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CDA & CDA INSTITUTE
SPECIAL EVENT -
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW:
OPENING REMARKS AND WRITTEN
STATEMENTS

May | mai 2016

On 11 May 2016, the Conference of Defence Associations and the CDA Institute held an exclusive, by-invitation only ‘Special Event’ on the Defence Policy Review (DPR), where select experts were given an opportunity to provide submissions and written statements to two members of the Minister of National Defence (MND) Advisory Panel (MAP), General Ray Henault (Ret’d) and Ms. Margaret Purdy.

In effect, since Ottawa will not be a location for one of the official DPR Roundtables, we decided to create a de facto by-invitation roundtable, and therefore allow individuals who might not have a chance in the official Roundtables to provide input into the process.

Dr. Kim Richard Nossal gave introductory scene-setting remarks, and speakers offered very brief presentations to Gen. Henault and Ms. Purdy on a variety of security and defence topics very much germane to the Review. These individuals were chosen from the Conference of Defence Associations Regular Member Associations, the CDA Institute Board of Directors, Council of Advisers and Fellows, as well as from the broader defence community for their expertise and qualifications, and included former senior military officers, policy-makers, and academics. The event was moderated by LGen George MacDonald (Ret’d), CDA Institute Council of Advisers, and a special thank you to him for having conceived the initial idea.

This CDA-CDA Institute Special Event was held under modified Chatham House – other than the presentations themselves, there was no attribution to individuals for the content of the discussion during the question and answer period. However, we did get permission from the scene-setter and all presenters to publish their written statements in this special CDA Institute Analysis.

We hope you find this particular Analysis of interest in light of the ongoing Defence Policy Review. We would also like to thank the corporate sponsors for this event: DRS Technologies and KPMG.

Tony Battista

CEO - CDA and CDA Institute

PDG - CAD et l’Institut de la CAD



CDA & CDA INSTITUTE SPECIAL EVENT DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW



AGENDA

1400-1405	Welcome , Tony Battista (CEO - CDA/CDA Institute), Grant MacDonald (KPMG)
1405-1410	Introduction , LGen George Macdonald (Ret'd)
1410-1415	Remarks , Gen Ray Henault (Ret'd) and Ms. Margaret Purdy
1415-1425	Scene-Setter , Dr. Kim Richard Nossal
1425-1455	Presenters - Group One Col Charles Davies (Ret'd) LGen Stuart Beare (Ret'd) & Dan Ross - RCAA LGen George Macdonald (Ret'd)
1455-1515	Question and Answer
1515-1545	Presenters - Group Two Col Dr. Michael Cessford (Ret'd) Dr. Elinor Sloan Dr. Stephen Saideman
1545-1605	Question and Answer
1605-1615	Health Break
1615-1635	Presenters - Group Three MGen Richard Blanchette (Ret'd) & CWO Ray McInnis (Ret'd) - Royal Canadian Legion MGen Douglas Dempster (Ret'd)
1635-1655	Question and Answer
1655-1700	Concluding Remarks , Tony Battista
1700-1800	Reception

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CAD ET L'INSTITUT DE LA CAD, L'ÉVÉNEMENT SPÉCIAL EXAMEN DE LA POLITIQUE DE DÉFENSE



ORDRE DU JOUR

14 h - 14 h 05	Mot de bienvenue , Tony Battista (PDG - CAD/Institut de la CAD), Grant MacDonald (KPMG)
14 h 05 - 14 h 10	Mot d'ouverture , Lgén George Macdonald (ret)
14 h 10 - 14 h 15	Remarques , Gén Ray Henault (ret) et M. Margaret Purdy
14 h 15 - 14 h 25	Mise en contexte , Dr Kim Richard Nossal
14 h 25 - 14 h 55	Présentation, premier groupe Col Charles Davies (ret) Lgén Stuart Beare (ret) et Dan Ross - AARC Lgén George Macdonald (ret)
14 h 55 - 15 h 15	Séance questions - réponses
15 h 15 - 15 h 45	Présentation, deuxième groupe Col Dr Michael Cessford (ret) Dr Elinor Sloan Dr Stephen Saideman
15 h 45 - 16 h 05	Séance questions - réponses
16 h 05 - 16 h 15	Pause-Santé
16 h 15 - 16 h 35	Présentation, troisième groupe Mgén Richard Blanchette (ret) et L'Adjud Ray McInnis (ret) - Légion Royale Canadienne Mgén Douglas Dempster (ret)
16 h 35 - 16 h 55	Séance questions - réponses
16 h 55 - 17 h	Mot de clôture , Tony Battista
17 h - 18 h	Réception

COMMANDITAIRES DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT



OPENING REMARKS – DR. KIM RICHARD NOSSAL

I have been asked to provide some very brief and general comments to frame our discussion today. I want to offer four observations that we might keep in mind today, and that the members of the Ministerial Advisory Panel might reflect on in the months ahead.

First, we need to put the 2016 review into broader context. Unlike many of our allies, Canada rarely reviews its defence policy: in the last half century, there were only six defence reviews between 1964 and 2008; the one initiated by the minister of national defence, Harjit Sajjan, this year is the seventh. By contrast, the United States reviews defence every four years with its Quadrennial Defense Review, and many other allies review their defence policies more frequently than in Canada.

However, the rarity of the process we are engaged in today should not blind us to the reality that the process of reviewing defence policy in Canada is actually very regular — indeed, it is as regular as clockwork. It is just that Canadian defence-review “clocks” do not measure time in a normal way, by hours or years.

Rather, in Canada, there is another regularity at work — and the years in which our defence reviews were published gives away the nature of that regularity: 1964, 1971, 1987, 1994, 2005, 2008, and now 2016.

In other words, when Canadians get a new prime minister, it is time for a new defence review. The reviews initiated by the Liberal government of Lester Pearson and his Liberal successor Pierre Elliott Trudeau; by the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney (initiated in 1984, but not delivered until 1987); by the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien, and his Liberal successor Paul Martin; and the Conservative government of Stephen Harper were all driven by the desire of a new prime minister to distance himself from the defence policies of his predecessors, and to leave his own mark on Canada’s defence policy. And Justin Trudeau’s defence review is very much in this mode.

However, equally important is what did *not* follow these reviews: in not one instance did a government that initiated a defence review think it necessary to revisit that review during the remainder of its term in office, even though Trudeau Sr., Mulroney, Chrétien and Harper were all in office for close to a decade or more.

What would be useful is if this particular regularity might be broken. In other words, rather than publishing a fancy review of defence policy that will adorn the desks of defence folks for a while

before it gets put up on a shelf and forgotten about, it would be useful if the government committed to coming back to this review on a regular basis — in four or five years.

Given the government's majority, we know that we will not be going to the polls until 21 October 2019, and so it would be useful if in the 2016 review the government would commit to a process of reviewing the review in 2020-21.

If the Liberals were re-elected in October 2019, a review published in 2021 would provide an opportunity to rethink defence for their second term. And if a new government were to come to office, they would have the opportunity to do the traditional review and put their own stamp on defence policy.

“...rather than publishing a fancy review of defence policy that will adorn the desks of defence folks for a while before it gets put up on a shelf and forgotten about, it would be useful if the government committed to coming back to this review on a regular basis — in four or five years.”

But what we need to do, it seems to me, is to make reviewing defence policy a regular part of the policy process in this country, as it is in many other countries.

Second, and in a related way, we need to ensure that there is a longer-term perspective with regard to the procurement of military systems required by defence policy. Defence procurement is one of the most difficult tasks facing democratic governments, partly because it takes so long that procurement projects extend well beyond the life of a single Parliament. Committing to an on-going process of defence policy review will encourage the creation of longer-term consistency in procurement.

Third, defence reviews in Canada have invariably been stove-pipe affairs: this review is conducted directly by the minister of national defence. The purpose of the review is to craft a defence policy that, in the words of the government itself, seeks “to ensure that DND and the CAF have what they need to confront new threats and challenges in the years ahead.”

This is, on the face of it, a rational way to proceed, given the way that government is organized and the way the Canadian Armed Forces are funded.

Yet there are at least two fundamental problems with a stove-pipe approach.

One is that there is a tendency for the various tribes of the Canadian Armed Forces to see the review process as the opportunity to press for their particular tribe to be privileged in the review outcome — rather than for the review to determine what military capabilities need to be embraced.

Another consequence of the stove-pipe is that defence policy cannot really be made without a broader assessment of what those threats and challenges are, and what Canada's foreign policy and

its national security policy will be.

So while the defence review is in essence a vertical activity, it would be useful if there was some “horizontality” in the mix — in other words, involving other government departments in a whole-of-government approach.

My fourth and final observation is that defence reviews often tend to be written without the broader polity in mind. Those who craft the review can too quickly lose sight of one unchanging political reality that we have seen since Confederation in 1867: Canadians are happy to spend as little on defence during times of systemic peace as they can possibly get away with. As my colleague Joel Sokolsky likes to remind us, Canadians are not so much free riders in defence as they are “easy riders.” It was true in the latter half of the 19th century; it was true in the years between the world wars; it was true during the post-Cold War era; and it remains true today.

This enduring verity has crucial implications for the defence policy review. Defence policies that are written without the “easy riding” nature of Canadians in mind will be quickly abandoned. Consider the 1987 defence white paper, or the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy, both of which were testaments to what happens when the desires of the defence establishment comes up against the persistent cheapness of Canadians, a cheapness that is always well represented in Cabinet.

In short, the defence policy embraced in the 2016 review has to “fit” the country for which it is designed. It is for this reason that whatever defence policy comes out of the stove-pipe, it must get *owned* by the Cabinet as a whole. If it is just introduced by Minister Sajjan and passed distractedly on the nod by other ministers, it will suffer the same fate as the 1987 and 2008 reviews — useful fodder for the *chatterati* but not much else.

For only if Cabinet as a whole buys into a defence policy will it provide the consistent funding that is so necessary for the delivery of a coherent and rational defence policy for Canada.

Dr. Kim Richard Nossal is a professor in the Department of Political Studies and the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University. His latest book, co-authored with Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, is *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th edition*, published by McGill-Queen’s University Press in November 2015.

WRITTEN STATEMENT – COLONEL CHARLES DAVIES (RET'D) *PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING DEFENCE POLICY*

Context

Unlike, say, foreign policy, governments are more stewards than owners of a nation's defence policy. Defence policy is not about current or future military missions, it's about the capabilities the nation will acquire, maintain, or divest – and 21st Century defence capabilities are complex and can't be created or scaled up on short notice. It takes years or even decades, so the current government has only the defence tools their predecessors put in the box and this policy review will define what tools future governments will have.

Beyond some enduring themes in Canadian defence policies – Priority 1, Defence of Canada; Priority 2, Defence of North America; Priority 3, Contributing to International Peace and Security – for example, the policies consistently flounder when it comes to turning “Bucks” into “Bang.” Part of the problem lies with the machinery of government, but political dynamics also push governments into expensive defence policy flip-flops and bad decisions.

Perspectives on the Policy Process

The defence policy reviews of France, the US, the UK, and Australia reflect good, disciplined policy development processes that have much in common, and I think Canada's review should be no less rigorous.

Many nations review their policies every four or five years and I think Canada should consider doing the same. If nothing else, it would trigger a more regular and structured political discourse that, over time, may encourage a stronger national consensus around defence policy.

Perspectives on Policy Development

Clearly, the ends a government defines in its defence policy will be influenced by the means it's prepared to allocate, but the first consideration must be an objective assessment of the global and regional security environment. The Department of National Defence's (DND) Future Security Environment document and the CDA Institute's annual Strategic Outlook for Canada offer good examples to follow. The assessment must lie at the core of the policy and it can't be artificially constrained by fiscal or other considerations. Although some back-and-forth re-examination of it is appropriate as the policy is developed, this can't be allowed to dilute its objectivity.

Strategic risks need to be methodically characterized and I've provided one example of a tool for

doing so (see Annex 1 - Figure 1). Major risks need viable responses in the policy, whether through our defence capabilities, other instruments of state power, arrangements with the US or another partner, or some other solution. We can't just "accept" major risks and hope for the best.

In prioritizing capability requirements, those needed for "No-Fail" missions have to come first. Capabilities critical to continental defence in particular must provide confidence on the part of both ourselves and our US neighbours in our ability to meet our commitments. We can't dodge the hard, if slightly oversimplified, reality that Canada's sub-surface maritime approaches will be protected by submarines, surface approaches by surface vessels, and air approaches by fighter aircraft – the question in all cases is whether they will be Canadian or American.

“We can't dodge the hard, if slightly oversimplified, reality that Canada's sub-surface maritime approaches will be protected by submarines, surface approaches by surface vessels, and air approaches by fighter aircraft – the question in all cases is whether they will be Canadian or American.”

After "No-Fail" missions, others are more discretionary. Decisions on these need to consider the global strategies future governments will need to be capable of pursuing, and not simply the current government's ambitions. For example, should Canada retain the capability to play a strong international leadership role as a G7 country, as it did when it assumed lead nation responsibility in Kandahar Province, or should it instead limit its capabilities to those needed for less ambitious roles such as selectively contributing to larger coalition forces? These questions will define the range of tools needed in the defence toolbox.

Finally, the new policy has to ensure a sustainable balance of resources across the many elements of capability: personnel; equipment; infrastructure; and the intellectual component that includes doctrine and the professional body of military knowledge. All have to be present in balance – and the force well trained, supported and readied – or the capability is useless. Shortchanging even one element undermines the whole. We currently spend proportionally too much on personnel costs and not enough on the other key elements of capability, and this is not sustainable. Your package contains a table providing some context to this problem (see Annex 1 - Figure 2).

With apologies for this fast skate across a very complex set of issues, thank you for your attention.

Colonel Charles Davies (Ret'd) is a CDA Institute Research Fellow and a former Logistics officer who served for four years as the strategic planning director for the Material Group of the Department of National Defence and three years as the senior director responsible for material acquisition and support policy in the department.

ANNEX 1 – COLONEL CHARLES DAVIES (RET'D)

Figure 1: High Level Summary of Defence Spending and Force Size (2015)

Country	Regular Force	% Navy and Air Force ²	% Army and Other	Defence Budget	% of GDP	Spending per Capita in SCA	Spending per Regular Force Member (SCA)
France ¹	215,000	38.3	61.7	€46.9B	1.9	\$927.69	\$322,200
United Kingdom	149,000	45	55	£45.1B	2.0	\$1,160.30	\$576,380
Australia	58,000	48.1	51.9	\$AS 32.0B	1.8	\$1,321.50	\$522,000
United States	1,430,000	45.5	54.5	\$US 597.5B	3.3	\$2,456.70	\$552,100
Canada	68,000	31.5	68.5	SCA 20.0B	0.9	\$527.28	\$294,120

^{*}Notes:

1. The French data does not reflect the fact that the country is now going through a significant transition from a reducing to an expanding trend in its defence spending and force structure. French force strength and budget data excludes the paramilitary Gendarmerie.
2. Naval and Air Forces are grouped here for simplicity. Both are capital and maintenance intensive versus land, SOF, and support forces, which tend to be more personnel intensive.

Data source: Wikipedia

Figures 2: Potential Strategic Risk Analysis Model (Derived from Old DND Risk Management Guidelines)

I m p a c t	Severe 5	Significant	High	High	Very High	Very High
	Major 4	Medium	Significant	High	High	Very High
	Moderate 3	Low	Medium	Significant	Significant	High
	Minor 2	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Significant
	Insignificant 1	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium
		Rare 1	Unlikely 2	Possible 3	Likely 4	Almost Certain 5
Likelihood						

Risk Level	Definition
Very High	High level of ongoing Cabinet engagement in tracking and directing a detailed action plan
High	Detailed action plan led by a minister or group of ministers
Significant	Regular reporting to a minister or group of ministers
Medium	Specific responsibilities for management of the issue assigned to departmental leadership
Low	Manage by routine procedures

Likelihood	Definition	Impact	Definition
5 Almost Certain	Expected to occur in most circumstances	5 Severe	Would stop achievement of national goals/objectives
4 Likely	Will probably occur in most circumstances	4 Major	Would threaten national objectives
3 Possible	Could occur at some time	3 Moderate	Would necessitates significant adjustment to national plans and/or objectives
2 Unlikely	Not expected to occur	2 Minor	Would threaten an element of national plans
1 Rare	Occurs in exceptional circumstances only	1 Insignificant	Lower consequences or impact

WRITTEN STATEMENT – LIEUTENANT-GENERAL STUART BEARE (RET'D) (ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION)

The Security Environment

Lots has been said and will be said about the nature and character of the Domestic and International Security Environment. In short, peer/near-peer competitors will challenge and in cases threaten the use of force – on their frontiers or threaten the application of force elsewhere – against the interests of regional and global security to pursue their ends. Failed and failing states, challenged by the acts of regional terrorist organizations with regional and global ambition, will continue creating and leveraging ungoverned spaces. Overall, the picture is one of sustained and increasing volatility, instability, and unpredictability.

In this world, the Government should continue to have at its disposal capable and credible Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) that offer a broad range of options – for safety, security, and defence of Canadians and our interests at home to be assured; and in international crises and crisis prevention, for Canada's interests, objectives, and values to be pursued. The CAF's utility to Canada and government in these cases is limited or expanded by the range of relevant capability options it can provide. In a world of uncertainty, that range should be wider vs narrower, diversified vs niche.

Strategic Utility

In order to have strategic utility, and to be effective within a reasoned level of vulnerability and risk, Armed Forces must remain general purpose and combat capable – in operations in the air, on the land, and at sea. And their engagement operationally and tactically needs to be relevant to the conflict that needs to be avoided or defeated. A force needs to be credible to adversaries, partners, and affected populations.

The capacity to deploy within a military or whole of government contribution in ways that are relevant to problems that need to be solved, and to deploy as a credible force, comes from the ability to apply or threaten the application of force - up to and including lethal force where necessary and lawful. And it comes from the ability to protect one's own force (people, equipment and infrastructure) from the actions of enemies and adversaries; in military parlance, Force Protection.

Force Protection and Counter ISTAR

Asymmetric threats – that is low tech, low cost, low complexity threats to own force protection – are exploding with increased technology innovation and with the low cost of entry. These threats can and will undermine the utility of our own CAF politically and strategically and can undermine the

effectiveness and credibility of the CAF if and where committed - if they are unable to provide for their own protection – and spend more energy on compensating for their vulnerabilities instead of focusing on shared mission outcomes, which is the *raison d'être* for being there.

Proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and asymmetric capabilities provides our opponents, of whatever nature, with comparable or even superior tactical capabilities – dislocating technologically and professionally superior armed forces. The Hezbollah, for example, have been able to challenge even the most sophisticated and heavy weight capabilities of the Israeli Army.

Russian backed forces in the Ukraine are enjoying undisrupted surveillance capabilities from the air – dislocating Ukrainian defence forces and undermining their morale.

“Proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and asymmetric capabilities provides our opponents, of whatever nature, with comparable or even superior tactical capabilities – dislocating technologically and professionally superior armed forces.”

Rocket and mortar attack by irregular forces like ISIS continue to harass both indigenous forces and our own forces deployed to assist them. Low cost for potential big payoff.

The security environment is littered with emerging threats such as commercially available Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones. Adversaries can surveil our forces uninhibited and these same UAVs can be weaponized cheaply, undermining our own Forces' ability to manoeuvre, be that at a port facility, an airfield, or field deployed site. And, as we experienced in Afghanistan, improvised systems for rocket, mortar and artillery attack continue to proliferate, delivering the same effect.

A strategic contribution of a credible and capable force can be easily dislocated by these low tech and low cost threats. And we do not have the capability today to deny enemies the use of UAV against us – for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) or for kinetic attack. And we do not have the capacity to defeat inbound projectiles in a way that allows us to affect that real risk to our own troops' safety, and a mission's overall viability. Absent real force protection capabilities in areas of conflict, the Canadian Armed Forces utility to the nation is significantly constrained, and its capability and credibility in challenged and challenging operating environments is at high risk of being completely undermined.

It is time for the CAF to possess the core of the capabilities that can deny enemy ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition And Reconnaissance) from the air over our own forces, and an adversary's ability to attack through the air our own forces or those we are protecting, whether at a G8/G20 meeting at home, a whole of Government partnership abroad, or critical infrastructure.

UAVs (armed and unarmed) and cheap gun, rocket, and mortar methods of attacking a more sophisticated force are proliferating. That ability to shield our own force from these threats, with a reasoned level of confidence, is key to their own moral and physical capacity to focus on the purpose for a mission's intervention – versus being consumed by their own vulnerability and inability to shoot back. Force protection is a national responsibility, and our vulnerabilities here are growing.

LGen Stuart Beare (ret'd) is a 36 year veteran - a gunner, soldier and proud member of the Canadian Armed Forces. He retired in fall 2014, having served 3 years as the Commander of Canadian Joint Operations Command. He is also a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. In January this year he joined Accenture as Senior Advisor for Public Safety and Defence.

WRITTEN STATEMENT – DAN ROSS (ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION)

General Henault, Ms Purdy, ladies and gentlemen. I will address two issues: Accountability and Schedule. Both are enormously inter-related.

Question: Is a 5 to 8 billion dollar annual spend worthy of having an accountable Minister?

The current accountability paradigm is clear, everyone is accountable and therefore no one is accountable. Three central agencies and three departments share accountability. But not really, as ultimately only the Department of National Defence (DND) is accountable for the budget, the lives of members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and the delivery of effects. Management by layers of committees is the norm.

“Since mid-2010, the bottom has fallen out of defence procurement. Treasury Board submissions from DND have dropped by half. Finance ministers from two governments have ‘re-profiled’ billions because ‘DND couldn’t spend it anyway.’”

The greatest risk to any program is always schedule slippage. The consequences are felt by DND in operational obsolescence or just real gaps in capability, in increased maintenance cost, in deflated buying power, in increasing cost, technology, and political risks.

As schedules slide and no one applies a sense of urgency, all the risks that I just listed occur. The fragmented accountability model drives the schedule. Project Managers must feed the beast of committees of Director-Generals (DGs), Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs), Deputy Ministers (DMs) and Ministers.

Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships had independent external reviews for each of the seven tasks in the design contract with sign-offs in two departments. Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement (FWSAR) has been underway for at least 14 years. Will the outcome be better or different if a competitive process had been completed 6 years ago?

Since mid-2010, the bottom has fallen out of defence procurement. Treasury Board submissions from DND have dropped by half. Finance ministers from two governments have ‘re-profiled’ billions because ‘DND couldn’t spend it anyway.’

Few projects have achieved contract award since the Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) was launched and Canadian industry have felt the impact. It’s hard to claim that the CAF are getting the right equipment or that Canadian industry are better supported.

I would argue that there is far too much process in getting to contract awards. Clearly some process is necessary to ensure due diligence in the expenditure of some much public money. The question

is how much is enough.

The Independent Requirements Review Committee led by Larry Murray is working and Project Managers tell me they have benefited by the advice and input of the committee. It has added some time but likely saved time overall.

Is there an urban myth out there that requirements are always fixed and that Statements of Requirements (SORs) should be disciplined by stakeholders other than the military? Yes, that is a common view. Is there some truth to it? At times, yes, but normally it is a myth. Let's let the Independent Review Committee do its job. Disagreeing and pressuring the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to change his requirements is not the job of Public Service and Procurement Canada (PSPC) or Industry Canada.

The military gets to say what they need, you don't want to come second in combat. The whole town has a say in what they don't get.

If there are real and rapidly emerging threats to Canadians and the Canadian Armed Forces domestically and when deployed, is a defence procurement system that averages 14 years to contract award acceptable?

So, let's cut process steps and layers. Use the Independent Review of Requirements Committee, minimize third party reviews, and cancel unnecessary reporting.

Is the Defence Production Act in the right Department? Is a 5 to 8 billion dollar annual spend worthy of having an accountable Minister?

***Dan Ross** holds a BSc in mathematics from the University of Saskatchewan and is a graduate of the National Defence College and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. In the rank of Brigadier-General, he served as the deputy Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister for three years. From 2002 to 2012 he served as an Assistant Deputy Minister with Public Works and Government Services and National Defence, the last seven as Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel.*

WRITTEN STATEMENT – LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GEORGE MACDONALD (RET'D)
DEVELOPING CAPABILITIES FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

Any commitment by the Government to address shortfalls in defence capability is welcome. However, the focus on this is largely through capital procurement and fails to recognize the need for a balanced approach to establishing and maintaining a viable capability. Simply put, the assumption that is made far too readily is that the purchase and delivery of capital equipment constitutes a new capability. Little or no mention is made of the many other components of a capability – the trained personnel needed for operation and sustainment, infrastructure (IT and physical), and the necessary maintenance services and spares. Without these, the capability will not be viable, or will be severely limited at best.

“The essential message here is that the political attractiveness of advocating a particular level of personnel strength must be supported by a defence budget that enables balanced capability planning. This is not currently the case and has not been for some time.”

The natural fixation by everyone on the purchase of equipment is not inappropriate, but it must be kept in mind that this commitment is only one step in acquiring a capability. Indeed, it is usually not even the major portion of the resources spent when the lifetime operation and support costs are included. Therefore, when government commits to a capability in response to a policy to do whatever, it should be considering the complete package of elements that contributes to the provision of that capability to ensure that all are provided, and in a balanced manner.

For some time now, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have struggled with long term sustainment issues, leading to limited availability, reduced training, higher unit costs for lower volume maintenance actions, and a general degradation in the longer term prognosis for a capability – all resulting in an overall higher cost for the level of benefit achieved. Much of this forced restraint has been precipitated by the need to fund personnel to an arbitrary strength established independently of the real need to maintain capabilities. This compromises the ability of the CAF to carry out its role as effectively as possible and limits the benefit achieved.

The essential message here is that the political attractiveness of advocating a particular level of personnel strength must be supported by a defence budget that enables balanced capability planning. This is not currently the case and has not been for some time. The Canada First Defence Strategy target of 100,000 military personnel (70,000 Regular and 30,000 Reserve Force) was never fully achievable within the allocated budget if all aspects of capabilities were to be properly resourced. Fixing the number of personnel artificially limits the effectiveness of achieving and sustaining balanced capabilities.

There is a strong constituency among those of us interested in defence issues that supports an increase in the defence budget. If higher personnel levels are desired, higher funding will be essential. Alternatively, if sufficient funds are not provided, the personnel level should be allowed to be adjusted to correspond with the resources available.

During any review of defence capabilities, which the current process professes to be, a holistic view should be taken to avoid a fixation on the capital equipment program in response to capability development. Similarly, a fixation on the number of military personnel needed must also be avoided. Capability-based planning is alive and well within the CAF and the Department of National Defence (DND), and should be used to ensure Canadian tax dollars are spent towards maximum benefit. Otherwise the CAF will achieve sub-optimal results in this period of renewal and revitalization.

LGen (Ret'd) George Macdonald served in the Canadian Forces for 38 years, retiring from the position of Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. Since 2005 he has worked with CFN Consultants, specializing in defence and security related procurement

WRITTEN STATEMENT – COLONEL DR. MICHAEL CESSFORD (RET'D)

Distinguished guests, colleagues and friends, it is my task – in the space of all of 5 minutes – to make the argument (which I think is utterly self-evident) that Canada must retain a wide range of multi-purpose combat capable maritime, land, air, and special forces for the operations that will unfold in the years and decades to come.

In doing so, I hope to put to rest that false and dangerous – but nonetheless remarkably persistent – premise that our future operational requirements, especially abroad, can be met through cunning specialization and sophisticated military niche marketing. This premise has, of course, nothing to do with the attainment of operational success, the protection of Canada and Canadians, and everything to do with saving money.

The fundamental issue is that the selection of a niche capability, unless you are simply and knowingly rolling the dice, demands an understanding of future operational requirements and environments that is virtually impossible to attain. Given this, the only realistic and prudent hedge against an uncertain future is the retention of a broad range of combat capable forces.

Let's look back to our recent past to illustrate how difficult it is to predict the future. Let me begin by noting that every Canadian prime minister from Brian Mulroney to Justin Trudeau has, over a period stretching 26 years and counting, committed Canadian troops to combat operations – and I doubt that any of us in this room saw these missions coming before they were upon us.

Furthermore, in conducting these combat operations, and for very good and practical reasons, Canada employed – with perhaps one or two exceptions – virtually every significant combat and combat support capability to be found in our maritime, land, air, and special forces. Every major surface warship, independently and in task groups; every Army combat, combat support, and combat service support arm, in units and formations; every fleet of operational aircraft; and every special forces capability gave good service in often difficult theatres of war.

This should come as no surprise. Libya is not Kuwait and Kuwait is not Afghanistan and Afghanistan is not Iraq. Different missions require different, nuanced capabilities to achieve the objectives identified by the government of Canada and here the utility of a range of effective military capabilities, kinetic and non-kinetic alike, is most apparent. And not only was Canada able to draw on a wide range of capabilities, these capabilities provided for joint force synergies that maximized their operational effect and provided truly strategic value.

Finally, it is equally worth noting that every serious examination of Canadian defence policy – in

1964, 1971, 1987, 1994, 2005 and 2008 – has concluded that our defence roles, which have remained virtually unchanged over the years, can only be met through the retention of a full range of combat capable forces. The 1994 White Paper on Defence, for example, stated this fact plainly: “This combination of military requirements has led the Government to conclude that the retention of multi-purpose combat capable forces is in the national interest. These forces provide the Government with a broad range of military options at a cost consistent with our other policy and fiscal priorities.”

It is striking that this commitment by the government of Prime Minister Chrétien to the retention of a full range of military capabilities was made in the face of extraordinary financial and economic challenges and was balanced against the need to address a wide range of competing federal priorities – and this in a period that appeared far more benign than we are likely to face in the immediate future.

Let me close with the words of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, spoken in 1947, when he was then Secretary of State for External Affairs:

A few moments ago I said that we must play a role in world affairs in keeping with the ideals and sacrifices of the young men of this University, and of this country, who went to war. However great or small this role may be, we must play it creditably. We must act with maturity and consistency, and with a sense of responsibility.

The Right Honourable Louis St. Laurent, The 1947 Gray Lecture: “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs,” University of Toronto, 13 January 1947

These words, spoken by one of Canada’s greatest statesmen in a lecture given in memory of a young man killed in the Second World War, retain their strategic relevance and moral clarity to this day. They are worthy of renewed and deeply considered reflection as we embark upon this important review.

Thank you.

Michael Cessford is a retired military officer and part-time academic who is currently employed by a major defence and aerospace company. He is affiliated as a Research Fellow with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

WRITTEN STATEMENT – DR. ELINOR SLOAN

Thank you for the invitation to be here today. I welcome this opportunity to provide my views on the defence review. I will frame my brief comments around two themes: (1) Canada is or has the potential to be more powerful, and therefore make a greater contribution to Canadian and international security than we think; and (2) the world is more dangerous today than it has been in 25 years and Canada needs to respond appropriately.

With regard to my first point, it is commonplace to hear that Canada is a small country with limited resources and that it must pick and choose the areas in which to get involved. Such comments are often paired with the requirement to figure out what should be Canada's 'niche' contribution on the world stage. It is of course always important to prioritize, whether you are a small power or a superpower. But I dispute the degree to which Canada has limited means.

Of the 195 countries in the world our population stands at 37th (i.e., in the top quarter). Our population is almost the same as Poland, and not far off that of Spain or Ukraine. We are often discussed in conjunction with the Nordic countries – forgetting or perhaps not registering in the first place that those countries have only between 5 and 9.5 million people; this is about the population size of the Greater Toronto Area (6 million).

Canada's GDP also stands at 10th or 11th in the world, depending on the list. Our GDP is higher than that of Spain and very close to that of Italy, a country with almost double our population. Demographic trends indicate Canada's power will approach that of France and Britain (which are growing much more slowly) by mid-century, and certainly within the lifetime of major platforms Canada is to acquire in the next decade, like fighter aircraft and naval ships.

Canada's 'limited means' mentality comes from our geographic location beside the United States, which is so much bigger than us and is growing apace. But the material basis of our power – population, economic strength and resources – clearly indicates Canada has the means to devote additional resources to our military capability.

My second point is that the world is more dangerous today than at any time in the past quarter century and we need to respond appropriately. Britain's 2015 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* well captures the nature of the strategic environment. It points to the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability; and the resurgence of state-based threats, and intensifying wider state competition. This assessment is shared by Australia and others. I believe it is accurate and needs to be reflected in our own Defence Review.

The Minister's mandate letter of last fall does not reflect such a perspective. A large part of the tasking in that letter involves finding ways to "renew Canada's commitment to United Nations peace operations." While a laudable goal, it is not the UN that will be addressing the two key points just mentioned – extremism and state based threats. Rather, it will be either NATO or a US-led coalition. Back in 1995, the UN explicitly stated its inability to lead warfighting operations, for a variety of capability reasons, and this position has not changed. Therefore, when it comes to the two main strategic threats to Canada we should be thinking foremost in terms of contributions to NATO and US-led coalitions.

“Back in 1995, the UN explicitly stated its inability to lead warfighting operations... Therefore, when it comes to the two main strategic threats to Canada we should be thinking foremost in terms of contributions to NATO and US-led coalitions.”

With regards to terrorism and instability, we will want to focus on Special Operations Forces (SOFs) contributions. To this end, the defence review should announce an increase in Canada's Special Forces capabilities – keeping in mind such forces are drawn from the Army and that the Army must therefore maintain its current (relatively small) size. A critical enabler in assisting such forces in intrastate conflicts is medium altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drones and these should be fast tracked. Arming these drones to assist SOF with precision strike if necessary only makes sense.

As for the resurgence of state-based threats, this is the most surprising new development. Russia is substantially expanding its surface and sub-surface naval forces, conducting mock exercises that explicitly identify NATO as the enemy, and arming its submarines and aircraft with new long-range precision cruise missiles that can strike North America, or complicate access to the Baltic and East Mediterranean Seas. China, too, is building up its navy. It is focusing on those capabilities likely aimed at blocking access to the waters around Taiwan and the East and South China Seas.

Generally speaking, Russia and China can be said to be pursuing what the United States calls anti-access/area-denial capabilities. The critical military means of addressing such challenges is anti-submarine warfare and especially submarines and long-range patrol aircraft (or an unmanned equivalent such as the maritime version of America's Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]). To this end, not just Britain and the United States but also Australia and Norway, are investing in new submarines and long-range patrol aircraft.

Australia, of course, looks to the Pacific waters around China, while Norway is concerned about Russian activity in the Arctic. Both regions are of significant concern to Canada. The Arctic interest

is self-explanatory given that much of Canadian territory is in the Arctic, where we will want to exercise surveillance and control. The challenge posed by Russia is compounded by the melting waters and resulting interest in the region by non-Arctic countries – notably China, which has just commissioned its second polar-class icebreaker. The Asia-Pacific interest exists as a result of our trade ties to the region and the resultant fact that we would want to be able to play a constructive role in the region in the event of a crisis.

Developments in both regions of the world point to the navy and to air force assets that support the navy. The Trudeau government has stated its commitment to the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy and this commitment must remain in place. In addition, it is time to put a marker out for the next generation of Canadian submarines (they must be air independent propulsion to operate more extensively in the Arctic) and long-range patrol aircraft (or possibly long range UAVs can fulfill that requirement).

To conclude, today's strategic environment is one of increasing extremism and instability, and intensifying interstate competition. At the same time, Canada is not a small power with limited means. We are a medium power by objective measures, and our power will almost certainly rival that of today's major European countries within the life span of our next fighter jet or major ship. We can draft a defence review that commits to the robust force that is necessary to meet contemporary threats – as we did in 1994. But changing the lens through which we view ourselves is the first step in finding the political will and intention to fulfill any stated aspirations.

Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.

Dr. Elinor Sloan is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa and is a former defence analyst with the Department of National Defence. Her most recent book is *Modern Military Strategy, 2nd edition* (London: Routledge, October 2016).

WRITTEN STATEMENT – DR. STEPHEN SAIDEMAN***THE ENDURING BUT OVERLOOKED REALITIES OF CANADIAN DEFENCE***

As the new government considers Canada's defence in a challenging world, there are many topics to address. While others will focus on threats, I think one way to organize the discussion is to focus on what the money is spent on – equipment, operations, and personnel. The media and the parliament tend to focus almost entirely on the procurement of equipment. I might guess that much of the discussion at the various roundtables will be as well, so I will focus elsewhere – on operations and on personnel. My points will be simple ones – NATO drives Canadian operations, readiness is often overlooked, and the size of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is something that needs to be considered.

First, my observation of this Liberal government is that NATO is an afterthought. The focus on UN and peacekeeping fits with Liberal values and is aimed at reversing the efforts of the previous government. In their defence platform, NATO was only briefly discussed. But the reality is that whenever NATO engages in an operation, Canada shows up and expends a great deal of effort: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and now the reassurance mission in Eastern Europe. Canada has opted out of coalitions of the willing, and there are too many UN missions so Canada has to pick and choose. But with NATO, Canada participates, so the review should consult NATO and consider what the alliance will need from Canada down the road.

My guess is that the Canadian Armed Forces will be disappointed – that NATO will not demand a full spectrum military but perhaps want Canada to focus on some things Canada does well, even if it means doing other stuff less. Which things/stuff? The people in Brussels and Mons may have some answers to those questions. The British consulted with NATO extensively during their recent review. I hope this review does the same.

Second, one of the big differences between American and Canadian debates about military spending is that you don't hear the word "hollow" much up here. In the US, there is always the concern that there is not enough spending on training, maintenance and operations, that the military will be big but not capable. In Canada, most of the discussion is on procurement. But we need to think seriously about how operations/maintenance/training is funded as that determines readiness, i.e., can Canada fight well when it has to?

Despite being out of Afghanistan, Canada faces a pretty high pace of operations – rotating into and out of Eastern Europe on a regular basis as part of NATO's reassurance missions, supporting the

training mission in Iraq, etc. But when the budget gets squeezed, it almost always comes out of readiness, as procurement has its own calendar and personnel costs are seen as fixed.

This leads me to my third point: personnel costs are nearly 50 percent of the defence budget. So, any defence decisions should take seriously this part of the budget. I am not saying that we need to cut pay or benefits. But the size of the force is a key constraint that cannot be ignored. If one assumes Canadians will not want more money spent on defence or this government is unlikely to do so, then the size of the force is a key consideration for whatever is planned.

A related trend is this – with every defence program becoming more and more expensive, Canada will buy less. The next fighter plane purchase will certainly lead to fewer planes than the original CF-18 procurement. The shipbuilding program is not going to lead to fifteen ships. So, we are likely to need fewer pilots and fewer sailors. To keep the intra-CAF peace and also to face the current budgetary reality, cutting the Army's size down a bit is probably a least worst solution.

I do think that the best decision would be for Canada to spend more on its military, but I recognize that this is a non-starter. Whatever increases will probably not catch up to inflation. I also recognize that Canada will continue to spend more and get less due to the insistence on buying Canadian built equipment even when better/less expensive stuff is available. Given these trends, the CAF is in for hard times ahead – expected to keep up the pace of operations while avoiding hard decisions about priorities. Perhaps the Defence Review will lead to some difficult decisions actually being confronted.

Dr. Stephen Saideman holds the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His most recent books are *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (with David Auerswald) and *Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanistan*. He is a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

WRITTEN STATEMENT – MAJOR-GENERAL RICHARD BLANCHETTE (RET'D) (ROYAL CANADIAN LEGION)

Good afternoon, it is a great pleasure to appear in front of your panel. I am pleased to be able to speak to you this afternoon on behalf of our Dominion President, Mr. Tom Eagles and nearly 300,000 members. Our mission is to serve veterans, which includes serving military and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) members and their families, to promote Remembrance, and to serve our communities and our country.

J'ai succédé à feu le général Bill Leach à la présidence du Comité de Défense et sécurité de la Légion et ce dernier m'avait décrit le poste comme étant la porte d'entrée ou le point de contact avec les différents ministères dont les décisions affectent les anciens combattants **et** les membres des Forces armées canadiennes en service, ainsi que les policiers retraités ou en service à la Gendarmerie royale du Canada. Equipment, training, compensation and morale are all part of the mandate of this committee that I have the honour to chair.

When you consider these responsibilities, rest assured that the Legion did not commit “mission creep” as we used to say at Staff College. Our organisation, **your** Legion, was created by an Act of Parliament in 1926 and to this day we have been assisting veterans through our legislative mandate in both the Pension Act and New Veterans Charter. The Legion is the only veteran service organization which assists veterans and their families with representation to Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board. Our 34 professional Service Officers are located across the country and provide free assistance to veterans and their families with obtaining benefits and services from VAC, and one does not have to be a Legion member to avail himself or herself of our services.

Accordingly, the Legion feels the new defence policy should hinge on the **people** who will make this defence policy work. Such a challenging mental exercise should be based on a wider national security strategy but it appears that our new government has elected to put the cart before the horse. Of course, we will hear that there was, there is, and there will be a lot of consultation with other departments and organisations to produce the new defence policy. But like many analysts have said before, we are missing a great opportunity to take a global look at security in our country.

Néanmoins, la Légion apprécie grandement l'occasion de communiquer avec le Groupe consultatif ministériel. Nous notons toutefois que le Ministère de la défense devrait développer une politique organisationnelle qui chercherait à augmenter l'interface avec les anciens combattants de manière à profiter de leur expérience et de leur unique point de vue. En toute évidence, la Légion

pourrait appuyer une telle politique et c'est dans cette perspective que nous présentons les **huit** recommandations suivantes.

Sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen are veterans by definition but they will one day retire and the Legion appreciates the double hatting of an Associate Minister of National Defence (MND) and Minister of Veterans Affairs. This will help doing away with some of the irritants known to happen during the transition from active service to retirement. The “tag team” Department of National Defence (DND)-VAC is an excellent start but it must not only be connected at the top. **Our first recommendation is therefore that this interdepartmental connexion be reinforced at all levels of authority.**

“Sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen are veterans by definition but they will one day retire and the Legion appreciates the double hatting of an Associate Minister of National Defence (MND) and Minister of Veterans Affairs.”

The positive transition to civilian life after release is essential for all Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and RCMP members, and their families as well. The experience of retirement is different and unique for each veteran. Some voluntarily leave after a short period of service, some are single, some have young families and some are in need of employment. Others are injured in service to their country and they must make this transition under difficult circumstances. **Our second recommendation is that DND, VAC, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (for the RCMP) put in place complementary policies, practices, and programs supported by a sustainable research program to enable the healthy transition of all veterans and their families.** In this regard, I draw your attention to the important and growing role of the Canadian Institute of Military and Veterans Health Research (CIMVHR) which involves 41 Canadian and foreign universities under the lead of Queen's University. We have to face the harsh reality that these health issues are with us for a long time and this Defence Policy Review needs to cover and leverage the excellent work that this institute is already performing.

Our **third** recommendation is an extension of the previous one. The Legion is seeing a change in the needs of some of our younger veterans. Many have invisible wounds and challenges with their transition to civilian life. Our experience from the national Veterans Transition Program provides evidence that some veterans and their families feel isolated and need to be welcomed home in a very real way. The Veterans Transition Program, the only program of its kind in Canada, assists former members of the Canadian Armed Forces and the RCMP in their transition to civilian life. This program was developed to address the invisible wounds of our soldiers so that they can function better in society. This program was established in 1999 with funding from Legion BC/

Yukon Command. It is a group-based program facilitated by the University of British Columbia's Faculty of Medicine. VAC supports the program and **we recommend that DND recognize and support the expansion of the Veterans Transition Program nationally, and ensure that serving CAF members affected by operational stress injuries be given the time off to have access to the program.**

Notre **quatrième** recommandation touche aux entrevues de transition. Celles-ci doivent être menées tôt dans le processus de libération de manière à aider les membres et leurs familles à identifier d'avance leurs besoins. Pour les membres en service qui reçoivent déjà l'appui d'un gestionnaire de cas d'Anciens Combattants Canada, **nous recommandons fortement qu'une partie de l'entrevue de transition soit menée en présence des membres de la famille.**

Indeed, we all know that families are the strength behind the uniform and must be engaged in the transition process from the very start, especially when it is not a physical injury. Families can request assistance from Military Family Resource Centres (MFRCs) as there is a Family Liaison Officer, a social worker located in the Integrated Personnel Support Centres, who can provide assistance to the family. **Given that Military Family Resource Centres are well established in areas where we have a large number of veterans, our fifth recommendation is that DND consider opening MFRCs to all military members, veterans and their families.**

The Legion continues to be concerned with the lack of a formal capability and/or program that proactively reaches out to Reserve Units and their members to ensure that Reserve Force members are being looked after with regards to disability benefits from Veterans Affairs Canada. With this in mind, the Legion sent two years ago a letter to every Reserve unit in Canada, offering a briefing on our Service Bureau Network and the assistance available from the Legion. To date, we have briefed more than 500 Reservists on our services but more importantly, **our sixth recommendation is that the military chain of command proactively support the organisation and execution of these briefings to Reserve units.**

The Legion maintains an extensive outreach program through seminars of the Second Career Assistance Network (SCAN) on all bases/wings to inform members of our services. The Legion also has a presence at most of the Canadian Forces Integrated Personnel Support Centres on each base to assist veterans and their families, as part of the transition process. However, many serving members have not been informed of our services and **our seventh recommendation is therefore complementary to the previous one. The chain of command needs to ensure that all Regular Force serving members, throughout their professional development, be briefed on**

and knowledgeable about the services available to them. Bien que nous ne soyons pas en mesure d'établir un lien direct entre ce manque de connaissances des services offerts et le haut taux de suicides parmi les militaires en service et les anciens combattants, nous avons la conviction qu'un meilleur rayonnement de l'aide disponible aura un effet positif sur le moral des troupes et de la communauté militaire dans son ensemble.

The *New Veterans Charter* and the *Enhanced New Veterans Charter Act* are comprehensive and complex. Our veterans need to know not only the weaknesses but also the strengths behind the legislation, programs, services and benefits. We are far from a reasonable standard and I would suggest that this highlights the ineffectiveness of the Government's communication of the programs and services available to veterans. **Our eighth and final recommendation is therefore that the Government needs to better communicate how it will put in place the resources and programs to meet the needs expressed in all ministerial mandate letters.** In other words, this must not be a self-service for our veterans; they deserve to be told what there is on this complex menu that affects their very livelihood.

In conclusion, rest assured that our programs will continue to evolve to meet the changing Canadian demographics while still supporting our traditional veteran community. However, notwithstanding the capacity of The Royal Canadian Legion, we certainly believe that the Department of National Defence, Veterans Affairs Canada, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, among other departments and organisations, have a responsibility to ensure that policies, practices and programs, supported through a sustainable research program, be accessible and meet the unique needs of all veterans, serving, about to retire or already retired. Ce sont eux, comme mentionné dans mon introduction, qui feront en sorte que l'examen de la politique de la Défense du Canada mènera aux succès opérationnels escomptés.

Major-General Richard V. Blanchette (ret) *commanded troops in three UN missions and two international coalition operations. He retired from the CAF after 35 years of service and is the Chairman of the Defence & Security Committee of the Royal Canadian Legion.*

WRITTEN STATEMENT – MAJOR-GENERAL DOUG DEMPSTER (RET'D)

A CHECKLIST FOR IMPLEMENTATION: THE DEFENCE REVIEW

Introduction

The Defence Minister has asked four eminent Canadians to support and advise him on the defence policy review. They can advise, suggest, challenge, validate, and temper ambitions. They can ask the hard questions, widen the discourse, observe on missing pieces, and tighten the focus.

Previous defence policy and strategies have often had a short shelf life as the world changed, key initiatives bogged down, or recessions arrived. If we are smart about this, we can build a resilient and adaptive policy that can be *implemented* even as the context inevitably changes.

Why must implementation be included as a vital component of the Defence Review? Most Canadian defence policies in the past had reduced impact primarily due to implementation challenges, not formulation. There are at least four reasons why an implementation focus is needed:

- a. *Action Imperative:* Without implementation direction the defence review risks becoming a statement rather than a forcing function for action. The defence review will ultimately represent a pivotal set of government choices. Lack of goal clarity or imbalance of ambition and resources will reduce the impact of the defence review. Direction and priorities need to be clear.
- b. *Challenges:* The execution of a policy is often more difficult than its formulation. Without a careful consideration of changing conditions, enablers, and obstacles, there is a risk that initiatives and changes will not succeed or be delayed. Implementation requires balancing resource allocation with flexibility of approach.
- c. *Horizontal linkages:* A clear set of goals and timelines will tighten the focus when collaboration with other government departments, allies, partners, corporations and Canadians is needed. The defence policy will be a cabinet decision, and its direction will drive efforts outside of the Department of National Defence (DND).
- d. *Metrics:* The government is committed to delivering its commitments and to achieving results. It has articulated deliverology as its core technique of getting to outcomes. This methodology is based upon a clear definition of what is to be achieved and how to measure the achievement.

On this last point, this defence policy review needs to be built for implementation via deliverology so as to achieve impact in a timely way. The goals need to be framed and aligned with accountabilities so

that achievement can be measured. This clearly implies a policy implementation plan, or what military professionals call a campaign plan. Such a plan has lines of operations, a sequencing of events across all the lines of operation, and a centre of gravity. The centre of gravity¹ is defined as the source of power that provides moral and physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.

A campaign plan has a central narrative that is energized by collaborative leadership that levers creative and critical thinking. So too must our new defence policy. Its centre of gravity must be the shared sense of purpose, values, and interests among government, Canadians and their armed forces in a global context. With a shared sense of purpose implementation can be steered through the inevitable turbulence, provided that flexibility is built in.

Vital Dimensions for Implementation

The desired policy ends need to be sufficient to handle forecast challenges to security and sovereignty while fitting within fiscal policy. Policy ends must be aligned with policy ways and means to be achievable.

The outline implementation plan needs to set out enough top-down direction without inhibiting the departmental management capacity to find innovative, collaborative, and emergent approaches.

High-level execution pathways must be provided for choices made, and in particular for the most critical dimensions (or lines of operation). In this case implementation direction should be clear for at least the following seven critical dimensions:

1. *Engagement*: How will Defence stay engaged with its key stakeholders and Canadians?
2. *Integration*: How will defence policy be tied to foreign policy, national security and prosperity?
3. *Capabilities*: What changes are needed to the military instrument to ensure capacity, utility and relevance?
4. *Resources*: What level of resources will be provided to achieve affordability?
5. *Enablers*: What championship, mechanisms, processes and systems will enable success?
6. *Institution*: How will the institution of the CAF be reformed and nurtured by the policy?
7. *Governance*: How will decisions be made to steer implementation?

¹ Jack Kem, *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2012).

The best practices in strategic implementation leadership² are to:

- Display championship, leadership, and commitment;
- Create a sense of urgency and relentless tempo;
- Achieve clarity of role and responsibility for key initiatives;
- Produce quick wins in the near term to build momentum and capacity for the longer term;
- Address institutional culture in parallel with change initiatives; and
- Provide incentives, rewards and consequences for results.

Both the UK and Australian defence reviews were explicit on implementation. In the November 2015 UK *Strategic Defence and Security Review*, implementation was covered in the last Chapter 7, although Chapter 6 contains related elements such as innovation, defence industry, and skills. In the 2016 *Australian Defence White Paper*, the final chapter 9 covered implementation while Chapters 7 and 8 covered defence reform and resources respectively. In Australia the topic of defence reform based on its first principles review received significant attention.

Implementation planning needs to occur in parallel with consultation and synthesis so as to ensure achievability. This will allow for iterative testing against the implementation checklist throughout the policy formulation period so as to achieve an adaptive and resilient policy statement.

Implementation planning may result in adaptive techniques such as additional option studies to prepare for future decision-making, prototyping, and pilot projects, contingency plans in case of unexpected shifts in the security environment, and learning from others' experiences.

A High Level Perspective on Policy Implementation

As a precis of issues addressed more thoroughly in the enclosed checklist, here are eight pivotal issues for consideration as part of implementation:

1. Support for an inherently collaborative (joint, combined, interagency, whole of government) approach to decision-making and moving forward, to include better connection to Canadian society;
2. Any changes to the top-level organizational structures and military-civilian mix;
3. An identified 3-5 key capital projects as a package to drive their acquisition through to key milestones;

² John Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

4. Specific scope and timelines for capability innovation in the arctic, space, cyber, and stability operations;
5. Shortening the timeline for capability acquisition, with some key metrics;
6. A blueprint for a 21st century Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) HR system for the knowledge age, one that will attract and retain millennials and exploit technology;
7. Financial envelopes and flexibilities, to include labour-capital balance and any adjustment to Defence Renewal; and
8. Other enabling plans to ensure achievability and results in a timely way.

Conclusion

To succeed, the goals of the defence policy review need to be aligned with the ways and means available. Government championship of key initiatives and engagement by military and civilian members will be essential. The level of change required must be achievable.

Defence policy implementation planning needs to occur in parallel with the consultation, synthesis and approval phases so as to ensure achievability. Implementation planning needs to be aligned with the deliverology approach to achieving results. This approach is similar to the campaign planning approach familiar to the profession of arms. It will require leadership attention and clear metrics.

Seven critical dimensions (or lines of operation in campaign planning terms) were identified for implementation planning – engagement, integration, capabilities, resources, enablers, institution, and governance. A checklist of 60 questions permits testing successive iterations of the policy statement for its ability to be implemented.

A resilient and adaptive policy will contain flexibility mechanisms so as to allow the departmental management capacity to find innovative, collaborative, and emergent approaches.

A fully aligned defence policy review that incorporates implementation planning with strong continuing performance feedback will be sustainable over time even as the external context changes.

Major-General (Retired) Doug Dempster served as the Defence strategic planner for the four years after 9/11 and as NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Executive Management from 2005 to 2010. He currently heads the Centre for Executive Leadership at the University of Ottawa

ANNEX 1 – MAJOR-GENERAL DOUG DEMPSTER (RET'D)**IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST FOR THE MINISTER'S ADVISORS****Engagement**

- a. How can we help Canadians get to know their CAF better through increased access to information, transparency and outreach?
- b. Have we established a resilient collaborative defence and security policy development capacity with Canadians, and especially a diverse set of advisory institutes and academia?
- c. Have we confirmed or refined our approach to Canada-US relations, most notably to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), and the US Unified Command System?
- d. Have new and effective mechanisms for alignment of defence, foreign, international assistance and national security been identified?
- e. Have we improved the relationship capacity with the UN, UN agencies, NATO, other international security organizations and NGO's?
- f. Does the policy increase the diversity of the CAF in terms of gender, culture and generations?

Policy Integration

- a. Does the policy explicitly derive from Canadian values and interests?
- b. Does the policy make an explicit link between prosperity and defence, including connections to international trade and freedom of the sea and air spaces?
- c. Does the policy provide connections to the government's emerging foreign policy themes?
- d. Is the policy for engagement in stabilization and peace operations well scoped in terms of risk levels and geography?
- e. Has the defence policy been connected to national security policy, including the ability to respond to terrorism, organized crime, and cyber threats?
- f. Has the defence policy been connected to the environment, climate change, extreme weather, and violent seismic events?
- g. Has the policy cross-connected to the emerging international assistance policy for an integrated approach to world regions with conflict?

- h. Has the policy been connected to Canada's Arctic policy, and its contribution put into the context of other departmental and territorial government roles?
- i. Has the policy been connected to Canada's policy towards indigenous peoples, and specifically the Rangers and Junior Rangers?
- j. Has the policy connected to innovation and science to meet defence needs, including research and development capability and the defence and aerospace industry?

Capabilities

- a. What is the relative balance in the force structure for combat, stabilization, humanitarian and developmental roles?
- b. What if anything will stop being done?
- c. How will jointness be improved to produce synergies in force development, generation, and employment?
- d. Has a capability construct such as the PRICIE model (Personnel, R&D/Ops Research, Infrastructure & Organization, Concepts, Doctrine & Collective Training, IT Infrastructure, Equipment, Supplies and Services) been recognized to ensure that capabilities have the necessary components to ensure that they can deliver?
- e. Has a specific way forward been identified for the surface combatant and fighter megaprojects, as well as the next 2-3 large capital investment projects?
- f. Have force package sizes been identified for the identified missions, including for the forward defence of the European NATO region and the eventual stabilization of the Middle East?
- g. Is there sufficient airlift and sealift to ensure timely deployment and sustainability on a global basis?
- h. Does C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) provide sufficient capacity to command and sense when at home and when deployed, with interoperability among allies and partners?
- i. Will Canada re-engage with NATO collective capabilities such as NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) or Airborne Ground Surveillance as part of a collective capability?
- j. Have emerging capabilities such as space, cyber, drones, and special operating forces been

sufficiently nurtured?

- k. Is there sufficient national capability to handle a CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) attack in Canada or on the CAF when deployed?
- l. How will the Reserves be revitalized?
- m. Are any new force structure changes completely identified and scoped for implementation?

Resources

- a. Is the policy level of ambition achievable with the resource levels provided, or are trade-offs or sequencing required?
- b. Have priorities been stated for implementation?
- c. Has the correct balance been struck between numbers of people and equipment, and does the department have some flexibility to adjust these inputs to achieve the policy outcomes?
- d. Will the department be able to divest non-essential infrastructure?
- e. What are the proposed levels of military, both regular and reserve, and civilian human resources in both people and funding?
- f. How will the current Defence Renewal process be assessed and if necessary changed to align with the new policy?
- g. What is the commitment to approving a new Strategic Capability Investment Plan so as to permit the start of new capital projects?
- h. What capabilities can be deleted, reduced, outsourced or transferred to ensure sustainment of the capabilities identified in the policy?
- i. Have sufficient resources been provided for health support, and especially mental health support, to CAF members and veterans?

Enablers

- a. What new initiatives will be implemented to make the capital acquisition process work effectively and in a timely way?
- b. How will the CAF achieve a knowledge-age human resources structure, and especially for the knowledge work classifications such as public affairs and intelligence?

- c. How will training and simulation be improved to increase readiness and lower costs?
- d. How will sufficient data analytics and information communication technology (ICT) capacity be generated to support both operations (C4ISR) and corporate applications (DREMIS)?
- e. Will an effective performance management regime be put in place to drive towards the required results, while permitting course correction and resource reallocation?
- f. Is the policy underpinned by a strong commitment to in-service education for both military and civilian members?
- g. How will gender and cultural diversity be achieved over time?
- h. How will CAF demographic renewal be conducted?
- i. How will the speed of implementation be increased?

Institution

- a. How will institutional culture be steered and reformed towards the future?
- b. How can the legitimacy and resilience of the military institution be increased?
- c. What can we learn and adopt from other institution-leading jurisdictions?
- d. How can the CAF cultural, normative, and regulative systems be brought into the 21st century without losing their core traditions?
- e. Do the top level organization structure and processes need to be adjusted?
- f. Can the institution be made more welcoming of diversity?
- g. Can the institution reduce the effect of its internal barriers of rank, service and classification so as to achieve greater collaboration, commitment and engagement?
- h. Can the institution improve support to military families?

Governance

- a. How will the policy implementation process be steered?
- b. What new mechanisms, if any, are needed to ensure horizontal integration of defence, foreign and national security policy across government?
- c. How will the policy implementation lever experts and external advisors to review progress?

- d. Will military and civilian Level 1 leaders continue to report separately to the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), or will integration and collective accountability increase?
- e. How will the efforts of National Defence Headquarters be coordinated?
- f. Who will manage the overall implementation campaign plan and associated performance measurement?

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