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Converting Defence Spending into Capability:
Institutional Misalignment and Senior Military
Leadership in Canada

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About the Author

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On The Cover

Combat Camera / Flickr

“EX MAPLE RESOLVE”

Members of Charlie Company First Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment move to a treeline as they conduct a section attack against the opposition force at OBJECTIVE Gorgons during Exercise Maple Resolve at Thetford Mines, Quebec, 14 April, 2026.

Photo: Corporal Liam Stagg, Canadian Armed Forces Combat Camera

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Abstract

Canada's defence expansion is shifting the policy problem from obtaining resources to converting them into capability. This paper asks why Canadian defence spending converts so slowly and unevenly into usable military capability and what that implies for the mandate, selection, and evaluation of senior military leadership. Drawing on parliamentary evidence, departmental data, audits, doctrine, and literature on organizational learning, accountability, and military innovation, it argues that underperformance is primarily a structural conversion problem. Authority, accountability, and time horizons are misaligned across the political, military, financial, procurement, training, and industrial institutions responsible for defence. The result is a recurrent break between appropriations and operational availability, recruitment and trained strength, Reserve numbers and mobilization depth, and technological acquisition and adaptive use. The distinction between custodial and builder leadership is used as a phase-fit framework rather than a judgment of personal competence: custodians preserve reliable systems, while builders redesign the interfaces that generate new capacity. Higher spending will not correct those interfaces by itself. Government should define the rebuilding phase before appointing the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), select a Chief and complementary senior team with documented records of system construction, issue a joint delivery mandate, protect candid escalation, and measure progress through trained strength, instructor depth, operational availability, procurement milestones, sustainment, and the capacity left in their wake.

Introduction

Canada has entered a defence expansion after decades in which governments largely asked the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to preserve commitments while absorbing scarcity. The policy environment has now changed. Canada's 2024 defence policy, *Our North Strong and Free*,¹ called for renewed investment in sovereignty and military capability; Canada reported reaching NATO's 2 per cent spending benchmark in fiscal year 2025-26;² and NATO's 2025 Hague commitment set a path toward defence and security investment equal to 5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2035.³ The 2026 Ankara Summit further emphasized that higher spending must produce capabilities, infrastructure, and industrial capacity.⁴ The policy question is therefore no longer only whether Canada will spend more. It is whether the defence institution can convert additional resources into trained formations, available equipment, stockpiles, infrastructure, repair capacity, and allied credibility.

Why does Canadian defence spending convert so slowly and unevenly into usable military capability, and what does that imply for the mandate, selection, and evaluation of senior military leadership? This paper proposes that Canada's defence underperformance is no longer best understood as a shortage of resources alone. Prolonged scarcity contributed to the present deficit, but the contemporary delivery problem is structural. Authority, accountability, and decision timelines are misaligned across the political, military, financial, procurement, training, and industrial institutions that together generate military power. These conditions interrupt the chain from appropriation to operational availability, from enrolment to trained

strength, and from technological acquisition to adaptive employment.

Capability is used here to mean a fieldable and sustainable military effect rather than an intermediate administrative output. Appropriations, signed contracts, delivered platforms, and enrolled recruits are inputs or partial outputs. Capability emerges only when people, equipment, doctrine, data, infrastructure, maintenance, munitions, logistics, training, and command arrangements function together at an acceptable level of readiness. Because no single office controls that entire chain, the central analytical problem is institutional conversion: how effectively the defence system turns policy direction and resources into operational effect.

The argument proceeds in five stages. First, it develops a framework for distinguishing custodial leadership from builder leadership and treats the distinction as a question of fit between leadership orientation and institutional phase. Second, it examines how fragmented governance weakens accountability for capability delivery. Third, it assesses the conversion of recruitment into Trained Effective Strength (TES), including training capacity, instructor depth, housing, and the Reserve. Fourth, it considers how Arctic requirements, technological change, and industrial adaptation compress the time available for reform. Fifth, it identifies implications for the mandate, selection, and evaluation of the CDS and the senior defence team. The analysis draws primarily on Canadian audits, parliamentary testimony, departmental reporting, doctrine, and relevant literature. It does not claim that every delay has the same cause; rather, it identifies recurring patterns across otherwise different capability systems.

Analytical Framework: Capability Conversion and Leadership Fit

Organizations must both exploit established routines for current performance and explore new approaches for future adaptation. Exploitation produces reliability, efficiency, and control; exploration supports adaptation when technologies, threats, or institutional demands change. Organizational learning research shows that systems tend to favour exploitation because its returns are more immediate and measurable, even when excessive reliance on existing routines creates long-term vulnerability.⁵ Military innovation literature reaches a related conclusion: new technology becomes effective military power only when organizations alter doctrine, career incentives, authority relationships, and learning processes around it.⁶

The distinction between custodial and builder leadership applies these insights to defence governance. Custodial leadership preserves inherited systems, controls risk, maintains standards, and sustains continuity. Builder leadership redesigns systems, joins previously separated functions, creates new capacity, and institutionalizes learning. The categories are not moral judgments and they do not describe fixed personality types. A competent custodian may be exactly what a stable institution requires, while an undisciplined reformer can damage essential capabilities. The relevant question is whether the leader's demonstrated orientation fits the phase the institution has been directed to enter.

Canadian military doctrine already provides a basis for this phase-fit argument. Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution defines effective leadership as accomplishing current missions while developing or improving the capabilities required for future success.⁷ It also assigns institutional leaders responsibility for strategy, stewardship, external relationships, and the conditions

under which the profession can succeed.⁸ The doctrine therefore treats maintenance and development as connected responsibilities, but it does not resolve how government should select, empower, protect, and judge leaders when development must temporarily take priority over continuity.

For much of the post-Cold War era, governments asked the defence institution to absorb reductions, preserve commitments, and manage scarcity. Under those conditions, custodial skill was often rational. The current instruction is different: expand, rearm, modernize, strengthen the Arctic, deepen alliance contributions, and connect defence investment to industrial capacity. This is a rebuilding phase. It requires leaders who can preserve essential operations while altering the systems that generate people, equipment, readiness, and adaptation.

Three mechanisms explain why the present system has difficulty doing so. The first is fragmented authority: multiple organizations control different parts of a capability and can delay or redirect it without owning the final operational outcome. The second is diffuse accountability: responsibility is distributed across so many actors that it becomes difficult to identify who must explain a failure and who can correct it. The third is temporal misalignment: political and military appointments are shorter than major procurement and force-development cycles, while software, drones, electronic warfare, and commercial technology evolve faster than conventional approval systems. Public-administration scholarship describes the first two conditions as an accountability problem involving many hands;⁹ megaproject research shows how long timelines and complex governance increase cost, delay, and lock-in.¹⁰ Together, these mechanisms favour procedural stewardship over capability delivery.

Fragmented Defence Governance and the Capability Conversion Problem

Canadian defence failures are often described as separate military problems: slow procurement, personnel shortages, ageing equipment, strained infrastructure, maintenance backlogs, and weak readiness. These conditions are real, but they are also linked. Parliamentary and departmental reviews of procurement have repeatedly identified dispersed accountability, disconnected information, heavy oversight, excessive documentation, and a system in which procedural compliance can be easier to demonstrate than operational effect.¹¹ The Canadian literature on defence procurement similarly emphasizes that recurring delay is not simply a technical purchasing problem; it reflects political incentives, divided responsibility, and inconsistent priority over time.¹²

Fragmentation weakens both decision-making and learning. When responsibility for a capability is divided among military headquarters, the Department of National Defence (DND), central agencies, contracting authorities, regulators, and industry, each actor may perform its assigned function while the combined system fails to produce an operational result. Accountability then becomes retrospective and partial. One organization explains the requirement, another the approval process, another the contract, and another the budget, but no single account connects the original policy objective to the readiness consequence of delay.

The relationship between the CDS and the Deputy Minister illustrates the problem. Section 18 of the National Defence Act charges the CDS, under the direction of the Minister, with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.¹³ Government describes the CDS as commander of the CAF,

principal military adviser, and the officer responsible for operations and readiness.¹⁴ The Deputy Minister, by contrast, holds specific statutory and delegated responsibilities for public funds, property, civilian administration, contracting, and departmental management.¹⁵ These are lawful and necessary divisions. They also mean that the CDS can be held responsible for readiness without possessing unilateral control over many of the financial, contracting, infrastructure, and sustainment levers that determine readiness.

The appropriate response is not to make the CDS the accounting officer or to militarize procurement. Civilian control, financial probity, competition, industrial policy, and parliamentary accountability are essential. The institutional requirement is to align the interfaces between military responsibility and civilian authority. Where operational accountability is not matched by control, government must create explicit shared obligations, named decision rights, and a protected route for escalation.

Time compounds the governance problem. Ships, aircraft, bases, information systems, and training pipelines extend beyond the tenure of most ministers, deputy ministers, and senior officers. Benefits may appear after the leaders who initiated a project have moved on, while the consequences of delay may be inherited by successors. Major projects also face optimism bias, changing requirements, technological obsolescence, and the accumulation of small approvals that protect individual organizations from risk while increasing risk to the overall program.¹⁶ The result is a system that can be procedurally defensible at each stage and strategically unsuccessful in aggregate.

The creation of the Defence Investment Agency¹⁷ and publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy¹⁸ are consistent with a recognition that the former acquisition system

was too fragmented and slow. These reforms can improve capability conversion, but their value will not be demonstrated by organizational charts or the number of contracts signed. It will be demonstrated by shorter delivery timelines, clearer accountability, operational availability, repairable equipment, resilient supply chains, and decisions that can adapt when requirements or technologies change.

For each high-priority capability, government should therefore issue a joint delivery mandate to the CDS, Deputy Minister, and Defence Investment Agency; designate one senior responsible leader for integration; and require a single schedule from approved operational requirement to operational availability. The CDS should own the military requirement, operational priority, acceptance standard, and statement of readiness consequence. Civilian authorities should retain responsibility for lawful financial stewardship, contracting, and industrial policy. Cabinet should decide unresolved trade-offs that cannot be settled within the defence portfolio. The CDS should also have a formal duty and protected channel to escalate when process delay creates material military risk. This model would not eliminate disagreement, but it would make the disagreement visible and assign responsibility for resolving it.

Personnel and Reserve Force Generation: From Intake to Trained Strength

Measuring Recruitment-to-Readiness Conversion

The CAF's reconstitution directive recognizes that personnel recovery depends on recruitment, retention, housing, family support, training, modernization, institutional optimization, and the Reserve.¹⁹ That systems perspective is correct. The central problem is that public reporting still tends to emphasize

entry into the system more clearly than conversion through it.

As of 31 March 2026, the Regular Force stood at 67,827 members against an authorized strength of 71,500. The Primary Reserve reported 32,444 members against a target of 38,800, while Average Paid Strength was 25,054 against the 30,000-figure used in the reconstitution directive.²⁰ Between April 2022 and March 2025, 191,981 people applied to join the CAF, but 14,946 were recruited. Median recruiting time ranged from 245 to 271 days against a target of 100 to 150 days, and pending security quality checks approached 23,000.²¹ There was also meaningful progress: external Regular Force enrolment reached 7,310 in 2025-26, the highest in more than thirty years. Including 758 component transfers from the Primary Reserve, total Regular Force intake was 8,068, or 106 per cent of target.²²

That improvement should be recognized, but intake is not readiness. The personnel pipeline contains distinct stages: applicant, recruit, basic-training graduate, occupationally qualified member, and member available to an employable team. Conflating these stages obscures the institution's actual output. Trained Effective Strength (TES) counts members who have reached the Occupational Functional Point (OFP), the point at which they have completed the individual training and education required for first employment in their occupation.²³ TES is therefore a better measure of usable personnel than total paid strength, although it does not by itself establish deployability, equipment availability, medical currency, or team readiness.

A detailed public snapshot dated 30 September 2024 reported 52,261 Regular Force members at TES and 22,160 Primary Reservists post-OFP.²⁴ The 2026-27 Departmental Plan reports current environment-level TES rates of 75

percent in the Royal Canadian Navy, 77 percent in the Canadian Army, and 84.7 per cent in the Royal Canadian Air Force.²⁵ Yet when a parliamentary committee asked in May 2026 for the actual numbers needed to reach TES, the response referred to the 71,500 establishment and the nearly 68,000 total Regular Force population.²⁶ Those figures do not disclose how many members are occupationally qualified or available to formations. Authorized establishment, total strength, TES, and formation availability are related measures, but they are not interchangeable.

Training Capacity and Instructor Depth

The training pipeline reveals where conversion slows. In April 2026, the Chief of Military Personnel placed the Basic Training List (BTL) at roughly 12,000. The BTL includes members who have not reached OFP, whether they are on a course or awaiting the next stage.²⁷ When a parliamentary committee asked how many had completed basic training but were waiting for occupational training, the hearing produced no national total for the post-basic Personnel Awaiting Training (PAT) subset.²⁸ It would be inaccurate to describe all members on the BTL as idle. It is equally misleading to report enrolment without disclosing how many members remain between basic training and useful employment.

Selection reform creates a second conversion question. In October 2024, the CAF replaced the Canadian Forces Aptitude Test with the Scored Employment Application Form, which assesses education, experience, leadership, and other life achievements. DND states that the change accelerates enrolment without lowering standards.²⁹ Its accessibility reporting nevertheless warned that complete removal of aptitude testing would impede continued analysis of aptitude outcomes.³⁰ In May 2026 testimony, the Chief of Military

Personnel stated that the basic-training success rate had fallen from 85 to 77 per cent as entry barriers were reduced.³¹ That sequence does not establish causation, because several selection and training changes occurred during the same period. It does establish the need to evaluate the new system by trained output and occupational fit rather than enrolment speed alone.

If an entry screening becomes less predictive of training success, selection risk is not eliminated; it is transferred into a paid system of instructors, beds, equipment, administration, and limited course seats. Every avoidable recycle or early release consumes capacity that could have advanced another member toward OFP. Every avoidable delay between courses adds cost before the institution receives the occupational effect for which the position exists. The appropriate test is therefore cohort conversion: how many entrants reach OFP, in which occupations, over what period, at what cost, and with what early attrition.

Housing and training capacity further demonstrate why personnel files cannot be managed separately. In spring 2025, only 205 military residential housing units were available while 3,706 applicants were on waiting lists.³² DND estimated that another 5,200 to 7,200 units were required, yet the existing plan still left a gap of at least 3,800.³³ Housing affects postings, retention, family stability, and whether trained specialists can serve where the institution requires them.

The Auditor General found that basic-training capacity had not kept pace with intended recruiting growth and that shortages of instructors, equipment, and facilities forced reliance on temporary instructors and additional cohorts that were not sustainable over the long term.³⁴ DND's retention evaluation similarly found that shortages of

trainers, equipment, facilities, and support could leave pre-qualified members underemployed for months; in occupations categorized as red trades, average training delays were approximately 206 days.³⁵ The Army has also identified shortages of master corporals, sergeants, and captains, the ranks that provide much of the training cadre.³⁶ These shortages are multiplicative: fewer experienced instructors produce fewer courses and smaller cohorts; slower qualification increases underemployment and frustration; attrition removes future supervisors and instructors from an already thin pool.

Training establishments should therefore be treated as operational production systems rather than administrative service providers. Critical training schools and Reserve training cadres require protected positions, current specialists, sufficient equipment, stable facilities, and career incentives that make instructional service professionally valuable. Compensation measures and temporary Reserve augmentation can help, but they cannot substitute for a deliberate instructor-generation model.³⁷ Evaluations of individual schools have also shown that staffing, governance, standards, and data must be managed together rather than as separate course calendars.³⁸

A monthly personnel conversion dashboard should distinguish authorized establishment, total paid strength, BTL, members actively on course, post-basic Personnel Awaiting Training (PAT), new OFP gains, TES by occupation, and personnel available to assigned formations. It should report median and 90th-percentile time to OFP, training recycles and releases, cancelled course serials, instructor fill, PAT person-days, housing constraints, and cost per member reaching OFP. The change in selection methods should be assessed through matched cohorts by occupation, using basic-training completion,

occupational-training completion, early attrition, and time to useful employment. These measures would shift attention from how many people enter the institution to how reliably the institution produces trained capability.

Reserve Readiness and Mobilization Depth

The Reserve exposes the same conversion problem under part-time conditions. A Reservist may require two summers of sequential training to reach OFP.³⁹ That model works only when course seats, instructors, equipment, facilities, and dates align with civilian employment and education. A missed or cancelled course can delay useful employment for another year. The 2016 Army Reserve audit found unclear guidance for major missions, limited access to equipment, understrength units, uneven readiness confirmation, and incomplete integration of training.⁴⁰ More recent policy describes assigned capabilities, flexible movement between components, mobilization depth, and full-time capability through part-time service.⁴¹ The unresolved issue is whether the training and equipment system can deliver those ambitions.

A Reserve unit can therefore grow in nominal strength while losing ground in trained strength, specialist depth, and the ability to reproduce expertise. Every Reserve capability should have an assigned operational outcome, a realistic readiness model, adequate equipment, predictable and employer-compatible training, protected specialist instructors, and a defined relationship to mobilization. Multi-year course calendars, modular training where standards permit, intelligent recognition of civilian qualifications, and measurement from trainee to practitioner to specialist instructor would make Reserve reporting more meaningful. Reserve leaders should also participate directly

in force and training design so that policies are not built around full-time assumptions.

Technological and Industrial Adaptation: Shorter Cycles, Longer Commitments

The conversion problem is becoming more urgent because Canada must make long-term force-structure decisions while relevant technologies change rapidly. In the Arctic, sovereignty depends on persistent awareness, communications, infrastructure, mobility, logistics, maintenance, presence, and the ability to reinforce and sustain forces over distance.⁴² Airfields, sensors, ports, fuel, housing, trained personnel, and supply chains cannot be improvised after a crisis begins. Decisions made during the present expansion will therefore lock in costs and operating concepts for decades.

Russia's war against Ukraine demonstrates that advanced platforms and battlefield courage are insufficient without industrial depth, repair, stockpiles, trained replacements, and rapid adaptation. Ukraine linked commercial technology, digital procurement, front-line feedback, local workshops, distributed production, and national mobilization.⁴³ One estimate places Ukrainian drone production at roughly 3,000 to 5,000 units in 2022 and more than 2.2 million in 2024.⁴⁴ The analytical significance lies less in the number than in the learning system that connected operators, engineers, suppliers, and commanders at operational speed.⁴⁵

Drones, artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, commercial sensing, and precision strike compress the cycle from observation to decision and action. They also increase dependence on software, data, secure networks, spectrum resilience, modular design, and supply chains able to replace components quickly. Major platforms will

remain essential, but platforms without open architectures, counter-drone protection, data rights, repair capacity, and rapid software pathways may lose relevance faster than conventional procurement can replace them. Canada's Defence Drone Initiative and Army work on robotic and autonomous systems implicitly recognize that parts of acquisition must operate as permanent learning systems rather than one-time purchases.⁴⁶

The future fighter project illustrates the difference between acquiring a platform and fielding a capability. The estimated project cost rose from \$19.0 billion in 2022 to \$27.7 billion in 2024, while the Auditor General identified at least \$5.5 billion in additional elements required for full operational capability.⁴⁷ Aircraft, ships, vehicles, and drones become military power only when integrated with trained personnel, weapons, data, secure networks, simulators, maintenance, spare parts, infrastructure, doctrine, and deployable support.

Canada therefore requires two connected acquisition logics. Major platforms need disciplined long-term governance, stable requirements, sustainment planning, and industrial capacity. Fast-moving technologies need shorter approval pathways, iterative testing, modularity, controlled experimentation, and direct feedback from operators. The two logics should meet through common data standards, open interfaces, munitions and spares planning, and a clear authority for accepting calculated technical risk. Without that architecture, larger budgets can produce larger queues, cost escalation, lapsed funds, and a more expensive version of the same readiness gap.

Senior Leadership Design for a Defence Rebuild

Defining the Rebuilding Mandate Before Appointment

The preceding analysis implies that selecting the CDS is an institutional design decision, not a contest among biographies. Government should first define the phase of the institution and the problem the appointment is intended to solve. If the phase is rebuilding, the mandate should identify the capabilities to be generated, the institutional interfaces to be redesigned, the risks requiring political decision, and the inherited activities that may need to stop. A leader cannot be evaluated fairly against a mandate that remains implicit or expands without priority.

The mandate should be joint. The CDS cannot independently solve problems whose authorities are distributed across the Deputy Minister, Defence Investment Agency, central agencies, infrastructure organizations, and industry. Government should appoint a complementary senior team and issue shared delivery obligations for priority capabilities. The team should work against an integrated 1,000-day plan that distinguishes outcomes within its control, decisions required from ministers or Cabinet, and longer-term programs whose early milestones must be achieved during the appointment.

Evaluating System-Building Capacity

Selection should examine evidence of construction rather than relying primarily on positions held, operational reputation, or seniority. Relevant questions include: Which organization, training system, readiness model, partnership, digital capability, or talent pipeline became materially stronger because of the candidate's leadership? Did the improvement survive the candidate's departure? Did the leader expose risk early, make trade-offs, develop successors, and

connect operational requirements to financial, technological, and industrial realities?

Builder leadership also requires principled challenge. The issue is not public confrontation or institutional disloyalty. It is the capacity to present military risk and feasible options clearly enough that elected leaders must choose, while continuing to execute lawful direction. Canadian doctrine and the CAF Ethos treat moral courage, stewardship, disciplined initiative, and the development of others as professional responsibilities.⁴⁸ Talent management should therefore reward leaders who improve systems, report unwelcome evidence, and create successors, not only those who perform well within inherited structures.⁴⁹

Authority, Tenure, and Protected Challenge

Selection alone is insufficient. Government cannot place a builder in a system that punishes adaptation and expect transformation. The CDS and senior team require authorities aligned as closely as law permits with their accountability, sufficiently stable tenure, access to ministers and central agencies when cross-government barriers threaten capability, and a protected route for candid military advice. They also require permission to stop activities. Rebuilding cannot mean adding every new priority to every inherited commitment. Programs must end, structures must simplify, obsolete requirements must retire, and some risk must be accepted deliberately rather than accumulated invisibly.

These protections should be balanced by independent assessment. At defined intervals, an external review should examine whether additional resources are becoming trained strength, operational availability, sustainment, and adaptive capacity. Public reporting should be as transparent as security permits; classified reporting should be direct enough to force political decisions. The purpose is not to personalize blame. It is to prevent ambiguous

language, moving baselines, or activity measures from substituting for capability.

Auditable Outcomes and Succession

A rebuilding mandate should use a small set of auditable outcomes. For personnel, these should include recruiting time, basic-training completion, BTL-to-OFP conversion, post-basic PAT, time to OFP, TES by occupation, instructor fill, cancelled course serials, and formation availability. For equipment, they should include decision and contract milestones, integration status, operational availability, repair time, munitions and spares depth, and the readiness consequence of delay. For the Reserve, they should include assigned capability, trained strength, specialist depth, equipment access, and mobilization readiness. For adaptation, they should include the time required for operational feedback to change doctrine, software, training, or equipment.

The final measure is what remains after the appointment. A successful rebuilding Chief should leave clearer authorities, more truthful data, functioning training and acquisition systems, a deeper instructor corps, stronger relationships with civilian partners, and leaders capable of continuing the work. The objective is not to find a heroic CDS. It is to make system-building leadership normal, protected, measurable, and reproducible across the defence institution.

Conclusion: Institutional Redesign as a Condition of Expansion

Canadian defence spending converts slowly and unevenly into capability because the institutions responsible for conversion divide authority, accountability, and time in ways that weaken ownership of the operational outcome. The same pattern appears in procurement, personnel generation, Reserve readiness, and technological adaptation. Resources are necessary, but resources entering an unreformed system can generate more activity without proportionate readiness.

The policy implication is that defence expansion and institutional redesign cannot be sequenced. They must proceed together. Priority capabilities need joint delivery mandates, named integration leaders, unified schedules, and protected escalation. Personnel reporting must follow recruits through training to OFP, TES, and formation availability. Training establishments and instructor cadres must be protected as production capacity. Acquisition must distinguish between long-horizon platforms and fast-cycle technologies while connecting both to sustainment and operational learning. The CDS and senior team must be selected and evaluated against that conversion task.

Canada's defence rebuild should therefore be judged neither by announcements nor spending totals alone. Its meaningful outputs are trained formations, available equipment, sustainable stockpiles, resilient infrastructure, adaptable industrial capacity, and leaders who leave stronger systems and capable successors in their wake.

Endnotes

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² Government of Canada 2026.

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⁴ NATO 2026.

⁵ March 1991.

⁶ Rosen 1991; Grissom 2006.

⁷ Department of National Defence 2007.

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⁹ Thompson 1980; Bovens 2007.

¹⁰ Flyvbjerg 2014.

¹¹ House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence 2024; Department of National Defence 2025d.

¹² Nossal 2016.

¹³ Justice Laws Website 1985.

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²⁶ House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence 2026.

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