



ON TRACK

THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE

L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

LE *SOFT POWER* EUROPÉEN DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE TRANSATLANTIQUE

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COVER PHOTO: Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND. Her Majesty's Canadian Ship St. John's currently deployed in the Baltic Sea performs a tow approach with FGS ERFURT (F626), a German corvette class ship during Operation REASURANCE. 4 March 2018.

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Caméra de combat des Forces canadiennes, MDN. Le Navire canadien de Sa Majesté St John's actuellement déployé dans la mer Baltique exécute une approche de remorquage avec le FGS ERFURT (F626), une corvette allemande pendant l'Opération REASURANCE. Le 4 mars 2018.


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FROM THE EDITOR

Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle

I am pleased to introduce the first issue of *ON TRACK* for 2018, consisting of a mix of Canadian-centric and internationally focused articles.

Nous commençons par une réflexion sur le soft power européen selon le **Dr Michael Lambert** (France). Même si le concept de soft power ou « politique d'influence » en langue française a été théorisé après la fin de la guerre froide, le concept est toujours pertinent puisqu'il est actuellement au coeur de la politique étrangère des États-Unis et de celles des États membres de l'Union européenne. Le Dr Lambert s'interroge à juste titre pour savoir si le modèle américain de soft power est différent ou similaire à celui de l'Union européenne. Il note que les États-Unis sont une fédération, l'Union européenne est plus proche du système confédéral, et que le voisin Canadien s'en distingue en regroupant deux entités distinctes sur le plan linguistique et juridique avec le Québec. Il considère que le soft power demeure aussi l'outil de prédilection pour exercer une influence dans le cadre du partenariat oriental. Le facteur clef est que le soft power de chaque pays est déterminé par chaque gouvernement de manière totalement autonome.

The next article, by **Major David Johnston**, briefly explores the conditions necessary for innovation to thrive. His short piece makes a timely and relevant contribution to the ongoing discussion about how best to achieve results given the Government of Canada's current focus on innovation. As he notes, a mix of cultural attitudes toward change, the influence of executive-level leadership, the organization's basic structure and the timing of innovative efforts all contribute, to a greater or lesser extent, to the successful adoption of novel ideas and methodologies. The implications for the Canadian Armed Forces are clear – if it is to be effective in a multidimensional, shifting and complex operating environment, innovative approaches to issues may be (and surely are) one of the keys to success. Yet, the CAF must in the first place be open to and then incorporate innovation, no small challenge in a large, hierarchical, traditional, bureaucratic and frequently stove-piped organization. Simple in theory, difficult in practice!

Following this, **Adnan Qaiser**, a repeat contributor, discusses the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In his analysis, he outlines the extent of China's deep economic and indeed cultural penetration into Pakistan, something that threatens to turn the former into a regional hegemon and the latter into a vassal or client or satellite state. The many challenges to CPEC's successful implementation, both internal and external to Pakistan, suggest

how difficult economic integration between the two countries may ultimately prove to be. In the end, he argues, Pakistan must neither surrender its sovereignty nor compromise its national interests in the pursuit of prosperity lest it end up with nothing.

Christopher Cowan, the CDA Institute's research analyst and editor, has compiled an invaluable record of the 2018 Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence that was held at the Fairmont Château Laurier on 22 and 23 February. Appearing next, it summarizes the principal comments made by the five keynote speakers and fourteen panelists. As is usually the case, albeit with some exceptions, there is no permanent record of what transpires at conferences – they occur, the participants disperse and that's it. His summary will help preserve the essence of this iteration of the Ottawa Conference for years to come, certainly an important consideration when one takes the long historical view. As things would have it, preparations are currently underway for the 2019 conference and we look forward to welcoming you all once again.

This issue concludes with a number of reprinted book reviews; a few select critiques have been drawn from our website and republished here given their timeliness and relevance to topics of contemporary interest. A brief note that explains the addition of this new section appears at its beginning.

And finally, I wish to note that some changes to *ON TRACK* are in the offing. Subsequent editions will feature pieces more in line with the CDA Institute's research agenda, which includes the new defence policy; the operationalization of personnel; NORAD and the north; and cyber and space. Although articles on any aspect of defence and security that in some way touch the Canadian Armed Forces will be considered, preference will be given to discussions of the above topics. More detail will be provided in the next issue, which is tentatively scheduled to be released in mid-September, as this shift in focus is more fully developed over the months to come. Stay tuned!


I trust that everyone will find this edition of *ON TRACK* an enlightening read. Please enjoy!

Kindly,

Craig Leslie Mantle, PhD
Director of Research & Senior Editor

LE SOFT POWER EUROPÉEN DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE TRANSATLANTIQUE: COMMENT BÉNÉFICIER DE LA SPÉCIFICITÉ EUROPÉENNE ?

par D^r Michael Lambert



1858 Trans-Atlantic telegraph cable route. Photo courtesy; Wikimedia Commons

Le concept de soft power a été théorisé par le Professeur Joseph Nye de la Harvard Kennedy School après la fin de la Guerre froide. Le concept est actuellement au coeur de la politique étrangère des États-Unis et de celles des États membres de l'Union européenne.

L'Union européenne (UE) ne disposant pas d'Armée commune à ce jour, le soft power est l'outil de prédilection pour exercer une influence -- volontaire ou non -- dans le cadre du partenariat oriental.

Les spécialistes du soft power comparent le soft power américain et celui de l'Europe, alors même que les États-Unis sont une fédération et l'Union européenne plus proche du système confédéral.

Le milieu du XIXe siècle marque le début de l'ère industrielle et la mutation du paradigme militaire. L'émergence des équipements contemporains -- principalement lance-flammes et véhicules blindés --, à laquelle s'ajoute la baisse de la natalité en Occident, pose la question fondamentale du souci d'affirmation de la puissance sans se résoudre au conflit. Berlin n'est qu'à quelques minutes de vol à peine de Paris, et même les grands espaces du continent nord-américain n'échappent pas à la règle. Dans ce contexte, les États tendent à trouver des stratégies de préférence non coercitives pour exercer leur influence sur les autres. Le soft power ou « puissance douce » connaît dès lors un fort succès après la guerre froide.

Cette remise en perspective des moyens pour véhiculer la puissance d'un État explique en partie le succès des travaux du Professeur Joseph Nye à la Harvard Kennedy School, qui propose après la fin de la guerre froide le concept de « soft power » ou « politique d'influence » en langue française. Le concept avance que l'influence d'un pays repose désormais sur sa capacité d'attraction culturelle, son influence dans le monde universitaire, son rayonnement cinématographique, et sur d'autres éléments non coercitifs. L'attraction se définit comme « Force, d'origine électrique, magnétique ou gravitationnelle, qui tend à rapprocher les corps matériels. Action exercée sur les êtres animés par quelque chose (lieu, milieu, élément, etc.) qui les attire »¹.

Dans cette idée, le *soft power* combine l'ensemble des éléments qui font qu'un pays ou un groupe de personnes souhaite intensifier les relations culturelles et économiques avec un autre État ou groupe de personnes. L'attraction rassemble de multiples paramètres mais s'observe avec l'intensification des échanges entre deux parties.

Avec la fin de la guerre froide, le *soft power* devient la principale préoccupation des États, aussi bien aux États-Unis qu'en Chine, et laisse apparaître de nouvelles craintes de la part de ces derniers. De nouvelles questions se posent : le modèle Américain doit-il percevoir l'influence de l'Union européenne à travers le monde comme étant en compétition avec celle des États-Unis dans l'espace postsoviétique ?

En bref, le *soft power* des États-Unis est-il différent de celui de l'Union européenne ou similaire ? La réponse à cette question est lourde de conséquence car une divergence signifierait qu'il est nécessaire de choisir entre les États-Unis et l'Union européenne, tandis qu'une similitude engendrerait une attraction pour les deux ensemble et nécessiterait dès lors aucune compétition entre les États-Unis et l'Union européenne.

Les débats sur le *soft power* émergent progressivement dans l'Union européenne et en Amérique du Nord, mais sans pour autant modifier le concept et en proposant de l'adapter pour chaque pays. Une situation paradoxale quand on sait que le modèle Américain trouve ses fondements dans celui d'une fédération, alors que le voisin Canadien s'en distingue en regroupant deux entités distinctes sur le plan linguistique et juridique avec le Québec.

L'adoption du concept dans l'Union européenne reste la plus surprenante, car elle regroupe 28 États souverains. Il est difficile de parler de « *soft power* de l'UE », sans altérer légèrement ce concept. Les publications universitaires tiennent

rarement compte de ces différences structurelles. Toutefois certains pays, tels que la Russie et la Chine, se penchent sur cette question en adoptant une approche du *soft power* qui ne repose pas sur ces deux valeurs que sont la démocratie et les droits de l'Homme, mais davantage sur le conservatisme et la facture sécuritaire. L'Union européenne diverge donc des États-Unis et même du Canada en raison des sphères d'influence de chaque pays membre qui se combinent ensuite au sein de l'UE. Par exemple, la sphère d'influence du Royaume-Uni avec le Commonwealth se combine avec la France et la Francophonie. Par contraste, un pays comme les États-Unis ne dispose que d'une sphère d'influence. L'Union européenne peut dès lors influencer le Commonwealth et/ou la Francophonie selon ses besoins, alors que les États-Unis se cantonnent dans une seule sphère d'influence. À ces sphères, s'ajoute celle de chaque membre, et l'UE dispose donc d'une influence dans des États où ni la France ni la Grande Bretagne n'ont historiquement pied, comme l'Ukraine et la Moldavie.

Dans un premier temps, et pour comprendre les différences entre les États-Unis et l'Union européenne, il semble pertinent de se pencher sur le modèle du « *US soft power* » tel qu'il est décrit à la Harvard Kennedy School. Les États-Unis sont une fédération, ce qui signifie que chaque État dispose d'une certaine autonomie et de sa propre culture, bien que l'ensemble des décisions en matière de politique étrangère ou de défense se prend exclusivement à Washington. En conséquence, la mise en place des stratégies d'influence est déterminée par la Maison Blanche.

À titre d'exemple, quand les États-Unis souhaitent renforcer leur coopération bilatérale avec un pays tel que la France, ces derniers vont jouer sur la puissance économique qu'exercent des entreprises comme Google, lesquelles véhiculent une certaine image de modernité et d'entrepreneuriat auprès des Français.

Google n'étant pas une entreprise d'État, cela signifie qu'une large part du « *soft power* américain » repose sur les entreprises et la société civile.

Cependant, les grandes actions de la diplomatie américaine, allant de la politique pour inciter aux échanges universitaires, en passant par les financements de projets bilatéraux, ou encore à la politique des ambassades, repose exclusivement sur les choix du Gouvernement américain. C'est à dire que si Google souhaite nouer des relations avec un pays tiers, cela devra passer par la cadre que l'administration américaine lui impose.

Dans le cas des États-Unis, on note cependant des éléments singuliers par rapport à l'Union européenne, et notamment le facteur linguistique anglophone. La diffusion du *soft power* et l'image que les États-Unis véhiculent passent en grande partie par l'usage de la langue anglaise. En tant que fédération, le *soft power* reflète la volonté du gouvernement de Washington, car il est le seul à prendre des décisions qui priment sur celles des États de la fédération. L'Union européenne peut, en revanche, décider d'user parfois de la francophonie en Afrique, ou parfois de la sphère d'influence de la Roumanie en Moldavie, ou encore de la Pologne en Ukraine.

Le modèle du « *US soft power* » contraste avec celui du Canada qui est un modèle intermédiaire et plus simple de ce qui se trouve en Europe. Bien que présentant des similitudes avec les É.-U. dans la mesure où c'est le gouvernement d'Ottawa qui impose les directives en matière de politique étrangère et de défense, le *soft power* de ce pays s'avère autrement plus fragmenté et ce en raison de la présence de la province francophone qui s'y est ajouté en 1867. Le Québec intègre la « Confédération canadienne » qui deviendra par la suite une « fédération avec un régime monarchique constitutionnel ». Le Québec est une

province du Canada qui se distingue des autres par sa singularité religieuse, avec le catholicisme, linguistique, avec la langue française, et dispose de son propre parlement, ce qui lui donne une position de Nation québécoise dans le Canada. Cette situation contraste fortement avec les États-Unis, bien que ces derniers disposent également de territoires avec une forte identité comme à Hawaï.

On retrouve une influence culturelle du Canada à l'international qui repose sur l'usage de la langue anglaise, mais à laquelle il faut ajouter l'influence culturelle francophone spécifique au Québec. Le Québec exerce donc une influence linguistique distincte en promouvant la francophonie en Amérique du Nord, il est un modèle social alternatif et plus socialiste, comme le montre la politique d'accès à l'université pour tous les Québécois. Le parlement de Québec peut également négocier la mise en place d'actions bilatérales de manière plus autonome, ce qui explique les frais réduits pour les étudiants francophones qui viennent étudier dans la province, ce qui n'est pas le cas du côté anglophone et dans les deux universités anglophones situées au Québec (McGill et Concordia).

Au regard de ces éléments, le modèle canadien du *soft power* diverge de celui des États-Unis, avec le Québec qui y exerce sa propre influence, parfois en parallèle à celle d'Ottawa. Il est ainsi possible d'être attiré par le Canada anglophone tout en rejetant le modèle francophone, et inversement, ou encore de vivre dans un monde purement anglophone ou exclusivement francophone au sein du même pays. Il reste à mentionner que le modèle du *soft power* du Canada ne s'applique pas à son *hard power*, qui est centralisé comme aux États-Unis. L'armée canadienne ne distingue pas les Québécois du reste des Canadiens. Si le Canada dispose d'un *hard power* fédéral, le *soft power* du pays, lui est objectivement double.

Qu'en est-il du *soft power* de l'Union européenne par rapport aux deux

exemples en Amérique du Nord ? Dans le monde universitaire, l'absence de travaux sur la singularité du *soft power* européen interpelle. Les institutions européennes calquent leurs stratégies sur le modèle nord-américain comme en attestent les stratégies dans le cadre du partenariat oriental, et notamment celui des États-Unis, ce qui semble constituer un paradoxe, car il est impossible d'adapter un *soft power* fédéral dans un cadre confédéral. Les similitudes des piliers du partenariat oriental avec la stratégie de la Maison Blanche ont un intérêt réel pour le concept de démocratie et les droits de l'Homme, et par la suite, pour la relance de l'économie. Par contraste, les fondamentaux de l'Union économique eurasiatique sont économiques avec un souhait d'émergence d'une puissance régionale (pas de connotation universaliste). Le *soft power* des États-Unis est similaire à celui de l'UE dans sa communication stratégique et vise à mettre en place la démocratie et les droits de l'Homme, via des budgets en provenance du gouvernement. On note une stratégie en provenance des institutions européennes qui donnent un budget à plusieurs initiatives alors même que l'option la plus adéquate serait d'avoir un pourcentage du PIB; pourcentage que chaque pays membre de l'UE devrait allouer à ses propres initiatives plutôt que de l'envoyer vers les institutions européennes; lesquelles le répartissent à nouveau entre les États membres et la Société civile. Cette nouvelle stratégie augmenterait l'efficacité et la rapidité du processus de la mise en œuvre des initiatives dans les pays de l'EaP.

Par contraste avec les États-Unis, l'Union européenne ne dispose pas d'un ministère des Affaires étrangères qui supplante celui des États membres, le *soft power* de chaque pays étant déterminé par chaque gouvernement de manière totalement autonome.

Par un souci de simplification, on mentionne dès lors le *soft power* européen qui renvoie aux grandes initiatives supranationales telles que

l'Espace Schengen, la Zone euro, ou le programme Erasmus. Reste à noter que l'Espace Schengen et la Zone euro, respectivement en raison de la crise des réfugiés et de l'intérêt pour les crypto-monnaies, semble s'atténuer.

Mais ces projets supranationaux complètent l'influence déjà existante des États membres de l'Union européenne, sans les supplanter. Qui plus est, les institutions européennes décident de certaines initiatives, mais les gouvernements nationaux disposent d'une marge de manœuvre qui leur est propre. On peut dès lors avancer qu'il existe un *soft power* des États membres, qui complète celui des grands projets européens. L'influence de l'Allemagne dans les États du partenariat oriental dépend dès lors de Berlin, qui décide des initiatives bilatérales. La participation de l'Allemagne au programme Erasmus et son adhésion à l'Espace Schengen renforcent l'attraction que l'Allemagne exerce, sans pour autant que les Institutions européennes ne puissent imposer une directive à l'Allemagne, et inversement.

Chaque État membre dispose donc de son *soft power*, et les institutions européennes exercent également un *soft power* distinct des États membres. À titre d'exemple, l'Union économique eurasiatique et l'ASEAN s'inspirent du modèle européen, mais pas d'un pays membre en particulier. Inversement, certains États prennent exemple sur la politique d'un pays en particulier, mais sans nécessairement promouvoir un schéma de coopération régional similaire à celui de l'Union européenne.

Quelles conclusions tirer de ces différences entre le *soft power* fédéral des États-Unis, double du Canada, et confédéral de l'Union européenne ? Comme le montre cette approche comparative, le *soft power* des États-Unis est unifié ou autrement dit orienté sur une cible avec des critères propres et un processus de décision central. On apprécie ou l'on rejette le modèle

américain, mais il semble complexe de ne l'aimer que partiellement ou de n'aimer qu'un État et de le distinguer du reste des États-Unis. Dans le cas du *soft power* canadien, la situation est autrement plus complexe, avec la possibilité de promouvoir deux images distinctes du pays en mettant en avant les divergences entre le Canada anglophone et le Québec, francophone. Cette distinction constitue à la fois une force pour le pays qui parvient à gagner en influence et en visibilité à l'international, mais s'avère être une faiblesse en générant une fracture interne que l'on retrouve lors des débats sur l'indépendance du Québec.

Pour le *soft power* de l'Union européenne, on peut s'étonner de l'absence de réflexion sur la singularité du modèle confédéral. L'UE parvient à attirer avec ses grands projets, mais sans pour autant décider de la politique de chaque pays. Tandis que les États membres peuvent avoir une politique de *soft power* qui leur est propre et ne s'accorde pas avec celle des institutions supranationales. Un État peut ainsi bénéficier de l'attraction qu'exerce l'Union européenne sans pour autant participer à l'Espace Schengen, ce qui est le cas de la Grande Bretagne. Cette singularité de l'Europe marque une distinction fondamentale avec le schéma en Amérique du Nord.

L'Union européenne dispose dès lors d'une flexibilité que n'ont pas les États-Unis pour développer des stratégies inédites pour son *soft power* et celui de chaque pays membre. Une stratégie pertinente serait de demander aux États membres de l'UE d'allouer une partie de leur budget pour l'EaP mais sans l'envoyer vers les institutions européennes. De cette façon, chaque membre de l'UE s'intéresserait davantage aux pays de l'EaP et devrait se spécialiser (ex. : la Roumanie, en Moldavie; la Pologne, en Ukraine). Cette approche multilatérale permettrait de gagner considérablement en termes de frais administratifs ainsi qu'en réactivité tout en jouant sur le facteur multiculturel (ex. : les initiatives

de la France seront probablement en français plutôt qu'en anglais). Ce type de stratégie accroîtrait les interactions entre l'ensemble des pays de l'UE avec ceux de l'EaP, alors que de nos jours certains États tels que l'Allemagne et la Pologne sont des leaders dans ce domaine, tandis que d'autres présentent un intérêt moindre pour la question. Chaque pays rayonnerait par son expertise dans des secteurs spécifiques (ex. : l'Allemagne, avec des initiatives économiques; la Suède, avec le droit des femmes et de l'environnement).

Si les institutions européennes ne sont plus en charge du budget, cela ne signifierait pas leur disparition pour autant, mais la possibilité de changer les structures en charge de l'EaP pour des centres d'excellence pour l'étude de l'EaP couvrant des domaines nouveaux comme celui de l'identité et de l'espace. Cela permettrait aux experts de l'UE de réaliser des études et des rapports similaires à ceux de nos jours mais avec pour objectif de les transmettre aux États membres pour leur suggérer des initiatives et des investissements pertinents. Une stratégie comme celle-ci permettrait également de contrer les initiatives de Moscou qui présentent souvent les institutions européennes comme ayant pour objectif final de pousser les membres de l'EaP à présenter une candidature pour intégrer l'UE.

Les Européens peuvent jouer sur leur influence supranationale, et celle des États membres. Et pourquoi ne pas innover en synchronisant les *soft power* de certains pays, ce que ne peuvent pas faire les États-Unis en raison de leur système fédéral ? Il importe dès lors de prendre en compte ce paramètre pour les initiatives en matière de *soft power*, en vue de développer une stratégie pertinente en Europe qui se détache de celles des États-Unis, d'autant plus, au regard des travaux que mène la Russie sur les composantes de son influence dans les États du partenariat oriental et l'influence grandissante de la Chine. ■

Michael Eric Lambert est docteur en Histoire des relations internationales à l'université de la Sorbonne - INSEAD. Ses ouvrages sur l'Europe et l'Union soviétique qui mélangent un esprit fin à une approche fantaisiste lui valent un certain succès.

Lectures complémentaires

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INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATIONS: FOUR INTERNAL FACTORS

by Major Dave Johnston

Military bureaucracies, including the Canadian Armed Forces, have a contemporary challenge: how to innovate in order to maintain tactical and technological overmatch against adversaries. The innovation challenge is compounded by smaller force structures and budgets without corresponding operational drawdowns. Likewise, antiquated doctrine has gone without a wholesale rethink despite an adaptive and networked modern enemy. This challenge then begs the question: how do organizational factors influence the course of innovation efforts?

This article explores four internal factors of significance assembled into two broad categories. The first category, focused on the people within an organization, will show how critical both organizational attitudes and executive leadership style are for innovation to succeed. The second category focuses on organizational structure, with emphasis on the structure itself and the timing and diffusion of technology. In order to innovate, especially in a military setting, organizations must seek balance between these four key internal factors.


Organizational Attitudes towards Innovation

The people within an organization make or break an innovation effort. Organizational culture - the pattern of assumptions used to cope with external adaptation and internal integration - determines in large part the success or failure of innovation.¹ If an organization is open and adaptive, innovation may thrive. The opposite is true for organizations staffed with inflexible

and close-minded employees. Parts of this culture are found in the society from which the organization is created: "The military profession of each nation develops a doctrine which reflects its social environment."² Germany developed *Blitzkrieg* - or lightning war - in part based on a national desire for short, sharp wars; despite being socially conservative and authoritarian, this national social desire helped spur a willingness to pursue military innovation.³ Culture further influences innovation at the organizational level. The *Wehrmacht* developed the revolutionary doctrine of *Blitzkrieg*, while *Luftwaffe* pilots were open to and supportive of close air support missions due in part to a shared cultural understanding of the army.⁴ To the contrary, the "stodgy, unimaginative officer corps of Britain and France refused to [innovate]" and went down to defeat in the early stages of the Second World War.⁵ The openness of an organization's culture impacts the success or failure of innovation. Dr. John Arquilla, a professor

at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, summarized this concept by affirming that "innovation is rare in large part because culture is a deep phenomenon, and is therefore hard to change."⁶

Is Canada culturally open to innovation? The literature demonstrates that Canadians could improve, much like the *National Post* headline "Canada has failed at innovation for 100 years" indicates.⁷ Nonetheless, perhaps Canada is not quite this bad. There are bright points in the history of Canadian innovation - the ubiquitous zipper, the Avro Arrow, tech giants like Research In Motion and Shopify, to name a few - and Canadians certainly pride themselves on being open to new and diverse cultures and beliefs. Perhaps the current government's innovation push can encourage more innovation on a socio-cultural level. Because of the importance of people to innovation, it behooves all military professionals to encourage and foster



a culture open to adaptation and originality.

New technology is adopted more easily into military service when it is harmonious with cultural norms and pre-existing military practices. As James Wilson states, “Organizations will readily accept (or at least not bitterly resist) inventions that facilitate the performance of existing tasks in a way consistent with existing managerial arrangements.”⁸ Amphibious operations were enthusiastically reborn during the Second World War because they allowed a continuation of U.S. historical practices, principally the massing and throughput of attritional power at a desired time and place.⁹ In similar fashion, the U.S. military enthusiastically adopted radio and radar technological innovations since they enhanced current practices instead of forcing the implementation of new ones.¹⁰ The enthusiasm for innovations that mesh with existing cultural norms was seen among other nations for similar reasons. The Canadian-designed *PH helmet* gas mask was quickly adopted by Allied soldiers during the First World War and saved countless lives without changing how trench warfare was fought.¹¹ As an aside, I can personally recall a similar transition in the Canadian infantry from tracked to wheeled fighting vehicles in the late 1990s; despite being a substantial change on the surface, the doctrinal principles remained unchanged and the transition occurred relatively smoothly. In these examples, innovations thrived when they fit easily and conveniently into pre-existing cultural concepts. Thus, successful innovations require a healthy balance between a culture open to change and ideas that mesh with pre-existing practices.


Executive Management Style

In many cases, innovative change requires a particular champion to push it along. Thus far this article has discussed the need for innovation to work with an organization’s culture, either through a

culture open to change or by implementing an innovation that dovetails into current norms. Nevertheless, this is not the sole manner in which people impact the success or failure of innovation efforts. Henry Mintzberg *et al.*, in *The Strategy Process*, explain that “Typically, major innovations require that a variety of experts work towards a common goal, often led by a single champion or a small group of committed individuals.”¹² In a military context, this is certainly the case, although Mintzberg understates the importance of one single champion. The military hierarchy invariably needs a leader’s endorsement for an idea to catch on. T.E. Lawrence championed an innovative use of the Arab way of war during the Arab Revolt. Dismissing traditional European doctrine, he championed irregular raiding parties, the early use of armored cars, and a focus on mobility, decentralized control and attacking the enemy in depth.¹³ Lawrence championed innovation in other words. Other successful historical military innovations also had a champion, such as U.S. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz revolutionizing submarine tactics. In this case, he took sub-optimized technology and implemented de-control, mission-type orders and radio silence to great effect.¹⁴ Canadian Commander J.D.

“Chummy” Prentice achieved similar results, being equal parts “experienced saltwater sailor, a fine ship handler, an extremely competent officer and a tactical innovator.”¹⁵ During the Battle of the Atlantic, Prentice was one of only two Canadian naval officers to achieve four German U-boat kills, doing so through passionate and innovative training methods. Orde Wingate and his irregular “Chindits” who fought in Burma during the Second World War is yet another example of an innovative champion who produced significant results. Being resupplied by air, his self-contained and largely independent “columns” operated in the Japanese rear by destroying critical infrastructure, diverting enemy forces and generally disrupting operations.¹⁶


As a final analysis relating to the people within an organization, a discussion of the relationship between culture and champions is necessary. It is contended that innovation will thrive with a culture open to innovation, a strong champion, or a healthy mixture of both. As author James Wilson points out, an executive might need to rise above organizational culture to institute bold, top-down change, or conversely allow “managers and operators to suggest new ways of doing.”¹⁷ With neither a champion



nor an open culture, it must rely on additional organizational factors.

Organizational Structure

Beyond the people who comprise an organization, the mere structure of an organization impacts the success or failure of innovation efforts. Large hierarchical bureaucracies suffer from an institutional reticence toward change. Conversely, small, flat and decentralized organizations are well-suited for change.¹⁸ Mintzberg named the latter an *adhocracy*: An innovative organization that avoids “all the trappings of bureaucratic structure, notably sharp divisions of labour, extensive unit differentiation, highly formalized behaviours and an emphasis on planning and control systems.”¹⁹ He thought of the Manhattan Project (the secret development of atomic weapons during the Second World War) as a large adhocracy, and the examples of Lawrence’s Arab raiders and Nimitz’s submarines exhibit similar characteristics. As a counterpoint, consider German Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. In contrast to Nimitz’s adhocracy, Dönitz tightly controlled German U-boats in a hierarchical and information-centric structure: “The Germans developed excellent weapons and trained their forces within an ingenious tactical framework, but they failed to innovate in the larger sense.”²⁰ Structure, along with the other people-centric factors discussed above, can either positively or negatively impact innovation.





With this in mind, military organizations must consider what structures may be employed to assist with innovation efforts. It might require the creation of a specific element within the wider organization that has an innovation focus. These adhocracies are often referred to as Skunkworks: an “enriched environment that is intended to help a small group of individuals design a new idea by escaping routine organizational procedures.”²¹ Wilson recommends this method if the task can be confined to a subunit. A Skunkworks would function well during the introduction and adoption of a new tactic or technology, but would need to be diffused into the larger organization to be sustained. Another structural aide to innovation is the synergistic linkage between military organizations and industry, exemplified currently in Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). This organization bridges the gap between industry and the U.S. Department of Defense, focusing on “Accelerating commercial innovation for National Defense.”²² This blend has benefitted innovation, with over 45 projects seeded with more than \$100 million USD in its first two years of existence.²³ DIUx has also replicated into a number of other versions, including SOFWerx that is affiliated with the United States Special Operations

Command; similarly, in Canada, the Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) program and the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command Innovation program.²⁴ When structured well and encouraged properly, the partnership between industry and military organizations can be potent.

Timing and Diffusion of Innovation

Whichever structural models an organization adopts to foster innovation, the importance of timing and equal diffusion of technology is critical to acknowledge. While discussing systems thinking, C. West Churchman observed the need for “a plan that will bring each subsystem up to the standard at a desired time so that the whole developmental effort goes along smoothly and there is no serious wastage on account of delay.”²⁵ In the Second World War, the German Army was only lightly (i.e., 10%) mechanized and was hindered by poor synergy between tracked armour, foot-mobile infantry and horse-drawn artillery.²⁶ German successes may have been greater had technology been equally diffused across the combat arms. The British equally suffered from unequal diffusion with respect to their aircraft carriers. While, in principle, the vessel was technologically advanced,





the Fleet Air Arm’s development lagged far behind, and without greater range or firepower, the value of the overall system was diminished.²⁷ In contrast, the British system of home air defence championed by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding during the 1940 Battle of Britain functioned smoothly, with radar stations synergized with pre-established and lower-tech practices.²⁸

While Churchman advocated for systems thinking, he also acknowledged that the real value of a system may be unknown at the outset and may

only emerge with time. Herein lies a paradox: early adoption of innovation provides a head-start advantage yet may result in unequal diffusion. Arquilla noted that German tanks in the Second World War were superior to those of the Allies in part because they imitated the French and British while improving on their drawbacks.²⁹ In this case, late modernization was a benefit. Conversely, he also noted that late innovation in significant areas could result in a drastically different world order; imagine a world in which Nazi Germany had built atomic weapons first. The timing balance, then, is precarious. In the end, he notes, “If you are first, you must not fall behind the late modernizers.”³⁰ Timing and diffusion of technology must be closely considered by those positioned to influence innovation efforts.

Conclusions and Implications for the CAF

This article discusses four factors internal to organizations that can positively influence the course of innovation. The first two, cultural attitudes and executive


influence, indicate that the people within an organization strongly influence innovation. The last two, structure and timing, demonstrate that organizational composition has an influence as well. Weakness in one factor must be compensated by strength in another. Ultimately, the presence of all four of these internal factors builds the strongest case for successful innovation.

The Canadian Armed Forces must consider these factors if it truly wishes to be an innovative organization: commanders and senior leaders must champion new initiatives; mid-level personnel must reduce structural impediments to new ideas; and all must foster a military culture that is open and willing to change. These implications do not come without risk however, for every successful effort at innovation has an equal (or greater!) number of failures. But innovate the armed forces must, for only through innovative change will they remain relevant and effective in an increasingly complex and multidimensional operating environment. ■

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17. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 230.
18. See Figure 3. From Arquilla, "The explosive growth of information systems."
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CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: PAKISTAN'S 'CHINANIZATION' OR COLONIZATION?

by Adnan Qaiser



Gwadar Port. Photo courtesy of Flickr user Moign Khawaja <https://www.flickr.com/photos/70798075@N00/5519732900/>

It is said that in 1960 when Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong sent off General Geng Biao, his second ambassador to Pakistan, he advised him: “Look after Pakistan; it is China’s window to the West.” Thus, the fact that Pakistan was a catalyst in connecting China with the United States in 1971 – when Henry Kissinger paid two crucial visits to China to establish bilateral relations during the height of the Cold War and to isolate the Soviet Union – comes as no surprise.¹ Pakistan’s centrality to China’s transition from a regional to a global power remains an established fact.² It even draws comparisons to the significance of Israel

to U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and beyond – Chinese General Xiong Guangkai once famously quipped, “Pakistan is China’s Israel.”³

Pakistan, however, refuses to be self-reliant. Having remained dependent upon the United States – defining its geostrategic importance through a ‘transactional relationship’ over the past 70 years – Pakistan has now chosen to fully integrate into China in the new world order. Considering the US\$62 billion Chinese investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (One

Belt One Road – OBOR), and in light of Pakistan’s lavish concessions to China through sovereign guarantees in return, a nuclear Pakistan is on course to becoming a Chinese satellite state.

In his book *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World*, Canadian scholar T.V. Paul finds Pakistan suffering from a historical “geostrategic curse” that results in its addiction to foreign aid for survival. Similar to how countries that have abundant natural resources can suffer from a “resource curse” or an “oil curse” (called the paradox of plenty) and end up with less democracy, poor economic growth

and lack of development, Pakistan has been (wrongly) encashing its geographic location in South Asia at the gateway to the Middle East and Central Asia through foreign aid, assistance and external loans. Paul concludes: “Pakistan became a *rentier* state, living off the rents provided by its external benefactors for supporting their particular geostrategic goals.”⁴

Despite describing their relations as “iron brothers” – without having any historical, cultural or religious commonalities or societal linkages – it has been Pakistan’s ‘geopolitical compulsions’ and China’s ‘geostrategic ambitions’ that keep the two countries together.⁵ Apart from military and nuclear assistance (for China’s own wider geopolitical interests), China has never offered Pakistan any financial aid or assistance; neither did China come forward to help Pakistan in the two wars against India in 1965 and 1971, plus the Kargil conflict in 1999. Indeed, as Johns Hopkins University adjunct professor Touqir Hussain notes:

Yes, the relations with China enjoy a national consensus and remain a success story [for Pakistan] but largely because the Chinese laid down the terms of engagement and drew up its broad parameters. And they did it so shrewdly it gave Pakistan an illusion of being an equal partner.⁶

Pakistan, however, finds itself constrained to put all its eggs in China’s basket owing to excessive U.S. leaning towards Pakistan’s archrival, India. The United States has cultivated a closer strategic relationship with India since the end of the Cold War. Beginning with President Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 (forgiving India’s nuclear tests of May 1998) and followed by President Bush’s famous Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in 2005, this relationship was further strengthened by President Obama and his Pivot to Asia policy that finalized nuclear and defence (logistics)

agreements with India in 2008, 2015 and 2016. This close relationship has only added to Pakistan’s consternation and caused it to look elsewhere for security guarantees and economic development.⁷

Generous Incentives and Fiscal Liabilities

In my 2014 paper on Sino-Pak relations entitled *The Beijing Bend: Future Trajectory of Pakistan-China Relations*, I tried to uncover the extent of (close) political and defence ties between the two countries; however, a leaked “CPEC master plan” – also called the Long Term Plan (LTP) – prepared by the China Development Bank and Chinese National Development Reform Commission, the biggest stakeholders in CPEC, reveals hair-raising details on how China plans to virtually colonize Pakistan.⁸ According to the master plan, the Pakistani government has already agreed to (briefly):

1. Deep and broad-based Chinese penetration into Pakistan’s economy, as well as society;
2. Leasing thousands of acres of agricultural land to China;
3. Establishing a full monitoring and surveillance system (with 24-hour video recording) of all major cities in Pakistan;
4. Installing national fibre optic cable, not only for the internet, but also terrestrial television broadcasts with Chinese media “disseminating Chinese culture”;
5. Building Chinese market presence in electronics and telecommunication, textiles and garments, cement and building materials, fertilizer and agricultural technologies;
6. Visa-free tourism for Chinese nationals visiting Pakistan – ironically not on a reciprocal basis; and,

7. Introducing “coastal tourism” and “nightlife” into the Islamic Republic.

Kept under close wraps, and even hidden from the smaller Pakistani provinces – as well as the Gilgit-Baltistan region in the north – the LTP envisages taking initial shape by 2020 by overcoming (so-called) bureaucratic, technical and social bottlenecks, only to look forward to CPEC’s Vision 2025, covering all areas of binational cooperation that include⁹:

1. Connectivity: construction of an integrated transport system;
2. Cooperation for implementing the Gwadar City Master Plan;
3. Information network infrastructure;
4. Energy related fields;
5. Trade and industrial parks;
6. Agricultural development;
 - a. Strengthening drip irrigation technology for water efficiency;
 - b. Strengthening production of horticultural products;
7. Poverty alleviation;
8. Tourism;
9. People-to-people contact: cooperation in areas connecting people’s livelihood and non-government exchange; and,
10. Financial cooperation;
 - a. Between financial institutions;
 - b. Between financial markets;
 - c. Between Free Trade Zones (FTZs).¹⁰

Pakistan’s Gwadar deep seaport has already been handed over to (state-owned) China Overseas Ports Holding Company on a 40-year lease until 2059. The enterprise holds a 91 percent share in the gross revenue that comes from

terminal and marine operations¹¹ and enjoys an 85 percent share in the gross revenue of the Gwadar free trade zone.¹² As the Chinese begin to show interest in a new airline and investment in Pakistan's banking sector, the Bank of China has already begun its operations in Pakistan¹³ and a Chinese consortium has bought a 40 percent stake in the Pakistan Stock Exchange.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Shanghai Electric is "committed" to buying K-Electric, the electricity distribution company in Pakistan's most populous city of Karachi.

While China pushes Pakistan to quickly finalize the nine special economic zones (SEZs) along the CPEC route,¹⁵ worries are growing about granting all CPEC-related contracts to Chinese companies, by-passing Pakistan Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) rules;¹⁶ the award of a US\$382 million Lahore Airport project to China Construction Third Engineering Bureau is a telling example.¹⁷ The nine SEZs across the country include:

1. Rashakai Economic Zone, Nowshera;
2. China Special Economic Zone, Dhabeji;
3. Bostan Industrial Zone;
4. Allama Iqbal Industrial City, Faisalabad;
5. ICT Model Industrial Zone, Islamabad;
6. Industrial Park at Port Qasim near Karachi;
7. Special Economic Zone at Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir;
8. Mohmand Marble City; and,
9. Moqpondass SEZ Gilgit-Baltistan.

Considering the exclusivity of these SEZs to only Chinese entrepreneurs,

however, the industrial zones are already being called "China enclaves."¹⁸

In what is seen as "Pakistan's Chinanization", Pakistani businesses are nervous of losing out to the monopoly of Chinese competitors who have been showered with liberal tax breaks and import concessions to the extent of lifetime waivers on corporate tax payments in spite of their guaranteed profits.¹⁹ Chinese investors' preference to deal with the government rather than local partners has further left Pakistani entrepreneurs grumbling about Chinese rigidity.²⁰

Pakistan's China infatuation under former President General Pervez Musharraf led it to enter into a Sino-Pak Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in July 2007, which granted duty concessions on a 35 percent tariff line to China without considering the huge trade imbalance between the two countries (in China's favour). As a result, Chinese goods flooded Pakistani markets rendering local manufacturers unable to compete. In the last fiscal year, Pakistan's exports to China were a mere US\$1.5 billion against US\$14 billion of imports from China. Waking up belatedly, Pakistan now seeks to remove the trade imbalance between the two countries.²¹

Meanwhile, China has turned out to be a demanding business partner for Pakistan. Beijing has lately been insisting on using Renminbi (RMB) – the official Chinese currency – as legal tender in the Gwadar Free Trade Zone²² to avoid exchange rate risks associated with the U.S. dollar and the Pakistani rupee. Despite the request being (temporarily) turned down by Islamabad as an affront to its "economic sovereignty", the government seems willing to accede to this demand.

Among many of Pakistan's ills and its (self-inflicted) problems, the perfidy and ineptitude of successive governments keep adding to the nation's misfortunes. As I have observed in several of my

earlier publications, democracy has yet to arrive in Pakistan. Pakistan's fortunes – as well as its future – remain hostage to its uncommitted and unfaithful political elite, which loots and plunders national wealth and its assets at will, throwing the nation in the dungeons of perpetual poverty and shackles of foreign debt. For the first time in Pakistan's 70-year history, a three-time prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, is being held accountable for corruption and having "assets beyond means", as revealed through *Panamaleaks* in 2016. However, as history stands witness, Mr. Sharif is expected to walk scot-free, either through a political deal with national institutions or an intervention by foreign stakeholders.²³ One of the latest examples is General Musharraf's ignoble National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) of 2007.²⁴ Ironically facilitated by international power guarantors,²⁵ the notorious NRO dropped all criminal cases against political elites in the name of "national reconciliation."²⁶ Despite Pakistan's Supreme Court declaring the NRO "null and void", successive governments refuse to hold their fellow politicians accountable.²⁷

As CPEC comprises two major areas of investment – coal-powered electricity generating plants and infrastructure development – the government's dubious silence on what comes under Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and how much falls under foreign loans (allegedly on unfavourable terms with additional country risk-specific insurance surcharges) makes CPEC's outlay questionable.²⁸ While the country is already plagued by a circular debt that comes from ill-thought out "sovereign guarantees" given to the Independent Power Producers (IPP) during early 1990s,²⁹ the accumulation of unpaid electricity bills, the inadequate transmission system and electricity theft (through meter tampering and illegal connections), keep adding to line losses and power blackouts.³⁰ However, in its indiscreet haste of installing 19 coal-powered plants worth US\$15.56

billion, the government has guaranteed a 17 to 20 percent return on investment/equity (ROI in dollar terms) to Chinese investors; adding the customs exemptions and generous tax allowances, the ROI shoots up to some 25 percent of profits.³¹

Small wonder that the Chinese firms investing in coal-powered plants in Bangladesh on projects related to OBOR's Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) are said to be offering electricity at US\$0.062 per unit as against Pakistan that buys it at US\$0.092 per unit – way beyond the reach of an ordinary person. As if this was not enough, Pakistan's National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) – ostensibly having a consumer protection mandate, but under the government's direction – has agreed to extract the security costs of CPEC from the hapless consumers through their back-breaking electricity bills for the next 20 to 30 years.³² Security costs involve monies spent on securing the three CPEC routes and nine SEZs as above from terrorist attacks – a herculean task. Moreover, having little or no regard for the dreadful climatic and environmental effects of coal-powered plants, the Pakistani government has further assumed 22 percent of power producers' liability, in case of their payment default, through sovereign guarantees. Such imprudent concessions may turn the trumpeted "game changer" corridor into a nightmare for the people of Pakistan in the future.

Pakistan's economy already finds itself in dire straits: the country's external debt and foreign liabilities have risen to a staggering US\$83 billion; foreign exchange reserves have been depleted to US\$13.86 billion; and the current account/trade deficit stands at US\$4.4 billion (October 2017 figures).³³ Amid acute financial crisis, CPEC's debt servicing – beginning in 2023-24, when early harvest projects see their completion – may push Pakistan into

default or economic meltdown with unknown consequences for the viability of the state and regional stability. With reports of Pakistan ending up paying US\$90 billion over the next 30 years to the Chinese state and private sector CPEC investors,³⁴ the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already warned to expect an outflow of US\$4.5 billion every year, besides advising to "rationalize and limit tax incentives and exemptions."³⁵

CPEC's Challenges

In my 2015 paper *Balochistan Separatism: The Geopolitics of Gwadar and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor*, I pointed out a few challenges to CPEC, which are no less relevant today.³⁶ First of all, the United States' response to CPEC remains unclear. Despite sending a delegation to attend the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2017, the U.S. is unlikely to support the initiative as it challenges America's long-term strategic plans in South Asia for which India is buttressed as a counterweight to China.³⁷ U.S. defence secretary General James Mattis' recent objection to CPEC "passing through a disputed territory" (Gilgit-Baltistan) has not only offended Pakistan, but also distressed China.³⁸

China's quest for an alternate trade route is natural considering tensions brewing in the South China Sea, which may result in a naval blockade of China's maritime route passing through the Strait of Malacca by the Asian Security Diamond, as well as the newly-formed "Quad"³⁹ consisting of the U.S., Japan, Australia and India.⁴⁰ Amid increasing Sino-Pak military cooperation,⁴¹ the Gwadar deep seaport may well become China's naval outpost among its "Strings of [naval] Pearls" in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Djibouti.⁴² Although refuted by Beijing, a Pentagon report has claimed that China is establishing military bases in Pakistan.⁴³


Second, India remains a major

roadblock. Protesting the corridor passing through Indian-claimed Kashmir (in Pakistan) and Aksai Chin (in China), New Delhi has rejected the initiative.⁴⁴ Citing the India-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir as a matter of concern, a report by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) warned that CPEC might create geopolitical tensions with India and ignite political instability.⁴⁵

CPEC further challenges India's plans of its Central Asia and Eurasia connectivity through the Iranian Chahbahar port and North-South Corridor passing through Iran and Afghanistan. The arrest of an Indian spy (Naval Commander Kulbhushan Jhadev) in Pakistan in March 2016,⁴⁶ confessing his subversive activities to sabotage CPEC in Balochistan province, demonstrates India's determination to derail the project.⁴⁷ Pakistan, however, does not mince its words when it comes to blaming India for subverting CPEC. Pakistan's Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Zubair Hayat, revealed to a seminar in November 2017 that the Indian intelligence Research and Analysis Wing had "established a new cell with a special allocation of over [US]\$500 million in 2015 to sabotage CPEC projects."⁴⁸

Third, keeping its Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang province suppressed,⁴⁹ China keeps complaining to Pakistan (behind closed doors) against Uighur terrorists having sanctuaries and receiving training in Pakistan's tribal areas. Driven by Islamic fundamentalist ideology, Pakistani *jihad* groups carry strong sympathy – and linkages – with their brethren under persecution by (a godless) China and may not "recognize" the larger economic benefits of CPEC.

Fourth, Pakistan's near hostile relations with Afghanistan keep both countries testy and unstable.⁵⁰ Pakistan keeps accusing the Afghan government and its



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intelligence agency of granting sanctuary to the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan terror groups, using this base to launch attacks inside Pakistan. As Pakistan's western flank remains vulnerable and unstable, CPEC's security cannot be guaranteed.

Fifth, the stark cultural, linguistic and religious dissimilarities will further come out in the open as CPEC progresses. China is not only bringing its own cement and steel, but also its own labour, citing language issues. The Pakistani people are, however, generally conservative in their outlook and are extremely particular about faith-defined values, moral practices and (halal) eating habits. As the country gets flooded with a Chinese workforce, the social contrasts

are certainly going to cause frictions in the Islamic Republic. A recent AFP report on the persecution of Xinjiang's Uighur Muslim population quotes a Chinese official giving China's mindset: "The government thinks this Islamic word is equal to separatism".⁵¹

Sixth are Pakistan's own innumerable internal challenges:

1. *Civil-military frictions:* The political and military leadership carry divergent outlooks toward CPEC.⁵² While the government desires to keep the project fully under its control, the powerful army wants to be an equal player. The government's lack of transparency in signing loans and offering sovereign

guarantees to China, not to mention arbitrarily planning industrial zones (for political mileage/patronage and kickback purposes), has already unnerved the army, which has created a 13,700-strong CPEC protection force called the Special Security Division.⁵³ Censuring the civilian government, Pakistan's army chief has already voiced his concerns publicly by saying: "The bottom line is, we must ensure that the people of Pakistan benefit from CPEC to enjoy the fruits of prosperity. This will require leadership, collaborative spirit and capacity building at a much higher pace and level. While the army will provide security to the project, the other national institutions will have to come forward and play their

respective roles".⁵⁴

2. *The Route Controversy*: CPEC is a fortune-changer, no doubt. In view of the potential magnitude of goods transported on a daily basis and the lives of people it would favourably affect, the corridor will transform the destiny of the land. However, owing to the greed and short-sighted policies of Pakistani politicians deciding the layout of CPEC, the corridor ran into controversy and dispute from day one. While the government wanted CPEC's prime artery to traverse through its political heartland – the prosperous Punjab province – the smaller and less privileged provinces rightfully demanded their due share from the prosperity generated by CPEC. The corridor, presently, has three arteries (see map on previous page): the western, central and eastern routes. The shortest route, of course, passes through the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province; however, considering its vulnerability to terrorism, the western route has been kept as the third and last priority. The eastern route is the longest and understandably costliest passage, thus leaving the government-desired central route to be adopted as the best choice.

3. *Balochistan unrest*: The Baloch insurgency in the restive province has not ended, although it has died down somewhat. The Gwadar port city remains prone to terrorist attacks, and so is the long CPEC route that traverses through the province where the government's writ remains lacking due to perpetual neglect and the denial of the people's due rights.⁵⁵

4. *Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict areas*: Among the three CPEC routes, the western artery passes through, or close to, the Shia-Sunni violence prone areas of Quetta, Dera Ismail Khan and the Kurram tribal agency. Sectarian killings in Pakistan keep

the country volatile. For example, a twin suicide attack and blast in Parachinar and Quetta claimed 85 lives (largely from the local Shia and Hazara community) on 24 June 2017.⁵⁶ Furthermore, all three CPEC routes culminate at the hotbed of sectarian clashes – Kohistan and Gilgit-Baltistan – threatening the very security of the passage.⁵⁷ In one of the most internationally embarrassing terrorist attacks in Pakistan, nine foreigners, including three Chinese mountaineers, were killed at Nanga Parbat in Gilgit-Baltistan in June 2013.⁵⁸

5. *Terrorism*: Despite controlling the menace of terrorism through military operations – Zarb-e-Azab (in North Waziristan) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (an intelligence-based operation in the whole of the country) – internal terrorism continues to persist. The problem is that while the military stays focussed, the government sleeps over its 2014 National Action Plan to rid the country of extremism and terrorism.⁵⁹ CPEC's western route would be particularly hazardous, as it travels right next to the lawless tribal areas, which some of Pakistan's self-serving politicians refuse to integrate into the mainstream country.⁶⁰

Conclusion

While it is Pakistan's right to seek any geopolitical alignment and strategic partnership with any country it deems fitting, the true nature of Sino-Pak relations remains shrouded in mystery. Although denied by Beijing, there have been (unsubstantiated) reports of Chinese military presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area and Chinese plans to use the Gwadar port as its naval base. Recent reports of China seeking an agreement with Afghanistan to station its troops in the Wakhan Belt bordering Pakistan has fuelled suspicions of China's long-term military presence in the region. In my 2015 paper mentioned earlier,

I cited an AFP report that quoted the Pakistani Army's Directorate of Inter-Services Public Relations. According to this report, pledging on behalf of Beijing, the vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, General Fan Changlong, had extended close cooperation to Pakistan "to ensure proper management and security of CPEC" – a reference to CPEC's joint patrolling by the two armies.⁶¹

Pakistan, however, needs to be mindful of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and a few African countries going sour.⁶² It is widely believed that the Chinese do not review their loans, let alone write them off. In such a backdrop, the rising costs of projects have compelled these countries to surrender a substantial amount of land to China to pay back their debt. While Sri Lankans surrendered their territory in return for a debt equity swap on the Hambantota port,⁶³ Tajikistan is also said to have ceded one percent of the country in lieu of unpaid loans to China.⁶⁴ CPEC can no doubt promise prosperity to the people of Pakistan, however the country needs to rely upon its own potential, and while safeguarding its own national interests, emerge as a truly sovereign state. Offering irrational concessions to China may turn out to be back-breaking and strangulating. In his book *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*, Andrew Small acknowledges that:

China's supposed plans for military bases in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], Pakistan's supposed intentions to lease China a tenth of its territory, and the purported presence of 11,000 Chinese troops in Pakistan's north are only a few ... questionable claims that are taken as 'accepted truth.'⁶⁵

Pakistan should also carefully take into account China's own outlook about its rising power status before handing over the keys to its destiny to a country that is aiming big at the world

stage – rekindling the myth of China’s Middle Kingdom representing *Shangri-La* (heaven on earth).⁶⁶ At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, president Xi Jinping proclaimed: “The Chinese nation ... has stood up, grown rich, and become strong – and it now embraces the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation ... It will be an era that sees China moving closer to centre stage and making greater contributions to mankind”.⁶⁷ Having his ideology enshrined in the Communist Party charter, Xi laid out his foreign policy objective of influencing emerging nations by offering them an alternate Chinese-style socialist model (rather than following Western democracy) to “accelerate their development while maintaining their independence”.⁶⁸

Under the banner of “time-tested and all-weather friendship” between the two countries – which is bragged about as higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Arabian Sea, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel⁶⁹ – voices in Pakistan are now questioning Chinese generosity as another East India Company in the making – a private British company that ushered in the subcontinent’s British colonization, subjugating the land for nearly two centuries.⁷⁰ Christine C. Fair, an authority on South Asia, observed in *Foreign Policy*: “If [CPEC] is even partially executed, Pakistan would be indebted to China as never before. And unlike Pakistan’s other traditional allies, such as the United States, China will probably use its leverage to obtain greater compliance from its problematic client”.⁷¹

At the end of the day, CPEC remains a Chinese priority for China’s own strategic interests. Although Washington needs to be equally blamed for abandoning Islamabad, Pakistan’s decision to seek a closer relationship with China neither diminishes its geostrategic significance nor undermines its role as a strong Muslim military and nuclear power. Situated at the crossroads of five great civilizations

– the Confucius civilization in the north, the Hindu civilization in its east, the Persian civilization in the south-west, the Muslim civilization in the west and having its own ancient Indus Valley civilization in its heartland – Pakistan has much more to offer to the world than how it sells itself. Most importantly, having shared liberal democratic values, Pakistan must not alter its future course or terminate its ties with the West.

It is less ironic but more consternating that having chosen to join the American camp immediately after its birth, having remained a steadfast U.S. ally during the Cold War, having been a frontline state in helping to stop the onslaught of a socialist Soviet Union from reaching the warm waters of the Arabian Sea, as well as fighting the war on terror as a major non-NATO ally, Pakistan is feverishly welcoming another communist country with open arms – but closed eyes – that may well turn Pakistan into a vassal state: “South Asia’s North Korea”. ■

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2018 CDA AND CDA INSTITUTE OTTAWA CONFERENCE SUMMARIES

by Christopher Cowan

The annual Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence, hosted by the CDA and CDA Institute on 22 and 23 February 2018 at the Château Laurier, attracted a wide range of participants and panelists. Following the release of Canada's new defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged in 2017, Canada has had to deal with a number of events and developments that are changing the international order in which the nation has prospered. Attendees of the 2018 conference had the opportunity to engage with prominent experts from Canada and abroad on issues such as the changing international order, how to cope with and take advantage of international disorder, and how to build the Canadian Armed Forces for a new security environment. A synopsis of the event appears below.

Speaker 1: Darrell Bricker

Darrell Bricker of IPSOS kicked off the 2018 Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence with an examination of the demographic trends that will influence Canadian defence and security in the decades to come. Touching first on ageing and fertility rates, he noted that the combination of longer lifespans and a lower fertility rate meant that Canada would have fewer young people and more elderly people. The implications of this trend are critical, as they will require the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to develop recruiting methods and redefine the traditional military career path to better attract and keep a more diverse pool of talent.

Urbanization, migration and immigration are other key trends shaping Canada's future. According to Bricker, most of Canada's population growth is occurring in cities, especially in western Canada; for example, Alberta's population grew by 11.6% between 2011 and 2016. The main factor behind this is immigration, especially from countries in Asia, which is compensating for low fertility rates and giving Canada the highest rate of population growth in the G7. This will likely have profound impacts on whom and where the CAF tries to recruit, as



previously fertile grounds are no longer able to sustain the CAF's recruitment goals.

While understanding the underlying trends behind Canada's demographic changes is key to the CAF's future success, so is public opinion. Unfortunately, defence ranks low on the scale of policy issue importance for most Canadians. Canadians care more about domestic issues that affect their lives in visible ways than issues like defence. However, there is sentiment amongst the public that Canada needs to be more engaged globally, and

having a capable military is a critical part of that engagement.

Canada as a country is changing and so the CAF must be able to respond and adapt to this change to ensure that it can protect Canadians in the future.

Panel 1: Security and Defence Challenges of the Future

Moderator: Kim Richard Nossal

Panelists: Dr. James Boutilier, Dr. James Fergusson, Dr. Walter Dorn

The first panel of the conference focused on the main security and defence challenges

facing Canada in the future. Kim Richard Nossal started by highlighting the fact that the “international order” has never been as static as it seems for it is constantly being made and unmade. What we are seeing today is an acceleration of the unmaking process by international forces like Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. This is bound to have critical defence and security implications for Canada, Nossal argued, but our ability to respond to these shifts will always be tempered by the fact that international affairs are fundamentally unpredictable. Thus, the decisions made today are critical as path dependence will determine the scope of policy options for future policymakers.

Dr. James Boutillier's remarks centred on how China's rise is affecting the international order. According to him, China has taken a prominent place on the world stage and has shifted from “hiding” its power to openly asserting it. This newfound power is reinvigorating the ‘Chinese Dream’ and is manifesting itself both economically and militarily. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative is challenging American and Indian economic power through its development of commercial links throughout the Indian Ocean. China has also recognized the maritime nature of the Indo-Pacific region and has embraced the importance of seapower through the development of significant military and civilian maritime capabilities. Dr. Boutillier ended his remarks by noting that Canada must be prepared to deal with a more powerful China that is going to have an ever-increasing role in regional affairs.

Shifting to North America, Dr. James Fergusson spoke about the evolution of the defence of North America and NORAD. He noted that discussions between the United States and Canada about the evolution of continental defence and NORAD have been underway for a number of years and highlighted many potential routes that the issue could take. During the Cold War, North America (and NORAD) faced a single-domain

threat: Soviet missiles and bombers coming over the North Pole. But now, Dr. Fergusson explained, North America faces threats from the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace, which necessitates a new approach to defence. Cold War-era systems like the North Warning System are no longer useful for dealing with these threats and need to be modernized; command and control systems and structures need to be updated as well. None of this will come cheap, Dr. Fergusson concluded, but the modernization is nevertheless crucial for maintaining the ability to successfully defend North America.

Dr. Walter Dorn rounded out the first panel by discussing Canada's new strategic environment and how Canada can respond to the new challenges it faces. Dorn emphasized the transnational nature of security threats confronting Canada – from international terrorism that transcends borders to pandemics that ignore borders altogether – brought on by this new era of global interconnectedness. United Nations peacekeeping missions have traditionally been seen as one way to maintain global stability, and peacekeeping is a concept that Canada has embraced. The country has moved away from these concepts recently, but they deserve further attention in this unstable time. Furthermore, countries like Russia and China are using non-traditional means like cyberattacks and hybrid warfare to challenge the *status quo*. Addressing these threats requires coordinated international actions and the recognition of a new global reality. Canada has played a key role in international responses to global challenges in the past and, should it want to maintain the global system that has brought it such prosperity, will have to do so again in order to maintain peace and stability throughout the world.

The question-and-answer session focused on how Canada can adapt to new security threats and operating environments. Dr. Dorn highlighted the fact that preventative action is always best for dealing with emerging security threats,

but occasionally military force needs to be used in a peacekeeping context should a situation escalate. Dr. Fergusson and Dr. Boutillier argued that, despite the rhetoric, the Trump administration's approach to security and defence is not much different from that of his predecessors. Finally, all three panelists also noted the key role diversity plays in dealing with emerging threats.

Speaker 2: Général de division aérienne Philippe Montocchio

The CDA and CDA Institute were pleased to again host le general de division aérienne Philippe Montocchio to discuss how France sees the evolving international security situation. He began by highlighting French President Emmanuel Macron's commitment to increasing defence spending, calling it a necessity to reverse years of decline. France has seen a decline in both the capacity and capability of its armed forces due to budgetary constraints, and reversing the decline is an important part of France maintaining its security at home and abroad. According to le general Montocchio, France's new defence budget will seek to encourage further European defence cooperation and integration, although France will retain national strategic autonomy in some key sectors and capabilities. Enhancing intelligence



Source: Richard Lawrence Photography

gathering and analysis capabilities, promoting innovation, and developing new programs and initiatives to predict and counter future threats and crises are all being emphasized in this budget. All in all, le général Montocchio concluded, France's new budget demonstrates France's commitment to maintaining a stable Europe and a stable world by giving it the capabilities needed to counter future threats to its security, wherever they may appear.

Panel 2: Taking Advantage of Disorder

Moderator: General (Ret'd) Paul Kern

Panelists: Richard Fadden, Mark Gwozdecky, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges, Dr. Jānis Sārts

The second panel of the conference focused on how Canada could adapt and thrive in the changing global order. General (Ret'd) Paul Kern began the panel with some thoughts on how countries have responded to disorder in the past. Following the end of the Second World War, countries like Canada and the U.S. created alliances, international organizations, and codified rules and norms to ensure that the conditions that led to that catastrophic war could never again occur. Today we face a different set of conditions that are causing disorder—the mass displacement of peoples, urban warfare, and the rise of the cyber domain are chief among them. General Kern concluded by stating that disorder can bring about opportunities to better shape the world, but collective ideas and action are required to do so.

The first panelist of the session was Richard Fadden, the former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. He began by calling for Canada to do some self-reflection and realize that the world is not as we think it is. We are living in a multi-polar world with new security challenges and conditions to which Canada must adapt. The role of the United States—Canada's principal economic and strategic partner—in world affairs is changing in ways Canada may not like. Revisionist powers like Russia and China



are challenging the international system at every turn, and the global economic order is under increasing strain. These are big problems that Canada cannot solve alone, argued Fadden. Dealing with them requires Canada to come to grips with the limits of its power and influence. He concluded his remarks by stating that Canada needs to think deeper about what it wants to accomplish in this new disorderly world, where it wants to accomplish it, and with whom it wants to partner to do so. It then needs to go beyond the rhetoric and actually set about doing something to actually make a difference in the world.

Mark Gwozdecky, the Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Affairs at Global Affairs Canada, spoke next. His remarks centred on how he thought the world was not as chaotic and disorderly as many believed. He began by arguing that despite what people think, we actually live in the most prosperous era of human history. People around the world have never been healthier, richer, or more secure than today. Despite this rosy picture, he argued, there were some ominous trends that must be confronted to ensure that Canada remains peaceful and prosperous. People are losing faith in democratic institutions and believe that they are less well-off and less secure than what they actually are, which is

threatening our democratic society. According to Gwozdecky, responding to these trends will require governments to recognize the fact that people are unhappy and include the private sector and local governments more in decision-making processes to better address the concerns of citizens. He concluded his remarks by stating that we face these problems because of the openness of our society; we should not abandon our values in dealing with these new challenges.

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges, formerly U.S. Army Commander—Europe, spoke on how NATO is responding to its new strategic environment and the challenge posed by a resurgent Russia. He highlighted the fact that Russia seeks to undermine the cohesion of NATO by creating doubt about whether it would respond to a limited Russian attack on a member state. To respond to this threat, NATO has made it a priority to develop a deterrence posture that can respond quickly to any Russian action against a member state. This, above all else, argued General Hodges, requires speed—the ability to quickly recognize, assemble, and respond to any Russian action. The most effective way to increase alliance cohesion, he concluded, was to enhance NATO logistics infrastructure, enhance intelligence sharing between countries

and agencies, and conduct more exercises to increase interoperability.

The final speaker of the panel was Dr. Jānis Sārts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia. His remarks focused on how countries like Canada can adapt to the world of technology and communications. He argued that we are currently undergoing the biggest shift in how we exchange information since the invention of the printing press. Democracies have always functioned best when proper information was accessible and all sides of a debate were heard before a decision was made. Now, the majority of people get their news from a single source and live in 'echo chambers' that lock them away from competing information, hardening their views. However, the news that they consume is not necessarily always true, which can lead to skewed decisions due to poor information. Furthermore, big technology companies now hold more information on billions of people than governments ever could (or dreamed of). According to Dr. Sārts, this information is being used to influence consumer decision-making and could potentially be exploited by adversaries to influence elections. He concluded by noting that we need to find ways of reintroducing trust into the relationship between citizen and government, as trust is the bedrock of democracy.

Questions for this panel centred on how Canada could better operate in cyberspace and how to broaden Canadian support for NATO. The panelists highlighted the challenges of attributing cyberattacks and the potential consequences of misattribution. They also noted that the lack of international norms for operating in the cyber domain makes it hard for actors to be held accountable for their actions. Regarding NATO, the panelists noted that there needs to be more advocacy and discussion by non-military experts of the benefits that NATO membership gives to Canada.

Speaker 3: Major-General Christopher



Coates, Director of Operations at NORAD

The CDA and CDA Institute were pleased to have Major-General Christopher Coates, NORAD Director of Operations, give the final keynote address on the first day of the conference. He began by highlighting the bi-national nature of NORAD's command structure and the linkages it creates between the Canadian and American militaries. Building on General Lori Robinson's talk at the 2017 *Ottawa Conference*, General Coates discussed the major areas of concern for NORAD as Canada and the United States consider the institution's future. NORAD now has to deal with a multi-dimensional threat environment that transcends regions including threats from nation-states, terrorism, disaster response, transnational crime networks, and cyberspace. According to General Coates, dealing with these threats will require new capabilities and new command structures, as well as require the establishment of linkages with new partners in Europe. He concluded his remarks by highlighting the sixtieth anniversary of NORAD's creation and the symbolism of the institution in the context of U.S.-Canada defence cooperation.

Speaker 4: General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff

The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance, kicked off the second day of the conference with his keynote address. General Vance's talk marked the first time he had spoken publicly at a CDA Institute event since the release of Canada's new defence policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)*. He began his remarks by addressing Canada's international engagements and how they fit within the framework set out by SSE. He touched on Canada's role in the international community's ongoing campaign to defeat *Daesh*, the country's prominent role in NATO operations in eastern Europe, and its new focus on the Indo-Pacific region in 2018. According to General Vance, SSE gives Canada the framework to acquire and develop the capabilities needed to respond effectively to a broad range of international crises and situations. Shifting to the domestic front, he highlighted how SSE engages with several critical issues facing the CAF at home. The opening of the Canadian Arctic to increased human development afforded by climate change is having drastic effects on the requirements of the CAF, compelling it to improve its ability to operate in the North. Having a military that represents the diversity of our country and is a good place to go to work is critical to the continued success and

relevance of the institution going forward. Furthermore, he argued, *SSE* improves the CAF's ability to attract new service members with diverse skill sets, positions the CAF to be better able to retain talent, and helps its service members transition to civilian life. General Vance ended his remarks by noting that since it had only been a year since the release of *SSE*, there was much left to do in the implementation of the policy, but he was happy with the progress being made.

Questions for General Vance focused primarily on how the CAF plans on shifting its recruiting and retention practices to adapt to the new job market. In response, he emphasized that attracting recruits from diverse backgrounds, both culturally and occupationally, is something toward which the CAF is devoting resources, and that efforts to combat sexual assault within the military are key to making the CAF an attractive place to work for all Canadians.

Panel 3: Harnessing National Capacity for Security and Defence

Moderator: Jody Thomas, Deputy Minister of National Defence

Panelists: Dr. Eric Dion, Shelly Bruce, Ted Itani, Dr. Yan Cimon

The third panel of the conference discussed how Canada could harness its

resources to improve its ability to operate in a disorderly world. Deputy Minister of National Defence Jody Thomas began by discussing how *SSE* improves Canada's ability to leverage its vast pool of talent to make Canada safer and more secure. She highlighted the importance of having a military that reflected the diversity of Canada's population, its values, and its interests. She also noted that *SSE* seeks to engage with the private sector and academic community to find new ideas, streamline current processes, and facilitate the development of new technologies to improve Canada's defence and security.

Dr. Eric Dion began the panelists' session by discussing how Canada needed a new mindset to truly be able to harness its national capacity. He argued that Canada needed to think about *synergy* between the various aspects of national capacity to truly be successful in the future. Doing so requires Canada to look beyond the obvious partners and recognize the importance of private-public collaborations, academia, the media, and other government departments in developing holistic solutions to Canadian defence and security challenges. He concluded his remarks by arguing that Canada needs to be able to recognize the root causes of conflict and address them using a variety of tools that only a "Team

Canada" can bring to the table in order to effectively respond to the security and defence challenges of the 21st century.

The second panelist of the session was Shelly Bruce, Associate Chief of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Her remarks focused on the cyber aspect of Canada's defence and security challenges and how the country can address them. She noted that since the cyber domain cuts across all industries, addressing cyber issues requires cooperation between different actors both inside and outside government, as "cyber defence is everyone's business". She concluded her remarks by highlighting how the current version of Bill C-59, which is currently tabled in the House of Commons, better allows CSE to undertake the measures necessary to defend Canada's cyber infrastructure and exploit this new domain for defence and security purposes. As a side note, Stephen Thorne of *Legion Magazine* used her comments at the conference in an article on cybersecurity (see the May/June issue, pp.58-9).

Ted Itani's remarks focused primarily on the humanitarian benefits Canada could bring to the world by harnessing its national capacity. He noted that in today's world, many security threats and sources of instability come from the failure of states and the mass migration of people that tends to follow. In these states, the lack of economic opportunity is leading to radicalization and eventually conflict. Dealing with these problems requires Canada, and the international community writ large, to understand and act preventatively in order to pre-empt crises rather than react to them. Itani concluded by stating that doing so requires Canada to leverage all of its resources and capabilities in order to bring real change to the world.

The final panelist of the session was Dr. Yan Cimon of l'Université Laval. He spoke on how the government can better leverage its relationships with academia and industry to better address the security challenges facing Canada in the future. He argued that academia can play an



important role in analyzing information and formulating new ideas and ways to tackle emerging security challenges. He noted that the government's partnership with industry is a prominent theme in *SSE*, which is a step in the right direction for solving some of the problems related to the procurement of defence equipment. Dr. Cimon concluded his remarks by stating that we need to look to our adversaries for inspiration in terms of how to become more efficient and effective at addressing security challenges.

The questions for the panel centred on innovation and how Canada can develop new, efficient ways of leveraging its capabilities. Better language and cultural training, and diversity, were frequently brought up as ways to turn Canadian soldiers into “enablers” during a mission. Furthermore, developing innovative policies requires a new organizational culture and a streamlining of processes since there is a tendency for more people and organizations to get involved in projects, thus slowing them down by adding more layers of bureaucracy to navigate.

Speaker 5: Major-General Mitch Mitchell, Director - Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, United Kingdom

The CDA and CDA Institute were delighted to have Major-General Mitch Mitchell of the British Armed Forces give the final keynote address of the 2018 *Ottawa Conference*. His remarks focused on how the United Kingdom is building its forces for future conflicts. He began by noting that the current way the UK goes about its defence activities is no longer enough. The UK is playing catch-up to countries like China and Russia who are racing ahead in the new world of conflict. According to General Mitchell, finding a way to catch-up requires a new guiding principle for the organization of the UK's forces, one that recognizes and exploits an adversary's weaknesses. Developing such a principle requires



strategic empathy in order to understand what adversaries want, how they plan to get it, and how one can best respond to deny and deter them. But, he stated, this is not solely a military issue for we need a “whole of government” approach in order to counter the non-military (i.e., civic, cultural, economic, etc.) aspects of contemporary and future conflict. Thus, General Mitchell concluded, partnerships with other government departments, as well as academia and private industry, will be crucial to responding to crises and conflict going forward.

Panel 4: Implications for Building Military Forces into the Future

Moderator: Rear-Admiral Darren Hawco
Panelists: Senator (Ret'd) Romeo Dallaire, Dr. Dave Pedlar, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Marc Caron

The final panel of the conference focused on how Canada could better structure its forces to deal with future security challenges. Rear-Admiral Darren Hawco set the stage for the discussion by emphasizing that Canada's circumstances and how it engages militarily with the world requires it to think from a capability-based viewpoint. Thus, having a multi-purpose, globally-deployable military that can operate in all parts of the spectrum of conflict is a necessity for Canada.

The first panelist of the session was Senator (Ret'd) Romeo Dallaire. He began by emphasizing the fact that what we call “the future” is now really only five or six years down the road due to the increasing pace of technological development. He argued that because of this, maintaining the *status quo* is no longer sufficient, as it means that we are no longer moving forward but actually regressing. Reform no longer cuts it either, as it means that we are solely adjusting Cold War principles to new circumstances, which often is not very effective in today's quickly evolving world. Dallaire argued that what the CAF truly needed to learn was to integrate disciplines together to create something completely new, rather than behaving on a five-year budgetary cycle. He concluded his remarks with a provocative argument: that the Canadian Armed Forces does not truly want to evolve and thus does not want to bring real change to the world, as we do not have the courage to act on new ideas.

Dr. Dave Pedlar, the Scientific Director of the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research, spoke next. His remarks focused on how the CAF could better adjust the “life course” of its service members to increase their quality of life and job satisfaction. He argued that there are seven domains of

well-being that the CAF should address: employment, finance, health, life skills preparedness, social integration, housing/physical environment, and cultural/social environment. While each of these domains is important (and needs to be addressed), dealing with concerns in the health and finance domains will be perhaps the most important going forward due to the dangerous nature of employment within the CAF. According to Dr. Pedlar, intervening early when a problem arises in the life course of a service member's career will be crucial for getting them back on the right track and achieving better long-term results for their well-being. He concluded his remarks by stating that the CAF's recent emphasis on people is a step in the right direction for making the CAF a safer, more effective, and more enjoyable place to work in the future.

The final panelist of the session, and indeed the conference, was Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Marc Caron who spoke about the importance of capacity building in future conflict. He began by highlighting

the importance of human security perspectives and security sector reform in preventing conflict because a fair and accountable security sector can play a key role in limiting conflict in the first place. Canada has traditionally done much in this field but has tended to emphasize effectiveness over accountability. This has led to Canadian-trained security forces in some countries engaging in human rights violations and undermining democracy, which decreases trust between citizens and government. He argued that emphasizing the accountability side in Canadian-led security sector reform missions will go a long way toward creating the conditions for future peace. He concluded by stating that such efforts are best done at the strategic level where fewer soldiers can have a larger impact.

The questions for this panel focused on how to best integrate new people-centric capabilities into the CAF. In response to a question about how to better recognize service member skills in the civilian world, Dallaire argued that the CAF

needs a better educated officer corps to better tackle future military problems. In response to the same question, Dr. Pedlar stated that giving service members civilian-equivalent accreditation would ease their transition to the civilian world.

■

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
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SELECT BOOK REVIEWS

Readers of either the CDA Institute's homepage or its weekly email, *What's New?*, will know that reviews are now being published of books relevant to the historical and contemporary discussion of Canadian security and defence broadly interpreted. Prominent national and international scholarly presses are now providing their latest volumes on a regular basis, so this initiative will continue for the foreseeable future. In order to ensure as wide a distribution as possible, select reviews that are particularly insightful, timely or relevant to contemporary events will also be reproduced in the final section of each issue of *ON TRACK*; all other book reviews not republished here remain archived on our website. Please visit <https://cdainstitute.ca/research-and-publications/books-available-for-review/> for further information and a list of both available books and completed reviews. Happy reading!



***The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard Tanks for Canada's NATO Brigade* by Frank Mass (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017).**

Reviewed by Peter Kasurak

Tanks are a litmus test for Canadian defence and foreign policy. How one views tanks can reveal preferences for defence budget levels, overseas engagement, UN and alliance policy and a host of other considerations. Ownership of tanks raises issues of foreign policy, civil-military relations and the technicalities and politics of major procurements. *The Price of Alliance* by Frank Maas explores all three of these dimensions.

Maas' book begins with Paul Hellyer's

1964 Defence White Paper and ends in 1975 with the acquisition of the Leopard tank by Pierre Trudeau's government. During this decade, the army faced the necessity of replacing its aging Centurion tanks while the government underwent two major defence policy revolutions: the first being Hellyer's quest for the creation of a "mobile force" and the integration and unification of the Canadian Forces; and a second when the value of the NATO alliance came into question during the Trudeau government's tenure. At issue were questions of whether the army should be equipped with a main battle tank or a lighter "Direct Fire Support Vehicle" (DFSV) that would be air portable and whether the Canadian brigade group should remain on NATO's Central Front or even be stationed in Europe at all. Maas makes it clear that the debate did not simply pit civilians against military officials. One side included "traditionalists" in the foreign and defence policy communities, as well as Prime Minister Lester Pearson and members of the both the Pearson and Trudeau cabinets, who supported continuing with a heavy brigade group on the Central Front. On the other side, the "revisionists" consisted not only of the new guard in Trudeau's cabinet and the prime minister himself, but also military modernizers like General Jean Victor Allard who wanted to equip the army with lighter, more modern equipment.

Probably the most written about episode in the Leopard tank story is Trudeau's meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, which is often summarized as the former caving to a threat by the latter, "No tanks, no trade." Others contend that the CDS, General Jacques Dextraze, or U.S. Secretary of State James Schlesinger changed Trudeau's mind. Maas considers all of these possibilities, but rejects them. While each man played a role, and Schmidt undoubtedly pressured Trudeau, Maas shows that Schmidt played a more subtle game by showing Trudeau that it was worth being part of the NATO club, and if tanks were the price of admission, then so be it. Maas also argues that Trudeau's thinking on defence policy had evolved, making him more amenable to stationing Canadian forces on the Central Front.

The tank issue was also a major contributor to the decline of civil-military relations during the 1970s. As Minister of National Defence, Léo Cadieux was supposed to negotiate the removal of the Canadian brigade group from the Central Front and keep cabinet informed if there were problems in accomplishing this. In any event, neither occurred. Cadieux, along with Mitchell Sharp, another cabinet colleague, threatened resignation over the issue and prevented a complete withdrawal from Europe by obtaining cabinet consent to a "phased reduction."

When Donald Macdonald succeeded him as minister, he was horrified to discover that the army wanted to buy tanks and was still committed to the Central Front. Trudeau launched an investigation. In my book, *A National Force*, I concluded that Cadieux, with the support of Allard, had stretched out negotiations and kept cabinet in the dark. Maas takes a contrary view saying it is “unlikely” that Cadieux attempted to “fool” cabinet. But I am not convinced. It seems unlikely to me that a cabinet minister would simply forget to keep his colleagues informed of a key provision of an international negotiation and equally unlikely that he would not ensure that NATO was aware (which it was not) of Canada’s intent to withdraw from the Central Front. As there is no “smoking gun” document in the archives, readers will have to make up their own mind as to whose account is best.

The history of the Leopard tank as a procurement project is the least interesting part of the book, mostly because National Defence selected what it considered the lowest risk option and then both it and Kraus-Maffei executed the contract well. Maas makes a careful appraisal of the project, concluding that off-the-shelf worked well for the Leopard, but would not be a suitable approach for all major defence procurements.

This is a solid work based on extensive research. There is much new material presented that historians will want to access. It is also well-written for the general reader and underscores the fact that the light/heavy debate continues into the present given recent controversies over yet another Leopard tank and the associated Close Combat Vehicle.



***NATO's Balancing Act* by David S. Yost (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014).**

Critique du livre par Samir Battiss

David S. Yost, professeur à la Naval Postgraduate School, reste un des rares chercheurs ayant gardé à ce jour l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) comme objet d'analyse, et ce depuis plusieurs décennies. Avec cet ouvrage, il publie un remarquable travail de mise en perspective et d'évaluation du développement de cette organisation depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide. La démarche est hautement empirique et les sources très riches. L'objectif de l'auteur est de présenter une appréciation très détaillée et très documentée de la performance de l'alliance ces deux dernières décennies autour de trois missions centrales énoncées dans le Concept stratégique de 2010 : défense collective, gestion de crises, et sécurité coopérative.

De nombreux points sont mis en avant de manière pertinente par l'auteur. S'agissant des interventions en Libye et en Afghanistan, auxquelles la participation politique et militaire est très inégale parmi les États membres, Yost remarque une tendance importante négligée par la plupart des observateurs: la disparition progressive du principe traditionnel « in together, out together

» régissant les opérations hors article V. Cette observation renvoie à la question qui hante l'alliance depuis 1991 : à quoi sert l'OTAN au XXI^e siècle ? Bien qu'imparfaite, la réponse alliée – les trois missions fondamentales – tente de fournir une explication convaincante, mais inévitablement, imprécise à cette question en tenant compte des fluctuations de l'environnement stratégique actuel.

Pendant plusieurs décennies, l'approche alliée claire consistait à contenir les ambitions d'une superpuissance marxiste-léniniste dont l'économie était maintenue de façon alarmante sur le pied de guerre permanente. Les trois tâches fondamentales restent, en revanche, floues quant à leur délimitation, y compris la défense collective ; si celle-ci semble à première vue être dans la continuité directe du rôle traditionnel le plus important de l'OTAN, elle n'en reste pas moins complexifiée par l'absence d'ennemis identifiés. Même les opérations de combats font désormais l'objet de nombreuses dissensions, et l'alliance peine à trouver une ligne fédératrice d'intervention. Les opérations contre la Libye de Kadhafi et contre l'Irak de Saddam Hussein montrent même que l'OTAN comme cadre approprié d'intervention est per se un objet de discussion.


Un des freins inhérents à la performance de l'Organisation reste sa nature interétatique, les gouvernements des États membres demeurant pleinement souverains quant au choix du cadre de décision et d'action ; ce qui induit des préférences en lien avec les sensibilités politiques nationales et les tractations interétatiques commandent les engagements. L'alliance n'est finalement qu'un instrument de nature militaire dont l'usage est dicté par les membres sans lesquels elle n'existe pas dans la mesure où ce sont ces derniers qui mettent leurs capacités nationales (politiques, militaires, civiles) à sa disposition. Cela vaut pour tous les volets explorés par l'ouvrage du Professeur Yost tout au long

des chapitres avec une argumentation claire et optimiste des réalisations et actions de l'OTAN qui convaincra même les plus OTAN-sceptiques. Ces dimensions de la présence alliée dans l'environnement stratégique international sont en redéfinition perpétuelle faisant preuve parfois d'audace, souvent d'opportunisme par des ajustements doctrinaux et organisationnels pour subsister comme un acteur clé de la sécurité régionale et internationale. Tout d'abord en ce qui concerne l'identification des risques, des menaces et des défis traditionnels (relations avec la Russie et l'espace postsoviétique, dont l'Ukraine, la Géorgie, ou encore la prolifération des armes nucléaires, le contrôle des armes et le désarmement, terrorisme, la piraterie). Ensuite, les activités touchant à la gestion de crise (Balkans, Afghanistan, Irak, Lybie, contrepiraterie). Enfin, la coopération Sécurité coopérative interétatique (les divers partenariats avec ses voisins immédiats et lointains) et interinstitutionnelle (relations avec l'Union européenne, les Nations Unies, l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe ou encore l'Union Africaine).

Ce livre se veut le plus exhaustif possible pour viser un large public intéressé par les affaires transatlantiques. Or, l'universitaire, hypermétrope, déplorera l'absence d'un cadre d'analyse clair et l'ancrage défini de l'auteur dans une « théorie de l'équilibre » qui résulterait des performances de l'alliance. Il reconnaîtra cependant la très grande richesse des données empiriques dont une grande majorité a été recueillie après une série impressionnante de rencontres, d'échanges et d'entrevues réalisées dans des milieux très variés; celles-ci sont complétées par des lectures rigoureuses des archives de l'OTAN comme le professeur Yost nous y a habitués avec ces précédents ouvrages sur le même sujet. De son côté, le praticien des affaires stratégiques transatlantiques, myopes, y retrouvera un examen distancié de son quotidien otanien de ces deux dernières décennies ainsi qu'un utile guide d'introduction pour les novices aux

grands enjeux du moment et à moyen terme au sein de l'alliance. En revanche, il ne trouvera pas d'explications sur le « pourquoi » on en est arrivé à une alliance qui donne plutôt l'impression d'une institution cherchant à se légitimer elle-même – quitte à se disperser – qu'une organisation douée d'une réelle capacité d'adapter de sa vision politique et de modeler son environnement stratégique. À moins que l'effet politique recherché par les alliés européens ne soit de garder à tout prix les États-Unis impliqués dans les affaires de l'OTAN...

Indépendamment de savoir si les lecteurs partageront les conclusions positives quant aux performances d'adaptation de l'alliance, NATO's Balancing Act reste une excellente contribution à la littérature sur l'OTAN, et est une lecture incontournable pour la formation : des étudiants en sécurité internationale ; des futurs décideurs politiques ; des personnels de sécurité (militaire et civils) ; et, toute autre personne engagée dans les affaires de l'OTAN notamment industrielles de défense. 📖



***NATO's European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will* by Janne Matlary Haaland and Magnus Petersson, eds., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).**

Critique du livre par Samir Battiss

Souvent critiquées dans la littérature académique nord-américaine ou anglo-saxonne par un effet de suivismes intellectuel plus que suite à une analyse objective ou une connaissance profonde, les politiques de sécurité des nations européennes dans le cadre de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) sont tout aussi passionnantes que celle des États-Unis. Leur compréhension est d'autant plus importante que les États européens représentent numériquement la majorité des nations signataires du traité de Washington et comptent parmi elles deux puissances nucléaires et membres du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations unies.

Ce collectif dirigé par deux professeurs norvégiens Magnus Petersson et Janne Haaland Matlary reprend toutes les critiques faites aux Européens sous deux angles : politique et opérationnel. Il ne s'agit pas pour les auteurs d'éviter les questions qui fâchent comme celle du relatif désintérêt politique pour la « chose militaire » — qui a pour conséquences des budgets de défense très bas — ou le meilleur partage du fardeau (burden sharing) des responsabilités en vue d'en finir avec la réticence européenne à participer aux opérations militaires de l'OTAN. Les différentes contributions tentent d'expliquer comment et pourquoi les États européens adoptent collectivement ou individuellement des postures qui tantôt renforcent tantôt fragilisent l'Alliance. Pour ce faire, les chapitres sont répartis en deux parties. Une première analyse plusieurs dimensions de la volonté politique et de l'aptitude militaire des États : les variables identifiées sont l'histoire, la culture politique et stratégique, la structure militaire interne ainsi que la situation économique nationale. Ces dernières forment le cadre conceptuel et théorique qui guident les études de cas de la seconde partie : elles commencent par le rappel du référent absolu, les États-Unis, pour ensuite s'attarder sur le cas d'Européens appartenant de catégories stratégiques différentes : les « mieux-disants militaires » (la France et le Royaume-Uni, dans une moindre mesure, l'Allemagne et l'Espagne) ; des États


d'Europe centrale (Hongrie, Pologne) ; et, des petits pays (Danemark, Norvège).

L'analyse ambitionne de mettre en lumière les dynamiques nationales en Europe qui impactent la volonté politique et l'aptitude militaire. Les variables ainsi prises en compte dans la présente étude sont : l'organisation et les courants politiques internes ; la culture stratégique et militaire et leurs impacts tant sur la structure de la prise de décision militaire que sur la perception de la menace et l'usage de la force ; et, la vigueur de l'économie. Les conclusions qui ressortent de cette analyse permettent de classer les Alliés européens par catégorie non pas en fonction de leur « degré de loyauté à l'Alliance et aux États-Unis » — comme c'est souvent le cas —, mais selon la place qu'occupe l'OTAN dans leurs priorités stratégiques (foreign policy priority) et d'identifier les motivations politiques afin de déterminer qui seront les leaders potentiels de l'Alliance une fois que les effets de l'effacement progressif des États-Unis se feront sentir.

Les chapitres consacrés aux nations alliées soulèvent explicitement cette question, ce qui constitue l'apport majeur de ce livre. Sous le prisme de la volonté politique et des savoir-faire militaires, les résultats répondent à ces interrogations sur l'avenir de l'OTAN vu par les Européens, la nature des opérations postérieures au cas afghan et libyen, et aux zones potentiellement concernées par celles-ci. Il apparaît que l'axe franco-britannique présidera au destin de l'Alliance ces prochaines années, avec une certaine bienveillance américaine. En cela, le professeur Yves Boyer souligne, dans le chapitre consacré à la France, que parmi les États étudiés, le nombre de puissances otaniennes influentes reste circonscrit, outre les États-Unis et le Canada, aux Européens participant au Multinational Interoperability Council (Allemagne, France et Royaume-Uni). Outre une analyse exhaustive et originale de la posture française dans ses relations avec l'Alliance, notamment en se référant à ses dimensions politico-organisationnelle et

capacitaire, l'auteur complète sa réflexion en attirant l'attention du lecteur sur les scénarios possibles d'évolution de l'organisation dans un environnement global de désintérêt progressive des responsables américains pour l'OTAN. Cette indifférence latente s'expliquerait par l'arrivée d'une nouvelle génération de décideurs, mais également par une forme d'agacement américain après plusieurs décennies de tentatives infructueuses de mobiliser les Alliés européens autour de projets militaires et capacitaires communs. Selon cet auteur, le « salut militaire » des Alliés passerait une intégration différenciée intensifiée, au sein de l'Alliance et en dehors, entre ces Européens et les États-Unis en raison d'une forme de « désertification capacitaire » durable et des divergences dans le temps des intérêts parmi les autres alliés. Cependant, l'organisation garderait ponctuellement toute sa pertinence pour les États-Unis en raison des avantages stratégiques qu'elle procure à partir de l'Europe continentale : un moyeu vers l'Asie centrale et le Moyen-Orient ; un ensemble d'États partageant des valeurs communes, et parfois, des intérêts hors du continent ; et, dans le but de maintenir un leadership qui se traduirait par le rôle de « protecteur » suite à la mise en place d'un système de défense antimissile.

Cet ouvrage s'inscrit dans les études stratégiques classiques sans pour autant négliger les aspects théoriques de diverses disciplines comme la sociologie militaire, la science politique et les relations internationales. Il est également une source importante d'informations pour les chercheurs en quête d'éléments empiriques récents sur les développements de l'OTAN et d'analyse en profondeur de la culture stratégique des membres les plus influents au sein de cette organisation. Au-delà de l'Université, il constitue également un outil utile pour les décideurs politiques et militaires dans la préparation de leurs notes professionnelles. 📖



***Bombs, Bullets, and Politicians: France's Response to Terrorism* by Christophe Chowanietz (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016).**

Reviewed by Dr. Robert Martyn

The 21st century has seen an explosive growth in publications on terrorism – its interrelationship with the media, or societal relationships, or legal and security responses. The major terror attacks against the United States (September 2001), Spain (March 2004) and France's *Charlie Hebdo* and multiple follow-on attacks (January and November 2015), have all brought welcome scholarly input from diverse fields. Christophe Chowanietz, who teaches social studies at John Abbott College in Ste Anne De Bellevue – part of Quebec's CEGEP system – saw a literary gap in studying terrorism's effect upon those responsible for responding to such attacks with suitable counterterror legislation. He thus produced this unique assessment of the effect of terrorist acts on political elites and partisan politics.

The research is relevant to Canadians as it is based upon similarly stable western democracies: the U.S., U.K., France, Germany and Spain. The book has a stated focus upon France: “Paris represented in many ways the ideal target, the most visited city in the world...Paris, more than any other European city would

achieve maximum publicity for ISIS” (p. 150). Unlike authoritarian regimes that have suffered terrorism, these chosen democracies, and Canada’s parliamentary system, allow for either criticism of the government’s actions or ‘rallying around the flag’ in support.

Rallying can be seen in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, as members of the U.S. Congress’ Senate and House of Representatives uniformly consented to every wish of the Bush administration, including passage of the subsequently-contentious ‘Patriot Act’; traditional partisan politics had effectively ceased.¹ Conversely, criticizing the government was demonstrated routinely in France throughout the 1980s’ many shootings and bombings, as its left-wing governments were considered too soft on terror. The right-wing populist Front National (FN) was particularly passionate in using terrorist incidents to advance its electoral platform, such as reinstatement of the death penalty. In determining whether to rally or critique, deciding what is best for the party versus best for the country often requires weighing dissimilar aspects, especially for the opposition parties’ leadership.

Setting the stage to investigate the conditions that might inform post-terror critique or rally choices, Chowanietz initially provides his definition of terrorism – a habitually-debated issue, which inevitably devolves into ‘evil terrorist or legitimate freedom-fighter?’ He relies heavily upon the, sadly, now defunct Terrorism Knowledge Base, which was shut down upon the U.S. Department of Homeland Security withdrawing its funding.² From here, he examines ordinary versus extraordinary political events, before settling upon two key variables: the magnitude of the terrorist attack, in terms of fatalities, and the frequency of terrorist acts.

Examining the effect of terrorist acts’ magnitude and frequency upon political elites is where the book becomes both valued for its depth of research, but overly

complex for the ‘non-Sheldon Cooper’ readership. Chowanietz formulates hypotheses on the likely impact of various patterns of terrorist actions. His qualitative analyses produce descriptive and inferential statistics, which he then examines through a qualitative approach to determine where political elites respond to the aforementioned magnitude and repetition (p. 170). His process, while academically quite strong, does not make for easy reading.


For magnitude, the evidence holds that an incident with a great number of fatalities, especially obviously innocent victims like children, will almost universally garner a rallying response. A clear exception is opposition parties being less prone to rally if the civilian target is a government agent. For frequency, a series of attacks will inspire criticism based on a perception that the government is mishandling national security. A series of attacks in short order, however, are often seen as one major crisis rather than a succession of incidents, which may inspire patience while the governing party sorts things out. For both magnitude and frequency, our global interconnectedness inspires terrorists to conduct more and greater spectacular attacks.

So what has been learned? Well, simplistically, terrorist attacks will always intrude upon democratic politics, regardless of the political orientation of the terrorist group. While domestic terrorism is less likely to cause a rallying than international sources of terror, the recent spate of killings in the U.S. that has been blithely dismissed by the political elites as ‘mere’ mental health issues is an issue not covered by Chowanietz in his book, likely due to its recent publication. Regardless, he succeeds wonderfully in producing original research in examining the manner in which terrorist acts affect stable political systems. I know of no other researcher who so thoroughly examines the responses of party politics to terrorist attacks. As such, there is limited literature for comparison.

While acknowledging that this is a very in-depth, technical analysis of relevant historical and recent data sets and hypotheses based on five countries, the book’s ostensible focus is France. Yet, much of the research is expressed within an American terrorism context. Given the global impact of the World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks, this may be reasonable, although it may suggest a requirement for a more suitable title.

A key attribute of this book lays in the excellent degree of analysis. While Chowanietz’s findings make a valued contribution to terrorism-related policy studies, have no doubt about the complexity of the reading! This work is unlikely to see much utility outside of a very focused postgraduate cadre; I doubt the book will be opened, let alone read, by the very political elites who might benefit the most from it. A second positive issue, to help assuage the first, is that each chapter concludes by reaffirming the critical points addressed, often with listings of the key specifics.

In reinforcing that this is a profound, multifaceted book, Chowanietz acknowledges that it remains a work in progress for which he includes proposals for additional beneficial research. Perhaps that would be a good starting point for potential postgraduate readers. Regardless of readership, in an age when the news is dominated by terrorist threats and debates on how we should respond, *Bombs, Bullets, and Politicians* offers a pertinent analysis of the relationship between terrorism and the conduct of Western party politics. 



***Law, Privacy, and Surveillance in Canada in the Post-Snowden Era* by Michael Geist, ed., (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2015).**

Reviewed by Dr. Robert Martyn

Edward Snowden came to global prominence in 2013 for having stolen classified information from the U.S. National Security Agency. The material, particularly that which revealed numerous global surveillance programs run by the NSA and the “Five Eyes” intelligence community, continues to garner public attention.³ Admired or reviled, Snowden remains in Moscow, subject to U.S. charges of government property theft and violating the Espionage Act.

In *Law, Privacy, and Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era*, Michael Geist and nine other contributors assess the subsequent effect of these revelations upon Canadians. This book provides a litany of examples supposedly showing governmental abuse of Canadians’ individual rights, with many examples becoming magnified through repetition, to which I will return momentarily. I personally believe, unequivocally, that one of this country’s greatest strengths is its respect for individual rights and freedoms. However, the strength of our freedoms must be balanced with the government’s requirement to provide us with defence and security from numerous

threats; except for the occasional one-liner, such acknowledgement is lost in the hubris.

With one exception, the authors assess issues of privacy and internet surveillance with analyses of varying quality. The one standout is Steve Hewitt’s chapter on covert human intelligence — old school spying. Hewitt is an acknowledged historian, having written extensively on intelligence and security topics. This chapter certainly reaffirms his abilities yet seems out of place with the remainder of the narrative.

While the book starts with how Snowden’s revelations shook the U.S. National Security Agency, the focus is primarily upon Canada’s counterpart, the Communications Security Establishment. The authors consider oversight and accountability effectiveness, the various permutations of metadata collection, and the impacts of various new technologies. In so doing, there is a consistent theme of frustration that Canadians are failing to see inappropriate government intrusions, and worse, are not actively mobilizing opposition. This theme of disappointment, interspersed with occasional suggestions on how to effectively combat the government, become somewhat repetitive. Several of the chapters acknowledge the support and feedback of other contributors in the book, which doubtless contributed to the echo-chamber effect.

In addition to failing to acknowledge a requirement to balance security with freedoms, several chapters include an almost apologetic acceptance that the situation is not as catastrophic as they portray, even observing that “formidable as the challenges are to achieving surveillance reform within Canada, it remains the case that Canadians’ data enjoy much better legal protection...” (p. 35) However, one generally has to read closely to find such confessions. As such, several authors stand out for specific mention.

Geist’s contribution on reforms and accountability recognizes that “current surveillance and privacy laws were crafted in a much different world.” (p.248) The geographic and content restrictions placed upon the Communications Security Establishment, for example, were suitable when CSE was focused almost exclusively upon the then-Soviet Union; the computing power and skills for metadata mining were non-existent. As such, many oversight improvements that fail to address these outdated issues risk leaving many of the perceived core problems as potential loopholes.

Lisa Austin’s chapter provides the most balanced assessment of the situation. She notes that the public protests national security issues because “it must be unlawful.” (p. 103) This presumes increased awareness and dissatisfaction at what the government is doing on our behalf, but little evidence is provided. Yet she is forthright in subsequently concluding that we “need to stop thinking that the issue is illegal activity on the part of our national security agencies... [understanding] that our national security agencies do, in good faith, see themselves to be acting within the law.” (p. 120)

Directly addressing Snowden’s Canadian revelations, Craig Forcese writes almost breathlessly about how the “controversies ignited by Snowden – although single-sourced, decontextualized, and often difficult to understand – has kept the matter in the public eye.” (p. 128) Personally following such issues, in addition to discussions with arguably left-leaning academics and students at three universities, leads me to believe that these matters are not remotely in the public eye.⁴

The author who comes across as the most personally incensed is Christopher Parsons, bemoaning the stagnation of anti-government access progress, within the context of earlier anti-cyber bullying legislation. He concedes that contentious issues bedeviling prior legislation


have been removed, yet there is still insufficient outcry, which he blames on a combination of: inadequate national security leaks to force the government onto the defensive; public, policy, and media agendas creating an environment where embarrassing questions are not asked; and, insufficient opposition party activity against the government. (pp. 271-272) Parsons therefore provides a “how-to” guide of forcing government change. In effect, virtually no one sees the issue as calamitous as the authors wish it to be.

As with any publication, strengths and weaknesses are to be expected. A particular strength of this book is the uniformly first-rate citations, provided by all of the various authors. I found myself on several occasions being led astray on tangential inquiries whenever I turned to the references. Yet there are disappointments as well. First, Professor Wesley Wark is mentioned in the opening Acknowledgement for having contributed “enormously to the vision behind the book and the recruitment of contributors.” (p. vii) He also appears consistently in various endnotes. Yet he does not have a chapter within this anthology. A revisiting of his 2012 research paper for the Privacy Commissioner, “Electronic Communications Interception and Privacy: Can the Imperatives of Privacy and National Security be Reconciled?” would have been quite apt and added balance to this anthology.⁵ My second concern is the inexplicable absence of an Index. As an academic who often returns to books to find specific details for later research, I rely often on the Index.

I do not think anyone doubts that there are potential issues surrounding our increased reliance on data, particularly regarding data ownership, predictive policing, privacy and protection, and cyber security – without even broaching the realm of artificial intelligence, which could magnify these issues exponentially. It is undeniable that electronic monitoring technologies are becoming more affordable, and hence, more pervasive; boundaries between

technical possibilities and legal and social acceptability are therefore being challenged. As timely evidence, this review is being written with the Cambridge Analytica scandal as backdrop, in which Facebook users’ personal information allowed the Trump campaign to better target voters by profiling their behaviour and personalities. Additionally, the U.S. National Intelligence Council has warned that “countries less bound by ethical concerns might deploy technologies that others oppose or loosen regulations to attract high technology firms and to build R&D capability.”⁶ Key choices will become increasingly political and ideological; nations must balance restricting information flows for privacy reasons with the potential curtailment of economic and social gains that could come with such actions.

If you are predisposed to feel that government surveillance needs to be curtailed, then this book will reinforce your beliefs. If you are unsure of the national security versus personal privacy balance, this book may motivate you to explore more deeply, which is not a bad thing. Personally, I found this to be an interesting, although occasionally exasperating, read. Despite the repeated warnings that government surveillance is out of control, one must conclude that the balance between freedoms and securities appears acceptable to the majority of Canadians, notwithstanding failing to meet the expectations of this distinct group. As Steve Hewitt reminds us, “the Supreme Court of Canada has been pretty clear in saying that the Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] doesn’t protect you from a poor choice of friends.” (p. 49) 📖



Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada by Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016).

Reviewed by Dr. Richard Roy

The fundamental purpose of all equipment procurement is to ensure national armed forces have the necessary capabilities to carry out the missions assigned to them by political authorities. Nations seek to maximize their capabilities by procuring the best equipment they can afford. Defence procurement is extremely complex with risks, occasionally enormous ones, in every purchase due to overall costs, technological advantages, economic benefits, and, of course, political consequences. It is unsettling that most national procurement systems are so dysfunctional, with the Canadian one having been particularly inept over the last decades. In this short, concise, well-structured and well-argued book, Kim Richard Nossal outlines the problems with defence procurement in Canada. Nossal, with a nod to Russel Ackoff, defines a “mess” as an interaction of complex systems in which complicated problems can be resolved within and between the systems (p.27). Nossal considers, as the title to this work indicates, that Canadian defence procurement is a Charlie Foxtrot – a polite military euphemism for a disastrous muddle – and proposes a politically-focused solution to reform it.

A professor of political studies at Queen's University, Nossal structures his arguments to both educate the reader and point to where the solution to the morass of the Canadian defence procurement system must come from. He begins by presenting the consensus about the need for reform that exists across numerous authorities: those closest to the process, the defence industry, academics, and the media. He then proceeds to describe the inherent problems using six case studies: the Ross Rifle, the CF-105 Avro Arrow, the Iltis jeep, the Victoria-class submarines, and the Sea King and F-35 "fascos." Nossal then describes the three standard perspectives on what has caused the mess in Canadian defence procurement: the institutional explanation, the economic benefits explanation, and the political gamesmanship explanation. He considers these to be only "distal" explanations. Ultimately, he attributes the cause of this mess to the Canadian "security imaginary," that is, how Canadians' view of their position in the world has led to their preference to spend miserly on defence as there are no attendant great national risks in so doing. For Nossal, this "imaginary" has two major effects: first, a highly permissive environment is created for Canadian politicians as voter indifference to defence issues is mirrored by an indifference to mismanagement of defence policy; and, second, a contradiction develops between the model of a military cabinet ministers might prefer and the one they are willing to fund (p.114).

Because of this particular Canadian "security imaginary," Nossal proposes a political solution to the current defence procurement mess. It is from this level – that of the principals (ministers) not the agents (bureaucrats) within the government institutions – he argues that the solution must be forthcoming. Nossal proposes three main remedies: first, ministers must craft a security strategy for an "easy rider" in alliances and coalitions while accounting for the

inherent stinginess of Canadians on defence expenditures; second, cabinet should actually articulate a defence policy, not just a shopping list, should review it regularly, and thereafter structure the CAF accordingly; and, finally, the federal government should encourage greater bipartisanship in formulating defence policy. These proposals would require a significant change in Canadian political culture, albeit one that would better serve Canadian security interests.

Setting aside the inherent difficulties of changing institutional and political culture, what is the likelihood that Nossal's proposals could be adopted? Certainly, forming bipartisan committees to consider defence matters should not be beyond the reach of responsible government. As to the formal articulation and review of defence policy, it is an activity well-practiced by our key allies. The United States reviews its policy every four years, and both Australia and the United Kingdom conduct regular formal reviews. Can the Canadian cabinet produce a defence policy that is more than a mere shopping list? Despite the simplicity and banality of the general and evident security threats to Canada, herein may lie the fault with Nossal's overall proposal. The cabinet, admittedly security issue amateurs, would likely struggle to craft a strategy that would balance the real security threats to Canada and the concerns of our important allies with the required force structure to respond to those threats and the necessary resources to equip the CAF. One could be optimistic that a Canadian government could act on these proposals, but it is more likely that they would merely tinker with reforms as they have so often done in the past.

I have two minor quibbles with this otherwise superlative book. First, there are some minor weaknesses with the case studies. The Ross Rifle was an unmitigated failure when tested in battle during the First World War, but it was designed for the austere conditions of South Africa, not the mud of Flanders. The complaint of

the use of the Iltis jeep in a war zone is not convincing as it was standard equipment in Germany and had long been used in Bosnia by the time the deployment to Afghanistan occurred. Better mine-protected vehicles had long been available from South Africa, but the use of the Iltis reflected the CAF's long cultural indifference to mine warfare more so than a straight procurement fault. Second, while I heartily agree with Nossal's disgust with the waste of taxpayers' dollars, he unfortunately confuses effectiveness with efficiency at points. Defence procurement is effective when the equipment shows up (the output of the process), but Canadian governments have regularly failed in this delivery function. Defence procurement is efficient when equipment is delivered in the most cost-effective manner, the best and most equipment for the least cost. More money could make you more effective – more dollars, more kit; gross inefficiencies currently waste significant dollars – more dollars, more waste.

Naturally, in such a short book as this, not all the questions about defence procurement can be answered, but it would have been helpful if two issues had been addressed more fully.

First, institutional cultures may play a larger role than the author has attributed to them. The institutional cultures of all of the government departments involved play a significant role in how procurement unfolds. In some departments, professionalism is a slogan and not an inculcated norm. This, along with diffuse and unattributed accountabilities and responsibilities, leads to the often-unfortunate lack of results in procurement (p.90). There are two other cultural practices that go unmentioned. The first cultural norm is to blame DND/CAF for all costing errors (the PBO and Auditor General's reports on the F-35 are only the latest installments in this game). Long-term cost projections are notoriously difficult to get right and quickly erode with changing economic conditions and delays caused by political decision-making,

program amendments or technological difficulties. Yet for many agents in government, this blame displacement retains bureaucratic and political utility. The second cultural norm is the continual imposition of additional procedures and processes into the procurement system while simultaneously preaching that this is streamlining the system, making it more efficient. Few of these additional steps have made the system either more effective or efficient – unless the objective is not to spend defence dollars.

Second, if we accept Nossal's arguments that for politicians there is little price to pay for partisanship in defence procurement, Jean Chretien's continued interference toward the Sea King replacement is even more unconscionable. Once elected, he could have simply reversed his position at little cost to himself or his party instead of wasting the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been frittered away since that bold stroke of his pen. According to Nossal, the Canadian electorate would barely have noticed or cared. Thus, there remain few reasonable explanations for the Sea King debacle.

The purpose of point of view books is to offer readers informed opinion about the hard choices facing Canadians to spur democratic debate. Charlie Foxtrot easily achieves this goal. This book is well worth the read for all Canadians. Nossal's presentation flows in a clear and easily understandable fashion. This book is extremely useful for it highlights the problems that have plagued Canadian defence procurement over the long-term. It analyzes the problem in detail by focusing on six case studies and by then elaborating various explanations of the procurement mess. Nossal correctly identifies the ultimate weakness in Canadian defence procurement: stingy Canadians and politicians who cannot reconcile the general-purpose force they want and the dollars they are willing to spend. Nossal focusses on the correct level, the political, to resolve this mess. His proposed solution is innovative and would go some distance to solving some

of the problems of Canadian defence procurement. Still, one would have to be quite the optimist to expect that those who so willingly place the brave members of the CAF in harm's way would also eagerly accept their responsibility to ensure they are adequately equipped. 

Notes

1. Even the simplified 'Patriot Act' name was designed for broad appeal; its proper title is "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," which expands to the kitschy acronym, "USA PATRIOT." Upon more composed review, several portions of the Act have since been ruled unconstitutional. See, for example, CNN, "Federal judge rules 2 Patriot Act provisions unconstitutional," 26 September 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/09/26/patriot.act>.
2. Brian K. Houghton, "Terrorism Knowledge Base: A Eulogy (2004-2008)," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 7 (2008), www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/43/html.
3. The Five Eyes community is an intelligence alliance comprising Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
4. In contrast to this chapter, I admire and often refer to Craig Forcese's *National Security Law: Canadian Practice in International Perspective* (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2008).
5. Wesley Wark, "Electronic Communications Interception and Privacy: Can the Imperatives of Privacy and National Security be Reconciled?," http://www.cips-cepi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/WARK_WorkingPaper_April2012.pdf.
6. U.S. Government, National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends: Paradox of Progress," January 2017,

176 and 197, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf>.



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