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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Retd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

On 27 September, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) announced the release of its newest study, *Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces*, at a press conference held in the Charles Lynch Press Conference Room in the Centre Block on Parliament Hill, in Ottawa. The study can be found on CDA's website at www.cda-cdai.ca.

CDA's mandate to inform the public of issues affecting Canadian security and the state of the Canadian Forces (CF) is achieved in part through the activities of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. It provides public information services by publishing the results of studies, seminar, and symposia. This new document falls under the heading of the first of these activities.

The release of *Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces* is timely, given the horrific acts of terrorism that were perpetrated in the United States of America earlier this month. This stark reality of terrorism close to home should be a vivid wake-up call for Canada. CDA has repeatedly voiced its concerns to the government and to Canadians over the need for improvements to defence to protect our democratic way of life. We will continue to do so.

This study follows, and is associated with, a CDA study published in September 2000, *Stability and Prosperity: The Benefits of Investment in Defence*, the main conclusion of which is that money allocated to the budget of the Department of National Defence (DND) is essential to maintain the prosperity and well-being of Canadians in an era of instability in many parts of the world.

Questions have been raised about whether the CF are operationally ready to undertake the commitments assigned

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LE MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

Le 27 septembre, la Conférence des Associations de la Défense a annoncé la parution de son étude la plus récente, *Coincé entre les deux: Une évaluation de la capacité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes*, lors d'une conférence de presse tenue dans l'amphithéâtre Charles Lynch, Édifice central de la colline parlementaire, à Ottawa. L'étude est affichée sur le site WEB de la CAD au: www.cda-cdai.ca.

Le mandat de la CAD, d'informer le public canadien sur les questions qui affectent la sécurité canadienne et l'état des Forces canadiennes (CF), est accompli, en partie, par l'entremise des activités menées par l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense. L'Institut fournit des services d'information publique en publiant les résultats d'études et en organisant des colloques et symposia. Ce nouveau document se rapporte à la première de ces activités.

La parution de *Coincé entre les deux: Une évaluation de la capacité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes* est opportune si l'on tient compte des actes horribles de terrorisme perpétrés contre les États-Unis d'Amérique au début du mois. Ces activités terroristes devraient fournir un avertissement sérieux pour le Canada. La CAD a fait part de ses inquiétudes à maintes reprises au gouvernement du Canada et aux canadiens et canadiennes sur les besoins d'améliorer notre posture de défense afin de protéger notre mode de vie démocratique. Nous allons continuer de le faire.

Cette étude fait suite et est associée à une autre étude de la CAD, publiée en septembre 2000, *Stabilité et Prospérité: Les avantages d'investir dans le secteur de la défense*, dont la conclusion principale était que les fonds alloués au budget du Ministère de la Défense nationale

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to them by the government. As reported by the Auditor General of Canada in his 2001 report, the last 10 years have been both turbulent and difficult for the DND and the CF.

The watershed of change underway in world affairs is bringing pressure to bear on Canada to provide credible resources to implement properly its defence policy. This study details how the operational readiness of the CF, and their ability to fulfill operational commitments, has been affected by shortfalls in the funding of DND over the past decade.

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute, a self-supporting entity within CDA, is dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

Les questions de défense sont portées à l'attention du public par le truchement d'analyse et de discussions informées parrainées par l'Institut de la CAD. L'Institut, un organisme autonome, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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(MDN) sont essentiels à la prospérité et au bien-être des canadiens et canadiennes durant une époque d'instabilité dans plusieurs régions du monde.

La question est souvent posée à savoir si les Forces canadiennes (FC) possèdent une capacité opérationnelle suffisante pour s'acquitter des missions qui leur sont confiées par le gouvernement. Tel qu'indiquait le vérificateur général dans son rapport de l'année 2001, les dernières 10 années ont été turbulentes et difficiles pour le MDN et les FC.

Les changements qui ont eu lieu sur la scène internationale exercent des pressions auprès du Canada de fournir les ressources nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre de sa politique de défense. Cette étude montre en détail l'ampleur des répercussions que le manque de fonds dont souffre le ministère de la Défense nationale depuis la dernière décennie a eu sur la capacité opérationnelle des FC ainsi que sur leur aptitude à respecter leurs engagements opérationnels.

Les canadiens et canadiennes ont besoin d'être assurés que le gouvernement fédéral prévoit de façon efficace les dépenses qu'il devrait faire dans le domaine de la défense en vue d'assurer la sécurité nationale. *Coincé entre les deux* se veut un instrument d'information publique qui contribuera à la réalisation de cet objectif. Dans ce numéro de "ON TRACK", le Colonel Sean Henry, analyste principal de la défense à la CAD, fournit à nos lecteurs et lectrices une vue d'ensemble de l'étude.

Cet automne, l'ICAD, en collaboration avec le Centre doe International Relations de l'Université Queen's, organisera le 4e Symposium des diplômés annuel. Le Symposium sera l'occasion de mettre en valeur les travaux d'étudiants de

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Canadians need to be assured that national security, and commensurate spending on defence, are being effectively foreseen and fulfilled by the government. *Caught in the Middle* is conceived as a public information vehicle to assist in achieving that end. In this issue of *ON TRACK* Colonel Sean Henry, Senior Defence Analyst, provides our readers with an overview of the study.

This Autumn, the CDA Institute, in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, will hold the 4th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities. Leading edge research from young scholars in the field of security and defence studies will be showcased. The aim of the symposium is to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions. Keynote speaker is Lieutenant-General (Retd) Romeo Dallaire, CMM, MSC, CD.

Anyone with an interest in Canadian military history, war studies, peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution, defence economics, ethnic and religious conflicts, intra-state conflict issues, strategic studies, terrorism, and non-traditional threats to security are welcome to attend. Mark the dates of 2 and 3 November in your calendar to attend a stimulating gathering of some of Canada's best military thinkers. For more information please read the symposium notice appearing elsewhere in this publication.

ON TRACK's readers will be pleased to know that Air Commodore (Retd) Leonard Birchall, CM, OBE, O Ont, DFC, CD, has been chosen as the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2001. Air Commodore Birchall is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career of service to Canada.

The award will be presented by the Honourable Arthur C. Eggleton, Minister of National Defence on 16 November, at a mixed gala dinner in the Ballroom at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa. I am gratified to report that the Ballroom, for this prestigious event, is completely sold out.

We are pleased to include in this edition *Training Assault Troop For Bosnia-Herzegovina*, by Lieutenant Francis Conliffe, an officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons in Petawawa. Lieutenant Conliffe is the son of a former colleague

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maîtrise et de doctorat des universités civiles et militaires. Notre but, est de proposer une vitrine des recherches à la fine pointe de jeunes universitaires dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense et renforcer les liens entre les établissements d'enseignement civils et militaires. L'orateur chargé du discours-programme sera le Lieutenant-général (à la retraite) Roméo Dallaire, CMM, MSC, CD.

Quiconque est intéressé dans l'histoire militaire canadienne, études de la guerre, sécurité et défense nationales, alliances de sécurité et de défense, opérations d'imposition et de maintien de la paix, résolution de conflits, liens entre la sécurité/défense et l'économie, questions liées aux conflits intra-état, et autres menaces non traditionnelles à la sécurité sont les bienvenu(e)s. Notez les dates du 2 et 3 novembre sur votre calendrier pour assister à une réunion enrichissante avec certains des meilleurs penseurs militaires au Canada. Pour information additionnelle, veuillez lire l'avis sur le symposium ailleurs dans cette publication.

Les lecteurs et lectrices de "ON TRACK" seront ravis de savoir que le Commodore de l'Air (à la retraite) Leonard Birchall, CM, OBE, O Ont., DFC, CD, est le récipiendaire du Prix honorifique VIMY pour 2001. Le Commodore Birchall est un canadien distingué qui a démontré les standards les plus élevés de leadership au cours d'une carrière consacrée au Service du Canada.

Le Prix sera présenté par l'Honorable Arthur Eggleton, Ministre de la Défense nationale, le 16 novembre lors d'un grand dîner mixte dans la salle de bal du Fairmont Château Laurier, à Ottawa. Je suis fier d'annoncer que tous les billets ont été vendus pour cet événement prestigieux.

Nous sommes heureux d'inclure dans ce numéro *Entraînement pour Troupe d'Assaut affectée en Bosnie-Herzegovine*, par le Lieutenant Francis Conliffe, un officier du Royal Canadian Dragoons, de Petawawa. Le lieutenant Conliffe est le fils d'un de mes anciens collègues, feu le Lieutenant-colonel Christopher Conliffe, Royal 22ième Régiment. Le lieutenant Conliffe nous a fourni un article incisif et bien rédigé qui illustre comment sa Troupe d'Assaut s'est préparée pour déploiement en

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of mine, the late Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Conliffe of the R22°R. Lieutenant Conliffe has provided us with a well-written, incisive article illustrating how his troop, Assault Troop, prepared for its duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Assault Troop was tasked to perform defence and security duties for MND(SW) HQ in Banja Luka. His article concludes with the astute observation that it is in the soldiers that the strength and combat capability of the CF ultimately rests.

The Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, former Minister of National Defence, presents the argument in *A Two-Pronged Approach*, for connecting overseas development assistance with additional investment in national defence. If you agree with the rationale of his argument contact your Member of Parliament and let him know. Better still, tell the Prime Minister.

Reprinted in *ON TRACK* are three items that have been provided for us from other publications. Major-General (Retd) Clive Addy, a Vice-Chairman of CDA, wrote in a letter to the editor of *Vanguard* his concerns for the adequacy of resources with which the former Vice-Chief of Defence Staff has at hand to manage the CF. In spite of the limited funding that has been made available to the Department, Vice-Admiral Garnett has done well.

In his article, *The Generals Have No Clothes*, Lieutenant-Colonel Terry Thompson examines the recent reaction to the Royal Canadian Military Institute's criticism of the state of our armed forces. He notes that while responsibility for defence policy must remain with Parliament, the shaping of that policy cannot be accomplished without consultation with the military.

We believe that these two articles that we have reprinted here, reflect the views of many Canadians and merit the wide distribution.

In closing I wish to thank our members for their financial support in the work of CDA and the CDA Institute. The recent

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Bosnie-Herzegovine. La Troupe était chargée de la responsabilité pour la sécurité et la défense du quartier-général du MDN (Sud-Ouest) à Banja Luka. Son article conclut avec l'observation astucieuse que c'est dans les soldats que la force et la capacité de combat des CF demeurent, en fin de compte.

L'Honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, ancien Ministre de la Défense nationale, présente l'argument dans *Une approche sur deux fronts* ("*Two-Pronged Approach*"), pour lier l'aide de développement à l'étranger avec des investissements additionnels dans la défense nationale. Si vous êtes d'accord avec son raisonnement, communiquez avec votre député et avisez-le. Encore mieux dites-le au Premier Ministre.

Réimprimé dans "ON TRACK" sont trois articles qui nous ont été transmis par d'autres publications. Le Major-général (à la retraite) Clive Addy, un vice-président de la CAD, a fait part de ses inquiétudes au sujet de la suffisance des ressources allouées à l'ancien vice-chef de l'état-major de la défense pour gérer les CF, dans une lettre au courrier du lecteur de la revue *Vanguard*. En dépit du manque de ressources, le Vice-amiral Garnett s'en est bien tiré.

Dans son article *Les généraux n'ont pas de vêtements* ("*The Generals Have No Clothes*"), Le lieutenant-colonel Terry Thompson examine la réaction à la récente critique de l'Institut Royal Militaire Canadien sur l'état de nos Forces armées. Il note que quoique la responsabilité pour la politique de défense doit demeurer avec le Parlement, l'élaboration de cette politique ne peut être accomplie qu'avec consultation avec les dirigeants militaires.

Nous sommes de l'opinion que ces deux articles réimprimés ici reflètent les vues de nombreux canadiens et canadiennes et méritent une grande distribution.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos membres de leur appui financier pour le travail accompli par la CAD et le ICAD. Les événements récents que nous avons observés me poussent à déclarer que votre appui continu est encore plus vital aujourd'hui, alors que nous ajoutons au débat sur les questions de défense et de sécurité nationale.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà membre de l'Institut de la CAD, je vous exhorte à vous joindre à nous. Des formulaires d'inscription sont imprimés à la dernière page de ce bulletin. Pour ceux et celles qui sont déjà membres, pourquoi ne pas **demander à un ami de se joindre à nous.**

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events that we have seen before us prompt me to say that your continued support is even more vital now, as we add to the debate on issues of defence and national security. If you are not already a member of the CDA Institute, I would

urge you to join us. Registration forms are printed on the last page of this newsletter. For those who are members, why not **ask a friend to join.**

CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: OPERATIONAL READINESS AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

Colonel A. Sean Henry, OMM, CD, Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations

Recently, questions have been raised about whether the Canadian Forces are operationally ready to undertake the commitments assigned to them by the government. The essence of the debate hinges on the adequacy of Department of National Defence Funding (DND) to implement the policy stated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. The latest CDA study, titled *Caught in the Middle*, analyses the operational readiness of the armed forces and makes recommendations to the government. It was published on September 27, 2001, and is summarized in this article.

The 1994 Defence White Paper states that the only prudent choice for Canada is to retain multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces. It then assigns commitments to the Canadian Forces' within the following roles: Protection of Canada; Canada-United States Defence Cooperation; and, Contributing to International Security. The CDA study concludes that, due to insufficient funds in the DND budget, the Canadian Forces cannot fulfil these commitments beyond a marginal level and, in the case of the most demanding tasks in the third category, could not meet them within the resource stipulations and time limits specified in current plans.

Operational readiness refers to the ability of armed forces to assemble people, equipment and materiel within a set period of time, and thereafter be capable of executing missions successfully. Operational readiness may be broken down into a number of components, such as force structure, doctrine, manpower, equipment, training and logistics. All of these elements must be made effective individually, and then be brought together to produce a fighting force. In this respect, armed forces are not unlike a symphony orchestra – a number of diverse elements blended to produce harmonious results. However, as in the music business, if any part of the organization is missing or weak the results will be less than harmonious. In the case of armed forces, the consequences would be much more serious, as they normally involve matters of life and death.

Previous studies by CDA have shown that the Canadian Forces have suffered from under-funding of the Department of National Defence (DND) budget for almost thirty years, with a critical drop of thirty percent of purchasing power in the mid-1990s, as the government imposed its program review to eliminate the deficit. In tandem with these cuts, the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces has proceeded on a steady downward curve. The funding shortfalls impact most seriously on the operations and maintenance account and on the capital account. The former serves the day to day expenses of the military, while the latter is applied to maintaining and replacing equipment. Failure to fund these accounts leads to a drop in operational readiness, as training levels fall and equipment “rusts-out” as a result of old-age.

In the past decade, the quick and dirty solution to the shortage of funds has been to reduce the number of people in the Canadian Forces – from 85,000 to some 57,000 (of which only 53,000 are effective). This has not resolved the problem for the longer term, as the operations and maintenance account keeps increasing like a credit card bill, and the equipment continues to wear out. The current deficit in DND funding, is of the order of an ongoing one billion dollars per annum for operations and maintenance, and an additional five to six billion dollars needed over the next decade to replace equipment. To stay alive in these circumstances, DND has been forced ‘rob Peter to pay Paul,’ but options under that tactic are drying-up, and armed forces’ operational readiness continues its downward trend.

The introduction of a limited number of high technology weapon systems, such as new frigates, and the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle, create only blips on the downward curve. It is similar to adding a couple of new instruments to the orchestra; overall, it is unlikely the quality of the music will improve unless other weaknesses are addressed as well. In this respect, probably the most serious aspect of under-funding of the DND budget is the unacceptable pressure it places on the dwindling pool of people in the Canadian Forces. They suffer burnout, or leave the service.

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To deal with this situation, within the context of evolving security threats and advancing technology, DND has tried to apply a rational process within a framework of policy documents and directives. The focus is on two major thrusts: maintaining current commitments through so-called “sustaining objectives;” and, addressing the future by implementation of “change objectives.” Another document, the yearly Defence Plan, allocates money and priorities to the major players within DND, including the chiefs of the navy, army and air force. The trouble is, there is not even enough money to carry out the sustaining objectives, let alone invest in the future through change objectives – which reinforces the downward trend of operational readiness. This condition is captured by the title of the latest CDA study. It alludes to the fact the Canadian Forces are faced with a decline of conventional capabilities, while new capabilities are unaffordable. They are thus “*caught in the middle.*”

If lack of money is the impetus driving the rundown of the Canadian Forces, reduction of trained manpower is the most serious result. Under the lowered manpower ceiling, the people who remain are not able to train beyond the level of individual skills and specific collective taskings. For example, the overseas taskings of the army, which require some 2000 people (rotated every six months), dominate the army’s entire existence. The symphony orchestra does not have enough people, and those that are present can only rehearse one musical production, and a relatively easy one at that – peacekeeping. Lack of trained manpower also limits the operational readiness of support functions such as logistics, communications, engineers and medical. There are not enough people to perform these tasks properly, and the numbers seeking release is increasing as the workload increases. In fact, the lack of capabilities in these fields would by themselves limit Canadian Forces’ contributions to North American and International Security missions to token forces, and for no longer than six months.

Recent testimony by the service chiefs at the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs contained some references to these problems. CDA has undertaken to go a step further and define the problems in detail, and then recommend to government that the DND budget needs to be increased on a priority basis by a minimum of one billion dollars per year. In short, action should be taken to fund the policy stated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. One may understand Canada’s parsimonious approach to defence funding by noting that, on a per capita basis, it allocates only \$265(US) to defence, while the NATO average is \$589 (US). Allies, including our most important trading partner, the United States, have been commenting more frequently and vigorously on this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The recent increase of \$3 billion to the DND budget was welcome, but falls some 50% short of the requirement.

The tragic results of the recent terrorist attacks in the United States underscore the need for vigilance and preparations in the realm of national security. Based on the realities of human existence, it is doubtful there will ever be long term “peace in our time.” Canadians have been especially influenced by the siren-call of the hopes embodied in that condition. As a result, the Canadian Forces have been allowed to fall into disrepair over the past decade, and have reached a stage where their operational readiness is far below what it ought to be. The government is urged to allocate additional money to the DND budget so as to repair the damage, and to re-establish stability as a pre-condition for fulfilling the policy directed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. Although immediate attention will not doubt focus on counter-terrorism, one of the biggest factors in war is uncertainty as to how events will unfold. The need for effective armed forces, able to counter a variety of threats persists. Canada’s response is now in the hands of the government. Hopefully the new CDA study will assist it in taking the appropriate decision.

Studies by Conference of Defence Associations are available on the website: www.cda-cdai.ca

TRAINING ASSAULT TROOP FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Lieutenant F.C.J. Conliffe, RCD

(Lieutenant Conliffe is an officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons and has served with his unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina – ed.)

Much has been made recently of the combat capability of the Canadian Armed Forces. Acquisition of new weapons and equipment is having an enormous impact on the way the combat arms are conducting training, organization and operations. Yet

one often overlooked factor in this debate is the Canadian soldier himself.

Whether mounted in a Coyote, a LAV 3, an M113 or on foot, Canadian soldiers continue to prove to be flexible, intelligent and capable of learning to deal with rapidly changing situations.

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Examples of this flexibility can be seen throughout the Canadian contingent serving on OP PALLADIUM Roto 8, comprising the 3 RCR Battle Group. Just a year prior to commencing work-up training A Sqn RCD was exchanging Cougars for the new Coyote. In addition to converting from a light infantry battalion to a mechanized infantry battalion, 3RCR simultaneously absorbed a large number of reserve augmentees. Of specific interest to me, my own troop, the Assault Troop, re-rolled from armour to infantry in the course of the work-up period.

Assault Troop was conceived as the troop to carry out a specific task: performing the defence and security duties for MND(SW) HQ in Banja Luka. It was built around the RCD Recce Troop, with augmentation from around the Regiment, predominantly from B Sqn and HQ Sqn. Being assembled in August 2000, we were required to meet the Infantry Battle Task Standards to Level 3, live platoon operations, by December 2000. The Troop was patterned on the standard infantry platoon of the battle group, with 34 soldiers, 4 AVGP Grizzlies, and the complete complement of infantry platoon weapons.

Basic infantry skills are common to all soldiers, being taught in the various battle schools. Weapons handling is maintained through frequent refresher training and annual testing. Bringing these skills up to the standard of an infantry organization, however, requires more serious training. This was not an insurmountable problem as many of the Troop had an extensive background in reconnaissance operations. Further, most of the soldiers had completed the Armour Assault Troop course within the last eighteen months in anticipation of the possibility of a 3RCR BG being sent to Kosovo for a possible Roto 2. With the end of Canada's commitment to that theater, those soldiers had returned to tank training, but the skills and knowledge were still fresh enough that they could be quickly recalled.

The Troop initially established its new organizational structure, inspected all equipment to ensure serviceability, conducted lectures in the basic tactics at section and platoon level for all phases of war, and increased the level of physical fitness through a graduated physical training program. This was followed by a two-week exercise in Meaford, which coincided with an RCD exercise in the same area. The focus was on developing section cohesion and proficiency at section level tactics. All section commanders, 2I/Cs and senior corporals got the opportunity to practice dismounted quick attacks. Once they were comfortable at that level we moved to troop dismounted quick attacks. The Troop was then integrated into the regimental exercise, conducting reconnaissance patrols until the end of the exercise.

A challenge was presented at this time when seven soldiers from armour militia regiments were added to the Troop complement. We thus had forty-one soldiers competing for thirty-four positions. The policy was made clear from the start: selection for the Troop was based purely on performance and final selection would be determined by the end of the war-fighting training cycle, which would be at Christmas. The initially tension and lowered morale caused by uncertainty was overcome through challenging training and the spirit of competition.

Returning to Petawawa, the Troop continued training in a mechanized environment and meeting established training requirements. Field training was complemented by hours spent in the small arms trainer, an excellent tool used to coach and develop skill and confidence with all weapons in the platoon. Starting with range simulation and progressing to war and operations other than war (OOTW) scenarios, the Troop developed proficiency with small arms as well as improving instinctive shooting and snap decision-making skills.

We saw the initial benefits of this training in the OOTW stands, as decisive, assertive application of the rules of engagement were consistently shown. Live-fire confirmation of skills was also necessary, and the Troop conducted live pairs, section and mechanized platoon attacks under the supervision of experienced infantry personnel. The training paid off as the Troop performed to a high standard throughout this period of assessment, achieving the Level 3 standard.

The Battle Group continued training with the intent of working to company live-fire operations. Assault Troop thus became an enemy force for dry company/ battle group-minus training. The exercise involved Assault Troop and an engineer section playing the roles of belligerent local forces that had seized a village and were defending. The Troop thus developed urban warfare skills, practiced basic assault troop tasks such as the construction of obstacles and bunkers, and rehearsed close quarters battle drills. We also took advantage of the exercise to conduct aggressive patrolling. After defending against three company-sized attacks, the Troop withdrew from the village and conducted a delay/withdrawal followed by a reserve demolition guard. Although the primary training audiences were the rifle companies, Assault Troop benefited through increasing skills in defensive operations.

Christmas saw the completion of the war-fighting training season. The senior NCOs and I assessed the performance of all soldiers concerned. Injuries and requests for drivers from other sub-units claimed four personnel, while a further three, two regular, one reserve, were deemed to have poor

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performance and were returned to their respective units. Four reserve soldiers were integrated into the Troop. Bringing the Troop to its established strength at this point gave the soldiers time to cement the cohesion of the sections and the platoon.

Mastering the skills required of the OOTW cycle was a simple task, as they are not unique to the infantry. Armour units are equally experienced at such tasks as establishing road blocks and traffic control points, conducting mounted and dismounted patrols, applying the ROEs, and interacting with locals. An interesting addition to the schedule was a week of public order training, where the Battle Group was exposed to crowd management and crowd confrontation operations. This training combined discipline, assertiveness, thorough knowledge of the rules of engagement, and coordination. The basic movements were easy to grasp for soldiers accustomed to parade square drill, and were quickly mastered.

Refining the appropriate responses to different situations was a matter of rehearsal and practice in training situations, opportunities presented over the course of various exercises. In addition to gaining a valuable skill set, the training increased the confidence the soldiers had in one another in conducting operations amongst hostile locals. While we never employed the high profile riot tactics in Bosnia, we did have to deal with controlling a large group of frightened, confused civilians in the wake of the Banja Luka mosque riots in May. The basic skills mastered in the training were easily adapted to meet the problem of a small number of soldiers dealing with several hundred civilians.

Carrying out the defence and security duties in Banja Luka did not require the extensive warfighting skills that had been developed, but the confidence and cohesion that had emerged through the course of this training was invaluable. With the completion of that three-month task, the Troop moved to

Tomislavgrad where it was attached to a rifle company. Duties there involved fitting into the patrol matrix, carrying out specific assigned tasks to augment the rifle platoons and providing depth and a surge capability. The infantry skills are thus more applicable in that environment.

Assault Troop successfully absorbed Reserve soldiers into the organization, and, more significantly, re-rolling from armour to infantry. In the event of a critical emergency, this could have been completed faster with a more concentrated period of time in the field. As it was, the combination of classroom and theory training followed by graduated field exercises, use of simulators and plenty of time on the ranges developed the necessary individual and collective skills required to be a proficient infantry platoon. Once again, Canadian soldiers proved their flexibility in adapting to changing circumstances in order to accomplish the assigned mission.

Effort and resources devoted to training were the keys to turning a group of armour soldiers into an infantry unit. In the short term, this resulted in a small group of soldiers with the tools to carry out their tasks in Bosnia. Longer term benefits from this action will include improved combined arms operations as the greater knowledge and understanding of infantry operations is spread through the RCD, complemented by the personal familiarity the Troop has developed with the soldiers of 3RCR.

The success of the Assault Troop has had nothing to do with any of the expensive equipment that is touted as improving our combat capability. Rather, it has everything to do with the motivation and training of the individual soldiers. While new equipment will no doubt improve the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces, it will require those soldiers to man that equipment, and it is in those soldiers that the strength and combat capability of the Canadian Armed Forces ultimately rests.

IN SEARCH OF PARTNERSHIP

The Honourable Jean Jacques Blais, PC, QC

Prior to the Liberal Edmonton Caucus last month, Prime Minister Chrétien set out four goals for the members of his caucus troops for the coming session of Parliament. Increased investment in Defence was not one of them. Not a surprise! One should not lose hope, however, the Prime Minister did identify international development as a priority item. What relevance to Defence spending, you may ask? Demonstrating that relevance is the purpose of this article. If I can persuade the reader of the essential connection between overseas development assistance and additional investment in National Defence, I may be encouraged to attempt to persuade Jean

Chrétien.

There persists both within the Canadian International Defence Agency (CIDA) and at National Defence Headquarters a perception that the two departments may be competing for the same money, that any funding secured by one is taken from the other. That view has prevented them from joining forces to gain better recognition both from the government and from the Canadian public of the advantages their joining

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THE VIMY AWARD WINNER

The Vimy Award is presented annually to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values. The Vimy Award Selection Committee has selected Air Commodore Leonard Birchall, CM, OBE, DFC, O Ont, CD, as this year's recipient of the award for 2001.



The Vimy Award

Air Commodore Birchall is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the highest standards of leadership throughout his career of service to Canada. The Vimy Award will be presented by the Honourable Arthur C. Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, at a formal reception and dinner to be held at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa on Friday 16 November, 2001, beginning at 6:30 P.M.

A Second World War hero, Leonard Birchall is known as the Saviour of Ceylon. Retiring from the Royal Canadian Air Force with the rank of air commodore, he went on to serve twenty-two years with the 400th Air Reserve Squadron. He also joined York University as Executive Officer in the Faculty of Administrative Studies. In his retirement, he continues to be active in many military and charitable organizations.

LE RÉCIPiendaIRE DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

La Distinction honorifique Vimy est présentée chaque année à un canadien ou à une canadienne ayant fait une contribution exceptionnelle à la sécurité du Canada et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le comité de sélection du Récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy ont, cette année, choisi le Commodore de l'air (à la retraite) Leonard Birchall, CM, OBE, DFC, O Ont, CD, comme récipiendaire de la distinction Vimy de 2001.

Le commodore de l'air Birchall est un canadien distingué qui a démontré les standards les plus élevés de leadership au cours d'une carrière consacrée au service du Canada. La Distinction honorifique sera remise par l'Honorable Arthur C. Eggleton, Ministre de la Défense nationale, vendredi le 16 novembre 2001, lors d'un dîner gala mixte au Fairmont Château Laurier à Ottawa, débutant à 18h30.

Héros de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, connu comme *le Sauveur de Ceylon*, Leonard Birchall s'est retiré de l'Aviation royale du Canada avec le rang de commodore de l'air, et ensuite servi pendant vingt-deux ans au 400e Escadron de la Réserve aérienne. Il est également entré à l'Université York comme cadre supérieur à la faculté d'études administratives. Pendant sa retraite, il continue à participer à de nombreux organismes militaires et charitables.

forces would bring to Canada's international image. It has been my position, one that I have communicated to officials of both ministries, that the Canadian Government must increase the budgets of both National Defence and CIDA and that the two responsible ministers must join in their efforts to persuade their cabinet colleagues of the connection between overseas development assistance and the use of the military.

The demands of the international community have changed dramatically in the last decade. On the one hand, the complexity of the international environment and the relatively mixed results achieved by overseas assistance, dictate a new approach to the funding of international development. On the other, since the end of the cold war the international community has been increasingly engaged in the use force to advance

collective security, creating in its wake, an intensified demand for humanitarian assistance and the consequent intervention of civilian non-government organizations.

The Balkans, Somalia, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, East Timor, among others, have made evident the direct connection between the military use of force and human security in all of its ramifications. Where military intervention has been successful, the continued presence of armed forces has proved essential to maintain order and ensure proper governance. That military presence has also assured the involvement of a multiplicity of non governmental and near governmental organizations engaged in assisting war torn communities.

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Experience has shown that first and foremost, in the post conflict period, security is what matters, both of the citizens of the host country and representatives of the international community. That security is dependant on a professional military, a competent police, a working legal system and available correctional institutions. Without the military, the other institutions are unable to cope.

Indeed the very nature of armed forces, the constabulary, judges and penal institutions is that they require force or the threat of the use of force to function. That use of force must be pursuant to the rule of law. Institutions that do not follow the rule of law need to be reformed and that reform, to be successful, will require the use or the threat of the use of force being brought to bear, as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor demonstrate every day.

The same can be said for societies where the turmoil does not result in civil war or inter ethnic bloodletting, where armed intervention may not be needed. Force, its use or abuse is nevertheless a key determinant. A review of internal governance in states with serious internal strife will reveal that either one, some or all of the organizations I have previously mentioned, including the military, the police, the courts, the penal systems, may be responsible for the mayhem. And since the military in any body politic is, physically, the most powerful, the most threatening, and potentially the most disruptive instrument of governance, it should be looked at first.

The Canadian military are in an ideal position to identify the failings in any foreign military institution. The level of professionalism in the Canadian Forces (CF) is one of the highest in the world. Canada is one of the few democracies in the world that has never experienced a coup d'état. Canada's armed forces have always supported the constitutional order and accepted their subordination to the civil authority. The CF are therefore ideally equipped to

participate in the evaluation process, the planning of needed reforms in conflict areas and their implementation, with the presence of Canadian military personnel, if required.

Now, back to the Prime Minister and international development. The PM will be hosting the G8 in Kananaskis Alberta next June. He, as the host, will want to make visible announcements that place Canada's efforts in the international community to the fore. Indeed he has already identified Africa as his target. A former Deputy Minister of National Defence, Robert Fowler, has been named the G8 Conference Sherpa with responsibility for the event's preparations including its substance. I am persuaded that Mr Fowler recognizes that nothing can happen in Africa unless the human security dimension is addressed, and that demands military involvement. The presentation to the G8 of a two pronged approach to international development including both human security and its military underpinnings and human development could be very well received by the international community.

A well articulated connection between the professionalisation of the military, the reform of those institutions essential to human security and the promotion of human development under all its guises would draw positive attention from international leaders. The training, within the recipient or targeted African state, of a military fully controlled by the civil authority is the key.

Is the Prime Minister amenable to the argument that, to ensure the proper utilization of Canadian overseas assistance dollars, the CF, one of the most professional military anywhere on the globe, have a role to play in professionalizing armed forces in potential African recipients of Canadian overseas assistance? If he is, then Jean Chrétien would have to accept that the already overstretched CF would need an infusion of funds to meet not only the new challenge, but to meet current commitments and to maintain its credibility as an internationally significant contributor to international peace and security.

Letter to the Editor of *Vanguard Magazine*

The following is a letter which appeared in the Special CANSEC Edition of Vanguard, courtesy of the editor of Vanguard – ed.

Dear Editor,

I could not but notice your Issue 3 interview, which you had with the departing Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, CMM, CD. It coincided also with an article in On Track (Conference of Defence Associations Institute's 29 June edition), in which Admiral Garnett wrote about "The Canadian Forces – More Capable in an Unpredictable World."

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I have watched and been impressed with the dedication and leadership shown by Admiral Garnett during his career. I have great regard for his knowledge and capabilities to fulfill that most thankless of senior appointments; the Bad Guy, he who controls the purse.

At the risk of offending others who may have occupied this position before him and read your magazine, I must recognize how publicly involved he has been and how well he has not only managed but focussed the limited purse he was given. It was with this zest and hard work that he earned the respect of the bureaucracy and that he and his staff contributed greatly to the credibility necessary to achieve some of the fiscal turn-around that we have witnessed over the last two years. As one of Canada's great sailors, he can be proud of the service that he has rendered and the legacy he leaves on both coasts. I salute him.

But with exposure comes criticism and I am a former serving soldier and cannot take lightly some of the remarks and deductions that he and, more shockingly, his superior have made in recent months about this so-called "operational capability" improvement over the last 10 years. This may indeed be the case for the navy, though I would not hesitate to at least question that assumption. I do not doubt the improved individual operational capability of the soldiers and leaders who have and continue to serve on operational missions.

I also am very much aware of the improvements over previous such vehicles afforded by the introduction of Coyote and LAVIII. However, I am concerned when the Chief of Land Staff expresses alarm when referring to collective training where only one third of the 12 army Battle Group commanders are exercised annually, recognizing that tours of command last only two years. In navy parlance, one third will not 'sail' under a flag officer during their command?

Essentially, I could care less what the operational capability was 10 years ago! What I am interested in is whether the Canadian Forces can meet what they are asked to do now in the government White Paper and whether they will be capable of doing so in the face of future challenges, foreseeable and less so.

Such information from the Chief of Land Staff indicates to me that trained and available numbers of soldiers...the ultimate "fragility"... preclude him from fulfilling the White Paper Main Contingency Brigade task accorded him now. It has been nine years since the army even trained at that level. Need I remind anyone of the training recommendations of the Somalia inquiry?

I am concerned and take no comfort in the stated reassurance that the government will not commit unready troops. Zaire and other more recognizable incidents would indicate we all be cautious. There are other less than accurate and incomplete references to the army structures of our allies and others, which I will leave for others to remark upon.

In addition to this, there are many other real defence challenges; RETAINING and recruiting new service personnel, our defence relationship with the US and our economic reliance on space, the upcoming 'bow wave' of expenditures on operations and maintenance, how we deal with asymmetric threats to Canada and the capital replacement juggernaut of 2010 to 2015 which, hopefully, technology will assist us to resolve.

We have no objective measure of operational capability. As the Auditor General points out we need one (or more). However, let us recognize that the Canadian Forces have lost essential capability over the years and that, without serious and reasonably constant funding beyond present levels, this erosion will continue.

There is a school of thought, evident before but more prevalent since the Gulf War and the then 'advisors' to the Government, that, when soft power fails, the 'Canadian way of war' is to have the Navy first in action and that "the role of the Air Force would increase even as that of the Army lessened." The aim here would be to avoid at all cost getting involved in messy casualties. Those who support this policy of only providing safe and secure contributions to the battlefield, be it that of the UN or other coalition, seem oblivious to the 'moral bankruptcy of such a policy' and that this modern version of the 'White Man's Burden' asks others, and particularly the Third World, to take all the risks. How transparently irresponsible to our allies and others is such a policy? Is this the aim of an under-funded White Paper? Are company-sized time limited commitments such as East Timor and Ethiopia the next compromise down this inevitable route? I trust not but remain ever vigilant and ask the Admiral to join me therein.

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**CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
4TH ANNUAL GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM**

**“THE BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES”**

**KEYNOTE SPEAKER:
LGEN ROMEO DALLAIRE, CMM, MSC, CD**

This autumn, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations at Queens University, will hold the Fourth Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The Symposium will highlight the work of PhD and MA students from civilian and military universities. Our aim is to showcase the leading edge research of young scholars in the field of security and defence studies and to strengthen linkages between civilian and military educational institutions.

Date: 2-3 November 2001

Location: RCAF Ottawa Officers' Mess, 158 Gloucester Street (opposite L'esplanade Laurier) Ottawa, Ontario

Registration: CDA Members: \$25.00, Students \$10.00* includes lunches
Dinner Friday: \$25.00

To Register: *Tel: (613) 236-9903*
E-mail: Tim Sparling at sparling@sympatico.ca
Fax: (613) 236-8191

*Student presenters will not be charged the registration fee. Funding may be available to assist with the travel costs. Contact CDAI for further details.

Admiral Garnett has done well in handling the cards that were dealt him and I admire his tenacity in this respect, but, as he once said of me, I hope that he also in his retirement “becomes wiser” and pressures whom he must to ensure that his successor is dealt a better hand with which to work.

With respect,
MGen (Ret) C.J. Addy

**CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
SYMPOSIUM DES DIPLÔMÉS**

**‘LES AVANTAGES D’UN INVESTISSEMENT EN MATIÈRE DE SÉCURITÉ ET
DE DÉFENSE : QUESTIONS NATIONALES ET INTERNATIONALES’**

**CONFÉRENCIER PRINCIPAL
LGEN ROMÉO DALLAIRE, CMM, CSM, CD**

Cet automne, l’Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense (ICAD), en collaboration avec le Centre for International Relations de l’Université Queen’s, organisera le 4^e Symposium des diplômés annuel. Le Symposium sera l’occasion de mettre en valeur les travaux d’étudiants de maîtrise et de doctorat des universités civiles et militaires. Notre but, c’est de proposer une vitrine des recherches à la fine pointe de jeunes universitaires dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense et de renforcer les liens entre les établissements d’enseignement civils et militaires.

Date : Les 2 et 3 novembre 2001

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THE GENERALS HAVE NO CLOTHES

Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) Terry Thompson

The following article is a re-print of an article that appeared in the Summer 2001 edition of The Bowline Journal, with the kind permission of the author and courtesy of the editor, LCdr (Retd) George A. Moore – ed.

The new Chief of the Defence Staff has recently perpetuated an inaccurate vision of Canada's military establishment. His predecessor, General Baril, was a master of the rose coloured glasses approach to the reality of the Canadian military today. General Henault's recent reaction to Royal Canadian Military Institute's (RCMI) criticism of the state of our armed forces, and the deficiencies in the uniformed leadership, bears much closer examination.

It's hard to see how the CDS can suggest that the military is in the best shape it's been in years, in view of rusting vehicles laid up in compounds across the country, aircraft being cannibalized to keep a pitiful few in the air, and fighting vessels tied up alongside in Halifax and Esquimalt.

The General is wrong in his claim that the military enjoys high morale. The military does not. In fact, morale of the troops in the field is at the lowest level I have ever witnessed during my thirty-one years of service, and in the past twenty years since my retirement. This also applies to the junior officers and NCOs who are dedicated to the welfare of their charges. At no time in the history of the Canadian military has the morale of the service men and women been so low.

While low pay in the very junior ranks is certainly an issue, one that other countries are grappling with in their own military organizations, it is not the focus of dissatisfaction within the Canadian Forces.

The RCMI criticism of defence policy, with special reference to ineffective senior uniformed leadership at National Defence Headquarters, is a manifestation of the frustrations that have been plaguing the military establishment since the integration of the three services. The Canadian Forces can no longer react to national need. Where in the past small numbers of troops could be diverted from training or other non-combat ready related tasks, there is nothing left on the bone of the military structure.

Training of warlike or even peacekeeping objectives necessitates a large infrastructure that is staffed to meet contemporary contingencies and international accords. Force levels can be adjusted up or down

depending upon circumstances and changing defence policy.

While the responsibility for defence policy must remain with Parliament, the shaping of that policy cannot be accomplished without consultation with the military. Such consultation must include a very wide range of academic, geopolitical and military experts including disgruntled old retired officers who the CDS rejects as being out of touch with Canada's modern military.

The offhand rejection of a valuable human element of our society who have devoted their lives to the study of geopolitics, defence strategies and technological development as it effects Canada, is yet another indicator of the shallow thinking extant in defence headquarters.

A civilian bureaucracy that has become fully integrated into the military headquarters establishment exacerbates this thinking. Civil servants who are focused on civilian management models, financial controls and political expediency, without any background or knowledge of the day-to-day problems facing a well led army, navy or air force in the field, have replaced the military imperative.

The generals, having spent years in the field learning their craft, are hopelessly overpowered by their senior civilian counterparts. They are no match for the wily bureaucrat who has spent his life in the shadow of Parliament hill. The generals enter into the game in Ottawa with an empty scabbard.

They have proven themselves admirably in a variety of field and staff appointments over a period of fifteen or twenty-five years. But nothing can prepare them for the bureaucratic political infighting that forms the daily routine at the so-called military headquarters. It is a world foreign to their training and background.

They are made to rely on their civilian counterparts as they assume their new role in the headquarters. They are unable to impose change on an entrenched bureaucracy that responds to political whim. They become civilians in uniform.

It is little wonder that most of the military institutes, associations and other affiliated organizations are becoming more outspoken as each new boast of military preparedness emanates from the headquarters in Ottawa.

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The generals are seen to have no clothes, indeed ... *the generals have no clothes!*

Still, it is unfair to single out the generals for the ineffectiveness of our military. For the past thirty years, succeeding governments have worn away at the military ethic. Introduction of bilingual and multi-cultural policies, the social engineering of gender related issues, minority recognition and false standards of behaviour have all been forced on the military and modified to suit a political imperative.

Rampant civil service authority in the domain of a military dynamic has eroded the armed forces of today to the point where they are no longer an effective influence in most spheres of military activity. The government can trot out its generals, program them to say whatever they want them to say, order them to send cooks, administrators, nurses and technicians into areas where danger lurks; but there is no rational defence policy to which the necessary resources can be tailored to meet government demands.

There is nothing mysterious about the military. Since the days of Hannibal the principles of war have remained about the same. The government must define its foreign policy and its defence policy. The military must then define what it needs to meet and carry out those policies.

There is no place for political and bureaucratic meddling in the military process as it is developed to meet a well defined

defence policy. The policy has to be determined by the government. If the government is unwilling to provide the resources to meet those policies, then the policy must be changed. No rocket science here.

The military doesn't need or want to make, shape or change national policy. Given clear direction and the necessary resources, it will perform the tasks and compliment the policies defined by the government.

In the process, the Canadian military in cooperation with our allies, will provide a protective umbrella for the nation, and an environment within which the citizens of Canada can pursue their dreams, aspirations, and the freedom bought at such high cost by the old soldiers of the past.

Surely the "Peace in Our Time" statement by Neville Chamberlain just before the outbreak of the Second World War must carry a message that never again should we allow ourselves to become complacent when it comes to the defence of our freedom.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Terry Thompson is a retired Canadian Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel. He is General Manager Public Affairs for the Naval Museum of Alberta and, a good friend of the navy. Our regular "Bowline" naval advocacy pundit Fred Fowlow, is currently enjoying a well-earned summer sabbatical but will return with our next issue.

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