



# ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

December, 2003

Volume 8, Number 4

## The Way Ahead for Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy



## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

*Colonel Alain Pellerin (Retd), O.M.M., C.D.*

The appointment of the Honourable David Pratt as Minister of National Defence, along with the announcement of a foreign and defence policy review on the first day of the Prime Minister's mandate, is the Right Honourable Paul Martin's signal to Canadians, the federal bureaucracy, and Canada's allies of the new government's determination to strengthen Canada's international position. This is very good news, indeed. The Conference of Defence Associations is pleased to support the new Minister in overseeing the defence policy review, along with fostering the betterment of Canada's armed forces.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute was honoured when General Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff, presented the Vimy Award to General Paul Manson at a sold out formal dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Gatineau, Québec, on 21 November. The evening was extremely well attended by leaders of corporate Canada who are supportive of the aims of CDA and of the CDA Institute to increase, annually, public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The very significant support of our corporate sponsors and of the member associations contributed to a very successful event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. We look forward to even greater corporate support of the Vimy Award Dinner in 2004. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors can be read elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Coincident with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award to Mr. Garth Pritchard, by the Honourable David Pratt. The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated by CDA in collaboration with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. The purpose of the award is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the understanding by the general public of Canada's defence and security issues.

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## DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

*Colonel Alain Pellerin (Ret), O.M.M., C.D.*

La nomination de l'honorable David Pratt comme ministre de la Défense nationale et l'annonce d'un examen de la politique en matière d'affaires étrangères et de défense dès le premier jour de son entrée en fonction comme Premier ministre, voilà le signal qu'a voulu lancer le très honorable Paul Martin pour dire aux Canadiens, à la bureaucratie fédérale et aux alliés du Canada à quel point le nouveau gouvernement était déterminé à renforcer la position internationale du Canada. C'est en effet une très bonne nouvelle. La Conférence des associations de la défense est heureuse d'appuyer le nouveau ministre alors qu'il devra superviser l'examen de la politique de défense, tout en stimulant l'amélioration des forces armées du Canada.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense a été honoré lorsque le général Raymond Henault, Chef d'état-major de la Défense, a présenté devant une salle comble le Prix Vimy au général Paul Manson à l'occasion d'un dîner tenu dans le Grand Hall du Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau (Québec), le 21 novembre. Assistaient à ce dîner de nombreuses personnalités réunissant les leaders des milieux d'affaires canadiens qui appuient les objectifs de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD, qui sont : de sensibiliser davantage chaque année le public à l'importante et insigne contribution d'un Canadien à la sécurité du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

L'appui très significatif de nos commanditaires des milieux d'affaires et des associations membres a contribué à la grande réussite de cette activité très appréciée par tous ceux qui y ont assisté. Nous envisageons que les entreprises nous appuieront encore davantage pour le dîner du Prix Vimy de 2004. Nous offrons publiquement nos remerciements à nos commanditaires du milieu des affaires, ailleurs dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

La présentation du Ross Munro Media Award à M. Garth Pritchard par l'honorable David Pratt coïncidait avec le dîner du Prix Vimy. Le Ross Munro Media Award est dû à l'initiative de la CAD en collaboration avec l'Institut canadien de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères. L'objet

*(voir p. 2)*

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On December 3<sup>rd</sup>, Queen's University School of Public Policy, in collaboration with the CDA Institute, released a major study entitled *Canada without Armed Forces?* at a media briefing in the National Press Theatre. Informed Canadians are aware of the perilous state of the Canadian Armed Forces. What is not

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive **ON TRACK** and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront **ON TRACK** et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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du prix est de reconnaître, chaque année, un journaliste canadien qui a contribué de façon significative et remarquable à la compréhension des questions de défense et de sécurité du Canada par le grand public.

Le 3 décembre, l'École de politique publique de l'Université Queen's, en collaboration avec l'Institut de la CAD, a publié une étude majeure intitulée "*Canada without Armed Forces?*" lors d'une séance d'information des médias tenue dans l'Amphithéâtre national de la presse. Les Canadiens informés sont au courant de l'état périlleux des Forces armées canadiennes. Ce qui n'est pas bien compris, c'est la crise nationale qui nous guette concernant la "force de l'avenir" - ces capacités qui auraient dû être acquises hier pour répondre à la demande de demain.

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well understood is the approaching national crisis regarding the “future force” - those capabilities that ought to have been acquired yesterday to meet tomorrow’s demands.

The Claxton Paper examines this crisis in detail and concludes that in the next few years military capabilities will be lost because funds will not have been provided over the last ten years to sustain them. The study concludes that the slide in capabilities is so steep, and the time needed to reacquire or rebuild them so long, that even a significant and immediate defence spending increase, would not allow the next government to redress the military deficit during its term in office.

The media briefing was well attended and has since generated a lot of public interest. The release of the report, itself, was covered by all of the major media, and is still the subject of commentary by defence experts. The authors of the report and members of the National Office were called upon to provide numerous interviews for days following the release of the report.

Articles by Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, CDA Chairman, and Colonel Howie Marsh, CDAI’s Senior Defence Analyst, provide us with a brief over-view and summary of the report. Authors who contributed to the report are Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair - Defence Management Studies, Queen’s University, Colonel Brian MacDonald, Colonel Howie Marsh, and Mr. Chris Ankerson. *Canada without Armed Forces?* is available at [www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml](http://www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml).

The world’s stage has seen tremendous change since the last Defence White Paper was produced, almost ten years ago. The White Paper’s relevance is, to-day, questionable; thus it is very encouraging that on the first day of his mandate, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced that the Federal government will undertake a foreign affairs and defence policy review. Professor David Bercuson has detailed for us, in *Serving Canadian Interests: A Defence Policy That Begins at Home*, first principles for a truly Canadian defence policy that

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Le document Claxton examine cette crise en détail et conclut que, dans les prochaines années des capacités militaires seront perdues parce que les fonds n’ont pas été accordés pour les soutenir au cours des dix dernières années. L’étude conclut que le glissement des capacités est si prononcé, et le temps nécessaire à les acquérir de nouveau ou les reconstruire si long, que même une augmentation significative et immédiate des dépenses de défense, ne permettrait pas au prochain gouvernement de rattraper le déficit militaire dans le cours de son mandat.

La séance d’information des médias a été très suivie et a par la suite généré beaucoup d’intérêt dans le public. La publication du rapport, elle-même, fut couverte par tous les grands médias, et fait encore l’objet de commentaires de la part des experts de la défense. Les auteurs du rapport et les membres du Bureau national ont été invités à accorder de nombreuses entrevues pendant les jours qui ont suivi la publication du rapport.

Des articles par le lieutenant-général Richard Evraire, président de la CAD, et le colonel Howie Marsh, analyste principal de la défense de l’ICAD, donnent un bref aperçu et un résumé du rapport. Les auteurs qui ont contribué au rapport sont le docteur Douglas Bland, président des Études de gestion de la défense à Université Queen’s, le colonel Brian MacDonald, le colonel Howie Marsh, et M. Chris Ankerson. On peut se procurer *Canada without Armed Forces?* à l’adresse électronique suivante : [www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml](http://www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml).

L’échiquier mondial a vu un immense changement depuis que le dernier Livre blanc sur la Défense a été produit, il y a presque dix ans. La pertinence du Livre blanc est aujourd’hui douteuse ; il est donc très encourageant que, le dès premier jour de son mandat, le Premier ministre Paul Martin ait annoncé que le gouvernement fédéral entreprendra un examen de la politique des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense. Le professeur David Bercuson a détaillé pour nous, dans l’article *Serving Canadian Interests: A Defence Policy That Begins at Home*, les principes fondamentaux

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should be addressed. Dr. Bercuson is Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and is Vice President Research with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

Terry Thompson has written a striking overview of the direction that Canada has taken, over the years, in its management of national policies, in particular those of foreign affairs and national defence, as well as those of health care and energy policies. We are very pleased to include in this issue *The Military as an Instrument of Diplomacy - A Canadian Perspective*, courtesy of the Editor of *Starshell*, the national publication of the Naval Officers Association of Canada. Terry is a retired Canadian air force lieutenant-colonel. He is Director Public Affairs for the Naval Museum of Alberta.

*Why Does Canada Need Armed Forces?* is the title of the article that Brigadier-General Don Macnamara, our President, has provided our readers. Brigadier-General Macnamara has written on the rationale for Canada to have armed forces with the resources necessary to provide the training and equipment for the missions expected of them.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Blaxland, of the Australian Army, is a 2002-2003 Visiting Defence Fellow at Queen's Centre for International Relations. In this issue Lieutenant-Colonel Blaxland examines the common ties and interests between Canada and Australia. He points out that our two countries face similar security challenges and parallel imperatives to deploy forces far from our shores. He points out, moreover, that Australia, with two-thirds the population and a bit over half the GDP of Canada, is able to field forces of greater capability than Canada. He concludes that if Canada is ever to regain the kinds of capabilities that enabled it to be the lead nation in the 1956 Suez Crisis peacekeeping mission and to have Lester Pearson win the Nobel Peace Prize, then recent experience of a similar nation, such as Australia, merits attention. That is the challenge that Canadians are facing to-day

I am pleased to report that the 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium, *Security and Defence: National and International Issues*, held 24 and 25 October, was very well attended. For the first time, the Symposium was held outside of Ottawa, in Kingston at Royal Military College (RMC). The Symposium, held in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at RMC, was made possible through the generous financial support of General Dynamics Land Systems, the DND Security and Defence Forum Programme, and Howard B Ripstein Holdings Ltd. We are grateful for the generous assistance that was provided by the sponsors. This important symposium provides the venue at which leading

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d'une véritable politique de défense canadienne auxquels on devrait s'attacher. Le docteur Bercuson est directeur du Centre d'études militaires et stratégiques de l'Université de Calgary, et il est vice-président de la recherche à l'Institut canadien de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères.

Terry Thompson a écrit un frappant aperçu d'ensemble de la direction que le Canada a prise, au fil des années, dans sa gestion des politiques nationales, en particulier celles des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense nationale, ainsi que des politiques touchant les soins de santé et les politiques énergétiques. Nous sommes très heureux d'inclure dans ce numéro l'article *The Military as an Instrument of Diplomacy - A Canadian Perspective*, gracieusement offert par le rédacteur de *Starshell*, la publication nationale de l'Association des officiers de marine du Canada. Terry est un lieutenant-colonel à la retraite de l'aviation canadienne. Il est directeur des affaires publiques pour le Naval Museum of Alberta.

*Why Does Canada Need Armed Forces?*, tel est le titre de l'article que le brigadier-général Don Macnamara, notre président, a offert à nos lecteurs. Le brigadier-général Macnamara traite de la justification, pour le Canada, d'avoir des forces armées dotées des ressources nécessaires pour dispenser la formation et l'équipement nécessaires pour les missions qu'on attend d'elles.

Le lieutenant-colonel John Blaxland, de l'armée australienne, est boursier invité 2002-2003 de la Défense au Centre de relations internationales de Queen's. Dans ce numéro, le lieutenant-colonel Blaxland examine les liens et les intérêts communs qui existent entre le Canada et l'Australie. Il souligne que nos deux pays font face à des défis analogues en matière de sécurité et à des impératifs parallèles en matière de déploiement de leurs forces à de grandes distances de leurs côtes. Il fait remarquer, de plus, que l'Australie, avec les deux-tiers de la population et un peu plus de la moitié du PIB du Canada, est capable de déployer des forces de plus forte capacité que le Canada. Il conclut que, si le Canada doit jamais

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*Général Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff, presents the Vimy Award to General Paul Manson (Retd). Brigadier-General Don Macnamara (Retd), President Conference of Defence Associations Institute looks on.*

edge research of young scholars in security and defence studies is highlighted. Keane Grimsrud, our intern, provides us with a review of the presentations that were made at the Symposium.

Canada's aerospace, and consequently its air power, are at a critical juncture. Our geography, economy, and standing in the world demand that Canadian air power not be neglected but be restored. With the aim of understanding the future of flight, a contingent of Canadian and international aerospace experts, in November, met in Winnipeg to discuss the impact of 100 years of flight. Colonel Marsh attended the meeting, organized by the University of Manitoba's Centre for Defence and Security Studies. Colonel Marsh reports with his observations and conclusions in *Aerospace Power Forum 2003* here, in *ON TRACK*.

The CDA Institute will present its 20<sup>th</sup> annual seminar, *The Way Ahead for Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy*, on Thursday, 26 February 2004, followed by CDA's AGM on

retrouver les niveaux de capacités qui lui ont permis d'être un leader des nations dans la mission de maintien de la paix lors de la crise du canal de Suez, en 1956, et de faire en sorte que le prix Nobel de la paix soit attribué à Lester Pearson, l'expérience récente d'une nation semblable, comme l'Australie, mérite qu'on s'y intéresse. Voilà le défi auquel les Canadiens ont à faire face aujourd'hui.

J'ai le plaisir de rapporter que le 6e symposium annuel des étudiants de deuxième cycle, sous le thème "*Sécurité et défense: Enjeux nationaux et internationaux*", tenu les 24 et 25 octobre, a réuni un auditoire très nombreux. Pour la première fois, le symposium était tenu à l'extérieur d'Ottawa, au Collège militaire royal de Kingston. Le symposium, tenu en collaboration avec le Centre de relations internationales de l'Université Queen's, et le programme des études sur la guerre du Collège militaire, a été rendu possible grâce au généreux appui financier de General Dynamics Land Systems, au programme du Forum sur la sécurité et la défense du MDN, et de la société Howard B. Ripstein Holdings Ltd.

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Friday 27 February, at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa. The theme of the seminar is timely, given that we have a new government, as well as the likelihood of a general federal election sometime next year. Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Paul Martin has been invited to attend the seminar, as the keynote speaker. We have an impressive lineup of prestigious speakers for the event, including General Klaus Naumann (Retd), former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and a Commissioner on the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, who will be the theme speaker; General John de Chastelain (Retd), former Chief of the Defence Staff; and Admiral E.P. Giambastiani, US Navy, Commander US Joint Forces Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander - Transformation, who will be the luncheon speaker.

We are very pleased that Général Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff will address the seminar, and Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair for Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, will provide the summary.

Please refer to the notice of the Annual Seminar and AGM elsewhere in this issue for more details. I urge our readers to attend what promises to be a very stimulating and informative period of discussion. Bring a friend along! Those attending the Seminar are invited to attend Day One of the AGM, Friday, 27 February, when the Vice-Admiral R.D. Buck, Chief of the Naval Staff; Lieutenant-General Ken Pennie, Chief of the Air Staff; Vice-Admiral Greg Jarvis, Assistant Deputy Minister (H/R Mil); and Major-General J.H.P.M. Caron, Assistant Chief of the Land Staff; will address the Meeting. Circulate the information widely to our pro-defence stakeholders.

Based on past experience, I advise you to register soon to avoid disappointment.

The Conference of Defence Associations believes that the first priority of our government is to ensure the security of its citizens, and has therefore advocated for a long time that the first order of business for the Government should be a thorough review of Canada's foreign affairs and defence policies. It is our hope that our readers will lend their voice to the discussion on the issues of security and national defence. The CDA Institute's 20<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar is an important platform from which these issues will be explored and hopefully, factored into a forthcoming review of Canada's defence policy by the Government.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute needs the financial support of the pro-defence community, as the independent **Voice of Defence**, to remain effective in the

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Nous sommes reconnaissants pour l'aide généreuse qui a été accordée par les commanditaires. Cet important symposium offre un lieu où la recherche de pointe des jeunes scientifiques dans les études sur la sécurité et la défense est soulignée. Keane Grimsrud, notre stagiaire, nous offre une revue des présentations faites au Symposium.

L'aérospatiale du Canada, et par conséquent sa force aérienne, sont à un point de jonction crucial. Notre géographie, notre économie, et notre statut dans le monde exigent que la force aérienne du Canada ne soient pas négligée mais restaurée. Avec l'objectif de comprendre l'avenir de l'aéronautique, un contingent d'experts en aérospatiale canadiens et internationaux se sont réunis à Winnipeg, en novembre, pour discuter de l'impact de 100 ans d'aéronautique. Le colonel Marsh a assisté à la réunion, organisée par le Centre d'études sur la défense et la sécurité de l'Université du Manitoba. Le colonel Marsh fait rapport de ses observations et conclusions dans l'article *Aerospace Power Forum 2003* ici, dans *ON TRACK*.


L'Institut de la CAD présentera son 20<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel, "*La voie d'avenir de la politique canadienne en matière d'Affaires étrangères et de la Défense*", le jeudi 26 février 2004, suivi de l'AGA de la CAD, le vendredi 27 février, à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Le thème du séminaire tombe à point, étant donné que nous avons un nouveau gouvernement et qu'il y a une probabilité d'élection générale fédérale dans le cours de l'année prochaine. Le Premier ministre, le très honorable Paul Martin, a été invité à assister au séminaire comme conférencier invité. Nous avons une impressionnante équipe de conférenciers prestigieux pour l'événement, dont le général Klaus Naumann (ret), ancien président du comité militaire de l'OTAN, et commissaire siégeant à la Commission internationale sur l'intervention et la souveraineté des États, qui sera le conférencier thématique ; le général John de Chastelain (ret), ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense ; et l'amiral E.P. Giambastiani, de la marine américaine, Commandant des forces interarmées américaines et Commandant suprême des forces de l'OTAN - Transformation, qui sera conférencier invité lors du déjeuner.

Nous sommes très heureux que le général Raymond Henault, Chef d'état-major de la Défense, adresse la parole au séminaire, et le docteur Douglas Bland, président des Études en gestion de la défense de Queen's University présentera le résumé des débats.

Pour plus de détails, veuillez vous consulter l'avis de séminaire annuel et d'AGA ailleurs dans ce numéro. J'invite fortement les lecteurs à assister à ce qui promet d'être une période de

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debate on issues of security and national defence. With your support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. **Your continued financial support as donors to the Institute is vital** to our continued success. Please renew your annual donation when you are asked - and introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.



*Keeping his eyes open for potential threats, Capt Sean Trenholm, 28, scales some rugged alpine terrain en route to an observation post that will be established near the top of a mountain..Capt Trenholm of Halifax, N.S., is the Reconnaissance Platoon Commander for 3 RCR Battalion Group. Members of the platoon were sent into the rugged mountains outside Kabul on a multi-day reconnaissance mission to silently probe for terrorist and criminal elements operating near the capital. All soldiers were wearing the new CADPAT (Arid Regions) desert uniform.*

Photo provided courtesy of Captain Jay Janzen, 3 RCR Battle Group Public Affairs Officer

discussion très stimulante et instructive. Amenez un ami ! Ceux qui assisteront au séminaire sont invités à assister à la première journée de l'AGA, le vendredi 27 février, alors que le vice-amiral R.D. Buck, Chef d'état-major de la Marine ; le lieutenant-général Ken Pennie, Chef d'état-major de l'Aviation ; le vice-amiral Greg Jarvis, Sous-ministre adjoint (R/H Mil) ; et le major-général J.H.P.M. Caron, Chef adjoint d'état-major adjoint de l'Armée de terre ; adresseront la parole à la réunion. Faites circuler l'information largement à vos intervenants intéressés à la défense.

Sur la base de l'expérience passée, je vous conseille de vous inscrire au plus tôt pour éviter des déceptions.

La Conférence des associations de défense croit que la première priorité de notre gouvernement est d'assurer la sécurité de ses citoyens et s'est donc faite, depuis longtemps, l'avocat de l'idée que le premier point à l'ordre du jour du gouvernement soit un examen en profondeur des politiques des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense du Canada. Nous espérons que nos lecteurs emboîteront le pas dans la discussion sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale. Le 20e séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD est une plate-forme importante où ces questions seront explorées et, nous l'espérons, prises en compte comme facteurs dans un prochain examen de la politique de défense du Canada par le gouvernement.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de défense a besoin de l'appui financier de la communauté intéressée à la défense, en tant que **Voix de la défense** indépendante, pour rester actif dans le débat sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale. Avec votre appui, nous pouvons promouvoir l'étude des affaires militaires canadiennes et la sensibilisation à ces questions. **Votre appui financier continu à l'Institut comme donateur est vital** pour la continuation de notre succès. Veuillez renouveler votre don annuel lorsqu'on vous le demande - et présentez un concitoyen canadien à l'Institut.





*Ross Munro Media Award presentation, L-R: Lieutenant-général Richard Evraire (Ret), Chairman Conference of Defence Associations; Mr. Garth Pritchard, 2003 Award recipient; Honourable David Pratt, Minister of National Defence; Brigadier-General Bob Millar (Retd), President Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute*

## UNE CRISE NATIONALE POUR LE PROCHAIN GOUVERNEMENT

*Lieutenant-général Richard J. Evraire (Ret), C.M.M., C.D., Président Conférence des associations de la défense*

Le mercredi 3 décembre, la School of Public Policy de l'Université Queen's a publié, en collaboration avec l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense, une importante étude intitulée *Canada without Armed Forces ?* : [www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml](http://www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml) (pour plus de détails voir l'article du Colonel Howard Marsh (retraité))

Le document a pour but d'informer les Canadiennes et les Canadiens ainsi que le milieu politique de la crise qui s'accroît et qui est causée par le manque d'attention prêtée et l'agent fournie, entre autres, au personnel, au matériel, à la formation, et aux installations d'appui logistique qui sont nécessaires à la capacité militaire crédible des Forces canadiennes de demain. Malgré l'envergure du problème, celui-ci n'est qu'un symptôme d'une situation difficile à laquelle

le prochain gouvernement canadien sera confronté.

En un mot, le nouveau gouvernement se trouvera très bientôt face à un effondrement précipité des capacités fondamentales des Forces canadiennes, même s'il augmentait immédiatement et de manière considérable les crédits du Ministère de la défense nationale.

Durant la campagne au leadership du parti libéral, le Premier Ministre Paul Martin s'est dit prêt à entreprendre une révision de la politique de défense ; un engagement qui, selon notre étude, s'avère essentiel et dont les recommandations doivent voir le jour dans les plus brefs délais. Cette révision devra faire toute la lumière sur les trois points suivants :

*(continued p. 9)*

- La façon dont le Canada aura à gérer, à court et moyen terme, sa politique nationale et étrangère compte tenu des capacités militaires sans cesse décroissantes ;
- L'élaboration d'un programme pour les forces armées futures qui cernerait les projets prioritaires et leurs coûts ; et
- L'esquisse d'un processus parlementaire qui superviserait le rétablissement à long terme des capacités des forces armées.

En guise de conclusion, nous croyons fermement que dans l'absence d'un plan visant la création des forces armées prêtes à contribuer de façon viable à la défense du Canada, du continent nord-américain, et à la paix mondiale, le Canada continuera sur la voie du désarmement éventuel et subira une perte importante de ses options en politiques étrangères.

## A CLAXTON PAPER; CANADA WITHOUT ARMED FORCES?

Colonel Howie Marsh (Retd), Senior Defence Analyst, CDA Institute

### Introduction

Following the 2002 successful reception of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's (CDAI) study, *A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces*, CDAI, in collaboration with Queen's University School of Public Policy, decided to examine further the nature and impact of Canada's declining military. The results of this study have been published as a Queen's University *Claxton Paper* under the title *Canada without Armed Forces?* (Go to [www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml](http://www.queensu.ca/sps/research/res-defence.shtml) )

With the understanding that modern military capability is the product of four major systems (effective equipment; well motivated and led service personnel; a competent training system; and the command expertise and support needed to execute operations), a six-month research project was undertaken to determine the state and interplay of those four

systems. The researchers examined both the current state of Canada's armed forces, and its future force.

The researchers concluded that Canada is perilously close to having little or no military capability for the next several years, given the deferral of major fleet replacements, the shortfall in capital intellect, the reduction of training capacity to sustain ongoing operations, and a myriad of other deficiencies that will render the military virtually incapable from 2005 to 2015.

The following provides the *On Track* reader with a preview and summary of the principal chapters of the 144 page *Claxton Paper*.

### Chapter 2 - Equipment

This chapter describes in detail the factors that determine the effectiveness of military equipment. The author reminds the reader that equipment "rust-out" has two components: physical deterioration and technological obsolescence, and that both components of "rust-out" figure prominently in the Canadian Forces today. Equipment life expectancy and replacement costs are presented in a way that clearly shows that a \$50 billion equipment replacement bill must now be paid.

Pointing to the fact that new equipment monies are currently insufficient to replace the aging fleets, and that equipment availability determines military capability, the author explains that: the Air Force is most vulnerable, as airlift and surveillance assets are the first to become unserviceable; the Navy will shortly lose command, control, and air defence platforms, and logistics capability; and the army's direct and indirect fire capabilities have reached a point of unserviceability (with no replacements in sight), and wheeled logistics vehicles will soon need major attention.

(continued p. 10)

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*Sgt Wayne MacLean, (left) and Sgt Paul Coppicus, (right) scan an area for signs of movement from their alpine observation post in the mountains surrounding Kabul, Afghanistan.. Both were attached to Reconnaissance Platoon, 3 RCR Battalion Group, on a multi-day covert mission that included establishing observation posts and watching for terrorist and criminal elements operating near the capital.*

*Sgt MacLean, a Forward Observation Officer / Forward Air Controller from St. John, N.B., is responsible to call in artillery fire and attack aircraft if required in support of ISAF missions. Sgt Coppicus, from Moosomin, Sask., is a Combat Engineer who is trained to recognize areas that may be mined and lead the platoon safely around them. Both soldiers are wearing the new CADPAT (Arid Regions) desert uniform.*

Photo provided courtesy of Captain Jay Janzen, 3 RCR Battle Group Public Affairs Officer

Plans to acquire future force “transformation” equipment are in jeopardy as all four transformation projects have yet to be funded. The chapter concludes with the following statement: “The primal challenge of the next administration will be to decide either to provide a capital renewal budget adequate to maintaining a “full service” defence capability, or to deliver a clear policy direction to DND as to which of the three services, Navy, Army, or Air Force, it deems to be strategically necessary to maintain. Such direction will have profound foreign policy implications, particularly with respect to our bi-lateral relations with the United States who cannot afford to have a strategic security vacuum on their northern border.”

### *Chapter 3 – Personnel*

There are two aspects to the CF’s personnel problem: Quantity, and quality.

The Canadian Forces has too few trained personnel to fulfil their myriad missions and obligations. Ships are tied up awaiting crews; aircraft are in need of pilots; and many soldiers are deploying to Afghanistan too soon after returning home from other missions. Operations in support of the war on terrorism have forced the leaders of the army and the navy to admit that their organisations are or will soon be pushed to the limit.

*(continued p. 11)*



The 1994 White Paper called for a Regular Force of 60,000 personnel. This figure represents every single person in uniform, even though not all are effective. Many are on training; some are awaiting training; others are on sick leave; more are on retirement leave. Since 1998, the number of non-effective personnel on full pay and allowances has been increasing; in the year 2000, they numbered approximately 4,000, and in 2004, that group will exceed 8,000.

It is projected that the difference between paid full-time military members and trained effective military members will remain at about 8,000 people for most of this decade. This is an important aspect of the personnel problem—the Canadian Forces will have a disproportionately high number of non-effective members as a result of high levels of recruitment, development and retirement, at least until 2012.

In terms of sheer numbers, the CF is in trouble. However, that fact only tells a portion of the personnel story. Quality, as well as quantity, is important in creating a strong and effective military. Ideally, the armed forces would prefer a balanced population, with a mix of junior and senior members.

Senior members are valuable not only for their inherent experience, but for their qualities as leaders, mentors, and trainers for the next generation. Therefore, a stable personnel profile would see a distribution of experience. However, the current population of the CF is not stable. As the author shows, it is seriously skewed in three areas. The portion of the population with 1-4 years of service (YOS) is too large; that with 6-11 YOS is too small; and the portion with 12-19 YOS is too large.

Starting in 2004, through to 2011, Canadian Forces relevance rests on the whether the large 12-19 YOS cohort decides to depart at the 20 years-of-service departure gate. The eleven thousand service members recruited from 1992-1999 (6-11 YOS) could only fill 40% of the 25,000 positions vacated by the larger cohort (12-19 YOS). The decision to significantly increase recruiting from 1984 to 1991 followed by drastically reduced recruiting from 1992-1999 will play havoc with human resource management to 2020 and beyond.

#### *Chapter 4 – Training and Support*

From 1994-1999 the Canadian Forces jettisoned approx. 500,000 person years of experience. Human intellect valued at \$30-40 billion was paid to depart. Concomitantly, economies achieved through a reduced training system were spent elsewhere.

Over zealous down-sizing resulted in over-shooting reduction goals, and the Canadian Forces slipped below 60,000 in 1999. In 2000, this was countered by a recruiting surge of 5,000 to 6,000 candidates a year. However, the training system was

not up-sized for the intake surge and the number of trainees in and awaiting training surged from 4,000 to 8,000. Force generators were hamstrung, as the assets necessary to restore the training system were distributed across 15 international peace and stability operations.

The primacy of operations is currently restricting the Canadian Forces in general, and the army in particular, from attaining preferred manning levels. For 2003 and 2004, the army training system can only meet 50% of the required basic, advanced and leadership training requirement. The army is currently in a manning “death spiral”.

This chapter goes on to explain why the department spends \$1,800 million on spare parts and only \$900 million on new equipment: the imperative of regional development over military effectiveness inflates not only capital acquisition but support costs by up to five hundred percent.

Trying to sustain equipment by cannibalization and deferring the purchase of spares for domestic capabilities is another contributing factor to the recent escalating demand for spare parts. The “uncontrollable” usage rates of equipment on 7/24 real operations is consuming spare parts at three times predicted rates. High usage, limited spares and a shortage of technicians are eroding military capabilities at an accelerating rate.

The bulk of the force’s realty assets were acquired in response to Korea and the early years of the Cold War. The realty assets are, for the most part, antiquated, in need of replacement and are in the wrong place. Rectifying the infrastructure dilemma requires \$billions.

Chapter 4 describes the interplay of the four main military systems and concludes with a table outlining the state of major capabilities. All major capabilities - **Command, Support, Intelligence, Conduct Operations, and Force Generation** - are assigned a “high-risk” assessment.

#### *The Historical Annex*

In order to enhance understanding and to place the current state of the Canadian Forces in context, the editor has provided a historical annex that encapsulated major world events and Canada’s defence response from 1930 to 2000. Personnel and budget allocations at the beginning and end of government mandates act as brackets and framework to the long history of neglect.

*(continued p. 13)*

**67<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the CDA  
and  
20th ANNUAL SEMINAR of the  
CDA Institute  
25-28 February 2004  
Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON**

**67<sup>ième</sup> ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE ANNUELLE de la CAD  
et  
20<sup>ième</sup> SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL de  
l'Institut de la CAD  
25-28 février 2004  
Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON**

The annual seminar, *The Way Ahead for Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy*, will be presented by the CDA Institute on Thursday, 26 February 2004, commencing at 0900 hrs. The Right Honourable Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, has been invited to be the keynote speaker. General Klaus Naumann (Retd) will be the theme speaker. Other participants will include General John de Chastelain (Retd), former Chief of the Defence Staff; Admiral E.P. Giambastiani, US Navy, Commander US Joint Forces Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander - Transformation, who will be the luncheon speaker; General Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire (Ret); Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair for Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, who will provide the summary.

**Registration Fees** (including luncheon, reception, and 1-year free privileges in the Institute for non-members who are attending the seminar for the first time)

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27 February, 0815 - 1230 hrs - Addresses by:

Mr. Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director, US Reserve Officers Association; Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Naval Staff; Lieutenant-General Ken Pennie, Chief of the Air Staff; Vice-Admiral Greg Jarvis, Assistant Deputy Minister (H/R Mil); and Major-General J.H.P.M. Caron, Assistant Chief of the Land Staff

Enquiries and individual registration, by 1 February 2004, by tel: (613) 236 9903; fax: (613) 236 8191; e-mail: [projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca)

Le Séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense, intitulé *La voie d'avenir de la politique canadienne en matière d'Affaires étrangères et de la Défense*, aura lieu jeudi, le 26 février, 2004, à 09 h. Le Premier ministre, le très honorable Paul Martin, a été invité à présenter le discours-programme. Le général Klaus Naumann (ret) sera le conférencier thématique. Le général John de Chastelain (ret), ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense; le Général Raymond Henault, Chef d'état-major de la Défense; et le Lieutenant-général Roméo Dallaire (ret) ont aussi été invités. Le Dr. Douglas Bland, président des Études en gestion de la défense de Queen's University, présentera le résumé des débats. L'amiral E.P. Giambastiani, de la marine américaine, Commandant des forces interarmées américaines et Commandant suprême des forces de l'OTAN - Transformation, sera le conférencier invité lors du déjeuner.

**Frais d'inscription** (incluant le déjeuner, la réception, et les privilèges gratuits avec l'Institut de la CAD durant l'année prochaine pour les personnes non-membres qui assistent au séminaire pour la première fois)

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### *Major Findings*

Research reveals a *future force* undeserving of this title. Rather - rapidly and then inevitably in five or ten years - Canada's major military equipments will succumb to the combined effects of overuse and technical obsolescence, making them operationally irrelevant. The military personnel described in official Canadian defence literature as "our most valuable asset", with the right balance of age, experience, and training, will not be available to replace those who will leave the armed forces over the next several years. Support for equipment and operations is disintegrating, and little can be done to stop it, in some cases because spare parts and technicians are not available and will not be available in the years to come.

Canada will soon be without effective military resources, even for domestic defence and territorial surveillance. Were the next government to provide nearly unlimited funds in an attempt to overcome this deficit, little could be done before the apprehended crisis became fact. The downward slide in capabilities is too steep, and too fast. Many core capabilities, or essential elements of them, will collapse before operationally effective units can replace them. In a few years, Canada will be effectively disarmed.

### *Policy Implications*

The next government will be caught up in a cascading policy entanglement initiated by the rapid collapse of Canadian Forces core assets and core capabilities. This problem will disarm foreign policy as Canada repeatedly backs away from international commitments because of a lack of adequate

military forces.

In these circumstances, new policy initiatives aimed at "being useful to the United States in our own interest" may well be derailed. When, however, the government moves to solve this capabilities problem (presumably by rebuilding military capabilities), the real crisis will be revealed. The government will find that it cannot achieve this aim before vital Canadian Forces capabilities fail.

Even if the government were to increase expenditure allocations to national defence immediately and substantially, that pending crisis could not be avoided. The time required to replace major equipment(s), develop coherent military capabilities, and rebuild the "trained effective strength" of the armed forces will simply exceed the mandate of the next government, even if it were to serve a full term.

Thus, the true crisis that will be sitting on the doorstep as the next government moves into office, will be to find ways to conduct a credible foreign policy and reconstruct relations between Canada and the United State while the operational capabilities of the Canadian Forces continue to decline through the next five to ten years. At best, the next government might set the Canadian Forces on the road to recovery, but that intent still leaves unfilled the immediate, critical needs of foreign and national defence policies.

### *Reader Recommendation*

This publication is a must-have for any academic, student or defence analyst interested in Canadian military issues. The tables, charts and end-notes constitute a most handy and comprehensive list of contemporary military data.

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## SERVING CANADIAN INTERESTS: A DEFENCE POLICY THAT BEGINS AT HOME

*Professor David J. Bercuson, Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary*

The time may shortly be here when the Canadian government, at long last, launches a defence (and hopefully also a foreign policy) review aimed to replace the 1994 White Paper. Few can deny that such a review is needed. The real question that remains unanswered is how extensive it ought to be and, by implication, how long it will take.

Although the last review took place almost a decade ago, and extended over virtually an entire year, it still left many key areas of defence policy un-examined. There was no examination of a procurement process that was even then over- lengthy and costly. There was no analysis of how the unified National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was functioning as an operational HQ even though the Cold War

was already five years in the past. Nor was there much attention paid to interoperability, jointness, the militarization of space, or the revolution in military affairs.

If such crucial issues are passed over yet again, the vacuum in government policy will continue to be filled in helter skelter fashion, with ad hocery dominating over rational policy choice.

The truly extensive review that is now so badly needed will take time. It is better to do it well and thoroughly than to do it hurriedly. It has been so long since some of these problems have been examined that another six to twelve months can

*(continued p. 14)*



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hardly matter compared to the urgency of the examination itself. There is, however, one way that time can be saved and that is if the review is done 'top down'. Instead of going to the public with a wholly open set of questions as to where Canadian defence policy might go in the future, under the pretence that there are no prior assumptions, the government ought to establish first principles that can then be used as the basis for further examination.

At the strategic level, this is simple to do. Canada is a democracy, by geography and culture a close ally of the US, and a part of the western industrialized world. Canada has long striven for a world that is liberal and democratic and as free as possible for the movement of things, ideas, and people. Those considerations have not changed since Canada emerged from the Second World War and will not change. But there are other, newer, and more basic defence policy requirements that have emerged over the last decade or so that ought also to be incorporated in any set of first principles enunciated to facilitate a defence review.

First, whatever policy is arrived at, it ought to be as Canadian as possible, not only to serve Canadian interests, but to reflect the strengths of the nation.

The long history of the Canadian military is dominated by the doctrines of others. In the first twenty months of the First World War Canada's amateur expeditionary force mimicked the British cult of the offensive attack doctrine and suffered grievously. It was only when Canadians themselves (with the vital encouragement of Corps Commander Julian Byng) began to shape their own attack doctrine that the Corps began its long string of successes. So it was on land, at sea and in the air in the Second World War.

All nations are unique and Canada must shape its defence posture to meet its unique national interests and reflect its'

citizens' worldview. Only when that defence posture is clearly defined by the government ought the military to plan its future strategically, operationally, and tactically.

In defining that defence policy, the government must ensure that it is a Canadian policy and not one that is meant to serve the interests of others, be they Canada's European friends or our American neighbours. Canadians are not likely to sanction significant increases in defence resources designed primarily to please Washington or Brussels; they might well support such increases when the policy they are meant to support can be clearly seen as reflecting Canadians' national self interests.

There are those who will point out that in any case such a policy will be welcomed by Canada's allies. But such a welcome ought to be the outcome of Canadian policy, not the object of it.

Canada does not exist in a dangerous neighbourhood. Its security and defence challenges are not similar to those of Australia, which is often lately pointed to as an example for Canada to follow. Nor is it Norway, another oft-pointed to nation which is revitalizing its small military. Canada is unique and its defence policy must be unique also, Canadian-made to address Canadian issues.

Second, Canada's chief security and defence challenges arise from its two basic national interests: the maintenance of beneficial relations with the United States and, beyond North America, the continuing evolution of a global society that is as free as possible for the movement of people, things, and ideas.

From these strategic interests other issues flow: the need to help the US secure North America from attack; the need to add our weight to the international military effort to destroy

*(continued p. 17)*

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terrorism on its home ground; the need to secure global trade, communication and legal immigration from interdiction; the desire of Canadians to help war torn societies heal themselves through the application of hard or soft power. These must be the chief aims of a modern Canadian defence policy and provide the requirements for the capabilities of the Canadian military.

Third, a more educated and canny Canadian public will only support its military if it can take greater ownership of it. That must translate into greater accountability in the shaping and administration of defence policy and the preparation and deployment of the Canadian Forces.

It is a given in a democratic society that the military acts under the direction of the civil authority and is accountable to it. Every democracy holds to this principle and, indeed, it is one of the basic measures used by democracies to gauge the state of democracy in other nations.

Forms of democratic government differ. Thus will the means of accountability. But in Canada, the centralization of power in the Prime Minister's Office and the almost complete lack of Parliamentary oversight of the operations, organization, and administration of the Canadian Forces has relegated the CF to the status of a prime ministerial instrument. In the recent past the Prime Minister has selected important CF missions without consultation with Parliament and apparently over the objections of the military. He has dominated the procurement process. This cannot continue.

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*Parliament can only assume greater responsibility for the military if Parliamentary committees are given greater powers, with commensurate resources, to investigate the defence establishment and greater freedom to determine the shape of legislation concerning the military*

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If indeed "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely", it is the lack of wider civilian oversight which has established conditions in which the military becomes dominated by one authority and at the same time loses touch with the Canadian people at large. This latter result comes in part because none of the people's elected representatives, other than the PM and possibly the Minister of National Defence, have any substantial oversight over the Canadian military. Unless they break party ranks at their political peril, ordinary Members of Parliament have virtually no opportunity to offer their own views of how troops are used.

In our system of government, with no real separation of the executive and legislative branches, Parliament can only assume greater responsibility for the military if Parliamentary committees are given greater powers, with commensurate resources, to investigate the defence establishment and greater freedom to determine the shape of legislation concerning the military. It should be adopted as a matter of course that Parliament debate and approve all substantial off shore deployments and that the unforeseen costs of such deployments are paid for out of government contingency and not out of DND's normal capital or operating budgets.

Parliamentary committees should also undertake regular reviews of Canadian security and defence policy and operations, perhaps every three to five years and monitor the state of both the operating and capital budgets. Only in these ways will the CF's structure, administration, preparation, and operations become transparent to all citizens.

Greater accountability of the CF to Parliament and of the Government to the welfare of individual CF members is the essential step for all other change in Canadian defence policy. Without it the future citizens of Canada may be unwilling to support an institution they don't know about and do not understand.

Third, the Canadian Forces must strive for much greater jointness in planning, training, operations, procurement and command than they have yet achieved. This is important not only for cost savings, but to expedite operations that serve Canadian interests and which also profile Canada's commitment to an international regime based on liberal democratic forms of government and markets. Jointness will promote concentration of Canada's hard power assets on operations, raising the nation's profile, gaining the nation influence, and stimulating pride within Canadians' of the concrete contributions their forces make to international peace and order.

Jointness is a mixed blessing. The more joint the Canadian military is, the greater is the possibility that each of the three armed services (and there are most definitely three today despite the efforts of Paul Hellyer to unify the forces) will be less likely to find niche roles alongside their US or other counterparts in international operations.

In a sense, the more joint the forces become, the less likely they will be deployable since operations requiring a full range of military capabilities arise much less frequently than ones that require only naval forces, or only air support or only a Canadian ground presence. But if the Canadian military is to be moulded as an instrument of national policy, jointness is

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essential. This does not mean that Canada's forces should not strive for interoperability with the forces of the US or other Alliance partners, nor that Canada's forces should only deploy en masse, together, or not at all. It does mean that that if jointness occasionally hinders deployability, jointness must trump.

Fourth, the Canadian Forces must be combat capable, but within a realistic range of possible scenarios. In fact, that has been true of the Canadian military since the end of the Second World War. Canada, for example, eschewed the strategic bomber role in 1945, never acquired fleet aircraft carriers, doesn't have nuclear missile firing submarines, etc. Canada has never gone to war alone and it never will. It is important that Canada be able to supply some, but not all, combat capabilities.

Fifth, the ability to deploy is as important for the Canadian Forces as the ability to shoot. In fact, there will never be

much to shoot at unless there is a means of getting to where the shooting is. Deployability has long been treated as an afterthought by those who shape and administer Canadian defence policy. But deployable forces are, by definition, the *sine qua non* of expeditionary capability. And since Canada's military forces, from the Boer War to Kabul, have served Canadian interests abroad as much or more than they have physically defended the nation at home, they must have cost effective, but efficient and readily available means, of getting where they need to go.

Each of these first principles for a truly Canadian defence policy should be addressed in descending order of priority with accountability as the most important and deployability the least, even though it is, in itself, highly important. But all are vital, all are linked, and all should form part of a single cohesive approach to shaping a defence posture that will fit Canada's national requirements and appeal to its citizens to spend wisely on defence and to support and understand their military resources.

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## THE MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

*Terry Thompson, Director Public Affairs Naval Museum of Alberta*

*(With thanks to the editor of Starshell —ed.)*

Beginning with the British victory on the Plains of Abraham, Canadians have been ambivalent about the use of force in times of peace.

The Boer War, the First and Second World Wars and Korea, all saw Canadians taking up arms against the evils of the times. It is a historical fact that Canadians have triumphed over evil wherever and whenever we have faced it. We abhor war, but we never shrink from the call to arms.

Why then have we become so complacent? Why have we allowed our military forces to rust away to levels that are no longer effective in performing the tasks that are normally assigned a national military institution?

Following both the World Wars and Korea, our men at arms dusted themselves off and went back to work. They worked on the farms, in the cities and the towns they had left as callow youth. They came home as men who had faced the enemy and thought they had prepared the world for their children—a world that was prosperous and safe from aggression and the evils of tyranny.

But the world was not safe. Man's inhumanity to man escalated in force and form leading to the Cold War and a nuclear stalemate. The fear of apocalyptic annihilation caused the western allies to band together in both loose and formal alliances to stand against the communist threat.

As world communism collapsed under the weight of its own burdensome policies, pacifist forces began to prevail among western democracies. The so-called *peace dividend* was born. *Soft power* has become a security blanket for many who find war distasteful, and it has led them to champion unilateral disarmament. Let us set the example ... they tell us naïvely. As we disarm, all peace-loving nations will follow.

Unfortunately, that is not human nature. Uncle Sam has seen clearly that the world continues to harbour the corrupt, the sinister, and the ominous despots whose only ambitions are the achievement and continuation of their power over their unfortunate masses.

The United Nations, while showing some strength in its beginnings, has over the past forty years lost its influence over world events. As its member nations procrastinate, the thugs of the world prevail and continue to perpetuate their calumny on their fellow man.

Fortunately, the United States of America, having re-learned the lessons of the past at Pearl Harbor in 1942, has sworn never to be caught unawares again. Since the end of WWII, the US has maintained strong military forces as an extension of their international diplomacy. In the past half century, the US has developed an efficient, high-tech military. Similarly, Great Britain, under a socialist government, continues to recognize this principle and preserves for itself an important role on the world stage.

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Following the Cold War, the American military embraced a new concept called Transformation. They transformed their armies from heavily-armed infantry supported by mass armour and artillery, to the new concept of light, mobile, self-contained battle groups, trained in a wide variety of roles. Supported by air and seaborne forces, the American defence structure is concentrated on smart conventional weapons with long-range, deadly accurate delivery capabilities. Mobility has become a high principle of US land, sea and air forces. Night vision devices have opened up a capability for 24 hour, round-the-clock warfare, even under adverse weather conditions.

Unfortunately, Canada has gone off in a different direction. Our government has been reluctant to allow the Canadian military to pursue advances in technology. Our equipment is outdated making interoperability with our friends and allies cumbersome at best.

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*We cling to the UN in desperation - failing to recognize that the institution, as an international policy authority, is bankrupt.*

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These days one would think that our government has difficulty acknowledging who its friends and allies really are. We cling to the UN in desperation—failing to recognize that the institution as an international policy authority, is bankrupt.

The Chief of the Defence Staff, in his recent Annual Report to Parliament, makes much of the new battle cry coined by the American Forces. “A Time for Transformation” is the title of his report, and it resonates well with those who have only passing interest in our country’s defence.

Unfortunately, transformation in today’s Canadian military context is meaningless unless or until Canada establishes a realistic foreign policy, and tailors its forces to support it.

I need only to outline one small but highly important example of how the Canadian government has betrayed its responsibilities to the country over the past ten years.

The last White Paper on Defence was tabled in 1994. Bad enough that Canada’s defence policy has not been revisited for nearly ten years, but now look at our international relationships. The last White Paper on Canada’s Foreign Policy was presented to Parliament a year later in 1995. Was the foreign policy developed with the defence white paper in mind? It begs the question: what was the basis for each of the policies?

It appears that the Federal government’s misunderstanding of both military principles and international convention has placed the wagon ahead of the mule. An art in no need of perfection by the current government.

We urgently need a complete review of Canadian foreign policy. Not just a routine review; we need to establish a clear foreign policy that is not only understood in Canada, but, and of utmost importance, it *must* be understood by our allies.

Of late, our ill-defined policies and total lack of will to make decisions has confused our friends and allies. Our self-righteousness in trying to be all things to all people has defiled

our international relationships. Our deficit in political leadership confuses everyone, and prejudices the wellbeing of our children and grandchildren.

Over the past thirty years, our military has sustained arbitrary cuts in defence spending; it has endured forced social programmes, civilianization of the defence headquarters, and a tinkering with military principles by those least equipped to do so. The military must never be used as an instrument of social change.

General [and Flag] officers have become bureaucrats, if only to maintain a place at the defence table. All this has taken a toll on Canada’s proud military history, none of which has gone unnoticed by the international community.

It is indeed a shame that a country such as Canada with such a rich history of strong leadership at a global level should now find itself in the wings of international dialogue. We have refused to support our friends, trading partners and allies in a common cause. We have turned inward.

Our refusal to support a “coalition of the willing” seems not to have been based on high principle or moral integrity, but rather on an inability to respond because of a lack of foresight and preparedness to meet our obligations in a modern, interdependent, international society.

We have recently dispatched a battalion of troops to Afghanistan. A hurriedly assembled mix of regular and reserve soldiers, lightly equipped with overly long supply lines, has once again been sent into harms way to satisfy a Liberal effort to save face from a situation they have created for themselves.

I am pleased to see that today, retired military officers are no longer the sole critical voices sounding the alarm. Historians, scholars, the media and industry have all grasped the significance of the sorry state of the Canadian Forces. They have taken up the cause of alerting Canadians to the dangerous path along which the government has been taking us.

At this point, let me turn back to the question I posed earlier—why have we become so complacent? It is not just our military that has been allowed to atrophy over the past ten years. Health care, energy policies and other natural resources, not to mention softwood lumber, mad cow disease and other calamities, are found on the priority list below same-sex marriage and a corrupt and worthless gun registry.

Have we as a society been unwilling to take a stand? In our evolution from an agrarian through industrial, to a high-tech nation, we have relied on a central government to manage our affairs. In times past, Canadians voted for the people they thought would best represent their interests, and sent them to Ottawa. In their day they served Canada and its people, and they did so with honesty, integrity, energy and patriotism. I am sure you can find exceptions to this norm, but in general they served our country fairly and well.

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Industrialization and the modern technologies of today, combined with a rich immigration of other cultures, have changed our society forever. Existing political party structures are no longer adequate to meet the needs of a disparate and widely dispersed electorate.

Today our politicians come back to their constituencies representing Ottawa to the electorate. The cart has been before the donkey for a long time, and unfortunately, we all helped put it there with our indifference.

Yes, we need to examine and modify the way we govern ourselves, and we must do it on a priority basis. Those who rise to the political service of their country and show the leadership and the will to change, must be engaged and supported. In short, Canadian society must be made aware of the mistakes of the past. It will take strong and steadfast leadership, but the power must be returned to the electorate and the voter must demand to be shown a blueprint for Canada's future.

I need say little more. Of late there has been a groundswell of critical commentary on Canada's decline in international stature, and its feeble domestic policies. The pressure on the Federal government—dithering for decisions—to adopt meaningful change has been increasing, and it must be sustained if we are to regain our self-esteem and the respect of the international community.

*Terry Thompson is a retired Canadian Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel who resides in Calgary. He is Director Public Affairs for the Naval Museum of Alberta. This paper was originally delivered on July 29, 2003, to the "Calgary Knights of the Roundtable," a venerable "luncheon club" organization dedicated to social, political and intellectual discourse, and comprised of local business professionals, academics, politicians, media representatives and others who value the right to candid expression of sincere opinion honestly held.*

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## WHY DOES CANADA NEED ARMED FORCES?

*Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Retd), O.M.M., C.D.*

As Canadians see their soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen being deployed abroad in large numbers in NATO missions in Bosnia and Kabul (ISAF), the UN, and other military operations, it is legitimate and appropriate for them to ask, "Why?" In extreme terms others may also ask, "Given the overwhelming military strength of the US, which would certainly protect Canada as well, why does Canada have any armed forces at all?"

National security has a broad meaning. It represents the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the Canadian people, and compatible with the legitimate needs and aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values essential to the quality of life in Canada.

In his book, "Strategy for the West", Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor said, "It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free." After September 11, 2001, many Canadians concluded that without national security, nothing else mattered – a sentiment expressed over and over in media around the world. But, at the same time, the limited capabilities of the seriously

under-funded and over-tasked Canadian Forces became a topic for discussion.

The armed forces of a country are the ultimate institutional and legitimate use of force and violence in the physical defence of the country and the interests of the state at home and abroad. The real and perceived capabilities of a country's armed forces represent, therefore, not only the degree to which a state perceives its interests to be at risk, but also reflects the national will or resolve of the state to defend those interests.

The Canadian Forces, then, both Regular and Reserves, represent Canada's capacity to apply ordered force – up to and including the ultimate violence of war, that is, sanctioned killing, in the name of Canadian state, its people and their interests. In executing this responsibility, the nation, through its democratically elected government, entrusts to its military leaders its most precious and valuable resource – its youth – for training and preparation for military service to Canada. It accepts that these young people will be expected to do so under a contract of 'unlimited liability', that is, to die for their country, if called upon to do so.

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This confers upon both Canada's national political and military leadership a double responsibility. The first is to ensure that the Canadian Forces have the resources necessary to be trained and equipped for the missions expected of them. This includes ensuring that the military leaders are educated, trained and responsive to the nation's needs, grounded in the nation's fundamental values – democracy, freedom and social justice. The Canadian Forces do represent Canada, and are expected to be effective and professional in conduct, ethics and leadership.

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The second responsibility is that neither the Canadian political nor the military leadership will permit the capricious commitment or deployment of the Canadian Forces, or otherwise place the nation's young people 'in harm's way', either when the nation's interests are not being served, or if the Forces do not possess the training, experience and equipment necessary for the assigned tasks.

These obligations lead to an implied *social contract* within which, in return for a willingness to accept the condition of 'unlimited liability', Canada, the government and its military leadership will 'look after' its military sons and daughters as a military family.

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*Canada, the second largest country in the world, with the longest coastline and but 34th in population, is essentially incapable of defending itself against all but minimal incursions.*

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The responsibilities of all citizens in a democracy are assumed to be part of an informed electorate. This should include an awareness and consideration of the nation's interests that must be defended – from the immediate physical defence of the homeland and its sovereignty, to the capability to contribute to the protection of its interests far from its borders. The latter contributes to international stability in the defence of political and economic interests, and precludes the need for direct homeland defence. Overseas commitments might also include armed forces as representatives in various councils, coalitions and alliances. Democratic governments must also ensure that an informed electorate is knowledgeable of the scope and issues affecting national security.

Canada, the second largest country in the world in area, with the longest coastline, and but 34th in population, is essentially incapable of defending itself against all but minimal incursions. It must, however, provide for its own internal security, and be capable of providing aid to the civil power or assistance to civil authority. Beyond that, it is appropriate that Canada

maintains alliances with countries of common values and interests for cooperative defence – the United States for the defence of North America, NATO for the defence of interests principally in Europe, and other coalitions for worldwide operations.

Canada became a contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Cold War as it was in Canada's vital interests to prevent the escalation of local and regional conflicts into an East/West confrontation and a US-USSR nuclear exchange, which could destroy Canada. Since 1989, Canada has been a contributor to many other overseas operations, which have ranged from benign humanitarian operations to peace enforcement and restoration operations involving combat. The number, intensity and repetitiveness of these missions, combined with the neglect of defence over decades, has strained the Canadian Forces to the breaking point. The army is in especially dire straits, and neither the navy nor air force possesses the equipment to support the deployment and sustainability of the CF abroad.

Canada, and Canadians, are among the most fortunate in the world being blessed with a neighbour, which does not represent a military threat, but rather an essential ally in its defence. Canada's commercial relationship with the United States has been enriching for every Canadian, placing us among the wealthiest in the world and consistently among those countries with the highest quality of life.

The question then must be asked and answered, hopefully in the promised defence policy review: what kind of armed forces, for what kind of Canada, in what kind of world? Canada may recognize its primary interest to be the defence of its homeland, including its people, their assets and values. The next interest would be Canada's economic well-being in a stable world, followed by projecting Canadian values and culture internationally. In a world convulsed by over 40 intra- and inter-state conflicts in all regions, which of these conflicts affect Canada's interests? How is Canada's national security affected by these world conditions? What kind of military capabilities should Canada maintain to protect its interests at home, within North America and abroad?

These are questions that are not best left to interest groups, elected politicians, public servants or the members of the armed forces themselves. These are questions that must be asked, understood and answered by an informed citizenry, in the interest of the national security of Canada and of all Canadians.

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Why does Canada have any armed forces at all? Our new Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Paul Martin, may have provided us with an answer when he stated in April 2003 that “Multilateralism is not a means to an end. In appropriate circumstances, and when consistent with our values, we should be prepared to use the means necessary to achieve our

international goals when full consensus on the right steps is not possible.” Even more clearly, he said that “I think that we are essentially responsible for security in the North American continent, and we do not want to be in a position where the United States feels that they need to come up here if they want to protect their northern border.”

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## A COMPARISON OF THE DEFENCE POLICIES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

*Lieutenant-Colonel John C. Blaxland, Australian Army  
2002-2003 Visiting Defence Fellow, Queen's Centre for International Relations<sup>1</sup>*

In my two years in Canada I have come to appreciate just how much the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have in common as well as what it is that has kept them apart and largely unaware of each other. I have also come to appreciate that while not spending any significant amount more than Canada on defence, Australia has managed to maintain a more self reliant and robust defence force capable of performing the kinds of tasks that ironically are more commonly associated with Canadian foreign policy priorities.

In essence, my research indicates that Canada and Australia share an extraordinary range of social, political and economic systems and values; they face similar security challenges and parallel imperatives to deploy forces far from their own shores, as witnessed in the last couple of years in South-West Asia and many other places before that. These two middle powers usually have been associated with more powerful allies and with a tradition of collective security. Both countries have armed forces that are remarkably similar in size, organization, equipment and professionalism.

The imperatives that have produced such remarkable parallels also have driven the need for both countries to maintain what in essence amounts to expeditionary forces that are able to be deployed far from their native shores. Such compatibilities make for relatively easy and rapid co-operation and collaboration on military operations, even when put together at very short notice, such as the Australian-led mission to East Timor in 1999.

Both Canada and Australia also have been eager to contain militant Islamic extremism, having actively supported US-led measures against terrorism, albeit with different incentives. For Australia, the threat has featured more prominently, while for Canadians, the concern has been more to placate a jittery neighbour.

The two countries, by and large, share a couple of distinctive foreign and defence policy features. The first feature is that foreign policy in both countries tends to stress distinctiveness within an alliance context while supporting multilateral agreements and bodies such as the United Nations. In contrast, defence policy, for sound military reasons, tends to emphasise the merits of enhanced interoperability with the United States. For both Canada and Australia this dichotomy results in varying degrees of foreign and defence policy dysfunction, as foreign policy officials stress distinctiveness while their military equivalents inadvertently worked to diminish that distinctiveness by stressing enhanced inter-operability.

This dysfunction has resulted in frequent change in the direction of national security policy, which in turn, has helped shape the forces of Canada and Australia in an, at-times, disjointed manner. Particularly for Canada, this has allowed for a certain tolerance of dysfunction between the stated priorities of foreign and defence policies. This haziness has been tolerated because policy ambiguity and constrained (let-alone limited joint) military capability has often served Canada's perceived national interests, allowing Canada not to have to commit military forces in circumstances not considered favourable.

This approach to international affairs has left Canada with only niche capabilities maintained to support foreign policy objectives, with little scope for independent or even Canadian-led military action. Yet as some observers have pointed out, the ability to predict the particular niche that would best fit future circumstances, given that these are unknown, is very bad. Any option of this sort risks further marginalising Canada's contributions, despite its membership in multilateral organisations.

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In contrast, while Canada integrated and unified its three services, Australia retained separate services, but has developed a more beefed-up joint command structure for operations. Most significantly, Australia, with two-thirds the population and a bit over half the GDP of Canada, is able to field forces of greater capability than Canada.

In part, this greater capability is because Australians have always been more nervous about their place in the world than their Canadian cousins who derive economic and security benefits from proximity to the United States. That security has allowed Canadians to be distracted by questions of identity and national unity — issues that are largely alien to their Australian cousins. In contrast, Australia's external nervousness but greater internal self-confidence has led to the maintenance of general-purpose and largely self-reliant forces not found in the CF including:

- (a) ships for amphibious operations;
- (b) more substantial and capable helicopters and fixed wing aircraft—including Chinook, Blackhawk, Seahawk, Seasprite and Eurocopter helicopters and F-111 strategic strike aircraft, as well as more modern C130J Hercules transport aircraft (Australia has not purchased C-17s, being satisfied with its cheaper and more versatile seaborne transport assets and Hercules fleet);
- (c) More robust and extensive special forces as part of the newly raised Special Operations Command including the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (4RAR) Commando, tactical assault groups (east and west) and an Incident Response regiment; and
- (d) More robust multi-faceted intelligence capabilities.

In effect, these capabilities have been achieved by a trade-off of conventional military units. For instance, Australia has fewer regular-force conventional infantry battalions (five versus Canada's nine) but has a brigade-sized Special Operations Command and an Aviation Brigade; both of which add significant flexibility and capability to the force. All this has been achieved with defence expenditure essentially no greater than Canada's.

What this shows is that Australia has taken more forthright steps to consider its own defence and security concerns and obligations in recent years. For instance, Australia has conducted several defence reviews, the most recent of which is the Defence Capability Review of November 2003. As a new administration takes office in Ottawa the time is ripe for a similar defence review and in doing so, the Canadian government may benefit from considering closely the experience of Canada's most approximate facsimile.

## Australian Defence Capability Plan 2003

What follows, therefore, is an examination of the most recent Australian defence policy statement to show, by means of contrast and comparison, what options Canada may benefit from considering in future. In relation to force structure, the review process identified a requirement to: strengthen the effectiveness and sustainability of the Army, provide air defence protection to deploying forces, enhance the lift requirement for deployments and position the ADF to exploit Network Centric Warfare advantages. In undertaking the review, the Government drew heavily on the advice of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and the three Service Chiefs. The Government also was mindful to strike a balance between maintaining near term preparedness and longer term capability.

Some of the more significant decisions are outlined below on a service-by-service basis.

### Australian Army

The Australian Government intends to make the Army more sustainable and lethal in close combat. This includes emphasising the combined arms approach to achieve rapid success while minimising friendly casualties. Maintaining the combat weight needed within combined arms will require the purchase of combat identification kits, more capable communications, increased provision of night vision equipment, and the replacement of Australia's ageing Leopard tanks.

In contrast to the CF, the Abrams and contemporary versions of the Leopard and Challenger 2 are being considered. The view taken by the Australian Army is that while the Stryker AGS is a great piece of kit, it does not fit into a Hercules aircraft, does not offer adequate protection against the ubiquitous rocket propelled grenades, and does not allow for off-road mobility to the same extent as tracked vehicles. In addition the Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, or Eurocopter is being introduced (a project which is on time) and additional troop lift helicopters for amphibious transport are being acquired (including marinised Blackhawks and additional Chinooks). The end result will be a force that is hardened and better networked.

### Royal Australian Navy (RAN)

Recent operations in Australia's region and beyond have re-emphasised the importance of better protection and of amphibious capabilities. Consequently, the RAN's defensive air warfare capability is to be improved with:

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- (a) the introduction of SM2 missiles to four of the guided missile frigates (FFGs)
- (b) the acquisition of three air warfare destroyers, probably using a variant of the Aegis air warfare system to increase protection from air attack of troops being transported and deployed.

As an offset, the two oldest FFGs will be laid off from 2006 when the last of the new ANZAC frigates is delivered. Furthermore, two mine hunter coastal vessels likely will be mothballed, but they could be brought back into service should the need arise.

### Sea lift

The Army and Navy also have a requirement for greater lift capacity than earlier envisaged. As a result, the Government proposes to

- (a) replace HMAS *Tobruk* with a larger amphibious vessel in 2010 and
- (b) successively replacing the two amphibious ships (LPAs) HMA Ships *Manoora* and *Kanimbla* with a second larger amphibious ship and a sea lift ship.

To help offset the costs of larger amphibious ships, the fleet oiler will be replaced through the acquisition of another operating oiler.

### Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)

Australian defence policy recognises that future strategic uncertainty demands continued emphasis on a balanced and flexible Air Force. The Air Force already plans for the

- (a) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft;
- (b) new Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft which are in production;
- (c) air-to-air refuelling aircraft which currently are out to tender;
- (d) acquisition of Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles;

- (e) replacement for the AP-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft;
- (f) an F/A-18 Hornet upgrade program (currently underway) including a bombs improvement program and the integration of a stand-off strike weapon (also to be applied to the AP-3C aircraft); and
- (g) the withdrawal from service by 2010 of the F-111 once the other upgrades are completed.

Undoubtedly, Canada's and Australia's different defence and security emphases reflect contrasting geo-strategic and domestic political circumstances. But the common ties and interests led their forces repeatedly to work together in the Boer War, in World Wars I and II, and in Korea, and since then in support of the United Nations and the United States on a plethora of missions. Indeed, despite the differences, their forces have more in common than virtually any others; which suggests that in the twenty-first century's 'global village', significant benefits may be gained from working more closely together, out of enlightened self-interest.

Indeed, if the twenty-first century is to be the Asian Century, Australia and Canada may be drawn together even more so than they have been in the past. Australians as much as Canadians, therefore should have a better understanding of what Canada and Australia have in common.

Moreover, if Canada is ever to regain the kinds of capabilities that enabled it to be the lead nation in the 1956 Suez Crisis peacekeeping mission and to have Lester Pearson win the Nobel Peace Prize, then recent experience of a similar sized nation, such as Australia, merits attention. With this in mind, there appear to be significant benefits for Canada of closely considering the Australian experience and of seeking greater trans-Pacific collaboration.

<sup>1</sup> This is written as the author's personal opinion. It is not an official account of events or government policy. The views expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Army or the Australian Department of Defence.

## SECURITY AND DEFENCE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 6<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

*Keane Grimsrud, MSS, Project Officer CDA Institute*

As the recently appointed Project Officer for the CDA Institute, I was tasked with organizing the 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Symposium. The graduate students who participated in this year's symposium were some of the top young academic minds on the security and defence issues, and I would like to offer CDA Institute's sincere thanks for their participation. Without the continued involvement of such like-minded individuals, the symposium would not have been possible.

The symposium, organized by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University and the War Studies program at Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), was held at Yeo Hall at RMC in Kingston on 24 & 25 October 2003. Some financial assistance for the two-day affair was provided by General Dynamics Land Systems, Flight Lieutenant Howard Ripstein, and the Department of National Defence's Security and Defence Forum Special Project Fund.

Over the two days 27 students presented on various defence and security related issues from international terrorism to the revolution in military affairs. Students who presented papers at this year's Symposium represent the largest turnout of students in the six years CDAI has held the symposium. It is also the first time the symposium was held at the Royal Military College in Kingston. Students from coast to coast came for the conference as well as various people in defence and security field, and military officers, including Major-General D.L. Dempster, director General of Strategic Planning for the Canadian Forces.

The vast majority of the students were from centers sponsored by the DND-funded Security and Defence Forum program. Special note should be provided to both RMC for providing a complete panel of students discussing 'the Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) and to the University of Calgary who had seven students presenting papers, four of which were from the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.

Hugh Segal, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), delivered the keynote address. Mr. Segal discussed his views on what kind of Prime Minister Mr. Paul Martin will be in the context of military and foreign policy decisions. He conceptualized the debate around, what he called, the disengaged camp of Chrétien, Trudeau, and Diefenbaker, and the engaged camp of Pearson and Mulroney.

Mr. Segal suggests that the evidence exists to assume that Mr. Martin will be a geopolitically engaged Prime Minister. However, the situation Paul Martin will inherit will be a tough one. The challenge is that, "the amount of intellectual and political linkage necessary between foreign, defence and aid priorities on the one hand, and our domestic economic and social agenda on the other, will need to be quite substantial if we are to see real investment in Canada's geopolitical mission." Working against Martin will be "both the broad geopolitical context external to Canada, and the investment deficit reality relative to foreign, defence and aid policy."

While Mr. Segal advocated a "grand strategy for a small country" that integrated military, diplomatic, and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunities at home, provides leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to threats abroad. He specifically warned, however, against the view that a country's armed forces can have a range of tasks that are other than centered around core combat capacity. Because of the 'soft power' bias that dominated the Department of Foreign Affairs during the Minister Axworthy's time, Mr. Segal stated, "there is a risk that the remnants of that movement will seek to expand critical non military aspects of this joined up approach at the expense of enhanced military capacity." This trade off according to Mr. Segal must be avoided at all costs.

The financial support that CDAI received through GM Land Systems, DND and Howard Ripstein, the symposium was able to offer travel assistance to wanting students, subsidized entrance fees and cash prizes along with a publication with Hugh Segal's IRPP to the top three papers presented. \$500, \$300, and \$200 dollars was given to the top three presenters respectively. Maria Mikhailitchenko from Queen's University was awarded first place, Phillipe Lagassé from Carleton University was awarded second place, and Richard Garon from Laval University was awarded third place.

Their papers will be found on the IRPP website, and on the CDA's website along with the papers of the other 24 presenters. Maria Mikhailitchenko's paper entitled, "Reform of the Security Council and its Implications for Global Peace and Security" argues that, since the creation of the United Nations, the geopolitical situation has undergone a significant change. Therefore, the membership of the Security Council as it was

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conceived at the San Francisco conference, is no longer relevant at the present time. Though there is a lot of skepticism around the reform of the UN Security Council, it should be understood that the geopolitical reality will inevitably force the permanent five members to concede to a reform. Though a reform would hardly come overnight, some change is likely in the next ten years.

Entitled “Trade-offs and Tough Choices: Contemporary Dilemmas in Canadian Defence Economics” Phillipe Lagassé’s paper argues that, under current fiscal realities, the Canadian Forces will be compelled to field a more specialized force. Specifically, absent a significant defence budget increase or a reduction in operational tempo, the CF is likely to abandon heavy armour and expeditionary fighter aircraft in favor of light armour, tactical airlift and a ‘high-end’ navy. Specializing along these lines will allow Canada to remain operable with the United States in low-intensity conflicts, at sea and in the defence of North America. Phillipe Lagassé’s paper will be published with *Defence and Peace Economics*.

Richard Garon’s presentation entitled, “Y a-t-il un rôle pour les Forces armées en sécurité publique” was based on a paper of the same title that was co-authored by himself and Dany Deschênes from l’ Université Laval. The paper argues that, notwithstanding the clear distinction between the functions of the military and the civilian police, many recent events challenge that postulate. More than any event, the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 have brought to the forefront the close links between internal security and external or international security. Garon and Deschênes address the transformation in the field of security particularly that of public security. They also present the hypothesis that public security is being militarized, and that this is particularly true in Canada.

I must reiterate, the papers presented at this year’s Symposium covered a wide range of topics and were second to none. The works of Maria Mikhailitchenko, Phillipe Lagassé, and Richard Garon underline this observation nicely. I encourage anyone interested in defence and security to submit a paper for presentation, or join us at the 7<sup>th</sup> Annual CDAI Graduate Student Symposium, which will take place end-October 2004.

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## AEROSPACE POWER FORUM 2003

### Winnipeg, November 20-21, 2003

*Colonel Howie Marsh (Retd), Senior Defence Analyst CDA Institute*

#### Introduction

With the aim of understanding the future of flight, a contingent of Canadian and international aerospace experts (academics and practitioners) recently met in Winnipeg to discuss the impact of 100 years of flight. The meeting, organized by the Winnipeg-based Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS), was ably supported by Air Command and by the Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba.

Themes were assigned to panels of experts. Each panel included a speaker from either the United Kingdom or the USA who emphasized his or her national experiences, realities and possibilities, and a Canadian spokesperson who, for the most part, described realities and limitations. This approach – providing allied and national perspectives - had the double benefit of stretching the imagination of participants while dowsing them with cold reality as they examined:

- Aerospace as a Strategic Instrument;
- Aerospace as a Control Instrument;
- Aerospace as a Joint Domain Instrument;
- Aerospace as a Foreign Policy Instrument; and
- Aerospace as a Public Good Instrument.

A room full of aerospace experts enlivened each panel by posing challenging questions to the panelists. At the conclusion of each panel, a retired Air Force General, a former joint commander, and a former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (Vice-Admiral Garnett) provided their perspectives on the discussions. A tour of 1 Canadian Air Division provided an additional degree of realism to the issues discussed.

A debate concerning the use of the word “aerospace” was launched in the early stages of the conference. Some held the view that this word encompassed activity in both the Earth’s

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atmosphere and in outer space, as well as the technologies of aviation used therein. Others held the view that this topic is better approached using two terms: air power (capabilities held aloft by gas laws) and space-based assets (held aloft by planetary laws). It was offered that as no technologies currently operate in both media of air and space, the use of the word “aerospace” should be reserved until then. Many others embraced the inherent duality of the word aerospace, and the forum got underway in earnest.

Forum papers are available at the University of Manitoba Centre for Defence Security Studies (CDSS) website <http://www.umanitoba.ca/centres/defence/aerospace%20power%20forum/forum%20papers.htm>. The following is a summary of the principal themes discussed during the Forum, presented under three general headings: Reflecting on the Past; Present Realities; and Future Framework.

### **Reflection on the Past**

The United States of America and Canada have a rich aerospace history of innovation and air power. At one time, Canada had the third largest airforce in the world and was, at various times, a leader in aerospace technology. It was offered that one of the prevailing historical traits of air power is its ability to inspire, regardless of limitations. One hundred years of powered flight and nearly 50 years of space exploration have demonstrated that aerospace proponents are more visionary than realistic. There has been no shortage of futuristic aerospace literature. Ideas and predictions tend to be 50 years ahead of technologically achievable products.

Air power advocates have always championed the concept of its independent strategic relevance. In most cases, however, air power has required and continues to require a land or sea component in order to successfully sustain national objectives. While air forces tend to seek independent roles, armies and navies view air power as a supporting arm to land and sea campaigns.

From 1945 to 1950, air power appeared to have achieved strategic relevance, but that relevance became frozen by the advent of nuclear weapons and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Recent advances in stealth, precision bombing and enhanced conventional munitions are restoring strategic relevance to air power, but those same advances are calling for a close integration of air and land power.

Although air power is viewed in terms of bombing and interdiction, its strategic relevance has been more rooted in airlift (Berlin Airlift 1948-1949). Dr Thierry Gongora, a Canadian defence scientist, proved that the most used instrument of Canadian foreign and defence policy is airlift. A

subsequent briefing by 1 Canadian air Division (1 CAD) confirmed this reality, citing recent examples of fixed wing and rotary airlift assets in support of international and domestic emergencies. In particular, the CC-130 Hercules transport fleet is the backbone of domestic security and international humanitarian assistance.

Air power has been tremendously successful in support of land and sea forces. Historically, however, it has suffered from three inherent flaws: lack of responsiveness; poor communications, and wrong target selection. Since the Gulf War (1991), great progress has been made in mitigating the impact of these flaws. Forum participants were nevertheless warned that despite considerable progress in this area, the “fog of war” would always prevent attaining the political ideal—zero collateral damage and zero blue-on-blue casualties.

The story of air power in Canada is perplexing. Geography demands, on the one hand, that we take to the air. On the other hand, political factors have combined to write a history of aerospace decline, the prolongation of which has created a survivor mentality in the Canadian Air Force and resulted in the stifling of intellectual thought. Forum participants noted that Canada’s Air Force trails the navy and army in transformational doctrines and agendas.

For most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, USA aerospace activities served as an expression of that nation’s values of freedom and exploration. They fueled aspirations and innovation that gave rise to an aerospace economy that annually generates about 10% of Gross Domestic Product (\$US 900 billion in 2002). Despite recent set backs in the commercial sector and space exploration (NASA), the USA is likely to sustain aerospace dominance for the foreseeable future.

Canada has been, for most of the Cold War and up until recently, the United States’ most trusted ally. This status is shifting to the United Kingdom and Australia, however, as a result of certain recent decisions by Canada seen by the USA as signs of lessening reliability.

### **Present Realities**

While the USAF prepares for next-generation aerospace capabilities, the Canadian Air Force is watching its resources atrophy. From over 700 serviceable aircraft in 1993, 1 CAD has shrunk to less than 300 aircraft with daily fleet serviceability rates of 30% to 60%. Mid-life refits that will stretch the life and enhance the performance of some platforms are the major equipment activities of this decade.

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Nineteen (19) of the thirty-two (32) Hercules transport aircraft (the CC-130E, 1963 model) are currently non-operational. The remaining thirteen (the CC-130H, 1975 model) are involved in fixed-wing Search and Rescue operations and operations in support of deployed land forces. Inappropriate and over use of these more recent vintage serviceable tactical airlift platforms will result in the shortening of their remaining years. This is particularly worrying for a nation that has alternate service delivery as its only airlift replacement program. It is interesting to note that Canada has relied on airlift seven times in the last five years for national emergencies.

The USAF dwarfs all other air forces. The United Kingdom's air force contribution to Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was only 6% of that of the USAF. Despite the size difference, their combined experience underscored the loiter capacity of bombers, the value of tactical reconnaissance, and the limitations to frontline combat imposed by air support capacity. In Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, communications and the availability of air platforms permitted an eight-minute servicing rate of ground targets. Future network-centric operations should permit greater integration of air and land power; hence faster response.

Uninhabited Aerial and Combat Vehicles (UAV and UCAV) are currently in vogue, but total reliance on them is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Piloted aircraft are likely to be necessary into the middle of this century.

The military capability divide between the USA and the rest of the developed world is becoming a new strategic determinant. USA air power renders traditional state against state warfare a non-starter. As a consequence, aggressors pursue their objectives through other means—asymmetric warfare and insurgency.

Dr Guy Finch, Joint Services Command and Staff College, U.K., outlined new roles for air power in the fight against asymmetric threats. He drew from historical and personal experience of the use of air power in counter-insurgency operations. As the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate, there is a need to rapidly rebuild failed and rogue states following combat. Canada's Air Force could play a pivotal role in restoring indigenous air power.

Canada's relatively low-tech Air Force is closer to that of developing nations. Developing nations need rudimentary air power capabilities, but even these are difficult to achieve because they lack the basics of organization and support. Competent supply technicians are most valuable to fledgling air forces. Restoring developing nation's air forces could be a relatively inexpensive but effective use of Canadian air power in support of foreign policy objectives.

A long discussion on joint warfare led to an interesting hypothesis. The United States Armed Forces are too large for joint operations. (The US Army has the second largest airforce in the world and can provide its own air support. The USN has its own airforce and ground troops—the Marines). The Canadian Forces are too small to be joint. Canada achieves “jointness” with allies or coalitions. The United Kingdom's armed forces have the right mix of capabilities and scale to achieve independent joint action.

### Future Framework

No panelist was sufficiently bold to prescribe Canada's aerospace future, but elements of that future kept emerging in the discourse. Canada's future is likely to be circumscribed by some of the following aerospace determinants:

- The devolution of aerospace capabilities made cheaper by emerging technologies is likely, at some future date, to deny USAF air supremacy. Although local air superiority can be attained, it will not be universal. Hence the USA and its allies must not neglect air defence.
- Canada should seriously contemplate participating in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Space-based surveillance satellites have already moved from under command NORAD to under command Strategic Command. In the near future it is entirely feasible that the bilateral aspects of NORAD could be limited to air defence radars that are, for the most part, limited and expensive to maintain. Not participating in BMD could result in virtually no access to space-based surveillance of Canada. Denmark (Greenland) could provide the BMD 'property requirements' by offering an eastern arctic downlink. The USA does not need Canada's participation or approval for BMD, but without BMD Canada could be left in a minor bilateral agreement (NORAD). Canada should not quickly disregard the BMD portal to space.
- Aging equipment and a lack of capital funding indicate that the Canadian Air Force will have very limited capability from 2004 to 2019 (the fifteen year strategic capabilities investment plan timeline). As aircraft fleets approach zero availability, the utility of the supporting command and base come into question. A major command and support realignment appears to be on the horizon. Sufficient information exists to render those decisions early and permit the application of realized economies to future capabilities.
- Given the next government's stated priorities, it is likely that defence will do well to retain current levels of funding.

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This effectively closes the door to expensive but necessary aircraft to fight alongside USAF aircraft. Other less expensive air roles necessary to international peace and stability operations should be explored.

- Network centric warfare with integrated air and land power capable of precision strike and air interdiction is unlikely to be affordable or desired by Canadian political leadership. The preferred Canadian foreign policy tool is airlift, an ever decreasing capability. This reality needs to be embraced. Transformation, in the Canadian context, does not necessarily mean better air-to-air and air-to-ground combat assets. A major challenge for the Air Force will be prescribing a different future that is relevant to the future security environment. Dr Finch offered that a low-tech, A-10, close air support capability for Canada would help the U.S.A. and Canada in 'low-density/high demand' scenarios both in combat and stability operations.
- Serving officers and academics stressed the need to encourage a thinking culture in the Canadian Air Force. The Air Commander's plans for an Aerospace Warfare Centre would provide a focal point for thought and development. The idea of establishing a thinking culture was energetically pursued. Some Forum participants reminded others of lost journals; others spoke of new partnerships and avenues of thought sharing.

## Closing

As one who often complained about air power, I came away from the Forum with mixed feelings. Canada's geography, economy, and standing in the world demand that Canadian air power not be neglected but be restored. The contrary seems to be occurring! I could not but wonder if the historical aerospace trait of aspiring to long-to-be-realized capabilities would endanger solving today's challenges. Post 2020 there might be a joint strike fighter in the Canadian inventory, but today's problems are national surveillance, reconnaissance and airlift.

One speaker described "Boyne's Criteria" for determining a nation's aerospace relevance and future. Those criteria are: size of military budget; perception of threat; level of technical investment; political leadership, and air force commander's vision. When assessed against Boyne's criteria, Canada's aerospace, and consequently its air power future, are at a critical juncture.

I came away from the Forum with the realization that there are many competent, loyal aerospace experts. Canadian leadership would do well to seek their advice.

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