



ON TRACK

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L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

ASSESSING CANADA'S APPROACH TO CHINA'S RISE

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The Honourable Hugh D. Segal is the recipient of the CDA Institute's Vimy Award for 2015. This year's Gala Dinner, to be held on 6 November 2015, marks the 25th Anniversary of the Vimy Award. A special numbered commemorative book, The Vimy Award 25 Years with a Companion History of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, will be available for purchase at this event.

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L'honorable Hugh D. Segal est le lauréat du Prix Vimy de l'Institut de la CAD de 2015. Le dîner gala cette année, qui aura lieu le 6 novembre 2015, est une grande occasion qui marquera la vingt-cinquième anniversaire de la création du Prix Vimy. Lors de cet événement, il sera possible de se procurer le livre spécial commémoratif Le Prix Vimy 25 Ans accompagné de la genèse et de l'histoire de l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense, qui fut créé pour fêter cette anniversaire.

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Mission Statement. It is the goal of the CDA Institute to promote informed public debate on security and defence issues and the vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces in society. It is intended that ON TRACK facilitate this educational mandate by featuring articles that explore security, defence, and strategic issues that may have an impact on Canadian interests and on the safety of its citizens. The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.

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Énoncé de mission. L'Institut de la CAD a pour but de non seulement encourager un débat public éclairé à propos des problématiques concernant la sécurité et de défense canadienne, mais aussi de promouvoir le rôle vital joué par les Forces armées canadiennes dans la société. Nous souhaitons que « ON TRACK » facilite ce mandat éducatif en mettant en vedette une gamme d'articles qui explorent la sécurité, la défense et le domaine stratégique pouvant avoir un impact sur les intérêts du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les points de vues exprimés dans « ON TRACK » reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l'Institut de la CAD.

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COVER PHOTO: Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND. Her Majesty's Canadian Ship Calgary (FFH 335) is assisted by two harbor tugboats as the ship departs Pearl Harbor for a missile exercise during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014 on 29 July 2014.

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Caméra de combat des Forces canadiennes, MDN. Le Navire canadien de Sa Majesté Calgary (FFH 335) obtient l'aide de deux remorqueurs tandis qu'il quitte Pearl Harbor pour participer à un exercice de missiles, pendant l'exercice Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), le 29 juillet 2014.

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FROM THE EDITOR

Dr. David McDonough

In the intervening months since the last issue of ON TRACK, Canada has found itself in the midst of one of the longest federal election campaigns in modern history, a campaign that began in early August and will finally conclude on 19 October 2015. At the time of writing, it is unclear which political party (or possibly a combination of parties) may have the opportunity to form a government.

At the CDA Institute, we have been busy acting as an important forum for lively discussion on these and other important strategic issues of concern to Canadians. One only needs to look at the numerous commentaries written by Canadian and international experts available on our [Blog: The Forum](#). By coincidence, this issue comes at a time very near the election date – so we have chosen to use the opportunity to feature several articles offering advice and insights on security and defence issues to the new government.

We are pleased to begin this issue with an Editorial by CDA Institute Board Member **Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret'd)**, who explores the role of national interests in any future Canadian defence policy.

To explore gender integration in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which has become a critical issue following the release of the Deschamps report, we are delighted to have an article by **Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky** at Queen's University and **Dr. Christian Leuprecht** from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) in Kingston.

Among the Conservative government's more controversial initiatives has been on counterterrorism, as reflected in the ongoing debate on Bill C-51. The critical role of intelligence in Canada's counterterrorism policy is examined in this issue by **Dr. Jez Littlewood** at Carleton University.

With the exception of Canada's role in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, political parties of all stripes have had very little to say about strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific this election. To shed more light on these issues, **Dr. John Blaxland** at Australian National University, offers a historical perspective on the possible future direction of Canadian-Australian relations. He is followed by **Dave Beitelman**, a PhD candidate at Dalhousie University, who questions the

effectiveness and wisdom of Canada's response to China's rise.

Given concerns about Russia's increasing belligerence and recent action in Crimea and Ukraine, we are fortunate to have **Dr. Alexander Moens** from Simon Fraser University discuss the continued importance of the NATO Alliance in this issue.

Canada certainly has a long and very close history with NATO, perhaps most recently demonstrated by its role in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. **Dr. Howard Coombs** at the RMCC Kingston, alongside being a CDA Institute Research Fellow, provides a retrospective look at the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. A different take on this issue is explored by **Dr. Craig Mantle**, also a Research Fellow at the CDA Institute, who explores how war art – and particularly the works of artist Gertrude Kearns – will likely influence the memory of the Afghan mission.

The final three articles in this issue explore the future direction of Canadian defence policy. The first article is by **Dr. Rob Huebert** at the University of Calgary, who looks at the changing nature of the critical Canada-US strategic relationship. The second, written by **Brigadier-General Dr. Jim Cox (Ret'd)**, looks at the guiding questions that should inform a new government's defence policy review. In the concluding article, **Dr. Jim Fergusson** at the University of Manitoba raises some important questions on the ultimate effectiveness of any putative defence white paper or policy review.

This issue concludes with books reviews by **Lindsay Coombs**, a CDA Institute Analyst; **Meaghan Hobman**, Administration and Public Relations Manager at the CDA Institute; and political and defence analyst **Adnan Qaiser**.

I hope you find the contents of this issue of ON TRACK informative and interesting.

Sincerely yours,
David McDonough, PhD

LE MOT DU RÉDACTEUR

David McDonough, Ph. D.

Depuis la publication du plus récent numéro de « ON TRACK, » le Canada se retrouve en plein milieu d'une campagne électorale qui est parmi la plus longue de son histoire. Cette campagne, qui débuta le 2 août, se terminera le 19 octobre 2015. Au moment de la publication de ce numéro, il est impossible de prédire quel parti, ou bien quel groupe de partis, aura l'opportunité de former le prochain gouvernement.

À l'Institut de la CAD, on continue d'agir comme forum important pour promouvoir la discussion sur des enjeux ayant une importance stratégique pour le Canada. Il suffit de lire les nombreux articles sur notre blogue, « [The Forum](#), » écrits par des érudits de renommée nationale et internationale. Il tombe bien que ce numéro de « ON TRACK » soit publié durant la période électorale; nous avons ainsi décidé de mettre de l'avant plusieurs articles qui offrent des conseils au nouveau gouvernement sur des enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationale.

Nous sommes heureux d'entamer ce numéro avec un éditorial du **Vice-amiral Drew Robertson (ret)**, membre du conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la CAD, au sujet de l'intérêt national dans une politique de défense future.

Afin d'aborder le sujet des relations hommes-femmes au sein des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC), un enjeu devenu plus pertinent suite à la publication du rapport Deschamps, nous sommes heureux de mettre de l'avant un article de **Stéphanie von Hlatky, Ph. D.**, de l'Université Queen's et **Christian Leuprecht, Ph. D.**, du Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston.

Parmi les initiatives les plus controversées du gouvernement conservateur est la loi C-51 sur l'antiterrorisme. En fait, le rôle essentiel du renseignement dans la politique antiterroriste du Canada est le sujet d'un article dans ce numéro par **Jez Littlewood, Ph. D.**, de l'Université Carleton.

À l'exception de la participation du Canada aux négociations du Partenariat transpacifique, il y a eu très peu de discussion sur les développements stratégiques dans l'Asie-Pacifique par les partis politiques pendant la campagne. Afin d'approfondir la discussion dans cette région, **John Blaxland, Ph. D.**, de l'Université nationale de l'Australie, offre une perspective historique sur l'avenir des relations entre l'Australie et le Canada. À la suite de cette parution est un article par **Dave Beitelman**, candidat au doctorat à l'Université Dalhousie, qui pose des questions sur l'efficacité de la

réponse du Canada quant à la croissance stratégique de la Chine.

Étant donné les préoccupations soulevées par la belligérance de la Russie et ses actions en Crimée et en Ukraine, nous sommes chanceux d'avoir un article par **Alexander Moens, Ph. D.**, de l'Université Simon Fraser, au sujet du rôle de l'OTAN dans ce conflit.

L'implication du Canada au sein de l'OTAN a toujours été importante, comme en témoigne la participation canadienne dans la mission de l'OTAN en Afghanistan. **Howard Coombs, Ph. D.**, du Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston, qui est également un chercheur « Fellow » avec l'Institut de la CAD, écrit un article dans ce numéro sur la mission canadienne en Afghanistan avec un point de vue rétrospectif. Sur ce même sujet, mais sous un angle différent, **Craig Mantle, Ph. D.**, qui est également un chercheur avec l'Institut de la CAD, écrit sur le thème de l'art en temps de guerre – plus précisément, il affirme que des œuvres d'art comme celles de l'artiste Gertrude Kearns auront une influence sur la manière dont nous nous souvenons de la mission en Afghanistan.

Les trois derniers articles dans ce numéro portent sur l'avenir de la politique de défense canadienne. Le premier de ces articles est écrit par **Rob Huebert, Ph. D.**, de l'Université de Calgary, au sujet de l'évolution des relations stratégiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Par la suite, l'article du **Brigadier-général Jim Cox, Ph. D. (ret)** examine les questions majeures qui devraient influencer la politique de la défense du prochain gouvernement. Enfin, l'article de **Jim Fergusson, Ph. D.**, de l'Université du Manitoba, soulève des questions importantes sur l'efficacité d'un potentiel livre blanc sur la défense nationale.

Le présent numéro se termine avec des critiques littéraires de **Lindsay Coombs**, analyste à l'Institut de la CAD; de **Meaghan Hobman**, gérante de l'administration et des relations publiques à l'Institut de la CAD; et d'**Adnan Qaiser**, analyste en matières de politique et défense.

J'espère que vous trouverez ce numéro de « ON TRACK » à la fois intéressant et informatif.

Cordialement,
David McDonough, Ph. D.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Sir, As a one-time keen Naval Reservist, I identified strongly with the sentiments in Ken Hanson's article "Future Full of Uncertainty for Canadian Naval Reserves" (ON TRACK, Summer 2015). The future is not entirely clear for the RCN these days either, even if there is some blue sky on the horizon, so what can we expect for the Reserve? The Regular Forces have often conducted a 'beggar thy neighbour' policy with regard to the Reserves when times are tough with respect to manning, training and equipment. Despite the contribution of Reservists in Afghanistan, memories may be short.

Hanson notes the trend in the 1980s to assemble a large cadre of full-time reservists to train and qualify to man the MCDVs. The Reserve has always had a few folks who spent extended time on active duty - we called them 'Perma-Shads' in my day, not an entirely complimentary moniker. After all, if one wanted to go "Regular" why not go Regular if the RCN would accept you? But what this increased trend towards more full-time contracts portended was a departure from what the old RCNR had represented in the community - citizen sailors who were active and visible in (now) twenty-four Canadian cities and towns. They trained as well as they could and perhaps some lesser qualified were promoted beyond their professional level of naval competence, but they were present.

With the change in direction to more full-time Reservists, much of this sentiment and camaraderie seems to have been lost, not only in the Divisions, but in the communities as well. No one would argue seriously about the underpinnings of a "One Navy" concept. In fact, even as an active Reserve officer in the 1970s and 80s, I never felt I was anything other than part of One Navy, and no one ever told me I wasn't.

So with the sea changes underway to-day, we have come full circle. Does the RCN



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want the Naval Reserve to maintain that community footprint that Commodore Hose laid out in desperation in the 1920s? Will it allow it to do so? In fact, if the trend continues going in the direction Hanson suggests, perhaps this is a decision that is too important to be left to the RCN alone.

What have senior Naval Reserve officers been advocating in the last fifteen years? Have they had a voice in decision making? I don't want to sound hidebound but the Naval Reserve continues to have a role to play in community and citizenship development - something it used to do rather well, in addition to fleet augmentation and staffing other

requirements such as Afghanistan. If the RCN really wants to kill it, that can be accomplished quite easily. But the Reserve was never meant to be a mini-Regular Force, which is what some seem to hope it has become in recent years.

I can but hope that the Commander RCN and the newly appointed NR commodore, Marta Mulkins, start giving the issues raised in Hanson's article some deep thought before it really is too late to salvage what we can. Yours sincerely. ■

David Collins

CDA Institute Board Member
19 July 2015

EDITORIAL

A DEFENCE POLICY BASED ON NATIONAL INTERESTS

by Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret'd)

Post-election, will you be looking forward to the inevitable Defence Policy review? No matter which party or parties take power, they will be confronted by both the declining capability of the Canadian Armed Forces and the rising complexity of the international security environment, neither of which was foreseen in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS).¹ Both factors create compounding risks to our national interests.

The CFDS level of ambition was for Canada to be a “credible player on the world stage” through international leadership that could make “a meaningful contribution to the full spectrum of international operations.” But beyond lowering today’s readiness, removing \$45 billion² from the envisioned 20 year window (until 2026) of “stable and predictable funding” has rendered the CFDS force structure unachievable, at least without targeted additional funding, and exacerbated the damaging delays in defence procurement.

In part, these problems stem from a strategy based on making a contribution abroad, rather than a clear appreciation of the capabilities required to safeguard our national interests. After all, a “meaningful contribution” can and has easily been redefined down to whatever is available to send, rather than what is

really needed for our security interests.

It’s as if we Canadians don’t believe our participation matters internationally and can’t see our own national interests. Worse, without a clear sense of those interests, governments over the past 20 years have failed to bring any

“A political party that was serious about Canada’s defence would...ensure the government understands the urgency of recapitalizing and restoring the capacity for relevant sovereign action in the Canadian Armed Forces in general, and in our fighting fleets in particular.”

sense of urgency in addressing the recapitalization of the CAF’s fighting fleets – the air and naval fighting fleets in particular. The result has been a steady erosion of Canada’s ability to act in its sovereign interests. Yet changes in the security environment remind us that growing risks to our security and prosperity demand capabilities that can safeguard those interests.

As just one example of the changed environment, consider the recent actions of Russia and China – two countries not even mentioned in the CFDS even though much about their power and potential for many of their recent actions could have been foreseen when that document was first published.³ These two great powers’ actions have

repeatedly violated international norms. Indeed, in the past two years alone, at least one and in some cases both have undertaken: coercion of neighbours through force; unilateral action over disputed territories, water, and airspace to demonstrate de facto sovereignty; invasion of neighbouring states; annexation of territory and changing borders by force; attempts to temporarily fence part of the global commons – the high seas – for national control; and the fomenting of insurgency in neighbouring states.

For both, violating international norms is not a by-product of their actions; attempting to change them is central to their strategies. Their actions have not been about mere disputes over rocks and shoals or tactical level opportunism; rather they should be seen as being driven by their strategies for regional control. Their actions and apparent strategies put our national interests at risk, by clashing with the US-led regional security regimes in Europe and Asia and challenging the international norms which have underpinned our prosperity and security for the past 70 years.

These are not challenges the US should address alone. NATO’s strength is derived from political and military risks being collectively borne by all

allies. Nor, given the ongoing US defence cutbacks, should one expect the United States to have the capacity to address these and other challenges around the globe without meaningful allied and partner participation. A US force posture that today requires, for example, naval deployments of nearly 10 months to maintain the persistent forward presence that deterrence and assurance require is not sustainable.⁴ As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs noted in the latest *US Military Strategy*, “global disorder [since 2011] has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode.”⁵ Additional cuts due to sequestration potentially loom ahead, and with them greater risk for US and NATO strategies.

The actions of Russia and China require that NATO in Europe and the US-led security regime in Asia respond to the repeated violations of international norms by reassuring allies and partners while deterring conflict, coercion, and adventurism, in part through credible military capability persistently deployed in both regions. Our allies need our participation in the US-led security regimes that underpin the international rules-based order. More importantly, Canada’s vital trade and security interests in the stability of Europe and Asia, as well as attendant security interests in continental defence, are at risk. So too more generally is our interest in the maintenance of international norms, without which global security and our prosperity are threatened. For Canada, beyond participation in the regions, the current and developing capabilities of both Russia and China also require continental cooperation in defence of the air and maritime approaches to North America, including in the Arctic.

There are important and complex issues on which we have mutually beneficial cooperation with both countries: in trade with China and counter-terrorism with Russia, for example. But neither is likely to abandon their

regional strategy. International efforts to both deter their strategy execution while also furthering international engagement and cooperation may take many years. Yet if Western nations are engaged in a multi-decade challenge, attempting to both integrate China and Russia into international norms while deterring adventurism and preventing misadventure, then the cost of our participation in deterrence will be judged more than worthwhile if that effort achieves these goals and so avoids conflict that could damage our security and prosperity.

There are, of course, many other existing and developing security risks and challenges, whether regional such as terrorism and instability in the mid-East, or thematic, like ballistic missile defence and cyber. Any new government will also have to assess the risks that such issues pose to our national interests as it crafts a defence policy.

A political party that was serious about Canada’s defence would pledge to have a policy driven by current and future risks to our national interests. Such a policy would ensure the government understands the urgency of recapitalizing and restoring the capacity for relevant sovereign action in the Canadian Armed Forces in general, and in our fighting fleets in particular.

Any lesser effort at policy formulation might allow us to make token contributions internationally. But they would not likely be sufficient to safeguard our interests at home and abroad, through meaningfully participation with our allies and partners in shaping a favourable security environment and defending our security and prosperity. ■

Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) is a former commander of the Royal Canadian Navy and is member of the CDA Institute Board of Directors.

Notes

1. Canada, National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: 2008), <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page>.
2. David Perry, “Defence Budget 2015: A Long-Term Funding Increase... Maybe,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (now the Canadian Global Affairs Institute), 1 May 2015, https://d3n8a8pro7vnm.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/532/attachments/original/1430536647/Defence_Budget_2015.pdf?1430536647.
3. In fact, the government’s 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy mentions only two foreign countries – the United States and Afghanistan.
4. Jeanette Steele, “Navy’s top officer makes final S.D. visit,” *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 17 August 2015, <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/aug/17/greenert-cno-final-visit-sandiego/>.
5. United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* (Washington, DC: June 2015), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

WOMEN AS PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS: CANADIAN VALUES ON THE FRONT LINE

by Drs. Stéfanie von Hlatky and Christian Leuprecht

On 30 April 2015, the government released the *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Force*, known as the Deschamps Report. This review, named after its external authority, former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps, presented some challenging findings for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Acknowledging that sexual misconduct is not unique to the CAF, the Report emphasizes its endemic nature within the military, concluding “that there is an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGTBQ [Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual, and Queer] members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault.”¹ Indeed, the external review was commissioned by then Chief of the Defence Staff, General Thomas Lawson, after victims of sexual harassment made their stories public as part of journalistic investigations featured in the Canadian magazines *Maclean's* and *L'Actualité*.

This was not the first sex scandal for the CAF. The military went through a similar ordeal in 1998, when incidents of sexual harassment made the news and caused public outrage. Why has the CAF been so complacent? How might the Department of National Defence focus its efforts post-Deschamps? Can Canada's action plan restore the excellent reputation it achieved when it was among the first countries to remove all barriers to women across military trades? In response to these questions, we highlight the key factors at the domestic and international

levels to understand the CAF experience with gender integration. We conclude by offering some modest suggestions.

Women in the Military: Arguments for Greater Integration

The integration of women in the armed forces has proven controversial, especially in the combat arms (infantry, armoured reconnaissance, artillery, engineers). There are at least three good reasons for their inclusion: institutional legitimacy in a democratic society; the functional imperative; and recruitment.

First, the citizen-soldier ideal in democratic societies holds that military organizational culture should be in line with the expectations of Canadian society and the government: If women face no professional restrictions in other fields, the military should follow suit. A CAF that is broadly representative of Canadian society is likely to be more closely aligned with that society, which translates into greater support from taxpayers who ultimately float the armed forces and its mission. Gender diversity, then, is a proxy litmus test of civil-military relations: How proactive is the institution as opposed to diversifying largely in response to external pressure, such as legislative change and para-judicial adjudication?

Second, there is a case to be made for operational effectiveness and mission success. Recent military experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan confirm that

including female teams in combat units is key to fulfilling mission objectives. For cultural reasons, reaching deep into communities and including women in political activities could not have been achieved without the presence of female soldiers. Having a man search a woman at a checkpoint would be an inconceivable contravention of cultural norms in these societies. Institutional diversity also offers operational advantages by increasing the skillsets required in postmodern society and warfare.² Hybrid wars of the future are likely to fuel demand for more women to fulfill some of these essential military tasks. However utilitarian, such instrumental arguments make a strategic case for greater integration of women, along with minorities and other underrepresented Designated Group Members (DGMs), within the CAF.

Finally, there is the recruitment argument. Broadening the military's applicant pool by removing barriers to certain trades will boost recruitment efforts. More applicants mean greater competition, which should result in more qualified recruits overall. Over the course of two world wars and the Cold War, the military gradually removed restrictions on the service of women until a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) in 1989 opened up all ranks and trades to women (except for submarine service, which took until 2000). Non-discrimination legislation aside, Canada's 1995 *Employment Equity Act* (EEA) actually requires federal institutions to be proactive about remedying disadvantage

and underrepresentation among DGMs: women, visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples, and persons with disabilities.

After unsuccessfully trying to negotiate exemptions to the EEA, the CAF was successful in delaying the lifting of restriction until 2002. The EEA has since resulted in the *Canadian Armed Forces Employment Equity Relations*, which, along with the CHRT decision, prompted the CAF to develop a methodology to establish annual recruiting targets. Still, the recruitment targets for the CAF, when compared to other security organizations, are not overly ambitious – so much so that the CAF recently altered the methodology so as to ensure that recruitment targets would not escalate. The target for women is 25.1 percent, compared to the RCMP's target of 30 percent. Yet, the CAF falls well short of this and other DGM targets: in 2015 women make up 17 percent of officers and 13.4 percent of non-commissioned members of the Regular Force, for a total of about 14.3 percent (16.6 percent in the Reserves, for a CAF total of 15 percent).

The delta between already conservative employment equity representation targets and actual representation rates suggest that there is room for the CAF to aim higher and do more. However, that arguably runs counter to deeply engrained premises of force cohesion and a tight institutional culture that values homogeneity and conformity. Yet, a tightening labour market due to population aging is raising the specter of stiffer competition for talent. The CAF's functional imperative thus hinges on it becoming an employer of choice for all Canadians.



A news conference in Ottawa with then Chief of the Defence Staff General Tom Lawson (second from right) at the release of the *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*, also known as the Deschamps Report, named after its author, former Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps (right). (Image credit: National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.)

A CAF that fails to accommodate by drawing more extensively on a more diverse recruit pool under conditions of population aging and a tightening labour market may either end up having to lower standards of recruitment – if it tries to recruit from the same yet shrinking cohort on which it has conventionally drawn – or shrinking the size of the force if it cannot find the requisite quality of recruit within its conventional yet shrinking recruit pool, neither of which are desirable. As the CAF contemplates more ambitious change, the post-Deschamps taskforce, which is mandated with implementing the core recommendations, has been looking internationally for best practices.

Benchmarking: What Are Canada's Allies Doing?

Canada was among the first NATO allies to remove almost all professional barriers to women subsequent to the CHRT decision in 1989. Today, the CAF is actually more representative of society on a per capita basis than most NATO allies, save Hungary (20.3 percent), the United

States (18 percent) and Latvia (16.5 percent), which all have more female uniformed members of their armed forces. However, allied data may not be readily comparable to Canada due to policy differentials: some countries have gender segregated roles that may affect female representation while denying men access to “feminized” occupational roles.

The Alliance has been collecting data from each of its 28 member states through a questionnaire, the *Annual National Reports to the NATO International Military Staff Office of the Gender Adviser*. NATO recently enhanced data collection from its member states in the hopes of generating best practices for the Alliance on gender integration in the armed forces of NATO members.³ Comparing national legislation and policies, human resources trends, how gender is integrated in military operations, as well as sexual misconduct and harassment, NATO's Science for Peace and Security Program – collaborating with external stakeholders and experts – concluded: (1) professional restrictions still exist for women in the



A Naval Boarding Party member on HMCS Winnipeg during a port visit to Karachi Pakistan in 2009. (Image credit: WO Carole Morissette, Royal Canadian Navy.)

military in seven NATO member states, though all of them allow women to join the national armed forces; (2) about half of NATO's member states support women's integration in the military through targeted efforts by the ministry of defence; (3) over three quarters of NATO states have incorporated gender training as part of operational or pre-deployment training; (4) most if not all of NATO's member states face significant challenges when it comes to addressing incidents of sexual misconduct and harassment.

A non-NATO ally, Australia, has been at the forefront of establishing best practices. In 2009, the Australian Defence Force took on ambitious reforms called *Pathway for Change* that aimed to transform the national military culture to eliminate predatory behaviour and establish a new professional standard that is safe for all service members, regardless of gender or background.

Canada has a similar opportunity with the Deschamps report and the CAF *Action Plan on Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour*. With Lieutenant-General Christine Whitecross at the helm of implementing this Action Plan, momentum is building to embark on an effort similar to Australia's.

Key to this effort will be strong ownership of the process, from the military's top brass and all the way down, and to make the link explicit between the need for organizational culture to make policies on diversity stick and effectively change the CAF's institutional culture. If the first few speeches by Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance, are any indication, he appears committed to the kind of transformative leadership that worked in the Australian Army, under their Chief, (now retired) Lieutenant-General David Morrison.

Conclusion

Within the CAF, the removal of formal restrictions to service has met with some success at improving recruitment trends outside of the military's traditional recruit pool of rural white heterosexual males. However, these incremental improvements have been spawned by outside pressure and para-judicial intervention, be it legislative or policy change, as with the 1992 Douglas case on homosexuals in the military. By and large, then, the military has been reactionary on matters of diversity. Moreover, improvements in representation are not keeping pace with the changing demographics of Canadian society. That is, inroads on improving the recruitment and representation of women remain tepid, and the delta of diversity in Canadian society relative to representation in the CAF is actually growing. As the 1989 CHRT, multiple

lawsuits, and Justice Deschamp's 2015 report suggest, the military leadership had hitherto underestimated the extent of the equality gap and the external societal, political, and legal expectations to remedy it.

As compared to the 1990s, the CAF no longer has retention issues among DGMs: women who opt to serve appear to be no less dis/satisfied than men. And for the first time in the history of the Royal Military College of Canada, four of the top five cadets are women. So, there is some evidence to suggest that the CAF is on a positive trajectory. Nor is there robust comparative evidence that issue of harassment and sexual assault are any more pervasive in the CAF than in other workplaces or sectors of Canadian society. However, the CAF appears to have underestimated the extent to which Canadians have higher expectations of civil servants in general, and those who serve in uniform in particular.

Rather than lagging behind, the federal government and the CAF – as the country's single largest institutional employer – should model employment equity to the rest of Canadian society as well as our allies. But becoming an employer of choice for all Canadians will require more than the 10 recommendations outlined in the Deschamps report.

First, past precedent of the CAF's

handling of gender issues suggests that those well-intentioned efforts are bound to fizzle unless federal politicians of all political stripes commit to holding the CAF and its leadership's feet to the fire. Second, the CAF's institutional culture will prove difficult to change unless and until there is an unwavering commitment to improving the representation of DGMs. The CAF habitually justifies underrepresentation by observing that apparently "they don't want to join." If that is, indeed, the case – we are not necessarily convinced that "they" do not want to join – then perhaps the operative question to ask is: Why would they not want to join? Finally, the CAF will fundamentally have to reassess its approach to civil-military relations. Old sergeants like to say: "We're here to defend democracy, not to practice it." But Canadians have been clear: the CAF's unique mission notwithstanding, they expect the CAF to reconcile the defence of democracy with democracy's fundamental norms and values. ■

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SUBMISSIONS

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INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM FOR CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

By Dr. Jeremy Littlewood

Terrorism has been described as “the most significant and persistent threat to Canada’s national security”¹ and the contemporary environment as being one where “the speed of change, and the ease with which people engaged in threat-related activity connect means we no longer have the luxury of time to contemplate our response.”² Any overview of counter-terrorism policy and strategy within a Western democracy identifies intelligence as the foundation for success. Intelligence is neither a panacea nor without risks, but it is “the most vital element of successful counterterrorism...[and] without such high-quality intelligence, it is likely that all aspects of state response (legal, military, propagandist) will stumble ineffectively.”³

Following the October 2014 attacks in Canada, resources have been shifted to counter this threat. Even with most of our security intelligence resources focused on counter-terrorism – up to 70 percent by some counts – and with the likelihood that the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is allocating significant resources to assist the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as well as providing intelligence support to Canadian Armed Forces with the mission in Iraq/Syria, the issue is further complicated by some very basic divisions and boundaries. Are we focused on terrorism at home (Canada) or terrorism abroad (worldwide)? Terrorism that results in a “bang”

(attacks) or activities that facilitate terrorism (propaganda, recruitment, procurement of materials, financing)? Terrorism that poses a direct threat to Canada (and Canadians) or that which poses a threat to Canadian interests? And, terrorism that poses the most direct threat – ‘Sunni Violent Extremism’ to use the old term from Canada’s Strategy to Counter Terrorism or bin Ladenism to use the Soufan Group’s term – or terrorism of all kinds regardless of ideological underpinnings?

The answer is all of the above, as a careful reading of CSIS Director Michel Coulombe’s evidence and other statements by officials make clear. So, what does the future hold for the incoming government, whatever its political orientation?

No one can predict the future, but trends can be identified – and in that realm the near future does not look promising. The incoming Government will quickly be apprised on the extent of the terrorist threat to Canada and its interests. This is itself too often misunderstood in the public domain. Terrorist threats cannot be reduced solely to a terrorist attack. Situational awareness requires information related to a number of issues. First, questions related to the causes of terrorism (the ‘root cause’ debate) and the grievance(s) – real or perceived – driving the individual, cell, or group to target Canada. Second, the facilitating factors of propaganda, recruitment, and mobilization of individuals to perpetrate

violence (from radicalization to violence of individuals) or material support offences under the criminal code. Third, the types of actors involved bring into play the organizational dynamics of the threat spectrum: from the true lone actor (i.e., one acting wholly independently and radicalized to violence without any interactions with others), or a lone actor with some contact, perhaps via the Internet, with like-minded individuals, to a cell of self-starters or part of a group, and how that group is organized, directed, and controlled. Fourth, how the plotters obtain funds, weapons, training, as well as target selection, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity prior to an attack are also part of the threat spectrum.

Canada has not, as the 2007 CSIS *Public Report* notes, experienced a concerted terrorist campaign for over two decades. Yet, the recently released data on terrorist incidents in Canada between 1960 and 2014 provide unequivocal evidence that Canada has experienced all types of terrorism – nationalist, left-wing, right-wing, single issue, and religious.⁴ Other types of terrorism have not disappeared after 9/11: Canada has experienced a few left-wing attacks, some connected to violent single issue groups, and occasional incidents of violent right wing extremism. The predominant threat, however, has been and remains that from al-Qaeda, or al-Qaeda-inspired and its offshoots, of which the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is the most violent at this time.

Despite only experiencing two attacks under this type, both in October 2014, four plots have been thwarted and led to convictions in the courts (Toronto-18 in 2006, Project Samossa in 2010, the 2013 VIA rail plot, and Canada Day plot in British Columbia in 2013), and two individuals have been convicted for facilitating plots in other countries (Momin Khawaja [2004] and Said Namouh [2009]). A number of individuals have been prevented from traveling abroad, with one conviction in the courts (Mohamed Hersi [2014]), and at least seven Canadians are understood to have died fighting abroad.

This terrorist activity – demonstrable by court cases, convictions, evidence, and testimony in Parliament, and more reputable media reporting, as well as academic studies and data – is sufficient to underline that there should not be any question of “Is there a threat?” While the threat is low in terms of scale (absolute numbers) and scope (quality and sophistication of actual and planned attacks), it is nevertheless, real. Moreover, the perceptions of the terrorist ‘spectacular’ have lowered since “perpetrators have paralyzed major world cities with only a few rifles or a shotgun and with shouted slogans” in recent months.⁵

The al-Qaeda inspired threat can itself be divided into three categories: (1) al-Qaeda core and the Islamic State, which represent the centre of the groups; (2) the affiliates of al-Qaeda or the *wilayats* of ISIL; and (3) the inspired individuals and cells with limited experience or training and quite often no direct connections to either core or affiliates. As Jason Burke observed in 2011, the traditional method of describing the threat based on its hardcore leadership, network of affiliates, and its ideology, no longer captured the scope or scale of the evolving threat:

At its most dispersed, but most widespread, level, this movement was little more than a way of thinking, a way of understanding the world,

an identity with its own dress codes, ideas, values, rituals and prescribed behaviour, its own self-sustaining culture. Transmitted through peers, through the media, at Schools, colleges, at sports clubs or prayer groups alike, from parents to children, from brothers to sisters, through internet magazines and carefully crafted videos, this movement was resilient and deeply rooted. ...it was something that had not existed a decade before. It was one of the real – and worst – legacies of the 9/11 Wars.⁶

Since then, the individuals and movements driving the ideology forward on the ground in Syria and Iraq, from Libya to Pakistan, through Nigeria and Somalia have attracted thousands of foreign fighters and inspired attacks in Western democracies. Terrorism within Western Europe inspired by al-Qaeda between 2008 and 2013 remained a small group/cell problem focused on particular states and types of target. Petter Nesser identifies an “increasingly heterogeneous threat” and a growth in activity despite the clear increase in activity across numerous conflicts. Furthermore, incidents more often than not still appear to be part of activities from organized groups and networks: truly independent lone actor attacks are few in number.⁷

Within the United States, more recent work examining the period March 2014 to mid-June 2015 identified 56 individuals charged in the Federal Court of the United States with supporting ISIL, but the frequency has shown a marked acceleration in 2015: “from an average rate of just over one per month (March to December 2014) to an average rate of over seven per month (from January to June 22, 2015).”⁸ Just over 50 percent of the plotters aspired to be foreign fighters joining ISIL abroad; slightly under a fifth were facilitators of recruitment, funding, and logistics; and, the remainder – just under 30 percent – were domestic plotters who are alleged to have devised attacks on the US, of whom three of the 17 were killed.

As Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser observe, “IS [Islamic State] has not yet ‘gone global’ in the sense of having committed a substantial proportion of its resources to out-of-area operations,” and there are few public indications of its leadership preparing “attack teams for major operations in the US or Europe,” much as al-Qaeda did in the 2000s. However, the Islamic State has inspired more attacks with “an average of two sympathiser attacks per month since al-Adnani’s call for individual jihad was issued in September 2014.” While often small scale, such attacks also have a high rate of being carried out (nearly 50 percent). They conclude that the “implication for counterterrorism professionals is clear: worry not only about the foreign fighters, but also about IS sympathisers who never made it to Syria.”⁹

In the United Kingdom, arrests related to terrorism average over one per day in the year July 2014 to July 2015.¹⁰ Like other analysis, the picture emerging “is distinctive largely because of the young age of the accused, the presence of women, the role of social media in their radicalization, and the desires of many of them to travel abroad and serve the caliphate.”¹¹ Analysis of the Canadian contingent of individuals and groups of friends who have traveled, attempted to travel, or facilitated the Islamic State and/or affiliates and inspired entities is similar.¹²

So what is it likely to mean for intelligence? Most terrorism does not, in fact, result in large numbers of deaths or casualties. Neither is terrorism an existential challenge to the Canadian state, although it certainly is a threat to national security and public safety. Furthermore, as empirical data and historical record suggests, “advanced democracies have generally not suffered from high levels of chronic terrorism unless they were interfering in other countries’ affairs through military intervention or occupations, or unless they had ongoing and unresolved

territorial conflicts.”¹³ Canada does not have unresolved territorial conflicts of the kind likely to result in a new wave of terrorism. However, the country is involved in expeditionary operations abroad, most notably as part of the anti-ISIL coalition, where it is training forces in northern Iraq to withstand and roll back ISIL, at the request of the Iraqi government, as well as undertaking air operations in Iraq and Syria.

Open source and academic studies of the emerging threat landscape tied to the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and the ideology of both point to a diverse, rapidly evolving, and consistent threat. It is low-level, but does not have to be sophisticated to work – given that attacks are often proclaimed as a spectacular by both the media and ideological supporters/sympathizers regardless of its outcome. Coinciding with unrealistic expectations of zero attacks, the intelligence community of Canada is very likely working close to its maximum sustainable effort and every available permissible source, method, and means to identify and thwart threats nationally and internationally.

The incoming Prime Minister is, therefore, likely to be advised that plots are ongoing and inevitable, an attack remains very likely, and the problem is not going to disappear anytime soon. With indications that the containment and rolling back of the Islamic State could take up to a decade, and that counter-terrorism successes in preventing ISIL sympathizers from travel abroad could result in them opting to attack at home, the next few years are unlikely to see a diminishing threat from terrorism. Moreover, there is no simple option that is humanitarian only, or focuses solely on the root causes and grievances. Canada, like others, faces an immediacy problem – foreign fighters, facilitators, and domestic plotters who target Canada or intend to use Canada as a base for attacks against others. This problem cannot be ignored without endangering public safety.

Recalibrating counter-terrorism efforts is on-going by necessity, but no Prime Minister can afford to ignore the complex realities of the threat landscape or the array of sources, methods, and means required to address the threat. ■

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FROM IMPERIAL SIBLINGS TO STRATEGIC COUSINS*

by Dr. John Blaxland

I wanted to reflect on the journeys of Canada and Australia from being imperial siblings to strategic cousins. Siblings, as you know, tend to be close. They know each other very well. As part of empire that certainly was true. Cousins, however, may know each other well or hardly at all, depending on the vagaries of extended family dynamics.

In the days since the end of the British Empire, the latter is probably a fairer descriptor for the Canadian-Australian relationship. But let us step back and reflect on how we got to that point.

As Australia federated as a nation in 1901, it had troops fighting the Anglo-Boer War alongside forces from Canada, New Zealand, and the British isles, under the command of Major-General Edward Hutton. He had served as commander of the New South Wales militia in the early 1890s before being appointed General Officer Commanding of the Canadian militia in the late 1890s. Canadians and Australians first fought together there on the South African Veldt as part of the 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade.

Thereafter a Scottish born former cadet from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) in Kingston, Ontario would migrate with his parents to Australia and go on to have a remarkable career in the Australian armed forces. That man, Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges, was the founder of Royal Military College Duntroon – a college said to be modelled on West Point but in



General Sir Arthur William Currie (left) and General Sir John Monash (right) presided over the Canadian and Australian corps in the First World War, respectively. (Image credit: Library and Archives Canada/Australian War Memorial catalogue.)

truth inspired by his alma mater, RMCC Kingston. A gallant and erudite soldier, Bridges commanded the 1st Australian Division at Gallipoli and later died from wounds received there. Had he lived, who knows if he may have emerged as an army group commander presiding over what emerged as the national corps of John Monash and Arthur Currie. But that was not to be. Nonetheless, the Canadians and Australians would develop further and stronger ties alongside in the field of battle in the so-called Great War of 1914-1918.

While Australians focus particularly on the heroic deeds at Gallipoli, Canada's Newfoundlanders, who only became part of Canada in 1949, similarly could claim credit – although for the

Newfoundlanders the sheer carnage of the Western Front would completely overshadow the Gallipoli experience. Thereafter, Australian and Canadian troops would be put through the meat grinder with Canadian troops shining under Currie at Vimy Ridge in the spring of 1917.

In late autumn 1917, not far from Ypres or wipers, as the diggers used to call it, in Flanders field, the 1st and Second Anzac Corps would launch the first five attacks of the battle of Passchendaele. Exhausted, they would be relieved in place by Currie's Canadian Corps, which fought the final four attacks of the battle and captured the remnants of the town by November.

With casualties mounting and calls for reinforcements getting louder, Canada, like Australia, suffered divisive debates over the introduction of Conscription. These debates would leave a scar across the political landscape in both countries that would last for generations. The debates coincided with Ireland's bloody Easter Uprising. In Australia, resistance to conscription was identified with Melbourne's Irish Catholic Archbishop Daniel Mannix. In Canada it was associated with French Canadian Catholics reluctant to fight in a far off conflict in defence of one country that had abandoned them 150 years before, France, and the resented conquering power of that age, the British.

Meanwhile, back in Europe, not long after, Canadian pilots chased Baron Von Richtofen, of Red Baron fame, straight into the killing zone of Australian ground gunners who finally brought down the German ace. The debate over who can claim the glory for the kill endures to this day.

By mid-1918, with the British and French armies exhausted and drained, the Canadian and Australian corps, under Currie and Monash, stood tried and tested and ready. Their greatest moment was approaching.

On 8 August 1918, just east of Amiens these two corps, as part of General Rawlinson's 4th British Army, spearheaded the breakthrough that General Eric Von Luddendorf would later describe as 'The Black Day of the German Army.' For it was at this point that the German defeat became virtually inevitable.

The next three months would see the German Army rolled back with little pause. To be sure it was not the Canadians and Australians doing this single-handedly. Much of the heavy lifting had been carried out by the French and British Armies and the arrival of the American Expeditionary Force, which by mid-1918 was in full swing. The blockade on Germany was biting hard and the Spanish

flu reportedly struck the Germans earlier than the Allies, who would suffer the full brunt of that deadly assault in the winter after the armistice. So it is important to keep things in perspective.

After tallying up virtually sixty thousand dead each, the prime ministers of Canada and Australia could argue that imperial solidarity managed to survive the war, but it would be among the conflict's casualties. In the end, in the words of Canadian historian Desmond Morton, Currie would turn the Canadians into allies, not subordinates of Great Britain. Arguably the same could be said of the Australian Corps under Monash.

When it came to the Second World War, the popular conception has been that while Australia fought in North Africa and the Pacific. Canada fought mostly in Europe and Italy. That is broadly correct. But while the 8th Division in the 2nd Australian Imperial Force was being rounded up in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, a Canadian-led formation was equally overwhelmed by Japanese forces in Hong Kong. Over 50 percent of the Canadians who fought there would never see home again.

In the dark days of 1942, Canada's High Commissioner to Australia, Major-General Victor Odlum, suggested two divisions come to Australia to help stem the Japanese advance. But few in Ottawa were willing to divert such substantial forces from the European theatre, beyond the formation already lost to the Japanese at Hong Kong. Still, the 1st Canadian Special Wireless Group came and around 1,000 Canadians operated from Darwin in support of special signals intelligence operations against the Japanese. Few realize just how much that secretive Canadian contribution helped. And when Australian forces were conducting amphibious operations in the islands to Australia's north, Canadians were similarly conducting amphibious operations to retake the island of Kiska in the Aleutians, northeast of Japan.

During the Korean War, Australians and Canadians would band together, much as they had done in the Anglo-Boer War, this time as part of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. Together they fought and won the battle of Kapyong in April 1951. Fighting this significant battle together, alongside US, New Zealand, and British forces in support, they held the Chinese forces at bay. At the same time Britain's Gloucestershire Regiment, operating separately in the nearby Imjin river valley, fought on its own, and was overwhelmed. The contrasting experiences demonstrated the importance of strength in unity which echoes through the years.

Almost 50 years later another Australian, British, Canadian, American (ABCA) brigade deployed on operations once more; this time in East Timor under the banner of INTERFET (International Force for East Timor). There, under Major-General Peter Cosgrove and Brigadier Mark Evans, troops from Canada and Australia, alongside British and New Zealand forces and some American specialists as well Irish troops, operated using their skills to help restore peace and stability to a newly independent nation.

More than 15 years after that fateful deployment to East Timor, Australians find themselves once again working alongside Canadians in remote places in the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrating the enduring bonds and the utility of seeking to collaborate further to bolster peace and security, not just in the Middle East but in the Asia-Pacific as well.

We started talking about Currie and Monash and the journey from being imperial siblings to strategic cousins. Yet, while reflecting back a century is a worthy endeavour in and of itself, one should remember that Canada and Australia have enduring common perspectives, interests and concerns. We could choose to largely ignore each other, but we should consciously act in pursuit of our common interests.

The Mercator projection of the globe, with Australia at one corner and Canada at the opposite corner, can lead one to believe that these two countries are too far apart geographically to bother seeking closer collaboration. But in fact Canada and Australia are roughly equidistant to the Northeast Asian hot spots – from the Taiwan Straits to the Korean Peninsula. The geostrategic dynamics at work likely will continue to draw us together.

As the Asian century unfolds, and as Canada's economic and security imperatives drive closer engagement, two more significant and enduring partners would be hard to find – a fact that should be noted by the incoming new government in Ottawa following the scheduled elections in October. Both have a stake in the capabilities and intentions of the United States Pacific Command based in Hawaii. Both have a vested interest in seeing China's rise continue on a peaceful trajectory and for the East Asian order to adjust to changing dynamics in a benign way. Both countries have strong imperatives to collaborate further with each other as well as with like-minded counterparts. There is much to be gained from closer collaboration in the future on a wide range of fronts, fostering capabilities that have repeatedly been demonstrated to be at their most effective when working together – at sea, on land, and in the air.

With this in mind, Canadian and Australian defence and foreign policy officials can work towards four key objectives:

- *Strengthen regional security.* Canada and Australia must align their separate defence and security engagement activities in East Asia, share lessons learned and look for ways to maximize their separate and collective impact in cooperating with regional friends.
- *Bolster regional governance mechanism.* Canada and Australia should strengthen regional capabilities that add to

stability, notably with peacekeeping skills, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and cyber resilience.

- *Enhance bilateral defence and security cooperation.* Both countries should deepen their individual defence and security dialogues and look for cost-effective ways to do more together across a broad sweep of areas from exercises to defence reform planning.
- *Boost defence industry and economic cooperation.* Both countries should find ways to align defence procurement plans to find cost savings and share best practices on equipment procurement.¹

For generations Canada and Australia have found themselves making uncannily similar choices concerning requirements for fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, surface and sub-surface naval vessels, distant early warning, maritime patrol and surveillance capabilities.

If we take the shipbuilding industry for example, Canada's like Australia's, has proven unsustainable on its own. While the Australian government recently announced its intention to develop a continuous build surface fleet construction program, skeptics point to the dismal track record of governments following through on such commitments beyond an electoral cycle or two.

Both countries need to replace their submarine fleets, yet neither Canada nor Australia has the critical mass to sustain its maritime defence industry single-handedly. Long-term industrial cooperation could see a longer production run and yield more benefits to industry.

Perhaps some economies of scale can also be found there with trade-offs in terms of offshore patrol vessels and ice-breakers, armoured vehicles, the development and use of remote sensors and weapons as well as our surprisingly similar indigenous-based forces. The list of potential points of

collaboration and burden sharing is long and under-explored.

Like with Currie and Monash a century ago, these are only a small handful of areas where clever and efficient collaboration could be considered as we reflect on the potential choices of these strategic cousins, Australia and Canada. ■

**This is an edited version of a talk delivered at the annual Currie-Monash Dinner held at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra on 12 August 2015.*

Dr. John Blaxland is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU who writes about military history, intelligence and security and Asia-Pacific affairs. He holds a PhD in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. His publications include *The Australian Army From Whitlam to Howard* (CUP, 2014) and *Strategic Cousins* (2006). In 2014 he was awarded a Minerva Research Initiative grant for a project, titled *"Thailand's Military, the USA and China: Understanding how the Thai Military Perceives The Great Powers and Implications For the US Rebalance."*

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ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? ASSESSING CANADA'S APPROACH TO CHINA'S RISE

by David Beitelman

When asked what keeps him up at night, Canada's new Chief of Defence Staff General Jonathan Vance named the Islamic State and Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) ranked first as a matter of practicality – Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are involved in kinetic operations against ISIL militants in Syria and Iraq. Russia's behavior in Eastern Ukraine, by contrast, may pose a long-term strategic threat, with General Vance saying, "Any actor of that size and strength that is failing to follow international norms of law and using force and a combined force of instruments of national power to change borders while not respecting the peaceful processes that ought to be used is also a threat and it could manifest itself in something far more dangerous than (ISIL) in the future."¹

What General Vance said about Russia, however, could just as easily be said of China. Granted, China has not invaded a sovereign state – an important distinction. Yet, with its recent land reclamation projects in the South China Sea, Beijing has opted for a process of incrementally shifting the status quo, often by using non-military forces, that is eerily similar. Yet, in contrast to Canadian action against ISIL and the government's bold rhetoric on Ukraine, China's action has garnered nothing more than a statement of concern from then Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird.² The same was true when China unilaterally declared an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea in November 2013.

With its muted response to China's recent behavior in Asia-Pacific region, the Canadian government has shown that it cannot see the forest for the trees. A major strategic rebalancing is currently underway in the Asia-Pacific, driven mostly by the expansion of China's economic and military power, and Canada is watching from the sidelines. Canada's approach to the Asia-Pacific region, and China in particular, ignores the implications this rebalancing has on Canadian strategic interests (economic, political, and military).

The typical characterizations of Canada's Asia-Pacific policy is that Canada wants to engage the region economically and politically, while staying distant from its security challenges, in order to: project an image of foreign policy independence from the US; position itself as an 'honest broker' in regional disputes; and avoid alienating China.³ This approach is misguided on all fronts.

The notion that Canada is able to maintain an independent foreign policy from the United States gives Canada too much credit, or those that need convincing in the region too little. While Canada can decide where and when to deploy its armed forces, the terms of its own bilateral trade deals, and other routine foreign policies, it can never escape America's shadow. Canada has made increasingly large contributions to the US-organized biannual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off the coast of Hawaii – an exercise Canada has never missed since its inception in 1971.⁴ The

United States is Canada's "most important ally and defence partner," according to the Canadian government.⁵ In late 2013, both countries signed the *Canada-US Asia-Pacific Defense Policy Cooperation Framework*, meant to help coordinate training operations in the region, though specifics are not publicly available. Canada is also a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, which the government places within the broader context of strengthening "North American competitiveness."⁶ The TPP is often seen as a pillar of the US 'rebalance' to the Pacific after 2011.

Canada can maintain operational independence from the United States, but its interests in the Asia-Pacific are, on a strategic level, indecipherable from those of its southern neighbour. Both countries are invested in maintaining security and stability in the region, including freedom of navigation, a rules-based order, and economic access to "the most economically vibrant region of the world,"⁷ – all of which depend on the US remaining the dominant regional player, if only to act as an 'off-shore balancer' and keep regional power politics muted. Canada's foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific may differ in terms of tactics, but not in strategy. Pretending otherwise by staying quiet on key issues that undermine the regional strategic balance, like China's land reclamation program, is self-defeating and a wasted opportunity for Canada to have a voice in the Pacific.

Another fallacious argument – that

Canada wants to position itself as an honest broker – stems from its brief leadership role in regional Track-II diplomacy in the early 1990s, when it sponsored dialogues to help resolve disputes in the South China Sea. Yet, if Canada wishes to be a mediator to help de-escalate regional tensions, then silence is an odd policy choice. There is no reason why Canada cannot be an honest broker while still being vocal about its preference towards maintaining the strategic status quo – a preference Canada supports with its actions and stated policy goals anyways. Rather than issuing a vague statement of concern, Canada could have asserted itself in the region by offering to once-again sponsor a regional dialogue. This, in turn, would bolster Canada's bid to join the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which has never been seriously entertained because of its 'fly-by-night' reputation in the region.⁸

Even more consequential, Canada's muted response on regional security issues sends a mixed message to the countries that are also potential economic partners. On the one hand, Canada informs Asia-Pacific nations about its commitment to regional stability and security, and its interest in improving economic ties. On the other hand, when the region's largest and most ambitious state (China) threatens that stability and security, Canada can only muster a statement of concern. Some observers (James Manicom, Jeremy Paltiel) have sought to explain such behavior with reference to Canada's interest in not alienating an important economic partner like China, its inability to really modify Chinese behavior, or its lack of security concerns vis-à-vis China.⁹ These arguments reflect Canada's ignorance, willful or not, of what is at stake in the region and Canada's place within it.

When Canada fails to use even its limited

influence here, what message does it send to Canada's allies and partners in the region who *do* have immediate security concerns with China? Why should these countries support Canadian interests, like membership in EAS or ADMM-Plus, if Canada will not support their interests? Manicom is correct when he says that Canadian diplomatic support is unlikely to have much of an impact on curbing Chinese behavior. It does, however, have a considerable impact on Canada's reputation in the region and, by extension, the behavior of other regional states towards Canada. Even worse, Canada remains silent in the Asia-Pacific while flexing its muscles in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, where its military contributions are unlikely to make much of an impact either.

The argument that Canada's approach to the Asia-Pacific is heavily influenced by its desire to maintain amicable relations

HMCS *Victoria* sailing past the Japanese Ise-class helicopter destroyer at Pearl Harbour during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercises in 2014. (Image credit: Sgt Matthew McGregor, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND.)



with China is closely related, and equally misplaced. As Manicom has argued, countries with close economic ties with China – including Australia, Japan, and South Korea – have all managed to effectively pursue policies which sharply rebuke aggressive Chinese actions.¹⁰ Before meeting then Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 2006 APEC Summit, Prime Minister Harper said that Canadians “don’t want us to sell out to the mighty dollar.” However, the government soon reversed course and has been courting Chinese investment and improved trade relations since at least 2009. Highlights of these efforts include the \$15.1-billion takeover of Canadian energy company Nexen in 2013 by China’s state-owned CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), and the signing of a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) between the two countries in 2014.¹¹

Canada’s policies in the Asia-Pacific harken back to the 1990s, when China was more amenable to third-party arbitration and the stakes of maritime disputes were far less consequential. In the 1990s, China was not challenging the regional order, nor was it anywhere near its current economic or military power. Today, China speaks of an ‘Asia for Asians,’ rejects United Nations arbitration of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and warns “external countries” against “meddling” in the South China Sea.¹² While not alone in undertaking reclamation projects in those waters, China has been the most aggressive in the scope and pace of its activities.

Even more troubling, China has asserted that it has “indisputable sovereignty over



The guided-missile destroyer USS *Lassen* (DDG 82) in an underway replenishment with the the replenishment oiler USNS *Walter S. Diehl* in the South China Sea in April 2015. (Image credit: U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Lauren Chatmas.)

the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.”¹³ To back that up, China is in the midst of a comprehensive military modernization program, with a particular emphasis on its naval and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capabilities. From 2013-2014, it launched more naval vessels than any other country. The size of China’s overall naval assets dwarfs those of other states in the region. Its naval fleet includes 303 combatants, including large and small surface ships, amphibious vehicles, and 64 submarines; Japan, with the second largest, has only 67 combatants, including 18 submarines. China’s MLE assets show a similar trend, with 205 total vessels compared to Japan’s 78 (the second largest).¹⁴

China’s rapid military growth and modernization characterizes a fundamental challenge to the US-led order, of which Canada is an important part. It is, in academic parlance, a systemic challenge. And Canada cannot pretend it is immune from this challenge or that it can

remain neutral. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police “devote the largest portion of their resources allocation for counter-intelligence to countering Chinese espionage.”¹⁵ China is often attributed to numerous cyber-intrusions and thefts of Canadian commercial and government networks, with the most recent high-profile incident being the July 2014 hacking of the National Research Council’s computer systems.¹⁶ In light of these challenges, what is Canada to do?

First and foremost, Canada must speak out against any aggressive or destabilizing actions in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese or otherwise. While Canada’s diplomatic efforts are unlikely to directly affect the behavior of a large state, whether China or Japan, it helps add weight to the voices of other weaker states and reinforces the country’s regional preferences. Remaining silent is a fool’s errand; Canada’s allegiances are well known and are routinely reaffirmed through its actions. Silence only reinforces the very perceptions Canada is hoping to change. Furthermore, refraining from

chastising China's behavior puts Canada in a position of weakness in any future negotiations; it sends a signal that Canada is willing to alienate its allies in pursuit of its economic goals with China. If Canada is unable or unwilling to deploy material assets to the region, the least it can do is be vocal and assert its interests through other means.

Secondly, if Canada is as serious about engaging the region as it claims, it needs to forward-deploy naval assets. Retired Commodore Dr. Eric Lerhe has suggested embedding a frigate with the Japanese-based US 7th Fleet on a twelve-month cycle, or CP-140 aircraft and submarines to Guam or another state in the region.¹⁷ The deployment of material assets to the region is useful for two primary reasons. As Vice-Admiral Mark Norman has noted, "greater levels of presence abroad equate to higher levels of influence for Canada."¹⁸ In addition, the Asia-Pacific is a region where relationships count and where "being there with concrete assets is what matters and what opens doors in the diplomatic (and economic) realm."¹⁹

As such, embedding a frigate with the 7th Fleet is a solid policy suggestion that builds on capacities and policies which already exist; the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is uniquely capable of interoperability with the United States. If the RCN is able to get its submarine fleet to operate smoothly, it might also consider Lerhe's suggestion of forward deploying underwater assets on a sustained basis. Alternatively, Canada could consider forward deploying a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) element, with accompanying airlift capabilities. States in the Asia-Pacific region are often victim to natural disasters and being nearby will send an important message. DART elements could also train/cross-train with regional counterparts on a sustained basis, making disaster relief operations more efficient. Importantly, DART is cheaper than building and deploying an additional frigate, or deploying a submarine, even if it would not be nearly as effective as stationing naval assets in the region.

At the 2014 Shangri-La Summit, then Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird told his audience: "Canada is prepared to do its part to help strengthen peace, security and stability in Asia. And we are well positioned to do so."²⁰ The rhetoric, however, does not match the reality. The RCN is the most important service branch for Asia-Pacific engagement, but it is in the midst of a major recapitalization program which has left a resource-strapped service with even more capability shortfalls. Canada simply does not have the means to increase its physical presence in the region. The CAF are also operationally stretched, with military engagements in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and routine deployments to the Caribbean and elsewhere. The state of the CAF is a reflection of Canada's political will; large defence budgets are not particularly well received by Canadian taxpayers.

More to the point, air and army assets are of less value in the Asia-Pacific, and so pulling assets out of the Middle East or Eastern Europe would not tip the scales in any meaningful way. This underscores the importance of articulating a cohesive Asia-Pacific policy, something the Canadian government has yet to do. Australia and Japan, for example, have produced numerous reports detailing their concerns regarding China's rise and their plans for securing their interests. This makes it easier for both governments to justify their defence budget increases.²¹ Of course, Australia and Japan face far different strategic imperatives than Canada. Without doubt, Canada will never be a strategically important power in the region in the same way as Japan, for example. But it can still be useful one, particularly when it works in conjunction with its allies. If Ottawa wants a voice in the region, it needs a sustained, physical presence. Accordingly, Canada should make the necessary investments in the appropriate defence platforms, such as frigates, allowing it to make a meaningful contribution to Asia-Pacific security.

ISIL deserves a response but it is not a

strategically important fight, nor is the region as consequential as far as global order and stability is concerned. Russia's incursion into Ukraine and the seizure of Crimea are indeed troubling, and pose a direct challenge to European stability and the NATO alliance itself. China's challenge in the Asia-Pacific is more insidious and is thus all the more dangerous. The response to this challenge from the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the other states in the region, has been a hedging policy: engage China economically and encourage its participation in regional institutions while firmly challenging any attempts to unilaterally alter the status quo. This is a policy advocated by many others, including Paul Evans and Bruce Gilley, and one which Canada should adopt.²² Canada need not be needlessly bellicose towards China. But standing firm for Canadian values and interests, as well as those of our allies and partners in the region, is paramount. Neutrality is simply not an option. ■

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2015 VIMY AWARD

HUGH D. SEGAL, C.M. – CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE 2015 VIMY AWARD WINNER

28 August 2015, Ottawa. The CDA Institute is pleased to announce that the Honourable Hugh D. Segal has been unanimously selected as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2015. This prestigious award is presented annually to one prominent Canadian who has made outstanding contributions towards the security and defence of Canada and the preservation of our democratic values. The Award honours the bravery and sacrifices of the Canadian soldiers who were victorious at the Battle of Vimy Ridge in April 1917.



Mr. Segal is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of service to Canada. Among his many prominent responsibilities, he was Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Canada in the 1990s; taught at the University of Toronto Law School; and lectured in Strategic Studies on a pro-bono basis for over 20 years at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He was appointed to the Canadian Senate in August 2005.

Mr. Segal retired from the Senate in June 2014 to accept an academic appointment as Master of Massey College, Toronto. He is also an Adjunct Professor in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University and is a Lifetime Fellow of the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Mr. Segal was recently re-appointed Honorary Captain (N), Royal Canadian Navy. He has served as Chair of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and as founding Executive Vice President of the Canadian International Council. He has also served on the Council of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute, the Fort Henry Guard, Kingston General Hospital and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. He is now Chairman of the NATO Council of Canada.

Recipients of the Vimy Award include eminent Canadians, from a wide variety of backgrounds. The complete list of the recipients for the first 25 years of the Vimy Award (listed in chronological order and with their title/rank – serving or retired – when they received the award) is as follows:

- 1991 – The Right Honourable Joe Clark
- 1992 – General John de Chastelain
- 1993 – Major-General Lewis Mackenzie
- 1994 – Major-General William Howard
- 1995 – Major-General Roméo Dallaire
- 1996 – Dr. Jack Granatstein
- 1997 – The Right Honourable Brian Dickson
- 1998 – Vice-Admiral Larry Murray
- 1999 – Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile
- 2000 – The Honourable Barnett Danson
- 2001 – Air Commodore Leonard Birchall (Ret'd)
- 2002 – Colonel, the Honourable John Fraser
- 2003 – General Paul Manson
- 2004 – Dr. David Bercuson
- 2005 – Mr. G. Hamilton Southam
- 2006 – Brigadier-General David Fraser
- 2007 – General Raymond R. Henault
- 2008 – General Rick Hillier
- 2009 – Warrant Officer William MacDonald
- 2010 – The Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson
- 2011 – Major-General Jonathan Vance
- 2012 – Honorary Colonel Frederick Philip Mannix
- 2013 – Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Ret'd)
- 2014 – Honorary Colonel Blake Goldring (who dedicated the award to Warrant-Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo)
- 2015 – The Honourable Hugh D. Segal

The 2015 Vimy Award Selection Committee was composed of Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret'd) as Chair and, as Members, Lieutenant-General Guy Thibault, General Ray Henault (Ret'd), Lieutenant-General Richard J. Evraire (Ret'd), Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard (Ret'd), Vice-Admiral Ron Buck (Ret'd), Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier (Ret'd), Dr. Oonagh Fitzgerald, Mme Louise Mercier, and Mr. Richard Bertrand.

The award will be presented to Mr. Segal on Friday, 6 November, at a mixed gala reception and dinner in the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. Dinner tickets and corporate sponsorship opportunities are available by contacting Denise Lemay at denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca.

PRIX VIMY 2015

HUGH D. SEGAL, C.M. – GAGNANT DU PRIX VIMY 2015 DE L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFERENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DEFENSE

Le 28 août 2015, Ottawa. L'Institut de la CAD a le plaisir d'annoncer que l'honorable Hugh D. Segal a été choisi à l'unanimité comme lauréat du Prix Vimy 2015. Ce prix prestigieux est présenté annuellement à un canadien ou à une canadienne qui a contribué de façon exceptionnelle à la sécurité et à la défense du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le prix Vimy est ainsi nommé en l'honneur de la bravoure et des sacrifices des soldats canadiens qui ont été victorieux lors de la bataille de la Crête de Vimy, en avril 1917.



M. Segal est un canadien de grande renommée qui a démontré un dévouement hors-pair au service du Canada. Il occupa le poste de Chef de cabinet du Premier Ministre du Canada dans les années 1990; a enseigné à l'université de Toronto (Faculté de Droit); et pendant plus de vingt ans, a été conférencier invité au collège d'État-major des Forces canadiennes à Toronto. Il fut nommé Sénateur en août 2005.

Le Sénateur Segal a pris sa retraite du Sénat en juin 2014 afin d'accepter le poste de Recteur du Massey College à Toronto. Il est aussi professeur-adjoint à l'université Queen's (School of Policy Studies) et membre à vie du «Institute for Research on Public Policy».

M. Segal a récemment été nommé une deuxième fois au poste de capitaine de vaisseau (capv) honoraire, Marine royale canadienne. Il a occupé le poste de président du «Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies» et celui de vice-président fondateur du «Canadian International Council». Il siègea aussi à titre de membre du «Council of the International Institute of Strategic Studies», du «Fort Henry Guard», de l'hôpital général de Kingston et des fondations Walter et Duncan Gordon. Il est l'actuel président du «NATO Council of Canada».

Les récipiendaires du Prix Vimy sont d'éminents Canadiens provenant d'une grande variété de milieux. La liste complète des 25 premiers récipiendaires du Prix Vimy (en ordre chronologique, et incluant le titre/grade – en service ou à la retraite – qu'ils détenaient lors de leur intronisation au palmarès des lauréats du prix Vimy) est la suivante:

- 1991 – Le très honorable Joe Clark
- 1992 – Le Général John de Chastelain
- 1993 – Le Major-général Lewis Mackenzie
- 1994 – Le Major-général William Howard
- 1995 – Le Major-général Roméo Dallaire
- 1996 – M. Jack Granatstein
- 1997 – Le très honorable Brian Dickson
- 1998 – Le Vice-Amiral Larry Murray
- 1999 – Le Lieutenant-Général Charles H. Belzile
- 2000 – L'honorable Barnett Danson
- 2001 – Le Commodore de l'air Leonard Birchall (ret.)
- 2002 – Le Colonel, honorable John Fraser
- 2003 – Le Général Paul Manson
- 2004 – M. David Bercuson
- 2005 – M G. Hamilton Southam
- 2006 – Le Brigadier-général David Fraser
- 2007 – Le Général Raymond R. Henault
- 2008 – Le Général Rick Hillier
- 2009 – L'Adjudant William MacDonald
- 2010 – La très honorable Adrienne Clarkson
- 2011 – Le Major-général Jonathan Vance
- 2012 – Le Colonel honoraire Frederick Philip Mannix
- 2013 – Le Brigadier-général W. Don Macnamara (ret.)
- 2014 – Le Colonel honoraire Blake Goldring (qui a dédié le prix à l'Adjudant Patrice Vincent et au Caporal Nathan Cirillo)
- 2015 – L'honorable Hugh D. Segal

Le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy de 2015 était composé du Major-général Daniel Gosselin (ret.) qui le présidait, du Lieutenant-général Guy Thibault, du Général Raymond Henault (ret.), du Lieutenant-général Richard J. Evraire (ret.), du Lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard (ret.), du Vice-amiral Ron Buck (ret.), du Lieutenant-général Michel Gauthier (ret.), de Madame Oonagh Fitzgerald, de Madame Louise Mercier, et de M. Richard Bertrand.

Le prix sera remis à M. Segal le vendredi 6 novembre au cours d'une réception et d'un dîner de gala au Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa. On peut se procurer des billets pour le dîner et profiter d'occasions de commandites d'entreprises en joignant Denise Lemay à l'adresse denise.lemay@cdainstitute.ca.

NATO AND RUSSIA: FROM AMBIVALENCE TO DÉTENTE

by Dr. Alexander Moens

After some twenty years (1991-2014) of ambivalence, NATO and Russia are again clashing loudly in all but arms. But some NATO nations and publics are uncertain if moral and political right is actually on their side. There are scholarly and editorial commentaries that argue NATO's policy is to blame for the onset of this crisis. A prominent American realist concluded that NATO and European Union (EU) expansion as well as democracy promotion triggered Russia's actions in Ukraine.¹ Others support the Russian view that NATO broke its alleged promise to Moscow in 1990 not to enlarge into Eastern Europe.

NATO nations cannot have a coherent policy if they have no moral and political clarity on this new confrontation with Russia. We will not know what to think and do in the current 'Cold War-lite' or 'frigid peace,' unless we understand our own position and Russia's policy. My purpose in this article is to make the point that the Western position is indeed grounded in a reasonable balance of legitimacy and interest.

NATO nations do not regard peace as merely the absence of war. The true conditions of peace include principles worth keeping. NATO arose from a shared purpose for a principled peace and international order which was expressed a few years before the signing of the 1949 Washington Treaty. The 1941 Atlantic Charter between Britain and the United States declares: "certain common principles in the national policies of

their respective countries." These include values of "no territorial aggrandizement, the freely expressed will of the peoples to choose their own government, due respect for existing obligations, collaboration in economic advancement, and practicable measures to lighten the burden of armament."²

The preamble to NATO's founding document captures the common principles in the following clause: "The parties to this treaty...are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."³

The common principles derive from Judeo-Christian values of law and justice adjoined by liberal philosophy. In a nutshell, the principles rest on two enduring beliefs: liberty resides in the individual, and the organization of free individuals must be ordered by law expressing their common will. We have recently celebrated the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta, an early version of the common principles. The British Member of the European Parliament, Daniel Hannan captured the point brilliantly when he wrote that this document "raises the rules over the ruler."⁴

Of course, principles alone do not explain the rise and nature of NATO. The Anglo-American alliance of World War II and the NATO alliance are also products of history and power. The alliance against Nazism paved the way for the Brussels

Treaty of 1948 and the NATO Treaty a year later. What happened in the onset of the Cold War captures NATO's soul. The Soviet Union was a key ally of the West in defeating Nazi Germany. The Western allies and Moscow shared a common vice but lacked a common virtue. Their collaboration could not be converted into cooperation on common principles. Instead, the sharp division of beliefs between Soviet communism and Western democracy on what constitutes individual freedom, legitimate political order, and military action immediately divided the two and, as a result, divided the European continent. The NATO soul did not change after the end of the Cold War. The common principles produced action against civilian suffering in the Balkans, and again in the attempt to bring accountable government and development to Afghanistan.

This is not a story of heroes and villains. The peoples of NATO are not nicer or smarter or more moral than Russians or any other peoples. Rather, the mechanism of liberal constitutional governance is objectively and morally better. Because law and government are circumscribed by inalienable rights and the consent of the governed, this political order offers more freedom and prosperity to more people. To be sure, this is a generalization rather than a law. The government of Russia will do things that are good for the Russian people. At the same time, selfish interest or deceit do not bypass the West. Governments of NATO may do things that betray their own principles.



US soldiers on M1A2 Abrams tanks at the Adazi training area in Latvia in 2014. (Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Jeremy Fowler, US Army.)

NATO members should never mistake their common principles for their own motives or actions. The principles must be applied critically for each issue as NATO members seek to find unity of purpose.

Has NATO violated its common principles or broken its promises to set off this new conflagration with Russia?

Regardless of what constellation of organizations national leaders had in mind for the future of European affairs after 1991, nearly all former states under Soviet control in Central and Eastern Europe have joined Western economic, political, and military governance. We often hear the term “NATO expansion,” but this phrase does not express the dynamic. There is no central plan or strategy to expand NATO’s boundaries. Rather, the dynamic is of newly elected governments that come into power with mandates to join the European Union and NATO. Both organizations, in return, put on some membership

conditions in accordance to their own treaties and agreements, but generally try to accommodate (often slowly) the wish of the peoples of these states.

The question of whether NATO acted properly in this matter – in light of Russia’s evident displeasure that more and more states have joined or shown an interest in joining NATO and the EU – is a fair question, and the answer is plain. The challenge of finding balance between legitimacy and interest was indeed met by NATO. The legitimate expression of sovereign states to join international organizations of their choice is a moral principle of ancient origin and has been acknowledged in many international agreements, including in the Helsinki Final Act of 1972 with Soviet (now Russian) active consent. At the same time, NATO made sure not to move troops, bases, equipment of significance or any other military posture into the new area, expressing clearly that it did not intend to treat NATO enlargement as an opportunity to enhance its military

power vis-à-vis Russia. NATO nations affirmed this policy in the Founding Act with Russia in 1997. NATO defence budgets and troop numbers have been steadily declining and the promise of no new bases in new members has been kept. NATO has widened but not deepened. In fact, until the recent crisis, it has hollowed out in terms of military capability.

NATO, however, did err on this point once, and in so doing muddled its own record. The George W. Bush administration wanted to rapidly admit Ukraine (and Georgia) into the Alliance, even though there was no clear democratic and legally expressed will in Ukraine to do so. Several allies resisted and the 2008 NATO summit produced the unusual phrase: “We agreed today that these countries (Ukraine and Georgia) will become members of NATO.” The phrase sounded like a policy conclusion and crossed the line of NATO’s principle of receiving rather than recruiting members. The Obama administration rightly corrected this mistake. The

phrase “will join” was never repeated. Moreover, a well-meaning effort to ‘reset’ relations with Russia was undertaken with some favourable results during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. Soon after Obama’s new approach, Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovich initiated legislative change to put Ukraine back to ‘non-bloc’ status, thus removing NATO membership as a policy option.

What about broken promises? Mary Elise Sarotte has done a thorough inquiry into this allegation with diplomatic correspondence now open to scholars.⁵ To make a long story short, in early 1990, both then Secretary of State James Baker and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in two private conversations with Mikhail Gorbachev in the span of one week alluded to the notion of NATO not moving east. Kohl, of course, hoped to get Soviet agreement to German Unification. Baker spoke without fiat from George H. W. Bush and none of the Allied governments ever endorsed this or put it on paper. Even if they had, it could not have legal standing because it would violate both the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and NATO treaties. In sum, Gorbachev is right to feel aggrieved and Baker and Kohl should have been more careful with their word, but the Russian line that no NATO expansion was an agreed promise is a self-serving embellishment.

Some analysts suggest that the government in Moscow has cause to interpret the European Union’s Eastern Partnership Program launched in 2009 as a quasi-NATO expansion policy.⁶ Meant to produce deep association in many policy areas, but without actual membership in the EU, the partnership was to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskyi assert that the EU’s initiative created an “integration dilemma” or a zero-sum contest between the EU and Russia over the future economic, political and foreign policy security allegiance of the six states in question. Hence, Russia created the

Eurasian Economic Union as a counter-model.⁷

Let us be clear, Ukraine wanted to diversify its trade and economic relationship as all states do (including with China) whenever they can. In the case of the EU Eastern Partners, it generally means enhancing trade with the West, as well as China, beyond their existing trading pattern with Russia. There is an element of competition going on. States pursue their economic interest when comparing a customs union with the EU or with Russia. The freedom to engage in economic exchange as an individual and as a country stands as clear in international affairs as the freedom to join international organizations. Russia has no objective grievance with the EU regarding the Eastern Partnerships.

Russia has every right to persuade Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Union rather than the Eastern Partnership. However, when Yanukovich changed his position just days prior to signing a deal with the EU, it appears that Russia was engaging in heavy-handed linkage.

To explain the popular uprising in Ukraine, consider that Yanukovich’s about face on the EU deal followed by the \$15 billion Action Plan with Russia a month later was the straw that broke the camel’s back in terms of popular discontent in Kyiv and increasingly elsewhere in the country. The discontent had been building in reaction to Yanukovich’s amassing executive powers by changing the power of the parliament and the courts. Also, the magnitude of corruption he and friendly oligarchs undertook was even beyond the Ukrainian pale. A growing segment of the public feared that energy dependence on Russia would only worsen under Yanukovich.⁸ By cancelling the EU Partnership agreement under duress, Yanukovich gave rise to a relatively small but genuine uprising. By 24 November, the protest grew to some 100,000 people in the square.⁹ The fear that in the 2015 election Yanukovich would tie

Ukraine decisively to Putin’s approach of “sovereign democracy” meant that for many Ukrainians this was their last chance to join the West.¹⁰

Some accuse Western governments of provoking Russia by sponsoring various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to foster democratic development in Ukraine. The charge is bogus. Democracy promotion NGOs in Ukraine were not operating against Ukrainian law. Advancing democratic ideas through freedom of information is something the West should not feel ashamed about.

NATO nations stand on the political and moral high ground in the lead up to the crisis, especially when we give due credit to Obama’s multiple attempts, including on missile defence, to engage Russia as a global partner. Ultimately, it was not the competition over integration with the East or West that brought us into a renewed military standoff. The politico-military conflict broke out when Russia played bait and switch. Russia pretended that the genuine popular pressure against Yanukovich gave it a legal and moral right to grab a piece of territory (Crimea) belonging to another sovereign state and to set off and decisively sponsor a separatist struggle in the Donbas area. On those violations the UN Charter is clear.

Something has changed in Russia rather than in NATO or the EU, which explains the lead-up and final actions that triggered the crisis. The turn to the Liberal West under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s is widely considered by Russians as a failure. Russia went from corrupt Communist Party rule to even more corrupt oligarchy, during which time state assets were sold to a few while living conditions of the majority declined. Privatization is very different from establishing rule of law, private property rights, and independent courts. Political institutions did not emerge to replace or check the informal power of individual strong men. Russians continue to look

to the state as the source of authority and stability. Most Russians feel confirmed in their mistrust of all things Western. Into this authoritarian 'seed bed' stepped a strong leader who replaced the power of the oligarchs with a controlling state apparatus which runs by means of informal networks or 'sistema'.¹¹ This new ruling network in which former KGB officials play a key role is often referred to as Siloviki.¹² Unlike the oligarchs, this security-intelligence elite has an interest in Russia itself and in Russian power. Authoritarianism as practiced by Putin means the pursuit of personal and national power at the expense of international agreements when the balance of power favours Russia. The Ukrainian crisis offered an opportunity to advance Russian power.

NATO's optimal military posture continues to be maximum certainty about defence of its members while posing minimal military threat to Russia. In other words, the military employed by NATO to deal with Russia's buffer zone assertiveness must be as defensive in nature as possible. This requires a careful calibration of power; signalling that Russia cannot expand its buffer zone and that NATO will not try to roll back Russia's gains militarily.

It is not NATO's weapons, but the common principles of its members that threaten this new version of Russian authoritarianism. The most important factor for Russians themselves and for the West remains its development into a law- and institution-based society in which the rules are raised above the ruler. There are three things NATO nations must not do: blame themselves for the crisis because, as I have argued, that is factually and normatively incorrect; second, overreact by turning NATO away from a defensive posture; and third, sacrifice the democratic and commercial development of countries around Russia that want to move closer to the West for the sake of Russia's so-called need for a buffer zone.

The influence of NATO's (and the EU's) common principles is what matters. If our defence can be so clear as to produce a new détente with Russia, that is a good outcome. It buys time and time is on our side. ■

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Notes

1. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs* 93, 5 (September/October 2014): pp. 77-89.
2. Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941, as posted by the Avalon Project, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>.
3. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (italics added).
4. Daniel Hannan, "The Magna Carta — the text that makes us who we are," *National Post*, 15 June 2015. <http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/daniel-hannan-the-magna-carda-the-text-that-makes-us-who-we-are>.
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7. Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 56, 3 (2014): pp. 7-42; Neil MacFarlane and Anand Menon, "The EU and Ukraine," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 56, 3 (2014): pp. 95-101.
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9. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine in Crisis: What it Means for the West* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), pp. 49-51.
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12. For example, see Alena V. Ledeneva, *Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Ellen Mickiewicz, *No Illusions: The Voices of Russia's Future Leaders* (Oxford University Press, 2014); Peter Pomerantsev, *Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia* (Public Affairs, 2014); Keith Gessen, "What's the Matter With Russia?" *Foreign Affairs* 93, 4 (July/August, 2014): pp. 182-189; and William Zimmerman, *Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism From the Revolution to Putin* (Princeton University Press, 2014).
13. Walter Laqueur, *Putinism: Russia and its Future with the West* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015), p. 51.

THE (ALREADY) FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF CANADA'S WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT IN KANDAHAR (2006-2012)*

By Dr. Howard Coombs

A DFAIT visit to Sarpoza Prison on 10 June, 2012 has confirmed that the last of Canada's outstanding obligations in Kandahar Province, detainee monitoring, has been fully and finally discharged. The last resident Canadian officer in Kandahar will shortly depart KPRT for the final time, bringing to a close almost seven years of Canadian presence at KPRT and focused engagement in Kandahar province.

- "KPRT0579: Canada in Kandahar - Last Man Out" (10 June 2012)¹

Canada's presence in southern Afghanistan ended not with the sounds of combat but this innocuous email from the then American-led Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) signifying the end of the Canadian Whole of Government effort. Canada's experience in Afghanistan, and particularly the south, offered an unprecedented challenge to the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),² the Department of National Defence (DND), as well as a host of other departments, organizations, and agencies.

The Afghan mission context required the Canadian government to put together organizations, which did not normally work collectively on such a scale, to provide a coherent Canadian effort in conjunction with that of the international community. This meant that the sometimes conflicting

imperatives of national departments and agencies' policy and practices as well as those of our international partners, primarily the United States but including various NATO allies, had to be taken into account. All this was with an exceptionally fragile Afghan government and security apparatus; an insurgency, the strength of which had consistently been underestimated by the international community; and shifting international and national views of both counter-insurgency and nation-building. While many hard-won lessons were identified as a result of this experience, they have yet to be institutionalized. This fact has attendant implications for Canada in both the current and future domestic and international environment.

Various inter-departmental perspectives, objectives, programs, plans, and activities were evident as part of Canada's "Whole of Government" approach in Afghanistan, which evolved from 2006 to 2011. This concept also occupied Canadian implementation partners from civil society and the private sector, members of the international community, and Afghan authorities at all levels. It was creative and responsive to the exigencies of Canada's most significant intervention in any country since the Second World War. Depending on one's outlook, for some, Canada's approach to whole of government activities in Afghanistan was replete with flaws, or, alternatively, for others, rich in lessons.

In early 2011, the KPRT organized a

Lessons Learned conference to examine the multi-agency experiences of the Whole of Government effort. Key stakeholders involved in implementing Canada's Whole of Government effort were involved in the workshop jointly managed by CIDA and Task Force Kandahar, the Canadian military mission. This was the only report for the entire time that Canada was active in Afghanistan that was jointly commissioned and signed by both the Representative of Canada in Kandahar and the Commander Task Force Kandahar. The workshop produced a number of key lessons (i.e., what was and was not working) related to a number of important issue areas, including cross-department civil-military bi-national cooperation, the evolution of the KPRT, strategic communications, contracting and implementation of the 'rule of law'.³

Firstly, the need to have expertise across the domains of security, governance, reconstruction and development was highlighted. Without balanced civilian expertise and support, the host nation is unable to extend its influence into the communities. While the Whole of Government team had a good deal of sectoral and technical expertise, two areas were cited as lacking Canadian civilian proficiency in the agrarian and conflict-ridden environment of Kandahar: agriculture and justice. Secondly, the need to have key personnel assigned to other government departments and particularly the Canadian military *prior to the deployment* was brought forward.



The Canadian flag is folded during the Mission Transition Task Force (MTTF) last flag lowering ceremony at Kandahar Airfield on 1 December 2011. (Image credit: Patrick Drouin, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND.)

Understanding other departmental cultures and modes of operation would have reduced friction between different organizations, while improving communications and effectiveness.

Thirdly, the bi-national, civil-military nature of the KPRT was effective, owing to the integrated governance structure put in place by the Canadian and American leadership. It reached across the province to the districts and assisted greatly in the handover of structures, programming, and operations. Fourthly, the need for the civilian agencies of the Canadian government to be able to communicate to the media was emphasized. While DND has great latitude in dealing with the media, the former DFAIT and CIDA did not, with a commensurate negative impact in informing the Canadian public of their activities and achievements. Fifthly, there is a need to standardize contracting procedures across the Canadian Whole of Government effort. While the practices of the Canadian Armed Forces⁴ and DND are flexible and were deemed to represent 'best practices,' those of other departments were seen as, at times, problematic and cumbersome.

Finally, while Canadian expertise was recognized in the area of rule of law, a more comprehensive and detailed program that would reach to the districts and their people would have been more efficacious.

As Canada's experience in Kandahar seems to indicate, twenty-first century interventions will likely require teams of people familiar with each other and their capabilities. This suggests the need for the establishment of integrated professional development systems and the wider use of inter-department assignments to increase operating familiarity between government departments – including DND, today's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development (DFATD), and others. Additionally, the Canadian government needs to increase its pool of deployable capabilities, on top of developing Whole of Government structures that contain a necessary cross-spectrum of skills and attributes, which can deploy quickly to conflict or post-conflict areas.

Canadian development specialist Andy Tamas advocates a "hybrid" organization

consisting of "an integrated team of soldiers, development workers, diplomats and others who can protect themselves." Such an organization would be funded and resourced sufficiently to deploy quickly and commence working effectively wherever required, regardless of security concerns.⁵ While Tamas' proposal is geared more at the international rather than national level, the ability to create, deploy and sustain such a structure over the duration of the mission would permit Canada to maintain the skills and relationships so arduously gained over the length of the Afghanistan experience. For it to succeed, Canada's capability and capacity must be improved, likely within existent funding envelopes. This effort will be somewhat painful, to be sure, but the cost of not doing so far outweighs any budgetary constraints that will result from current strategic reviews. Tamas aptly captures this with the comment that "unstable regions affect us all"⁶ and in a global community of nations this is truer now than ever before – a situation that will not change for the foreseeable future.

While these concepts have been clearly articulated, little has been done in the intervening years to institutionalize the lessons identified – to make them lessons learned. As the Canadian government looks forward towards involvement with other fractured and war-torn environments, like Iraq and Syria, as well as threats at home, it needs to heed the lessons identified by our contribution in southern Afghanistan and increase the effectiveness of its Whole of Government efforts. Only then could it meet the exigencies of the demands of the international and domestic environments. Otherwise, in the well known and much over used words of philosopher George Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the past

are condemned to repeat it.”⁷

Sadly, we may no longer have the same luxury of time to re-identify these recent lessons and Canadians will bear the consequences of national ill-preparedness in meeting the complex and nuanced challenges which are the hallmark of this century. ■

**In part, this article uses research from Howard G. Coombs, Canadian Whole of Government Operations Kandahar – September 2010 to July 2011, Vimy Paper (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, December 2012). I would like to thank Lindsay Coombs of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and Anne Lavender of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development for their assistance in editing this article.*

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Notes

1. KPRT Email dated 06/13/2012 10:34 AM, n.p. In possession of the Author.
2. In June 2013, the former DFAIT and CIDA merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD).
3. Taken from Canada, Department of National Defence, “3350-1 (JLLO) ‘Report On Kandahar Whole Of Government Lessons Learned Workshop,’ 02 June 2011,” 2 pp.; and also, Canada, “Kandahar Lessons Learned Workshop, Task Force Kandahar and Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, 24 February 2011.” Both documents in possession of the Author.
4. The title Canadian Forces was changed to Canadian Armed Forces in March 2013.
5. Andy Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), p. 219.
6. Ibid., p. 223.
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CONTRIBUTING TO THE LEGACY: GERTRUDE KEARNS, *THE ART OF COMMAND*, AND THE DEVELOPING MEMORY OF THE AFGHAN WAR

By Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle

How will future generations remember Canada's mission in Afghanistan? What will be its legacy? It is perhaps too early to tell. Combat operations ceased in 2011 while complete withdrawal of Canadian military personnel occurred only in 2014. But the lasting memory of Afghanistan has already started to take shape. The images of ramp ceremonies in Kandahar, repatriation ceremonies in Trenton, and the long convoy of black vehicles somberly rolling down the Highway of Heroes have assumed something of an iconic quality. The participants themselves have ensured that their voices will be incorporated into whatever narrative emerges by contributing their thoughts to anthologies¹ or publishing their own full-length works.² The growth of charitable organizations to aid the military community is yet another important dimension. And so the list goes on.

Without a doubt, art strongly influences how conflicts in which Canadians have participated, as either combatants or peacekeepers, are remembered. One need only visit the Canadian War Museum (CWM) in Ottawa, where pieces from its extensive collection of war art are on display – encompassing prints, drawings, sculptures, and paintings – to see the truth of this statement.³ Artists such as Frederick Varley, Charles Comfort, and Ted Zuber

have documented through their work elements of Canada's major wars of the 20th Century – the First, Second, and Korean, respectively – and in so doing have influenced how each conflict has and will be remembered. The same also applies to artists who have recorded aspects of Canadian peacekeeping missions, like Ian Harding MacKay and his work on Somalia.

Through *The Art of Command ~ Portraits and Posters from Canada's Afghan Mission*, Gertrude Kearns has done something similar, contributing to the developing memory of Afghanistan by exploring the “inner-soldier” of many of Canada's senior military leaders from this conflict and describing the intellectual, even personal, challenges that they faced as commanders.⁴ Afghanistan will surely be remembered, at least partially, as the “Difficult War”⁵ or the “Long War.”⁶ Kearns's art begins to explain why.

The Art of Command premiered at the Fort York Visitor Centre in Toronto from 5 March until 14 June 2015. The exhibition was divided into two main sections, seemingly for reasons of space. Head-only portraits of nine senior Canadian



LAV III AS METAPHOR [Major-General David Fraser], 2015. (Image credit: Gertrude Kearns.)

commanders, all colonels and generals, were located in a separate room that began the installation. Painted on a black background, the heads are colourful and bright, mixing flesh tones and CADPAT camouflage in varying proportions. As a consequence, the portraits have a digital feel that in some instances borders on the slightly abstract. Some of the subjects gaze off into the distance, while others stare directly into the viewer's eyes. No



L-R: Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Jourdain, 2013; Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Marc Lessard, 2014; Lieutenant-Colonel François Dufault, 2014. (Image credit: Toni Hafkenscheid.)

one smiles.

The remaining pieces were located in a nearby corridor. At the entrance to the hallway, ten full-length drawings of various soldiers were presented. It is from both the head portraits and drawings that come what is arguably the most interesting part of the exhibition, the 23 texted war prints. Incorporating single words, pithy catchphrases, or complete sentences that pertain to the sitter and his experiences, each print offers a partial window into the mind of the subject. Although the prints are specific to individual commanders, in many cases they also reference the broader period in which these soldiers served. Interestingly, a few pieces include either attributable or anonymous criticism of the subject by fellow soldiers.

The selection of text was, to varying degrees, a collaborative effort between Kearns and her subject, alternating between her own sound bite-like conceptualizations, denser more journalistic text, and even script-like blocks of dialogue. The officers

did not control the text as has sometimes been assumed; the artist always drove the discussion and set the research agenda. In some cases, she asked for specific text in an officer's own words; in other instances, she morphed commentary from many officers into one voice. As a result, the text is exceptionally personal and uniquely crafted to each image, and if read carefully, gives insight into the individual as a commander and the multitude of challenges, some ultimately unresolvable, that he was forced to confront. Indeed, this body of work is as much about military concepts that interest Kearns, as it is about what actually occurred on the ground in Afghanistan. The decision to link text and image was deliberate and far from hasty – certain words simply “worked” better with certain leaders for both personal and professional reasons (and in a few cases, so that a clever play-on-words might be employed!).

For some, the prints may be endlessly distracting because in many cases so much text accompanies a subject's portrait. One

has the feeling of reading a disjointed, yet fascinating, book when viewing the pieces relating to Brigadier-General Richard Giguère (THE WAY AHEAD, artist's collection) or Colonel Ian Hope (THE LONG FIGHT, artist's collection). Viewers certainly have to work at appreciating this art. Yet, the inclusion of so much text may be a strength. In a very real sense, the texted prints are historical documents in and of themselves, recording what each soldier thought about his Afghan experience at the time that the piece was created. Like the memory of the war itself, their impressions of their own experiences may, perhaps will, change.

Early on, Kearns made the conscious decision to identify each commander on his respective piece and to secure his approval of the final product. The latter decision challenged the creative process, as there was occasionally some “push back” – some things were perhaps better left unsaid or phrased a little more diplomatically – but she wanted that. In her estimation, the back-and-

forth exchanges, when they occurred, strengthened the end result and forced her to continue learning and considering different perspectives throughout. She ultimately wanted to present an image with dynamic yet unsensational text that felt “right” for each officer, and of course, “right” for her.

The exhibition's offerings, as is usual for major shows like this, included more than just the passive display of art. During these three-and-a-half months, Kearns gave a number of lectures and guided tours to interested visitors, providing a degree of insight and behind-the-scenes commentary that would not otherwise be available. That the artist was so readily accessible was a boon for all, organizers and patrons alike. Owing to the success of the show, Kearns is hopeful that national or provincial galleries across Canada will opt to host her exhibition in the near future. By so doing, they will inevitably help preserve the memory of the war in Afghanistan through contemporary military art and simultaneously offer a

window into the myriad professional challenges that Canadian soldiers faced – and will surely face again.

The City of Toronto certainly did its part to further both of these ends. Aside from providing an *apropos* venue, it paid for both the printing and framing of the large textured prints, thereby ensuring uniformity throughout the exhibition. The City's Museums & Heritage Services also contributed to the accompanying catalogue, with Dr. Larry Ostola, the director, writing a short introductory foreword and Mr. Wayne Reeves, the chief curator, authoring an insightful essay on Kearns and her war art from the Gulf War to Afghanistan. (Kearns's own essay followed his, as do various statements from the soldiers featured in the exhibition that she gathered.) Publicizing the exhibition through both traditional and social media ensured that it received notice within and beyond the city's contemporary art scene and military garrison. Reeves and his team even suggested the title of the exhibition, Kearns having proposed something

entirely different (*CORE COMMANDS: Senior Leadership, Canada's Afghan Mission*). It is safe to say that without the City of Toronto's wholehearted support, *The Art of Command* would not have come off as well as it did. In Kearns's estimation, this exhibition was an exemplar of cooperation between artist and the expertise resident in community galleries/museums.

Gertrude Kearns has deep connections to Toronto, her home since she was three-months-old, having been born on her father's (Frederick Steiger) business trip to St. John's, Newfoundland in 1950 on the invitation of Premier Joey Smallwood. Apart from three years (1979 to 1982) in South America, predominately in Brazil, she continues to reside in the city and maintains a home/studio there. Previously affiliated with several commercial galleries and the Propeller Centre for the Visual Arts, a member-run and community-oriented gallery in the heart of downtown, she has been independent of commercial representation since 2005; the intense

L-R: SCIENCE OF WAR [Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie], 2012; JUST WAR THEORY [Brigadier-General David Fraser], 2012; HOPE OF WAR [Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope], 2012; LIGHT 'EM UP [Captain Jon Hamilton], 2013; CONCEPT AND WAR [Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance], 2013 (Image credit: Toni Hafkenscheid.)





ANCIENT/MODERN 2006 Col M Hussin Andiwali (ANP PRT Kandahar after the VBIED hit Jan 15 2006). (Image credit: Gertrude Kearns.)

and particular nature of her military work has not meshed easily with their outlooks. Given her need for completely independent access to the military and flexibility in terms of both the content of her pieces and deadlines, she has preferred to remain autonomous. This approach, the consequence of which is that she manages every aspect of her career, strongly influenced *The Art of Command* – she desired to have a comprehensive body of work finished before mounting an exhibition, and to avoid altogether both commercial pressures and the need to justify her work to a civilian audience prematurely, which an association with a gallery would have occasioned.

Kearns has worked, both officially and unofficially, as a Canadian military/war artist for over two decades. Perhaps owing to her independence, private collectors, national institutions and universities, more so than commercial galleries, have gravitated towards and shown her work. Her paintings can consequently be found at the CWM; Canadian Forces College,

Toronto; National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Ottawa; the Art Gallery of Nova Scotia, Halifax, and so on. Significantly, she has also been the “war artist in residence” at the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) in Toronto, a private members’ organization that promotes education on matters related to defence, security, and foreign affairs. Since 1989, she has had numerous solo exhibitions in Toronto and has won several awards from such organizations as the Ontario Society of Artists and the National Aviation Museum. From 2003 to 2005,

following a decade of researched projects, she participated in the Canadian Forces Artists Program (CFAP), a military-run initiative designed to record military activity both at home and abroad through art.

Working completely outside of the CFAP framework, Kearns travelled on contract to Afghanistan in 2006 and spent four-and-a-half weeks with Task Force Afghanistan (TFA), Rotation 0, being embedded with the Canadian Battle Group centred on the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry in Kandahar. And, just prior to returning to Canada, she also found herself in Kabul with the Strategic Advisory Team, a Canadian undertaking to build capacity within Afghan government departments through mentorship. Then Colonel Steve Noonan, the commander of TFA in 2006, conceived of and organized the contract, the time spent in Afghanistan being an opportunity to collect material for the art that would follow later that year.

While overseas, Kearns completed more than 50 small sketches and took reference photographs “outside the wire.” She completed many large paper studies in her Toronto studio afterwards. The body of work that resulted – six canvases, all three feet by four feet – were produced within six months of her return to Toronto and have since been installed in six different locales throughout the Department of National Defence (DND). The canvases were framed and delivered to Colonel Noonan at NDHQ in the fall of 2006. These six canvases, it should be noted, were very different from the subsequent independent (i.e., non-commissioned) works that make up *The Art of Command*; they incorporated a minimal amount of text and, in Kearns’s words, were “basically image pieces.”

Kearns’s exposure to the Canadian Afghan mission via TFA was the genesis for what would culminate in 2015 with *The Art of Command*. This latter undertaking had the full support and unprecedented cooperation of DND despite it being conducted outside of its purview and control. It took about 10 years to create, with the last piece completed in early 2015, just in time for exhibition. (For the sake of comparison, that’s the entire length of Canada’s combat mission and follow-on training mission, plus a few more years on top of that for good measure!)


And there is ample reason why the entire project took a decade. Kearns first had to find her subjects. She approached many of them on her own initiative; her connection to the RCMI facilitated a number of introductions, but it was mostly her already-established reputation as an artist that opened the door. Additionally, she “harassed” some officers whom she hoped would participate (Major-General David Fraser finally relented after three years of hounding!), while sympathetic officers, like Noonan, exerted influence from within the military. To quote Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, the commander of Task Force 3-06, “But gentle coercion by my superior chain of command and even

less gentle persuasion by Gertrude prevailed, and here I am [appearing in the exhibition].”

Then, multiple sittings in Kearns’s studio had to be scheduled. For senior officers in an army still engaged in Afghanistan, whether fighting the Taliban or training Afghan security forces, this was not always an easy task. Indeed, sittings were sometimes scheduled up to a year in advance. Colonel Ian Hope found time *en route* from Stuttgart, Germany to Edmonton in 2014 to meet with Kearns. No one ever cancelled. Kearns always acknowledges the respect and commitment these officers showed to her and her project: “It never ceased to amaze me that these commanders were willing to schedule work time for the project. I never took it for granted.” And then the difficult task of capturing images and deciding on text began!

In the exhibition at Fort York, Wayne Reeves, the curator, gave an appreciative nod towards Steve Noonan, Kearns’s initial 2006 “employer.” Although Noonan is featured throughout *The Art of Command*, Reeves installed a 2006 ink head study of Noonan with the collection of head-only portraits, all of which date between 2011 and 2014, to recognize his seminal role in facilitating an in-theatre contract that would ultimately provide Kearns with a foundation from which to expand in order to realize a much larger goal. Although stylistically the piece was “the odd man out,” as the nine large heads, all the same size, formed a visually-cohesive group, the ink study satisfied his sense of context and orientation. In a somewhat removed sense, Noonan was responsible for the project, and this responsibility had to be acknowledged.

But Noonan did more than just get Kearns to Afghanistan, where her larger and more ambitious ideas began to germinate. He reaffirmed that she was onto “something.”



PLAN/LEAD 2006 Colonel Steve Noonan. (Image credit: Gertrude Kearns.)

The ink study, which Reeves installed as an homage, proved to be a turning point in the progression from the TFA contract to the independently-pursued and more intellectual and conceptual works that followed. Kearns used this image as the ground to create her first and most visually-simple texted print, with the digitally-overlaid words “PLANNING FROM THE FRONT” appearing at the top, “LEADING FROM THE REAR” at the bottom, and Noonan’s head and shoulders squarely in the centre (PLAN/LEAD, artist’s collection).

Among other meanings – like where is the front in an asymmetric war? – the poster, based as it is on an ironic and supposed oxymoron, is meant to suggest that many operations had an Afghan-face, that Canadians may have planned them, but that it was Afghans (with help) that saw them through. Noonan initially questioned her wording, but after Kearns defended the content, he stated over

email, “You have created a working concept.” This print proved to be a watershed, establishing a starting point for the larger body of work to come, one that would explore through image and text the tactical, operational and strategic considerations that Canada’s leaders faced in Afghanistan. As Kearns said, Noonan was “the hinge into the concept.” “Once that initial piece was under my belt,” she recalled, “I knew I had a unique direction for my art that would include both leadership and mission concepts; I could breathe a sigh of relief.” The many texted prints that followed, when combined with the portraits, comprise *The Art of Command*.

Mixing recent military history with contemporary art, Gertrude Kearns has used large format portraits and texted prints as the jumping-off point to explore the complexity of command in modern, asymmetric warfare. *The Art of Command* is far from a passive exhibition, for it invites viewers to engage with the history of the mission and a handful of its protagonists, admittedly a very important handful. For Kearns, personally, it is imperative that her work challenge traditional notions of military art; all of her art has done that, and this material is no different. If nothing more, the collection prompts viewers to think about the awesome responsibilities that Canada’s soldiers held in Afghanistan and the complex and ever-changing environment in which those responsibilities were exercised. How this art will influence the memory of Afghanistan in the decades to come – significantly, marginally or not at all – remains to be seen. Only time will truly tell. ■

Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle is a Research Fellow at the CDA Institute. He was most recently employed at the Canadian War Museum as the post-1945 historian. He is the principal editor of In Their Own Words: Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery

from Afghanistan, 2001-2007 (Kingston: CDA Press, 2013), a collection of first-person narratives by 23 Canadian soldiers who earned some of the nation's highest honours for their actions in Southwest Asia. He would like to thank Ms. Gertrude Kearns for her assistance – without it, this article would never have happened.

Readers interested in acquiring collectable small edition, original fine art prints in various sizes from *The Art of Command* are encouraged to contact the artist directly at gertrude_learns@hotmail.com.

Notes

1. For instance, Melanie Graham, ed., *Afghanistan: A Canadian Story, 2001-2014* (Ottawa: John McQuarrie Photography, 2014); Kevin Patterson and Jane Warren, eds., *Outside the Wire: The War in Afghanistan in the Words of Its Participants* (Toronto: Random House, 2007); and Craig

Leslie Mantle et al., eds., *In Their Own Words: Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery from Afghanistan, 2001-2007* (Kingston: CDA Press, 2013).

2. For instance, Harold Ristau, *At Peace with War: A Chaplain's Meditations from Afghanistan* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2012); Robert Semrau, *The Taliban Don't Wave* (Toronto: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012); Ryan Flavelle, *The Patrol: Seven Days in the Life of a Canadian Soldier in Afghanistan* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2011); Ray Wiss, *FOB DOC: A Doctor on the Front Lines in Afghanistan: A War Diary* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009); and Ray Wiss, *A Line in the Sand: Canadians at War in Kandahar* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010).
3. A glimpse of the CWM's collection is to be had through Dean F. Oliver and Laura Brandon, *Canvas of War*

~ *Military Art Treasures from the Canadian War Museum* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2000).

4. See also, Craig Leslie Mantle, "Commanding Art: Gertrude Kearns and Canada's Afghan Mission," *CDA Institute Blog: The Forum*, 9 June 2015, <https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/commanding-art-gertrude-kearns-and-canada-s-afghan-mission>.
5. A phrase that has already seen some use. See Emily Spencer, ed., *The Difficult War: Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces* (Kingston and Toronto: CDA Press and Dundurn Press, 2009).
6. Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, "Agility and Endurance: Task Force Orion in Helmand," in Patterson and Warren, eds., *Outside the Wire*, p. 163.

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THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN “SPECIAL” DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP: NEW CHALLENGES AND DEMANDS

By Dr. Rob Huebert

The Canadian strategic environment has begun one of its most challenging transformation since the end of the Cold War. There have been subtle but fundamental changes to some of the most important elements of Canadian defence and security policy. However these transformations are occurring in a manner that is not an immediately apparent and are still in flux.

Since the early days of the Second World War the core the Canadian security requirement has been to ensure that the United States is satisfied with Canadian defence efforts. Its large geographical size combined with its small population has always made an independent security policy difficult, if not impossible. But its geography also placed it as a neighbour to the United States. As the Americans shifted from being a significant military power to the world's strongest superpower, Canadian defence security was ultimately “guaranteed” by the Americans. The only provision, first established by the *Kingston Disposition*, was that Canada needed to do only enough to ensure that the Americans did not feel vulnerable to any action or inaction taken by Canada. As long as this requirement was met, all other security requirements and actions were discretionary. It did not so much matter what Canada specifically did, so long as the Americans believed its neighbour was doing enough to prevent a third actor from being able to directly threaten the United States from Canadian territory.

With the defeat of the Axis powers and rise

of the Soviet Union, Canada endeavoured to demonstrate to the United States that it was serious in its efforts to meet the new Soviet threat. The focus of Canadian security and defence policy was to provide for the shared responsibility of defending North American aerospace defence and for providing for the maintenance of deterrence in both the Arctic and Europe. From an institutional perspective, this resulted in Canada's full participation in the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Command agreement with the United States and full participation in NATO with the Americans and Europeans. These two core alliances have acted as the central element of Canadian defence policy since the 1950s to the current era.

Canada has developed other elements related to its security and defence policy, including long-term participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. But these efforts have always been secondary and ultimately discretionary to the core requirements of Canadian defence policy. Canada has always been able to pick and choose which exercises to support and by what means.

Canadian security and defence policy has also been based on the assumption that it was best served through the procurement and development of military forces that could be relatively easily integrated with American forces. This has resulted in a long-term procurement history that has normally seen Canadian Armed Forces buying or building military equipment that is combat capable and generally in

the top tier of fighting capability, therefore allowing Canada to operate with the Americans worldwide when Ottawa decided to act.

In effect, Canadian strategic and defence policy was relatively straightforward. Keep the Americans satisfied and Canada will be protected. As a result, there has been little effort to develop a uniquely Canadian strategic understanding of the international threat environment or a determination as to the core security threat to Canada. The Department of National Defence has made some effort to understand the various threats facing Canada over time, such as when it was asked to create a specific defence policy, often expressed as a white paper. But it is very difficult to identify any sustained long-term Canadian effort to isolate threats to the country's security, at least outside those developed in American and/or NATO threat evaluations. Even when a large number of Canadian are killed in the Air India terrorist attack in June 1985, Canada did not deem it necessary to develop a sustained anti-terrorist set of policies until the American were attacked on 11 September 2001.

Where it is possible to find any indication of an independent Canadian security rationale, it has been to ensure that Canadian economic security is protected. This again ties back to the Americans. Ensure that the United States is satisfied with Canadian defence efforts, and its economic prosperity will continue through good relations with the Americans. In those periods when the Americans



Canadian and US soldiers during the field training portion of the Sabre Strike exercise in the Baltics on 16 June 2014. (Image credit: Staff Sgt. Brett Miller, US Army National Guard.)

become concerned about the perceived inadequacy of Canadian defence response, it is not worries about the American perceived threat that drives Canadian decision-makers but rather a concern that the Americans could take action that would threaten the country's economic prosperity.

Ultimately, this 60-year old relationship has allowed the Americans to feel secure in North America, while ensuring that Canada is protected and can focus on its own economic security. However, there are now clear indications that this core relationship is entering a transformational period. Elements of the core Canadian-American security relationship are now undergoing a shift. This may be one of the periodical alterations that have occurred in the past, or it may be the beginning of a much more fundamental shift.

The end of the Cold War combined with the development of the new threat of international terrorism has resulted in a number of changes to the Canada-US security relationship. The American focus shifted from state-based threats to that of

non-state actors. While the US remains officially committed to both NORAD and NATO as well as the maintenance of its nuclear deterrent, it has become increasingly focused on meeting the threat posed by international terrorists groups and the states that support them.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks altered substantially American understandings of national security. Some senior American decision-makers such as Hillary Clinton originally believed that the terrorists had used Canada as an entry point into United States. While Clinton and other American leaders came to recognize that this was not the case, the attacks led to a major transformation of the Canadian-American border. New security steps taken by the Americans drove home the fact that, while the two North American partners maintain a very close relationship, Canada is a foreign country. Throughout the Cold War, the ease of mobility across the border had always been seen as a point of pride for Canada. Proclaimed as the world's longest undefended border, it had been seen as evidence of the special relationship that existed between the two countries. As

the Americans have deemed it necessary to improve the security of this border, one unintended consequence has been a further division of the two countries beyond geography.

Since the attacks, a series of presidents have entered office who do not appear to believe as strongly as their predecessors in the special relationship between Canada and the United States. Both the Bush Jr. and Obama administrations have not expressed the same appreciation of Canada as has been the case in the past, and both administrations have also ceased engaging in many of the ceremonial actions that reflect this friendship. The first foreign visits of these leaders have not been to Canada, as was the tradition. Of course, this may just be specific to the two individuals who have held office in this time. But it could indicate a shift in the overall American appreciation of the relationship.

At the same time, the attacks of 9/11 have also had an important impact on the relationship between Canada and NATO. Following the attacks, the Paul Martin government invoked Article 5 of NATO's

Charter to approve the deployment of military force to Afghanistan. This was to assist the Americans in their efforts to destroy the terrorists based within that country and those who supported them. The Canadian effort was substantial and long-term. Canada initially deployed much of its navy to support the American efforts to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda, followed by a significant commitment of air and land assets – and ultimately the Canadian Armed Forces paid a heavy price in blood and treasure.

Traditionally, Canadian decision makers engaged in NATO operations in part to gain a “seat at the table.” In a case of the Afghan mission, Canada was clearly engaged at a level that entitled it a “seat at the table” and beyond. The question that arose – one that has not yet been publicly answered – is what did this actually mean? What were the benefits of being such an important actor in this war? It is entirely possible that Canadian military and political leaders, after all of these years of wanting a larger voice in NATO’s councils, may have discovered that it was not all that we had assumed it to be. Of course, it is also entirely possible that there have been important undisclosed benefits, and Canadian decision-makers were therefore satisfied with the result.

But two other factors must also be considered. First, there have been suggestions that Canada was dissatisfied with the overall commitment of some NATO partners in this conflict. While never officially stated, there are indications that Canadian officials did not believe all the NATO partners were properly engaged in assisting the Americans who were attacked. Second, the economic crisis that exploded in 2008 has meant that the Europeans focus on NATO is disjointed. The lack of European attention has been exasperated by their divided response to increased Russian assertiveness policies and in particular the Russian intervention into the Ukraine. All of this has a significant impact on the alliance and will increasingly complicate Canada’s efforts to keep NATO as one of its core defence

pillars. Traditionally Canadian officials were able to rely on NATO as a means of demonstrating their commitment to collective security to the Americans. Given that the alliance faces significant challenges today, the question remains as to whether Canadian officials will be able to continue with this approach.

The Canada-US relationship in NORAD has also begun to transform. The increased Russian bomber patrols in the Arctic has seemingly re-energized the need to modernize NORAD’s capabilities. This means updating the various missile and aircraft detection systems. It will also mean Canada will have to update its increasingly aging fighter aircraft fleet. With the political uncertainty surrounding the Canadian efforts to acquire the F-35 as a replacement, it is unclear how this will proceed. Furthermore, any modernization effort will be very expensive in addition to the acquisition of new fighters. All these factors will require important considerations and actions on the part of Canada, and will be politically difficult. But, in the absence of such Canadian action, it may be possible that the United States will become concerned regarding the Canadian commitment to the shared defence of North America.

Finally, one can also discern a shift in American perceptions of Canada’s role in the economic security of the United States. Nowhere is this clearer than in the supply of oil. Canada has been one of the United States largest suppliers of energy. American reaction to Pierre Trudeau’s National Energy Program became one of the most important factors that led to the free trade negotiations. In return for the elimination of rising American tariffs on Canadian goods, Canada agreed to a common energy market for North America. While more attention was placed on suppliers such as Saudi Arabia or Venezuela, Canada became one of the American largest suppliers of oil in the 1990s. Judging from actions such as the US reluctance to commit to major pipeline projects, this special economic relationship is increasingly now under question from

Washington’s perspective. It may be that the current administration is more focused on the environmental impact of a continued reliance on oil. It could also be that the US feels less dependent on Canada as before, given the development of new sources of American production through shale oil in Texas and North Dakota. On the other hand given the chronic drought conditions now plaguing much of the southwest United States, a question that should be asked – will the demand for fresh water replace the American dependence on Canadian oil? Of course the difficulty for Canada is that unlike with the case of oil, there is no agreement within Canadian society as to whether or not its fresh water should be placed on sale? This alone raises the question as to what an increasingly water deprived United States may do, if Canada ultimately decided against selling water.

So what does this all mean? At a minimum, it suggests that the special relationship between Canada and the United States – which has provided for the foundation of Canadian security since at least the Second World War – is undergoing changes. There is not yet enough evidence to suggest a fundamental recasting of the relationship, but Canadian leaders need to ensure that they do not simply assume all is proceeding as normal. This relationship is central to Canadian international and economic security. If the Americans are not as convinced this relationship is something “special,” as did their predecessors, then Canada will face an increasingly difficult challenge ahead. ■

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THREE QUESTIONS: THE BASIS OF A NEW DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

by Brigadier-General Dr. James Cox (Ret'd)

There have been considerable geopolitical/strategic, technological, and global economic changes since Canada's last real defence policy statement in 2005.¹ Another defence policy review is therefore long overdue. The next government should waste no time getting on with it, but rather than immediately diving into the same old issues of personnel strengths, new aircraft, promised ships, and more Arctic exercises, the next defence policy review should feature up-front, in-depth thinking about the basic nature of the Canadian national defence enterprise.

Disappointingly, Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government is the only Canadian government since the Second World War to not publish an explicit national defence policy. Many will shout, hold on a minute! What about the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)? Is that not the government's expression of national defence policy? In a word: no. The CFDS has been inadequate and unaffordable since it was published in 2008. It fails to address all components of the overall national defence enterprise, offers no substantive political objectives, and ignores any sense of prevailing against adversaries in the post-modern security environment. The CFDS aspires only to be "a detailed roadmap for the modernization of the Canadian Forces," in the words of the prime minister at the beginning of the document.² A new, full defence policy review should first address truly foundational policy issues that go well beyond mere procurement.

Accordingly, this article identifies three fundamental questions that should form a basis for a thorough and comprehensive defence policy review, before government moves on to develop a new national defence policy. Will we fight? Why will we fight? How will we fight?

These three fundamental questions are examined in sections that follow. Time and space prohibit full answers, so the focus falls on some of the larger complex issues involved in pursuing full responses. In the end, it seems each question might produce different answers, depending on whether each is examined in context of defending Canada, defending North America in concert with the United States, or contributing to the wider global peace and security environment.

The Basis of a True Defence Policy

The essence of a true defence policy lies in its conceptualization of Canada's ultimate capability to defend our country, preserve our liberal democratic way of life, and protect our state institutions from external threats. It should highlight and outline our determination to exploit the integrated and coordinated energy of all elements and instruments of state power, up to and including the use of maximum violent force as a last resort. Such a declaration should not only be aspirational, but should also provide enduring inspiration to all Canadians.



National defence policy must further provide clear and defined reference to our national values and national interests, being sure to differentiate between the two. A value represents an enduring and just good that appeals to all Canadians, something that is worth fighting and dying for. Government has been relatively consistent in identifying freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights as Canada's national values and, to be fair, these seem eminently sensible.

Interests also have intrinsic worth. They are more tangible derivatives of values. For instance, if Canadians value freedom, one of the derived interests would be the defence of our political independence, further supported by a prosperous economy, another national interest. The

promotion and defence of our national interests are also worth great sacrifice in blood and national treasure.

To set the foundation for eventual government consideration of values, interests, and political objectives, three fundamental questions should first be explored in any defence policy review:

- Will we fight?
- Why will we fight?
- How will we fight?

Complete responses to these simple but still difficult questions require deep thought, honest introspection, and the courage to see our society as it really is. Full and intelligent answers will provide the basis for a new defence policy.

Will We Fight?

Perhaps the most fundamental question to be considered is: Will we fight? History says we will ... sometimes. It is unlikely, anytime soon, that Canada will face the degree of existential danger endured by Russia in the Second World War, or by Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973. Nonetheless, it must be asked whether Canadians and their government are determined and prepared to fight for their national existence, should it become necessary.

Some will think that such a discussion is unnecessary, if not misguided. "Of course we will fight if we need to, but we don't have to talk about it," they might say. However, despite history, it is not categorically established that Canadians will fight in all circumstances. We have never faced an existential catastrophe with our backs to the wall (and the only possible exception, the War of 1812, can only in the loosest sense be considered a 'Canadian' war). Admittedly, and fortunately, such a discussion may be largely hypothetical, at least at present. But it is necessary that it take place for the purpose of laying down a basic conceptual marker.

In thinking about possible cataclysmic circumstances in which Canada might find itself, Douglas Bland's framework of two *defence imperatives* and one *strategic choice* is helpful.³ Bland's first defence imperative – the defence of Canada – leads one to expect Canadians would fight if the country's very existence was threatened. But do all Canadian citizens and their government see the ultimate defence of Canada as their collective responsibility? Are all, or enough, of our multicultural diaspora sufficiently loyal and committed to Canada to fight if needed? Will we fight for, or with, *all* our allies or only with *close* allies? Will the diaspora vote count affect the government's decision to fight? Any defence policy review faces a sophisticated challenge in deriving a fundamental principle that might motivate all Canadians to fight in our own defence. As thinking moves away from clearly fighting at home for ourselves to fighting elsewhere or for others, our motivations become more complicated.

Why Will We Fight?

If a defence policy review recognizes Canadians will fight in their own defence, the next large issue to be tackled is defining the conceptual argument for why we might fight abroad. Bland's framework is of some assistance here too, because the second defence imperative – defending North America in cooperation with the US – suggests we would also fight an existential threat to the continent. Do we really see it as our role to fight equally hard in all continental locales, or do we fight just hard enough and/or frequently enough to retain the confidence, support, and protection of the Americans? Do we help defend the Aleutian Islands as robustly as we might defend Vancouver Island? What about the Polynia Islands? Do we see Mexico as part of North America, to be defended? The Gulf of Mexico? Cuba? Do we see Canada as part of North America in a way that government should expect, and accept, reciprocal help from others (e.g.,

Mexico?) to defend Canadian territory? Beyond North America, Canadian inclination to fight seems to wane when considering our one strategic choice – contributing to international peace and security. How might our will to fight in these circumstances be expressed as a principle of action within national defence policy? Consider some recent history, in which rhetoric outpaced action.

During a March 2006 visit to Canadian troops at Kandahar Airfield, the Prime Minister was reported as saying, "You can't lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader.... There will be some who want to cut and run, but cutting and running is not my way and it's not the Canadian way."⁴ However, in early 2008, the government appointed the *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, led by former Liberal Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, concluded that Canada should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan if additional troops and more equipment, particularly troop carrying helicopters, were not provided.⁵ The report also encouraged a general winding down of Canadian combat activity in favour of a re-orientation to a training role, which eventually occurred in 2011. Neither the government nor the Manley panel showed any political will to prevail in the fight against the Taliban, even though government rhetoric persistently focused on the direct national security threat posed by terrorists in Afghanistan; highlighting the importance of helping to develop a strong and democratic Afghanistan that would never again become a terrorist haven.

Also in 2008, a dramatic global financial collapse led to massive stimulus programs that sent western governments deep into deficit. Canada's fiscal surplus was eliminated, the federal deficit ballooned to historic proportions, and the Afghanistan mission suddenly became much more expensive to maintain, at a time the Canadian economy could not afford it. Canada, along with its NATO



Two CF-18 Hornets resume their activities over Iraq during Operation IMPACT in February 2015.. (Image credit: Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND)

allies, would soon wind down their role in Afghanistan and most Canadian troops would come home by the end of 2014. National defence, diplomatic, and development assistance budgets all faced considerable and continuing cuts. It seems that leading and doing our bit have a price limit.

Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan offers a good example of both why Canada fought and then why Canada didn't fight. Our Afghanistan mission pushed government to the point of deciding whether it was in our best interest to fight in Afghanistan in order to counter global terrorism, or to not fight abroad in order to avoid over-burdening the Canadian economy. In 2005, we decided in favour of the former. In 2008 we decided in favour of the latter. Why? The salience of our interests changed. While there were certainly partisan political machinations in play at the time, in the end, our mission in Afghanistan presented more of a threat to the Canadian economy than it did to the Taliban. We had to (and were able to) stop fighting.

Once clear on why we fight, a defence policy review should move on to exploring how we will fight.

How Will We Fight?

This question demands a more profound discussion than is normally found in the usual defence debates prevalent in Canadian academia or media. The essence of this question revolves around such fundamental concepts as national mobilization; the role of various societal components in the defence of Canada at home and abroad; the composition, organization, location, equipping, and training of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); and the constitutional, legislated and customary controls of the CAF (the relationship between government, the population, and the profession of arms, etc.).

There is general acceptance that modern defence operations take place in a joint, interagency, multinational, and public environment (JIMP). Is government structured and run in a manner that allows for defence contributions from departments, other than the Department of National Defence (DND), to act in a whole-of-government manner at home and abroad? Most departments (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Public Safety, Transport Canada) lack any 'surge' capability to act alongside the CAF abroad in a timely manner. Perhaps more to the point,

is there any acceptance outside of DND and the CAF that the national defence enterprise involves more than soldiers and defence bureaucrats?

One should also consider the historical habits of a "Canadian way of war," so ably described in a book edited by Colonel Bernd Horn.⁶ General Jonathan Vance has described Canada's approach to fighting as "contribution warfare." He describes this approach as follows: "Canada has never taken full responsibility for running (and therefore the outcomes of) an overseas

theatre of operation, preferring or being relegated instead to a supporting role in providing Canadian blood and treasure to shared strategic objectives."⁷ Do we now need to do otherwise?

How will we fight in concert with allies in the future? It might be time to 'come clean' and clarify our premier intention to remain interoperable with American forces. Will we act only in concert with US forces and admit to not wanting to deploy CAF elements under incompetent United Nations military command, on missions that do not serve Canadian interests. Recent history shows our clear preference for acting alongside the US and other close allies, such as Australia, France, the UK, and the Netherlands. This inclination becomes even clearer when turning questions around and asking: Would we have deployed to Afghanistan if the US had not? Would we have bombed Gaddafi if the US had not? Would we now be bombing the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria if the US was not? Would we be in NATO if the US was not? An honest appraisal of the impact of our alliances on how we will fight will be critical to the honest formulation of any future defence policy.

Organization is another consideration in how we fight. It is time to examine exactly what comprises the national defence intelligence enterprise. Contrary to popular (and lazy) opinion, it is much more than the CAF. Do not all other armed elements within Canadian society have an ultimate role in contributing to the defence of Canada when called upon? Consider that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has served with the CAF abroad, as have officials from the Canada Border Services Agency, Correctional Service Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), to name just a few. CSEC, in fact, is involved in defence operations daily. How about the Canadian Coast Guard? Do armed agencies at the provincial, territorial, and municipal level have a role in fighting for Canada? Any defence policy review should come to grips with a modern understanding of all players making up the entire defence enterprise.

Another aspect of overall CAF organization concerns the mixture and proportion Regular and Reserve Forces. The National Defence Act also allows for raising a Special Force when required. A defence policy review should address the roles of each component and review the conceptual relationships among all three. Are all three needed in their present form? What changes are needed to produce viable and effective military forces in the post-modern period? What do we need to fight the "Forever War," a term that is becoming popular among western academics?⁸

If there is any area that requires a new, modern, frank, sober, and indeed 'hard-ass' examination, this would be it. The current CAF organization, although 'transformed' during the last decade, remains a prisoner of history, trapped in an inefficient structure. The Reserve Force organization is particularly anachronistic, top-heavy and grossly inefficient, and has been for a long time. The most obstinate obstacle to true

modernization might be a small clique of well-heeled and politically influential honorary appointments who insist on seeing all things through a rear-view mirror. It is time for change and a defence review will find much grist for the mill here.

Conclusion

Canada has no real national defence policy today. The CFDS has been inadequate and unaffordable since its inception. The geo-strategic security environment, the international threat spectrum, technology, and the global economic framework – all have changed significantly since the last real defence review was conducted in 2004-05. This article has therefore called on the next government to conduct a new defence policy review, beginning with three fundamental questions. Will we fight? Why will we fight? How will we fight? Using Bland's framework of two defence imperatives and one strategic choice, it becomes clear that there are considerable complexities involved in answering these basic questions. In pursuing full, frank, and honest answers, a future defence policy review should set a firm and honest foundation for a new national defence policy. If these questions are cast aside, future defence policy runs the risk of being built on nothing more than shallow rhetoric, pathological partisanship, and worst of all, ignorance. ■

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Notes

1. Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence* (Ottawa, March 2004).

2. Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, 2008), p. 3.
3. Douglas Bland, ed., "Defence Policy," in *Canada's National Defence*, Vol. 1 (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, School of Policy Studies, 1997), pp. 3-4.
4. "Canada committed to Afghan mission, Harper tells troops," *CBC News*, 13 March 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-committed-to-afghan-mission-harper-tells-troops-1.573722>.
5. John Manley, Derek Burney, Jake Epp, Paul Tellier, and Pamela Wallin, *Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), pp. 37-38.
6. Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006).
7. Colonel J.H. Vance, "Tactics without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives*, eds. Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), pp 271-292.
8. See proceedings of the 2015 LENS Conference, "Law in the Age of the 'Forever War,'" sponsored by the Duke University Centre on Law, Ethics and National Security, <http://web.law.duke.edu/lens/conferences/2015/program>.

TIME FOR A NEW WHITE PAPER?

by Dr. James Fergusson

In the wake of this fall's election, one might expect the 'new' government to begin the process of constructing and issuing a new Defence White Paper. If either of the main opposition parties win, tradition indicates that this will occur as a means to communicate to the Department of National Defence (DND), the public, allies, and the world at large their 'new' defence policy position and priorities. Moreover, the need for a Liberal or NDP government to do so stems, in part, from the absence of defence policy within their current electoral platforms. At least since 1964, every new government has issued a formal White Paper.

Even if the Conservatives are returned to power, there is still a possibility that a new Defence White Paper will result. The Canadian First Defence Strategy (CFDS), issued in 2008, has become dated, not least of all as a function of the current budgetary/procurement situation. Promised stable long-term funding increases have been replaced by a series of significant budget cuts. Planned procurements have been pushed significantly into the future. The question of priorities now loom with changes in the international defence environment and emerging new defence technologies and capabilities. Moreover, for some time, there have been rumours of a CFDS 're-set' in the works.

While the case for a new Defence White Paper appears strong on paper, whether it is a truly useful exercise is another question. Indeed, one should ask whether

a new White Paper will produce anything of significance, regardless of who wins the next election. Evaluating the case for a new White Paper requires an examination of the significance of past White Papers, the underlying reality of White Papers, and an assessment of change in the defence environment.

At the basic level, the fundamental objectives of Canadian defence policy have not changed, nor are they likely ever to change – the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security. While the specific language in the White Papers surrounding these three objectives vary over time, the objectives themselves have not. The same can be said about the objectives concerning either support to civil authorities or defence investments meant to align with broader national economic circumstances and interests.

There have, of course, been significant differences. In some cases, a White Paper as a formal statement of government policy approved by cabinet details major shifts in defence policy. The 1971 "Defence in the Seventies" called for a shift in priority from an alliance driven policy and related investments to nationally driven set of priorities. The 1964 White Paper, arguably the most dramatic of all, set out the objectives of integration of common requirements among the military services and the unification of the services loosely based upon a US Marine Corps model.

In both cases, elements of the new policy were translated into reality and remain in-place. However, the bold changes proposed in both White Papers faded into obscurity or were slowly, but inevitably, eroded and eliminated from within. By the time of the Trudeau government's major re-capitalization programme in the mid-to-late 1970s, alliance priorities had largely re-asserted themselves. The unified armed forces became a relatively short-lived blip in history, even though it has been partly resurrected under the label of 'jointness,' albeit with similar beneath-the-surface problems that ultimately doomed unification.

The 1987 White Paper, reflecting the Mulroney government's commitment to restore the Armed Forces, provided the most detailed list of major new procurement plans. Alas, this White Paper was 'dead' in two years. A Paper set firmly within the Cold War became instantly obsolete when the Cold War ended in late 1989. Even before this dramatic transformation in the international environment, the 1987 White Paper lay in tatters with the significant budget cuts that arose in spring 1989. It must have been deeply embarrassing for the government's departmental and military officials to repeatedly state in the years following that the 1987 White Paper remained operative.

The 1994 White Paper (arguably the most hated of all by the military services, largely because it detailed major budget cuts) in many ways still guides defence policy. In

the context of the uncertainty of the post-Cold War defence environment, its level of generality and ambiguity committed the government to maintain “multi-purpose, combat capable forces” without ever defining what this meant; a task left to the functional experts within National Defence. It also provided the government with the flexibility to respond to the new international security environment. Its lineage, in both regards, remains present in the Martin government’s 2005 Defence Statement and the 2008 CFDS.

Of course, there are differences between 1994, 2005 and 2008, even though policy fundamentals are constant. CFDS, echoing 1987, also provides a fairly detailed shopping list of military re-capitalization projects, even though all of the projects had been in the works before 2008. Having been criticized for failing to deliver on its funding commitments, and pushing some of these projects further into future, the lesson for the next government – as it was for the Chrétien government after 1987 – is surely to avoid detailed commitments. In other words, a future ‘new’ White Paper is most likely to reflect 1994 again, rather provide any detailed ‘new’ guidance.

This, in turn, raises the repeated concerns, especially within the military, of the lack of government guidance for defence policy.¹ On one hand, if history is any guide, there is no reason to expect that the future government will delve more deeply to provide greater guidance. Lessons from the past indicate that greater guidance is more likely to be politically problematic in two ways. First, greater guidance creates the possibility that events beyond government control can quickly negate the guidance, as occurred in 1987 and 2008. Ambiguity and generality protect a government from charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency. Second, greater guidance, à la 1964, if at odds with military preferences and interests, are likely to become even more problematic in execution.

On the other hand, it is also important to recognize that a White Paper is actually constructed within a government department, and adopted via cabinet approval by the government. The ‘pen’ resides with the office of the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy in DND. The Paper is drafted on the basis of the best information available on the government’s defence preferences, although such information is generally limited as evident, for example, in the low, if not absent, profile of defence during federal elections and the lack of any detailed policy platforms among the political parties. Policy officials also

"Canada, as a function of its place as a minor military power in the world, will wait to react and follow the lead of the United States and its other major allies, as it did following the end of the Cold War."

examine a wide range of possible sources, including speeches to the House and party views expressed in meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence. But, in the end, officials are left to piece together the likely parameters of what will and will not be acceptable to the government – the ‘best guess.’ This alone drives the outcome towards the general level.

The process also entails detailed consultations with all the internal stakeholders, the Minister and his/her political staff, as well as the relevant external departments, such as Foreign Affairs, Industry Canada, and Finance. The objective is to build an internal and external bureaucratic and political consensus, which provides some assurances that the final Paper will be acceptable to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

In effect, the consensus building process itself also promotes relative generality in the final White Paper.

The general lack of detailed guidance is also the product of the paucity of knowledge about defence among elected officials. Few elected officials enter office with any experience on the defence file, and this includes the Prime Minister (PM) and Ministers of National Defence (MND).² While the PM and MND do appoint advisors to their respective staffs, their level of expertise on the details of defence varies greatly. This is not the United States, where academic defence experts are in great quantity, and move in and out of government as administrations change. Indicative, the Privy Council Office (PCO) in the defence realm is staffed with DND officials. The National Security Advisor is also a civil servant, rather than an outside expert at arms length from the bureaucracy.

As a result, the capacity of the political side of the White Paper equation to provide more detailed guidance is deeply constrained. Moreover, such guidance, as in 1964, is likely either to be potentially unrealistic and problematic relative to the bureaucratic side of the equation. In other words, too much detailed guidance is more likely to be dismissed as naïve, and undermined from within by the functional military experts. Despite the misplaced critiques of those who lament the lack of detailed government guidance, its absence provides greater flexibility for the internal actors to implement general policy in a realistic manner, time for ‘new’ governments to learn about the intricacies and complexity of the defence world, and therefore the capacity to respond to the unexpected.

Perhaps under these circumstances, governments should consider moving towards the American model to either issue annual national strategy statements or adopt the quadrennial review approach. Both would provide an opportunity for government to present policy adjustments as a function of changes in the international or national defence

environment. Indeed, this approach was briefly adopted in the early 1990s by the Mulroney government, which issued several annual defence statements. Unfortunately, the statements provided little of new substance, were politically and publically ignored, and required a significant investment of internal DND resources, for little (if any) gain. It is highly unlikely that this would change, if the government decided to adopt either American model. Moreover, whether annual or quadrennial, the likelihood that the outcome would produce any more clarity on national defence policy is very low, and simply reflects the low priority attached to defence by Canadians and Canadian governments.

Perhaps, the strongest case for a 'new' Defence White Paper, regardless of who wins the October election, resides in the international defence and security environment. The relative decline of

American power, the rise of China, and the re-assertion of Russian regional power portends a transformation of this environment. The post-Cold War age of discretionary Western military intervention into local and regional conflicts driven by humanitarian considerations and the 'war on terror' is coming to an end. Great Power competition and rivalries are returning to dominate the defence and security environment. This, in turn, dictates a re-examination of Canadian foreign and defence policy. In addition, the rapid pace of technological change relative to military capabilities also requires a re-examination of defence investment priorities. Such a re-examination is also possible because procurement priorities have been pushed into the future due to the budgetary situation.

However, there is no consensus surrounding the nature and significance

of these changes, and arguments of transformation are at best premature. Until this becomes truly self-evident in an environment of uncertainty, no Canadian government is going to undertake major defence policy changes. Canada, as a function of its place as a minor military power in the world, will wait to react and follow the lead of the United States and its other major allies, as it did following the end of the Cold War.

Even if, or when this environment transforms, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the fundamentals of defence policy laid down since the end of the Second World War. Despite the transformation occasioned by the end of the Cold War, the fundamentals did not change. Canada may have removed its permanently stationed forces from Europe, but its political commitment to European defence and security through NATO has remained in place.

L-R: Public Works Minister Diane Finley, Defence Minister Jason Kenney, and Justice Minister Peter MacKay pose in front of a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter at 12 Wing Shearwater on 19 June 2015 (Image credit: Royal Canadian Air Force.)



As for the technology-investment question, it has long been the case that the military faces major structural challenges in keeping up with technological change. Calls to speed-up the procurement process, and develop flexible initiatives to be able to insert new technologies as new platforms are acquired are longstanding. Structural impediments ranging from the changing health of the economy, broader governmental rules and policies concerning transparency, accountability, and competitiveness, and the internal process of reconciling competing requirements and priorities are not going to disappear. Moreover, if one examines the recent National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), which builds directly upon the CFDS and largely privileges Canadian industry, it is highly unlikely that the next government, regardless of its political stripes, will make any substantive changes. If there is one thing all the major parties agree upon, it is employing defence investment dollars to support Canadian economic, industrial, and technological needs.

This, of course, raises the issue of whether a Liberal or NDP government is likely to make a major shift in Canadian defence policy, and communicate this in a new White Paper. The possibility is arguably greatest with the NDP as function of its past, given its somewhat anti-military/anti-US positions during the Cold War. But the NDP under Thomas Mulcair has moved significantly to the policy centre, and largely shed its hard left-wing, ideological posture. Even though NDP policy entails the complete withdrawal of Canada's military commitments to the anti-ISIS coalition – the Liberals under Justin Trudeau plan to only withdraw the air-strike component – this does not amount to any indication that the NDP would make any significant changes to the fundamentals of Canadian defence.

Indeed, there is little recent evidence to suggest that either the NDP or Liberals would make any significant changes to those fundamentals. Certainly, one would expect some changes to occur. One

candidate would potentially be the future of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Project, in a manner reminiscent of the Chrétien government's decision to cancel the EH-101 Shipborne Helicopter project: a decision whose ramifications are still with us today. Even so, the requirement to replace the aging CF-18s would remain, and while such a decision would extend the process, the likelihood that either a NPD of Liberal government would eliminate the capability altogether is extremely low. Once in power, the reality of the significance of combat-capable forces in the world of international politics would take hold. At best, or worst, expect changes at the margins, but not in the fundamentals.

Of course, one cannot predict exactly where a Liberal or NDP government will go on the defence file. Part of the answer lies in terms of where such a government might go on the foreign policy file as well, which the Harper government has studiously avoided issuing a formal White Paper. Regardless, the answer will not likely be found in the next White Paper(s). Rather, it will be evident over time as the next government responds to unexpected international events, in which pressures emerge internally, and externally from Canada's allies, or the international community to commit the Canadian Armed Forces.

All of this is not to suggest that a 'new' Defence White Paper, potentially linked or married to a 'new' Foreign Policy White Paper, is not in the future. Notwithstanding tradition driving a new government to go down this path, with the exception of a re-elected Conservative government, much will hinge upon whether the outcome of the election produces a clear winner, or a minority government whose future is likely to be short-lived. Nonetheless, a clear Liberal or NDP victory, or relatively stable tacit coalition, is likely to generate the conditions for a 'new' Defence White Paper, and the process may well repeat 1994, in which a crafting of the White Paper occurred simultaneously with wide-ranging public consultations through a

Joint Parliamentary Committee study.

While meaningful public consultations, and the value of a new government communicating its Defence Policy through a formal White Paper should not be dismissed out of hand, do not expect any future White Paper to deviate significantly from its predecessors. The fundamentals will remain in place, and even if a new government attempts to deviate significantly, as on occasions in the past, the attempt is likely to fail for external and internal reasons.

The only true measure of a government's defence policy is not to be found in White Papers per se, but in the specific decisions the government makes over time in terms of budgets, investments, and commitments largely in reaction to a world beyond Canada's control. ■

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Notes

1. Although the literature is limited, this criticism of government policy is evident in the work of Douglas Bland and Robert Hartfiel. See Douglas Bland, "The Public Management of Defence," in Craig Stone, ed., *The Public Management of Defence in Canada* (Toronto: Breakout Press. 2009); Robert Michael Hartfiel, "Planning without guidance: Canadian defence policy and planning, 1993-2004," *Canadian Public Administration* 53, 3 (September 2010), pp. 323-349.
2. One rare exception was the appointment of Gordon O'Connor, a retired general, as Harper's first Defence Minister, which created its own set of issues.

BOOK REVIEWS

***Unflinching: The Making of a Canadian Sniper*, by Jody Mitic, Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 2015, 256 pages, ISBN 978-1-4767-9510-2**

Unflinching: The Making of a Canadian Sniper, is the profound memoir of former soldier Jody Mitic. This powerful account of one man's personal journey in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), from training, through deployments to his eventual release, portrays an authentic and relatable account of life in the Canadian military. Although this book touches on an array of serious subjects – including mental health issues, as well as the challenges of juggling one's family and personal relationships with one's commitment to the military – Mitic's uplifting and frequently humorous anecdotes are sure to enthrall readers from start to finish.

Since childhood, Mitic was determined to follow in the footsteps of his uncle by becoming a member of the Canadian Army. Throughout his wayward youth, Mitic longed for a sense of belonging and chose to dedicate himself to serving a higher purpose. As readers follow Mitic's progression in the military, from his basic training to master sniper training, the audience is able to appreciate his dedication and discipline. After a fateful explosion in Afghanistan, Mitic lost both of his legs below the knees. This single moment transformed Mitic's life and forced him to face a military health care system that was unprepared for gravely wounded soldiers. Moreover, it catapulted Mitic down a path that he was not yet ready to contemplate; his release from the CAF.

Of the main themes that are discussed

in the chronicle, significant emphasis is placed upon illustrating the environment and ethos of the military as well as its effects on its member, and systemic issues that lie at the very core of the CAF. Throughout the book Mitic describes the stalwart sense of comradeship that is famous to the military, in addition to a culture of loyalty, perseverance, and dedication. A clear example of the latter quality was when Mitic suggested that he was "married to the army" (p. 136) for the duration of his military career.

"Afghanistan, 2007. I was a Master Corporal, part of an elite sniper team sent on a mission to flush out Taliban in an Afghan village. I had just turned thirty, after three tours of duty overseas. I'd been shot at by mortars, eyed the enemy through my scope, survived through stealth and stamina. I'd been training for war my entire adult life. But nothing prepared me for what happened next."

-Jody Mitic

Although Mitic expresses the sense of honour and duty he felt while serving in the CAF, he also underscores several challenges he faced at the institutional level. For instance, due to limited resources he and his fellow snipers were unable to train with proper equipment (e.g., night vision goggles, p. 163) prior to deployment and, resultantly, were initially unready to use the equipment in a theatre of war. In addition, he dedicates a substantial portion of chapter 10 to describe the effects of not having the proper weapons, like a handgun, available when acting as a Driver in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Related to his portrayal of an ill-equipped CAF were the challenges Mitic faced after he sustained his injuries in Afghanistan. Not only does he aptly describe some

weaknesses in the CAF health care system, he also points to a greater need to assist soldiers after they release. When examining Mitic's departure from the CAF, one can discern that he clearly struggled when reintegrating into civilian life and suffered a jarring loss of identity when transitioning from military to civilian life.

Although Mitic successfully recovered from his physical injuries, it is evident that he struggled to mentally acclimate to civilian life. Given that Mitic's story is one of sheer willpower and persistence in the face of adversity, it is not surprising that Mitic chose to channel his efforts towards assisting wounded veterans by publicly advocating on their behalf. It needs to be emphasized that even though Mitic describes numerous shortcomings, he expresses an overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the CAF and his time as a soldier. Ultimately, thanks to dedicated people like Mitic, many of the issues identified in *Unflinching* pertaining to veterans care are being addressed.

Overall I found *Unflinching* to be an engrossing read and I would highly recommend this book to members of the military community. That being said, Mitic takes great efforts to ensure that this book could (and should) be read by the general public and even adds a rather useful (and colourful) glossary at the back of the book to explain military jargon and slang in laymen terms.

Mitic's memoir is genuine and heartfelt which enables the reader to become completely engrossed in his stories. Although sometimes memoirs are edited by their authors, so as to only portray the good side of its subject, Mitic does not

do this and portrays a clear reflection of himself – both the good and the bad. His anecdotes encourage its military readers to reminisce on their own war stories and early days in military, like being yelled at when getting off the bus with all your kit and coursemates for the first time on training, that ‘pit of the stomach’ feeling before going on course, and initially wondering why you even joined in the first place only to later ‘embrace the suck.’

After reading *Unflinching*, the reader is compelled to reflect on the thousands of untold stories of the countless brave individuals who have served our nation selflessly. For Jody Mitic and many others, Remembrance Day does not occur just once a year, it is a daily affair. ■

Lindsay Coombs, Analyst, CDA Institute

***Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second Tier-Powers*, by Benjamin Zyla, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014, 344 pages, ISBN 978-1-4426-1559-5**

In *Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers*, author Benjamin Zyla sets out his objectives in a clear and up front manner, which as a reader I certainly appreciate. First, it is to produce empirical evidence to demonstrate that second-tier powers, specifically Canada, were not the ‘Atlantic free riders’ of the 1990s, as many have so accused. Second, to show how the national preferences of these powers drove their motivations, behaviour, and contributions to NATO burden-sharing. While the work has left me fully convinced of the first, I am less so of the second.

I first became intrigued with the thesis in Chapters 4 and 5, where traditional hard power indicators are unexpectedly turned on their head. There, we examine Canada’s military contribution to the UN mission of the first Gulf War, as well as its involvement in various missions in the former Yugoslavia, including the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the United Nations

Protections Force (UNPROFOR), the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lastly in Kosovo under *Operation Allied Force* and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The important difference Zyla brings to the table is the introduction of relative (as opposed to absolute) force indicators, which considers contributions by states in relation to their total national force strength. In other words, rather than just looking at the absolute number of forces sent on these missions, emphasis is placed on how that number is calculated as a percentage of a country’s total forces available.

By using this relative force index, a new perspective quickly emerges. Canada jumps from the 9th ranked contributor by absolute force numbers to the 5th ranked contributor to IFOR; from 7th to 3rd in contributions to SFOR, and from 6th to 4th in contributions to KFOR. In each case, the empirical evidence presented suggests that Canada not only shared a higher percentage of the collective burden than the NATO average, but more often than not ranked higher than comparable second-tier powers. The evidence also supports the notion that second-tier powers, in general, shouldered a larger burden than major powers when their efforts were examined with the relative force index.

The second major part of this examination is a look at the less-traditional soft power contributions by NATO members, which became increasingly important as NATO moved away from an existence as a collective defence force to a more flexible, political entity focused on peacekeeping, nation-building, and Central and Eastern European (CEE) security. The soft military indicators used by Zyla include the contributing force to UN Peacekeeping Personnel; financial contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions; defence expenditures allocated to modernization and infrastructure; contributions to Rapid Reaction Forces; and finally, Ottawa’s

financial costs of burden sharing. In addition, the author includes what he dubs ‘hard civilian indicators’, which include foreign aid and assistance and NATO common budgets.

Again, all seems to be coming up roses. Canada is shown as the third highest (relative terms) personnel contributor to peace operations of the second-tier powers and the highest contributor in all other soft military power categories among such states. What is equally impressive, is that when examining the hard civilian factors, Canada punched at a ‘major power’ level, contributing 4.7 percent of foreign assistance and 5.2 percent of NATO’s common budgets. And with that, the author closes what I believe is a convincing case.

However, Zyla’s case for how national preferences influenced behaviour is somewhat less sound. After wading through Chapter 5’s very specific and detailed empirical evidence, Chapter 6 offers much greater generality – which detracts from the argument. The author suggests that the fall of the Berlin Wall, breakup of the Warsaw Pact, and the economic and political struggles of CEE paved the way for a liberal peace paradigm and a spreading of democratic values and systems to Central and Eastern Europe. For Canada, he suggests, it was an obvious decision to engage politically and foster relations, specifically economic ones, which would be beneficial to a country in recession. He continues, “Canada’s preferences were defined as ‘the survival of the nation state as a distinct entity; the maintenance of democracy and freedom; economic prosperity; and the physical safety of Canadians’” (p. 164).

However, it seems overly simplistic to say that Canada, as well as other NATO members, practiced enlargement and engagement simply because a secure and prosperous East made sense for the West, and an insecure East was a threat. It would have been preferential to provide more specific details, specifically regarding the Canadian context at home. There are

tidbits here and there that allude to the fiscal restraint, sovereignty issues, and the political instability of elections in the 1990s, but nowhere are such issues addressed full on.

My only other complaint, is that the thesis and objectives of the book truly lie solely in Chapters 5-7. The preceding chapters include a wealth of information on political theory and the changing 'world order' following the Cold War, and read like a university text book for a political science class. While it is important to establish liberal IR theory as the political framework for the book, (as this becomes important in understanding how states are assumed to think and act) as well as to provide context for the changing environment, neither warrant the large amount of text that has been dedicated to it.

In the end, however, the reader is left quite convinced that Canada, along with other second-tier powers, have been wrongly accused for shirking NATO burden-sharing responsibilities in the 1990s, and often shouldered more than their fair share. It would be of extreme interest and use to continue Zyla's methodology and compare contributions by Canada to NATO in the 2000s and today, as the looming elections have again brought about pointing fingers that Canada did not pull its weight. ■

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What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan 1979-89, by Bruce Riedel, Brookings Institution Press, 2014, 189 pages, ISBN: 978-0-8157-2584-8

History chronicled by any vanquisher tends to be twisted in its favour. However, drawing the theme from a cable sent by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) station chief in Islamabad in 1989, Bruce Riedel's latest book titled *What We Won*

on the Soviet's war in Afghanistan gives credit where it is due: Pakistan. The war that ended four decades of Cold War had been a rare conflict in which the United States found itself standing at the sidelines, letting Pakistan play a central role in what is remembered as 'Afghan jihad.'

Since it had been the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that planned, trained, supported, and executed the jihad by employing native Afghans – who took the war as their national obligation – and Muslims fighters from across the Islamic world, the book could better be titled as, 'What Pakistan Won.' Riedel admits that "Afghan war was Zia's war," (p. xii) referring to Pakistan's President General Zia-ul-Haq. But, as ISI's former director-general, Lieutenant-General Hameed Gul (Ret'd) proudly claimed, "It takes an Afghanistan to make an ISI."

America's low-key role had obviously been due to geopolitical considerations. Any direct involvement would not only have expanded the war to other international theatres, but also brought US forces and CIA in direct confrontation against Soviet Union's 40th Red Army and KGB – quite similar to the Vietnam War. Engaging Pakistan in a decision-making process was the only option, as it provided the sole access to the landlocked Afghanistan while maintaining plausible deniability (p. 146).

The book's nine chapters examine the roles of the Afghan communists, the Soviets, Afghan Mujahedeen, Pakistan, the Saudis, successive US Presidents, and the CIA. Riedel deserves respect in how he forthrightly and courageously points out some of the CIA's failures, despite being a former CIA employee himself. He notes, for instance, that "CIA was risk averse" (p. 144), and unlike ISI and Britain's MI6 did not send its assets inside Afghanistan. Acknowledging the CIA was effectively blind to "militant Sunni Islam" (p. 152), Riedel observes, "Rarely does a country fight the same war in one generation; to fight it twice from opposite sides is even

rarer" (p. 136) – a reference to the US war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11. However, he does exonerate the CIA on the suggestion that it helped in creating the phenomena of al-Qaeda and global jihad, calling that claim "bad history" (p. 151).

The book begins with discussing Afghanistan's contemporary history, laying-down the Afghan political landscape before the Soviet invasion. Peering into the thinking of Soviet leadership after the two Afghan coups, by Muhammad Daud in July 1973 and Saur Revolution by Nur Mohammad Taraki in April 1978, Riedel finds the 40th Red Army pulling-off a surprise invasion that took the US and CIA completely off-guard.

Pakistan's compulsion in becoming a frontline state is tied to its historical enmity with respective Afghan governments, as none have recognized the Durand Line (border) between the two countries, with Kabul preferring instead to stoke the 'Pashtunistan' issue by claiming Pakistan's Pashtun and Baluch areas. Soviet advance towards the Arabian Sea was another key concern for Pakistan (p. 26), besides worries of hostile encirclement. As General Zia "feared a two-front war in which Soviet Union and India dismantled Pakistan" (p. 118), Pakistan's air force engaged in a number of dogfights during Soviet cross-border incursions.

The author documents how the Soviets, in collaboration with Afghan intelligence, alongside India undertook covert offensives inside Pakistan by supporting terrorist organization Al-Zulfiqar and Baluch separatists (p. 37). Quoting Indian agents for carrying-out Ojhri Camp (ammunition depot) blasts in Pakistan in April 1988 (p. 70), Riedel singles-out India for "not condemning" the Soviet invasion in the UN General Assembly vote (p. 104). Highlighting the complexities of the Afghan ethnicities, Riedel records the infighting among seven Mujahedeen groups and ISI's preference for Pashtuns (pp. 42-43), which led to MI6's decision to

train and equip Tajik forces under Ahmed Shah Masoud. The author appreciates the wisdom of General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, then director-general ISI, in transforming the Mujhaadeen groups as political parties for legitimacy and international recognition (p. 60). Riedel acknowledges the general's valour, which took him to construct a fully-equipped forward base-camp and training facility in Khost – called the “Zhawar Base” – and defend it tooth-and-nail in three Soviet assaults (p. 53).

General Zia, who was found by President Carter as “calm, very courageous and intelligent” (p. 96), shrewdly crafted his war-strategy “keeping the pot boiling but not boil over” (p. 114). Yet he took greater risks, allowing his ISI to carry out provocative cross-border raids – called the “Bear-Baiting Operations” – reaching up to the Soviet Central Asia across Amu Darya River in 1984 (pp. 65, 118).

The book discusses Saudi financing, by which Soviet weapons were provided to the Mujahadeen in the first five years for “plausible deniability” (p.103). Crediting President Carter as “one of America's most successful presidential spymasters,” Riedel notes his strategy “to make the invasion as politically costly as possible for the

Soviets” (p. 103). President Reagan, on the other hand, changed the war objective into winning, and pushing the Soviets from Afghanistan (p. 120). Finally, Riedel recognizes the roles of Congressman Charlie Wilson and Pakistan's Honorary Consul in Houston, Joanne Herring, in funds appropriations and the availability of Stinger missiles in 1986, which acted as a game-changer in the war resulting in Soviet defeat.

However, criticizing the reversal of US policy – ‘as failure’ – under President George Bush (p. 129), the author notes the downturn in US-Pakistan relations on nuclear issue after “United States turned its back on Afghanistan for the next decade” – clearly a strategic “mistake as Afghanistan was left to the mercy of warlords” (p. 132). As Pakistan felt betrayed for being used and later discarded after the war, Riedel highlights the similarity in the defeat of two superpowers in Afghanistan due to “the role played by Pakistan” – observing that Washington had “lost Islamabad” (p. 136).

Carrying out the war's post-mortem, Riedel notes the flawed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in March 1988, which had erroneously predicted the fall of Najibullah's government after the

Soviet withdrawal (pp. 125-126). Further, the NIE could not see the implications of Soviet defeat for the global Islamic movement (p. 152). An earlier NIE in 1987 did not anticipate the wholesale collapse of the USSR either (pp. 154-155). Riedel attributes Soviet defeat on (i) being an aggressor, leading to its international isolation; (ii) using conventional army, untrained in guerrilla warfare; (iii) lack of adequate troops and resources; (iv) not deploying forces at Pak-Afghan border; (v) recklessly killing close to a million Afghans, losing hearts and minds; and (vi) a frequently changed and uncommitted leadership (p. 154).

Finally, in lessons learned, Riedel establishes how secret/covert wars can produce “unintended consequences” (p. 143) – a lesson for Afghanistan, which has always allowed its soil to be used for proxy wars, thereby destabilizing itself and the region.

While the history of the world is written in blood, it is also inked in flawed outlook and failed policies. ■

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