



ON TRACK

Conference of Defence Associations Institute • L'institut de la conférence des associations de la défense

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- *An Open Letter to Senator Colin Kenny*
- *7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium*
- *Counter-Insurgency and the Structure of Canada's Army*
- *Letter to the Editor from Lieutenant-General Eric A. Findley, Deputy Commander NORAD*

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Ret'd), OMM, CD

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute was honoured when the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, presented the Vimy Award to Dr. David Bercuson at a formal dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Gatineau, Québec, on 19 November. The evening was extremely well attended by Canada's corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of CDA and of the CDA Institute to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a Canadian to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values.

The very significant support of our corporate sponsors and of the member associations contributed to a very successful event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. We look forward to even more popular corporate support of the Vimy Award Dinner on 18 November of 2005. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors can be read elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Coincident with the Vimy Award Dinner was the presentation of the Ross Munro Media Award to Ms Sharon Hobson, by Brigadier-General Bob Millar (Ret'd), President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated by CDA in collaboration with the CDFAI. The purpose of the award is to recognize, annually, one Canadian journalist who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the understanding, by the general public, of Canada's defence and security issues.

The world's stage has seen tremendous change since the release of the last Defence White Paper, ten years ago. The White Paper's relevance, today, is questionable. In this vein, we are pleased to include in this edition *An Open Letter to Senator Colin Kenny*, by Fred R. Fowlow, courtesy of *The Bowline Journal*. Fred's letter was written to draw Senator Kenny's attention to number of defence issues of concern to those who feel that Canadians should be made more aware of our country's security and sovereignty matters. Fred's letter is timely, given the reaction of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence to Vice-Admiral Ron Buck's testimony, earlier this month, on the Canadian Forces'

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MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel Alain Pellerin (ret.), OMM, CD

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense a été très honoré de la présence de l'honorable Bill Graham, ministre de la Défense nationale, à la remise du prix Vimy à M. David Bercuson, lors du dîner officiel qui a eu lieu le 19 novembre, à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations à Gatineau (Québec). Bon nombre de dirigeants d'entreprise qui soutiennent les objectifs de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD y ont assisté; le prix avait pour objectif de mettre en valeur la contribution exceptionnelle et importante d'un Canadien à la sécurité du pays et à la protection de nos valeurs démocratiques.

L'appui considérable de nos sociétés commanditaires et des associations membres a concouru à une soirée très réussie, dont ont profité tous les participants. Nous espérons avoir un appui encore plus solide des entreprises à la soirée du prochain prix Vimy, qui aura lieu le 18 novembre 2005. Vous lirez dans le présent numéro d'*ON TRACK* les remerciements que nous adressons aux sociétés commanditaires.

En même temps que le dîner du prix Vimy, a eu lieu la remise du Prix Média Ross Munro à M^{me} Sharon Hobson, par le brigadier-général Bob Millar (ret.), président du Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Ce prix a été lancé par la CAD, en collaboration avec le CDFAI. Il vise à récompenser, chaque année, un journaliste canadien qui a fait une contribution importante et exceptionnelle à la compréhension publique des enjeux de défense et de sécurité canadiennes.

La scène mondiale a connu des changements considérables depuis la publication du dernier livre blanc sur la défense, il y a 10 ans. De nos jours, la pertinence du livre blanc est discutable. Dans le même ordre d'idées, nous avons le plaisir de publier dans le présent numéro, une lettre ouverte au sénateur Colin Kenny, rédigée par Fred R. Fowlow, reproduite ici avec la permission de *Bowline Journal*. M. Fowlow s'efforce d'attirer l'attention du sénateur sur plusieurs sujets de préoccupation à l'égard de la défense, pour ceux qui estiment que les Canadiens devraient être davantage sensibilisés aux enjeux de sécurité et de souveraineté du pays.

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inability to incorporate the personnel increases that was announced earlier this year by the Prime Minister, because of a lack of resources.

I am pleased to report that the 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, *Security and Defence: National and International Issues*, 29-30 October, was the most successful we have held. The symposium was sponsored by the CDA Institute and the CDFAI, and was made possible

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Sa lettre est très à-propos, vu la réaction du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense au témoignage du vice-amiral Ron Buck, au début du mois, sur l'incapacité des Forces canadiennes à incorporer les augmentations de personnel annoncées au début de l'année par le premier ministre fédéral, en raison d'un manque de ressources.

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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Our Cover

La couverture

HMCS Ottawa's crewmembers replace 20mm Tungsten ammunition in the close in weapons system (CIWS), while patrolling the Arabian Gulf region during Operation APOLLO/Des membres de l'équipage du NCSM Ottawa remplacent des munitions de calibre 20mm à pénétrateur en tungsten dans le système de défense rapproché du NCSM Ottawa lors d'une patrouille dans la région du golfe Arabo-Persique pendant l'opération Apollo. *Credit/photo par: Cpl Charles Barber*

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through the generous financial assistance provided by our supporters. Sarah Noble, the Institute's Project Officer and Security and Defence Forum Intern, was the principal organizer of the symposium. She has provided us with a report on the proceedings of the symposium.

The winning presentation during the symposium, overall, was *Lessons Learned or not Learned from the Rwandan Genocide of 1994*, by Major Brent Beardsley, a research officer at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. He served as personal staff officer to (then) Major-général Roméo Dallaire in Rwanda. An abridged version of Major Beardsley's paper appears in this edition.

Major-General Terry Liston (Ret'd) has observed that the Federal government has shown a distinct disinterest in military policy, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. He has identified for us in *Counter-Insurgency and the Structure of Canada's Army* factors that he believes must be looked at when the Army's most pressing priorities are considered.

We are very pleased to have received from Lieutenant-General Eric Findley, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), a letter to the editor to update our readers on NORAD, in response to the article by Mr. Joe Varner, *NORAD is Dead and Canada Held the Knife*, that appeared in the Autumn issue of *ON TRACK*. Lieutenant-General Findley has outlined for us NORAD's two enduring roles.

Joe Varner has since reaffirmed for our readers in this issue his assessment of NORAD's role in the defence of North America and its impact on Canada's ability to play its role, in *NORAD is Dead*.

Je suis heureux d'annoncer que le 7^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, intitulé *Sécurité et défense : enjeux nationaux et internationaux*, qui a eu lieu les 29 et 30 octobre, a été le plus réussi jusqu'à maintenant. Parrainé par l'Institut de la CAD et le CDFAI, le symposium a été réalisé grâce à l'aide financière généreuse de ceux qui nous soutiennent. Sarah Noble, agente de projet de l'Institut et stagiaire du forum sur la sécurité et la défense, était la principale organisatrice du symposium. Elle nous a fourni un rapport sur le compte-rendu du symposium.

L'exposé lauréat du symposium au classement général s'intitulait « Leçons tirées ou non du génocide de 1994 au Rouanda », par le major Brent Beardsley, agent de recherche au Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. Il a été officier d'état-major personnel auprès du major-général d'alors au Rouanda, Roméo Dallaire. Une version abrégée du document du major Beardsley est publiée dans ce numéro.

Le major-général Terry Liston (ret.) a remarqué que le gouvernement fédéral a fait preuve d'une grande indifférence envers la politique militaire, depuis la chute du mur de Berlin. Dans son article intitulé « Counter-Insurgency and the Structure of Canada's Army », il a cerné plusieurs facteurs dont, selon lui, il faudrait tenir compte en se penchant sur les priorités les plus pressantes de l'armée.

Nous sommes très heureux d'avoir reçu du lieutenant-général Eric Findley, commandant adjoint de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD), une lettre au rédacteur en chef qui met à jour les lecteurs sur la NORAD, à la suite de l'article de M. Joe Varner, « NORAD is Dead and Canada Held the Knife », publié dans le numéro d'automne d'*ON TRACK*. Le lieutenant-général Findley nous décrit les deux rôles durables de la NORAD.

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Earlier, an article written on the subject of wars of attrition as an outdated aspect of warfare caught our eye, and we invited commentaries on the matter from our Public Affairs Officer, Captain Peter Forsberg (Ret'd); Colonel Brian MacDonald (Ret'd), Defence Analyst; Colonel (Ret'd) Howie Marsh, the Institute's Senior Defence Analyst; and Mr. Christopher Ankersen, who was at the time a doctoral student at the London School of Economics in the UK.

In the Autumn issue of *ON TRACK* Captain Forsberg introduced the subject with a review of some of the thoughts on war of attrition that were put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. military intelligence officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Peters' article, *In Praise of Attrition*, can be found at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parmeters/a-index.htm>. Colonel MacDonald provided us with insights contained in the famous Lanchester Square Law, in *Attrition and Asymmetric Warfare*. In this issue Colonel Marsh has written *The Metaphysical War of Attrition*, in which he examines the phenomenon of terrorism and fear from a perspective that one rarely considers. Mr. Ankersen has added his critical assessment of Peters' views on the approach to investing in the war on terrorism.

The CDA Institute will present its 21st annual seminar, *After the Elections: Canada-US Security Relationships and the Role of the Canadian Forces*, on Thursday, 3 March 2005, followed by CDA's AGM on Friday, 4 March, at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa. The theme of the seminar is timely, given the ongoing defence policy review and growing concerns of the impact that Canada's reduced military capabilities will have on foreign policy options. The Honourable Bill Graham has been invited to address the seminar, as the keynote speaker.

We have a very impressive lineup of prestigious speakers for the event, including Mr. Andrew Cohen, author of *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*, who will be the theme speaker; Hugh Segal, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy; Christopher Sands, Senior Associate, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington; James Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister (Global and Security Policy), Foreign Affairs Canada; John Noble, Director of Research, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Carleton University; Général Maurice Baril, former Chief of the Defence Staff; to name a few, and Thomas Barnett, author of *The Pentagon's New Road Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, (US Naval War College), who will be the luncheon speaker.

We are very pleased that Général Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff, will address the seminar, and Dr. Frank

Joe Varner a depuis réaffirmé à l'intention des lecteurs son évaluation du rôle de la NORAD dans la défense de l'Amérique du Nord et son influence sur la capacité du Canada à s'acquitter de son rôle, dans l'article intitulé « NORAD is Dead ».

Plus tôt, un article rédigé sur le sujet des guerres d'usure et qui qualifiait celles-ci d'un aspect dépassé de la conduite de la guerre avait attiré notre attention et nous avons invité plusieurs personnes à faire des commentaires sur la question, notamment notre agent des affaires publiques, le capitaine Peter Forsberg (ret.), le colonel Brian MacDonald (ret.), analyste de la défense, le colonel Howie Marsh (ret.), principal analyste de la défense de l'Institut, et M. Christopher Ankersen, qui était alors étudiant en doctorat de la London School of Economics (Royaume-Uni).

Dans le numéro d'automne d'*ON TRACK*, le capitaine Forsberg a présenté le sujet en passant en revue quelques réflexions sur la guerre d'usure avancées par le lieutenant-colonel Ralph Peters, officier américain à la retraite du renseignement militaire aux États-Unis. L'article du lieutenant-colonel Peters, intitulé « In Praise of Attrition », figure à l'adresse Internet suivante : <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parmeters/a-index.htm>. Le colonel MacDonald nous présente quelques idées tirées de la célèbre Lanchester Square Law, dans l'article « Attrition and Asymmetric Warfare ». Dans le présent numéro, le colonel Marsh a rédigé « The Metaphysical War of Attrition », dans lequel il se penche sur le phénomène du terrorisme et de la peur sous un angle que l'on considère rarement. M. Ankersen a ajouté une évaluation critique des opinions présentées par le lieutenant-colonel Peters sur l'idée d'investir dans la guerre contre le terrorisme.

L'Institut de la CAD présentera son 21^e séminaire annuel, intitulé *Au lendemain des élections : les relations canado-américaines en matière de sécurité et le rôle des Forces canadiennes*, le jeudi 3 mars 2005, lequel sera suivi de l'AGA de la CAD, le vendredi 4 mars à l'Hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Le thème du séminaire est très à-propos, vu l'examen en cours des politiques de défense et l'inquiétude croissante des effets qu'auront les capacités militaires diminuées du Canada sur les options en matière de politique étrangère. L'honorable Bill Graham a été invité à prononcer le discours-programme du séminaire.

Nous avons une liste impressionnante de conférenciers pour cette manifestation, notamment M. Andrew Cohen, auteur de *While Canada Slept : How We Lost Our Place in the World*, qui prononcera l'allocation-thème, Hugh Segal, président de l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, Christopher

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Harvey, Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, will provide the summary.

Please refer to the notice of the Annual Seminar and AGM elsewhere in this issue for more details. I urge our readers to attend what promises to be a very stimulating and informative period of discussion. Bring a friend along!

Those attending the seminar are invited to attend Day One of the AGM, Friday, 4 March, when Vice Admiral Bruce MacLean, Chief of the Maritime Staff; Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Land Staff; Lieutenant-General Ken Pennie, Chief of the Air Staff; Vice-Admiral Greg Jarvis, Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Military); and Mr. Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director Reserve Officers Association of the United States of America; will address the meeting. Please circulate the information widely to our pro-defence stakeholders.

It was gratifying to see the Ballroom of the Fairmont Château Laurier filled to capacity, last year, for the 20th Annual Seminar. Based on last year's experience, I would advise our supporters to register soon to avoid disappointment.

The CDA believes that the first priority of our government is to ensure the security of its citizens, and has therefore advocated for a long time that, as priority number one, the Government should conduct a thorough review of Canada's foreign affairs and defence policies. We believe that Canada's foreign policy options in the world are now at risk because of the reduced capacity of the Canadian Forces to back up those policy objectives, especially the 3Ds of Defence, Diplomacy, and Development. Therefore, we encourage the government to be more transparent in the development of its foreign affairs and defence policies. It is our hope that our supporters will lend their voice to the discussion on the issues of security and national defence.

The CDA Institute's 21st Annual Seminar is an important platform from which these issues will be explored and, hopefully, factored into the ongoing review of Canada's defence policy by the government.

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, a charitable institution, needs the financial support of the pro-defence community of Canadians, as the **Voice of Defence**, to remain effective in the debate on issues of security and national defence. With your support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. **Your continued financial support as donors to the Institute is vital** to our continued success. Please renew your annual donation when you are asked - and introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.

Sands, principal associé, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Washington), James Wright, sous-ministre adjoint

(Politique mondiale et sécurité), Affaires étrangères Canada, John Noble, directeur de la recherche, Centre de droit et de politique commerciale, Université Carleton, et le général Maurice Baril, ancien chef d'état-major de la défense. Par ailleurs, Thomas Barnett, auteur du livre *The Pentagon's New Road Map : War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (École de guerre maritime des États-Unis), sera le conférencier invité au déjeuner.

Nous sommes très heureux que le général Raymond Henault, chef d'état-major de la défense, prenne la parole dans le cadre du séminaire; M. Frank Harvey, directeur du Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Université Dalhousie, nous donnera un sommaire.

Veuillez consulter l'avis du séminaire annuel et de l'AGA ailleurs dans le présent numéro pour obtenir plus de renseignements. J'encourage tous les lecteurs à assister à un débat qui promet d'être des plus stimulants et des plus informatifs. Profitez-en pour amener un collègue !

Les participants au séminaire sont invités à assister à la première journée de l'AGA, le vendredi 4 mars, où les personnes suivantes prendront la parole : le vice-amiral Bruce MacLean, chef d'état-major de la Force maritime, le lieutenant-général Rick Hillier, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre, le lieutenant-général Ken Pennie, chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne, le vice-Amiral Greg Jarvis, sous-ministre adjoint (Ressources humaines - militaires) et M. Jayson Spiegel, ancien directeur exécutif de l'association des officiers de réserve des États-Unis d'Amérique. Veuillez diffuser ces renseignements à autant d'intervenants en faveur de la défense que possible.

Nous avons été heureux de constater que le 20^e séminaire annuel a fait salle comble l'an dernier, dans la salle de bal de l'Hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier. Forts de notre expérience de l'an dernier, je conseille à tous de s'inscrire dès que possible avant que tous les billets soient vendus.

La CAD est d'avis que le premier impératif de notre gouvernement est de veiller à la sécurité de ses citoyens et elle recommande donc depuis longtemps que le gouvernement mène un examen détaillé de ses politiques aux plans des affaires étrangères et de la défense. Nous sommes d'avis que les choix dont dispose le Canada en matière de politique étrangère sont en danger car les Forces canadiennes disposent de capacités réduites pour défendre ces objectifs de politique, particulièrement les 3 D (défense, diplomatie et développe

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ment). Nous encourageons donc le gouvernement à faire preuve de plus de transparence dans l'élaboration de ses politiques d'affaires étrangères et de défense. J'espère que nos partisans participeront au débat sur les questions de sécurité et de défense nationale.

Le 21^e Séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD est une plateforme importante permettant d'explorer ces enjeux et avec un peu de chance, le gouvernement en tiendra compte dans son examen en cours des politiques de défense du Canada.

L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense est un organisme caritatif sans but lucratif qui a besoin de l'appui financier de la collectivité des Canadiens favorables à la défense, en tant que **Voix de la défense** indépendante, pour continuer d'être efficace dans le cadre du débat sur les enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationale. Grâce à votre appui continu, nous sommes en mesure de promouvoir la sensibilisation aux affaires militaires canadiennes et l'étude de celles-ci. **À titre de donateurs, votre appui financier continu de l'Institut est essentiel** à la poursuite de nos activités. Nous vous demandons donc de renouveler votre don annuel lorsque vous en recevez avis et d'encourager un compatriote à y participer, lui aussi.

AN OPEN LETTER TO SENATOR COLIN KENNY

Fred R. Fowlow

(Re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor of The Bowline Journal, published by the Calgary Branch, The Naval Officers Association of Canada – ed.)

Dear Senator Kenny:

The purpose of this letter is to draw your attention to the lengthy list of issues which concern those of us who feel that all Canadians should be made more aware of our country's security and sovereignty matters, and perhaps more important, draw the attention of the Prime Minister to a series of issues which should jolt him out of the casual approach his government seems to be taking with regard to the defence of our country.

Many Canadians hold the opinion that only in the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence is there the stability of membership and less political bias that allows the development of competency and understanding of the real needs for Canada's security at home and abroad.

It is apparent that senior military leaders and civilian bureaucrats have not fully exercised their professional function when appearing before your committee. They have in fact, failed to offer unfettered advice as to what the armed forces can or cannot do. Regardless of this neglect, your committee — and it should be mentioned, the House of Commons

Committee on Defence — must be commended for excellent reports dealing with Canadian security and defence issues.

Paradoxically, federal government politicians, civilian DND bureaucrats, and in isolated cases senior military, have chosen to lull the public into thinking that things can't be too bad for the armed forces because few senior military leaders have made much of a public fuss about the Canadian Forces posture. This act of smoke and mirrors governing must stop.

It is contended the Canadian public has the right to expect that the government investigate, comment and/or challenge the recommendations made in your reports. Sadly, it has lacked the political will to respond to your recommendations and least of all, give assurance that the voices of serving senior military leaders in NDHQ will not be muted.

One is not so naive as to fail to recognize that the tasking, funding, staffing and equipping of Canada's armed forces derives from defence and foreign policy. One accepts the fact that the military has no choice but to follow the direction given by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet through the Minister of National Defence.

It has been suggested that transparent advice given by career military professionals might be attained by removing the military component from the existing national defence department organization, and forming a separate armed forces headquarters. This would allow the military to concentrate on military affairs only, in an atmosphere free from political pressure often exercised by politicians and civilian bureaucrats.

Recent Prime Ministerial announcements stating the need for the government to capture Canada's loss of influence in world affairs, perhaps innocently signaled his agreement for the rebuilding of the Canadian Forces. What is now needed is action, not words.

It is assumed your Senate Committee recognizes the need for a foreign and defence policy review that must be completed

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as soon as possible so that rebuilding and improving military combat effectiveness can move ahead and catch up with the military capabilities of our NATO allies.

Concomitantly, the uncertainty regarding what the future holds for our armed forces accounts for the public perception that poorly informed parliamentarians, exerting pressure on civilian bureaucrats and senior military leaders in National Defence Headquarters, along with incomplete funding of the forces, account for the deplorable state of the Canadian Forces. Many defence critics theorize that those in position of authority have incompetently — or even deliberately — refused to recognize that there is an ongoing need to contain and suppress the rise of worldwide regional conflict and international terrorism.

One recalls that you personally stated your committee's problem of obtaining candid professional advice and testimony from serving officers. Is it not reasonable to agree with critics that the reluctance of senior military officers to offer transparent advice might conceivably owe its origin to the abolition of Canadian Forces Headquarters, and the integration of the formerly independent military and civilian sides in 1972?

In June of this year, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie (Ret'd), following his appearance as a witness before your committee on May 3, helped prepare a package of recommendations designed to identify the means whereby Canada could make a credible, meaningful military contribution internationally, in a much more timely manner. A package of recommendations given the title *Sea Horses*, was prepared and released long before Prime Minister Martin's statements regarding Canada's international goals and responsibilities.

The *Sea Horses* document was forwarded to the Prime Minister with copies to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Leader of the Opposition, Chairman of the Commons Defence Committee, and your Senate Defence Committee.

Additionally, *Sea Horses* material was published in the summer edition of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute magazine *ON TRACK*, and the Royal United Services Institute (Vancouver Island) web site, www.rusiviccda.org.

Sea Horses, as you no doubt appreciate, provides details and recommendations supporting the formation of a Canadian Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) that would be deployable by sea in purpose-built amphibious ships.

Major-General MacKenzie has stated that while he fully supported Mr. Martin's announced election promise confirming acceptance of a Joint Supply Support (JSS) ship programme, he emphasized JSS ships will not give the CF an expeditionary capability envisaged in the *Sea Horses* proposal.

CFB Shearwater has an infrastructure which constitutes a perfect location for embarkation of a rapid reaction force requiring sea-lift service. It is located adjacent to an ice-free port with jetties, dock-loading and off-loading equipment, a long runway, airhead, railhead and barracks, all waiting to be put to use.

It is understood the government has given the Canadian Lands Company the go ahead to sell the Shearwater property including destruction of the long runway, before completion

of a proper foreign and defence policy review. The least that can be done at this point in time is to put a hold on the planned development, or at a minimum, retain the longest runway at the site until the foreign and defence policy review has been completed and the proposed formation of a rapid reaction force has either been approved or rejected.

Sea Horses calls for the acquisition of at least three amphibious ships similar in design to the US Navy's planned twelve San Antonio-class amphibious ships which are designed to transport troops and equipment to overseas theatres, rendering them to be ready for operations upon arrival in an overseas theatre.

The San Antonio-class ships are considered to be one of the most versatile vessels in the US Navy, capable of performing in battle, rescue operations and humanitarian missions. They will carry helicopters, have three vehicle decks, three cargo/ammunition magazines, and carry cargo fuel. They will embark, transport and facilitate the landing of 800 to 900 soldiers using helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or a combination of these methods.

Rumours that the American programme might be changed prompts the speculation that if *Sea Horses* is approved, Canada might consider negotiating a lease arrangement with the USA. This arrangement would add a new attractive dimension to the US Navy programme which seems to be experiencing some problems with concerned shipbuilders in several states. In the final analysis, a lease arrangement would probably deliver ships to Canada at much less cost than might be paid if Canada attempted to build the ships in Canadian shipyards.

....the focus and priority of your committee and the Commons Defence Committee (sic) should, first and foremost, complete a full and open review of Canada's military needs and choices in foreign and defence policy.

It is emphasized that before the *Sea Horses* proposal and other important defence and security issues are considered for approval, the focus and priority of your committee and the Commons Defence Committee should, first and foremost, complete a full and open review of Canada's military needs and choices in foreign and defence policy. Conceivably, your committee should insist on being involved in the review process.

Recognizing that military capabilities must be responsive to Canadian foreign policy objectives, it is worth noting Andrew Cohen's comments in his book, "While Canada Slept." He states, "Nations make choices, and certainly Canada can. To renew its international citizenship, it will have to make its foreign policy distinctive to protect a new sense of identity." When considering the military he goes on to say, "Canada will face all kinds of material threats in future — threats it cannot foresee — and it must be ready."

Parliamentarians and bureaucrats in Ottawa should take note of Cohen's comment regarding the military. Equally as important, the Canadian public must be better informed of all domestic and international events that depend on the armed forces for help when an emergency arises.

(continued p. 8)

Without doubt, the time has arrived when the senior serving military leaders must be allowed to state their convictions without fear of retribution. It has been claimed that if they were now unfettered, they would have to state that in addition to being unable to effectively assist our allies, our military are unable to deter war; and that against determined enemies, our air force cannot now control our airspace, our army cannot defend our soil, and our navy cannot now protect our shores.

Comments made by many defence experts all appear to build a strong case — perhaps unintentionally — for formation of a national security council for Canada. The council would be charged with the task of helping develop security, sovereignty, foreign and defence policy, outside the closed doors of status quo minded politicians and bureaucrats in Ottawa. It would hopefully be free from the encumbrances introduced via blatant political interference.

A national security council might also promote and support the building of dedicated and unfettered staff expertise needed by the government concerning the transformation of the forces, the development of a rapid reaction force, the acquisition of new air and sea capability and the purchase of three joint supply ships.

A well balanced national security council would be designed to bring a balanced, informed level of common sense into the defence and security decision making process, thereby discarding outdated, erroneous “peace dividend” thinking which has influenced such mismanaged defence decisions as the planned sell-off of Shearwater, before an updated Canadian defence policy for the 21st century has been approved.

The Prime Minister and his Cabinet must accept the fact security and advancement of Canada’s national interests, and continued international participation, must carry a high priority.

Added to the many transformation and equipment problems facing the forces is the preparation for improved surveillance and military presence in Canada’s arctic territory. The separation of the civilian and military functions in National Defence Headquarters must not be put off any longer. All these priority issues must be undertaken before the Canadian Forces reach the point where rebuilding becomes impossible, the cost beyond our financial capability or worse, unattainable within an acceptable time frame.

Your Senate committee, together with the House of Commons Defence Committee, have important roles to play in ensuring that a well formed foreign and defence policy comes out of the planned review, and that security and sovereignty for future generations of Canadians will not be endangered.

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THE VIMY AWARD RECIPIENT



The Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, (right) presents the Vimy Award to Dr. David Bercuson (left) at the Vimy Award Dinner, 19 November 2004

THE ROSS MUNRO MEDIA AWARD RECIPIENT



Brigadier-General Bob Millar (Ret'd), President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (left) presents the Ross Munro Media Award to Ms Sharon Hobson (right) at the Vimy Award Dinner, 19 November 2004

**7TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE/
CANADIAN DEFENCE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS INSTITUTE
GRADUATE STUDENT SYMPOSIUM**

Sarah Noble, Project Officer/SDF Intern, CDA Institute

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) is pleased to report that the 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium sponsored by the CDAI and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and held in collaboration with the Institute for Research and Public Policy, the Centre for International Relations and Defence Management Program at Queen's University, and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College (RMC) was the most successful symposium to date. The 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium was made possible by a grant from the Department of National Defence Special Projects Fund and from Howard Ripstein Holdings.

The symposium is a unique venue for graduate students to present scholarly works on defence and foreign policy related issues in a public forum.

The two-day symposium covering "Security and Defence: National and International Issues," was held in Yeo Hall in the New Gym at RMC, October 29-30, 2004. There were more than 100 people in attendance including academics, graduate students, military personnel and government officials.

The symposium featured 2 keynote speakers: Major-General Lewis MacKenzie (Ret'd) and Dr. David Bercuson who addressed the future direction of Canadian defence policy.

Major-General MacKenzie spoke of the changed nature of UN peace "keeping" operations and highlighted the need for a rapid reaction force. He pointed out that while a soldier's duty is to establish security, soldiers are not social workers with guns and that they do not do the work of NGOs.

Dr. Bercuson discussed the need for a defence policy review and a re-commitment to defence by the Canadian government. He felt elements of the defence policy should include: Canada must defend its sovereign territory to the best of its ability; Canada must help the United States defend North America; and Canada needs to assume a 'fair share' of the cost of protecting freedom and democracy in the world. A full copy of Dr. Bercuson speech is available on CDAI's website.

This year's symposium featured 35 presenters (from over 55 abstracts submitted) from nine Security and Defence Studies Forum centres: Dalhousie University, Université Laval, Université de Montréal, McGill University, Université du Québec à Montréal, Queen's University, University of Manitoba, University of Calgary (Centre for Military of Strategic Studies (CMSS)), and RMC.

The presenters were divided into 10 panels addressing issues including: Canada's national security policy; two panels on the military in the 21st century; national security issues; Canada-US relations: the fallout from Iraq and the war on terror; lessons learned in peace operations; two panels on international issues; the role of intelligence in the war on terror; and a panel on human security.

Panel chairs included Ambassador Louis Delvoie, Queen's University; Dr. Bercuson, Director CMSS, University of Calgary; Major-General MacKenzie; Dr. Charles Pentland, Director of the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University; David B. Harris, President, Insignis; as well as several professors from RMC including Dr. Brian McKercher, War Studies Programme; Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Dean of Arts; Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Bradley (Ret'd), War Studies Programme; Dr. Roch Legault, History Department; and Lieutenant-Colonel John Martinson (Ret'd), War Studies Programme.

Two cash prizes of \$1000, and one of \$500 were awarded. Our overall winner was Major Brent Beardsley, RMC, for his

(continued on p. 10)

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7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium prize winners: (left to right) Jorim Disengomoka, Andrea Charron, and Sumon Dantiki

paper, on *Lessons Learned or not Learned from the Rwandan Genocide of 1994*. In his presentation, Major Beardsley identified four major failures in Rwanda in the areas of knowledge, will, means and the use of time. He also identified some of the major lessons that may or may not have been learned by the international community for preventing future genocides.

A tie was awarded for first place was awarded to Andrea Charron, RMC, for her paper, *Northwest Passage: Is Canada's Security Really Floating Away?* and Sumon Dantiki, McGill University, for his paper, *Solving the Collective Action Problem: Policy Options for Future Humanitarian Interventions*. Charron argued that the alarm on the Northwest Passage need not be sounded yet and that a hurried approach may be the real threat to Canada's sovereignty. She concluded that measured and considered action in conjunction with other states and commercial shipping companies will prove the wiser course of action. Dantiki's presentation looked at the problem of humanitarian intervention in a novel manner, treating it as a collective action problem, rather than simply a normative debate.

Third place was awarded to Jorim Disengomoka, CMSS, for his paper, *Terror Financing: A Case Study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. In his presentation, Disengomoka outlined how the loophole in the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme can further weaken global security, destabilize Africa and argued for the need to improve its essence.

An honourable mention went to Benoît Gagnon, Université de Québec à Montréal for his paper, *Revolution in Terrorist Affairs*. In his presentation, Gagnon discussed the many changes that have occurred within terrorist organizations that have resulted in a revolution in terrorist affairs.

The winning papers are available at: <http://www.cdfai.org/cdaigraduatesymposium.htm> and the additional papers are available online at CDAI's website at:

<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2004/symposiumpresentations04.htm>

Mark your calendars for next year's Symposium, to be held at RMC, October 28-29 2005.

LESSONS LEARNED OR NOT LEARNED FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE OF 1994

Major Brent Beardsley, MSC, CD



Major Brent Beardsley presenting his paper at the 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Lessons Learned or not Learned from the Rwandan Genocide of 1994

From April to July 1994, in a period of about 100 days, approximately 800,000 human beings were murdered in the Rwandan genocide. The international community failed to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide and largely stood by while hundreds of thousands died in one of the fastest and deadliest genocides in history.

In April of this year, while the world commemorated the Rwandan Genocide and lamented its failure in 1994, yet again genocide has been exposed in Darfur, Sudan. The central theme of this article is: Will the International Community, including Canada, also fail to prevent or suppress the genocide in Sudan, as it did in Rwanda a decade ago, or will this time we honor our moral, legal and policy obligations to stop the genocide in Darfur? The intent of this article is to provide a list of lessons the international community should have learned from the Rwandan Genocide and to pose them in the form of questions to Canadian and other International policy and strategic decision makers as they consider our response to the genocide in Darfur.

Genocide is the worst of crimes against humanity. The deliberate intention to destroy a designated group of innocent men, women and children is morally wrong and places an obligation on all of humanity to rescue the victims of genocide.

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, Canada and up to 142 other nations have ratified and incorporated into International and National Law *International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. As a signatory to that convention, Canada has accepted the moral and the legal obligation of the convention to prevent, to suppress and to punish the crime of genocide.

Partially in response to the failure to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide, and in direct response to a challenge from Secretary-General Koffi Annan in September 2000, the Government of Canada commissioned the *Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. The commission report is entitled *The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)*. The report and the policy

(continued on p. 12)

that it articulates has been adopted by Canadian policy makers and is expected to be a key component of the soon to be released Canadian Foreign Policy Review.

R2P's central theme "is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states". This policy proposes a bi-polar strategy to humanitarian intervention. First, it encourages and justifies the use of non-battle means like diplomacy, humanitarian aid, international condemnation, restrictions like embargoes or sanctions, commissions of inquiry, monitoring missions and traditional Chapter 6 peacekeeping operations.

These actions constitute a non-battle pole, but if they fail in preventing or suppressing the humanitarian catastrophe, then the report recommends, as a last resort, moving to a battle-pole of humanitarian intervention to use armed force to suppress avoidable humanitarian catastrophes like genocide.

The current situation in Darfur is genocide and meets the Genocide Conventions legal definition and acts thresholds. In addition, through their failure or inability to date to stop the genocide in Darfur, the Government of Sudan (consistent with its genocidal policies for over 40 years) has abdicated its responsibility to protect its citizens. In accordance with R2P, the international community must now assume that responsibility.

....we may at some point in the near future have to decide whether we should continue to follow a failed non-battle pole strategy or whether we should shift to the battle-pole.

To date our non-battle pole efforts to prevent this genocide have failed. In order to suppress the genocide in Darfur, we may at some point in the near future have to decide whether we should continue to follow a failed non-battle pole strategy or whether we should shift to the battle-pole. Shifting to the battle-pole will require an international humanitarian intervention mandated, preferably by the United Nations Security Council, to use armed force in Darfur to suppress the genocide.

Before such a shift from the non-battle to the battle pole is considered or conducted, it might be wise to examine some lessons from the Rwandan genocide to ensure that such a shift is realistic and can be effective. My research has led me

to initially identify 11 major lessons from the Rwandan genocide that can be posed as questions to assist decision-makers considering armed humanitarian intervention.

LESSON 1. Do we understand the history, culture and the root causes of this genocide? The lack of knowledge about the history of Rwanda, its culture, and the root causes of the conflict in Rwanda directly contributed to the failure of UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) to understand the conflict, which turned into genocide. The ignorance of Rwanda by virtually every non-Rwandan decision-maker during this crisis could hardly provide the foundation upon which to build a solution to the problems in Rwanda. We cannot contribute to the solution if we do not understand the problem.

LESSON 2: Do we have the relevant, timely and accurate information upon which to base our planning, decision-making and operations? In order for any decision-maker to make timely, accurate and relevant decisions he requires timely, accurate and relevant information commonly referred to as intelligence.

The failure to effectively gather, analyze and disseminate even the most basic pieces of information or intelligence placed UNAMIR and international decision makers in the position of never seizing the initiative and always being caught in an information decision cycle that was reacting to the extremist perpetrators of the genocide. One has to have accurate intelligence in order to make effective decisions and to take effective actions.

LESSON 3. Do we have an integrated and comprehensive political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and security campaign plan to solve the root causes of the genocide? The Rwandan mission lacked a plan for the future of Rwanda. Peacekeeping, in too many cases like Rwanda, has been an attempt to 'treat an infected ulcer with a band-aid'. While it covers up the infection and can give the appearance of normalcy, in fact the infection, if not cured will only resurface.

In order to suppress genocide, not just the acts of violence must be suppressed, but the root causes of the genocide must be determined and they must also be solved. There has to be an effective solution in the form of a long-term plan to solve the underlying causes of the problem.

LESSON 4. Have we assembled a multi-national coalition of the willing who are committed and prepared to

(continued on p. 15)

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see this humanitarian intervention through to its successful conclusion? The failure to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide has often been blamed on a lack of will by the international community to risk casualties in a conflict in which they had no vital national security interests. You have to marshal the international will to act as a coalition.

LESSON 5. Have we prepared the nation to support this humanitarian intervention? In addition to the lack of international will, there was also the absence of national will as it was easier for political leaders of many nations to make great pontificating speeches, but then abstain from committing the means to actually conduct an intervention. It was easier to lay the blame on the UN, on UNAMIR and on the United States than to make the hard decision and assume the risks of intervention. The political leaders and the government must be committed to support the mission, because they truly believe it is the only option, it is right and it is important.

LESSON 6. Have we prepared the public for the mission? There was also a lack of public will in individual nations for humanitarian intervention. Few people in the world had ever heard of Rwanda and certainly did not identify it as something that was vital to their security and prosperity. The public must understand and support the intervention and understand that it will ultimately cost ‘treasure and blood’.

LESSON 7. Have we prepared the military for the mission? There was no U.S. or allied military intervention in Rwanda because military will at the Pentagon and other national military headquarters was lacking. In the cold war-based view of the military planners, militaries exist to fight and win the nations’ wars and must train, equip and prepare for major wars against definable state enemies in support of vital national interests. They believe that militaries should not be squandered on sideshows like peacekeeping and intervening in an unimportant area of the world in someone else’s conflict.

The military from its most senior levels to its most junior members must understand that what they are being called upon to do and to sacrifice is right, it is important and that the nation will support them throughout this mission.

LESSON 8. An anonymous spokesman during the Rwandan genocide stated “Where political will is absent the means will seldom be found to act”. Are we prepared to expend a large amount of financial resources on this mission? Non-battle pole means like diplomacy, aid and peacekeeping cost money. Intervention will cost more money. Rebuilding after genocide will cost even more money. Humanitarian intervention cannot be done on the cheap without risking mission success and the lives of both the rescuers and the victims.

Sufficient financial resources must be provided to conduct the strategy decided by the decision-makers.

LESSON 9. Do we have the multi-purpose combat capable force, trained and prepared to deploy rapidly, operate effectively in a complex combat environment and be sustained indefinitely? These three requirements became readily apparent for any intervention force entering Rwanda to stop the genocide. Humanitarian intervention, in order to suppress genocide, must not only be willing to use force; it must be capable of using force.

LESSON 10. Are we prepared, in a worst-case scenario (e.g. an opposed intervention) to use force, which means fighting and which means “killing and spilling blood” to achieve our objectives within the law? In Rwanda, the international community did not want to use force to prevent or suppress the genocide and confined their actions to the non-battle pole. Humanitarian intervention to suppress genocide will require the use of force.

LESSON 11. Has the coalition, the government, the public and the military been prepared to take casualties? The Rwandan genocide demonstrated the abhorrence of taking casualties in a humanitarian intervention. The death of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu, in 1993, and 10 Belgian soldiers in Rwanda, followed immediately by the withdrawal of these and other national contingents from their missions, demonstrated this lack of will. If the mission is prepared to “fight and spill blood” than it must also be prepared to “shed blood”.

This article has summarized a longer paper presented at the 2004 CDA Graduate Student Symposium. It has attempted to make the case that the crime of genocide is occurring in Darfur and that in accordance with our moral, legal and policy obligations, Canada and the international community, have a responsibility to prevent and suppress the genocide in Darfur.

In accordance with prudence, escalation and the policy of R2P, our response to date has been to use non-battle pole efforts to prevent and suppress the genocide. Should these efforts continue to fail, at some point the decision may have to be taken to move to the battle pole and to conduct a humanitarian intervention to stop the genocide. However, before such a decision is taken, the 11 major lessons/questions should be considered by policy and strategic level decision makers to ensure we have the knowledge, the will and the means to conduct a successful humanitarian intervention.

(continued on p. 17)

68th ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the CDA
and
21st ANNUAL SEMINAR of the
CDA Institute
2-5 March 2005
Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON

The annual seminar, *After the Elections: Canada-US Security Relationships and the Role of the Canadian Forces*, will be presented by the CDA Institute on Thursday, 3 March 2005, commencing at 0900 hrs. The Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, has been invited to be the keynote speaker. Mr. Andrew Cohen will be the theme speaker. Other participants will include Hugh Segal, President of the Institute for Research on Public Policy; Christopher Sands, Senior Associate, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington; James Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister (Global and Security Policy), Foreign Affairs Canada; John Noble, Director of Research, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Carleton University; Thomas Barnett, author of *The Pentagon's New Road Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, (US Naval War College), who will be the luncheon speaker; Général Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff; Général Maurice Baril, former Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, former Chief of the Land Staff; Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Dean of Arts, Royal Military College; and Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director of the Centre for Managing Security in Transitional Societies, Cranfield University. Dr. Frank Harvey, Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, will provide the summary.

Registration Fees (includes luncheon and reception):

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| A. | <i>CDA Institute donors, CDA Members and Associate Members</i> | \$150 |
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4 March, 0815 - 1230 hrs - Addresses by:

Mr. Jayson Spiegel, former Executive Director, US Reserve Officers Association; Vice Admiral Bruce MacLean, Chief of the Maritime Staff; Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Land Staff; Lieutenant-General Ken Pennie, Chief of the Air Staff; Vice-Admiral Greg Jarvis, Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Military); and Major-General Herb Petras, Chief of Reserves.

Enquiries and individual registration by 8 February 2005, by tel: (613) 236 9903; fax: (613) 236 8191; e-mail: projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca; website: www.cda-cdai.ca

68^{ième} ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE ANNUELLE de la CAD
et
21^e SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL de
l'Institut de la CAD
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Le Séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD, intitulé *Au lendemain des élections: les relations canado-américaines en matière de sécurité et le rôle des Forces canadiennes*, aura lieu jeudi, le 3 mars 2005, à 09 h. L'honorable Bill Graham, le ministre de la Défense nationale, a été invité à présenter le discours-programme. M. Andrew Cohen sera le conférencier-thématique. Hugh Segal, président de l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques; Christopher Sands, Centre for Strategic and International Studies à Washington; James Wright, Sous-ministre adjoint (Politique mondiale et sécurité), Affaires étrangères Canada; John Noble, directeur des communications de la recherche, Centre de droit et de politique commerciale, Université Carleton; Thomas Barnett, auteur de l'ouvrage *The Pentagon's New Road Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, (École de guerre maritime des É-U), sera le conférencier invité lors du déjeuner; le général Raymond Henault, Chef d'état-major de la Défense; le général Maurice Baril, ancien Chef d'état-major de la Défense; le lieutenant-général Mike Jeffery, ancien Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre; M. Joel Sokolsky, Doyen des arts, Collège militaire royal; Mme Ann Fitz-Gerald, directrice du Centre for Managing Security in Transitional Societies, Université Cranfield; et M. Frank Harvey, Directeur, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, présentera le résumé des débats.

Frais de'inscription (incluant le déjeuner et la réception):

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4 mars, 8h 15 - 12h 30 hrs - Présentations par:

Mr. Jayson Spiegel, Ancien directeur général de la US Reserve Officers Association; le Vice- amiral Bruce MacLean, Chef d'état-major des Forces maritimes; le Lieutenant-général Rick Hillier, Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre; le Lieutenant-général Ken Pennie, Chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne; le Vice-amiral Greg Jarvis, le Sous-ministre adjoint (Ressources humaines-Militaires); et le Major-général Herb Petras, Chef des Réserves.

Renseignements et enregistrement, avant le 8 février 2005, par tél: (613) 236 9903; télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courrier électronique (e-mail): projectofficer@cda-cdai.ca; siteweb: www.cda-cdai.ca.

Our actions should not be taken out of naive idealism, but must be well grounded in common sense, good judgment, reality and experience. The Canadians who could die or be injured in this mission and the hundreds of thousands of our fellow human beings, whom we will save, deserve nothing less.

Major Brent Beardsley has served for 26 years as an infantry officer in the Royal Canadian Regiment. In 1993-94, he served as personal staff officer to (then) Major-général Roméo Dallaire in Rwanda before and during

the genocide that took place there. He is the co-author of Major-général Dallaire's best-selling memoir, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Major Beardsley serves as a research officer at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute of the Canadian Defence Academy. He is completing his Masters of Arts degree in War Studies at Royal Military College. The focus of his studies is on genocide and humanitarian intervention. The full footnoted version of the paper on which this article is based can be found on the CDA website at www.cda-cdai.ca.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADA'S ARMY

Major-General Terry Liston, MBE, CD (Ret'd)

Major-General Terry Liston, MBE, CD (Ret'd) served in 1987-1988 as Chief of Operational Planning and Force Development of the Canadian Armed Forces. Previously he commanded the Canadian Air Sea Transported Brigade Group (CAST) based on 5^e GBC in Valcartier, and the 1^{er} bataillon, Royal 22^e Régiment in Lahr, Germany. His e-mail address is: terry.liston@gatewayamerica.ca. This article reflects his personal views.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the government has shown a distinct disinterest in military policy. Furthermore, its financial neglect of the Forces over the subsequent years left Canada with a Cold-war era military structure, devoid of capability. Now that all political parties are in agreement that something must be done immediately to *fix* Canada's 'hollow' land forces, we must look seriously at their most pressing priorities. Two factors are key: the rapidly evolving technology; and the significant changes in the threat.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHANGED THREAT

The US-led technology-oriented "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)" began in the latter years of the Cold War. Over the next two decades it became "Military Transformation". Lighter, faster, more agile, and more lethal brigade groups would destroy the massed Soviet armour as well as other post-Cold War conventional forces.

Small contingents, with network-centric communications, supported by high tech surveillance (satellites, surveillance drones, etc.) would direct PGMs (lethal, precise smart bombs) onto any enemy that dared show itself. This led to the "shock and awe" campaign that obliterated Iraq's massive armed forces

in two weeks, vindicating transformation and appearing to augur in a new era of world-wide military dominance by the US and its allies.

This technology-based transformation was so effective, however, that it generated an equally revolutionary change in the threat. The era of conventional forces, reflected in Saddam Hussein's huge army, is over. Such armies no longer constitute a credible threat against US and allied technology. However, the continued fighting and civil chaos in Iraq demonstrates vividly that war fighting does not end when the enemy's tanks and headquarters buildings are obliterated.

The modern enemy disappears into the population, or other 'difficult terrain', where the tools of Military Transformation provide little help. Charles Penna (Cato Institute) summed up the dilemma faced by US strategists: "All the defense transformation and technology in the world is not going to help you when it comes to having to occupy a country".

The Americans have recognized their problem and are moving quickly to fix it. The most recent U.S. long-term military strategy would accelerate the US shift away from conventional threats in order to focus more firmly on terrorists and low-tech guerrillas as in Iraq. One of its reported objectives is to develop a force able to deploy 200,000 soldiers into a territory after conventional fighting (if any) has given way to guerrilla warfare. Congress has overridden Rumsfeld's high-tech concepts by imposing a significant increase in the strength of the Army.

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In the meantime, Canada's Army had also thrown itself into 'Military Transformation' with great determination and innovative technical skill. Minister John McCallum told the Conference of Defence Associations that the Army was "replacing brawn with brains". Technological orientation became the driving factor in selecting the leadership and senior staff of Land Forces HQ. New tactical concepts focused on managing the application of effects on a conventional enemy identified through centralized high-tech surveillance equipment. New organizational concepts favoured "modular, capability-based" task-tailoring of small high-tech battle groups.

Furthermore, existing units were reduced significantly in order to provide funds for high tech surveillance, long-range weapons and the development of a major training centre for high-tech manoeuvre warfare on the open plains of northern Alberta. The Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) project became the focus of much of Canada's combat support community. Many classes of weapons and vehicles were withdrawn from units into central pools. The management and financing of training was centralized at Army HQ.

This revolutionary change in threat...requires that the Army staff return to the drawing board....

THE REQUIREMENT

Despite this commendable transformation effort, the time has come to recognize that there are, now, few imaginable scenarios where Canada's Army would undertake high-tech war fighting against a conventional armoured force. Military professionals must focus on the most difficult and the most likely future threats, those of asymmetric warfare and counter-insurgency operations. This is what our allies need from us, as they also play catch-up with the changed threat. It is fully consistent with the current government's clearly stated intention to play a major role in multi-lateral initiatives.

We must be able to sustain troops overseas in support of counter-insurgency war fighting and Peace Support Operations (PSO).

This revolutionary change in the threat, not to mention the current government's clearly expressed intentions, requires that the Army staff return to the drawing board in order to design a force optimised for counter-insurgency. The demands of asymmetric war fighting are virtually indistinguishable from those of robust PSO. Whether in Falluja, the Congo, the Medac Pocket or Kabul, the core need of these battle groups is for large numbers of highly-skilled troops on the ground.

The driving requirement of the future Army is to sustain overseas, simultaneously, on an on-going basis, at least two counter-insurgency/PSO battle groups. Canada's allies can provide eloquent models for such teams. In Iraq, the 850-man Black Watch battle group sent to assist in the Falluja area in November 2004, had as its nucleus three mechanized infantry companies and a fourth company of Royal Marine infantry.

It is clear that the 1000-man Canadian battle groups must be built around a similar critical mass of highly-trained and well-led infantry soldiers. Although they will need and appreciate support, it is their 'boots on the ground' that will be the measure of the battle group's usefulness.

The 5000 regular positions offered by the government to reinstate Canada's peace-support capability must be used, therefore, in very large part to maximize the infantry capability of our counter-insurgency/PSO battle groups. Our current infantry, now reduced to less than 4000 soldiers, is grossly inadequate in the face of that requirement.

A BATTLE GROUP

It is useful to focus on the more important characteristics of such a battle group, and how these changes can be achieved.

Cohesiveness vs. Modularity. A battle group, built around infantry companies that will most often fight on foot at close range, must favour, above all else, cohesiveness and stability. Even in the US Army, unit cohesion has now been recognized as a priority over the efficiency of its traditional man-for-man replacement, task-tailoring and modularity.

General Schoemaker, US Army Chief of Staff, said it best in addressing the House Armed Service Committee 21 July, 2004: "Tailoring and task-organizing . . . renders an ad hoc deployed force and a nondeployed residue of partially disassembled units, diminishing the effectiveness of both". He unwittingly described Canada's overseas contingents of the past decade, and particularly its "non-deployed residue" left behind. He relegated modularity and capability-based structuring to division level and above, and stated the intention of the US Army to maximize, instead, unit cohesion below that level. Canada's army, famous for the superior fighting spirit and discipline of its proud regiments, can afford no less.

Tactical Self-Sufficiency vs. Capability-based Structure. Battle groups must also be tactically self-sufficient, with command facilities and an integral combat support company providing reconnaissance, observation, indirect fire, bunker busting direct fire, and engineer/explosive ordnance disposal support (EOD) that is required on a 24/7 basis. Brigade-level

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combat support units are NOT usually available; they make up a brigade commander's reserve to influence the battle anywhere in his area. In Kabul, even the Canadian Artillery and Armour that was deployed specifically to support the Canadian battle-group in lieu of its integral combat support platoons, were soon detached, as they always will be, under separate NATO operational control in support of the whole Area of Operations.

Balanced Mix of Fighting Vehicles. Since each battalion in our small army has to take its turn in an operational area, its troop carrier fleet should be a standardized and balanced mix of light armoured vehicles (LAV) and light vehicles. Light infantry is too vulnerable once the shooting, mining and suicide bombing starts. It also needs the 25mm canon on its LAVs. However, in most areas, light vehicles are also needed for many patrol tasks. It is not merely a coincidence that the US 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is also returning to Iraq as this article is published with a similar mix of Bradley companies and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) companies in its infantry battalions.

It goes without saying that the current decision to centralize vehicles and weapons must be reviewed. The crew of a fighting vehicle can't train without its weapons system and vehicle!

Logistical Self-sufficiency. Our deployed battle groups require, as well, their own logistics support element or service support company in order to ensure that they remain mobile and usable anywhere in the theatre, unlike the static posture they had in Camp Julien, Kabul.

The officer corps. A major reorientation of the Army is needed. As the clearing of Falluja demonstrated, close combat against insurgents in a city is often a bloody and decidedly low-tech business. At the same time, a successful campaign to win hearts and minds is also needed. The US Marines concept of the three-block war where "every corporal is a strategist" well describes this reality. It reflects a timely US rediscovery of the well-known cliché of Commonwealth infantrymen who described the action in Malaysia, Ireland or Cyprus as "section commander's wars".

In the same way that the decade of Transformation skewed our Army towards a centralized high-tech model, affecting the selection of leadership, staff officers, organizations and doctrine, the future Army requires a rapid rebalancing of expertise towards decentralized, infantry soldiering. This demanding form of military professionalism must be rediscovered and reflected in strategy, organization, doctrine and training.

The Army leadership must seek out those with the necessary expertise and put them to work! In particular, the current restriction (or preferred manning level) on the proportion of officers with infantry expertise in the senior ranks of the Army must be immediately reviewed. Indeed, infantry experience and expertise should be a key qualification for as many officers as possible to bring about the needed reorientation of the Army.

CONCLUSION

There are, of course, other development issues. These include our needs in the areas of EOD, psychological operations, civil affairs, development assistance, training assistance, etc. As well, there should be a concept for a contingency force beyond the battle-group level that would "surge" overseas in an insurgency or PSO crisis. We must determine the appropriate mix of combat support and service support for it. The extent to which Canada would wish to maintain some residual capability for dealing with a conventional war scenario, however unlikely, should be examined, along with options for maintaining a nucleus of expertise in that area. The role of other services, including strategic air and sea lift and, in particular, tactical helicopter support must be "negotiated". The contribution on an ongoing basis of the Reserves must be determined, as well as their key role in mobilizing for a home defence crisis.

However, the main thrust of force development efforts must be guided by a new vision of the real-world threat and Canada's response. Our first priority must be to sustain, in overseas theatres, battle groups organized, equipped, and trained to carry out demanding counter-insurgency war fighting and PSOs. These cohesive and self-sufficient battle groups must necessarily be infantry-heavy, using the new resources offered by the current government to bring this about as soon as possible.

Letter to the editor

Dear Captain Forsberg:

I am writing to update your readers on North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), in response to the article NORAD IS DEAD AND CANADA HELD THE KNIFE by Mr. Joe Varner in your Autumn 2004 issue.

NORAD has two enduring roles - aerospace warning and aerospace control. In the first, our enduring Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment mission, NORAD detects, characterizes and if necessary warns the civilian leadership of both Canada and the United States of ballistic missile attack on North America. In the latter, which was not mentioned in the article, we monitor Canadian and United States airspace, and if necessary, defend North America against airborne attack, be it by terrorists taking over civilian aircraft or the more traditional threat of air-breathing bombers or cruise missiles. Since September 11th, 2001 NORAD aircraft have flown in excess of 38,000 missions in all weather conditions to deter or investigate possible threats to North America.

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), a US-only Regional Combatant Command was conceived in the days following September 11th, 2001 and achieved full operational capability in Colorado Springs two years later. It has responsibility for the defense of the United States. Aerospace defence missions are handled through NORAD, not USNORTHCOM, in accordance with the NORAD Agreement. USNORTHCOM's unilateral mission is analogous to operations conducted in Canada under the direction of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are separate commands, but there is much communication between the two staffs (and the DCDS staff) to avoid duplication of effort or working at cross purpose, as do NAV CANADA and the Federal Aviation Administration, or Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Department of Homeland Security in their areas of expertise.

Since September 11th, 2001, NORAD has undergone the greatest transformation in our 46 year history, moving from doing aerospace defence in relative isolation to an interagency approach including partners such as the RCMP, NAV CANADA, the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration, and intelligence agencies, among many others.

In December 2002, Canada and the United States exchanged diplomatic notes to create a Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) outside of, but supported by NORAD and USNORTHCOM. The BPG is almost two years into its mandate. It has created an exhaustive online database of military-to-military agreements between Canada and the U.S., redrafted the Basic Security Document describing how Canada and the U.S. defend North America, and is working on a Bi-National Civil Assistance Plan.

Highly skilled Canadians serve in a variety of positions in NORAD in the United States; as of this writing, there are 311 Canadian professionals serving in a variety of positions, including 19 at early warning radars, 30 in Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (manning the Missile and Air Warning Centers, and on staff - including the Vice Commander), and 10 at U.S. Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs. NORAD and the BPG are vital organizations in which Canadian (and American) men and women work hard to deter, detect, and if necessary, defend North America from any aerospace threat. Canadians are proud of their accomplishments and commitment - as I am.

Sincerely

Eric A. Findley
Lieutenant-general, CF
Deputy Commander, NORAD
Head, Bi-National Planning Group

NORAD IS DEAD

Joe Varner

The last few months have only re-affirmed views presented in my earlier On Track article entitled, "NORAD is Dead and Canada Held The knife."

Cellucci, warned that NORAD was outdated and must be modernized and its role expanded to include maritime and cyber space. In fact, NORAD's co-located, sister, regional command,

On October 21st it was reported that U.S. Ambassador, Paul

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Northern Command, has been discussed repeatedly in American circles as the most appropriate place to undertake an expanded role responsible for all North American security matters.

When the issue of Missile Defense came up during U.S. President George W. Bush's recent, first official visit to Canada on November 30th, our Defence Minister, Bill Graham, said that the issue could be discussed as part and parcel of NORAD Treaty renewal discussions due to take place in 2006. A day later, on December 1st President Bush made it very clear in a major foreign policy speech in Halifax that the U.S. would take whatever steps were necessary to protect the American people and that the U.S. would not engage in limitless multi-national dialogues.

One would have to conclude a similar attitude to limitless bilateral discussions including NORAD that have been on-going without real resolve for at least four years. Now, through Graham's clear intervention, and a likely ensuing Canadian general election, it could be another two years before the issue even reaches the table.

These issues of un-ending Canadian diplomacy, 'foot dragging' if you will, were not lost on the first George W. Bush administration when in October of 2002 the U.S. took Space Command, a command with global responsibilities and direct control over the early warning satellites that circle the earth from NORAD, and co-located Space Command with Strategic Command. At the end of the day, this reorganization essentially

gave the 'double hatted' Commander of Space and Strategic Command both the ability to warn of an impending missile strike on the U.S. and to launch a counter-strike either with an interceptor or a nuclear response.

In a single move, NORAD had become redundant to American command and control arrangements. During his recent visit to Canada, a senior Bush administration official said the President raised NORAD's "potential role in any Missile Defense" with Prime Minister Martin. "Potential" because NORAD increasingly has no role whatsoever other than the defense of continental civil air space. Northern Command was given the "missile defense" responsibility in what appears to be an ever expanding organization at the expense of NORAD.

In establishing a separate regional command for North America, responsible for all operations on the continent, in addition to the regionally oriented NORAD, the U.S. was sending a message that the joint aerospace command's days were numbered. Its transition into Northern Command is only a matter of time, with Canadian participation or without.

At the end of the day, if Canada is to have any meaningful role in the Defence of North America or in Missile Defense, then it is going to have to come through Northern Command; and not NORAD. Sadly, NORAD is on 'life support' systems, a command arrangement that neither the U.S. or Canada supports, other than in the 'warm and fuzzy' terms associated with the past.

THE METAPHYSICAL WAR OF ATTRITION

Colonel Howie Marsh (Ret'd), Senior Defence Analyst Conference of Defence Associations

Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. military intelligence officer, has written an article, "In Praise of Attrition", which appears in the summer edition of Parameters, the US Army War College quarterly (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters>) - Ed.

Introduction

Ralph Peters' recent essay *In Praise of Attrition* is provocative. He chastises the USA leadership for being blind to the true nature of the War on Terrorism. He shouts a warning; the West is into a long, relentless war of attrition with those who want to war. He concludes that the West has few realistic choices; only wear down the enemy, mainly by killing the terrorists.

Although some killing may be necessary I think that Peters'

admonition will not bring success. Like a number of writers, Peters has offered a solution to the yet to be defined problem of global terrorism. The West and Peters advocate military force but have yet to place that instrument in an effective context of action. Secondly, Peters' arguments lead me to believe that he does not understand wars of attrition against covenant-based cultures. A population's reaction to killing in Atlantic and Pacific theatres of war is far more benign than that of the Middle East. Attrition based warfare against a covenant-based culture, especially if restricted to conventional weapons, would exhaust the West.

In his defence, Peters does fleetingly point to a more profitable theme—the "metaphysical war of attrition" and dares us to call the "child" by its true name, but he then retreats into a criticism of extant doctrines. The metaphysical aspects of this War on Terrorism interest me. *(continued on p. 22)*

Terrorism and Fear

Why is terrorism the focus of our fears? Global annual road carnage kills 1,200,000 and maims 50 million. Illness, privation and poor judgement are more effective killers of people than terrorism. Why does terrorism captivate so much thought and resources? It cannot be dying or wounding that we fear; we are accustomed to that. What is it that we fear?

Could it be that we fear uncertainty, or have we become so accustomed to near- zero, infant mortality that we now have unrealistic expectations of life? One hundred years ago a mother knew that she would lose 20-40% of her children before they reached adulthood. Ever present death in the home steeled many for the losses of World Wars and epidemics. Perhaps we need to return to the robustness of our forefathers.

This fear of ours that emboldens terrorism is the first metaphysical challenge; it must be studied and measured. I wish that Ralph Peters and others would develop this further. Once we know the true nature of our fear then we might be able to deny the very thing that is currently empowering our adversary.

Expectations and Leadership

At present protecting everything from every possible disruption is the expectation of our society and this unrealistic goal shapes my thinking. Anti-terrorism strategies require acknowledging that any system will be breached. The best counter to terrorist attacks is rapid response and restoration. Simple systems are easier to protect and restore than the complex.

Preservation of everything all the time is unachievable....

The West needs to stop and reverse the trend of amalgamation, (especially in the energy, banking and food sectors). Subsidiarity—local governance of decentralized sustenance should become an objective. Many small targets confound terrorists; smaller targets are easier to restore. Preservation of everything all the time is unachievable, but the restoration of everything is achievable.

As high-density infrastructure and high capacity transport are targets of choice we should be making great effort to diversify. Those in authority who enjoy the benefits of scale may be reluctant to divest power, but the security and preservation of our society must come before the other benefits of centralization. Decentralization offers greater security. People should be clamouring for the robustness of many small systems.

This is the second metaphysical element that needs consideration. Why are our expectations so high and our leadership so slow to make robust the vital systems of our society? The current strategy of building large security apparatus to protect large systems only provides terrorism greater opportunities for humbling us.

Ideologies and Covenant

The third metaphysical aspect of terrorism that needs much examination is ideology. What are the elements of the terrorist ideology? It is offered that the following sustain most terrorist threats to the West.

- First the terrorist needs a cause. Preferably this cause should be to correct a long-standing injustice or restore something lost. Better that the root events are shrouded in antiquity and details are more poetic than factual.
- Second a living visionary, poet or spiritual guide exists to provide inspiration. The cause needs a human face and voice that can interpret the cause for today's man of action.
- And thirdly, the terrorist needs deeply committed (covenant) relationships.

Armed with the foregoing, let us now examine the strategy of metaphysical attrition by wearing down the terrorists ideological elements.

The brand of terrorism that emanates from the Middle to Far East serves as illustration.

Metaphysical Attrition

Metaphysical attrition of the ideological elements require wearing down and eventually eliminating the cause, the inspirational leadership and the covenant relation(s).

First, the cause needs to be critiqued until all errors surrounding its genesis are exposed. The tenets of Islam need to be studied in the light of rational thinking. Two tests—the consistency of God's nature and the coherency of prophecy—are good starting points to test the validity of the prophet's claims. Truth withstands scrutiny.

The full academic acumen of both the East and West need to be engaged in this examination. Should this trial demonstrate that the tenets of *Jihad* and *Shahada* (martyrdom) were plagiarized from earlier writings, then the cause may suffer a mortal blow.

Although the media would have us believe that Osama Bin Laden is the inspirational leader for terrorism, it is likely that greater motivation comes from the local cleric who divinely

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sanctions acts and absolves murder. The influence of the inspirational leader(s) needs to be exposed. Character disclosure is better than martyrdom.

The power of covenant relationships is not well appreciated by the Western mind. Covenant agreements not only require blood restitution for death; they also place obligations on future generations. Modern man abhors imputing descendants. Nevertheless it exists as a powerful coercive force within a covenant-based culture. In addition to physical enforcement of covenant, the fundamental Islamic terrorist has the incentive of spiritual rewards. Is the reward program forthcoming when exercised? What are the flaws in the incentive program?

The metaphysical war of attrition requires challenging the essentials of terrorist ideology. It is not for the faint hearted.

Could a secular society challenge the metaphysical tenets of another culture? Europe and Canada would not. The United States might, but it would be reluctant.

Conclusion

Many have warned that the war on terrorism will be long. Therefore we should think and ensure we start this struggle well. To date, the West's initial response is to give the terrorist no rest. While military forces pursue the terrorist on the physical plane, the best minds of the West need to examine both the physical and metaphysical aspects of this conflict. The three metaphysical aspects introduced here—*Fear Expectations* and *Ideology*—need more development. Let us think this through and develop effective strategies we owe it to our soldiers.

ON WAR: A CRITIQUE OF PETERS' ATTRITION

Christopher Ankersen

Peters' article "In Praise of Attrition" reads like the directions on a bottle of dandruff shampoo: hit, kill, repeat as necessary. Nothing could be simpler. However, outside of the fantasy world of Hollywood, video games, and Peters' imagination, this is not possible. Peters' portrayal is alluring but ultimately wrong because he understands neither war nor politics. He would do well to re-read his Clausewitz.

War is the Art of the Possible

Clausewitz does paint a picture of pure war, similar to that which Peters advocates, one where violence and killing go on unchecked in constant escalation. This he calls absolute war, and is quick to dismiss it as theoretical. In the real world, war does not consist simply of endless killing. Instead, Clausewitz wisely reminds us, politics enters the frame and imposes limits. War, the Prussian says,

'is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means...The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.' (On War, p. 99)

This is exactly what Peters' is forgetting: attrition is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Killing the enemy is an instrument of war, which is, in turn, an instrument of politics. Concentrating on killing to the exclusion of all else is merely fetishism.

Political intercourse entails debate, negotiation, bargaining and compromise. While this may not be possible between the West and Al-Qaeda or Iraqi insurgents, it is a constant feature of life within the West, and not just between both sides of the Atlantic camp. The domestic political environment within which the U.S. armed forces are embedded does not cease to exist so that war may be waged. Constitutional convention, the rule of law and the expectations of a wide variety of parties continue, and in so doing, form the constraints on pure violence which Clausewitz claims make war real.

Not the Only Show in Town

Peters writes as a military man, annoyed at political correctness and interference. Politics means that the military does not get to wage war on its own terms. However, to decry this truth is to ignore that fact that the armed forces are only one of the actors that determine the form and shape that war will take. Again, as Clausewitz intones:

'The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone...These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to

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one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. (On War, p. 101)

That Peters is not satisfied with the passions of the people or the aims of his government is no small matter; it is a reflection of immature and dangerously misleading thinking.

The Forest is more than just Trees

It may be the prerogative of a tactical commander to worry exclusively about firefights and engagements. However, wars are not conducted at the tactical level alone. Beyond the reach of the bayonet lies the real, ugly, complicated, and confusing world of politics. On the integration of politics and military action, Clausewitz is clear:

'Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are more influential in the planning of war, the campaign, and often even of the battle.' (On War, p. 733)

There can be no "purely military" perspective in war, the only mature position is to understand that war is the synthesis between military means and political ends that matters.

Politics is the solution, not the enemy

Unlike Dorothy in Oz, Peters cannot click his heels together and wish things were different. There are rules of war and Western societies are sensitive to casualties—both friendly and collateral. In order to be responsible, governments must be sensitive to a whole host of issues, including but not limited to, body counts. In grand strategic terms, killing is attrition and politics is manoeuvre. Accordingly, the real war winning formula is to synchronise both these aspects. Sure, toughening up the troops is important, but so is properly preparing the population that supports them. This cannot be done by adopting ostrich-tactics, denying the harsh reality that killing (and dying) is a necessary part of war. Neither can it be achieved through a cocktail of politicians' snake-oil of fear nor through the arrogant declarations of soldiers who believe that 'soft civvies just don't get it'.

Killing is a necessary, but not sufficient component of war. Real war requires an *understanding* of what the issues are and a capacity for *explanation* of those issues to the public. Peters' rightly denounces the mincing of words and the disingenuous use of euphemisms, but we must also avoid crass tub-thumping, or devising fantastic plans to kill every 'potential' Muslim extremist. Neither creates the kind of sustainable and constructive brand of politics that will carry the day in the long 'war on terror' in which we find ourselves. Train the soldiers to be unflinching in their duty, to shoot straight and hit hard. But in so doing do not lose sight of the fact that military action is just one part of modern war.



Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Bill Graham, joins in the Vimy Award Dinner festivities in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization with Vimy Award recipients past and present (left to right) Dr. David Bercuson (2004), Dr. Jack Granatstein (1996), General Paul Manson (Ret'd) (2003), General John de Chastelain (Ret'd) (1992), Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile (Ret'd) (1999), and Vice-Admiral Larry Murray (Ret'd) (1998)

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