



CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE

FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Sustaining Canada's Future Submarine Fleet

Report - February 2026



FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Sustaining Canada's Future Submarine Fleet

Report - February 2026

On the Cover

Combat Camera/Flickr
“RIM of the Pacific exercise”
MS Dan Bard, Canadian Forces Combat Camera,
Canadian Armed Forces Photo
<https://flic.kr/p/2jCjynC>

Introduction

In recognition of the incredible complexity of sustaining defence capabilities, including timely defence procurement, the CDA Institute has initiated the ‘Force Development Series’, comprised of events involving a diverse range of subject matter experts and reports, as a contribution to the national discussion on defence policy. With the generous support of Department of National Defence (DND), the CDA Institute hosted a roundtable event on December 3rd, 2025, on the topic of securing Canada’s future submarine fleet. This event was a follow-up to the CDA Institute’s 2022 event, Canada’s Future Submarine Capability, which focused on Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy and the Victoria-class replacement.

The objective of the event was to address, at a high level, Canada’s progress on renewing its submarine fleet, focusing on sustainment, recruitment and retention, agile procurement, ensuring interoperability, information sharing, the successes and challenges of allies’ procurement arrangements, and the role of submarines in Canada’s Indo-Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic maritime strategies. The workshop also addressed how public support and interest can be sustained for this capability and emphasized the role submarines play in securing Canada’s national and international interests.

This report summarizes the discussions held during the event, providing a comprehensive overview of the key points made by the invited experts. The report aims to promote better understanding and informed debate about the challenges associated with sustaining this critical capability for Canadians. Complying with the Chatham House rules, the report does not attribute any comments to individuals.

A special thank you to our Rapporteur, Madison Fillmore,
PhD Candidate in International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa

Introduction

This report summarizes expert discussions on Canada's progress on replacing its aging Victoria-class submarines by the mid-2030s, as well as what is required to sustain the future fleet.

Canada has initiated a process to replace its aging Victoria-class submarines, acquiring up to twelve new submarines. Given increasing global geopolitical tensions, including in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, as well as rapidly evolving technologies, Canada must invest in increasing the capabilities of its Navy, including its submarine capabilities. The Government of Canada has “downselected” two international shipbuilders, the German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and the South Korean Hanwa Ocean Co., Ltd. (Hanwa). Both options meet Canada's unique operational requirements.

The increased speed and risk tolerance of Public Service and Procurement Canada (PSPC) for this project is welcomed. In particular, the downselect process saved many companies a significant amount of money in preparing proposals.

When selecting a submarine, the Canadian government should consider operational requirements, strategic autonomy, timetables, partnerships, and scalability. For sustaining the fleet, Canada should focus on doing as much at home, with Canadian materials, as possible. We should also think about the value we can offer others, including manufacturing pieces of the supply chain and repairs.

In sustaining and operating this fleet, many things need to be carefully planned before the arrival of the new submarines, including building resilient and secure supply chains, building sustainment capacity in Canada, including manufacturing and necessary infrastructure, and ensuring we have enough skilled people with proper training, including submariners, trainers, and technicians.

Although costly, the submarine project has the potential to bring significant military benefits and great economic benefits to Canada. To ensure success, careful, long-term planning and investments are needed, with a whole-of-government approach, as well as partnerships with industry and the education sector.

Points of Consensus

- Increasing geopolitical tensions, including in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, as well as increasing technological advancements in Russia and China, make the sustainment and improvement of Canada's submarine capability of essential importance.
- It is crucial to replace the Victoria-class as soon as possible. This will require careful planning and a compressed procurement process. "Schedule is king," and there are many elements that need to come together at the same time, including building, training, and building domestic capacity for sustainment.
- "Buying off the shelf" makes strategic sense because it will allow Canada to replace the Victoria-class faster and work with other states operating the same submarine platform for maintenance and sustainment needs. Most importantly, Canada will not be operating an orphan-class and will avoid the resulting maintenance problems of the Victoria-class.
- Although the shipbuilders will not be Canadian, we still can integrate Canadian materials throughout the building and sustainment process. Canada can play a large role in manufacturing elements for the supply chain, and in providing maintenance for states operating the same platform.
- Going from four to twelve submarines is a very complex undertaking with many moving pieces. Operations, training, and maintenance philosophies all need to "jive." This will require significant cooperation and co-planning between the government, the Canadian Armed Forces, industry, and the education sector.
- The most important aspect of this project is people. Canada will need a skilled workforce to secure and maintain the fleet, including submariners, trainers, technicians, and manufacturers. Canada should centre human capital throughout the process.

Points of Contention

- It was agreed that the Canadian government needs to view the submarines as potential war-fighting vehicles and prioritize operational capabilities. However, there was further discussion on whether the government should frame the submarine project as preparing for a possible war or as increasing economic prosperity.
- Although, understandably, parliamentarians advocate for their constituents, regional economic benefit for key ridings may not correlate with the best plan for improving Canada's military capabilities. Similarly, though the Canadian public may not want to collaborate with the US, cooperation may remain the best plan in terms of military capabilities and preparing for a possible global kinetic conflict.

Background

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) currently has a fleet of four Victoria-class submarines. However, the submarines have a history of maintenance problems, exacerbated by their “orphan-class” status. There is currently only one reliably working submarine. The Victoria-class is scheduled to be decommissioned by the mid-2030s. To avoid a capability gap, the Government of Canada has initiated a process to procure up to twelve conventionally powered, under-ice capable submarines by this time. The submarine project will cost at least \$60 billion, with some estimates as high as \$100 billion.

In August 2025, the Government of Canada announced that it had downselected two international shipbuilders: the German company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), which is offering the Type 212CD submarine, and the South Korean company Hanwa Ocean Co., Ltd. (Hanwa), which is offering the KSS-III submarine.

Sustaining and building its submarine capabilities has significant strategic importance to Canada. Submarines are one of the only strategic capabilities the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has, and Canada plays an outsized role in this space. Canada needs to think about submarines as a strategic asset that brings value domestically and to our allies. Submarines offer many advantages, including water-space management, intelligence gathering, deterrence, protecting commerce, and operational capabilities.

Global Geopolitical Landscape

The global geopolitical landscape is increasingly unstable, featuring rising great-power competition, regional tensions, massive military spending, and significant advancements in military technologies, which further underscore the need

to maintain and strengthen Canada’s military capabilities.

The maritime realm is a site of rising contestation. States are making expansive claims to parts of waters, often clashing with maritime law. Critical underwater infrastructure is also increasingly under attack. While Canada’s geographical location used to be seen as a source of protection, rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic mean that the situation has now been inverted. Canada must focus on building its capacity to defend itself and its allies in these strategic locations.

The Indo-Pacific: The Indo-Pacific is a highly dynamic region with increasing challenges, including tensions over Chinese claims to Taiwan and the threat of North Korea’s nuclear capacity. The Indo-Pacific is already primarily a maritime domain, and many states are investing in building their naval capacity. For example, Australia has made massive investments in shipbuilding, and India is building its fleet, including aircraft carriers and submarines. Singapore’s capabilities are small, but highly advanced. Japan and South Korea also have extremely good shipbuilding capabilities. In the coming years, the Indo-Pacific is likely to be the most important military theatre, posing the biggest security threat. As a Pacific nation, Canada must have the capacity to protect itself and its interests in the region.

The Arctic: The threat in the Arctic is also real and of significant importance to Canadian security. The Arctic is becoming more of a maritime military domain, and there is a definite role for Canadian submarines in the Arctic. The ability of submarines to travel to the Arctic with minimal surface exposure is essential for Canada. Operating in the Arctic is expensive, but submarines can do many things, including intelligence gathering, special operation support, and strengthening deterrence through presence.

There is increased Chinese and Russian interest in the Arctic. Changing ice conditions reshape access, acoustic environments, and operational risk for Russian submarines in the Arctic. The Northern Hemisphere may become a more crowded submarine space. There is also a “donut” area of concern around the Arctic, as connected regions in the Baltic and North Pacific are increasingly contested.

If Canada and its allies are vulnerable in the Arctic, adversaries could launch a surprise attack on the region itself. Such an attack could not only threaten Canada and allied forces operating in the Arctic but also facilitate attacks on our allies elsewhere. Deterrence is therefore essential in maintaining Arctic security. It is time to move from rhetoric to action in terms of protecting Arctic security.

The Global Submarine Landscape: The world's great powers, Russia, China, and the US, have been focusing on increasing their submarine capabilities for a long time. We are moving past nuclear deterrence with the capabilities of the “big three.” The Russian Borei A-class and Poseidon weapons system, for example, are war-fighting technologies designed to overcome deterrent systems. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is based on having a warning system for nuclear attacks. This system is being challenged by ongoing technological advancements.

Importantly, there is a shipbuilding crisis in the US, which is facing a significant shortage of skilled workers as well as obsolescent infrastructure. China's commercial shipbuilding capacity is 230x that of the US. The situation in terms of submarine delivery is already critical in the US as these combined challenges of infrastructure limitations and China's massive production advantage make it increasingly difficult for the US to maintain a competitive submarine fleet. The US is currently falling short of its submarine building targets, producing only 1.2 Virginia-class subma-

rines annually against a requirement of at least 2 per year.

The Canadian Submarine Landscape: Currently, there is no bigger priority for the RCN than the replacement of its Victoria-class submarines. Canada is currently down to only one reliably working submarine from the Victoria-class. It is therefore imperative to get submarines to the RCN as quickly as possible, in a way that ensures they can be maintained. Canada learned many important lessons from the Victoria-class, such as the importance of an effective maintenance routine. Most importantly, Canada learned the importance of not owning an orphan-class of submarines, which ultimately exacerbated all the problems with the Victoria-class.

Due to recent increases in defence spending, DND and the CAF have a significant amount of funds available right now. Canada has also committed to reaching its NATO commitment of 2% of spending our GDP on defence, and 5% by 2035. Securing and maintaining the submarine fleet offers a valuable return on this investment.

Despite these large investments, the absorptive capacity of DND is limited, and the department has not been able to spend all the money available to it since the introduction of its previous defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, in 2017.

It is also important to acknowledge that, despite the steps the Canadian government have taken to invest in defence, there are skeptics who do not believe the submarine project will come to fruition. They have good reason to be skeptical, as Canada has a history of announcing major military procurement and then not having the process proceed as envisioned. This includes the F-35 program and the previous submarine procurement project, which was cancelled in 1989, among other reasons, due to high costs framed as a choice between spending on defence or social programming. However, a lot has changed

in the last forty years. At the time, we were in the midst of the peace dividend and facing pressures for decreasing defence spending. Now, we have entered a new era of threats, and the geostrategic situation has greatly evolved. Importantly, the government has demonstrated that they understand this situation.

Skeptics will also point out that there is no dedicated fund in the 2025 budget for the submarine project. However, the budget did earmark new money for recruiting, training, equipment, military infrastructure, cyber defence capabilities, defence procurement, and improving Canada's military industrial base, all of which speak to the submarine project.

Canada's Relationship with the US: The Canadian relationship with the US is shifting. The Canadian public's view of the US is increasingly negative, driven in large part by President Donald Trump's "51st state" rhetoric. Historically, we have been driven by American pressure and have been focused on doing "just enough" to convince the US that we are not a security problem and are not reliant on their protection. The shifting Canada-US relationship is an opportunity to think about what Canada can do for its own security.

At the same time, it is important to remember that the Canada-US military relationship remains strong. While few specifics were offered, some participants argued that the US will and should play a role in Canada's submarine program. This is because Canada-US cooperation, through bi-national control of NORAD, is an essential feature of Canadian and American security.

The Procurement Process

The Canadian government has recognized that, in the case of replacing Canada's submarine fleet, a drawn-out procurement process increases

Canada's technological gap and security risk. In this context, the Government of Canada has taken multiple actions that have accelerated the pace of the submarine procurement process. The decision to downselect to two firms is welcomed by the defence sector, as it speeds up the process and saves other companies a lot of time and money in writing proposals when the government likely already has a preferred supplier. The Defence Investment Agency will also greatly accelerate the procurement process. In this case, PSPC was also given a lot of flexibility, with direct lines of communication to the Prime Minister. The process has also involved doing a lot of things in parallel rather than sequentially, for example, collaboration with industry on a sustainment plan at the same time as procurement.

Although PSPC has a reputation for being overly risk-averse, these are signs that it is accepting more risk, which is welcomed by the sector. The submarine procurement process can be seen as a "test case" for modern Canadian procurement, proving that Canada can deliver a complex capability in a compressed timeline.

Which Submarine?

Off the Shelf: The decision to buy "off the shelf" is not a compromise, but a strategic choice. It allows us to speed up the process, share risks and innovation with our allies, and avoid the pitfalls of owning an orphan class, as demonstrated by the Victoria class.

Considerations: The TKMS Type 212CD is not yet operational. The KSS-III is already in service, with new submarines currently being constructed. The Type-212CD is a smaller submarine, at 73 m. KSS is a bit larger, at 89 m. Both boats require smaller crews than the Victoria-class. While the legacy fleet requires a crew of 40, KSS-III requires a crew of 33, and Type-212CD requires a crew of 27. Although both submarines will have

under-ice capabilities, neither can operate under ice for prolonged periods, which would require nuclear power. This means that with either option, Canada must rely on its partners with nuclear capabilities to operate deep in the Arctic basin. Importantly, we will not own an orphan-class with either option. Future operators of the Type-212CD are Germany and Norway. South Korea is already operating the KSS-III option.

When choosing a submarine platform, Canada needs to ensure that it provides the capabilities we need, including lethality and the ability to fight our adversaries. Meeting Canada's unique operational requirements includes being able to operate in all three of Canada's oceans, under-ice capabilities, range, stealth, endurance, precision, and a full suite of missiles, including torpedoes. Commander of the RCN, Vice Admiral Angus Topshee, has already stated that he would be happy with either submarine and has confirmed that they both meet our capability requirements. Therefore, it may be other considerations, and which option offers the best "comprehensive package" to Canada that ultimately decides the choice of submarine. Ultimately, the only wrong decision is not making one fast enough.

Strategic autonomy: Canada should avoid "linkage issues" from the countries of origin and ensure that it does not sacrifice sovereignty in the buying process.

Timetable: KSS-III is already operational, meaning that we can rely on the country of origin already working with the platform. We would also likely be able to replace the Victoria-class faster. On the other hand, the Type-212CD is still in the final design, which allows the possibility for Canada to be part of the process. TKMS has indicated they would provide the first hull on Canada's required timelines (2035).

Allyship considerations: Buying KSS-III could be seen as an "asset test" for Canada's Indo-Pa-

cific region, demonstrating that we are prioritizing our relationships in the region and are ready to invest in them, opening better trade and relationships with our partners in the region. On the other hand, buying TKMS could be seen as an "asset test" for our commitment to European defence and our NATO partnerships.

Scalability: Buying "off the shelf" does not mean we can't use Canadian materials throughout the process or adapt the existing platform to our unique needs. The ability to scale up or down the existing platform is an important consideration in choosing a submarine. We should work with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) on these options. This strategy allows Canada to focus on adaptation rather than invention. We need to focus on securing the capability right now and leave room to "tinker" with it later.

Sustainment

Building Resilient Supply Chains: Submarines are very complex, with many components, which means that they involve complex supply chains. Submarine construction alone involves several tonnes of critical minerals. Building and sustaining resilient supply chains is therefore essential. Globally, we have seen the weaponization of supply chains, with countries that dominate production or processing of critical minerals and semiconductors able to disrupt or constrain high-tech and military supply chains. This highlights how important it is to work with our allies. The ability to support each other brings security.

Canada should not only think about what it needs, but also what it can provide in terms of secure supply chains. Canada can offer a secure and resource-rich manufacturing base for submarine components. Canada has twelve out of fourteen minerals that are essential for submarines. We also provide a much safer manufacturing base for our allies than continental

Europe, for example. Relatedly, the security of the ammunition supply chain is also critical, and we have seen from Ukraine that this is currently an inadequate supply chain. Ammunition is an industry that Canada can invest in building at home, bringing value and security to us and our allies. These goals will require working with industry early to ensure Canada has access to the crucial minerals that will be needed. Canada also needs to think about a plan for supply chain management in a conflict context, and not just in peacetime.

Maintenance: Submarines require significant maintenance, such as routine checks and hull and systems repairs. The government must work with industry to ensure that the critical maintenance infrastructure is in place before the first submarine arrives. Canada also needs to increase its dockyard capacity. Canada should start examining potential sites for Fleet Maintenance Facilities to expand and develop maintenance hubs on both coasts to support In-Service Support (ISS). This will also require building domestic capacity in manufacturing. Canada should also develop digital maintenance systems.

Canada needs to establish a cutting-edge sustainment industry and do as much sustainment in Canada as possible, aiming for a “sovereign sustainment ecosystem.” However, this does not mean we can’t work with our allies on collaboration. Effective collaboration already happens with our allies on C17 sustainment, for example. Canada also must recognize that buying “off the shelf” means that it will always have to at least partially rely on the OEM and the country of origin for maintenance needs. There will also always be export-controlled items, which is unavoidable.

Although we need to prioritize domestic sustainment, we should not stop there. Canada can develop a maintenance “niche” that will bring all our partners who operate the same class here for maintenance. Importantly, Canada needs to start

these preparations while also sustaining the legacy Victoria-class fleet until the new submarines arrive.

People: The most essential component of effective procurement, operation, and sustainment of a new submarine fleet is people. Canada needs to view human capital as one of the keys to an effective transition. The needs and experiences of workers and stakeholders, including sailors, trainers, technicians, and engineers, need to shape the process.

Submarines require a skilled naval, government, and industry workforce. We need a specialized and knowledgeable workforce capable of maintaining the submarine fleet, such as submarine engineers and technicians. This starts with Canada’s youth, working with universities and industry.

Recruitment and retention problems in CAF, and specifically the RCN, need to be addressed. CAF personnel policies are often designed with the army in mind, because it is the biggest workforce. However, the RCN has specific needs and considerations. Submarining is a demanding job, and we need to ensure we are looking after them. Canada needs to ensure stable career paths for submarine operators, trainers, and technicians. We also need to ensure that we don’t lose the people currently supporting the Victoria-class, so that we can ensure an effective transition and make sure that expertise endures.

Human capital is another area we can cooperate with and learn from our allies. How do our allies ensure they have the right people in the right places and have the proper skills training?

Partnerships: Sustaining and operating this submarine fleet demands partnerships. This includes domestic partnerships between government, CAF, industry, and the education sector. It also includes bilateral and multilateral international partnerships. Securing and effectively sustaining

these submarines sends a strong signal to our allies that we are willing to invest in our collective security, increasing our international reputation. Through the submarine program, we can become a better ally and become enriched by our allies, particularly those that operate the same equipment. We can share training, logistics, R&D, the risk of development, spiral upgrades, and maintenance. Ultimately, this increases operational abilities and deterrence.

Opportunities for Canadian Industry: The submarine program offers import opportunities for Canadian industry, including the production of components, long-term sustainment and life-cycle management, and the integration of national communications and intelligence systems.

Operational Considerations

The RCN has always been primarily a destroyer navy, with submarines as a niche. If Canada increases from four to twelve submarines, this is no longer a niche, and the RCN will become a submarine-intensive navy. Submarines will no longer be solely “piggybacking” off the surface fleet. This comes with different operational considerations.

Canada also needs to consider where to focus the submarine fleet. There are multiple points of threat, including the Pacific and the Arctic. Where do our priorities lie? Where does the future lie for Canada in terms of its submarine-centre?

We need to consider the “fungibility” of our submarine asset, or the ability for them to do multiple things, and fill multiple needs.

Middle power: Sustaining and increasing Canada’s submarine capability offers an important way for us to increase our influence as a middle power. Traditional middle powers, for example, Norway and Australia, are becoming significant military powers. How can we think about working

together with other middle powers? How can we become a middle power that is also a regional power?

Submarines as “socio-technical” systems: Submarine systems can be seen as interactions between social and technological aspects. Naval power, for instance, reflects technical assets and abilities, but is also socially constructed by the state and by the navy. How does the Navy think about itself? The RCN has historically viewed itself as a surface-based navy. With this new fleet, is the RCN a submarine navy or a navy that operates submarines?

Public Engagement

There is a huge Canadian public interest and support for defence right now. This is rare and needs to be capitalized on and sustained through clear engagement with the public. The Canadian public has typically not felt threatened because of a lasting narrative of Canada as a “fireproof house,” protected by its geographical location. Because of the changing relationship with the US, increased hostilities with adversaries, and emerging technologies, this threat perception is slowly changing. The Canadian government needs to clearly communicate the current security threats to the Canadian public to sustain support for the Submarine project and other large procurement and sustainment projects. The largest threat to Canadian security may be convincing Canadians that security is a problem.

The Arctic is an area of public engagement and education that could be improved. Canadians often hear that we must “protect our sovereignty in the Arctic”, but the average Canadian has very little experience in or knowledge of the Arctic.

The two submarine platforms under consideration are huge and exciting technological advancements. This should be clearly communi-

cated to the Canadian public and celebrated. At the same time, for many Canadians, especially young people, the biggest perceived security risk is economic security, including the cost of living and housing costs. The issues of national security and economic security can be “married” to demonstrate the economic benefit of investing, for example, in a modern submarine fleet.

It's important to clearly communicate the importance of submarines for increasing our military capabilities. However, the capability argument has not won popular support from the government or from the Canadian public in several decades. Tying the capability argument with economic prosperity is essential. For most Canadians, the most pressing security threat is the cost-of-living crisis. Support for increased defence spending is tied together with desires for economic prosperity and increased jobs.

Economic Benefits: The submarine program will come with huge costs (\$60-100 billion). However, it is also an investment which can provide huge economic benefits, in addition to military benefits. As discussed above, sustaining and operating this modern fleet requires many different skilled personnel, leading to the creation of well-paying and secure jobs. The vast infrastructure needs can create an economic boom, including regional economic development. The advanced technology of submarines will also result in technology transfer and innovation in the military and civilian sectors. Ultimately, the submarine program should be communicated not just as a naval project, but as an opportunity to grow the Canadian maritime industrial base for generations.

Risks

There are several risks to the submarine project. These include:

- **Other projects:** Although there is a lot

of money available for Canadian defence spending right now, the submarine project still must compete with the cost of other projects, including the River-class destroyers.

- **Time:** A lot can happen between now and 2035. Government priorities might shift due to new technologies or global events, including new conflicts.
- **Government Change:** There could be a change in government at any time, which may cancel or shift the project.
- **Partisan approach to defence:** It is difficult to have an effective parliamentary committee for defence because members are isolated from the stream of information, as they do not have proper security clearance and do not get the relevant intelligence reports. Although there are political incentives to retain this model, we are the only NATO member without some sort of multipartisan approach to defence. Ultimately, moments in military projects will always be “transitory” until this model changes. This is not effective for large projects which require decades of planning.
- **Risk Aversion:** With this complex a project, we will likely not get everything correct. It is very likely that there will be waste and that some projects will not work out. This will create political pressure. As a country, we need to create a culture and an appetite for learning and understand that we are learning and re-learning how to be an effective submarine power.
- **University Research Capacity:** Universities are also feeling immense financial pressure because of reduced government funding as well as cuts to international student quotas. Canada has typically been

averse to pure R&D, meaning research that is not tailor-made for military use. However, we need to be able and willing to invest in pure R&D and recognize that a lot of military technologies will come from the civilian world. This requires strong relationships with universities.

- **Flow of Information:** An additional problem is the flow of information within the RCN, because the understanding of submarines is restricted to a small number of people.

Accountability, Transparency, and Evaluation

This submarine project, with its compressed timeline and high cost, demands effective accountability, transparency, and evaluation mechanisms. We need quality data, performance-based incentives, and transparent reporting.

Although Canada has had smaller parliamentary reports on the issues with the Victoria-class, it did not undertake a comprehensive evaluation and reporting process. Australia, for example, undertook the Coles Report to understand the problems with sustainment with the Collins-class. Canada could consider a similar evaluation report to clearly understand and remedy the problems with the Victoria-class.

Conclusion

The replacement of the Victoria-class with up to twelve modern submarines is an exciting project with the potential to greatly improve Canada's operational capabilities and provide economic benefits. Despite a history of slow procurement, there are many reasons to be optimistic about the submarine project. The procurement process has happened at an accelerated rate, including

a downselect of two options early in the process. The creation of the Defence Investment Agency will also speed up the process. The Government of Canada is prioritizing defence and security and providing adequate resources, which is welcome. The Canadian public is currently also very interested in and engaged in defence issues. Current security risks and the benefits of submarines and other defence investments need to be clearly communicated to the public to sustain this interest and support.

To maintain this momentum, the Government of Canada needs to build strong relationships with industry and the education sector, and invest in guaranteeing secure supply chains, a manufacturing base in Canada, a strong sustainment and maintenance domestic capacity, and the proper training of military and civilian personnel. This is a complex project requiring a whole-of-government approach, innovation, creativity, and resolve.

Ultimately, guaranteeing the success of the submarine project is not a short-term goal. Current actions for procurement and building sustainment capacity need to be embedded in a larger term strategy, signalling that Canada is going to invest in maintaining its submarine capacity in a big way. This will ensure that we are not in another crisis moment in another 30 years.