Baifu. General (Ret'd) Henault visited China, recently, at the invitation of the China International Institute of Strategic Studies (CIISS) and held roundtable discussions with Major-General (Ret'd) Huang, Vice-Chairman of the CIISS. General (Ret'd) Henault was accompanied on the visit by Colonel (Ret'd) Alain Pellerin.*

*Photo courtesy  
General (Ret'd) Henault.*

*Le général (ret.) Raymond Henault avec le major-général (ret.) Huang Baifu. Le général (ret.) Henault a récemment visité la Chine à l'invitation du China International Institute of Strategic Studies (CIISS) et tenu des discussions en table ronde avec le major-général (ret.) Huang, vice-président du CIISS. Le général (ret.) Henault était accompagné dans cette visite par le colonel (ret.) Alain Pellerin.*

*Photo, gracieuseté du  
général (ret.) Henault.*

des études sur la situation stratégique internationale. Il a entrepris d'établir des contacts académiques et des échanges avec des institutions des personnages publics pertinents et il fait de la recherche pour le gouvernement et les chefs militaires chinois.

Son président le plus récent était le lieutenant-général Qi Jianguo, qui était (au moment de la visite) un des chefs d'état-major général adjoints de l'Armée populaire de libération (APL).

Le CIISS est financé grâce à des contributions du gouvernement chinois, de l'APL et d'autres institutions. Il maintient un vaste programme d'échanges académiques avec quelque 100 institutions situées dans 50 pays, et l'Institut de la CAD est la seule OGN canadienne en contact avec le CIISS. L'organisation tient également deux conférences annuelles ainsi qu'une rencontre trilatérale annuelle entre la Russie, les États-Unis et la Chine.

Les cadres du CIISS ont souligné que leurs points de vue étaient personnels, mais à la lumière de certains des commentaires faits par le ministre chinois de la défense, Chang Wanquan pendant sa récente visite à Washington, on reste avec l'impression claire que les points de vue exprimés pendant notre visite reflétaient ceux du gouvernement chinois.

Les cadres supérieurs du CIISS ont exprimé des inquiétudes concernant la stratégie de rééquilibrage des États-Unis vers l'Asie, en notant qu'ils espéraient que la stratégie américaine amènerait la paix à la région du Pacifique plutôt que d'affaiblir la Chine.

On a aussi exprimé une certaine inquiétude à l'effet que, en essayant d'entraver la montée de la Chine, la stratégie américaine a enhardi certains alliés des É.-U., et particulièrement le Japon, à défier la Chine en brisant le statu quo sur certains enjeux territoriaux maritimes comme les îles de la mer de Chine orientale.

On a clairement dit que la Chine n'abandonnerait pas sa souveraineté sur les îles de la mer de Chine orientale, mais qu'on préférerait solutionner ces problèmes par des voies politiques. On a eu le sentiment que le rééquilibrage avait lieu à cause de la croissance économique de la Chine et



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Another subject of discussion was Japan and its relations with and attitude toward China. It was felt that while Japan, the United States, and South East Asian countries talk about the Chinese threat, they should be talking about cooperation rather than confrontation. The example of the recent summit between the US and Chinese presidents was provided as a positive example, where the two countries agreed to foster military-to-military relations to help establish a new model for cooperation between two powers, one based on mutual respect and a win-win outcome.

It should also be noted that there is a consensus in Chinese strategic thinking that China's growth cannot be stopped, and that the Chinese government intends to carry on unimpeded with economic development and reform of its infrastructure. Its desired approach is to do so peacefully and not by becoming a hegemonic power.

It was reinforced that China's defence policy is defensive in nature: China has no intention of attacking any country, and believes that countries should choose their own leaders and not have forms of government imposed upon them. In this vein, it was posited that the countries of the Middle East - and China for that matter - were not yet ready for western-style democracy.

On the issue of NATO-China relations, we were told that China is more comfortable with bilateral rather than multilateral discussions and that NATO is seen by China as a military organization as opposed to a political-military entity. On the issue of cyber security, the Chinese expressed the view that it is a very important issue that requires a control mechanism and that left uncontrolled, it would lead to chaos. The announcement of a recent working group on the subject as a result of the recent US-China presidential summit was welcomed. Finally, on the issue of Iran and nuclear weapons, the Chinese clearly expressed the view that Iran has the right to be a peaceful nuclear power but were strongly opposed to Iran possessing nuclear weapons: "we will not allow it," one of our interlocutors stated.

In concluding, all parties agreed that the discussions had been frank, wide-ranging, and very productive, and that a repeat gathering between the two Institutes would hopefully take place soon. Further collaborative opportunities will be developed between the two Institutes. ©

de l'Asie ; et que cette croissance pourrait aussi faire surgir non seulement pour les États-Unis, mais aussi pour l'Union européenne et la Russie des occasions de s'impliquer (- l'Asie-Pacifique est assez grand pour deux grandes puissances.)

On a aussi noté que les États-Unis ont beaucoup à faire pour convaincre la région et la Chine que son rééquilibrage stratégique ne se fera pas au détriment de la paix et du développement, et on considère qu'un pays ne peut pas mener le monde pour toujours. Si par le passé les changements se sont souvent produits par la guerre, c'est le point de vue chinois que, à l'époque moderne, la paix mondiale devrait être maintenue en ayant recours aux négociations consultatives.

Autre sujet de discussion, le Japon et ses relations avec la Chine et son attitude envers elle. On estime que, alors que le Japon, les États-Unis et les pays de l'Asie du sud-est parlent de la menace chinoise, ils devraient parler de coopération plutôt que de confrontation. L'exemple d'un récent sommet entre le président des États-Unis et celui de la Chine est cité comme un exemple positif, où les deux pays ont convenu d'encourager les relations de militaires à militaires pour contribuer à l'établissement d'un nouveau modèle de coopération entre deux puissances, une coopération basée sur le respect mutuel et sur un résultat gagnant-gagnant.

On devrait aussi noter qu'il y a consensus dans la pensée stratégique chinoise voulant que la croissance de la Chine ne peut pas être stoppée et que le gouvernement chinois a l'intention de poursuivre sans entraves le développement économique et la réforme de son infrastructure. L'approche qu'il souhaite adopter est celle de le faire de façon pacifique et non pas en devenant une puissance hégémonique. On note avec insistance que la politique de défense de la Chine est de nature défensive : la Chine n'a aucune intention d'attaquer quel que pays que ce soit et croit que les pays devraient choisir leurs propres chefs et ne pas avoir de formes de gouvernement qui leur seraient imposées. Dans cette veine, il est posé en principe que les pays du Moyen-Orient - et la Chine elle aussi - ne sont pas encore prêts pour une démocratie de style occidental.

Sur la question des relations entre l'OTAN et la Chine, on nous a dit que la Chine se sent mieux dans des discussions bilatérales que multilatérales, et qu'elle voit l'OTAN comme une organisation militaire, plutôt que comme une entité politico-militaire. Sur la question de la cybersécurité, les Chinois expriment le point de vue que c'est une question très importante qui nécessite un mécanisme de contrôle et que, laissée sans contrôle, elle mènerait au chaos. L'annonce récente d'un groupe de travail sur le sujet comme résultat du récent sommet présidentiel É.-U.-Chine a été accueillie favorablement. Enfin, sur la question de l'Iran et des armes nucléaires, les Chinois ont clairement exprimé le point de vue que l'Iran a le droit d'être une puissance nucléaire pacifique, mais qu'ils étaient fortement opposés à ce que l'Iran possède des armes nucléaires : « nous ne le permettrons pas », a affirmé un de nos interlocuteurs.

Pour finir, toutes les parties ont convenu que les discussions avaient été franches, variées et très productives, et qu'il était à espérer qu'une autre rencontre entre les deux instituts ait lieu bientôt. D'autres occasions de collaboration seront développées entre les deux Instituts. ©

## China – all that glitters is not gold

George Petrolekas

*Colonel Petrolekas writes that we are consumed by China's 7-10% growth rate, not realizing that they absolutely need that simply to lift vast portions of the country out of poverty. As growth dips below 7%, China cannot sustain its present internal development. Unemployment and underemployment amongst the young is common, and exacerbated by the fact that the young generation must care for China's rapidly growing elderly population.*

Pollution associated with China's rapid growth is concern. The leaders of China's centrally commanded economy – and that is what China is, as the state owns all land – are aware of the country's difficulties: bringing standards of living up uniformly; provide paths for continued betterment for youth that have come to expect advancement; feed and care for an aging population; reduce the imbalances between the have and have nots and address the ancillary products of such issues.

I recently traveled to China on behalf of the CDA Institute to attend a summit on Security Cooperation in the Pacific. The topics were primarily of strategic interest: China's position as an emerging power, the frictions that would cause with the existing great power, and territorial disputes affecting China (such as the South and East China seas, the territorial dispute with Japan, and other such issues). Most of those topics will be examined in the coming year's *Strategic Outlook*, which will have a wider focus on the Pacific than in previous editions. In the meantime, this short article explores the non-military impressions I made of China during my trip.

Everyone knows of China's meteoric growth - it is what China wishes the world to see and is the source of its newfound strength. That growth is evident in a host of new cities, each more sparkling than the other – cities of millions that most in the west have not even heard of.

From a land of rationing and coupons thirty years ago, whose contemporary of the time might be considered the present North Korea, China has changed exponentially for at least half of its citizens. Beijing, the territorial limits of which were defined thirty years ago by a first ring road, has now expanded beyond eight ring roads. But the growth is nowhere more evident than in Shanghai: 30 years ago the now-developed area south of the Hamphong River - known as the Pudong - was farmland.

Today, the Pudong is fully built up and home to many of the world's largest companies. Three decades ago, there were no bridges or tunnels across the Hamphong River - ferries were the only way to cross.

Today, there are over 17 bridges and tunnels that span the Hamphong, not including the first, second,

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*Colonel Petrolekas has a background, combining years as an army officer and as a senior executive in the telecommunications industry. He has been a guest commentator on major television networks. Colonel Petrolekas is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.*

eight, and ninth longest bridges in the world that connect Shanghai either to high-speed rail networks or to deep water terminals, each built by thousands of workers and costing billions of dollars each. In 1970, Beijing had a population of approximately 9 million and Shanghai a population of 11 million; today they have grown to 20 and 23 million, respectively. Where once bicycles were the primary mode of travel, they have now been supplanted by metros/subways, buses, freeways and cars.

People can aspire to ownership (limited, in that it is freehold ownership for 70 years, as the state still owns all land) of a small apartment. Such modest accommodations are at least superior to the single-family dwellings without communal toilet facilities that used to be typical - though many of those still exist.


The older generation, which still remembers the revolution, the Cultural Revolution, and the days of rationing and food stamps is dizzy with the change of circumstances. The younger generation no longer venerates the heroes of the revolution quite like their parents, and are focused on their own upward mobility. A university education is within reach of many, at least in urbanized centres.

All of these remarkable achievements have certainly been made possible by the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1978 – his “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which vaulted the country forward at a rate unmatched by any other country.

It must be said, even though many criticize China's lack of democratic institutions and the suppression of the student revolt culminating in the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, that a fully liberal and democratic free market state with concomitant commitments to rights and environmental protection could simply not have achieved what the Chinese have achieved in such a short time. As a person who lives in Montreal can attest, we patch bridges while the Chinese build new ones.

But there has been an enormous price for such growth, and this is the side of China that many are steered away from seeing. That less appealing side of China forms the foundation of what is the country's strategic vulnerability. Far from the guided tours, in the coffeehouses, bars, and living rooms of the emergent middle class, one senses concern and dissatisfaction on the one hand, as well as pride coupled with frustration on the other. It is an amalgam of emotions, and how China deals with them in the future will have much to do with how the country's circumstances evolve.





*Figure 1 - Thirty years ago, the Pudong - South of central Shanghai - was nothing more than farmers' fields and villages. Today it is the financial centre of Shanghai.*

*Photo courtesy of the author*

The success of China, and more specifically the imbalance in the imposition of economic reforms has created immense changes in Chinese society. All of China has seen incomes rise and urban poverty has been nearly wiped out. In rural provinces, poverty and the welfare state are distant memories. However, free market reforms have been concentrated in the coastal states while the rural interior lags behind. In both areas, notwithstanding real income growth, income inequality has increased exponentially.

The privileged official class has been supplanted by the privileged economic class, to the point that vast swaths of the population see what is possible but realize that they are living under a glass ceiling. Further contributing to that frustration is the realization that some have attained their wealth and status through corruption or cronyism - one often hears of "black money" or "black income" that permits ownership through unethical means not available to all.

As extreme growth has been concentrated in the coastal states, there have been shifts in population and also demographic changes to that population. A larger percentage of the population is now urbanized. Meanwhile, even as the one-child policy has stabilized population growth, it has also skewed the balance between the young and upwardly mobile generation and the older (now almost geriatric) generation.

For the young and increasingly urban population, that means that China must absolutely maintain high growth rates to provide them employment and increasing incomes - on the one hand to reduce the income disparity and on

the other to fund the care for what is an increasingly aging population.

As global growth has fluctuated as a result of the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis, one sees fissures in China's economy. For example, some students report that they are unable to find jobs upon graduation from university or report that they believe that they are underemployed. In either case, that presents long-term potential domestic problems and corollary effects.

In another example of the potentially negative effects of rapid and non-inclusive economic growth, one central Beijing home of six rooms, connected by a courtyard, and with communal shower and toilet facilities (which is not much better in quality than a country shack in Canada) was now privately owned and valued at over \$700,000. Whilst that represented a real growth in the resident family's net worth, price inflation and increases in the values of other relative properties meant that a substantial change in the family's living conditions could never truly be realized.

The growing urban population has presented an additional series of challenges, beyond what was noted above, which play out in part through China's international actions. Most notable is the pursuit of stable, affordable energy supplies and food, particularly protein based foodstuffs.

During the period of reform, agricultural output was greatly improved, food shortages were eliminated, and the spectrum of food grown within China increased beyond rice and grain to include significant vegetable, poultry, and meat

crops. As a result, food prices dropped significantly. As one resident recounted, “when I was young, I only got to taste an egg once a year at a festival as a treat, and to this day I never want to see a boiled potato as that was almost all we ate.” But with the demographic changes mentioned above and despite efforts to control population growth, growing urbanization has increased demand for foodstuffs and affordable protein.

That reality explains much about China’s pursuit of resources abroad, competition over maritime territory that underlies control of resources, China’s position on fishing (particularly in the protein rich tuna belt of the South Pacific), and its courtship of and investments in smaller Pacific nations.

What has been noted in respect to food equally applies to energy, as large urban metropolitan areas create demand that is difficult to sustain. To date, large parts of the energy producing sector is based on coal, with the well-known and publicized attendant environmental effects. What is less publicized is the reaction of the population at large to that energy policy. Chinese citizens, though cognizant of the need for power production, may often quip about how “they long to see blue sky” or, in a more politically tinged response, “the government says it’s a foggy day today. Do you think it’s fog?”

Downstream, the effect of growth and, to recapitulate, income inequality, urbanization, class inequality, inflation, access to food, water and clean air, differing growth between urban and rural populations, an aging population, and the inability to fully employ and satisfy the young and upwardly mobile creates a political dynamic of people wanting a greater voice.

Whilst few would talk openly about the causes and results of the Tiananmen Square protests some 20 years ago, the underlying discontent was nonetheless present. One elderly man said “why did we have to host the Olympics, couldn’t the money have been better spent elsewhere?”

I frequently encountered similar questions, whether regarding clean air, or who could afford what apartment and why; but the unifying chord was a suppressed desire to have some sort of voice in how the future of China would unravel. That is the core challenge that China faces in the coming decades.

How the country’s government manages an increasingly vocal civil society, while addressing the structural issues caused by its tremendous growth, will define China’s future.

From the outside, the West sees China’s growth as the emergence of a competitor and, as the 2013 *Strategic Outlook* outlines, a potential military rival. But beyond the façade, all that glitters is not gold. ©

## North Korea: Now What?

Marius Grinius

*This article briefly reviews recent crisis points initiated by North Korea. It looks at South Korea's, China's and the US' reactions to these provocations. It then explores possible ways forward. Finally the article comments on Canada's policy position with respect to North Korea and suggests what steps Canada should take to become again a relevant player in this ongoing imbroglio.*

While some Canadians perhaps would not be unhappy to find Ottawa reduced to “a sea of fire,” most Canadians would not tolerate a Royal Canadian Navy frigate being deliberately sunk off, say, Vancouver Island, or a Canadian town being bombarded by enemy artillery. But South Koreans in Seoul have long lived with “sea of fire” threats - Seoul is within range of North Korean artillery deployed close to the Demilitarized Zone, while all of South Korea is within range of the North's Scud missiles.

In 2010 North Korea sank the South Korean naval ship Cheonan with the loss of 46 crew, and then bombarded Yeonpyeong Island, off the west coast of South Korea, causing civilian casualties. Despite these threats and serious incidents, despite its provocative challenges to regional and global security, despite strong resultant UN sanctions against it, North Korea has managed to survive even as most other communist regimes have been relegated to the dustbin of history.

With recent celebrations of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Canadian-South Korean diplomatic relations and the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Korean War (albeit only as a ceasefire under an armistice agreement), it is timely to review the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and reflect on what Canada could do to contribute to a lasting peaceful resolution for Koreans divided at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. One should, however, begin with a caveat. Many experts predicted that the North Korean regime would collapse with the death of “The Great Leader” Kim Il-sung. Yet this despotic dynasty has endured, first with his son “The Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il and now with one of his grandsons, “Supreme Leader” Kim Jong-un. Expert predictions about North Korea do not fare well. Indeed, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains predictable only in its unpredictability.

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*Marius Grinius served in the Canadian Army as a Gunner for 12 years before joining the Canadian Foreign Service in 1979. His early postings included Bangkok, Brussels and Hanoi. Later, he was Ambassador to Vietnam (1997-99), to the Republic of Korea (2004-07), to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (concurrent 2005-07) and Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (2007-11). In 2011-12 he was seconded to DND as Director-General International Security Policy. Grinius retired in November 2012.*

### *The State of North Korea*

North Korea is a failing state that, notwithstanding many previous dire predictions about its imminent demise, has not yet imploded. There are a number of reasons why North Korea, as is, still exists. First and foremost is the continuing repressive Kim dynastic regime that would have made Stalin jealous. In conjunction with the omnipresent security apparatus, brainwashing of North Koreans almost from birth is reminiscent of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. Kim Il-sung created North Korea's “juche” or policy of self-reliance policy he had purged his Korean Workers' Party of rivals and then both the pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions within the Party. However, juche is a myth because North Korea continues to rely on various external benefactors, with China being the most important.

China historically has preferred to retain North Korea as a buffer state rather than allow any uncertainties of instability on its doorstep, including fears of a refugee tsunami if North Korea implodes, or a potentially reunited Korea with US military forces on the Yalu River. China's enormous hunger for resources also makes resource-rich (and corrupt) North Korea a relatively attractive commercial partner. But of late even China's patience appears to have its limits, as China must recognize, at least internally, that North Korea is a growing liability. Other states that remain supportive of North Korea, whether on the left or right ends of the political spectrum, are true believers in the so called principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state, for fear of any global interest into their own internal affairs.

### *Humanitarian Efforts*

While Pyongyang boasts a cocooned nomenklatura that includes a privileged military cadre, Kim ideology and domestic policies were responsible for the death of 600,000 to one million North Koreans through famine between 1995 and 1998. Only great humanitarian efforts, mostly through UN organizations and the Red Cross but also with the help of various international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), prevented an even greater disaster. By the end of 2005, however, the North Korean government had drastically curtailed the operation of the World Food Program and had ordered the NGOs to leave the country. Given regular food shortages, North Korea has continued to rely on China, South Korea and the international community to provide rice and other food to its people. North Korea has also tried



to take advantage of these humanitarian gestures, particularly those of South Korea, to extract more food, hard currency and other advantages in concert with its grand strategy of extortion in the field of nuclear weapons.

## *Nuclear Challenges*

Former South Korean president (1998-2003) and Nobel Peace Prize winner (2000) Kim Dae-jung initiated his “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea in the hope of drawing North Korea out of its hermit crab status of aggressive isolation and having it become a responsible member of the international community. While continuing to extract concessions from the South, however, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and then threatened to reopen its old Soviet-era nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. This threat led to the establishment of the Six Party Talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, United States) later that year as a renewed effort to disable North Korea’s nuclear programs in exchange for fuel oil and aid. A similar effort had floundered in the 1990s.

On October 9, 2006 North Korea tested its first nuclear device, despite pleas from the international community to the contrary. A few months earlier North Korea had test-fired a series of missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2 missile. As previous missile tests, including an unsuccessful attempt to launch a satellite, these were simply covert tests of North Korea’s ballistic missile technology. The Six Party Talks process followed a sine-wave pattern and finally collapsed in April 2009 when North Korea announced that it would no longer acknowledge the Six Party Talks and re-embarked on its path of nuclearization.

North Korea detonated its second nuclear device on May 25, 2009 and continued with its missile testing, again despite near universal condemnation and continuing UN sanctions. North Korean actions also coincided with Seoul’s robust anti-appeasement policy established by President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013).

## *“Military First” Bombast*

North Korean advances in nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology also emboldened Pyongyang to be more aggressive on the conventional military side. 2010 saw the deliberate sinking of the Cheonan and then the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. 2011 was relatively quiet with the deterioration of Kim Jong-il’s health and death in December of that year, and the steady rise of his heir apparent, son Kim Jong-un. It should be noted that, as much as *juche* is a farce, *songun* or “military first” policy, established by Kim Jong-il, is serious. To survive, the Kim dynasty must have a symbiotic relationship with its military. This means that the military has a particularly privileged position within the nomenclatura hierarchy of Pyongyang.

The nature of this *songun* relationship under Kim Jong-un no doubt continues to evolve; but, he is both the



*Ambassador Grinius and the Deputy Director of the Defence of the Fatherland Front Museum, Pyongyang.*

*Photo courtesy of the author*

“Supreme Commander of the (North) Korean People’s Army” and, perhaps more importantly, “First Chairman of the National Defense Commission.”

Further missile tests in 2012 culminated with the successful launch of a three-stage rocket and placement of a satellite into orbit in December. This set the stage for North Korean military provocations during the first half of 2013 beginning with a third nuclear test in February.

Much of the sabre-rattling was in anticipation of annual US-Korean military exercises. Nevertheless the level of North Korea’s vitriol this year was unprecedented. While threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fire were old hat, in short order North Korea announced its abrogation of the 1953 Armistice, closed the Kaesong special industrial complex (the only major source of legal hard currency for the North), threatened the United States with nuclear attack, warned foreign diplomats resident in Pyongyang that their safety could no longer be guaranteed, closed the North-South hotline, possibly initiated a series of cyber attacks against the South, declared that a state of war with the South existed, put its military forces on high alert (although no overt mobilization was ever detected by US and South Korean intelligence services), insulted the incoming South Korean president Park Gyeun-hye, announced plans to re-start the plutonium reactor in Yongbyon, moved missiles into possible launch-sites, told foreigners to leave Seoul, and declared that its nuclear weapons were the “nation’s life which can never be abandoned as long as the imperialists and nuclear threats exist on earth.”

The result of all this bombast? North Korea achieved none of its usual objectives, which include the lifting of UN sanctions, direct talks with the United States, as well as diplomatic recognition and the resumption of massive aid from South Korea. On the contrary, it caused China to lose patience

and agree to further UN Security Council sanctions while publicly chastising North Korea. It antagonized the United States and allowed for further US military deployments into the region. It gave the United States and China an excellent reason to consult more closely. It also stiffened South Korean resolve not to blink in the face of North Korean bombast.

## *Status Quo Ante*

Then a few months ago North Korea's temper tantrum vanished as if it had never happened. In June North Korea suggested that it should recommence bilateral talks with South Korea. The latter agreed. The North-South hotline was restored. North Korea also stated its desire to talk directly with the United States, something that the United States would do only if North Korea complied with UN Security Council resolutions and lived up to its international obligations.

In July, at China's urging, Kim Jong-un apparently agreed that reconvening the Six Party Talks would be a good thing after all. In August both Koreas agreed to re-open the Kaesong industrial complex. In September South Korea announced that it would provide USD 8.4 million of aid mostly in the form of medical supplies for malnourished infants and children. There is also talk of re-establishing family reunification opportunities and allowing South Korean tourists to once again visit historic Mount Kumgang, both activities of course subject to exorbitant hard currency prices by the North.

President Park has wisely taken a measured response to North Korea's earlier provocations. Her cautious middle way falls between the uncritical (some would say appeasement) "sunshine policy" of Presidents Kim and Roh and the robust tough love approach of President Lee. Now it will be a question of waiting to see how North Korea acts next.

On the surface nothing has changed. Ongoing UN sanctions have had no effect on the North's nuclear weapons or missile programs. North Korean arms trafficking, counterfeiting and money laundering likely continue apace. The re-opening of Kaesong will simply turn back on another source of hard currency. Most recently there have been media reports that Yongbyon may have been re-started, perhaps yet again with the aim of wresting concessions out of the United States and South Korea.

One would hope that Kim Jong-un and his military have learned something from their recent aggressive behaviour. Much depends, of course, on who ultimately rules in North Korea. Is it really Kim or the military? Both may be prone to geopolitical miscalculation.

No one really knows how Kim Jong-un - Swiss-educated, basketball-loving, but apparently a bully - and his trusted advisors think. No one seems to know how North Korea's nuclear command and control system truly works, or who is really in charge. Equally important, North Korean military thinking is problematic. Nicely swaddled in songun policy the military has not demonstrated an acute knowledge or awareness of the geopolitical and security drivers in their region. All the military does is repeat their view that only North Korean nuclear weapons prevent the United States

from invading. Kim Jong-un and his advisors appear to agree with this view, perhaps to keep the military happy. Or maybe they really believe it.

The military in Pyongyang seems to disdain their diplomat comrades who, if they would only dare, may be able to provide the military with a few clues about how the real world works. This particular stovepipe situation increases the danger of military and geopolitical miscalculation.

While world attention has remained focused on North Korea's military security and nuclear proliferation challenges, the country's abysmal human rights record has not been totally ignored. In March 2013, as North Korea's military threats were reaching a crescendo, the UN Human Rights Council decided to establish a year-long Commission of Inquiry into North Korea's human rights record.

North Korea's sophisticated gulag system holds up to an estimated 200,000 inmates, of whom some 50,000 are political prisoners. Long ago the Kim dynasty dispensed with Soviet-style show trials in favour of simple disappearances. Also in contrast to Stalin's gulag procedures, the entire family of a "political criminal" is incarcerated, thus allowing for up to three generations to be punished for the same alleged political crime.

In 2011 Amnesty International estimated that 40 percent of camp prisoners die of malnutrition. The Commission's eventual findings should have a significant impact not only on world opinion but also on those countries that still defend North Korea's record. It should also be noted that, while family reunification activities in the past have allowed divided families to meet their loved ones after some 60 years of separation (at exorbitant prices), these same families are subsequently not permitted to have any further communication with each other, something that even the Soviet Union allowed during the darkest hours of the Cold War. The human rights issue in North Korea should be as closely followed as the various military and security issues.

As noted earlier, China must increasingly view North Korea as a liability both in a regional sense and as an obstacle to its greater ambitions as a serious global leader. It is time for China, ever the long-term strategic thinker, in concert with the United States and supported by South Korea, Japan and Russia, to recognize the benefits of a united, economically vibrant Korean nation rather than to continue to prop up a failing North Korean Stalinist state that has gotten wilder since the ascension of Kim Jong-un.

Optimistic observers have suggested that North Korea could follow a China or Vietnam model of a "mixed economy with socialist characteristics" (i.e. grass roots capitalism mixed with state-owned enterprises, and all controlled by the supreme Communist Party). Such potential reform, however, remains anathema to the Kim regime as it may well guarantee the regime's demise.

China should work closely with the United States to envisage a united Korea in the context of a long-term strategic and stable bilateral relationship. Similarly, the ongoing US pivot towards Asia has got to be visionary and long-term, not a zero-sum game, and include a united Korea.

Issues to be addressed would include the recalibration of US regional security arrangements, the eventual withdrawal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula,



# ON TRACK

## *Canada's Korean Policy*

plans to temper or entirely avoid any refugee tsunami, the quick dismantlement of the North Korean gulag, exile of Kim Jong-un and his family (think Idi Amin or Baby Doc), the dissolution of the North Korean military elite with monetary incentives and freedom from prosecution, massive infrastructure construction (including electrical power to the North and connection of a united Korea's railway system to China, Russia and beyond for commercial purposes, including the export of raw material), and the full denuclearization of the North.

Korean unification will be a massive undertaking with few, if any, historical precedents. While the heavy lifting will have to be done by South Korea, China and the United States with considerable financial support of Japan, inevitably they will not get it all right. There will be a role to play for other interested parties including most UN organizations (health, agriculture, refugees, human rights, etc.) as well as the European Union, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (humanitarian support, rule of law, good governance, democratic institutions, etc.).

Most Canadians are not aware that Canada-Korea relations date back to 1888 when Canadian missionary James Scarth Gale of Toronto was first sent to Korea. Famous in Korea for his creation of the first Korean-English dictionary, he also prepared the first Korean translation of the Christian Bible and wrote the first substantial English-language history of Korea. Dr. Francis Schofield from Guelph became a national hero in Korea for his brave participation in the 1919 Independence Movement against Japanese colonial rule. Dr. Schofield is the only foreigner buried in the exclusive Korean Patriots' section of the Korea National Cemetery.

Official Canadian involvement began in 1947 when Canada participated in the UN commission that supervised free elections. Canada formally recognized the Republic of Korea in 1949. Canada's contribution in the 1950-53 Korean War is well known and highly appreciated by the South Korean people, who annually honour Canadian (and the other) UN Korea war veterans when they return to South Korea. Canada retains a military presence both on the UN Armistice Commission and on UN Military Command.



*Rush hour in downtown Pyongyang. View from the Koryo Hotel*

*Photo courtesy of the author*



Canada, in concert with Australia, New Zealand and most European countries, established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2001 in support of President Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy," all in the hope of persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions and to become a respectable member of the global community. In October 2002, however, Canada adopted a "business not as usual" policy in reaction to North Korea's revelation that it had been pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program.

In September 2005 Canada made a slight adjustment to its policy to allow for small-scale, grassroots-level capacity building in support of progress that had been made by the Six Party Talks process. In December 2005 Canada shifted diplomatic accreditation from its embassy in Beijing to its embassy in Seoul to better focus its expertise on the entire Korean Peninsula and to take advantage of both official and unofficial sources of information on North Korea that exist in Seoul.

Canada's modest engagement revival, however, was again put on hold when North Korea completed its first nuclear test in October 2006. Canada did continue to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea through the United Nations, Red Cross and the Canadian Foodgrains Bank, while fully supporting UN sanctions against North Korea. Canada also continued to support the Six Party Talks process and indeed once again in November 2007 adjusted its policy to allow for greater engagement with North Korea in the light of positive developments towards denuclearization.

Subsequent Six Party Talks progress, however, proved to be futile as North Korea tested its second nuclear device in May 2009. When in May 2010 the international investigation concluded that North Korea had sunk the Cheonan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Canada would "take measures to enhance restrictions on trade, investment and other bilateral relations" as well as suspending "senior-level contacts with North Korea."

In October 2010 the government announced the adoption of a Controlled Engagement Policy whereby official bilateral contact with North Korea would be limited to subjects concerning regional security, human rights and the humanitarian situation, inter-Korean relations, and consular issues. All other topics remain off the table.

Canada's Controlled Engagement Policy continues to be in effect, likely reinforced by North Korea's litany of provocations during the first half of 2013. This means that Canadian views on North Korea may be conveyed in official statements by Canada in multilateral fora such as the UN Human Rights Council, the Conference on Disarmament (in 2010 Canada boycotted North Korea's two month presidency - but South Korea, Japan and the United States did not), the UN General Assembly, and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Unfortunately such statements have limited impact, if they are even reported by North Korean delegations to their masters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang, because the ministry itself is marginalized in Pyongyang's decision-making process. Furthermore (and as it should be) Canada is an enthusiastic supporter of UN sanctions in place against North Korea. But Canada's effect is anaemic because, outside of humanitarian aid, Canadian commercial

investments and interests are non-existent. While Canada's Controlled Engagement Policy may demonstrate how verbally tough Canada is on North Korea and it may generate some internal ideological satisfaction among political decision-makers, it really has no teeth and only serves to marginalize Canada in any deliberations about the future of the Korean Peninsula.

## *"Seeing is believing"*

Is what Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said to this author and Canada's first Ambassador to be accredited to both South and North Korea, when the latter presented his credentials in Pyongyang in December 2005. They then proceeded with an extensive, frank, and fraternal exchange of views on issues of mutual interest (humanitarian assistance, human rights, nuclear ambitions, imperialist running dogs of the United States, etc.). They agreed that "seeing is believing," although their interpretations of what this entailed probably differed.

Canada's highest foreign policy priority remains the maintenance of best possible relations with the United States. Canada's strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region is to re-establish a long-term relationship with China that covers, *inter alia*, geopolitical security interests as well as strong commercial and economic ties.

One possible area where Canada can be helpful as it pursues its own strategic interests with both the United States and China is the Korean Peninsula. Canada already has solid relations with South Korea, which can be further deepened by regular exchanges about North Korea.

"Time spent on recce is seldom wasted" is what every junior artillery officer quickly learns. The same applies to diplomacy. In diplomacy, as in combat operations, nothing beats knowing what is actually happening on the ground. For this to happen, the Canadian ambassador must regularly visit North Korea and convey to Pyongyang's highest levels Canada's views on human rights, nuclear weapons, humanitarian issues, and regional security concerns. Much of this will be wasted on the senior true believers within the foreign affairs ministry, the military, the Party, and elsewhere. In the long run, however, one is speaking to the next generation and there is always a young note-taker from the nomenklatura class in the third row who will be listening intently and perhaps questioning official dogma.

Equally important is the opportunity actually to be on the ground and to see for oneself what is happening in Pyongyang and elsewhere, albeit always maintaining a jaundiced attitude. This entails not only official calls on North Korean leaders, but calls on ambassadors resident in Pyongyang, including long-term residents such as the Chinese, Russians and Swedes, as well as the senior representatives of UN agencies operating in North Korea.

It also entails simply walking and observing the streets of Pyongyang and elsewhere, noticing changes in what the locals are wearing or where they are eating, visiting the local markets and stores to see what is available and from where, or checking out the local hard currency restaurants and noting whether North Korean comrades

also eat there. Travelling the road south from Pyongyang to Kaesong and Panmunjon in the demilitarized zone is always very informative.

Taking the train from Beijing to Pyongyang is not only an adventure in itself, it is an opportunity to study the countryside as one crosses the Yalu River from prosperous Dandong on the Chinese side and plunges into the darkness of Sinuiju on the North Korean side. From there to Pyongyang one sees poor mouldy villages, broken down factories, denuded hills that only exacerbate flooding during the rainy season, a dearth of mechanized farm vehicles or any vehicles for that matter, and everywhere desperately poor people.

Only through repeated senior-level visits to North Korea does one build up the knowledge and experience that is required to be a serious player on the Korean Peninsula and to be recognized as such.

In the long run it will mean that not only will Canada have something substantive to contribute, but that its contribution will be welcomed by all, particularly by the United States, China and South Korea. ©



*North Korean military escort to Canadian Delegation in Panmunjon. Shown in picture is also Mr Rhee, chief minder from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interpreter Anna Song from the Canadian Embassy in Seoul.*

*Photo courtesy of the author*

## So Defence Procurement is broken again – or is this just normal?

Dan Ross

*Defence procurement, and the attendant complications is a topic that never seems to go away, whether progress in equipping the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is happening or not. My view, from close personal experience, is that we have a system of vague accountabilities, endless analysis by process gatekeepers, and conflicting priorities that drive schedules off the chart to the right. Such is our system, which evolved over decades and through many governments. But there was a brief period where extraordinary success occurred.*

Let's start by understanding what the subject is and what it is not. The defence materiel business is not just about procurement; it's about the management of defence materiel throughout its entire life cycle - requirements identification, options analysis, project definition, acquisition, in-service support, and disposal. It includes the management of a complex, global supply chain to get the right stuff to our troops wherever and whenever they need it. It also includes the management of contracted services for training, transportation, IT, and contracted support in overseas theatres of operation. The contracting for major new equipment, which gets all the heat and light, is a supporting activity to the whole business of defence materiel management.

The defence materiel business was consolidated 49 years ago by Bill C-90, which created Materiel Command and eliminated the three separate logistic services, the Quartermaster General, and the Master General of Ordnance.

By the mid-1980s, the materiel organization was reduced to 13,500 people and then further reduced by in the 1990s to the 4,600 person Materiel Group, which is currently supported by a hundred or so analysts within the Department of National Defence (DND) and about 500 contract staff at Public Works. Materiel Group will decline in size through the current deficit reduction program by another 400 civilians. With an annual budget of \$5-6 billion, Materiel Group is essentially a department in and of itself, possessing the internal capacity to function without significant DND corporate support.

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*Mr. Ross was Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel from May 2005 to December 2012 with the Department of National Defence. Prior to that appointment, he was Assistant Deputy Minister of Information Management in the Department of National Defence. From 2002 to 2003 he was Associate Assistant Deputy Minister of the Operations Branch of Public Works and Government Services Canada. From 1999 to 2002 he was Deputy to the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister and Director of Operations for the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Privy Council Office. Mr. Ross retired from the Canadian Forces in September 2002 after serving in uniform for 30 years and four days.*

Managing defence materiel is an integrated function that depends enormously on the unique training and experience of 1,600 military experts. It is also highly dependent on close cooperation with the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to identify and articulate requirements and manage readiness levels.

Public money cannot be spent without Treasury Board authorization or the delegation from Treasury Board to do so. Projects are regularly briefed to Treasury Board Secretariat, and guidance from that department is sought on any matter pertaining to authorities.

Almost all projects are completed under budget, with unused funding that can be reallocated. Not a single project, of the thousands managed by DND, has a "cost overrun." The notion that DND would contract without the appropriate authority to do so (as suggested around the cancellation of the Standard Military Pattern truck request for proposal) is simply ridiculous.

The defence materiel business has also changed substantively in recent years. Materiel Group implemented performance-based, best value procurement, and in-service sustainment processes. Evaluations were designed and weighted to focus on demonstrated performance, and technical specifications have been substantially reduced. Proven, off-the-shelf solutions have been pursued to minimize development, schedule and cost risks.

That being said, decades-old culture and traditional engineering training is hard to change in a few years, and many smaller projects were pursued with detailed technical specifications and lowest price. In many instances that is entirely appropriate.

The *Canada First* Defence Strategy eliminated, for at least a few years, the uncertainty about affordability in defence procurement. It was the most ambitious re-equipping program for the CF since the Korean Conflict. The government announced 13 multi-billion dollar projects and has advanced 7 to contract award. That does not include several dozen acquisitions greater than \$100 million.

C17 airlifters, C130J Hercules transports, Leopard tanks, M777 lightweight howitzers, armoured logistics vehicles, and many smaller capabilities are already in service and new C47F Chinook helicopters, upgraded LAVs, and new Tactical Patrol Vehicles are in production. The \$2 billion modernization program for the CF-18 has been hugely



successful and the aircraft performed very well over Libya. Modernized frigates are undergoing sea trials as part of their \$4 billion modernization program.

DND will spend approximately \$30 billion on new equipment and another \$30 billion on the sustainment of in-service equipment over the next decade. \$12 billion for new equipment is already under contract for Chinook helicopters, armoured patrol vehicles, modernized frigates, and other new capabilities. Approximately \$2.5 billion of sustainment funds will be spent replenishing consumables such as clothing, rations, and ammunition. Approximately 75% of the overall sustainment budget (paid almost always to the company that won the initial acquisition) will go to spare parts and repair, as well as the overhaul of in-service equipment. Much of the un-contracted capital will go to build Joint Support ships, Arctic Patrol ships, and warships for the Navy.

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*It is fair to characterize Canada's normal defence acquisition process as highly risk adverse and unbelievably slow.*

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Results from about 2005 to 2010 were driven by two extraordinary factors, first by powerful political will backed up by a funded strategy, and second by the urgency of supporting our troops in combat during that period of time. But political will is flagging and the relative success of the government's reequipping of the CF doesn't sell newspapers or win elections.

The government appears to be very intent on achieving a balanced budget before the next election. Most stakeholders believe that we are back to "normal" times in the defence procurement business. So the legions of analysts are re-exerting their control, Public Works is ensuring that everyone knows that they own the contracting mechanism and that their processes have to play out to perfection, and perfection is equated to zero risk.

It is fair to characterize Canada's normal defence acquisition process as highly risk adverse and unbelievably slow. No one minister or deputy minister is accountable for the business. There are many cooks in the kitchen: three departments and three central agencies with different agendas, that all have a veto and often don't agree. Schedules take a beating and as schedules slip, capital budgets lapse (and contribute to deficit reduction), buying power erodes, estimates go stale, political and communications risk goes up, existing equipment becomes more costly to maintain, and operational capability is more difficult to sustain.

Analysts in many places, and at multiple times, inflict years of delays on projects. For example, financial attestation by both DND and Public Works routinely takes at least six months for every decision point. Materiel Group's project management teams devote most of their time to feeding secretariats and to almost endless consultation exercises.

The business is a part-time job for ministers, deputy ministers, financial officers, and analysts at Treasury Board. Only DND's Materiel Group and one division of Public Works acquisition branch are devoted to this \$6 billion business full time.

The Materiel Group could be 90% of a separate department with a minister and deputy minister focused solely on this multi-billion dollar business. A dedicated chief financial officer and small policy shop could streamline the approval document and financial processes of capital materiel projects. Duplication between DND and Public Works contracting personnel could be eliminated with the reassignment of the Defence Production Act to a Minister of Defence Materiel.

The first thing critics will say is that a Defence Materiel department would look like another National Defence department, due to its close relationship to DND and that department's military/civilian workforce, and it therefore could not be trusted to be unbiased.

With or without a separate Department for Defence Materiel, there needs to be a more robust program integrity capacity in the defence materiel business. A broad and comprehensive program integrity capacity would address the issue of bias and re-establish a contract audit capability, provide more comprehensive review services, coordinate an independent third-party review of the overall business annually, and work proactively and collaboratively with the Auditor General and Parliamentary Budget Officer.

The Minister of Defence Materiel should also have an advisory board of distinguished Canadians to provide an independent second look at major procurements at the end of the options analysis work and before it goes to Government for policy approval.

Yes, the acquisition process is broken. But I believe it is really just business as usual in our system of vague accountability. In many aspects we are leaders amongst G8 countries in the management of defence materiel. We drive positive results out of a much smaller and more efficient organization than most of our allies. To shatter that organizational strength would be dumb. What needs to be resolved is the fragmentation of accountability, duplication of effort, and the lack of contracting authority in the organization that manages defence materiel. ©

## Procuring Canada's new fighter – what went wrong?

Richard Shimooka and General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson

*The Conservative government's attempt to replace Canada's ageing fleet of CF-18 Hornets with the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was an unmitigated disaster.*

Although clearly the preferred choice of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the F-35 was beset with alarming reports of escalating costs and technical problems to the point where, in the face of relentless attacks from the media, parliamentary opposition and other critics, the government reset the acquisition, effectively going back to square one.

While Canada remains a partner in the JSF program, slated to deliver more than 3,000 F-35s to nine JSF partners and two other nations, the path has now apparently been opened to options from other American and European contenders. As a result, the RCAF may not see the selection of a replacement fighter for several years, at a time when the CF-18 is nearing the end of its operational life.

All of this is in stark contrast to what happened the last time Canada set out to purchase a new fighter some 36 years ago, also amidst considerable controversy. At that time, from the Cabinet's go-ahead to the signing of a contract, the New Fighter Aircraft program (NFA as it was called) took less than three years, and the CF-18 Hornet entered operational service not long after.

What went wrong this time around?

It is common knowledge that the procurement process for major military systems in this country has become seriously dysfunctional, to the point where specific acquisitions can take 15 years or more. To be fair, the problem is not exclusively a Canadian one. Most of our allies face similar difficulties these days. But the F-35 experience in Canada has brought into focus several factors that reflect a peculiarly Canadian dimension, and which together exacerbate the difficulty in producing timely, affordable, operationally effective and publicly supported purchases of major military systems. Here are the principal problems as we see them in the context of the recent F-35 episode.

### 1. Strategic questions

Canadians can be forgiven for almost totally ignoring the strategic context of the F-35 debate. It is an understandable void: the government failed to state in any sort of detail why a CF-18 replacement is needed. Unfortunately, it is a question that cannot be answered in other than the most general terms, because no one can accurately predict the threats

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*Richard Shimooka is a defence analyst with the CDA Institute. General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, was program manager for the New Fighter Aircraft program (1977-80).*

Canada and her allies will be facing ten years from now, let alone 50.

Political, military and technological analysis will give some indication of the nature of future operational roles and missions, but the inescapable reality is that the best way to be prepared for a diverse and unknowable range of future threats is to acquire a very high performance, multirole combat aircraft. Half measures would be an enormous waste of taxpayers' dollars while risking failure in our nation's ability to cope with future strategic environment. Canadians need to be informed of this logical conclusion in understandable terms.<sup>1</sup>

### 2. The international dimension

In the first-round debate, heavy emphasis was given to the new fighter's role in protecting sovereignty in Canada's Arctic. But the aircraft will have a second vital role, namely joint overseas operations with our allies, of the kind that have characterized so much of our air force's history since the Second World War, and typified most recently by the Libyan operation. Consequently, the real test will likely be the RCAF's ability to participate effectively with allied air forces in countering threats abroad. This demands a high degree of interoperability, not only in the air, but also in the technical and logistical support of our aircraft on the ground.

The enormous number of F-35s that will be flown by friendly air forces presents obvious advantages in this regard. It should also be recognized that non-stealth fighters cannot normally operate jointly with a fleet of stealth aircraft, since even a single unstealthily aircraft would contaminate the whole force.<sup>2</sup> Were Canada to purchase an "orphan" fighter aircraft, the RCAF's ability to operate effectively in joint operations would be diminished, as would our stature as a contributor nation for collective defence and security. The international dimension cannot be neglected in the course of the current reset.

### 3. The escalating cost of fighter aircraft

In the past three decades, the cost of acquiring combat aircraft has increased dramatically, in large part due to growing complexity, especially of avionics systems. Looking back at the CF-18 fighter case, Canada joined a program that was delivering over 100 aircraft a year by 1985, with economies of scale and manufacturing efficiencies favourably affecting program and unit costs. Most modern fighter procurements experience the opposite trend, particularly in the early years.

Unexpectedly high development costs lead to early price escalation, causing governments to delay or stretch out purchases or to reduce aircraft numbers. This results

in higher unit cost, leading to further cuts or restructuring, which in turn can result in what is called a death spiral unless total costs are contained. The F-35 has avoided such a fate thus far, although the development of its highly advanced avionics has seen unanticipated delays and cost overruns. Consequently it will take several years to raise production levels to a point where efficiencies are accrued and per-unit cost drops significantly, although this process has already begun.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, delays in the Canadian acquisition program would push the RCAF's purchase out to at least 2017, at which time a significant price advantage should be available.

#### **4. Public indifference and cynicism**

While the nature of military procurement has shifted significantly since the CF-18 acquisition, it pales in comparison to changes in public attitudes towards the military and its needs. In the 1970s and early 1980s a significant proportion of the public had a real interest in military matters. Certainly the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union was a source of concern. Furthermore, there was a large structural reservoir of support in the form of the many Canadians with military service in the Second World War, Korea and the Cold War, and others with first hand experience of armed conflict. This contributed to a broad and influential public understanding that the Canadian Forces required up-to-date warfighting capabilities to defend Canada in concert with its NATO allies.

Today the situation is markedly different. The number of Canadians with war experience has diminished substantially, and Canada no longer faces an ominous external threat to its security. This has created a sense of strategic ambivalence within the general public and a skewed perspective regarding the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces. Over 50% of the population believe that the military's primary role should be peacekeeping rather than more coercive forms of peacemaking. Consequently many Canadians viewed the F-35's advanced capabilities as being excessive and unnecessary relative to Canada's security needs. This diminution of public support clearly weakened the government's determination to follow through with its intended purchase of the F-35.

#### **5. Political factors**

Given the reduced public interest in defence issues, procurement debates can be unduly influenced by poorly informed public opinion and media criticism. The Conservative government initially attempted to exploit the F-35 for political purposes, announcing a "commitment" to procure F-35's in July 2010 when one was not required. But spending billions on new fighters is a tough sell at a time of fiscal austerity, especially when the strategic need and the real long-term costs are difficult to define. At the same time, opposition parties routinely attack the government on defence issues in a corrosive partisan atmosphere without due consideration of the consequences for national security.

Bad news about the F-35, including negative reports from the Parliamentary Budget Officer and the Auditor General, presented the opposition with a golden opportunity to hit the government hard for political advantage. This has continued despite the F-35 project's steadily improving

status and the resolution of many of the initial complaints against the fighter.

#### **6. A highly competitive marketplace**

The RCAF's plan to acquire the F-35 directly through its partnership in the JSF program fell victim to the huge controversy that emerged in the face of criticism, much of which centred on the planned "sole source" approach.

Not surprisingly, manufacturers of the handful of other fighters currently available jumped at the opportunity to bid on the Canadian acquisition. Regardless of claims to the contrary, none of these alternative aircraft can come close to matching the F-35's interoperability and potential operational performance, especially in the critical areas of data fusion and stealth. This is in stark contrast to the NFA, where Canada had six potential competitors with roughly similar performance, all of them in or nearing production. Furthermore, the massive scale of the JSF program offers an unmatched level of long-term supportability.

Competitors (assuming that a formal competition will now occur) will therefore have to make their case on the basis of other factors such as program costs, the technical maturity of their candidate aircraft and attractiveness of their industrial and regional benefits proposals.

#### **7. Interdepartmental complexities**

In looking back at the CF-18 acquisition, it is no exaggeration to say that its remarkable success was primarily due to the creation in 1977 of a closely integrated, highly cooperative interdepartmental program management office, with full-time representatives from the Defence, Supply and Services, and Industry departments of the federal government. This arrangement ensured that interdepartmental issues were resolved at the working level, and the net result was speedy passage of the program office's recommendations through cabinet committees and the full cabinet.

Since then, the military procurement process has evolved into a highly complex and convoluted bureaucratic system, which complicates the government's ability to facilitate quick and efficient military acquisitions. Likely the most significant factor is implementation of several government-wide regulations governing all procurements, which has imposed a greater administrative burden and further delays.

For example, the Agreement on Internal Trade provides Industry Canada with a significant role in procurement, as they must evaluate each submission's adherence to the Industrial and Regional Benefits program. This has further divided responsibilities between departments, leading to increased delays as critical decisions and agreements work their way through multiple approval paths.

Recently, the government implemented a new institutional structure to manage major procurement decisions, in the form of an independent secretariat. This innovation was intended to provide a more cohesive approach to projects like the replacement for the CF-18, but its effectiveness remains to be seen.



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To summarize, then, much did go wrong in the abortive attempt to replace the fleet of CF-18s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Responsibility for this unfortunate state of affairs can be placed largely on the government, but also on the media, the opposition and other critics who for one reason or another endlessly disparaged Canada's F-35 intentions.

The Conservatives failed to lay out the strategic requirement and the procurement process in terms that the average interested citizen could understand.

In the face of considerable obfuscation about the aircraft's ultimate cost, and undue pessimism about the technical problems that are inevitably encountered in the early development phase of such a highly sophisticated

military system, misleading impressions were allowed to dominate the debate. Lost in all of this was the very real operational need for a CF-18 replacement and the fact that the F-35 is demonstrably the only suitable candidate to fulfil that need.

The greatest risk at this critical stage is that, in response to political and commercial pressure, the government might allow the operational requirements to be watered down to the point where a much less capable aircraft could be selected.

Looking ahead, then, even if a formal competition is deemed necessary, the F-35 reality must dominate the next phase of the procurement process. Canada's national security demands it.

## (Endnotes)

- 1 See Shimooka, Richard. "F-35 and the Future of Canadian Security". Strategic Studies Working Group Papers, CIC/CDFAI. November 2012.
- 2 Manson, Paul. "The Demonization of Stealth". The Hill Times, 14 January 2013.
- 3 "F-35 price cut in offing with new deal inked between Pentagon, Lockheed Martin". Canadian Press, 30 July 2013. ©

## Command of the Canadian Army

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Peter Devlin

*There are thousands of experienced veterans in our ranks, ensuring Army readiness and shaping the soldiers of the future through training, mentoring and leadership.*

This past summer, I had the honour of handing command of the Canadian Army to Lieutenant-General Marquis Hainse. Lieutenant-General Hainse is an experienced and committed infantry officer who will excel in leading the Canadian Army.

Throughout my tenure as the Commander Canadian Army, I was continually impressed by the achievements of the Army. I am grateful to the troops for their dedication and the Army leadership for their unwavering commitment to excellence. I am extremely proud and humbled to have served as their Commander.

Both the Regular and Reserve forces have served, and continue to serve with distinction in operations overseas – in Afghanistan and around the world in other important deployments. Our training process has incorporated lessons learned, and broadened to prepare our troops for whatever task they may take on next. New equipment is on the way and old equipment reconstituted or divested.

I am confident that I am leaving the Army in excellent condition. The Reserve force, which performed admirably in Afghanistan, constitutes a valuable portion of the force, and will remain a key Army presence in communities across Canada as they continue their transition to a more traditional part-time structure.

The realignment from full-time Primary Reserve to traditional Class A service is ongoing, with Class B positions being adjusted to a sustainable level. Success, particularly in domestic operations, is contingent on the continued health of the Primary Reserve. The Army will maintain established funding to deliver 37.5 days of Class A training per soldier, plus 7 days of collective training for targeted portions of the Primary Reserve.


The Canadian Army made significant achievements in Afghanistan, and our current contribution to the NATO-led training mission continues to provide important support to capacity building in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). *Operation ATTENTION* is delivering key training and supporting the development of ANSF military and policing institutions.

The Army has engaged in several substantial capital acquisition projects, as well as the overhaul and refit of existing equipment. The LAV III and Leopard tanks are in the process of reconstitution and modernization. The new family of land combat vehicles is on schedule to deliver a fleet that will enhance battlefield mobility, lethality and protection for our soldiers.

*Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin retired from the Canadian Army as Commander in the summer of 2013.*

The tools that will equip the networked soldier of tomorrow are on the horizon today. As of November 2012, the Army was officially 'reloaded' and ready to respond to any mission assigned by the government, including a sustained large scale expeditionary combat operation.

Armies have always operated under budget constraints, and ours is no different. We have seen some tough adjustments over the past few years. We have had to find a balance between fiscal efficiencies and effective



*This war print of LGen Peter Devlin is loaded with ideas and issues.*

*Based on a large portrait (four by three feet) he sat for this summer, just a month before retiring from the CF, he holds his FMP Field Message Pad, connecting him to the reality of operations on the ground. The War print is one in a series about current CF command responsibilities.*

*Portrait by Gertrude Kearns, 2013*

training that will properly prepare our soldiers for the broad range of missions they can be given. To this end, we have transitioned from an eight month to a 12-month Managed Readiness Plan that preserves level 5, live-fire training while continuing foundation training, incorporating key courses and increasingly important joint training exercises, both here in Canada and abroad with our allies.

The transition to a training and mentoring mission in Afghanistan has been accompanied by a broadening of the range of Army training scenarios. The Army may be required to operate in a variety of environments including jungle, desert, littoral, mountain, or arctic, and so we must be prepared for a more diverse range of locations and challenges. In particular, a renewed focus has been placed on winter warfare capabilities, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training.

While there is no longer a primary focus on training for combat operations in Afghanistan, the lessons learned from that theatre have been incorporated into the training that all deploying troops receive. We have gained valuable experience in the areas of counter-IED, asymmetric warfare, adaptive dispersed operations, strategic airlift, and armoured mobility, among others. We incorporate these lessons into training to ensure this knowledge is not lost and to prepare troops for future operations.

Another important aspect of training has been the efforts to incorporate training with the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force through JOINTEX, as well as with allies wherever possible. This is a great way to prepare our troops to operate with the other services in the Canadian Armed Forces as well as with our international partners. In today's complex operating environment the Army needs to

be able to work as a joint and multinational force, involving a range of partners.

The ranges, training areas, bases, and installations that comprise the Army's infrastructure are vital tools in maintaining readiness. The Army has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure projects to ensure that our troops have modern facilities. At the same time, infrastructure holdings have been, and will continue to be reviewed in order to divest of nonessential facilities.

The Army has made great strides to fulfill the government's military objectives in the North. Achievements include the establishment of the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, the creation of four Arctic Response Company groups, the establishment of a Reserve Company in Yellowknife, and the significant increase in the number of Canadian Rangers. These developments have allowed the Army to increase its footprint in Canada's northern communities, and provide a permanent base for the Army to further develop its northern capabilities.

Finally, the Army has celebrated significant historical milestones during my tenure. The return to historic designations connects today's soldiers with a storied past that Canadians are proud of. The Army has done a fantastic job of connecting with Canadians and I am confident that this important relationship will continue in the future.

The future for the Canadian Army remains very bright. With a force based on soldiers and leaders experienced in combat, possessing battle-proven equipment and trained to high standards in a challenging and realistic environment, the Army remains well postured to respond to government assigned missions at home and abroad. Canada's Army - strong, proud and ready! ©



## Advising at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC)

Colonel Peter J. Williams

*Canada's commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and more specifically the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), remains our largest overseas military operation, and is conducted under the name of Operation ATTENTION.*

Canada's military mission in Afghanistan does not get much press these days, certainly not as much as our former combat mission in the south of that country. Indeed, many Canadians might be surprised to learn that Canada still has troops deployed in Afghanistan.

For over a year, as a member of ISAF/NTM-A, I had the very good fortune to command an international team of military and civilian contractor advisors, working alongside our Afghan National Army (ANA) colleagues at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC), our team being known as the KMTC Training Advisory Group (KMTC TAG). Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) soldiers formed the largest single part of my team.

The aim of this article is to describe what KMTC is, what we did in the KMTC TAG over the last year, and to offer some personal comments about what participation in future missions such as NTM-A might mean for the CAF.

The mission of NTM-A is to support ISAF, in order to enable accountable, Afghan-led security not later than 31 December 2014. In order to accomplish this, a number of NATO and non-NATO advisors were stationed around Afghanistan, to work alongside their ANA counterparts.

The KMTC TAG was but one of these. KMTC is the ANA's largest training facility and is focused on individual training for recruits, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers. Advanced NCO and officer training, as well as training for drivers and instructors, are also offered at KMTC.

The ANA does include women in its ranks, though not in very large numbers (fewer than 400 during my time there, with the ultimate aim being 19,500 female ANA members, or 10% of the final ANA strength of 195,000). At KMTC women train separately from the men, and indeed have their own secure compound with facilities for instruction, dining, exercise, recreation, and accommodation.

KMTC is commanded by Brigadier-General Paytani, a former Chief of Staff of 205<sup>th</sup> Corps in southern Afghanistan, and thus is well known to a generation of Canadian and Coalition soldiers who served there. When I arrived he was into his third year in command, and besides being the KMTC TAG Commander, I was also Brigadier-General Patyani's advisor as part of the NTM-A mission.

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*Colonel Peter Williams completed his second tour in Afghanistan, commanding the multinational KMTC Training Advisory Group (KMTC TAG) for a year. An artillery officer by background, he has also served on operational duty in Angola, Cyprus and in Bosnia.*

KMTC reports to the ANA Training and Education Command (ANATEC), somewhat akin to our own Land Forces Doctrine and Training Command, and is divided into a number of training brigades. In addition there is a garrison command element, led by a colonel, with all the responsibilities that a base commander in Canada would have, including, most importantly, security, which was perhaps Brigadier-General Patyani's main area of focus. Finally, there is a KMTC headquarters (HQ), led by a Chief of Staff (again, a colonel), which included all the normal staff functions one would find in such a large organization, including personnel devoted to course curriculum development. Brigadier-General Paytani was entrusted with all aspects of the command of this vast enterprise.

And truly vast it is. It is the scale of KMTC's activity that is perhaps the most striking aspect of life there. We must remember that, even at the time of writing, the ANA is building an army while fighting a war, and so there was a constant influx of new students throughout my time at KMTC. New recruit cohorts, some 1,400 strong, and grouped as a single *kandak* (battalion) arrived and were processed each week. Indeed, during my tour, KMTC trained some 38,000 soldiers, NCOs and officers - an outstanding achievement, particularly when one considers that this number is over half the Regular strength of the CAF.

Upon completion of their training at KMTC, many graduates proceed to the nearby Consolidated Fielding Centre (CFC), where they undergo a course of collective training in order to make them into an operational *kandak*, ready to assume a combat role in its areas of responsibility in Afghanistan. Others proceed to various branch schools (for training in communication, artillery, engineering, etc.), or are selected for duty in the Special Forces or the Afghan Air Force. Some basic NCO and officer graduates remain at KMTC as instructors.

In order to fulfill our NTM-A mandate of assisting the ANA to become self-reliant, the KMTC TAG consisted of a large number (some 400-plus on my arrival in June 2012) of military and civilian advisors. The variety of nations that provided advisors gives a sense of the international commitment to the NTM-A mission. On my arrival, the KMTC TAG had advisors from Canada (who were the majority), Croatia, France, Greece, Jordan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (who provided ex-military civilian contractor advisors).

I must stress the fact that we were "advisors." While earlier Coalition soldiers working alongside the ANA, and indeed our own Operational Mentor and Liaison



*An ANA instructor with the distinctive black hat, teaches new recruits at KMTC about machine guns. A Canadian advisor stands in the background.*

*Photo courtesy of the author*

Team (OMLT) in Kandahar, may have styled themselves as “trainers,” training was not our mandate. The ANA at KMTC were responsible for training and had their own cadre of instructors (some of whom sported distinctive headgear to denote their special status). And so, if one visited a group of ANA students in a classroom, on a firing range, or in the field for an exercise, one would see Afghan instructors and staff running things, with our advisors in the background, ready to step in if necessary and as required.

Our role was to advise and assist, not only on matters of training, but, given Commander KMTC’s scope of responsibilities, also on matters of logistics, security and planning. As my RSM used to tell me: “There are two things you can do with advice, you can take it or leave it.” Throughout our year, we experienced both.

The ANA at KMTC did not take all our advice on every occasion it was offered. However, in two areas in particular, where I was able to make a link with both safety and security, they did. And that was perhaps the key: the way in which advice was presented. In the end, it had to be something they wanted to do, for reasons that made sense to them, and which would work for them.

Throughout my time in Afghanistan, I found the words of Lawrence of Arabia, who advised and assisted indigenous military forces of a very different sort, highly useful: “Better

to let them do it imperfectly than do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their war, and your time is short.”

Over the course of the year, I found the ANA were able to make great strides at KMTC in assuming full responsibility for their mission, whether in matters of training or in other areas. For example, when I arrived, the loss of power or other critical KMTC utilities would have normally resulted in late night calls to me to sort out the matter. Similarly, the arrival or the opening of a new training facility might leave the ANA taking some time to decide exactly how to make best use of it. However, as time progressed, and with, it must be said, a degree of “tough love” on our part, the ANA were able to address these and many other issues on their own without reference to us.

As mentioned earlier, when I arrived we had some 400 advisors. By the time I left our numbers were reduced to some 70, the majority still Canadian. This reduction in advisors was fully in concert with NTM-A’s Transition Plan, whereby organizations such as KMTC are expected to achieve certain Capability Milestones (CMs), based on competencies in various areas. As those CM levels are achieved the number of NTM-A advisors are reduced accordingly.

What is broadly termed as “cultural awareness” I found to be of inestimable value to us as advisors. While exposure to the Dari language was part of our pre-deployment

# ON TRACK

training, in retrospect I wish I had paid more attention to it. Nevertheless, we all found that even small attempts to use simple phrases of greeting went a long way toward building relationships.

Bridges could be built in other ways: on two occasions we challenged our ANA counterparts to sports competitions, sadly losing on both occasions. That did not matter however, as the important thing was that we had done something worthwhile together and were both better for the experience. Cultural awareness also extended to respect for religious practices, such as the holy month of Ramadan or “Ramazan” as it’s known in Afghanistan, during which, out of respect for our ANA colleagues as well as our fellow Muslim advisors and Afghan locals who worked on our camp, I ordered that we would not eat or drink outside during daylight hours. That gesture was well received by our practicing colleagues.

All that to say that by the time I left, we already had some KMTC units with no advisors at all, and had made recommendations that the remainder be given the highest CM rating by the end of 2012. Thus, when I handed over to my successors, I was very confident that KMTC was well on the road to full autonomy in handling all its own affairs.

I can’t say that KMTC’s success was entirely due to our own efforts. Many KMTC instructors were highly experienced and, even when faced with a cohort of 700 officer candidates when normally there were only 50, with some advice from us, they were able to work through the myriad of challenges involved in training such a large group. That bodes well for the ANA’s future and that of KMTC in particular.

It is my firm belief that missions such as that of NTM-A will become more common in the years ahead. Whether nations such as Canada will decide to participate in them remains a matter for their respective governments

to decide, but sending “boots on the ground” in the form of training advisors, vice fighting troops, may prove to be a more palatable option for those nations that would seek to avoid the potential cost in blood and treasure inherent to a combat mission.

Indeed, one could argue that such missions, particularly if done as a pre-emptive form of “upstream capacity building,”<sup>1</sup> are more decisive than combat operations. In addition, training and advisory missions by their very nature expose the contributing nation to the civil and military leadership of the host nations, in ways that combat missions may not; links which could prove highly beneficial in the future, particularly in the foreign affairs domain.

Canadian soldiers are well suited to such work. The CAF has a well-deserved reputation as being well-trained, and from what I saw over the course of a year, its members are able to adapt to new cultures easily - whether those of the host nation or our Coalition partners.

That said - lest Canada, particularly in these fiscally challenged times, seeks to restructure its military solely for advisory purposes, a word of caution: armed forces worldwide exist to provide the government with options when faced with threats to national defence, or anything deemed to be in the national interest.

Having a force optimized for operations across the spectrum of conflict, as the CAF is currently structured, is the best means of generating the advisors that Canada was able to produce for service at KMTC and other areas of Operation ATTENTION. I remain totally convinced that our upbringing in an Army where we trained for combat was the ultimate guarantor of our success.

All Canadians can be very proud of our role in this highly decisive, if relatively unknown, mission of helping ensure a secure and stable future for Afghanistan.

## (Endnotes)

1 I was reliably informed during my tour that this term has become increasingly in vogue in UK defence and security circles.

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## Op HUSKY2013

Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg

*Op HUSKY 2013 commemorated the Canadian campaign in Sicily, where 23,000 soldiers first landed on the southern beaches of Pachino, 70 years ago.*

It was 10 July 1943 when 160,000 troops from Canada, Britain and the United States engaged in what was then the biggest invasion in history: the Allied landings in Sicily. In 35 days the 1st Canadian Division, together with our British and American allies cleared the largest island in the Mediterranean of enemy forces.

Major-General Guy Simonds commanded the 1st Canadian Division during the campaign in Sicily and mainland Italy. On November 1, as the Canadian troops closed on Ortona, he was transferred to command the 5th Canadian Armoured Division as part of the 1st Canadian Corps being formed in Italy. On 2 November, 1943, he wrote the following:

“When admiration is expressed for the German rearguard actions in Sicily and Italy, I agree t h e Germans fought well, but there is no country in the world better suited to delaying action. Having seen it first hand, my own reaction is not what wonders the German rearguards achieved, but what wonders were achieved by our own soldiery against strong opposition in some of the most incredibly difficult physical conditions...”

The Canadians slashed and fought their way though the centre of the island and were pivotal in puncturing Hitler’s Mediterranean flank - at a cost of 562 Canadians dead and more than 1,600 wounded. For the survivors, Operation HUSKY was an outstanding success. It was the first independent, division-level Canadian action in the Second World War, and the first Canadian victory in that conflict.

Sadly, over the years, little recognition has been given to the Canadian victory and the sacrifices of the Canadian soldiers who made that strategic victory possible.

Colonel (Ret'd) Fredrick K. LaForge, the Canadian Military Attaché in Italy from 1991 to 1994, attempted to provide visibility to the Canadian sacrifices during that campaign. The 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Allied invasion of Sicily fell during Laforge’s tour of duty in Italy, on 10 July 1993. Preceding that event he held a series of meetings, telephone conversations, and other communications with the Department of National Defence (DND) and the planning staff at Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC). It immediately became clear that there was no intention to hold any events or even to recognize the amazingly complex planning, landings, and extended actions by our soldiers on the Island of Sicily a half-century before. Despite Colonel LaForge’s protestations,

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*Captain (Ret'd) Peter Forsberg is the CDA Institute's Public Affairs Officer.*

our fallen soldiers of Sicily were not to be amongst those honoured. He then requested funding from VAC. VAC refused funding and would not supply one single wreath or dollar in support. Colonel LaForge then called and made a pitch to the Royal Canadian Legion in Lahr. His call was met immediately with outstanding support. The Lahr Legion funded five members from their strong and dedicated membership; they paid for and rented a large van to carry all their flags, their wreaths, themselves, and their luggage. It was an amazing display of needed support to highlight the Canadians’ participation in Sicily.

With Colonel LaForge’s plans in motion, accommodations were booked. He arranged for a priest from Pachino to meet the Canadians on the beach early on the morning of 10 July. With great solemnity and dignity, Colonel LaForge and members from the Royal Canadian Legion marked the bravery and purpose of the First Division landing. They paid homage to the first of many fallen that died during the campaign. Over the next three days, the group traced the route of the Division from battle area to battle area. That trip and the support from the Lahr Legion is one of Colonel LaForge’s best and strongest memories of his tour in Italy.

Operation HUSKY 2013 commemorated the Canadian campaign in Sicily, where 23,000 soldiers first landed on the southern beaches of Pachino 70 years ago.

The preparations for Op HUSKY 2013 began in 2006, when Steve Gregory, owner of the Montréal technology training company IsaiX, learned through his son Erik about the Battle of Assoro (the Canadians’ daring night-time attack on the Sicilian mountain town) from a veteran of that campaign, Bombardier Hunter (2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery). The Gregory men soon realized that they could not locate any material about the Canadians in Sicily.

Following an interview with Bombardier Hunter, father and son went to Sicily, where they visited the all-Canadian cemetery in Agira – the final resting place of 496 soldiers. It was at that point that the senior Gregory decided that he would put on “a real show” to commemorate the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Op HUSKY.



*Major-General Guy Simonds*



*Canadians landing on Pachino Beach 10 July 1943*

Inspired by the discovery that there was little awareness of Canada's contribution to the Sicilian campaign, Mr. Gregory conceived the idea of Operation HUSKY 2013. He assembled a team of committed Canadian and Italian volunteers and led the complex operations - which required him to liaise with many groups in Canada as well as national, regional, and local authorities in Italy. Steve's primary sponsor was Canada Company, a charity founded by Honorary Colonel Blake Goldring.

This year, on 10 July, 300 Canadians and Italian civilians gathered on Bark West beach in Pachino to watch the raising of the Canadian flag in honour of the soldiers who fought in the Sicilian campaign and to plant the first of many fallen soldier markers. The ceremony marked the beginning of a 20-day march in the footsteps our soldiers took 70 years ago - through Grammichele, Piazza Armerina, Valguarnera, Leonforte, Assoro, Agira, Catenanuova, and Regalbuto. The final Canadian task in Op HUSKY was the capture of Adrano.

Throughout Op HUSKY 2013, Canadians were welcomed in each town by many enthusiastic and curious Sicilians, who lined

their streets for the parade and performed in marching bands that played our National Anthem.

Sixty sailors, soldiers, and airmen and women, headed by the Pipes and Drums of the Seaforth Highlanders and under the leadership of 1st Canadian Division, joined the Op HUSKY 2013 ceremonies for the final week. The grand



*L-R: Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance, Deputy Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples; Francesca Ganci, Segretario Generale, Province of Catania; Dottore Ettore De Salvo, Capo del Gabinetto de Catania; the Hon. Julian Fantino, Minister of Veterans Affairs; Mr. Stephen Gregory, initiator of Op HUSKY 2013; and Colonel Tony Battista, former Canadian Defence Attaché, Rome.*



finale of Op HUSKY 2013 was a two-part event. First, there was one person at each of the 480 soldiers' graves in the Canadian cemetery at Agira when Steve read the names of the Fallen. In honour of the dead, the response "HERE" or "PRÉSENT" or "PRESENTI" rang out loudly. Wreaths were laid and speeches pronounced. The second part of the day was an identical recreation of the concert in Agira that was performed by the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada band on 30 July 1943. More than 400 Canadians and thousands of Sicilians attended the concert, which took place 70 years to the day after the original. The events were all unqualified successes and emotionally charged. Op HUSKY 2013 reflected very positively the initiative of Canadians who remember those who brought great respect for Canada and for the

Canadian soldiers who fought in Sicily. Through Mr. Gregory's efforts, Op HUSKY 2013 raised the awareness of Canadian and Italian citizens regarding Canada's role in freeing those who suffered under the tyranny of Mussolini.

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Ernest Beno joined the marchers for the final week. He said that, "Operation HUSKY 2013 was a very memorable and moving experience - marching in the footsteps of those who fought and died in Sicily 70 years ago. The 1st Canadian Division led the way in the liberation of Europe, and remembering their challenges and sacrifices is important to Canadians and Europeans to this day. Well done Steve Gregory and Operation HUSKY 2013 team."

Go online to [www.operationhusky2013.ca](http://www.operationhusky2013.ca) to find out more about Operation HUSKY 2013. ©

## Operation Nanook – A Model for Contingency Response across Canada

David Perry

*Since 2007 the Canadian Armed Forces have conducted a series of increasingly sophisticated operations in the Canadian Arctic. The largest and best known of these is Operation Nanook, which has served to bring together military forces and other Canadian government departments at a range of locations in the Eastern and High Arctic. These operations are designed to contribute to the four priority areas of Canada's Northern Strategy: exercising arctic sovereignty, protecting the environment, promoting social and economic development, and improving and devolving Northern governance. Operation Nanook particularly, is oriented towards a more discrete set of goals: asserting sovereignty, enhancing the Canadian military's ability to operate in Arctic conditions, improving coordination in whole-of-government operations, and maintaining interoperability with other partners involved in responses to safety and security issues in the North. While Canada's military command in the Arctic, Joint Task Force North is primarily oriented towards exercising sovereignty, this year's Operation Nanook devoted priority of effort towards the other goals.*

The 2013 iteration of Operation Nanook encompassed four scenarios. A sovereignty patrol by the Canadian Rangers was the only purely military exercise, patrolling King William Island, Nunavut. Each of the other three scenarios involved requests for military assistance by other government departments.

On Cornwallis Island, the Canadian Armed Forces responded to an Environment Canada request for assistance investigating a poaching threat and on Resolution Island a request for aid to an RCMP investigation of suspicious activity. These latter two scenarios are notable for witnessing the first deployment of an Arctic Response Company Group (ARCG) (from 35 Canadian Brigade Group, Québec) on Operation Nanook.

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*David Perry is a doctoral candidate in political science at Carleton University, where he holds a J. Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship (SSHRC). He is a fellow with the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, at Carleton University and a defence policy analyst with the CDA Institute.*

The ARCG emerged from the Conservative government pledge to strengthen Canadian military capacity in the North, and originally envisaged the creation of a dedicated Arctic capacity at Goose Bay, Labrador. The current ARCG concept involves four reserve units spread across the Army's geographically based divisions devoted to Arctic operations on two year cycles. Two ARCGs focus on summer operations and two on northern operations at a time, switching after one year. Their concept of operations envisages deployment within 1-2 weeks of a request for military resources in the North with specialized Arctic warfare capabilities.

The most significant Canadian Armed Forces involvement in Operation Nanook 2013 was with the scenario centered around a request for federal government assistance to respond to a wildfire threatening the city of Whitehorse. This represents the first time the military's premiere Arctic operation has taken place in the Yukon.

This scenario, which involved roughly half of the 1,000 military members deployed, centered around a wildfire



burning near the capital city of Whitehorse, threatening the town, and thus the majority of the territory's population and government. Premised on an unusually active wildfire season in Northwestern North America, assistance from firefighters from the Yukon's neighbouring provinces and states was unavailable, necessitating a fictional request for assistance from Yukon's emergency management organization to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada for federal assistance to the tune of several hundred personnel. As the only federal agency with such a reserve of ready labour, the federal request was passed to the Department of National Defence, resulting in the deployment of one of the Army's four Immediate Reaction Units (IRUs), the 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, along with three CH 146 helicopters from the 430e Escadron tactique d'hélicoptères, both based in Valcartier, QC.

This year's operation was significant for largely turning the scenario's development over to the Government of the Yukon, after the initial concept proposed by the military – a response to an earthquake – was not favorably received by the local authorities.

Given what the exercise developers termed a blank sheet of paper, the Yukon government designed a series of disaster response activities related to a wildfire, including a response to a mass casualty event, the evacuation of one of Whitehorse's suburbs, deployment of a wildfire-fighting sprinkler system, and creation of a fire-smart fire defence line. For the latter three activities, the IRU provided a standing pool of manual labour to assist the Yukon Emergency Management Organization and Wildland Fire Management. This fostered a greater understanding of the relevant disaster response activities in the Canadian Armed Forces, provided them with familiarity with the challenges of operating in the North, and provided the local authorities with a better understanding of exactly what a pool of military labour could do to improve their disaster response. In particular, the IRU assisted the Fire Services in thinning an extended area around Whitehorse to reduce its fire fuel load to create a Fire Smart line that will stay as a legacy of Operation Nanook for the local community.

Nanook 2013 provided a significant step forward in developing and testing northern disaster response capabilities. As this is the most likely scenario for a large scale military response in the North, allowing local authorities in the Yukon to craft a scenario they felt was most needed testing was a valuable step forward to achieve real coordination with the CAF's northern partners.

As in previous iterations of Operation Nanook, the 2013 version served to preposition forces in the North in the case of a call for a military response during the period of most significant Northern activity. (Two years ago, an exercise centered around an air disaster was cancelled to respond to the real life crash of First Air Flight 6560).

Although planned months in advance, the fire scenario was prescient, as a real wildfire broke out near Whitehorse a few weeks before the start of the operation,

and conditions during the early days of the operation in Whitehorse (unusually hot and sunny) were conducive to a rapidly spreading fire. Allowing the territory to craft the scenario ensured widespread and active participation, giving it more realism and provided more fulsome interaction and experience by the CAF.

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*Nanook 2013 provided a significant step forward in developing and testing northern disaster response capabilities.*

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Despite this, there is still room to improve the planning of these operations. Due to the planning timelines, the military scenario development has typically precluded other government departments at the federal level from obtaining extra budgetary resources that would allow them to participate more fully in these operations. As it is, only the CAF came to the operation 'funded' (the budget was roughly \$10 million) and the other participants were forced to reallocate their budgets internally to participate to the extent possible. As a result, Operation Nanook is planned as a 9-5 exercise, to avoid costly overtime, and while its timing coincides with a period of high activity in the North, it also overlaps with civilian agencies' vacation periods, further challenging their ability to send participants.

Ensuring earlier planning of the operation and providing incremental funding for the operation to all relevant departments, not just the military, would ensure that these operations maximize their impact in developing federal northern response capabilities.

Despite these limitations, having exercised in a large scale capacity in the North for seven iterations of Operation Nanook, the Canadian federal government response to a request for assistance North of 60 is likely better practiced than anywhere other than the areas of BC that underwent extensive preparations for the 2010 Olympics.

This author hopes that the expertise and experience gained during these northern operations can be passed along to Southern Canada, and used to improve the coordination of whole-of-government operations and develop interoperability with other partners involved in response to safety and security issues in Canada's provinces.

Nanook and its complimentary operations have greatly increased the military's activity levels and familiarity with the North, an area with few resident military assets. Having gained years of experience exercising simulated requests for assistance to whole-of-government operations in the North, there is likely a wealth of lessons learned to be passed along and tested in the Canadian provinces.

As remote population centers with limited indigenous infrastructure also reside South of 60, a truly Canada First Defence Strategy should build on the success of operations in the north to improve the ability of all levels of government to respond to emergencies throughout Canada.

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## Is it time for BMD?

George MacDonald

*Recent media coverage of threats being issued by North Korea has precipitated a smattering of renewed discussion on ballistic missile defence (BMD).*

This lightning-rod issue was essentially buried by the Martin Liberal government in February 2005 when a decision was taken not to participate in BMD with the United States. This choice was driven largely by political considerations of the time, which overrode any logical argument to incorporate this important capability into our NORAD partnership. Now, eight years later, the threat presented by the capabilities of so-called rogue nations like North Korea and Iran has evolved (along with their rhetoric) to the point where the fundamental rationale for the US-developed missile defence system remains more valid than ever. It is time to reconsider BMD cooperation with the Americans.

Naysayers will be quick to dredge up all the sensational or incomplete arguments that surfaced in 2004 and set so many Canadians against BMD. Opponents maintained that there was no threat, that BMD would precipitate nuclear proliferation, that a system would lead to the deployment of weapons in space, that it would be too expensive, that it would destabilize the strategic power balance, and so on. The fact that these points prevailed was... remarkable.

In truth, the system being developed and tested did not involve nuclear weapons, interceptors deployed into space, or any identified expense beyond the involvement of NORAD personnel and possibly the use of a Canadian site to base a radar. Moreover, there is a strong case to be made that the deployment of a BMD system would actually contribute to stability, without any real perturbation of the nuclear strategic balance.

Perhaps the only justified criticism was that the system was still in the early stages of deployment and not without some operational difficulties. True to form, however, the Americans have addressed those issues and increased the reliability and probability of intercept of an incoming missile. A functioning system now exists.

For many involved in the BMD file, perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the 2005 decision was the impact it had on the Canadian contribution to NORAD. We Canadians gain a great deal from this partnership in providing for the collective defence of Canada and the US. – it represents a terrific 'bang for the buck'. Over some 55 years, we have cooperated in the detection, warning and defence of the airborne threat from bombers and cruise missiles; and

we have participated together in the missile detection and warning mission to ensure that an effective deterrent is in place, backed up by the U.S. capability to respond, if ever needed. But when technology evolved to the point where defence against ballistic missiles was reliable enough to be deployed, we declined to be involved in this most logical extension of the NORAD role.

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*One only has to reflect on the aftermath of the events of 9/11. The outcome of an actual attack on U.S. territory should be of direct and dire concern to us all.*

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For those who might argue that we aren't threatened by ballistic missiles, we need to remind ourselves that the consequences for Canada of an attack on the U.S. could be profound. One only has to reflect on the aftermath of the events of 9/11. The outcome of an actual attack on U.S. territory should be of direct and dire concern to us all.

If one draws the direct route for any missile launched from either the Middle East or from Asia to any continental U.S. target, from Los Angeles to New York City, the path crosses Canadian airspace. With intercept missiles now staged in Alaska and California, an early intercept may well take place over the Pacific Ocean, but seconds are precious and any delay could mean interception over Canadian territory. In any case, it will create an extensive debris field and this should be of concern to us and our sovereign interest.

And what if there are several missiles inbound? Would Vancouver get priority for defence over a strategic U.S. target? Our explicit abdication of any involvement in the deployment of the system leaves us with no meaningful influence in its employment.

As we continue to debate BMD of our own continent, it is interesting that Canada continues to support the project to develop and implement a NATO ballistic missile defence system. When it comes to collective defence with our NATO partners, we have accepted the majority view that BMD is important to protect alliance territory. Additionally, it should be noted that missile defence systems are often provided by our allies to protect coalition operations – including Canadian personnel.

In light of these actions, is it logical to deny the need to protect our own sovereign territory against the evolving threat? Will the Government act on its first responsibility – protecting the safety and security of its own citizens? Will it be able to properly inform Canadians in a way that a reasoned decision can be taken to propose to join the U.S. in providing a defence against ballistic missiles?

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*Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George Macdonald is a consultant in Ottawa. He was the Deputy Commander of NORAD from 1998 to 2001, during a time of intense BMD development in the US.*

The strident claims of North Korea, and the very recent deployment of U.S. resources to take defensive action if a missile is launched, have once again reminded us of the potential dangers from a 'rogue' ballistic missile attack.

Through considerable investment, the U.S. has fielded a modest, but capable system to address this threat.

It is time for Canadians to reassess, and get involved in North American defence – our participation in NORAD is

the obvious vehicle to re-open discussion. A re-evaluation and update of our defence policy, as described in the Canada First Defence Strategy five years ago, is appropriate and could address BMD.

Much has changed in those five years, and in the eight years since the negative BMD decision was taken. Let's take advantage of our close relationship with the U.S. to explore meaningful defence options to our mutual advantage. ©

## Le Caucase comme champ de compétition géopolitique entre l'Occident et l'Orient; l'exemple de la Géorgie

Pierre Jolicoeur

*Le Caucase du Sud fait l'objet d'une vive concurrence géopolitique depuis l'éclatement de l'Union soviétique. À ce jeu d'influence, la Russie constitue la puissance régionale ayant le plus de succès. Cette compétition entre puissances rivales est le plus manifeste en Géorgie, où se tiendra une élection présidentielle en octobre 2013. L'article montre l'impact de ces enjeux sur les changements de politique intérieure et étrangère en Géorgie.*

L'emplacement stratégique du Caucase du Sud a soumis cette région à l'influence, voire à la domination de diverses puissances étrangères au cours de son histoire. Sur le plan interne également, la géographie joue un rôle dans les enjeux politiques des États de la région : les hautes montagnes de cette vaste chaîne ont fait de l'unification de ces pays un défi aussi difficile que la protection de leurs frontières. Pour illustrer ce propos, le texte qui suit se penche sur le cas spécifique de la Géorgie. L'élection présidentielle de Géorgie en octobre prochain aura lieu alors que le pays subit de profonds changements de politique intérieure et étrangère. Ces changements ne sont que le dernier avatar d'une histoire longue et compliquée profondément ancrée dans la géopolitique. Sans nul doute, la géographie continuera à façonner la politique intérieure et étrangère géorgienne à l'avenir, peu importe qui remportera les élections.

### *Enjeux géopolitiques de la Géorgie*

Comme les autres républiques du Caucase du Sud, la Géorgie est devenue indépendante après l'effondrement de l'URSS en 1991. Ses réalités géographiques confrontent l'État de Géorgie à deux problèmes majeurs. D'abord, la Géorgie se trouve toujours entourée par de grandes puissances régionales et, deuxièmement, elle est aux prises avec des divisions internes, suite au refus de plusieurs groupes

ethniques d'être pleinement intégrés dans la Géorgie. Cela a encore été aggravé par un gouvernement faible, économiquement ébranlé par l'absence du soutien soviétique, et par les politiques nationalistes agressives menées par le premier président du pays, Zviad Gamsakhourdia.

La Géorgie a sombré dans la guerre civile au début de l'ère post-soviétique. Entre autres, cette guerre a opposé, dans des conflits distincts, les forces géorgiennes aux républiques séparatistes d'Abkhazie, au nord-ouest, et d'Ossétie du Sud, au nord du pays. Des renversements de gouvernements à Tbilissi ont eu lieu en 1993 et en 2003. L'opinion géorgienne est prompte à voir dans tous ces soubresauts le jeu des autorités russes, qui a su préserver ses intérêts dans la région bien au-delà de l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique. Pour sa part, l'influence croissante des États-Unis sur la politique géorgienne est venue brouiller les cartes, notamment en 2004, lors de l'arrivée au pouvoir de Mikheil Saakashvili<sup>1</sup>. Le Kremlin, qui s'était engagé à retirer ses troupes du pays, redoute la présence militaire américaine en Géorgie, même si Washington a démenti tout projet d'installation de base permanente<sup>2</sup>.

Le soutien apporté par la Russie aux territoires sécessionnistes de Géorgie et les efforts des autorités à Tbilissi de restaurer leur souveraineté sur ces territoires depuis vingt ans ont finalement suscité l'intérêt de l'Europe et des États-Unis. L'ancien président géorgien Édouard Chevardnadze a cherché à contrer l'influence russe en coopérant avec l'Occident militairement et économiquement grâce à des alliances avec l'OTAN et l'Union européenne. L'actuel président Saakashvili a intensifié ces efforts. Pour leur part, les puissances occidentales se sont intéressées à la Géorgie parce qu'ils l'ont vue comme un levier de sécurité contre la Russie. En outre, en raison de sa localisation, la Géorgie peut

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servir de voie de transit énergétique, reliant l'Azerbaïdjan voisin à l'Europe en contournant la Russie. De fait, l'oléoduc Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan, inauguré en 2005, évite clairement le territoire russe, à la satisfaction des opérateurs et du gouvernement américains<sup>3</sup>. Suite au conflit russo-géorgien d'août 2008, la Russie a renforcé sa présence militaire dans les territoires sécessionnistes d'Abkhazie et d'Ossétie du Sud, ce qui mine d'autant plus l'intégrité territoriale géorgienne.

La concurrence actuelle entre la Russie et l'UE/OTAN sur la Géorgie ressemble à plusieurs égards aux compétitions entre puissances rivales ayant sévi pendant des siècles dans la région.

## *Perspectives actuelles*

Au cours de la dernière décennie, le gouvernement Saakashvili a tenté d'ancrer la Géorgie dans l'Occident, au prix d'une détérioration marquée des relations russo-géorgiennes. Ces relations houleuses ont atteint leur creux au cours de la guerre russo-géorgienne d'août 2008, qui a commencé à l'occasion d'un conflit en Ossétie du Sud. Saakashvili avait présumé à tort que la guerre allait gagner le soutien de l'OTAN, mais cette dernière n'était tout simplement pas prête à intervenir directement pour contrer l'action militaire russe<sup>4</sup>. Même si la Géorgie était un allié dévoué de l'OTAN, elle n'était pas un membre de l'alliance et donc ne pouvait bénéficier de l'assistance garantie par l'article 5 de la charte de l'OTAN.

La guerre a incité l'Ossétie du Sud et l'Abkhazie à déclarer officiellement leur indépendance de la Géorgie et la Russie a rapidement augmenté sa présence militaire et son soutien dans ces territoires. Ceci a mené à une rupture des relations économiques et diplomatiques entre la Russie et la Géorgie<sup>5</sup>.

Alors que la plupart des Géorgiens continuent de croire que l'Abkhazie et l'Ossétie du Sud sont une partie légitime de la Géorgie, beaucoup se méfient des actions du président Saakashvili, qui a provoqué l'agression militaire russe. Le commerce avec la Russie, rompu pour les mêmes raisons, a toujours été un pilier essentiel de la petite économie de la Géorgie. La Russie a toujours été le plus grand marché de destination pour le vin, l'eau minérale et d'autres exportations agricoles géorgiennes.

C'est pour ces considérations sécuritaires et économiques que Saakashvili et son parti, le *Mouvement national uni*, ont subi un revers majeur aux élections législatives d'octobre 2012. Les partis d'opposition étaient complètement divisés depuis la Révolution des Roses de 2003, mais le visage politique de la Géorgie est en train de changer. 2011 a vu l'émergence du magnat milliardaire Bidzina Ivanishvili dans le paysage politique. Ivanishvili a su rassembler plusieurs partis d'opposition un peu éclectiques dans le *Mouvement du rêve géorgien*, dont l'objectif ultime était de mettre fin au monopole sur le pouvoir politique détenu par Saakashvili.

Combiné à la baisse de popularité de Saakashvili, les efforts de mobilisation de Ivanishvili appuyés par les finances personnelles substantielles de ce dernier

ont permis au parti du milliardaire de battre le Mouvement national uni. Fort de cette victoire, Ivanishvili est devenu le Premier ministre et se prépare aux élections présidentielles d'octobre 2013.

Depuis lors, Ivanishvili et son camp ont consolidé leur pouvoir. De nombreux acteurs des secteurs clés tels que la justice, l'industrie et de la sécurité loyaux au camp Saakashvili dans ont été remplacés par des fidèles à Ivanishvili. De nombreuses personnalités importantes au sein du *Mouvement national uni*, dont l'ancien Premier ministre de Saakashvili, Vano Merabishvili, ont été arrêtées et pourraient faire face à l'emprisonnement. La prochaine élection présidentielle, pour laquelle Saakashvili n'est pas admissible, pourrait nuire encore davantage l'actuel président car il pourrait faire face à la justice en raison de soupçons de corruption.

Non seulement Saakashvili et son parti se situent à un creux historique dans les intentions de vote, mais un changement constitutionnel qui entrera en vigueur en même temps que les élections donnera plus de pouvoir au Parlement au détriment de la présidence – assurant ainsi une position dominante du camp Ivanishvili quel que soit le résultat des élections présidentielles d'octobre 2013.

En termes de politique étrangère, les implications sont également importantes. Ivanishvili a fait campagne sur une plateforme de renforcement des liens avec la Russie, notamment dans le domaine économique. Déjà des changements importants ont été réalisés avec la reprise du commerce de biens essentiels avec la Russie. Des discussions sur une coopération accrue dans d'autres secteurs, comme l'énergie et la sécurité, sont en cours. Selon la façon dont la situation politique interne se jouera pendant et après les élections de l'automne, il est possible que la Géorgie soit l'objet d'une autre réorientation stratégique plus large, cette fois en faveur de la Russie.

Cependant, plusieurs obstacles se dressent sur le chemin de la réorganisation complète de la politique étrangère. Tout d'abord, Ivanishvili a maintenu, au moins théoriquement, que l'adhésion à l'Union européenne et à l'OTAN demeurent des objectifs prioritaires de la politique étrangère géorgienne. En outre, la présence militaire russe en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du Sud reste l'obstacle majeur d'une normalisation complète des relations entre Tbilissi et Moscou. Néanmoins, il devient de plus en plus clair que l'orientation résolument pro-occidentale et anti-russe de la Géorgie de Saakashvili, déjà affaiblie au cours de l'année écoulée, prendra fin après l'élection présidentielle d'octobre 2013.

Ce dernier épisode de lutte de pouvoir à Tbilissi, où l'orientation de la politique étrangère joue un rôle primordial, illustre le fait que la politique géorgienne se réduit au fond à un jeu d'alliances géopolitiques. Ce sont les pouvoirs des moyennes et grandes puissances qui entourent la Géorgie – et non le gouvernement géorgien ou des considérations internes – qui constituent les réelles forces qui façonnent les politiques externes et internes du pays. En dernière instance, les décisions prises à Tbilissi finissent toujours par être façonnées et corrigées par les vastes forces de la géopolitique.

(Endnotes)

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2 Régis Genté, « Pas d'accord sur le retrait des bases russes », RFI, 5 septembre 2005, <[http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/065/article\\_36036.asp](http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/065/article_36036.asp)>.

3 Turab Gurbanov, *Le Pétrole de la Caspienne et la politique extérieure de l'Azerbaïdjan : tome 2- Questions géopolitiques*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 2007, 297 p.

4 Pierre Jolicoeur, « L'intervention russe en Géorgie et le jeu d'équilibre des puissances », *Points de mire*, vol. 9, no 7, (8 septembre 2008).

5 « Géorgie, le dessous de l'échiquier », *AgoraVox*, 11 août 2008, <<http://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/georgie-les-dessous-de-l-echiquier-43124>>. ©

## RMC Saint-Jean's Wall of Fame

## Temple de la renommée du CMR Saint-Jean



*General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff; and Colonel Jenny Carignan, Commandant, RMC Saint-Jean; at the official unveiling of the framed photos and biography of Wall of Fame honouree, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, prior to the placing of the frame in the Wall of Fame hallway of the College's de Lery Hall.*

*Le Général Tom Lawson, CEMD, et le Colonel Jenny Carignan, commandant du CMR Saint-Jean, au dévoilement du cadre de photos et de la biographie de l'intronisé au Temple de la renommée, Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire; cadre qui fut placé au mur du Temple de la renommée situé au Pavillon de Lery.*

**O**n 7 September last, during the annual RMC Saint-Jean Ex-Cadet weekend, a great honour was bestowed on Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chair of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) (2002 - ). Named to the College's Hall of Fame which recognizes those

**L**e 7 septembre dernier, dans le cadre de la fin de semaine des retrouvailles des Anciens du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, le Lieutenant-général (ret) Richard Evraire, Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense (2002 - ), a été intronisé au tout nouveau Temple de

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who have brilliantly contributed to the CAF, their community and the Canadian society and whose career was greatly influenced or related to RMC Saint-Jean – either as students and/or military, teaching or administrative staff, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Evraire joined four other honourees (the Hon. Joe Day, Senator; Lieutenant-General (Ret'd), the Hon. Roméo Dallaire, Senator; General (Ret'd) Walter Natynczyk and Professor Jacques Castonguay) in this very first event of its kind to be held at the College.

Last year, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Evraire was honoured by the Royal Military College Class of 1963 by having his name inscribed on a bronze plaque which was placed on the Wall of Honour, located on the grounds of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC). He is the only ex-cadet to be honoured by both CMR and RMCC.

As a former officer-cadet (1954 - 1957), former Commandant (1975 - 1978) and current Chair of RMC Saint-Jean's Board of Governors (2008 - ), and through his association with the CDA and the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Evraire continues, as do his co-honourees in their own special way, to inspire young officer cadets who attend RMC Saint-Jean by demonstrating that the same path has been taken by successful individuals.

la renommée du Collège. Nommé à ce Temple qui a pour but de reconnaître ceux et celles qui ont brillamment contribué aux Forces armées canadiennes, à leur communauté et à la société canadienne et dont la carrière a été influencée de façon très importante ou a été étroitement liée au CMR Saint-Jean comme étudiants et/ou membres du personnel militaire, enseignant ou administratif, le Lieutenant-général (ret) Evraire fut un de cinq personnalités (l'Hon. Joe Day, Sénateur, le Lieutenant-général (ret), l'Hon. Roméo Dallaire, Sénateur, le Général (ret) Walter Natynczyk et le professeur Jacques Castonguay) intronisées au cour de ce tout premier événement en son genre tenu au Collège.

L'an passé, le lieutenant-général (ret) Evraire a été honoré par la classe de 1963 du Collège militaire royal, qui a fait inscrire son nom sur une plaque de bronze placée sur le Mur d'honneur situé sur les terrains du Collège militaire royal du Canada (CMRC). Il est le seul ancien élève-officier à être ainsi honoré à la fois par le CMR et le CMRC.

Ancien élève-officier (1954 - 1957), ancien commandant (1975 - 1978) actuel président du Conseil des Gouverneurs du CMR Saint-Jean (2008 - ), président la Conférence des associations de la défense et membre du Conseil exécutif de l'Institut de l'CAD, le Général Evraire est, comme le sont ses co-réциpiendaires, chacun à sa façon, source d'inspiration aux jeunes élèves-officiers du CMR Saint-Jean en démontrant que leur parcours a très bien servi à la réussite professionnelle des intronisés au Temple de la renommée.



## A Reluctant Accomplice: Dissecting the Abbottabad Commission Report

Adnan Qaiser

*Some people are cursed to haunt the world, even in their deaths. Osama bin Laden was one such example. Following the US raid – Operation Neptune Spear – that killed him, Pakistan launched the Abbottabad Commission to investigate events leading up to the event. While the leaked report of the Commission revived painful memories, the world still has not received a straight answer as to whether Pakistan was complicit in hiding bin Laden, and whether Pakistan was privy to the US operation that killed him on that fateful day of 2 May 2011.*

Due to the politics of Pakistani civil-military relations, the Commission was constrained in its work and had to employ ‘nuances wrapped in its astonished observations’ to record its opprobrium on Pakistan’s involvement in the affair. What the Commission could not openly describe in its findings was instead intelligently posed as 46 questions to itself.

Pakistan was unable to claim the trophy of bin Laden due to the severe backlash after his death from not only Islamist extremists, but also from ordinary Pakistanis and the Muslim world, where bin Laden and his philosophies continue to be espoused. Even Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani acknowledged the complexity of Pakistan’s society, where people have sympathy with Osama bin Laden’s cause. A political gathering on 15 May 2011 lauded bin Laden as a “martyr of Islam,” surprising nobody.

The Pakistani government preferred to feign ignorance and plead incompetence regarding the bin Laden raid, as it simply could not afford to be seen as a partner in killing bin Laden. The growing conservative population of Pakistan, 74 percent of which considers the United States as its biggest enemy, still holds bin Laden in high esteem for having challenged an infidel United States and Western imperialism. Although former CIA director Leon Panetta said Pakistan was “complicit or incompetent,” he admitted that its involvement could have jeopardized the operation, and an overt joint US-Pakistani raid would have further inflamed a country already suffering from everyday suicide and terrorist attacks for fighting extremism in a war that is largely seen as an American one.

### *Bin Laden’s official support base?*

The international community had long suspected that some in power in Pakistan had been complicit in sheltering bin Laden. Media reports indicated the Pakistani military and intelligence services helped bin Laden avoid capture, as he needed a trusted network for his security.

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The Commission, while alluding to Pakistan’s connivance and culpability no less than 16 times in its findings, stopped short of identifying bin Laden’s official support base, as the people who mattered did not want this to happen. President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, and Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani refused to appear in front of the Commission, despite its mandate from parliament.

The house where bin Laden resided was referred to by local residents as “Waziristan Haveli” (tribal mansion), as it was believed a powerful and wealthy tribal chieftain lived there. However, quite strangely, none of the neighbours felt suspicious of the strange behaviour of its residents. For example, instead of returning tennis balls that fell into the compound when local children were playing cricket, cash was given out. Understandably, the balls were cut open to see if any tracking device or chip was inserted. Likewise, nobody ever tried to find out why the otherwise-charitable Al-Kuwaiti brothers did not keep on retainer drivers or security guards for their modest Suzuki jeeps as against expensive vehicles, which is the norm.

An investigative journalist who examined 52 months’ worth of natural gas bills of the compound made a surprising revelation, that while no less than 22 members of bin Laden and Al-Kuwaiti families were residing there, the gas bills from (out of the ordinary) four meters installed over the period from 2007 to early 2011 were astonishingly low: they averaged around USD 220 per year, well below the normal charges for gas consumption by any household for hot water, heating and cooking. However, no sooner had the residents left the premises, the gas bills shot back up to normal: over the period May-November 2011, following the raid, the bill was a total of Rs. 43,150, or USD 430 – in other words, the gas bill for those seven months was almost double the previous average annual amount, despite the huge drop in occupancy, when an army guard detachment and maybe intelligence and forensic examiners occupied the premises. This begs the question if ‘someone’ had instructed the bills to be kept low to avoid possible detection or undue attention towards such a large household.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency rightly received a lot of flak for failing to detect bin Laden’s presence. While it had captured 100 or so high-value Al Qaeda operatives, how could it miss bin Laden and his three wives living for

nine years, travelling around the country with impunity? For instance, one of bin Laden's wives, Amal Al-Sada had given birth to four of his children in the government hospitals of Haripur and Abbottabad, where proper registration is mandatory. This makes reports about the ISI protecting bin Laden in return for favours from a powerful Middle Eastern country sound credible.

What boggles the mind is that when the ISI finally apprehended Abu Faraj Al Libbi, Al Qaeda's number three on 2 May 2005 in Mardan, why no information could be extracted from him. Libbi, who had escaped an earlier arrest in April 2004 along with Arshad Khan (Al-Kuwaiti courier) a stone's throw from the bin Laden compound, knew of bin Laden's future residential plans.

It is equally questionable why Omar Patek, the Indonesian terrorist wanted for the October 2002 Bali bombings, when captured by the ISI on 25 January 2011 from Abbottabad could not provide a lead on bin Laden. An eminent Indonesian newspaper, *Koran Tempo* claimed Patek was seeking bin Laden's support and protection for carrying out a terrorist attack on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Ironically, the "house survey" ordered by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province's Home Secretary to identify foreigners living in Abbottabad after Patek's arrest also failed in locating bin Laden.

Finally, as *The New York Times* reported in June 2011, the cache of materials recovered from the bin Laden compound indicated that bin Laden was possibly in talks with Pakistani authorities seeking protection.

## *The US operation and Pakistan's response*

The Commission expressed its disbelief that the United States would undertake such an operation without the knowledge and consent of an ally, recognizing the magnitude of the political impact in case any one of the US Navy SEALs was harmed. The Commission observed in its findings that "even a slight miscalculation or an escalation through a response by Pakistan's security forces would have not only jeopardized the whole mission, but also brought the two countries to war against each other."

The United States had always exercised caution in its relations with Pakistan, especially in the context of ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan. For instance, on 20 August 1998 when the United States launched a cruise missile attack against suspected Al-Qaeda hideouts in Khost, with missiles flying over Baluchistan province, the United States made sure that its Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Ralston was having a friendly dinner with Pakistan's army chief, General Jehangir Karamat to avoid Pakistan mistaking the strikes as an Indian nuclear attack.

An eyewitness to the operation against bin Laden recounted that when he started to move towards *Waziristan Haveli* to find out what was going on, a laser beam spotted him with someone saying in Pashto, "Kor Taza" (go home), with the area already cordoned off by troops who spoke the native language.

Some reports indicate that it was very much a joint US-Pakistani effort, with all logistics, including refuelling

arranged inside Pakistan with the approval of Pakistan's highest military command (although Pakistani authorities may not have known the identity of the high-value target).

The Commission noted that the whole neighbourhood was asked a day earlier to stay indoors and not send their children to school. Trees had been cut, probably to facilitate helicopter landings, and the electricity was shut off during the operation.

While almost all civilian organizations drew the Commission's condemnation, the armed forces provoked special ire for having several missing links in its narrative. It noted the Director General Military Operations' lamentations of "betrayal" by the United States and "a stab in the back" as "unprofessional emotional outbursts."

The ISI's Director General's statement, though hard-hitting on the emotions of national degeneration and failings, evaded his own organization's connivance or incompetence in the affair.

Observing "inconsistencies" in the Pakistan Air Force's (PAF)'s account, the Commission also expressed surprise at the unrest that was generated among the junior ranks of the air force, which necessitated giving them a separate technical briefing. While Pakistan took refuge behind the excuse of the Black Hawk helicopters' stealth technology, observers questioned why the noisier Chinooks (having two main rotors) were missed by Pakistan's air defences. The Commission noted, "[the helicopters'] noise was heard all over Abbottabad due to echo chamber of the valley."

Furthermore, with 24 US and NATO cross-border air and ground attacks inside Pakistani territory in the 2002-2011 period, Pakistan's Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman's assertion that radars on Pakistan's western borders were inactive is incredulous.

It is no secret that Pakistan army has a separate Corps of Air Defence besides the Pakistan Air Force's surveillance system, most likely connected to Chinese satellites. The nuclear Strategic Plans Division and the ballistic missile program's Army Strategic Force Command are also known to have their own early warning systems.

Incensed with the air force's "faulty early warning and response system," the Commission was rightly alarmed that the Air Chief Marshal sprang into action only "after receiving a call from the Army Chief" - that too when the US helicopters were leaving. It is indeed baffling that even though the "two chiefs fearing an attack on Pakistan's nuclear installation at Kahuta" - where no nukes are reported to be stored - they "scrambled just two F-16s from nearby Kamra Air Base." Despite knowing that Pakistani helicopters lack night-flying capability, the pilots ignored the US helicopters blipping on their radar screens.

Later reports - which were never denied by Pakistani authorities - alleged that the US helicopters were actually in contact with Pakistani Air Defence and Air Traffic Control. There was also an alleged transcript (which was later confiscated) that contained information about the actions and reactions of Pakistani civilian and military leadership during the raid.

U.S. President Barack Obama's acknowledgement following the attack that the United States' "counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead [the United States] to

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bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding” proves Pakistan’s direct role. Furthermore, an article by Pakistani President Zardari appeared in the Washington Post the day of the raid, suggesting that the article was kept ready for the occasion and media space had been booked for days in advance. Highlighting President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s appreciation, Zardari took satisfaction in “that [Pakistan’s] early assistance in identifying an al-Qaeda courier ultimately led to” bin Laden’s elimination.

Prime Minister Gilani took no time in praising the operation as a “great victory” without bothering to protest the breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty, which the Commission called “an act of war.”

While the bin Laden saga awaits closure until the United States declassifies its documents, one thing is clear. The choice of the night of May 1-2, 2011 for the operation was due to the ISI’s deadline of May 2, after which it had threatened to pull out of an intelligence-sharing pact, called the Tri-Star Agreement, with the United States following the Raymond Davis episode and Pakistan’s attempt to identify all US operatives working on its soil.

As someone once said, “[t]he only lies for which we are truly punished are those we tell ourselves.” Pakistan needs to remember that while the bin Laden chapter sullied its international standing and as that Aymal Al-Zawahiri and his Takfiri followers continue to threaten the world, Pakistan can ill-afford another Operation *Neptune Spear* on its sovereign land. ©



## An interview with Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance

Ferry de Kerckhove

*The CDA Institute conducted an interview on November 14 with Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance, Deputy Commander of Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. The interview was conducted over the phone by Ferry de Kerckhove, Executive Vice President of the CDA Institute.*

**FdK:** I note that the activation of the new Joint Forces Command (JFC) was a part of NATO's transformation aimed at adapting the allied military structure to the operational challenges of coalition warfare, to face the emerging threats in the new millennium.

Would you like to expand on these threats particularly as you look out to the Mediterranean and the instability in the Arab world? What lessons were learned from the Libyan operations and from your own tour of duty in Afghanistan?

**JV:** The new JFC in Naples is one of two commands, under SHAPE's command, and is seized with maintaining situational awareness in the region, and capable of acting quickly on any issues which may arise that the Alliance would want to address militarily. Part of the Command's role is to plan for all contingencies, such as the defence of Turkey, and also to provide balanced and detailed advice to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) on matters pertaining to the wider region.

There is also an awareness that many of the issues found around the Mediterranean are not simply NATO issues, but global issues that individual member states are facing, and these are also factored into our planning and consideration. Finally, considering the instability and level of activity in the Mediterranean Region and Middle East, this area of the world is certainly featuring more prominently in NATO awareness and prudent thinking.

**FdK:** What are the implications of the recent reorganization which saw the Allied Maritime Command Naples deactivated, the Allied Air Component from Izmir moved into Allied Land Command, and Allied Force Command Madrid being "mothballed"? There are so many other changes that it must be confusing, despite the assumed rationality of it all. Is this reorganization financially driven, or is there a desire for efficiency underpinning all this?

**JV:** The reorganization had several purposes and was motivated by many considerations. Efficiency and fiscal considerations are always a part of this sort of process, but the concept of reviewing and revamping the various components of an organization, in this case NATO, is a good practice.

Although there is an element of balancing the size and cost of command elements against the ability to maintain a specific level of operational readiness, this reorganization also reflects a learning and updating process, to keep NATO agile, and to help with the transition from heavy active

deployment missions, to a posture of responsiveness, which will facilitate operational readiness. In other words, a streamlining of command structures to make sure that they increase the response capability of force structures.

Naples can now deploy at the JFC level, as can the other Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, with support from the three single service commands, which allows for well trained and well managed readiness. It is important to remember the leadership role carried out by NATO command structures, but investment in force structures is also vital to maintaining a relevant and capable NATO.

**FdK:** This brings me to a more charged question. Some argue that "no boots on the ground" is not just an American mantra but a quasi-worldwide posture. How does this play out in the NATO context, particularly in terms of readiness?

**JV:** In the NATO context, the level of deployment and whether or not there are ground forces deployed, depends on several factors. To begin with, political direction guides planning. Next, the appropriate steps needed to achieve a set of strategic objectives are considered, and if the objective can be achieved more effectively in another way, for example, as was the case in Libya, then we use the best means available in pursuit of our military objectives.

Despite recent events, the idea that "no boots on the ground" has become an institutionalized preference is not true. The most recent case in Libya may give that perception, but the mission in Libya was determined as being best served by means other than a ground deployment.

**FdK:** Chasing the next dollar has been a NATO affliction from its early days. The growing disproportion of funding - at 70 percent from the United States and 30 percent from other member states - raises more fundamental questions than simply a matter of dollars and cents. What of European common defence as seen from Naples?

**JV:** Despite the financials of the situation, the renewed emphasis on operational readiness has done much to reinvigorate NATO, as evidenced by the NATO Response Force. The desire for NATO to remain lean and streamlined through its command structures, and capable and ready on the force structure side, is held not only by NATO as an organization, but by the individual member countries as well.

By way of example, NATO training exercises, such as Steadfast Jazz this year, have been designed and implemented thanks to NATO expertise, through a shared commitment to

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readiness, inter-operability, and organisational effectiveness. Indeed, much of the global community shares the perception that NATO is a leader in the field of inter-operability, as is evidenced by the continued desire for NATO membership or partnership by countries currently outside the alliance.

FdK: NATO's Strategic Concept is a great document. How much more needs to be done in Naples to operationalize your contribution to it?

JV: Much of this has already been covered, but having a clear statement about NATO's purpose is not only key for success within the organization, but also in reassuring member countries and the wider international community. In short, the Strategic Concept has not only reaffirmed NATO's readiness to deploy in response to the full spectrum of potential operations, but also encourages a level of stability in NATO areas of interest.

FdK: The integration of the European Defence Community in the 1950s was highly sensitive emotionally and politically. We now have the NATO Response Force. This is a great achievement for NATO. Is it sustainable at the force levels of 17,000, and is integration working well?

JV: While initially somewhat challenged, the concept of integration has become a key concept in the success of NATO. At its high water mark, our 42 countries worked together in Afghanistan under NATO auspices, and did so with an incredible degree of inter-operability. What was initially a challenge has become a matter of course for NATO member countries.

This operational integration is now widely recognized for the benefits it provides to the alliance in terms of training exercises, inter-operability capabilities, the addition of new members, while still providing the opportunity for member countries to determine their own priorities in a national context. ©



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