



# ON TRACK

THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE

L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

**BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE  
– A NEW IMPERATIVE**

**CHINA'S MILITARY  
TRANSFORMATION**



**THE 2014 OTTAWA CONFERENCE  
ON SECURITY & DEFENCE / LA  
CONFÉRENCE D'OTTAWA 2014 SUR  
LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA DÉFENSE**

# ON TRACK

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ON TRACK is published by the CDA Institute.

**Mission Statement.** Through the pages of ON TRACK it is the goal of the CDA Institute to see the federal government adopt and fund credible defence and security policies for Canada. It is intended that ON TRACK facilitate the development of such policies through informed discussion and debate of defence and security issues that have an impact on the strategic interests of Canada and on the safety of its citizens. The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.

ON TRACK est publié par l'Institut de la CAD.

**Énoncé de mission.** À travers les pages de ON TRACK, l'Institut de la CAD a comme but d'inciter le gouvernement fédéral à adopter et financer des politiques de défense et de sécurité crédibles pour le Canada. On souhaite que ON TRACK facilite le développement de telles politiques par le biais d'une discussion et d'un débat éclairés sur des enjeux de défense et de sécurité qui ont un impact sur les intérêts stratégiques du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les points de vues exprimés dans ON TRACK reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

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**COVER PHOTO:** The Hon. Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, addresses the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security. Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

**PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE:** L'hon. Kevin Rudd, ancien Premier Ministre de l'Australie à la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et de la sécurité. Photo par le Lieutenant-colonel Gord Metcalfe (ret)

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.....  
"HEY DON'T CALL ME DUDE!"

PORTRAIT OF LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL MARC LESSARD (RET) BY GERTRUDE KEARNS.

PHOTO COURTESY OF THE ARTIST.

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# From the Executive Director

Tony Battista

We are pleased to begin our 19th year of publication of the CDA Institute's journal, ON TRACK. This year also marks the 27th anniversary of the CDA Institute as well as the 82nd anniversary of the founding of the Conference of Defence Associations. With this remarkable period of longevity, these institutions have evolved significantly while remaining focused on their respective mandates and true to a few golden rules. I invite us all to a brief reminder of the respective mandates of the CDA and the CDA Institute.

Founded in 1932, the CDA ([www.cdacanada.ca](http://www.cdacanada.ca)) is a Canadian non-partisan organization representing 52 like-minded associations (comprising 14 Member Associations and 38 Associate Members). Collectively, this conglomeration represents more than 450,000 members. The mandate of the CDA is to advocate for a credible and relevant National Security Policy for Canada (which encompasses foreign and defence policies or components), together with the required public resources to execute such policy. In meeting its mandate, the CDA engages in and conducts advocacy activities to inform Canadians and policy-makers on security and defence matters important to Canada.

Founded by the CDA Council in 1987, the CDA Institute ([www.cdainstitute.ca](http://www.cdainstitute.ca)) is a Canadian non-partisan organization, with charitable status, whose mandate is to promote - through research, publications, events and studies - informed public debate and discourse on national security and defence matters pertinent to Canada.

As your new executive director I look forward to continuing the success of these two organizations, following on the outstanding work of my predecessor, Alain Pellerin, whose unflinching dedication over the span of some 16 years, has contributed remarkably to the credibility and growth of the CDA and the CDA Institute. I am grateful for the confidence that the CDA Council and its Associations, and the CDA Institute's Board of Directors have placed in me. I am humbled to step into Alain's very large shoes and excited to take up the challenge, and I am ready to work with everyone who contributes to the crucially important realm of security and defence issues that matter to Canada and to Canadians. I wish to acknowledge and thank so many for their warm welcome and expressions of support.

The 2014 CDA and CDA Institute Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence - a truly world-class event - was held on 20 and 21 February in the Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa, with an impressive group of participants and attendees numbering over 600. The summary of proceedings and addresses delivered at the Conference are available on the CDA Institute website. The CDA Institute's Strategic Outlook 2014, co-authored by Ferry de Kerckhove and George Petrolekas, examining the strategic world and its relevance to Canada, was released and presented during the conference. SO2014, together with several other research studies on security and defence, such as analyses of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the federal defence budget, to name but a few, are also available on our website.

I am pleased to note the very positive feedback we have received in the days following the conclusion of the 2014 Conference, reflecting the overall heightened interests in Canada's role in national and

Nous sommes heureux de commencer notre 19e année de publication de la revue de l'Institut de la CAD, ON TRACK. Cette année marque également le 27e anniversaire de l'Institut de la CAD et le 82e de la fondation de la Conférence des associations de la défense. Avec cette remarquable période de longévité, de continuité et de changement, ces institutions ont beaucoup évolué tout en restant concentrées sur leurs mandats respectifs et sur le respect de quelques règles d'or. Je nous convie tous à un bref rappel de ces mandats de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD.

Fondée en 1932, la CAD ([www.cdacanada.ca](http://www.cdacanada.ca)) est une organisation canadienne non partisane représentant 52 associations aux vues similaires (soit 14 associations membres et 38 membres associés). Collectivement, ce conglomérat représente plus de 450,000 membres. Le mandat de la CAD est de plaider en faveur d'une politique nationale de sécurité crédible et pertinente pour le Canada (qui couvre les politiques d'affaires étrangères et de défense ou leurs composantes) et des ressources publiques nécessaires à l'exécution de ces politiques. Dans la poursuite de son mandat, la CAD s'engage dans des activités de plaidoyer dans le but d'informer les Canadiens et les auteurs de politiques des questions de sécurité et de défense qui sont importantes pour le Canada.

Fondé par le conseil de la CAD en 1987, l'Institut de la CAD ([www.cdainstitute.ca](http://www.cdainstitute.ca)) est une organisation canadienne non partisane, ayant statut d'organisme caritatif, dont le mandat est de promouvoir - par la recherche, des publications, des activités et des études - un débat et un discours publics éclairés sur les questions de sécurité et de défense qui ont de la pertinence pour le Canada.

Comme votre nouveau directeur général, j'espère bien poursuivre sur la voie du succès de ces deux organisations et sur les traces du travail exceptionnel de mon prédécesseur, Alain Pellerin, dont le dévouement indéfectible pendant 16 ans a remarquablement contribué à la crédibilité et à la croissance de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD. Je suis reconnaissant au conseil de la CAD et à ses associations, ainsi qu'au conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD pour la confiance qu'ils ont placée en moi. C'est avec humilité que je m'appête à entreprendre la difficile tâche d'emboîter le pas à Alain, mais je suis emballé à l'idée de relever ce défi et je suis prêt à travailler avec tous ceux qui contribuent au domaine d'une importance extrême des questions de défense et de sécurité qui comptent pour le Canada et les Canadiens. Je veux reconnaître et remercier les nombreuses personnes qui m'ont accueilli et témoigné l'expression de leur appui.

L'édition 2014 de la Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité, de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD - une manifestation véritablement de calibre mondial - a été tenue les 20 et 21 février derniers au Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa, avec un groupe impressionnant de participants et d'auditeurs dont le nombre s'élevait à plus de 500. Le sommaire des débats et les communications présentées à la conférence sont disponibles sur le site Web de l'Institut de la CAD. La

international security and defence matters. The presence of so many speakers from around the world and across Canada was made possible through the generous financial assistance of our supporters and corporate sponsors, and the herculean efforts of the very small staff.

**ON TRACK**, the journal of the CDA Institute, is an important vehicle through which the Institute contributes significant value to the discussion and understanding of security and defence issues important to Canada. I am particularly grateful to the contributors to this edition of ON TRACK. Credible and effective security and defence policy options must be based on rigorous and objective research, backed by adequate and affordable resources. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policy and decision-makers, elected officials, academia, like-minded institutions and the Canadian public, we influence the formulation of these policies and promote change for the betterment of our country. This edition of ON TRACK includes articles by both seasoned experts and rising stars alike: David Perry, Ron Cleminson, Colin Robertson, Dr. John Scott Cowan, Colonel Ian Hope, Rachael Bryson, Major Rich Little, Shakir Chambers, Colonel Jeff Tasseron (Ret'd), Dr. David Last, Robert Cook and Emmanuel Seitelbach.

The CDA Institute's senior security and defence analyst, David Perry has been recognized in The Hill Times' spring 2014 edition of its Power and Influence as one of the top 100 individuals influencing Canada's global future, and I quote from the citation: "Mr. Perry has made a name for himself through research and smart commentary on Canadian defence policy ... he has made waves with his recent assessments of DND budget cuts. Put simply, 'people pay attention to his stuff,' said one former member of the military's top brass."

On behalf of the CDA and the CDA Institute, I wish to acknowledge, salute and remember all Canadians who served the Afghanistan mission since 2001 and those who continue to serve in Afghanistan in various roles and missions as part of the international efforts there. The declaration of a National Day of Honour, on 9 May 2014, for those who served the Afghanistan mission is a fitting recognition by the federal government to honour them. Their sacrifice must never be forgotten.

The CDA and the CDA Institute continue to be involved in a number of other great initiatives promoting security and defence matters and programs, such as the Annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Vimy Award and the Vimy Dinner, the Ross Munro Media Award, numerous round-table discussions and special events.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, with a record number of excellent submissions that were considered by the Vimy Award Selection Committee. The programme culminated with the presentation of the award to Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Ret'd) by the Rt. Hon. Beverly McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada and General Ray Henault (Ret'd), President of the CDA Institute before some 700 guests at a formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place on 7 November at a gala reception and dinner, again, at the Canadian War Museum. To make the Award truly meaningful the CDA Institute continues to count on your nominations for this year's recipient. While we have already received a number of nominations, CDA member

Perspective stratégique 2014, des co-auteurs Ferry de Kerckhove et George Petrolekas, qui examine le monde stratégique et sa pertinence pour le Canada, a été publiée et présentée pendant la conférence. Le document, ainsi que plusieurs autres études de recherche sur la sécurité et la défense, comme des analyses de l'avion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter et du budget de la défense, pour n'en nommer que quelques-uns, sont également disponibles sur notre site Web.

J'ai le plaisir de noter le retour d'information très positif que nous avons reçu dans les jours qui ont suivi la clôture de la Conférence de 2014, ce qui reflète l'accroissement de l'intérêt qu'on port au rôle du Canada dans les questions de sécurité et de défense aux niveaux national et international. La présence de si nombreux conférenciers venant du monde entier et de partout au Canada a été rendue possible par l'aide financière généreuse de nos supporters et de nos entreprises commanditaires, et par les efforts herculéens de la très petite équipe de notre personnel.

**ON TRACK**, la revue de l'Institut de la CAD, est un véhicule important à travers lequel l'Institut contribue une valeur significative à la discussion et à la compréhension des enjeux de sécurité et de défense qui sont importants pour le Canada. Je suis particulièrement reconnaissant envers les auteurs qui ont contribué pour beaucoup au présent numéro de ON TRACK. Les options de politiques crédibles et efficaces en matière de sécurité et de défense doivent être basées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective appuyée par des ressources adéquates et abordables. En partageant les résultats de notre recherche et nos recommandations avec les auteurs de politiques et les décideurs, les élus, les universitaires, des institutions partageant notre esprit et le public canadien, nous influençons la formulation de ces politiques et promouvons le changement pour l'amélioration de notre pays. Ce numéro de ON TRACK inclut des articles proposés par des experts chevronnés ainsi que par des étoiles montantes : David Perry, Ron Cleminson, Colin Robertson, John Scott Cowan, le colonel Ian Hope, Rachael Bryson, le major Rich Little, Shakir Chambers, le colonel Jeff Tasseron (ret), David Last, Robert Cook et Emmanuel Seitelbach.

L'analyste principal de l'Institut de la CAD en matière de sécurité et de défense, David Perry, a été reconnu dans le numéro du printemps 2014 de la rubrique Power and Influence du Hill Times comme l'un des 100 individus les plus influents sur l'avenir mondial du Canada, et je cite : « M. Perry s'est fait un nom par sa recherche et ses commentaires intelligents sur la politique de défense canadienne... et il a fait des vagues avec ses évaluations récentes des compressions infligées au budget du MDN. En termes simples, 'on porte attention à ce qu'il dit', a déclaré un ancien membre des hauts gradés militaires. »

Au nom de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD, je voudrais reconnaître, saluer et rappeler tous les Canadiens qui ont servi la mission de l'Afghanistan depuis 2001 et ceux qui continuent à servir en Afghanistan dans divers rôles et missions dans le cadre des efforts internationaux déployés là-bas. La déclaration d'une Journée nationale de commémoration, le 9 mai 2014, pour ceux qui ont servi la mission en Afghanistan est une reconnaissance appropriée par le gouvernement fédéral pour les honorer. Leur sacrifice ne doit jamais être oublié.

La CAD et l'Institut de la CAD continuent à participer à un certain



Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire (Ret'd), Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), (left), thanks Colonel Alain Pellerin (Ret'd), (right), during the CDA's annual mess dinner, for his years of dedicated service as Executive Director of the CDA and as Executive Director of the CDA Institute. Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

Le lieutenant-général Richard Evraire (ret), le Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), (gauche), remercie le colonel Alain Pellerin (ret), (droit), pendant le dîner régimentaire annuel, pour son service comme directeur exécutif de la CAD et comme directeur exécutif de l'Institut de la CAD. Photo par le lieutenant-colonel Gord Metcalfe (ret).

associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit additional nominations for deserving Canadians. Please refer to the call for nominations that appears elsewhere in this issue and on our website.

The nomination and selection criteria for the Ross Munro Media Award are currently undergoing a review. As soon as this review is finalized, a call for nominations will be distributed.

In closing, I wish to thank our individual benefactors - particularly donors to the Security and Defence Fund, donors to the CDA Institute Annual Fund, and our corporate sponsors - for their generous financial support, without which we would be hard-pressed to fulfil our mandate. If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation of \$150 or higher, you will receive the following benefits for the next 12 months:

- a charitable donation tax receipt;
- three issues of the CDA Institute's magazine, ON TRACK;
- advance copies of all other CDA Institute publications, such as the Vimy Papers; and,
- a discounted registration rate at the Ottawa Conference.

Donor information and forms are available on our website.

I wish to dedicate this edition of ON TRACK to our supporters, sponsors and donors, to Alain Pellerin, and to the amazing staff of the CDA and the CDA Institute. I salute you! ©

nombre d'autres grandes initiatives promouvant les questions et les programmes de défense et de sécurité, comme le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, le prix Vimy et le dîner Vimy, le Ross Munro Media Award, de nombreuses discussions en table ronde et des activités spéciales.

Une des manifestations principales au calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la remise annuelle du prix Vimy à un Canadien ou une Canadienne qui a apporté une contribution significative et exceptionnelle à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'an dernier a remporté un succès extraordinaire, avec un nombre record d'excellentes soumissions qui furent étudiées par le comité de sélection du prix Vimy. Le programme a atteint son point culminant avec la remise du prix au brigadier-général W. Don Macnamara (ret) par la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada et le général Ray Henault (ret), président de l'Institut de la CAD devant quelque 700 invités lors d'un dîner formel tenu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Cette année, la remise du prix Vimy aura lieu le 7 novembre lors d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala tenus à nouveau au Musée canadien de la guerre. Pour que le prix soit vraiment valable, l'Institut de la CAD continue à compter sur vos mises en candidature pour le ou la récipiendaire de cette année. Même si nous avons déjà reçu un certain nombre de candidatures, nous encourageons les associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les individus à soumettre des mises en candidatures supplémentaires pour des Canadiens méritants. Prière de se référer à l'avis d'appel de candidatures qui paraît ailleurs dans ce numéro ou sur notre site Web.

Les critères de mise en candidature et de sélection du Ross Munro Media Award sont présentement en révision. Dès que celle-ci sera finalisée, un appel de mises en candidatures sera distribué.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs individuels - particulièrement les donateurs du Fonds de la défense et de la sécurité, les donateurs du Fonds annuel de l'Institut de la CAD et nos sociétés commanditaires pour leur généreux appui financier, sans lequel il nous serait plutôt difficile de remplir notre mandat.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur de l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais de le devenir et de recruter un.e ami.e. Si vous vous joignez à nous au niveau Supporter, avec un don de 150 \$ ou plus, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pour les 12 prochains mois :

- un reçu de don de charité aux fins d'impôt ;
- trois numéros de la revue de l'Institut de la CAD, ON TRACK ;
- des exemplaires à l'avance de toutes les autres publications de l'Institut de la CAD, comme les cahiers Vimy ;
- un tarif d'inscription réduit à la Conférence d'Ottawa.

Les renseignements aux donateurs et les formulaires sont disponibles sur notre site Web.

Je veux dédier ce numéro de ON TRACK à nos supporters, à nos commanditaires et à nos donateurs, à Alain Pellerin et à l'extraordinaire équipe de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD. Je vous salue ! ©

# The 2014 Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence

by Robert F. Cook

The 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, held at the Chateau Laurier on 20 and 21 February, brought together a broad and representative cross-section of the Canadian security and defence community. The Conference was attended by over 600 individuals which included serving and retired members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), senior DND employees, senior executives from many of the most prominent private companies in the security and defence sector, scholars and students in the fields of national defence and security, members of foreign militaries and embassies, representatives from think tanks and foundations and graduate students. The Conference provided an ideal forum for sustained and interactive engagement between attendees and speakers in several ways, such as during keynote speeches and panel discussions which typically included a question and answer period. In all cases, attendees made excellent use of these opportunities, asking insightful questions which allowed speakers to elaborate on a variety of topics. The Conference also provided unique networking opportunities for attendees, providing an open forum for those of all backgrounds and age groups to engage with their peers and seniors.

The Ottawa Conference opened with a summary of the CDA Institute's 2014 Strategic Outlook for Canada, which provided readers and the conference audience with a laundry list of factors affecting Canadian interests in North America and internationally, as well as specific defence transformation and foreign policy challenges facing this nation.

The first day of the conference featured several keynote speakers and panel discussions which primarily addressed topics concerning the Asia-Pacific region, and the potential security concerns, and opportunities greater Canadian involvement in the region could yield. The Hon. Jean Charest, former premier of Quebec and the Hon. Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia both provided valuable context for the theme of the first day's discussion, "The shifting theatres of Canada's engagement – Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean". M. Charest provided the audience with global economic and technological factors which were affecting Canada's international standing and



Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, addresses guests at the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security luncheon, Day One.

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

L'amiral Jonathan Greenert, Chef des opérations navales, United States Navy, adresse les invités qui assistent au déjeuner pendant le Jour Un de la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et la sécurité.

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

interests, and Mr. Rudd provided a unique perspective on the perceptions of the current Chinese leadership as they grapple with the challenges of balancing the desire to become an international superpower with domestic constraints on policy and resource allocation. Keynote speaker Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, contributed to the discussion of future Canadian and American security and defence challenges in the Pacific, with an emphasis on the transition from traditional maritime theatres of operation, namely the Atlantic, to regions of growing economic and military importance, such as the Pacific.

The first panel on Day 1, "Facing West, Facing North: Canada and Australia in the Asia-Pacific", examined Canada's growing defence partnership with Australia in the Pacific theatre, in order to address issues of force planning and force development in the Pacific, and the increasing role Canada will play in regional security as it continues to develop more in-depth defence and

economic partnerships with regional actors.

The second panel, "The West's pivot towards Asia: what it means", brought together speakers from Canada, Europe, and China, who offered multiple points of view to the discussion. The variety of perspectives contained within this panel helped to address balancing Canada's growing economic relationship with China and other Pacific nations, while considering the national defence and security implications of becoming increasingly integrated in such a dynamic region of the world.

The next panel, "Cyber security in the post-Snowden era", addressed future approaches in the cyber theatre of operations, including capability development. Experts and practitioners in the field, such as Major-General John Adams (Ret'd), former director Communications Security Establishment Canada, and Melissa Hathaway, provided unparalleled insight into these topics, both from Canadian and allied perspectives. This also allowed the panel to discuss new security challenges which will be



The Hon. Jean Charest, former Premier of Québec and former Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, addresses the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security / L hon. Jean Charest, ancien Premier-Ministre du Québec et ancien Vice-premier ministre du Canada, adresse la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et la sécurité.

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)



Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire (Ret'd), Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), (left), thanks General Sir Nick Houghton, U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff, (right), following his address at the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security.

Photo by Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

Le lieutenant-général Richard Evraire (ret), le Président de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD), (gauche), remercie le général Sir Nick Houghton, chef de l'état-major de la Défense du Royaume-Uni, comme suite à sa allocution à la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et la sécurité.

Photo par le lieutenant-colonel Gord Metcalfe (ret).

faced in the context of the North American relationship between Canada and the United States.

The final panel on Day 1, “Lest we forget: other strategic concerns – Arc of Instability from Maghreb to Pakistan”, was aptly named. Despite the increased focus on economic and security partnerships in the Pacific region, this panel focused on areas of continued instability in the Middle East and North Africa, which, due to energy security concerns, will remain a priority for the West. The panellists emphasized that

the changing nature of security threats, such as increasing levels of internal displacement and the growing number of refugees in the region, will force Western nations to re-evaluate how we approach security in that area of the world. The second day's theme, “Armed Forces in a period of financial constraint – a new fiscal reality”, was particularly timely for Canada and its allies. The keynote speakers all addressed the topic from their individual perspectives – the Hon. Rob Nicholson and the Hon. Diane Finley, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Public Works and Government

Services, respectively, addressed the challenges of defence procurement and readiness in times of fiscal austerity. The Chiefs of the Defence Staff of Canada and the United Kingdom, General Tom Lawson and General Sir Nick Houghton, provided the audience with an understanding of the military capabilities required by their nations, how these requirements are informed by policy and political considerations, and provided key insight into the ongoing transformation of both Canada's and the United Kingdom's armed forces.

The luncheon keynote speaker, former German minister of defence Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, addressed the topic of international security through the lens of greater involvement on the part of private sector companies in managing, providing and controlling critical government systems and sources of information. This provided a unique perspective to the audience on the role of transformative technologies in defence.

The first panel on Day 2, “Defence and security at a time of fiscal, operational and strategic transition - Allied Views and Approaches”, examined defence and security in a time of fiscal constraint from Canadian, European, American, and NATO points of view. These points of view focused on the issue of fiscal constraints from multi- and bi-lateral standpoints, with regard to force readiness, the effects of budget cuts on O&M and the reassessment of strategy with an eye towards economic considerations.

The last panel of the conference, “The new Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) - new vision or less of the same?”, included former commanders of all three service branches of the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as a former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. This panel discussed the implications of a new Canada First Defence Strategy from operational, readiness, and procurement standpoints. The panellists also touched upon the implications for future force training and force development, and the ability of the CAF to deal effectively with future defence and security challenges around the globe.

The CDA Institute has made Conference material widely available to the public on our website. This material includes: a summary of proceedings, a media round-up and summary, and audio recordings of most sessions. The CDA Institute also covered the conference on Twitter hash tag #TheOC2014. The conference program which lists the more than 30 domestic and international subject experts who participated as speakers is also available. ■



# La Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la sécurité et de la défense

by Robert F. Cook

La conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité de 2014 qui a eu lieu les 20 et 21 février au Château Laurier a rassemblé un éventail vaste et représentatif de la communauté canadienne de la sécurité et de la défense. Plus de 600 personnes ont assisté à la conférence, dont des membres actifs et des membres à la retraite des Forces armées canadiennes, des employés seniors du MDN, des membres de la haute direction de plusieurs des plus importantes compagnies privées dans le secteur de la défense et de la sécurité, des universitaires et des étudiants dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité nationales, des membres de forces militaires et d'ambassades étrangères, des représentants de groupes de réflexion et de fondations, ainsi que des étudiants diplômés. La conférence a offert un forum idéal pour l'engagement interactif et soutenu entre les participants et les conférenciers de plusieurs façons tels que les discours liminaires et les panels d'experts dont plusieurs incluaient des périodes de questions et réponses. Dans tous les cas, les participants ont pleinement bénéficié de ces occasions en posant des questions pertinentes qui ont permis aux conférenciers d'élaborer plus amplement sur une variété de sujets. La conférence a aussi offert des occasions de réseautage aux participants en leur donnant un forum ouvert où les gens de diverses disciplines et groupes d'âge ont pu rencontrer leurs pairs et leur aînés.

La conférence a débuté avec un résumé de l'édition 2014 de Perspective stratégique pour le Canada de l'Institut de la CAD, ce qui a offert aux lecteurs et aux participants une liste des facteurs affectant les intérêts canadiens, en Amérique du Nord et au plan international, ainsi que des renseignements spécifiques sur la transformation de la défense et les défis de politiques étrangères auxquelles ce pays fait face.

Le premier jour de la conférence a présenté plusieurs conférenciers d'honneur et groupes de discussion qui s'adressaient surtout aux problèmes de sécurité potentiels de la région Asie-Pacifique et les avantages d'une implication plus importante du Canada dans la région. L'Honorable Jean Charest, ancien premier ministre du Québec et l'Honorable Kevin Rudd, ancien premier ministre de l'Australie ont présenté un contexte important pour les discussions de la



The Hon. Rob Nicholson, Minister of National Defence, addresses the 2014 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security / l'hon. Rob Nicholson, Ministre de la défense nationale, adresse la Conférence d'Ottawa 2014 sur la défense et la sécurité.

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

première journée : « Les théâtres changeants de l'implication du Canada – la région Asie-Pacifique – océan Indien. M. Charest a présenté à l'auditoire les facteurs globaux, économiques et technologiques, qui affectent la position internationale du Canada et ses intérêts, alors que M. Rudd a présenté une perspective unique des perceptions du leadership actuel en Chine qui tente de maintenir un équilibre entre le désir de devenir une superpuissance internationale et des contraintes intérieures de politiques et d'allocation de ressources. Le conférencier principal, l'amiral Jonathan Greenert, chef des opérations navales de la Marine américaine, a contribué à la discussion de défis futurs de défense et de sécurité canadienne et américaine dans le Pacifique, en mettant l'accent sur la transition, allant des théâtres traditionnels d'opérations maritime, plus précisément l'Atlantique, vers des régions de croissance économique et d'importance militaire, comme le Pacifique.

Le premier panel du premier jour : « Face à l'ouest, Face au nord : le Canada et l'Australie dans l'Asie-Pacifique », jetait un regard sur le partenariat de défense avec l'Australie dans

le théâtre du Pacifique afin de considérer le problème de planification et développement de forces dans le Pacifique, et le rôle croissant que le Canada va continuer à jouer dans la sécurité régionale à mesure qu'il continue à développer une défense plus approfondie et des partenariats économiques avec les instances régionales.

Le deuxième panel, « Le pivot de l'Ouest vers l'Asie : ce que ça veut dire », a rassemblé des conférenciers du Canada, de l'Europe et de la Chine qui ont apporté plusieurs perspectives à la discussion. La variété des points de vue offerts dans ce panel a contribué à équilibrer la relation économique croissante du Canada avec la Chine et d'autres nations du Pacifique tout en considérant les implications de la défense et de la sécurité nationales découlant du fait d'une plus grande intégration dans cette région dynamique du monde.

Le panel suivant, « La sécurité cybernétique dans l'ère d'après-Snowden » s'adressait aux approches futures dans le cyberthéâtre d'opérations, y compris le développement de capacité. Des experts et praticiens



Panel 1: Canada-Australia Security in the Asia-Pacific. L-R: Commodore Eric Lerhe (Ret'd), former Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific; Colonel John Blaxland (Ret'd), Senior Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University; Leonard Edwards, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI); and Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Global Security & Politics Program, CIGI / Les invités 1: La sécurité Canada-Australie dans l'Asie-Pacifique. G à D: le Commodore Eric Lerhe (ret), ancien commandant de la Flotte canadienne du Pacifique; le Colonel Dr. John Blaxland (ret), maître de recherche, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University; Leonard Edwards, ancien sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères et Distinguished Fellow, CIGI; et Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Distinguished Fellow et directeur de Global Security & Politics Program, CIGI

Photo by / par Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe (Ret'd)

dans le domaine, comme le major-général John Adams (ret), ancien directeur de Communications Security Establishment Canada, et Melissa Hathaway, ont offert un éclairage incomparable sur ces sujets, tant du point de vue canadien et que de celui des alliés. Ceci a aussi permis au panel de discuter des nouveaux défis de sécurité dans le contexte des relations nord-américaines entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

Le dernier panel de la première journée, « N'oublions pas : autres implications stratégiques – l'arc d'instabilité qui va du Magreb au Pakistan » était bien nommé. Malgré l'accent qu'on met de plus en plus sur les partenariats économiques et sécuritaires dans la région du Pacifique, ce panel concentrerait son attention sur les instabilités continues dans le Moyen-Orient et l'Afrique du Nord, lesquelles, à cause des préoccupations en matière de sécurité énergétique, demeureront une priorité pour l'Ouest. Les panélistes ont souligné que la nature changeante des menaces à la sécurité, tels les niveaux croissants de déplacements internes et le nombre croissant de réfugiés dans la région, obligera les pays de l'Ouest à réévaluer comment nous abordons les questions de sécurité dans cette région du monde.

Le thème de la deuxième journée, « Les Forces armées en période de contrainte financière – une nouvelle réalité fiscale », tombait particulièrement à point pour le Canada et ses alliés. Les conférenciers invités ont tous traité du sujet à partir de leurs points de vue propres

– l'Honorable Rob Nicholson et l'Honorable Diane Finley, respectivement ministre de la Défense nationale et ministre des Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux, ont parlé des défis des acquisitions de défense et de l'état de préparation en des temps d'austérité fiscale. Les chefs d'état-major du Canada et du Royaume-Uni, le général Tom Lawson et le général Sir Nick Houghton, ont donné à l'auditoire une idée des capacités militaires nécessaires à chacun des pays, de comment ces exigences sont modelées par les politiques et des considérations politiques, et bien expliqué les transformations qui ont présentement cours à la fois dans les forces armées du Canada et et dans celles du Royaume-Uni.

Le conférencier invité lors du déjeuner, l'ancien ministre allemand de la défense, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, a traité du sujet de la sécurité internationale vue par le prisme d'une plus grande participation des sociétés du secteur privé dans la gestion, la fourniture et le contrôle de systèmes gouvernementaux et de sources d'information critiques. Cet exposé a donné à l'auditoire un point de vue unique sur le rôle des technologies transformatives dans la défense.

Le premier panel du deuxième jour, « La défense et la sécurité à une époque de transition fiscale, opérationnelle et stratégique – points de vue et approches alliés », examinait la défense et la sécurité en des temps de contrainte fiscale sous les points de vue canadien, européen et américain, et sous

celui de l'OTAN. Ces points de vue étaient concentrés sur l'enjeu des contraintes fiscales sous des points de vue multi- et bilatéraux, quant à l'état de préparation des forces, quant aux effets des coupures budgétaires sur l'O&M et quant à la réévaluation de la stratégie en tenant compte de considérations économiques.

Le dernier panel de la conférence, « La nouvelle stratégie de défense Le Canada d'abord (LCD) – une nouvelle vision ou moins de la même chose ? », faisait participer d'anciens commandants des trois services des Forces armées canadiennes, ainsi qu'un ancien chef d'état-major de la Défense. Ce panel a discuté des conséquences d'une nouvelle Stratégie de défense Le Canada d'abord sous les points de vue des opérations, de l'état de préparation et des approvisionnements. Les panélistes touchèrent aussi aux implications sur l'avenir de l'entraînement et du développement des forces, et sur la capacité des FAC de répondre efficacement aux futurs défis en matière de défense et de sécurité autour du monde.

L'Institut de la CAD a mis la documentation de la conférence à la disposition d'un vaste public sur notre site Web. Il s'agit notamment : d'un sommaire des délibérations, un suivi et un sommaire médiatiques et des enregistrements audio de la plupart des séances. L'Institut de la CAD a également couvert la conférence sur le mot-clic de Twitter #TheOC2014, disponible sur Twitter. Le programme de la conférence, qui aligne plus d'une trentaine d'experts canadiens et internationaux qui ont participé comme conférenciers, est aussi disponible. ■

## Centenary of the 1st Canadian Division

The 1st Canadian Division draws its roots from the first contingent of 30,000 men who volunteered for service in August 1914, following the declaration of war. The Division fought with distinction in World War I at the battles of Ypres, Festubert, Somme, Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, Passchendaele, the Drocourt-Quéant Line, and Canal du Nord.

On 10 July, 1943, during World War II 160,000 troops from Canada, Britain and the United States engaged the Allied landings in Sicily. 1st Canadian Division took its place on the left flank of Eighth Army with the amphibious landing on the Pachino peninsula at the start of a 35-day campaign that cleared the island of enemy forces. The operation, known as Operation HUSKY, was carried out at a cost of 562 Canadians dead and more than 1,600 wounded.

70 years later, Operation HUSKY 2013 commemorated the Canadian campaign in Sicily. Preparations for Operation HUSKY 2013 began in 2006, when Steve Gregory and his son, Erik, visited the all-Canadian cemetery in Agrigola. During their visit the senior Gregory decided to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Operation HUSKY.

On 10 July, 2013, 300 Canadians along with Italian civilians gathered on Bark West beach in Pachino to watch the raising of the Canadian flag in honour of the soldiers who fought in the Sicilian campaign and to plant the first of many fallen soldier markers. Through Mr. Gregory's initiative and efforts, Operation HUSKY 2013 raised the awareness of Canadian and Italian citizens regarding Canada's role in freeing those who suffered under the tyranny of Fascism and Nazi occupation.

Go to [www.operationhusky2013.ca](http://www.operationhusky2013.ca) to find out more about Operation HUSKY 2013.

## Le centenaire de la 1re Division du Canada

La 1re Division du Canada a ses racines dans le premier contingent de 30 000 hommes qui se portèrent volontaires pour le service en août 1914, suite à la déclaration de guerre. Au cours de la Première guerre mondiale, la Division s'est distinguée dans les batailles d'Ypres, de Festubert, de la Somme, de la crête de Vimy, de Hill 70, de Passchendaele, de la ligne Drocourt-Quéant et du Canal-du-Nord.

Le 10 juillet 1943, pendant la Deuxième guerre mondiale, 160 000 hommes du Canada, de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis engageaient les débarquements alliés en Sicile. La 1re Division prit sa place sur le flanc gauche de la Huitième armée avec le débarquement amphibie sur la péninsule de Pachino, qui fut le début d'une campagne de 35 jours qui a nettoyé l'île des forces ennemies. L'opération, connue sous le nom d'Opération HUSKY, fut exécutée au coût de 562 Canadiens morts et de plus de 1 600 blessés.

70 ans plus tard, l'Opération HUSKY 2013 est venue commémorer la campagne canadienne en Sicile. Les préparatifs pour l'Opération HUSKY 2013 commencèrent en 2006, quand Steve Gregory et son fils Erik, visitèrent le cimetière exclusivement canadien d'Agira. Pendant leur visite le père Gregory décida de commémorer le 70e anniversaire de l'Opération HUSKY.

Le 10 juillet 2013, 300 civils canadiens et italiens se rassemblèrent sur la plage Bark West de Pachino pour assister à la levée du drapeau canadien en honneur des soldats qui avaient combattu dans la campagne de Sicile et pour planter le premier de plusieurs marqueurs dédiés aux soldats tombés. Grâce à l'initiative et aux efforts de M. Gregory, l'Opération HUSKY 2013 a sensibilisé les citoyens canadiens et italiens au rôle joué par le Canada dans la libération de ceux qui avaient souffert sous la tyrannie du fascisme nazi.

Rendez-vous sur le site [www.operationhusky2013.ca](http://www.operationhusky2013.ca) pour vous renseigner davantage sur l'Opération HUSKY 2013.



\* Learn more about Operation Husky 2013 at: [www.facebook.com/operationhusky2013](http://www.facebook.com/operationhusky2013)

## Italian Campaign Remembrance Tour November 4<sup>th</sup> / 12<sup>th</sup>, 2014

Following the success of Operation Husky 2013\*, organizers are sponsoring an annual Bi-National Remembrance program consisting of student project exchange, historical conference and remembrance. This year \$10,000 has been raised for student subsidies.

The mission of the project is to highlight the role Canadian soldiers played in the liberation of Italy while visiting the towns and cemeteries rarely visited by Canadians. The tour will be coordinated with local community remembrance activities and bring Canadian students together with Italian and Sicilian students to honour the sacrifice of those fallen on all sides.

**All-inclusive** packages at just \$3,495.00. Spaces are limited for the 2014 tour.

### For more information contact:

Ed Rayment: call 416 254 1999 or email: [erayment@me.com](mailto:erayment@me.com)

Or Steve Gregory at [steve@isaix.com](mailto:steve@isaix.com) or call 514-919-5858

# Dollars and Sense: The Pacific Pivot in Context

by David Perry



*(The following article is re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor of Canadian Naval Review, Vol 9, Number 4 - 'Dollars and sense: the Pacific pivot in context' - Ed.)*

Some considerable discussion and debate has emerged examining a possible Canadian defence shift to the Asia-Pacific region, which would presumably involve a significant role for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Much of this, including in these pages, has been undertaken without taking into account the impact of the substantial change that has occurred in Canadian defence over the last three years. This has on the one hand substantially reduced defence resources (cutting funding by \$2.1 billion a year) and on the other hand identified several areas where the defence establishment would like to invest new funding. Given this, despite the wider strategic arguments for greater involvement in the region, neither the funding nor inclination to become more involved in the Pacific appears to be present.

This is particularly the case given the release of four important documents in quick succession in the fall of 2013: the Defence Renewal Plan; the 2013 Speech from the Throne; the 2013 Fiscal and Economic Update; and the Fall 2013 Report of the Auditor General of Canada. Combined these suggest the following: DND's current efforts to find money and people to reinvest in new priorities will produce fewer reinvestment opportunities than the 2010 Transformation initiative believed necessary; DND will face more budget pressures starting next year; the government of Canada will renew its defence strategy, but has shown no inclination to focus this on Asia-Pacific; and budget constraints will mean Canada's future seagoing fleet will be less capable than the one the navy currently operates. Taken together, these factors indicate a significant degree of scepticism is warranted regarding the feasibility of any move to the Asia-Pacific region that requires financial investment in the short term.

In 2010 the Chief of Defence Staff appointed Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie Chief of Transformation. Leslie's transformation team sought, by reforming the way national defence operates, \$1 billion and 3,500 regular forces, several thousand reservists and civil servants that could be re-directed towards new departmental priorities (detailed below). While the transformation team was stood down without action on its major recommendations, the notion of finding efficiencies to allow for reinvestment in new

priorities was transferred to the Defence Renewal Team launched in August 2012. The result of its preliminary work, the Defence Renewal Plan released in October 2013, outlines opportunities that could allow for a reinvestment of 2,362 to 3,741 full-time positions and \$528-\$845 million to new defence priorities.<sup>1</sup>

This is a positive, if much delayed, effort by DND to try and free up resources by making changes to internal processes. However, even if the full reinvestment potential materializes, not a given because of the difficulties in implementation, it will fall short of what the Report on Transformation identified as necessary just two years ago. Furthermore, it will take several years and significant initial investment to realize these defence renewal reinvestments. Critically, it has not yet been determined how much of the reinvestment potential will be devoted to new initiatives or to help offset the impact of several years of budget cuts, which have reduced readiness funding sharply. While the original intent of this effort was to allow DND to reinvest in new capabilities, it may well morph into an effort to preserve the status quo.

The prospect of defence renewal becoming a way of dealing with fiscal austerity gained greater salience after the 2013 Speech from the Throne pledged a two-year operating budget freeze and "targeted reductions to internal government spending."<sup>2</sup> The operating budget freeze will mean DND must reallocate operations and maintenance funds towards personnel spending so it can honour contractually mandated pay increases for its personnel. Based on the impact of the same measure in 2010, I estimate that the annual impact will likely be at least \$118 million, with the cumulative impact by 2015/2016 of \$236 million.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the downward pressure on the defence budget will increase in the short term, even if DND avoids a targeted reduction. Notably, the Speech from the Throne also pledged balanced budget legislation once the deficit is erased. Thus, although many argue that additional defence funding is needed to bolster the naval shipbuilding program, fund the priorities identified to date, and/or enable a Pacific pivot, the balanced budget pledge makes the prospect of substantial additional defence funds uncertain, if not unlikely.<sup>4</sup>

This continues to be problematic for the navy as there is evidence that the naval shipbuilding program needs more money. In his fall 2013 report, the Auditor General (AG) found there is a "key project risk"<sup>5</sup> that the budget for naval recapitalization is inadequate as the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project budget of \$26.2 billion "is insufficient to replace Canada's 3 destroyers and 12 frigates with 15 modern warships with similar capabilities."<sup>6</sup> In essence, while the Canada First Defence Strategy pledged to "improve and replace key existing equipment"<sup>7</sup> the AG contends that the navy's future surface fleet will be less capable than the one it operates now, unless the fleet shrinks. As the AG acknowledges, this could mean that "Canada may not get the military ships it needs if budgets are not subject to change."<sup>8</sup> Since the CSC is in the first year of a lengthy project definition, a substantive understanding of exactly how much certain capabilities and fleet sizes will cost will not be known for several years; presumably after Canadian defence policy is renewed. Yet, despite the recognition of a possible funding shortfall, securing additional funds for naval shipbuilding has not emerged publically as a priority likely to influence defence policy renewal.

Indeed, while sound strategic arguments can be made for bolstering the naval capital program and taking a more active approach in the Pacific, several other priority areas of investment appear to take precedent. A 2012 letter from the Prime Minister to the Minister of National Defence directed several areas where DND should devote additional effort. These included protecting Arctic sovereignty, monitoring and defending the sea and air approaches to Canadian territory, enhancing intelligence and cyber capabilities, bolstering search and rescue and capabilities to respond to domestic emergencies, and establishing a sovereignty protection mandate for 5 Wing Goose Bay as key defence priorities – not improving Canada's attention in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the Defence Renewal Team has not yet determined its potential reinvestment areas, it has stated that space and cyber capabilities are leading contenders for potential reinvestment.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, the 2013 Speech from the Throne emphasized domestic emergency response, a capacity to respond to terrorism and cyber-attacks, and the Arctic as focal points for CFDS renewal. While none of this precludes an additional focus on the Pacific, and some of these new capabilities could contribute to such a move, there are strong indications that the government has other priorities.

Taken together the prospect of a substantive refocus westward seems bleak. DND is midway through its fourth year of fiscal austerity, with at least two more years to go. A plan for using

efficiencies to facilitate reinvestment has finally been produced, but it is less ambitious than the transformation effort launched just three years ago, and may end up simply helping DND deal with its reductions. While naval recapitalization is edging closer to cutting steel, the AG has raised concerns about how much capability the budget can buy.

This has not yet influenced the government's defence priorities. The government has consistently called for greater investments closer to home, and in space and cyber capabilities, not the Pacific. Altogether, this indicates that CFDS renewal will provide incremental policy adjustments, not a new direction, westward, or otherwise. ■

| David Perry is the Senior Defence Analyst with the CDA Institute and a columnist for Canadian Naval Review. David is also a doctoral candidate in political science at Carleton University.

<sup>1</sup>David Perry, *Doing Less with Less*. Ottawa: CDA institute, forthcoming. - <sup>2</sup>Canada. *Seizing Canada's Moment*. Ottawa: Governor General, October 16, 2013.

<sup>3</sup>Canada. Department of Finance Canada, *Update of Economic and Fiscal Projections* (Ottawa: 2013). - <sup>4</sup>Canada. *Seizing Canada's Moment*. Ottawa: Governor General, October 16, 2013. - <sup>5</sup>Canada. "Chapter 3: National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy," *Fall 2013 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*. Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2013, 3. - <sup>6</sup>AG, "Chapter 3," 20. - <sup>7</sup>Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*. Ottawa: DND, 2008, 18. - <sup>8</sup>AG, "Chapter 3," 23. - <sup>9</sup>Defence Renewal Team, *Technical Briefing*, October 28, 2013

## THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the 2014 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 by the CDA Institute to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include:

General John de Chastelain, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Dr. Jack Granatstein, the Rt. Hon. Brian Dickson, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Hon. Barnett Danson, General Paul Manson, Dr. David Bercuson, Mr. G. Hamilton Southam, Brigadier-General David Fraser, General Raymond R. Henault, General Rick Hillier, Warrant Officer William MacDonald, the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson, Major-General Jonathan Vance and Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara.

Any Canadian may nominate one individual citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, be accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the nomination and include a brief biographical sketch of the nominee. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2014, and should be addressed to:

**VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE  
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE  
151 SLATER STREET, SUITE 412A  
OTTAWA ON K1P 5H3**

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 7 November 2014, at a gala dinner that will be held at the Canadian War Museum.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at the above address, or fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail [pao@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:pao@cdainstitute.ca); or telephone (613) 236 9903.



## LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2014.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 par l'Institut de la CAD dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou Canadienne qui s'est distingué(e) par sa contribution à la défense et à la sécurité de notre pays et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Général John de Chastelain, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, le Major-général Roméo Dallaire, M. Jack Granatstein, le Très hon. Brian Dickson, le vice-amiral Larry Murray, le lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Hon. Barnett Danson, le Général Paul Manson, M. David Bercuson, M. G. Hamilton Southam, le Brigadier-général David Fraser, le Général Raymond R. Henault, le Général Rick Hillier, l'Adjudant William MacDonald, la Très hon. Adrienne Clarkson, le Major-général Jonathan Vance et le Brigadier-général W. Don Macnamara.

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**COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY  
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE  
151, RUE SLATER, SUITE 412A  
OTTAWA ON K1P 5H3**

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 7 novembre 2014, à un dîner qui aura lieu au Musée canadien de la guerre.

Pour de plus amples informations, incluant la demande de billets pour le dîner, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à l'adresse ci-haut mentionnée ou télécopier: (613) 236 8191; courriel: [pao@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:pao@cdainstitute.ca); ou téléphone (613) 236 9903.

# The Polar Basin: Attempting To Square The Circle

by Ron Cleminson

✿ On December 2, 2013, following a decade of work and an expenditure of more than 200 million dollars, Canadian Arctic experts announced that they were prepared to submit Canada's claim to 1.7 million square kilometers of the Polar Basin seafloor. Under the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they guaranteed that there would be "no overlap" with Russia's submission made a decade earlier. But, within 48 hours, guru/sherpas from the PMO renounced that claim and directed the experts' group to reconfigure their findings with the possible extension of Canada's claim to include the North Pole. A day later Georgiy Mamedov, Russia's Ambassador to Canada, and respected expert in international diplomacy, called for a focus on continued Russian-Canadian cooperation in the "northern" Arctic. Days later, President Putin confirmed that expanding an Arctic presence was a "military priority". His senior Arctic advisor, Anton Vasiliev, followed up quickly with a statement that Russia's build-up in the Arctic threatened no one. He encouraged other Arctic nations to bolster their own military assets in the region. With a slight whiff of Cold War in the cold Arctic air, Chuck Hagel, the American Secretary of Defence, simply commented (in Halifax) that the Pentagon continued to review guideline changes in its approach to military and polar codes. All of this "innocent" rhetoric took place during the four weeks of December 2013\*,

as the sun slowly disappeared below the Arctic horizon.

*\*Subsequently, on February 14, 2014, US Secretary of State, John Kerry, remarked that "the Arctic has enormous and growing geo-strategic, economic, climatic, environmental and security implications for the United States and the world". The USA has not yet ratified UNCLOS. It will assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015.*

FRC. Ottawa, Canada.

20 March 2014

**T**he Polar Basin, perhaps the most avidly explored yet least understood frontier on earth, has intrigued generations of Canadians since confederation. Few regions on earth combine such breathtaking beauty with such bone chilling mystery, creating puzzles that we have attempted to solve for the better part of two centuries. The United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) could prove to be the venue within which problems, thought incapable of solution by purely geometrical means, can be solved. Such solutions, whether in a multi-dimensional format or not, may still be a decade away.

Sovereignty, security, stability, strategy, surveillance – these geostrategic characteristics of Canada's Arctic, studied at one time almost exclusively in military terms, are now increasingly viewed in terms of international economics and slowly, with an increasing focus, in the eight-country Arctic Council. Canada holds its chairmanship this year.

The Arctic Ocean, once seen as impenetrable in terms of surface vessels, is no longer so. Bridging the gap between Arctic economics will be the focus of the newly formed Arctic Economic Council. To add to this political and economic mix, non-Arctic nations such as China are increasingly arguing that they deserve a place to be heard in the future of Arctic trade and resource research. The Arctic Ocean, they suggest, is becoming simply another ocean to be traversed. Arctic nations strongly disagree, citing history as a basis.

Security issues, specifically those relating to Arctic sovereignty, have been perennial concerns to successive Canadian governments since the founding of the nation in 1867. National sovereignty in the Arctic Archipelago was inherited essentially from the British and is based on the extensive documented record of exploration in "British North America" dating back to the early 1500s.

Exploration per se in the high Arctic during the 19th century was not exclusive to the British. A glance at current Canadian government maps reveals a generous sprinkling of place names in the Queen Elizabeth Islands that graphically portray periods of exploration that were undertaken by highly motivated groups of international polar adventurers from at least four other nations. The 19th century narratives that were created by those intrepid adventurers suggest that the challenge found in Arctic regions in those days was not so much related to the quest of sovereignty but, rather, to the fight of simply surviving.

By the early 1900s, there was little doubt within federal government circles concerning Canada's authority and ownership in this region. That was evident in the federal government's instructions to Captain J.E. Bernier in 1910 as he prepared in Quebec City to undertake a sovereignty patrol into the "Northern Waters" and the Arctic Archipelago. The instructions issued to him were straightforward and unambiguous. Bernier's orders were to proceed on patrol to the "northern waters of Canada." These included Baffin Bay, Lancaster and Melville Sounds, Barrow and McClure Straits, as well as the Arctic Archipelago. While on patrol in these waters, he was authorized to acquaint sealers, fishermen and other persons that he was the "duly appointed officer of the Canadian Government." As such, he was to collect appropriate fees and taxes and, in the event that those intercepted refused to pay up, he was to take the names of the ships, the skippers and the crews.

Bernier was also authorized, if ice conditions permitted, to proceed through the as yet uncharted Northwest Passage to Victoria, BC "in a year or two." Otherwise he was expected to return to his homeport of Quebec City.

Although Bernier clearly had the pioneering spirit to proceed west, ice conditions did not permit.

The Arctic first became recognized as a region of “strategic” interest to Canada during the Second World War. The chains of airfields developed by the allies<sup>1</sup> in the southern reaches of the Arctic in Canada and in Greenland did much to open the area. Thule Air Base, located in Greenland at the 75th parallel, was the best evidence of a changed appreciation on the part of the United States to the significance of the Eastern Arctic in strategic terms.

That change in strategic perception of the Arctic was not lost on Lester B. Pearson, then one of the most senior Canadian experts on the Canada-US relationship in the immediate postwar years. In the July 1946 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Pearson wrote, “not long ago, the vast Canadian Arctic Territory was considered to be little more than a frozen northern desert, without any great economic value or any political or strategic value ... [w]e know better now ... and the reason is obvious ... [i]t was the war and the aero plane,” he concluded, that had driven home to Canadians the importance of their Northland, in strategy, in resources and in communications.

Although Mr. Pearson may have been extraordinarily perceptive regarding the value that the Arctic would have for future generations, there were relatively few members of the Canadian public who leapt forward immediately to embrace his concept. Over the succeeding 68 years between 1946 and today, the level of public interest as expressed in foreign and defence policy documented and related to government activity has waxed and waned, often determined by events and factors exogenous to Canada.

Not long after Mr. Pearson’s article was published, the Canadian government undertook a number of actions relating to what Pearson had termed Canada’s “Northland.” In 1947, under a joint agreement with the United States, five joint weather stations were established in the Queen Elizabeth Islands.<sup>2</sup> During approximately the same timeframe, the Canadian army experimented with a communication network in the barren lands and launched the Muskox expedition, the first of many live exercises designed to test personnel, planning and material. This sort of combined operation continued for more than a decade under several names such as “Sweetbriar,” “Bulldog” and “Snow Chinthe.” “Polar Pass” was planned in the early 1960s to be the largest of the series, but was abandoned due to cost. Its demise marked the

waning of military activities in the Arctic.

In 1955-57, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line and the Mid-Canada line were created to provide better protection from the threat posed by the strategic bomber fleet of the Soviet Long Range Air Force (SLRAF). Radar lines, in fact, provided for national security in the north but conveniently from operational facilities well to the south. Nevertheless, the DEW line did have a direct effect in terms of regional activity. It has been said that prior to the addition of the DEW line, explorers, geologists and others had to spend 90 percent of their time simply being able to survive and 10 percent on their scientific activities. With the activation of the DEW line, these percentages were reversed.

Suffice it to say that during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Canadian Armed Forces were better-equipped and trained to monitor Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic than before or since. The army’s quick reaction capabilities, mostly at company and sometimes battalion level, were airborne or air transportable and exceedingly well trained. Not only did the air force maintain an airlift capability for rapid deployment of these quick reaction units, but it designated a special Arctic reconnaissance squadron for deep Arctic penetration. 408(AR) Squadron, equipped with appropriately modified Canadian-built Lancaster Mark 10s, flew out of RCAF Station Rockcliffe on routine surveillance missions to the pole for national sovereignty and security purposes. These flights, codenamed “Air Romps,” were undertaken on a 12 months per year basis. Those missions were to carry out routine reconnaissance over the Queen Elizabeth Islands and “the Canadian sector of the Polar Basin.” If reconnaissance were required beyond the Canadian sector of the Polar Basin, and many of them were, they were always flown under special authorization provided directly from Air Force Headquarters. These missions were codenamed “Apex Rockets.” In those days the Royal Canadian Navy operated HMCS Labrador, an icebreaker well known throughout the Arctic as it “showed the flag” in the Arctic for domestic as well as political reasons.

On top of all this, the Defence Research Board (DRB) operated a small, dedicated Arctic section whose scientists were recognized internationally as being the “best amongst equals.” They maintained a unique relationship with their Soviet counterparts even in the midst of the Cold War. Other Canadian Arctic activities including the polar shelf project of the 1980s added significantly to Canadian knowledge of the high Arctic coastlines. Only the Russians knew more.

Today, a 21st century challenge is in the

process of emerging and deserves more than a cursory glance in terms of homeland security considerations. Early in the year 2000, a number of commercial airlines began flying between North America and Asia directly over the North Pole, initially on a “test” basis. This new and practical activity added a new dimension to the sovereignty issue. On May 19, 2000, a Cathay Pacific Air Bus A340 undertook a nonstop flight from Toronto to Hong Kong via the North Pole to become the first ever transpolar flight from Canada by any airline. The jet flew north over Hudson’s Bay to within 50 nautical miles of the North Pole and south over Russia, Mongolia and China to land at Hong Kong International Airport.

From a commercial perspective, regular scheduled polar flights such as these have now shaved hours off of trips from North America to Asia. A flight from New York to Hong Kong, which previously lasted a gruelling 17 hours, now takes five hours less via the North Pole. As the number of these transits increases, Canada, as the custodian of the northern half of the continent, must continue to reassess the Arctic in terms of sovereignty considerations. The use of Canadian airspace within a continental security context includes problems associated with Search and Rescue as well. This means that surveillance in the High Arctic will be not only a national but an international priority as well.

The surveillance task is one that can be accomplished by drawing from experience of the past and employing technologies of the future.

Detection and tracking can be achieved by radar whether space borne, air borne, or ship borne, and does not require the cooperation of the targets. A single surveillance satellite in low earth orbit covers an enormous field of view, but only revisits any particular area at intervals of many hours or even a few days.

Canadian aircraft like the Aurora can cover large areas while it is airborne on sorties lasting many hours. Ice-capable ships’ radar can only cover a very small area, and can only move to another area at very slow speed, but it can remain on station for days if necessary. In addition to detection and tracking, surveillance needs to provide identification of each vessel, and observation of activities that may deserve closer inspection.

Radars cannot provide identification (although it would be technically possible to add an automatic IFF system requiring each aircraft and vessel to carry an individually coded transponder beacon). If the vessel carries a GPS

receiver calculating its position, and equipment is added to transmit this to an operations center automatically, perhaps two or three times an hour, the identity of the vessel can easily be added to the reports. But the transmitting device (or an IFF transponder) can only operate with the cooperation of the vessel.

Surveillance aircraft and ships are expensive to operate on a continuous basis, so it is important to plan their sorties to take maximum advantage of their limited capabilities. An operations center provided with an accurate up-to-date plot of all activity in the area of interest should be able to direct the available aircraft and ships to locations in which their services are most required.

Technologies will clearly provide solutions to the quest for Arctic sovereignty and national security. In both of these, however, the question should be asked as to whether there is a need of personnel in situ or is it adequate to simply know what is going on through remote sensors.

*In order to learn more of our Arctic history, do read "In the Shadows of the Pole: An Early History of Arctic Expeditions 1871-1912" authored by S.L. Osborne, Dundurn, published in 2014. To learn more about the current Arctic, I recommend that you read and subscribe to the magazine Up Here, available at [www.uphere.ca](http://www.uphere.ca) ■*

#### **|Wing Commander Frank Ronald Cleminson, CM CD MA LLD:**


**Born in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario in 1928, Ron joined the RCAF during the Korean War. Through a series of complicated cross-postings between 408 (Arctic Reconnaissance) Squadron and the Air Photo Intelligence Centre (APIC), he accumulated a decade of operational experience using overhead imagery to document Arctic activities. Seconded in 1964 to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington, DC, he was indoctrinated into the use of satellite derived overhead imagery. Following 32 years at DND, he transferred to Foreign Affairs for an additional 18 years during which he made use of overhead imagery for verification purposes in the Arms Control and Disarmament Process. A graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff College and the NATO Defense College, he holds degrees from the University of Western Ontario and the University of Maryland with honorary doctorates from Wilfrid Laurier University and the University of Victoria. He was appointed to the Order of Canada in 2005. He still follows the Arctic.**

<sup>1</sup> The "Crystal and Bluie-west" chains of airfields in Canada (including Goose Bay, Fort Chimo, Coral Harbour and Frobisher Bay) and in Greenland (Sondrestrom and Narsarsawak).

<sup>2</sup> Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island remains today the node for high Arctic activities. The other stations were Eureka and Alert on Ellesmere Island Isachsen, near Ellef Ringnes Island and Mould Bay on Prince Patrick Island; the latter now abandoned.

# Ballistic Missile Defence – a New Imperative

by Colin Robertson

 *Advised that newly-elected Prime Minister Stephen Harper would not welcome a renewed request for participation in ballistic missile defence, President George W. Bush reportedly asked Mr. Harper what would happen if a North Korean missile, aimed at Los Angeles or Seattle, wound up heading towards Vancouver or Calgary. Is it logical to have a say in the establishment of that architecture in Europe but to exclude ourselves from having that say in North America? At what point is the Canadian national interest put in jeopardy by not having a say?*

**I**t is time for Canada to join the rest of the western Alliance - our 27 partners in NATO – and our friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific - Australia, Japan, South Korea - under the umbrellas of ballistic missile defence (BMD).

We need to be prepared for the threat of missile attacks. Continental defence has been integral to Canadian national security since MacKenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt parleyed at Kingston in 1938.

Led by Louis St. Laurent we were architects of NATO because of our belief in collective security. A decade later we would create NORAD, our bi-national aerospace defence agreement that now includes aspects of maritime warning. Today, our security is again threatened.

North Korea has conducted several ballistic missile tests under the guise of peaceful satellite launches, it has stated its long-range missiles will target the United States, and it has developed a road-mobile ballistic missile capability. Iran has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles. We hope that the current Geneva discussions will stop Iranian nuclear development but their outcome is uncertain. The Six Party talks with North Korea broke down in 2009 after North Korea repeatedly broke its commitments.

As foreign minister John Baird observed, before we trust we need to verify.

While Iran does not have the capacity today to strike Canada with missiles, the evidence is there that they are trying to build that capacity. We don't know what new threats are coming down the pike. What happens if Pakistan goes rogue? Risk assessments forecast more bad actors with access to warheads, intercontinental missiles and weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical and biological.

Despite our best efforts, the genie is out of the bottle on proliferation.

Through NORAD, we currently share information in early warning and attack assessment with the United States. But when it comes time to make the critical launch decisions, our officials literally have to leave the room. The algorithms that US Northern Command has developed to protect the US homeland do not include Canadian cities like Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto or Montreal. Membership brings the privilege of being in the room, part of the conversation on how to protect Canadians.

Canada has a conflicted history when it comes to nuclear weapons and domestic air defence. Though we were present at the creation – nuclear energy research during the Second World War in Canada was vital – we eschewed the development of nuclear arms for ourselves. Instead, we opted to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes through the CANDU reactor. We sold it around the world on condition of non-proliferation.

We would be deceived by India. It developed its own nuclear weaponry using plutonium



derived from a research reactor provided by Canada. The Indians argued that in a nuclear neighbourhood they had to be prepared.

Placement of nuclear warheads on Canadian soil, as part of our alliance commitment, tormented John Diefenbaker. The resulting BOMARC controversy contributed to his government's undoing and the election of Lester B. Pearson.

Lester Pearson, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize over the Suez crisis, concluded that our obligations to NORAD and NATO required participation. The decision was controversial. A young Pierre Trudeau called Pearson the "defrocked prince of peace." Two decades later, now Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau faced similar divisions within his own cabinet over the testing of cruise missiles on Canadian soil. Trudeau agreed to the testing, arguing that "it is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a hand when the going gets rough."

Notwithstanding his friendship with Ronald Reagan, Brian Mulroney joined with Australia, France and other allies in rejecting participation in the US "Star Wars" missile defence program because Canada "would not be able to call the shots."

When a new and much more modest BMD program was developed under George W. Bush, Paul Martin dithered, then opted out, to the confusion of his new Chief of the Defence Staff and ambassador to the United States. Advised that newly-elected Prime Minister Stephen Harper would not welcome a renewed request, Mr. Bush found this puzzling. He reportedly asked Mr. Harper what would happen if a North Korean missile, aimed at Los Angeles or Seattle, wound up heading towards Vancouver or Calgary.

Criticism of BMD boils down to the following: first, according to critics, it does not work and it weaponizes space. It is a latter-day Maginot Line – costly, unreliable, and provocative. NORAD, they argue, provides sufficient defence but they forget that, at the critical moment, we must leave the room. BMD is not Star Wars with its improbable futuristic weapons and enormous cost. The current system has no space-based weapons. Instead it uses kinetic energy to stop warheads.

With the system essentially in place, participation does not come with an admission charge. Any future costs can be scaled and shared within the Alliance. Technology, research and constant testing have made BMD a reasonable shield. The Israelis' Iron Dome demonstrates the defensive worth of anti-missile technology.

The second criticism of BMD is that it makes us too reliant on the United States. This tiresome argument is also applied to trade and commerce but who would argue that freer trade has not benefited Canada? In terms of defence, the whole point of collective security is to contribute according to our capacity for mutual security and protection.

Protecting Canadians (and Americans) was the logic of the original DEW line and NORAD. Should not Canada have a say in the development of the North American BMD architecture in advance of the actual emergence of a combined ICBM-nuclear threat? Moreover, is it logical to have a say in the establishment of that architecture in Europe but to exclude ourselves from having that say in North America? At what point is the Canadian national interest put in jeopardy by not having a say?

During the cruise missile debate, Prime Minister Trudeau remarked that some Canadians, "are eager to take refuge under the US umbrella, but don't want to help hold it." The rest of NATO has signed onto missile defence.

So have Australia, Japan and South Korea. While the United States has a general invitation to its Allies to join the shield it has not put any pressure on Canada.

The third criticism is that BMD is morally wrong. But we live in the real world, not Elysium. We cannot be sure whether something aimed at the United States isn't going to strike Canada. A Senate report in 2006 concluded that an effective BMD "could save hundreds of thousands of Canadian lives." The moral argument should be reframed to ask why the Government of Canada does not have a voice in how BMD may be used? One could argue that it is a moral imperative for the government to have such a say when the potential target is a Canadian city.

By being part of the defensive shield we strengthen the deterrent effect of BMD. Taking part in surveillance for BMD is part of the continuum of capabilities that contributes to the Alliance. This could include missile defence capacity in our new warships and using our submarines to track potentially hostile attack submarines.

Participation in BMD is both an insurance policy for our homeland and a renewed commitment to contemporary collective defence. By being part of the defensive shield we strengthen the deterrent effect of BMD.

In putting these remarks together I sought the advice of friends and colleagues. British defence scholar Professor Julian Lindley-French pointed out that BMD should be seen as part of the modernisation of NATO's Article 5 and thus part of the need to create 21st century collective defence. As Lindley-French observed:

"In that light BMD sits at the crux of two axes of future defence. The first axis links NORAD to a 'NATO' Advance Defence as part of an evolving umbrella, even if the Russians do not like that. The second axis concerns the development of complementary advanced deployable forces and cyber-defence, amongst other efforts.

As part of this effort, which is reflected in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, BMD would be part of a defence 'cornerstone' which would underpin collective defence, crisis management and, of course, co-operative security. Indeed, the ability to project civil-military influence to stabilise societies can only take place if the home base is secure - BMD is thus part of a new balance between protection and projection.

Russia should be invited to be part of this effort because BMD is counter-technology rather than counter-state." This is good advice.

Collective security means preparation and commitment. "Only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt," observed John F. Kennedy, "can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed." Collective security through NATO and our alliance with the United States has guaranteed the peace since 1945, contributing to the greatest growth in commerce and development in world history. Canada has been a beneficiary, with marginal premiums.

Changed circumstances, Alliance solidarity, and self-preservation oblige us to update our security policy. BMD must now be incorporated within our 'Canada First' defence strategy. ■

**|A career foreign service officer, Colin Robertson is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute. He is currently Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Vice President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Senior Strategic Advisor to McKenna, Long and Aldridge LLP and works with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives.**

# Hill 70 and Canadian Independence:

## How Lt Gen Currie's resistance to a bad order turned the Canadian Corps into a national army and hastened Canadian independence

by Dr. John Scott Cowan



*The important decision taken during 7-10 July 1917 to focus Canadian effort on Hill 70 was a crucial way station on the road to Canadian independence. In 1919, effectively, Canada was a nation state, and somehow four and a half years had done what 47 earlier years had not. Canada had acted like a nation, and so came out of the Great War as a nation.*

Canadian students learn about Confederation, and most of them believe that Canada ceased to be a colony and became a country with the passage of the BNA Act in 1867. Not so. The BNA Act provided only for internal self-government of the colony of Canada. In the 47 years from Confederation to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, no country had an embassy in Canada, nor did Canada have any embassies or high commissions abroad, except for a High Commissioner to the UK from 1880, with limited duties and limited access to information. If Canada wished to communicate with a nation state, the Governor General would write to the Colonial Office in London, who would forward the communication to the Foreign Office, who in turn would move the question to the British Embassy in the country of interest. On occasion a Canadian observer might go along to subsequent discussions abroad.

On 4 August 1914, the same day that Britain declared war on Germany, Sir George Perley was appointed Acting High Commissioner from Canada to London. But Sir George was not allowed to see correspondence between the Governor General and the Colonial Office.

At the outbreak of the war, Canada declared war on no-one. Britain did it for all of the Empire. Canada merely got to decide how it would react to being at war.

The first commander of the Canadian Corps was Lt Gen Edwin Alderson, a British officer appointed by Britain after consultation with

Canada. He was reprimanded early in the war by the War Office in London for responding directly to questions from the Canadian government in Ottawa. He was reminded that all communications with Ottawa were to be passed through the War Office. Thus in the early stages of the war, Canada was seen merely as a source of manpower for the British Army.

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### *We started the war as a colony and ended it as an ally.*

When the war broke out, Canada was a nation of perhaps seven and a half million people. Some 680,000 went into uniform, about 625,000 of them into Canadian uniform, and about a half a million went to Europe. About 66,000 died and 172,000 were injured or fell gravely ill during operations.

But in 1919 Canada had a seat at the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, a seat in the League of Nations, and the right to be elected to the League Council. Effectively, Canada was a nation state, and somehow four and a half years had done what 47 earlier years had not. Canada had acted like a nation, and so came out of the Great War as a nation.

In Canada students are taught variously that complete independence from Britain was achieved by the Statute of Westminster (11 Dec 1931) or by the patriation of the Constitution in 1982. But no-one is really so naïve. Paperwork follows later to solemnize the facts on the ground. Paperwork never leads events, it follows them.

Canada's war of independence was the First World War, the so-called Great War. Unlike the Americans, our war of independence was not fought against the entity from which we

became independent, but alongside it. We started the war as a colony and ended it as an ally.

The autonomy came gradually. The efforts in London of Sir George Perley, in both his roles as Acting High Commissioner and simultaneously as Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, and those of his successor in this second role, Sir A. Edward Kemp, were of great importance. But the real autonomy came from the performance of the Canadian Corps and its first Canadian commander.

All Canadians learn about the Battle of Vimy Ridge, which began on 9 April 1917. It was the first action in which all four divisions of the Corps fought. At the time the Corps was commanded by LGen Julian Byng, a British General who later that spring got promoted to command the British 3rd Army. In the 1920's, as Lord Byng of Vimy, he was Governor General of Canada.

His senior division commander was Maj Gen Arthur Currie, who was the chief planner for Vimy, basing much of his planning on lessons learned from the French defence of Verdun. Because of meticulous planning and rehearsing, recent technological advances, and good leadership, the Canadian Corps succeeded where earlier French troops had twice failed. Two unsuccessful French attempts to take and hold the ridge in May and Sept of 1915 had cost them about 150,000 casualties. During a period with little other good news, the Canadian Corps victory got tremendous attention. It has since taken on iconic significance for Canadians, so much so that few Canadians know that of the 170,000 men in the allied attack on Vimy Ridge that day, only about 97,000 were Canadian. In

some ways, it was not a Canadian battle, but a British battle with high Canadian content and a Canadian planner.

But exactly two months after the start of the assault on Vimy Ridge, a Canadian, Sir Arthur Currie was promoted to Lt Gen and given command of the Canadian Corps. On 7 July 1917, when Currie had been corps commander for under a month, he received orders from Gen Horne, commander of the 1st British Army, of which the Canadian Corps was a part, to attack and capture the small industrial city of Lens, somewhat north of Vimy. Currie refused.

Had Currie been a newly minted British Lt Gen, he probably would have been sent home, but he wasn't. Field Marshal Haig and Gen Byng both agreed with Currie's reasoning, and counselled a rethink.

Why had Currie balked? For good reason. On the whole, Canadian generals did their own reconnaissance, and British generals rarely did. Perhaps that was a residuum of the class system. Indeed, the casualty rates for Canadian general officers in the corps were higher than for the corps as a whole (42% vs 37%), partly as a result of this. Currie had done his own recon of Lens and considered it a killing ground, as it was dominated by German artillery on the hill to the north-west. From that hill, the German gunners could see the entire Douai Plain, the flat coal-mining area east of the Vimy Ridge. Currie made clear that he would prefer to attack and capture the high ground first.

Currie's view prevailed. Three days later, on 10 July, after a meeting of commanders in his HQ, Horne issued revised orders to his army, including to the Canadian Corps (the new orders went to 1st Corps, 2nd Corps, 13th Corps, Canadian Corps, and 1st Brigade, Royal Flying Corps). It reads, in part, "...On discussion with the GOC Canadian Corps, and on the allotment of additional artillery to the 1st Army, it has been decided to amend the objectives for the Canadian Corps". The orders moved Currie a bit further north along the front, and essentially turned that section of the front over to Currie. But it is the first mention in army-level orders of "the high ground NW of Lens", which subsequently became known as Hill 70.

Between 15 and 20 August, 1917 three divisions of the Canadian Corps (plus one in reserve) battled five German divisions and took and held Hill 70. The attack cost the Corps some 3,500 casualties, and the clever

and innovative defence against a massive counter-attack cost another roughly 2,200 casualties. But the Canadians held, and to this day no-one knows the German losses, but they are believed to have exceeded 20,000. It had been a hard fight; six Canadians were awarded the VC for their actions at Hill 70, somewhat more than the four Canadians awarded the VC for valour at Vimy Ridge. After that Currie had new status. He was viewed as having superb judgement. Army commanders treated him carefully (Horne, 1st Army, and Rawlinson, 4th Army). He largely got his orders from Haig, with the relevant army commander also present. Suddenly the Canadian Corps had become a national army, and not just another unit of the British Army.

In the months that followed, Currie differentiated the Canadians even more. In January 1918 he refused triangulation of Canadian divisions, and in doing so refused personal promotion to Army commander. At that time, British divisions went to a structure which included three brigades, each with three battalions of infantry (hence the 3x3, or "triangulation"). British battalions were also understrength by then, often about 600.

Currie believed that triangulation could cause pointless casualties, and preferred to fight divisions at full strength. He kept the infantry in the Canadian divisions at three brigades, each with four battalions of infantry. These were over-strength battalions too, at about 1100 men each, as each carried 100 of their own reserves. Had he agreed to triangulation, he would have had at least seven divisions in two corps. Anything six or more is an "army". He kept the Canadians as a corps rather than an army, eschewing the complexity of having two corps HQ and an army HQ. But the Canadian Corps was by then larger and more powerful than most British armies, and each of the four Canadian divisions was equal to at least 1.7 British divisions. Haig started adding to the impact of the 156,000 strong Canadian Corps by placing additional British divisions under Currie as well for the last year of the war.

The successful battle for Hill 70 was the watershed. After that, the Canadian Corps was viewed as a national allied army, and Currie as a national force commander. His effective reporting lines changed. The Corps became different. By 1918, a Canadian division would have one automatic weapon for every 13 men, vs one for every 61 men in a British division. A Canadian division would have about 13,000 infantry and about

3,000 engineering troops, vs about 5,400 and 650 for a British division. And the Canadian Corps had 100 more trucks than any British corps. There was a distinct Canadian way of war. In the period known as the "100 days", the Canadian Corps drove through and defeated 47 German divisions, one more than the 46 defeated by 650,000 Americans in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. But the Canadians took half the casualties of the Americans, and used twice the number of artillery shells. Currie's slogan was "Pay the price of victory in shells, not men".

The important decision taken during 7-10 July 1917 to focus Canadian effort on Hill 70 was a crucial way station on the road to Canadian independence. The instrument of that Canadian differentiation was the resolve and insight of a former schoolteacher, insurance company manager and real estate speculator called Arthur Currie, who refused an order that was not in Canada's interest. But his bold choice to protect his men would have had little ongoing impact if his judgement hadn't been vindicated by the events of August 15-20, 1917, when the Canadians, under his command, won the battle for Hill 70. Victory at Hill 70 dramatically hastened Canada's independence.

The successes of the Canadian Corps, particularly those under Canadian command, beginning with Hill 70 and culminating with the Battle of Amiens and the subsequent "hundred days", achieved great recognition for Canada and strengthened Borden's hand to such an extent that, during the Versailles negotiations, Borden stood in for Lloyd-George from time to time when the latter could not attend. Borden had set the stage for this throughout the war by his determined and effective efforts in pressing for a distinctive Canadian role and for the Canadianisation of the Corps. In person, and through the fine work of Sir George Perley and Sir A.E. Kemp, his representatives in London, Borden adroitly exploited Currie's push for a degree of autonomy to further the cause of Canadian independence. In this the military and political spheres were in perfect harmony.

That is why we wish to improve commemoration of this battle, and to use this commemoration as a platform for an educational program to remind Canadians of how their land became a country and not a colony. ■

**Dr. John Scott Cowan was President of the CDA Institute from 2009–2012. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute and is the Past Chair of the Defence Science Advisory Board of Canada (DSAB).**

# Why NATO Needs to Engage Rapidly and Decisively in Libya

by Colonel Ian Hope



*Colonel Hope's appointment in AFRICOM has exposed him to conflict situations throughout the African continent, but he believes Libya poses the greatest threat. Given the challenges facing Libya and the Maghreb, and the scale of effort needed to adequately address these challenges, He suggests that the only organization capable of reversing the slowly deteriorating situation in Libya is NATO. Recent experience gained in fielding hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan lends itself to a similar effort in Libya.*

In the wake of its intervention in 2011 the NATO alliance has been absent from Libya, a fact that contributes greatly to that country's deteriorating situation. As of March 2014, NATO was poised to re-commit, putting an eight person advisory team into Tripoli to assist the Libyan ministry of defence. This modest contribution will join a number of teams already in Libya from various countries and organizations committed to building Libyan military capability. Their collective work may well fail however for want of coordination and effort sufficient in size to overcome the challenges. Similar Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan during the past decade and a half suggest that the Libyan problem needs two things to succeed: a lead agent or lead nation to achieve unity of command and effort, and international commitment to train, equip and field military capability big enough to secure the country, and to simultaneously build institutional capacity that will be able to sustain these forces. NATO represents the only institution with size, legitimacy, and endurance to assume such a lead role, and thanks to its success in the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), it has enough recent expertise to create an effective Libyan armed forces.

Currently there are four factors affecting progress in Libya: limitations of the General Purpose Force (GPF) that the United States and several European countries are attempting to build; lack of coordination of effort; EU and UN insistence upon a Libyan lead in SSR; and the complex and growing threat of internal fractionalization and extremist influence.

The Government of Libya (GoL) pays approximately 35,000 soldiers, sailors, and air force personnel, most of who are only nominally on active duty, belong to militias, are untrained, and lack equipment, barracks, and unit structure. Recognizing these problems,

several NATO members at the Lough Erne G8 summit in June 2013 agreed to train Libyan units to create the GPF. The Italians and Turks are currently training over 300 GPF soldiers each in their respective countries. The United States will train another 500 in Bulgaria later this year, and the United Kingdom will train a similar cohort in England. Funding for this training has been somewhat slow in coming from the GoL, but is beginning to flow in fits and starts. Much more problematic is the size and scope of employment envisaged for the GPF. It will be a relatively small force (8,000 strong). It will be a facilities defence force, securing vital oil production and military and government infrastructure, hopefully including numerous massive weapons and munitions storage facilities, which are currently not under GoL control. The GPF will not be capable of manoeuvre to challenge the activities of extremist organizations or numerous separate militia factions throughout Libya. Even if the GPF assumes offensive tasks, given the number of installations to secure and its small size, the GPF will probably not change the current balance of armed force that exists between anti-government militia factions and the government, or the armed impasse that this has produced.

The United States, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have all committed to training the new GPF. However, each of these nations, together with many others, also conducts separate military sales and training activities in Libya. The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have also begun independent SSR activities. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is attempting to advise the GoL in SSR at the ministerial level. The EU has taken on responsibility for border security reform, but is having trouble moving activity out of Tripoli. Slowness in reform and self-interest has prompted other nations and contractors to deal bilaterally with Libyan

ministers to secure contracts in various SSR sectors (military, police, naval/coastguard, and border force training and equipment). Because these ministries woefully lack the capacity to deal with so many entities simultaneously, very little coordination is occurring between SSR efforts.

Insistence that Libyan ministries set priorities for SSR and control processes is another limitation. The EU believes strongly in this approach. So in principle does the United Nations, admitting however, to the severe lack of capacity in the GoL to actually lead SSR. UNSMIL also insists that major militias play a role in implementing SSR, because the militias are still viewed by local populations as the providers of local security and amenities. These militias believe that they – and not the government – are the true protectors of the spirit of the 2011 revolution. The poor state of GoL ministries and governing bodies and their inability to provide basic amenities strengthens militia claims of popular representation and makes integration of militias into SSR problematic. UNSMIL has helped the GoL establish six SSR working groups (National Security Architecture, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Defense Reform, Police Reform, Border Security, Arms and Ammunition) but without legislative mechanisms, the work and decisions of these working groups remains impotent. UNSMIL sees potential for stabilization and beginnings for civil society in Libya, but is concerned that uncoordinated international community efforts and small incremental commitments to certain ministries might at best fail to seize opportunities, and at worst strengthen militia credibility. Despite their desire for more GoL and militia involvement in SSR processes, the EU and UN do not know how to achieve it.

The GPF and other SSR initiatives are in part a response to the seizure of eastern oilfields

by eastern federalist forces (militias) in 2013, a move which has cost the GoL approximately \$10 billion in lost revenue. It is an ancient reality that Libyans divide themselves between westerners looking toward Tunisia and Europe, and easterners looking toward Egypt. Internal factionalism is now worsened, however, because of a lack of central authority and because there is no monopoly upon the means of violence in Libya by any single entity; no militia or GoL agency holds enough military might to win outright, therefore creating a continuing armed impasse with the dysfunctional Libyan government, which has no real power outside of Tripoli. This, combined with the growing influence and presence of regional extremist organizations linked to Al Qaeda (mainly Ansar Al Sharia and various Salafist and Wahabist militias), plus the ease with which they can appropriate heavy weapons and munitions from unguarded stockpiles, poses massive issues for the GoL. So strong is extremist presence at this time that an estimated 2,000-3,000 fighters have been recruited and trained in Libya and transited from there to Syria, where they hope to acquire experience in combat. The situation in Libya will worsen with their return, bringing back a commitment to radicalism equal to the Algerian mujahidin who returned from Afghanistan in the 1990s to create the Group Salafist for Preaching and Combat - now Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. The GoL does not have the institutions and capability to take control of its vast territory and prevent extremist movements, or the destabilizing effects of jihadist returns. The situation may continue to deteriorate slowly as disparate militia factions resist the government's consolidation of power, political unity dissolves and extremists work to destabilize the country. These threats have potential to produce negative regional effects, especially with the potential proliferation of hundreds of thousands of weapons and munitions (now stockpiled in Libya) through extremist groups into the Maghreb and Sahel.

Given the cumulative effects of poor coordination, GPF limitations, the small scale of EU and UN activities and their desire for Libyan lead, combined with the size and nature of the threat, something needs to change if international efforts in Libya are to succeed. Two major lessons that we have learned from similar problem sets, historically, are the need for unity of command and effort, and the need for a capacity-building activity equal in scale to the challenge.

The current situation in Libya is reminiscent of that of Kabul in 2002-2003. There it took seven years to find a viable mechanism for defence institution building. The Office of

Military Cooperation-Afghanistan began efforts in 2002, and expanded efforts with a new name - the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A) - in 2006 when the G8 SSR initiatives proved impotent. OSC-A was subsumed into Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in 2009, yet because of limitations in mandates and US Title authorities, it was only when CSTC-A was integrated within a new NTM-A in late 2009 that things became effective. Over 30 nations joined the NTM-A effort, which included a 120-man Ministerial Advisory Group that helped grow ministerial capacity. Eventually NTM-A took on all aspects of defence institution building. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been stronger unity of military command and effort in Afghanistan because of NTM-A. Given the many years it took to get to this level of effectiveness, the insurgent threat was allowed to grow considerably stronger than it was in 2002. In Sierra Leone, things were different. The United Kingdom accepted lead nation status from the beginning, and between 1999 and 2006 used a combined Department of Defence/Department of Foreign Affairs approach to leading the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). This lead nation structure directed efforts of all troop contributing countries from the beginning, creating a loose unity of command but certainly sustained unity of effort. Lead agency or lead nation unity of command and effort is now required in Libya.

Given the size of the emerging threats and the size of her territory, Libya will require well-trained armed forces greater in strength than that of Sierra Leone (13,000), even though the two countries have roughly the same population (6 million). Libya will especially need an air-land manoeuvre force of sufficient size to deal with major militias, naval and coastguard forces that can secure coasts and harbours, and air/ISR sufficient to monitor and interdict extremist groups and smugglers anywhere in Libyan territorial space. This capability-building effort must be sufficiently large-scale and holistic (with comprehensive recruitment, training, equipment, and fielding efforts). More importantly, all efforts to train and equip Libyan soldiers will be spoiled if we cannot create defence institutions that can sustain such forces. This will require a significant capacity-building approach that must reform all security-related ministries and defence organizations simultaneously. Of the NTM-A and UNAMSIL models, the former holds the best promise of succeeding in Libya. At its height NTM-A was comprised of just under 3,000 trainers, mentors, staff and support personnel. This was considerably larger than UNAMSIL's training and mentoring component (about 500, but

supported by a 17,000 peacekeeping force in-country). The scale of both of these success stories dwarfs what we are doing in Libya.

International community attempts to counter internal and external threats and bring Libya out of its deteriorating state require greater commitment and united effort. This can only come about if a semblance of unity of command is achieved under a lead agency with authority over SSR activity (including GPF training). The UN and the EU will not accept such a lead as it would require considerably more human and other resources than they are prepared to commit. US Africa Command has no mandate to establish a Joint Task Force or sub-unified command headquarters to take on the task of holistic SSR in Libya. It is doubtful that the United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey or France has the desire to unilaterally take on the Libya problem as lead nation in an international effort. The single organization with the strength, credibility, expertise and endurance to take the lead in Libya is NATO. The alliance may be drawn into Libya incrementally as the situation deteriorates, or it may embrace Libya as a new post-Afghanistan mission on its own impetus. But given Libya's geographic position, oil wealth, and the destabilizing potential of its weapons stockpiles, it is doubtful that NATO can ignore Libya for long. A NATO Training Mission-Libya (NTM-L) (with a robust Ministerial Advisory Group, just as in Kabul) would, on the other hand, go a long way to addressing current problems.

In slow recognition that its post-Afghanistan *raison d'être* should in part be capacity building, in exactly the same way that it did in NTM-A, NATO is deploying its eight person advisory team into Tripoli from March to July 2014. They will advise the Libyan defence ministry on establishing effective defence structures and on developing security policy and strategy. The leaders of this initiative are pragmatic enough to know that this is a very small approach to a big problem, but have observed that initial lack of NATO interest has been reversed after receipt of an official request by Libyan prime minister that NATO advise on defence institution building. It is doubtful that the small advisory team will be able to effect change enough to guarantee proper GPF integration and employment, or to facilitate much coordination between various agents working in Libya. However, NATO is ripe for a new post-Afghan mission and might be convinced to expand this initial effort and create an NTM-L if it can realize the positive aspects of this mission, which are:

- the mission would be considered to be in a geographically relevant country (unlike

Afghanistan, where many NATO nations had no direct interests);

- the mission would be perceived to be benign, with capability- and capacity-building being more popular and credible to pacific-minded alliance members than stability or counterinsurgency operations. That Libya does not face an external insurgency is an attractive point to war-weary alliance members;
- the mission would capitalize upon years of accumulated experience resident in NATO commands and staffs in capability- and capacity-building;
- the mission would be relatively easy to sustain (compared to Afghanistan or Iraq);
- alliance militaries could gain approval from their governments to sustain troop strengths and defence budgets in the post-Afghan era (without missions, budgets will be cut); and,
- the mission would offer the NATO generalship the coveted chance to command overseas in the time-honoured rotating-national flag fashion. Relatively low-resource but high impact, this mission would offer nations a chance to lead or co-lead (as in Kabul).

Beyond the above speculation lies the geopolitical fact that Libya matters. Unlike central Africa, Libya rests on the Mediterranean, and while it looks east for spiritual leadership, it leans northward for economic and social identification. Libyans are part of the Mediterranean world and have no history of identification with sub-Saharan Africa. Its proximity to Europe and its place in the Mediterranean make it an imperative for the attention of Europeans. In a geostrategic sense the West must keep the Mediterranean a European sea and no other region in Africa is as vital to Europe as the Maghreb. The north eastern and north western littorals of Africa are also of strategic interest, but not as much as the Maghreb. This fact should galvanize NATO. Getting the alliance to accept a NATO training mission in Libya would require considerable diplomatic and military-to-military effort, and would require significant information sharing and undoubtedly some brain-splitting negotiations. It might also take considerable time. However, the alliance has demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, that once in, it is in for the long haul. And that is exactly what Libya needs. ■

| Colonel Ian Hope is a long-service infantry officer who has written a number of articles for ON TRACK regarding US and NATO strategic activities in Afghanistan and more recently about the growing competency of the Afghan National Army. Colonel Hope commanded the 1st Battalion PPCLI Battle Group (Task Force Orion) in Kandahar from January to August 2006. He is currently the Canadian Liaison Officer to United States Africa Command.

## CALL FOR PAPERS

**CDA Institute 17th Annual Graduate Student Symposium: "Canada's Security and Defence Interests"**

*Thursday & Friday, 16-17 October 2014  
Currie Hall, Royal Military College of Canada  
Kingston, Ontario*

Symposium presentation topics may include: the role of defence/military diplomacy in conflict prevention; war mitigation and conflict resolution; Canada's past, current and future national security interests; Canada and alliances; insurgency and counter-insurgency; Canadian military campaigns and operations; peace support operations and conflict resolution; security and defence-related economics; intra-vs-inter-state conflict; aspects of security and defence privatization; cyber-terrorism/cyber-crime/cyber-espionage/cyber-war; terrorism and transnational crime.

Cash prizes of \$1,000, \$500 and \$250 will be presented to the top three presenters, who will also be offered an honorarium of \$2,000 each to develop their presentations for publication in a CDA Institute publication. An additional prize of \$750, the Colonel Peter Hunter Award will be presented by the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI). The recipient of the Colonel Peter Hunter Award will also be offered the opportunity to develop the paper into an RCMI publication.

Abstracts of proposed presentations from Masters and Doctoral students in the realm of security and defence are being accepted with the deadline for submission of 15 September. The final draft of presentation papers (maximum 4,000 words) must be submitted by no later than 29 September.

A limited number of travel grants are available to presenters for their travel to Kingston.

Please send all presentation abstracts with your institutional affiliation and contact information (no more than one page) by email to [policy@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:policy@cdainstitute.ca). For more information go to <http://cdainstitute.ca/en/symposium>

## APPEL A COMMUNICATIONS

**17e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés de l'Institut de la CAD «Les intérêts canadiens sur les questions de sécurité et de défense»**

*Jeudi et vendredi, le 16 et 17 octobre 2014  
Salle Currie, Collège militaire royal du Canada  
Kingston, Ontario*

Le thème central du Symposium, « Les intérêts canadiens sur les questions de la sécurité et la défense », offre aux intervenants un large choix de sujets dont voici quelques exemples parmi bien d'autres: Le rôle du militaire et du diplomate dans la prévention et le règlement des conflits; les intérêts canadiens du passé, d'aujourd'hui et de demain sur les questions de sécurité et de défense; le Canada et les alliances; l'insurrection et la contre-insurrection; les campagnes et les opérations militaires canadiennes; les opérations de paix et la résolution des conflits; l'économie et la sécurité et la défense; les conflits inter étatiques les conflits intra étatiques; la privatisation de responsabilités; le cyber terrorisme/cyber crime/cyber espionnage/la guerre cyber; le terrorisme et la criminalité transnationale.

Des prix de \$1000, \$500 et de \$250 seront présentés aux trois meilleurs intervenants à qui une prime additionnelle de \$2000 sera offerte pour la préparation d'un texte portant sur le sujet de leur intervention et qui sera publié dans une des revues de l'Institut de la CAD. Un prix additionnel de \$750, le Prix Colonel Peter Hunter, offert par le Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI), permettra au récipiendaire de préparer un texte, portant sur le sujet de son intervention, qui sera publié dans une revue du RCMI.


Les résumés de prestations des candidats diplômés seront acceptés au plus tard le 15 septembre. Le texte final de leur intervention ne devra pas dépasser 4000 mots et devra nous être soumis au plus tard le 29 septembre 2014.

Les candidats choisis pourront profiter d'un nombre limité de bourses de déplacements.

SVP faire parvenir par courriel votre résumé, votre affiliation (université, unité, etc.) vos coordonnées au [policy@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:policy@cdainstitute.ca). Pour plus de renseignements, visiter notre site Web <http://cdainstitute.ca/fr/symposium>.

# Remembering Fifty Years of Peacekeeping in Cyprus

by Rachael Bryson

 This March marks the 50th anniversary of Canada's contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Dating back to 1964, UNFICYP is one of both Canada and the UN's longest running operations. Over the five decades of service, more than 25000 Canadians have deployed to Cyprus and 28 Canadian Forces members have given their lives in the pursuit of peace and stability.

**G**reek and Turkish Cypriots have lived side-by-side on the small island for centuries. Greeks have had a presence on Cyprus since the Hellenic Period, but the island came under Turkish political rule following the end of Venetian control at the beginning of the 16th century. This continued until 1878 when the British took over the administration of Cyprus and formally annexed the country in 1914. The island nation was then a Crown Colony until 1959 when it became independent under the Zurich Agreements.

The independence of Cyprus, and more specifically its new constitution, had an immediate impact on the stability of the state. Under the new constitution the Turkish minority population was given broad rights in communal affairs and a veto in important government matters. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus from 1960-63, suggested 13 changes to the constitution in November 1963. These included removing the restrictive presidential and vice-presidential vetoes, providing greater unity in the House of Representatives, restricting the rights of the separate Turkish community, and reducing the Turkish representation in the police force, armed service, and civil service.

These suggested changes were wildly unpopular and led to the resignation of much of Makarios' government, including his Turkish vice-president. Ethnic tensions rose and violence broke out between the two communities on 21 December 1963. The conflict quickly escalated out of government control.

## THE PEACEKEEPING SOLUTION

Finding a solution to the conflict in Cyprus



Minister of Veterans Affairs Julian Fantino with a group of ten Canadian veterans of the Cyprus peacekeeping mission, Robert Peck, High Commissioner of Canada to the Republic of Cyprus, and Colonel Larry Zaporzan, on the steps of the Cyprus Presidential Palace.

Photo: Andrew Caballero-Reynolds, <http://www.ACRphotographer.com>

was a slow process. An initial meeting of the UN Security Council did not result in action, and two options for intervention without the UN were rejected by all parties. The Cypriots demonstrated a willingness to accept an international solution, yet both demanded that it would not be at the hands of either Greece or Turkey.

Finally, through a series of UN Security Council meetings from 18 February to 4 March 1964 a resolution was reached to create a peacekeeping force to stabilize the conflicted island for three months. The force was mandated to “use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as

necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions” in Cyprus.

Canada played an integral role in the formation of the original peacekeeping force. Answering the call for volunteer states, 1,087 Canadian soldiers were swiftly deployed to Cyprus. Canada and the United Kingdom, with its more than 2,700 soldiers, were the first two member states of UNFICYP to become operational on 27 March 1964. They were quickly joined by Swedish and Finnish forces, and followed later by Irish, Austrian, and Danish support. By June 1964 some 6,411 UN peacekeepers had brought a delicate balance to the island.

This “temporary” solution remained in place until 1974.

#### OPERATION SNOWGOOSE

UNFICYP had clearly extended its mandate beyond the originally intended three months, and the resolve of the peacekeeping force was tested greatly in July 1974. On 15 July 1974 Greek Cypriots favouring a union with Greece led a coup d'état. This was responded to on 20 July by a Turkish invasion of the island. Turkish forces were able to gain control of the northern part of the island even as Canadian peacekeepers from 1 Commando, Airborne Regiment responded to the conflict, supported by rapidly deployed 2 Commando and 3 Commando, to protect the citizens of Cyprus from widespread violence in what became Operation SNOWGOOSE. One Canadian soldier was killed and 17 injured in July and August 1974 before a ceasefire agreement could be reached. Operation Snowgoose is one of the first instances of Canadian peacekeepers using force to protect themselves, and an early recorded use of guerrilla tactics to protect the airport, making it seem as though there were more forces protecting it than were actually available.

Following the resurgence of violence, an initial (and never formalized) ceasefire was agreed to with lines dividing the island, separating Turkish Cypriots in the north from Greek Cypriots in the south. The mandate of UNFICYP was changed to include maintaining the delicate ceasefire lines and a buffer zone that crosses the island. The buffer zone, which follows the ceasefire lines, stretches 180 kilometres across the island. The buffer zone is as wide as 7 kilometres in some areas, and as narrow as 20 metres in urban areas. In addition to the sheer size of this neutral zone, it contains some of Cyprus' most fertile land, and thus requires extensive observation and patrol, leading to the continued permanent presence of UN peacekeepers.

Operation SNOWGOOSE continues to this day. Until 15 June 1993 Canada maintained a battalion-sized contingent of peacekeepers on Cyprus, and today one member of the Canadian Armed Forces serves as a peacekeeper at UNFICYP in Nicosia. UNFICYP and police officers in Cyprus still respond to hundreds of incidents each year.

#### COMMEMORATION

March 2014 marked the 50th anniversary of Canadian peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus. Over the course of those 50 years 28 Canadian soldiers lost their lives for the peace and stability of the Mediterranean island. Over 25,000 Canadian soldiers in 58 rotations served in Cyprus. To mark the occasion a delegation of ten veterans, accompanied by Minister of Veterans Affairs Julian Fantino, visited Cyprus and took part in commemorative activities as part of UN Day on Cyprus. The delegation also had the chance to meet with the last returning Canadian soldiers from Afghanistan, who were in Cyprus for decompression. ■

| Rachael Bryson is an Analyst with the CDA Institute. She is pursuing a PhD at Carleton University, where her studies focus on Canadian defence decision making, civil-military relations, and national defence. Rachael holds an MSS from the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and a BA from the University of Ottawa.

# A Focus on South Lebanon

by Major Richard Little

✿ *Whenever the news over the past several decades mentioned Lebanon, it was always war that brought it to the attention to anyone in the west. The United Nations (UN) has deployed several forces to the region in order to help the region stabilise enough for the Lebanese government to be able to provide its own security and usher in peace to the region. Canada has been a full participant in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) since its inception in 1949 and continues to support the oldest peacekeeping mission through the provision of seven UN Military Observers (UNMO) to observe the boundaries between Israel and its neighbours. One of the principle areas where Canada's UNMOs operate is in south Lebanon.*

**D**espite years of operating in south Lebanon, there is very little that is passed down from UNMO to UNMO about the history, religion and culture in the area. The large issues, such as the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, are easy to research and one can gain a perspective on the strategic and political situations that existed at that time. However, this sort of research does very little to prepare the Canadian UNMO to interact with the people of south Lebanon itself. A little knowledge in history, religion and culture can go a long way to reduce the culture shock and prepare the UNMO to work in this interesting region.

South Lebanon is well known throughout history. It has several references in the Bible, most notably for the friendship between King Solomon of Israel and King Hiram of Tyre, and for the quality and quantity of its cedar wood. This wood is so important to the Lebanese identity that it is its national symbol and is found on its flag. At this time, south Lebanon was the home of part of the Phoenician Empire. These seafaring traders grew incredibly wealthy by trading all throughout the Mediterranean. The centre of commerce was Tyre, which was an island in the Mediterranean Sea, and is currently the location of the residences for all UNMOs working with UNTSO. The Phoenician influence is still felt as many Lebanese people consider themselves the descendants of the people of that empire.



The downfall of the Phoenician Empire came at the hands of Alexander the Great. As Tyre's fortress was located on an island off the coast of Lebanon, Alexander ordered a causeway built that allowed his siege machines to be used in conjunction with his fleets to overcome the defenders and conquer the once invincible island. With Tyre defeated, Alexander went on to conquer the remainder of the region and beyond.

Alexander's impact is still felt in the region today. Nevertheless, after the Greeks, the Romans took the region by force. Much of the famed archaeology found in south Lebanon today is testament to the Roman conquest and development of the region. Within Tyre, one can find the Hippodrome (the largest outside of Rome), a funerary complex, a marketplace, an industrial complex, and a water distribution complex. Further afield, you can find defences, aqueducts, temples and residences. The eventual adoption of Christianity by the Romans had a considerable impact on the population of Lebanon. Many Christians in the country can trace their religious ancestry through some of the oldest denominations in Christianity.

After the prophet Mohammed died, his forces continued their conquest. As Jerusalem was being conquered, military forces moved northwards and conquered Lebanon and Syria, and moved into Turkey. These forces laid the foundation for much of the religious presence one can find in the region today. Language, religion, law and custom changed considerably from the Greco-Roman influenced society and much of it remains dominant today.

The presence of Islam in the Holy Land incited a movement in Europe to conquer the region through Crusades. Several were mounted, moved and fought into the Holy Land, eventually capturing Jerusalem. While Jerusalem was the prize, history would not see it remain in Crusader hands for very long. Tyre, thus, became the principal city for Crusader government in the region, being called at one time the capital of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Crusaders built throughout the region – a Cathedral in Tyre, several large military castles in the mountains (Beaufort, Nimrod, Tibnin), and several smaller forts to protect religious pilgrims along the routes to the south (Blackguards, Hunin). Many of these remain today and some were used for centuries after their Crusader builders left.

Eventually, the military capability to defend against sustained Muslim attack was worn down, and the Crusaders were finally driven from the region. Muslim rule remained uninterrupted for the next several centuries. It was the conflict from 1914 to 1918 that next saw major change in the region. At the end of the war, the treaties that were drawn up saw the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In 1923, the region was partitioned between two countries, and each given a Mandate. The British Mandate consisted of Palestine and Transjordan, while the French Mandate consisted of Syria and Lebanon. The French brought considerable influence to the region through language, culture, European sophistication,

military organization, governmental structure and the constitution. The Lebanese people adapted quite rapidly. Lebanese society was 50 percent Christian (dominated by Maronites, but considerable numbers of Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and increasing number of Armenian Christians) and 50 percent Muslim (split pretty evenly between Shia and Sunni). The Christian portion of the population largely looked west to Europe for their influences while the Muslim populations likewise looked east to the heart of Arabia. The constitution was ratified along this breakdown, making the President of Lebanon forever a Maronite Christian, and any government department staffed at 50 percent Christian and 50 percent Muslim.

This 1923 Mandate survived until the fall of France in the Second World War. With the establishment of the Vichy government, the French mandate fell under the Vichy regime. British and Australian forces in Palestine were ordered to create a corridor from Jerusalem through south Lebanon, into Syria and on to British controlled Iraq in order for oil to be moved to the Mediterranean Sea. The Vichy French were ordered to prevent the corridor. The resulting major battle fought in Lebanon and Syria saw several tough engagements, one Australian Victoria Cross and an open corridor for oil. Following the battle, the people of Lebanon pursued independence, which was granted in 1943.

In 1948, the state of Israel was created from Palestine within the British Mandate. The war that year saw massive evictions, invasions, deaths and the introduction of UN forces to monitor the truce signed to establish the boundaries of Israel. UNTSO deployed its UNMOs to observe the lines separating the people of Israel and the people of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. The UNMOs have been consistently present and observing during the fighting of 1967, 1973 and 2006, the fighting of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon into Israel from 1968-1982, the Lebanese Civil War from 1975-1990, from the occupation of south Lebanon by the Israel Defense Forces from 1982-2000, the occupation of Lebanon by Syrian forces from 1976-2005 and throughout 65 years of tension.

UNMOs are highly trained unarmed officers who have the skills to make observations, negotiate and report on what is occurring along the boundary between Israel and Lebanon. Some background information provided to them prior to deployment can easily assist in the transition from life in Canada, to life among the people in south Lebanon. ■

**| Major Richard Little joined the military in 1988 as a Reserve Artillery officer and transferred to the Regular Force in 1994. He has deployed several times throughout his career including Bosnia, Afghanistan and his recent tour to Lebanon. He is currently posted to NDHQ in Ottawa.**

●●●●●●●●●●  
***Tyre, thus, became  
the principal city for  
Crusader government  
in the region,  
being called at one  
time the capital of  
the Kingdom of  
Jerusalem.***

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# China's Military Transformation: Past Drivers, Current Strategies, and Future Directions

by Shakir Chambers

 This paper examines China's military transformation since 1991 and seeks to address three questions. First, what were some of the drivers for China's modernization? Second, how have Chinese military planners incorporated the notion of "informatization" (i.e. a heavy emphasis on information superiority on the battlefield), and Anti-Access/Area Denial into their military planning? Third, how has China's military transformation affected Asia-Pacific security and America's presence in the region?

One must credit China's continued strong economic growth for its current military modernization efforts. China has devoted significant capital to its military transformation efforts with the leadership in Beijing increasing military spending by an average of roughly 10 percent every year since the 1990s. With much focus granted to the improvement of China's armed forces, China has unveiled its first aircraft carrier and intends to develop its first indigenous aircraft carrier within this decade. Due to the military advancements of other nations around the globe China, too, has sought to incorporate information technology into its strategic doctrine and the mainland's military transformation has further reinforced China's intentions to be seen as a regional and global power. Indeed, as China increases in military strength, a common view is that China's rise will eventually convince the United States that it cannot maintain its current military position in the Pacific. To comprehend China's military transformation, one must understand some drivers for China's military efforts.

This article examines China's military transformation since 1991 by exploring three central questions: 1) What were the drivers of China's military modernization? 2) How have concepts of "informatization" and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) been incorporated into China's military planning? 3) Looking forward, how can one interpret

China's military transformation with its expanding conception of national interest?

China's drive to modernize its military can be traced to two major events: the 1991 Gulf War (the First Gulf War) and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The First Gulf War awoke the Chinese to the sizable gap between their military capabilities and those of advanced, industrialized countries, and the Taiwan Crisis provided urgency for People's Liberation Army (PLA) planners to prevent foreign interference in matters central to China's national interest.

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***China has unveiled its first aircraft carrier and intends to develop its first indigenous aircraft carrier within this decade.***

## THE FIRST GULF WAR

During the first Gulf War, the US-led military coalition achieved a stunningly quick victory over Iraqi forces. This came as a surprise to many PLA strategists as they had anticipated a protracted conflict with the United States suffering significant combat losses. Chinese assessments were well wide of the mark, and such miscalculations introduced the Chinese to the changes that were taking place in modern warfare, primarily through the use of information technology.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, America's battlefield successes triggered an internal reassessment within the Chinese military that emphasized strengthening the PLA with scientific and technological advancements in pursuit of a military revolution with Chinese characteristics. The fulfillment of this reassessment is evidenced today by the PLA's acquisition and integration of advanced

military and information technologies, as well as doctrinal reassessments, and important organizational reforms, such as the continued reduction of China's armed forces, and increased professionalization of their forces.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the reduction in the size of China's armed forces, the PLA remained a predominately land-oriented force. However, following the first Gulf War, China embarked on a broader conception of national security. For the first time, the Chinese moved away from a strict preoccupation with internal security—defending the mainland—and underscored the need to possess capabilities to ensure a "favourable peripheral environment."<sup>3</sup> This presupposed more advanced air, naval, missile, communications, and intelligence assets, and increased competence and experience in utilizing these capabilities. Absent a specific threat, however, these efforts lack direction and momentum.

## THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS 1995-1996

The Taiwan Strait Crisis provided greater urgency for the PLA and its military modernization efforts. In short, the PLA's military exercises opposite Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 (e.g. the testing of unarmed short-range ballistic missiles) provoked a major military response from the United States with Washington deploying two carrier battle groups east of Taiwan. The details of this event are unnecessary here, but it is important to note the longer-term effects that this event set in motion. For the Chinese, US interference in cross-strait relations validated their belief that America was prepared to intervene in matters of defining importance to China's national interests. Taiwan had

always provided the initial impetus for China's military development and with the United States becoming a major factor in matters of great importance to the mainland, China had to now plan for situations where US power was a factor, as well as those scenarios where it was not.<sup>4</sup> Such planning is more fully materialized today through China's development of A2/AD capabilities.

#### CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION: INFORMATIZATION AND ANTI-ACCESS/ AREA DENIAL

The Asia-Pacific is a maritime theatre and much has been written about China's rising naval power.<sup>5</sup> But, based on the events that drove China's military transformation, the notion of "informatization" and the strategy of A2/AD will receive greater attention below.

#### INFORMATIZATION

Throughout China's Defence White Papers there is a clear emphasis on preparing the armed forces for winning local wars under the conditions of informatization, and enhancing the PLA's warfighting capabilities based on information systems.<sup>6</sup> Within this strategy, the PLA believes that in this era, information superiority is power. This, of course, stems from the notion that today's militaries rely on computer networks on the battlefield. The Chinese take seriously the concept of network-centric warfare advanced by the US Department of Defense in the 1990s. Therefore, if information can serve as a competitive advantage on the battlefield, China has sought to expose the vulnerabilities of this military doctrine, and it is not lost on the minds of US military planners that China's military transformation is aimed at countering US capabilities.<sup>7</sup> Information is not confined to technology, and the Chinese have heard many calls for them to increase transparency during their modernization efforts. However, if information is power, and information provides superiority and battlefield advantages, then a lack of transparency can also be viewed as a military strategy, a deterrent of sorts, which cultivates uncertainty about the PRC's precise intentions and induces caution among its adversaries.

The PLA understands that the information age creates new opportunities to target an enemy's resolve. In a world in which

nuclear weapons are unusable, the threat or actual use of cyber attacks and information warfare can target an enemy's resolve, disrupt information flows, and, consequently, cause considerable damage to infrastructure or result in battlefield losses. For instance, in a future conflict scenario, part of the Chinese strategy would emphasize striking at an enemy's ability to maintain information flows (e.g. affecting "jointness"), while keeping one's own communications secure. This would be the key to gaining a war-winning advantage in conflicts to come.<sup>8</sup>

#### ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL (A2/AD)

In line with the emphasis on information superiority, "disruption" of an attacker's capability is also prominent in China's military modernization. For instance, the decision in January 2007 by China to shoot down one of its own weather satellites constituted a warning to the United States that its systems were vulnerable in any future Taiwan contingency. The development of other such systems by China including a supposed anti-ship ballistic missile (the first of its kind), hypersonic cruise missiles, and other such systems are specifically targeted at US naval platforms.<sup>9</sup> The United States has taken note of this, and America's Pacific planners have undergone a serious rethinking of their military assets in the region, as shown by the basing of US Marines in Australia, the basing of US naval elements in Singapore, and the consideration of facilities in Vietnam and the Philippines.<sup>10</sup>

By advancing its A2/AD strategy China has rightfully placed an emphasis on strategic-asymmetry. The United States is the greatest military power the world has ever known. China realizes this, which precludes any objectives to attain across-the-board military parity with the United States; rather, in accordance with the notion of informatization, the PLA is focusing its concepts and military development on certain areas which could considerably degrade an adversary's capabilities.<sup>11</sup>

To that end, China's A2/AD strategy centres on scenarios in which US power will be a force. It aims to deny America the opportunity to bring its superior military strength into a contest area, and prevent the United States from

operating freely and maximizing its power in the Asia-Pacific (e.g. in another Taiwan Strait Crisis, or a clash in the South or East China Seas). Preventing regional access for a military power that China cannot otherwise defeat was one of the primary lessons learned from both the First Gulf War and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

#### LOOKING AHEAD: CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Chinese strategists have learned their lessons throughout the 1990s and have incorporated information technology into their military strategies while advancing the concept of "Anti-Access/Area Denial" in order to keep foreign forces from intervening in Asia-Pacific affairs. China's military modernization has had a profound impact on Asia-Pacific affairs and the global military balance. There are a few final points that should be highlighted in terms of China's military modernization and protecting its national interests.

Taiwan has always been the main priority of China's military development. However, as China rises in all other dimensions, the mainland aims to link its military power with its economic reach. Therefore, China is looking beyond the straits. The late 2013 announcement of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, and territorial claims in the East and South China Seas epitomize China's expansive conception of its national interest.<sup>12</sup> Even as China's economic growth slows, its military spending remains high. This can be legitimated, however, under the claim that China's military growth is moving in unison with its economic might. For example, energy imports are a major consideration for the leadership in Beijing. China's hunger for food, raw materials, energy, and other resources has encouraged the PLA to consider various strategies for securing access to China's resource needs. Mirroring its military development, China has global economic interests to protect and these include shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, strategically important straits, and oil resources in the Middle East and along the coasts of Africa.<sup>13</sup> During the Second World War, the United States was able to blockade the straits and stop energy imports to Japan. This is not lost in the mind of the Chinese and, therefore, safeguarding shipping lanes remains a high priority for China's military planning.

Much has been made about China deploying

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*China's A2/AD  
 strategy centres on  
 scenarios in which  
 US power will be a  
 force.*

its first aircraft carrier (the Liaoning) and seeking to develop its first indigenous carrier, along with four indigenous carriers in the coming decades. While there are various limitations to the current carrier—such as the use of a “ski jump” ramp rather than a catapult for aircraft take off, which means it cannot launch aircrafts with a full load of weapons or fuel. This will result in limited range and strike ability. One must also consider how China will incorporate its other emerging capabilities (air- and space-based) with its carrier capabilities. The ability to do this may be a true game-changer for China’s navy.

Related to this, China is getting increasingly comfortable with conducting operations

beyond its ‘near-seas’ and learning how to sustain a force away from home thanks to its involvement in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. And while transparency is likely to remain an issue for some time, China has offered to give a tour of its aircraft carrier to the US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel. The Chinese seem to be making the statement that the expansion of the PLAN should not cause alarm to China’s neighbours, as the PRC depends on the seas to sustain its economic life. Accordingly, it is only logical that China attempt to develop a first-class navy.<sup>14</sup>

China’s military transformation will continue. And if its aim is to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific, then

American policymakers are confronted with a scenario that could define great power relations in the 21st century: China is rising, and the Asia-Pacific is evolving into an environment where the United States may not be able to assume unambiguous strategic dominance. If this is the case, is America prepared to accept such a future? If not, what does America intend to do about it? The status quo appears to be in flux. ■

**| Shakir Chambers is a second-year PhD student in Political Science at Carleton University who has spent time in China. Shakir’s research focuses on North America’s foreign and security relations with the Asia-Pacific region. He is a former junior analyst with the CDA Institute.**

<sup>1</sup>See, Dennis J. Blasko, *The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>2</sup>You Ji, *The Armed Forces of China* (I.B. Tauris, 1999), 32-34.

<sup>3</sup>Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *China-US Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions* (New York: Routledge), 33.

<sup>4</sup>See, Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” *International Security*, 25, 2 (Fall 2000): 87-123, esp. 120; and, Arthur Ding, “The Lesson of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Developing a New Strategy toward the United States and Taiwan.” In Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel (eds.), *The Lesson of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003): 379-402.

<sup>5</sup>For a good overview see, Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” *International Security*, 34, 2 (Fall 2009): 46-81.

<sup>6</sup>This has been a continual theme since, at least 2004. See, China’s National Defence 2004, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/> (accessed 2 February 2014); and China’s latest report, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c\\_132312681\\_2.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681_2.htm) (accessed 2 February 2014), esp. Section II. “Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces.”

<sup>7</sup>James C. Mulvenon, Murray Scot Tanner, Michael S. Chase, David Frelinger, David C. Gompert, Martin C. Libicki, Kevin L. Pollpeter, *Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense* (Santa Monica: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2006); Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33, 4 (August 2010), 486, 488, 498.

<sup>8</sup>John Arquilla, “Beijing’s ‘Bitskrieg,’” *Foreign Policy*, 13 May 2003, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/beijings\\_bitskrieg](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/beijings_bitskrieg) (accessed 14 May 2013).

<sup>9</sup>John Hemmings, “China: America Hedges Its Bets,” *The National Interest*, 6 December 2013, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-america-hedges-its-bets-9510?page=3> (accessed 10 January 2014); “China tests hypersonic missile vehicle,” *The Guardian*, 16 January 2014.

<sup>10</sup>See, Jackie Calmes, “A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China,” *The New York Times*, 16 November 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) (accessed 22 February 2014); David Axe, “US Eyes Singapore Base,” *The Diplomat*, 6 June 2011, <http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/us-eyes-singapore-base/> (accessed 22 February 2014); Dan de Luce, “Gates: New Weapons For ‘Robust’ U.S. Role In Asia,” *DefenseNews*, 3 June 2011, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110603/DEFSECT04/106030304/Gates-New-Weapons-For-Robust-U-S-Role-In-Asia> (accessed 22 February 2014); “U.S.-Vietnam Naval Exercises Begin Amid Sea Tensions,” *Bloomberg*, 8 April 2014, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-07/u-s-vietnam-naval-exercises-begin-amid-sea-tension.html> (accessed 10 April 2014).

<sup>11</sup>Adm. Jonathan Greenert, and Gen. Mark Welsh, “Breaking the Kill Chain,” *Foreign Policy*, 16 May 2013, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking\\_the\\_kill\\_chain\\_air\\_sea\\_battle#shash.WyI00Rq0.1gXNKItB.dpbs](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle#shash.WyI00Rq0.1gXNKItB.dpbs) (accessed 15 February 2014).


<sup>12</sup>Hou Qiang, “Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.,” *Xinhuanet*, 23 November 2013, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c\\_132911634.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm) (accessed 2 March 2014). For a brief overview of Sino-Japanese tensions in the East and South China Seas, see, “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” *International Crisis Group: Crisis Group Asia Report*, No. 245, 8 April 2013.

<sup>13</sup>Erica S. Downs, “China-Middle East Energy Relations,” *Brookings Institute*, 6 June 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/06/06-china-middle-east-energy-downs> (accessed 3 April 2014); David H. Shinn, “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 10 April 2014, <https://csis.org/story/africa-china-united-states-and-oil> (accessed 10 April 2014).

<sup>14</sup>Stew Magnuson, “China’s Navy Takes Great Leap Forward,” *National Defense*, 27 March 2014, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/April/Pages/China%E2%80%99sNavyTakesGreatLeapForward.aspx> (accessed 27 March 2014); US defence chief Hagel tours China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier,” *BBC News: Asia*, 7 April 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26917693> (accessed 7 April 2014).

# Who Should Watch the Watchers? Disruptive Innovation and the Digital Divide

by Colonel Jeff Tasseron (Ret'd)

 *While the initial outcry has subsided over Snowden revelations that CSEC had tested metadata collection and analysis techniques in a Canadian airport, the increasing maturity and prevalence of the technologies involved makes a recurrence of the debate virtually inevitable. In this article, Jeff Tasseron suggests that rather than perpetuating an emotive and unsophisticated discussion of how to balance personal privacy and national security considerations, crafting sound policy around this unique and critically important issue demands a more informed and pragmatic approach than has been the case thus far.*

There has been more than a hint of the disingenuous in the recently rekindled debate regarding Canadians' privacy rights, oversight of our national security and communications apparatus, and the ethical challenges inherent in developing and testing metadata tools allowing the movements and behaviour of citizens to be tracked.

After all, it was only days before the Ontario Privacy Commissioner appeared on television, metaphorically wringing her hands over the admittedly thorny legal ambiguity of government agencies conducting metadata surveillance, that the *Globe and Mail's* February 2014 Report on Business published the (not so) shocking revelation that smart companies all over the world are investing in advanced customer tracking and analytic technologies. An entire cottage industry is rapidly growing up around electronic surveillance and data exploitation. Since the programming and data analysis technologies required are becoming more accessible all the time, it bears many of the hallmarks of a veritable cottage industry. It is well known by even casual observers that metadata analysis, formerly the exclusive province of governments and large computing and communications firms, is now trickling down and becoming more widely commoditized. This makes the hue and cry over alleged improprieties by the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) all the more puzzling – not because the question of who should watch the watchers isn't worth asking, but because the foundation of the debate appears so patently unsophisticated.

When considering the growth of these tools, a fairly standard disruptive path is evident. Well-known technologies (wireless access points, cell phones, and software analytic tools) have become mature and omnipresent, thereby exposing new opportunities for combined use that is incidental to their original purpose. Beginning with specialized, niche service providers, market forces are driving interest and wider commercial adoption in a self-reinforcing cycle, raising the level of the associated technologies and processes, while spinning off previously unconsidered business opportunities. And like all truly disruptive innovations, big data and real time analytics are actually undermining an existing 'market': in this case, the perversely comforting 'monopoly' our public security institutions used to have over surveillance and modelling of our activities. Though the tools and techniques are gaining in maturity and prevalence, their application is certainly not new. Metadata analysis has been chugging

along in the background behind commercial decision-making for years, shaping business practices across sectors as diverse as the insurance industry, air travel, and web marketing. From unsettling ads that echo our web surfing habits, to book purchase suggestions that aggregate the buying habits of thousands, to plane tickets sold within moments of each other for hundreds of dollars in price difference – all function with the aid of sophisticated algorithms created to tease meaning and mercantile advantage from the seeming chaos of our virtual environment.

One might even suggest that our national security apparatus is actually late to the game. Do we really believe that the companies that place and maintain routers and cell phone towers in public places haven't been monitoring how their products are being used, and by whom? With respect to the powers of 'big data', would we really want our credit card companies to give up monitoring our spending patterns for the tell-tale signs of theft or fraud? And are we really less comfortable with the news that our national security agencies are taking an interest in these technologies, than we are with the idea that private companies have been doing exactly the same thing for quite some time? Perhaps the real question is not whether CSEC should be testing its tracking algorithms in Canadian airports, but why it has taken them this long to get such tools in place.

There is also an interesting generational quality to this discussion, which in some ways parallels the evolution of the technologies involved. From the humble origins of watch lists on banned library books in the 1950s, to wiretaps and cameras in space through the 1970s, it would appear that each generation must acclimate to a degree of Orwellian fear as new technologies enter the market. In the 1990s, it was the proliferation of security cameras and visual monitoring systems. After the millennium, email security and privacy became the hot button topics. Now, the source of fear appears to be the dawning realization that the real power lies not in knowing what individuals may be up to, but in being able to discern macro patterns of thought and action, and in assembling chains of causality from the digital breadcrumbs we let fall with every moment we spend interacting within our electronic universe. Maybe the true generational difference is that while they might not like being tracked any more than their predecessors, today's digital natives understand that the widening penetration of metadata analysis systems and techniques leads inexorably

towards a future where everybody, and therefore nobody, can be Big Brother.


In the meantime, there is no doubt that we need to have a thoughtful and pragmatic conversation about who should watch the watchers, and how best the legitimate concerns of privacy and public security might be balanced. The technologies in question are only going to become more effective, more easily accessible, and more prevalent. At the same time, it must be recognized that we are living in an environment where the lines between commercial competition and national security are increasingly blurred, and where access to and exploitation of data is the strategic high ground for companies, countries, and criminals alike. The issue therefore merits our careful attention, because it affects all of us. When anybody with a cell phone, a computer, a modern car, a pacemaker, a smart fridge or a fitness tracker becomes an involuntarily accessible node in a vast and ever-changing stream of data, we should be concerned about how the information is being collected and used. Not because it offends hazy notions of what constitutes 'privacy' in the electronic age, but because we recognize that the ready availability (and potential abuse) of metadata information represents a new and tangible force that may be used by others to shape what we do in our daily lives, often with only our peripheral awareness.

Therefore the sooner we dispense with the hyperbole and mock outrage surrounding much of the discussion thus far (a great deal of which must seem incomprehensibly anachronistic as well as hopelessly naïve to anybody accustomed to living in the present), the quicker we can get to the real issue of how we need to adapt our oversight and legal frameworks to deal with disruptive innovation in this sector. The best place to start the debate is from a practical and sophisticated perspective, preferably one that eschews theatrics and unrealistic notions that this particular genie can be stuffed back into the bottle, but which is also informed by a clearer idea of what capabilities and potentials exist. This is not a suitable subject matter for bland bureaucratic evasions and comforting platitudes. After all, this is hardly the last time we will need to think about how public institutions should evolve in the face of technological progress – if we think crafting sound public policy around metadata surveillance is hard, just wait for ubiquitous supercomputing, bathtub genomics, and garage nanotechnology. ■

| Colonel Jeff Tasseron (retired) is a Naval Aviator and the former Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff under General Walt Natynczyk. He was a key contributor to the 2011 Report on Transformation ("The Leslie Report") and also served as Director of Joint C4ISR systems in the Chief of Force Development organization.

# Security Education and Emerging Challenges

by Dr. David Last

 *The world's countries invest a lot in educating military, paramilitary, and police leaders at entry, mid-career and senior officer levels. A research group at the Royal Military College of Canada has been working since 2009 with a nascent community of educators to understand and improve security education around the world. Here Dr. Last discusses emerging security challenges, security education, and the communities of security professionals being shaped by education.*

**S**tabilization missions after the Cold War—Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and the Congo—have a mixed record, but on the whole have cost less and achieved more than the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Russian assertiveness in the margins of the old Soviet Union, and the new axis of authoritarianism in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) seem to threaten renewed Cold War competition. But this is a distraction from other serious and long-term security challenges, which may provide common security objectives.

If America's abortive war on terror and the long campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us anything, it was the limits of military power, for any state. But big states and their wars are a small part of global security. Only 11 of 193 UN members have populations over 100 million. Canada is one of 162 states with populations under 40 million. Most of the world's people, wealth, land area, territorial ocean space, and stable and unstable areas fall into this group of "majority countries" along with Canada. They produced more than half of the world's citable documents (a proxy for new knowledge) between 1996 and 2012: about 14 million to 13 million for the top 11 by population. These states are also the majority troop and police contributors for multinational missions, hold the majority of votes in international organizations, and take the lead in institutional developments like the International Criminal Court. Most of them understand that they cannot achieve security unilaterally – a point sometimes lost on the largest powers prone to unilateral action.

Emerging security challenges can be addressed neither unilaterally nor by military force, yet military and police actions are becoming a central part of the new security architecture for emerging challenges, and require more sophisticated education.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a good place to start a discussion of emerging security challenges: "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal...the atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased." Extreme weather events, including heat waves, heavy precipitation, draughts, cyclones, and high sea levels have all increased since 1950 and are likely to continue to do so. Rising temperatures will challenge food production, and

rising sea levels will challenge growing urban areas in coastal planes.

Energy consumption will increase as China and India improve living standards. Increased consumption hastens climate change and increases pressure on dwindling fuel stocks. Trade will suffer from higher transport costs. The interaction of population, resources, and technology seems to be pushing us towards conflict. Good governance and social stability are essential to finding solutions. Without solutions, populations die or move, and survival migration destabilizes neighbours and disrupts economies.

Amongst transnational challenges, terrorism gets more attention than it deserves. It threatens governments only indirectly and kills far fewer people than traffic accidents or chronic disease. Insurgencies that create rival centres of political power, organized criminal networks that challenge economic systems, and corporations that damage the environment and defy government taxation and regulation are growing challenges for many states.

Frozen conflicts abound and can descend quickly to violence. Migration, ideology and resource demands influence groups' calculations, but combining new ways of waging war are novel: social media, information operations, special forces infiltration, manipulation of neighbouring states and international organizations, and cyber warfare. Conflict with indigenous populations and land disputes are also evolving.

At sea, maritime choke points, piracy, conflict over renewable and non-renewable maritime resources, and environmental problems like toxic dumping and pollution promise to be continuing sources of conflict. Security demands leaders who understand complex chains of cause and effect and who can plan to address them. Effective professionals might make the difference between vicious cycles of conflict and decline, and virtuous cycles of stability and problem solving. Neither domestic nor international violence is inevitable, but it

will take knowledge and skill to avoid it, and better evidence about what works in the pursuit of security. Our security leaders will need sophisticated knowledge of politics, economic, and society, and a good understanding of the rest of the world.

### SECURITY EDUCATION AROUND THE WORLD

Socialization (the inculcation of values, attitudes and beliefs), training (transfer of specific skills and abilities) and education (developing habits of mind and tools for enquiry) are always found together. Our study focuses on education, including critical thinking and problem solving, because we think it shapes not only perception of security problems, but also the ability to conceive and execute solutions. The world survived the Cold War partly because strategic thinkers and military leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain developed common understandings and approaches to nuclear deterrence.

At the heart of these epistemic communities for security are universities—with laboratories, libraries, research programs, graduate students and conferences—feeding government policy and options. Universities are the main vehicles for generating, retaining, and transmitting new knowledge. When medical and engineering knowledge began a meteoric rise in the nineteenth century, leading to many of the wonders we live with today, the engines of innovations were partnerships between practitioners and universities including teaching hospitals and research laboratories. Military universities and staff colleges also date back to the 19th century, and have evolved with the professions since then, with a focus on war fighting and the application of force. Our focus is on the contemporary distribution and impact of university-like institutions for security education, at entry, mid-career, and senior officer levels.

More of the world's military and police academies and staff colleges are now aspiring to university status or to greater educational



Cadets of the National Defence University of Malaysia, with Professor Ananthan and Professor Last, both retired Lieutenant-Colonels.  
Photo courtesy of the author

content in officer education, often bachelors degrees before commissioning and relevant masters degrees at mid-career level. The most common institutional pattern around the world is a joint mid-career staff college, but there are a lot of variations involving degree-granting aspirations and partnerships with civilian universities. Hungary, Romania, Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, Nepal, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia and Brazil are just some of the countries experimenting with ways to enhance the intellectual preparation of officers, offering new degree programs and incentives. Several motives are in play. Degrees confer social status, and are a recruiting incentive. But emerging security challenges like those listed above are often cited as justification for more mid-career study.

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than it deserves.*

Like 19th century doctors and nurses facing cholera and typhoid epidemics without a good understanding of hygiene and public health, security professionals in many countries today are becoming aware that they lack the knowledge to achieve security. Soldiers look to police tools, and police look to staff colleges. Staff colleges focusing on operational planning for formations based on imported doctrine are losing ground to new curricula. In an informal survey of mid-career officers from 19 countries, about one-third identified a decline in the relevance of conventional operations compared to their time as junior officers, and two-



thirds perceived an increase in the time spent on unconventional tasks, including operations other than war, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, disaster assistance, and stabilization missions.

One of the biggest changes is the increasing number of staff colleges requiring graduate-level research papers, combining mid-career experience with theory. This makes new data available to security practitioners. Both the collected knowledge and the research skills these projects engender in majority countries are important for addressing emerging challenges. We can expect majority countries to make a disproportionate contribution to the evolving body of knowledge as this trend accelerates. Big states pursuing their own interests feel less urgency for innovation: powerful interests are served by the status quo; their size is fragmented by specialization that impedes integrated responses; and the relative abundance of resources sometimes delays expedient innovations and experiments. American doctrine is readily accessible almost everywhere and is often irrelevant because it is built on technology and organizations that majority countries will never have. Kenya and Nigeria have more experience with forced migration than any NATO country, and their majors and colonels are beginning to write about it.

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### EMERGING COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE

America remains the leading world power but is often impotent, disengaged, or outplayed by regional powers or local forces. Majority states seek security within regions. In less than a decade, the African Peace and Security Architecture has given shape to cooperation on subjects ranging from piracy and poaching to regional peacekeeping and infrastructure standards. ASEAN defence ministers have made progress on humanitarian assistance standards. The Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) now fields a combined task force with common doctrine and combined staff college exercises. The SCO offers a new authoritarian axis. Other regions, like central Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and parts of the post-Soviet fringe, remain intensely conflicted. These are challenges for security professionals, who need education and evidence-based practice to dig out from centuries of bloodletting in the name of peace and security. It demands data collection, observation, experimentation, and collaboration across disciplinary boundaries in the face of emerging challenges. More competent commanders for combat systems, satellites and drones may not be the answer. That seems to be the focus of military education in the world's big powers, but less so for the

world's majority states and for police and paramilitary organizations confronting emerging challenges.

At every military and police academy or staff college that I have communicated with, there are dedicated professionals who are passionate about research and teaching to improve their students' ability to meet new challenges. This is an emerging community of practice. Much of what we research and teach can be shared, compared, and improved for mutual benefit without risk to national security. The Global Security Education Project maintains a password-protected collaborative research space for this purpose, and now hosts more than 100 members from 20 countries—numbers growing monthly. How our security leaders are educated will have a big impact on whether they can rise to the emerging security challenges of the coming decades, and knowing more about global security education will help the world's majority countries to improve human, national, and international security. ■

| David Last served for 30 years in the Canadian Army. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College (BA), Carleton University (MA), London School of Economics (PhD), and the US Army Command and General Staff College (MMAS). He has been teaching at RMC in the Department of Political Science since 1999.

<sup>1</sup> SClmagojr, country comparison data compiled for 1996-2012. The gap is widening slowly. In 1996 the big 11 accounted for 49 per cent of all citable documents, and this shrank to 47 per cent by 2012. <sup>2</sup> T. F. Stocker, D. Qin, and G. K. Plattner. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Summary for Policymakers)* Printed October (2013), p. 4. <sup>3</sup> Stocker et al, op cit., Table SPM1. <sup>4</sup> J. Rubin, *Why your world is about to get a whole lot smaller*. Random House, 2009. <sup>5</sup> N. Choucri, and R.C. North, *Nations in conflict: National growth and international violence*. San Francisco: WH Freeman, 1975. <sup>6</sup> T.F. Homer-Dixon, "The ingenuity gap: Can poor countries adapt to resource scarcity? *Population and Development Review*, 21:3 (1995), 587-612. <sup>7</sup> Betts, 2013. <sup>8</sup> T. Risse-Kappen, "Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war," *International Organization*, 48 (1994), 185-214. <sup>9</sup> Martin L. Van Creveld, *The training of officers: from military professionalism to irrelevance*. Free Press, 1990. <sup>10</sup> David Last, David Emelifeonwu, and Max Langlois (2011) "Separate Worlds: a comparison of police and military education with deductions about common curriculum and education assistance," presented at the working group on blurring of police and military roles, 11th Biennial Conference of ERGOMAS, Amsterdam, 13-17 June. <sup>11</sup> Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*. Vol. 91. Cambridge University Press, 2003. <sup>12</sup> Wenger, Etienne. "Communities of practice: A brief introduction." [www.wenger-traynor.com](http://www.wenger-traynor.com) (2011). <sup>13</sup> [www.othree.ca/globalsecurity](http://www.othree.ca/globalsecurity), administered by David Last at RMCC and Paul Mitchell at CFC since November 2013.

# Mental Health Care and Support in the Canadian Armed Forces

Courtesy of the Chief of Military Personnel, Department of National Defence.



*This article is presented as a follow-up to the presentation by the Chief of Military Personnel at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Roundtable on Mental Health held in January 2014.*

*“There are many misconceptions about mental illness. There’s a stigma about it - and one that needs to go away. It’s not a weakness, a character flaw or something you can just suck up and get through. Like any other disease or a wound it needs treatment and it’s something you can recover from. Every day with treatment, support and help, people recover from mental illnesses.”*

These were the words from TV personality Rick Mercer in a video addressing the stigma of mental health in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In fact, one in five Canadians struggle with mental health problems, but the truth is CAF members are at an increased risk because of the work that they are required to do.

Mental health is a very complex issue, and maintaining the health of its members is critical to the CAF; thus, the mental health needs of CAF members is seen as a priority for the Government of Canada and CAF leadership.

In 2012, the Government of Canada announced an additional \$11.4 million in funding to enhance the CAF’s mental healthcare system. Since then, the CAF has procured high-definition tele-mental health technology to help accelerate care to remote locations and reduced the inconvenience of travel for care. Although the CAF is in competition with provincial healthcare for the mental health professionals that it needs, recruiting has paid off recently and DND is making significant progress in filling vacant mental health positions.

*“It’s this simple: mental health injuries need to be considered in the same light as physical injuries. They need professional treatment. Going forward, we’ll continue to improve the healthcare system and our members’ confidence in it; and continue to work with our colleagues at Veterans Affairs to improve the healthcare for both serving and retired members.”* – Chief of the Defence Staff, General Tom Lawson

Mental health care in the CAF is guided by evidence-based practices and is delivered through multidisciplinary teams including primary care clinicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health nurses, addictions counselors, and chaplains. Members are routinely assessed through regular medical check-ups and screened for issues related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, addiction, and suicide, among other mental health conditions.

The CAF has 26 mental health clinics at bases across Canada varying

in size depending on the population of the base they support. The services also range in size from psycho-social services provided through a social worker to operational trauma and stress support and addictions counseling.

In order to keep mental health a focus for its leadership and members, the CAF has developed the Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) program. Provided throughout the deployment cycle, this program combines classroom and interactive learning to help members understand the impact deployments can have, the importance of managing stress, potential challenges that may be encountered while deployed, the importance of values, beliefs and a social support system in mental readiness, and the role leadership and family members may have in supporting a member.

Canada deployed mental health professionals to Afghanistan, including uniformed psychiatrists, social workers, mental health nurses and chaplains, who provided care in both official languages. These teams had the ability to diagnose and treat mental illness with both psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy.

In order to support CAF members returning from overseas deployments, seven Operational Trauma and Stress Support Centres were established across the country. These facilities are centres of excellence in areas such as PTSD. The centres have four mandates — assessment, treatment, outreach and education, and research.

*“There’s a very large mental health education program where we teach early awareness, early recognition of distress but also some skills to help manage the demands placed on people and help people perform their jobs. But at the same time, through that education, which is throughout the career cycle and deployment cycle, we also let people know that there are certain things we can take care of on our own with respect to mental health, sort of the equivalent of a sprained ankle.”* - LCol Suzanne Bailey, Head Social Worker, Canadian Forces Health Services Group

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The CAF approach to care consists of more than solely the delivery of care to those who develop an illness or who have sustained an injury. It includes all elements of an organization that could support mental health.

One of the key service providers and coordinators to provide this support, from recovery to rehabilitation, is the Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU), which includes 24 Integrated Personnel Support Centres (IPSCs) located across the country. The JPSU provides focused, individual assistance and expedites access to CAF and Veterans Affairs programs, family support expertise, and peer support. It provides one-stop access to services and benefits, simplifying the process for members seeking assistance. It reduces the potential for gaps and overlaps, and the potential for confusion among service providers. Specifically, the JPSU performs the following core functions:

- return to work program coordination;
- casualty support outreach delivery;
- casualty tracking;
- casualty administrative and advocacy services;
- military leadership, supervision, and administrative support to personnel who are posted to the JPSU; and
- liaison with military family resource centers, local base support representatives and local unit commanding officers.

In order to perform these vital functions, the IPSCs house service managers, platoon staff, family liaison officers and Veterans Affairs staff. These personnel coordinate the provision of family, spiritual, social, and financial support services. This collaboration has greatly facilitated the comprehensive care for CAF members and their families. Staff members are extremely dedicated and compassionate and do everything possible to ensure a smooth transition for those who are leaving the CAF.

The JPSU also supports referrals and those who “walk-in” to the facility, as well as those posted longer-term to the unit. It also responds to queries from family members regarding support services and programs for ill and injured personnel, and provides referrals as appropriate.

The primary goal of care and support is to return personnel to duty in their military occupation as soon as medically possible. Success depends on a number of factors, including the nature and severity of the illness or injury, the speed and intensity of the intervention, patient morale and commitment, the quality of case management and the efficacy of available treatments.

Members who are severely injured or ill, have complex transition needs, and who do not meet Universality of Service standards work with a team to develop an integrated transition plan, which features individualized goals and projected timelines for achievement. These timelines are used to determine the duration

of the transition support and a release date.

In some individual cases, the road to recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration is measured in months. More typically, however, the road to recovery is measured in years—from the point of injury or illness to when a CAF member is ready to return to work or transition into civilian life.

For those members that do transition out of the CAF, there is a range of programs and services to help them integrate into a civilian career and civilian life. For example, the CAF partners with employers and industry, educates stakeholders on the benefits of hiring former military members, and connects releasing military members with potential civilian employers, continuing education, vocational training, entrepreneurial opportunities, and other second career opportunities. More information on this program is available on the Canadian Armed Forces Transition Services webpage.

Currently, just under 2,000 ill and injured members are posted to the JPSU.

*“After my 29-year career, I thought I had a tough skin to be that aggressive, super soldier; however, inside, I was in turmoil and it cost me my personal life. The Canadian Forces has given me help through my chain of command, they have supported me, given me my case manager, my psychiatrist, my psychologist, my addictions counsellor. They have all supported me and got me to where I am today.”* – MWO Larry Clarke in “My Road to Recovery”<sup>1</sup>

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***The primary goal of care and support is to return personnel to duty in their military occupation as soon as medically possible.***

The CAF’s mental health program has been recognized among its NATO allies and by civilian organizations for its robust approach to care, its stigma reduction initiatives, its mental health research and its mental health training and awareness programs. But despite everything the CAF, and Canadian research organizations have learned from research, we remain far from fully understanding mental illness and the optimal approaches to prevention and treatment.

With its civilian and international partners, the CAF is committed to ongoing mental health education and research in areas such as virtual reality, medication, and brain imaging, thus helping improve the lives of military personnel and all Canadians who suffer mental illness. Over 20 per cent of Canadians will experience a mental illness in their lifetimes, yet two-thirds of them will suffer in silence for fear of being judged or rejected.

In order to fight this stigma, the CAF, and many of its civilian partners, including the Bell Let’s Talk campaign, are encouraging all Canadians to learn about mental illness, its signs and the importance of seeking care early for themselves or their loved ones. As so many successfully treated people have learned, this offers hope and the best chance of recovery. ■

<sup>1</sup> Available online at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-health-services/members-stories.page?doc=my-road-to-recovery/hs7g0mh3>

# The Moribund Middle East Peace Process

Emmanuel Seitelbach

✿ *In recent weeks, US Secretary of State John Kerry has been trying to revive the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) seemingly against the will of the two negotiating teams. The mutually hurting stalemate prevailing during the Second Intifada created an urgency for conflict resolution that no longer exists. Throughout this entire round of negotiations, Israeli and Palestinian leaders have shown a lack of motivation to reach an agreement for different reasons.*

Israel is in the comfortable position of having quelled the Second Intifada and reduced violence from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to manageable levels. Israeli leaders are reluctant to commit to an agreement that could end the current calm conditions and bring about what they worry will become a failing Palestinian state, unable to maintain a sustainable economy, and a safe haven for Jihadist organizations like those currently operating in Syria and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government also lacks the political will to transfer hundreds of thousands of settlers to Israel. In the 1950s, the government built 200,000 apartments to absorb a comparable amount of Jewish refugees from Arab states and Europe over half a decade, as described by Ari Shavit in *My Promised Land*.

On the other side, the Palestinian Authority has developed an addiction to foreign aid that will come to an end once a peace agreement is obtained. Pervasive corruption within the government and Israeli restrictions prevent international funding from being used for urgent infrastructure renovations, and the creation of an investment-friendly environment. Conflicting signals by the international community have convinced the Palestinian Authority that it can satisfy all its demands not by direct negotiations but by pressure and condemnation of Israel in international jurisdictions.

Commentators simply admit that the two sides are not ripe for a peace agreement as the positions gap is not bridgeable. New conditions are needed for a breakthrough

to occur, starting with a change of guard at the head of the states. In Israel, a more flexible coalition must arise, casting aside the extremists that support the settlers' movement such as Naftali Bennett. An awareness campaign is required to revive the interest for the two-state solution and fight apathy that benefits the political right wing. In Palestine, pressure must be put on the PA to hold long overdue general elections.

But a failure of the current peace process, exacerbating despair and lack of hope in the Palestinian Territories, could lead to a new outburst of violence that must be avoided. Until favorable conditions are in place for a peace process restart, analysts suggest that the two sides should anticipate a failure of the current talks and manage the status quo by promoting unilateral confidence building measures and low profile engagement that demonstrate commitment to peace. On the Israeli side, the government can provide financial incentives for settlers willing to abandon the West Bank immediately. It must uphold the rule of law in the West Bank by punishing settlers' violence, and improve Palestinian civil rights in Area C, in particular freedom of movements and the end of land grabs. The Palestinian Authority must promote governance transparency and accountability, economic growth, security cooperation against terror cells, and put an end to the culture of incitement against Israelis in state media.

Creativity will be needed to resolve the core issues such as the status of Jerusalem. Alternatives to the two-state solution will

likely gain momentum. The demand to recognize Israel as a state for the Jewish people could be tied to an Israeli recognition of its responsibility for the Palestinian exile of 1948. After such an apology, a limited implementation of the right of return would seem more acceptable. Breaking taboos would constitute reciprocal steps towards truth and reconciliation necessary for long term healing between the two nationalist movements and would guarantee the end of all claims.

If the PA considered absorbing a number of Jewish settlers as citizens of Palestine, this concession would remove many roadblocks:

1. The implementation of the two-state solution would be simplified by avoiding a complex movement of populations
2. The PA would be able to negotiate a permanent border closer to the Green Line
3. The State of Palestine would inherit hundreds of thousands of tax payers with a steady income and an established trade infrastructure with the State of Israel, including the West Bank industrial zones that already provide thousands of jobs for Palestinians today.

This may sound like a utopian idea because the risk of violent retribution towards Jews acquiring Palestinian citizenship is high. But ideological settlers would refuse Palestinian citizenship and move out, leaving behind economical settlers only interested in affordable housing without antagonism towards Palestinians.

Current regional turmoil is having a mixed impact on the prospect of peace and, although civil societies on both sides have repeatedly shown their support for a two-state solution, the two governments are hostage to extremists with incompatible positions. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have to wait once again for a more favourable context. In anticipation for a prolonged status quo, immediate alleviation of the oppression arising from the occupation of the Palestinian Territories is essential to prevent an escalation of violence. ■

| Emmanuel Seitelbach is a human security and peacebuilding analyst, and technology expert with a Masters degree from Royal Roads University.

## REMEMBER TODAY, REMEMBER ALWAYS. CANADA'S D-DAY TRIBUTE

## AUJOURD'HUI COMME DEMAIN, SOUVENONS-NOUS. HOMMAGE CANADIEN DU JOUR J



On June 6, 1944, D-Day, 359 Canadians were killed in action on the beaches of Normandy. Many were just boys when they went off to war, storming the beach as young as 18.

This year the Juno Beach Centre commemorates their sacrifice by installing 359 Tribute Markers – one for each fallen soldier – on Juno Beach.

There are two ways help:

### I. SPONSOR A TRIBUTE

Individual D-Day Tributes can be sponsored for a minimum of CDN \$500. Each sponsor will receive a Canadian tax receipt for their donation, as well as recognition on the marker itself and on the Juno Beach Centre's website. The individual tributes will consist of a stylized marker, standing about a metre tall, embossed with a maple leaf. Each one will feature a plaque providing biographical information about the Canadian it represents as well as a brief message of thanks from the sponsoring organization or individual. Sponsors will also receive a package of information about their sponsored soldier, profiling the work of the Lest We Forget program. For an additional CDN \$150, sponsors can receive a replica of their tribute's plaque.

### II. MAKE AN INDIVIDUAL DONATION

Individual donors will have the chance to send a message of thanks that will be placed on the website and printed in a book of remembrance at the Juno Beach Centre in Normandy. Every donor will be recognized on our website. Contributors will receive a tax receipt for their donation.

Honour a soldier and show your support for the Juno Beach Centre. Sponsor a Tribute Marker today.

Visit the Juno Beach Centre website ([www.junobeach.org](http://www.junobeach.org)) or call the office in Canada for more information, 877 828-JUNO.

Le 6 juin 1944, D-Day, 359 Canadiens ont été tués lors des combats sur les plages du débarquement en Normandie. Beaucoup étaient seulement de jeunes garçons âgés d'à peine 18 ans quand ils sont partis à la guerre, à l'assaut de la plage Juno.

Cette année, le Centre Juno Beach rend hommage à leur sacrifice en installant 359 Marqueurs du souvenir – un pour chaque soldat canadien tué le Jour J – sur la plage Juno.

Il y a deux manières de participer :

### I. PARRAINER UN MARQUEUR DU SOUVENIR

En faisant un don d'un minimum de 500\$ CDN, vous pouvez parrainer un Marqueur du Souvenir. Chaque parrain/marraine recevra un reçu pour fins d'impôts canadiens correspondant au montant de leur don. Leur don sera signalé sur le Marqueur ainsi que sur le site Web du Centre Juno Beach. Chaque marqueur mesurera environ 1 mètre et sera estampé d'une feuille d'érable. On y trouvera une plaque avec la biographie du soldat canadien qu'elle représente, de même qu'un bref message de remerciement de la part de l'organisation ou de l'individu ayant parrainé le Marqueur.

### II. FAITES UN DON INDIVIDUEL

Les donateurs individuels auront la possibilité d'envoyer un message de remerciements qui sera posté sur notre site Web et imprimé dans un Livre du Souvenir au Centre Juno Beach en Normandie. Chaque donateur sera signalé sur notre site Web. Pour chaque don un reçu pour fins d'impôts canadiens sera envoyé au donateur.

Honorez un soldat et montrez votre soutien au Centre Juno Beach. Parrainez aujourd'hui un Marqueur du souvenir. Pour obtenir plus d'information, visitez le site web du Centre Juno Beach ([www.junobeach.org](http://www.junobeach.org)) ou téléphonez au 877 828-JUNO.

## – IN FLANDERS FIELDS – LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN MCCRAE, MAY 1915 – MAY 2015

Lieutenant-Colonel John McCrae, artillery officer, physician and poet, wrote *In Flanders Fields* at the height of Second Ypres, one of the most bitter battles of World War I. The centenary of that poem falls at the beginning of May 2015.

The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery (RCA) will erect a statue to honour John McCrae. Renowned Canadian sculptor Ruth Abernethy, known for works such as the Oscar Peterson statue at the National Arts Centre in Ottawa has been commissioned to create the statue. The statue will be unveiled in Ottawa on 3 May 2015.

The citizens of Guelph, Ontario will also honour John McCrae by placing an identical statue near his birthplace.

The RCA Heritage Campaign is fund-raising for the statue with a Campaign Goal of \$350,000. All Canadians can help to ensure that this iconic Canadian and his work are remembered on the centenary of *In Flanders Fields*.

To donate or for further information visit the RCA's web site at <http://www.artillery.net/beta/>. Mention McCrae Statue in the comments section of the donation form at the Canada Helps button; or mail a cheque payable to the "The RCA Fund" to: Lieutenant-Colonel MD McKay, P.O. Box 970, Guelph, ON, N1H 6N1. Mention "McCrae statue" on the cheque; or contact the Regimental Major RCA at [cdnartillery@gmail.com](mailto:cdnartillery@gmail.com) or at 204 765-3000 ext 3595.

Charitable Registration No. 11925 2997 RR 0001. Tax Receipts are issued for donations over \$20, or on request.

## – AU CHAMP D'HONNEUR – LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN MCCRAE, MAI 1915-MAI 2015

Le lieutenant-colonel John McCrae est un officier d'artillerie, un médecin et un poète qui a composé *Au champ d'honneur* lors de la seconde bataille d'Ypres, une des batailles les plus horribles de la Première Guerre mondiale. Le centième anniversaire de ce poème aura lieu au début de mai 2015.

Le Régiment royale de l'Artillerie canadienne (ARC) érigera une statue en l'honneur de John McCrae. La réputée sculpteure canadienne Ruth Abernethy, connue pour des œuvres comme la statue d'Oscar Peterson au Centre national des arts d'Ottawa, a reçu une commande pour créer la statue. Celle-ci sera dévoilée à Ottawa le 3 mai 2015.

Les citoyens de Guelph, en Ontario, travaillent également sur un projet pour honorer John McCrae, qui est d'installer une statue identique près de son lieu de naissance.



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN MCCRAE

La Campagne du Fonds du patrimoine de l'Artillerie royale canadienne commence le financement pour la statue avec un objectif de campagne de 350 000 \$. Tous les Canadiens peuvent nous aider à faire en sorte que l'on se souvienne de cette légende canadienne et de son œuvre lors du centenaire du poème *Au champ d'honneur*.

Pour faire un don ou pour en savoir plus, visitez le site Web de l'ARC à <http://www.artillery.net/beta/>. Mentionnez Statue McCrae dans la partie commentaires du formulaire de don sous le bouton CanaDon; ou envoyez un chèque par la poste payable au nom de « Fonds de l'ARC » au : Lieutenant-colonel MD McKay, C.P. 970, Guelph (ON), N1H 6N1. Mentionnez « Statue de McCrae » sur le chèque; ou contactez le major régimentaire, ARC, par courriel à [cdnartillery@gmail.com](mailto:cdnartillery@gmail.com) ou par téléphone au 204 765-3000, poste 3595

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
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