As they prepare to meet in The Hague on June 24th, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are slated to debate whether to raise the 2% of GDP spending target to 3.5% or even 5%. While the former appears more likely, these discussions are bound to distract from an awkward fact: the Alliance’s nuclear shield has never been weaker. Undeniably, one of the great casualties of the polarization of American politics and of the Trumpian takeover of Republican foreign policy thought is the dependability of American extended deterrence for close allies who built their defence policies around it.
Trump’s approach towards the defence of its allies poses a distinct challenge, for which there is no easy answer in Europe. It is a fallacy to equate Canada’s problems to those of its European friends. While cosmetically similar, the two strategic situations are simply too different to be resolved by the same solution. Yet Canada’s position is not comfortable either and does require important adjustments.
How Much Does It Cost to Be Defended?
The Trumpian outlook on the defence of the United States’ allies has been quite rightly compared to a protection racket: Washington will defend you… at a cost! A few months ago, President Trump publicly toyed with refusing to defend NATO members if they refuse to “pay” by meeting the defence spending threshold. This statement, which called into question whether Washington’s nuclear commitment to its allies was truly ironclad, implied a simple solution. Indeed, could the allies simply meet the spending target?
The problem, however, is much more complicated than that. First, few countries (not even the United States) currently meet the potentially new defence spending target of 3.5%. Second, and most critically, President Trump changes his mind—regularly. This incessant flipflopping has been witnessed on a variety of subjects, such as the trade relationship between the United States and Canada, and it undermines trust in any long-term agreements with the current administration. If the strength of extended deterrence lies in stable expectations, how can NATO members—and Canada—ever trust the protection racket President Trump now seems to offer them? This is the dilemma at the heart of the current debates over the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella.
French and British Nukes to the Rescue
Since Trump’s March 2025 remarks, European political leaders and scholars alike have suggested that they could compensate for the loss of the American nuclear umbrella by creating a new European equivalent, from which strategic independence would emerge. With the United Kingdom and France already possessing nuclear weapons, this suggestion appears both credible and workable—with some important caveats.
The current nature and composition of both countries’ nuclear forces are ill-suited to fulfill the role of an extended nuclear protection over non-nuclear allies. Both countries have maintained relatively small arsenals that historically sought to complete U.S. nuclear posture. Creating a new nuclear umbrella entirely independent from Washington would require colossal investments and adaptations, particularly in the case of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the very operation of its nuclear weapons is intertwined with the United States. Additionally, President Macron of France has signaled that even if he is open to extending the French nuclear protection to its neighbours, his country would not bear the cost of defending others.
Notwithstanding these hurdles, if France and the United Kingdom extended the protection of their nuclear weapons to other European nations, it would create a form of ‘strategic redundancy’ that would solve the uncertainty created by President Trump’s erratic behaviour. For instance, if the Trump administration chose to not defend Latvia against Russian aggression, it would be much less problematic for Europeans who would be ready, willing, and credibly capable of doing it themselves. Deterrence against Russia, particularly for Eastern European members of NATO, could be restored.
Yet the notion that this same solution—a European umbrella—could be workable for Canada, as proposed by Chrystia Freeland and others, is misguided for two reasons. First, the stakes are simply not high enough for European leaders in the case of an attack against Canada. The solution is workable in the European context because, as Héloïse Fayet puts it, the “national security [of the United Kingdom and France] is inextricably tied to Europe’s stability.” The idea that either countries would be similarly threatened and destabilized by conventional or nuclear attacks against Canada is simply not realistic. Second, and more importantly, this proposal assumes that Canada and Europe face the same conundrum—complete abandonment by Washington. That is, fortunately, a fallacy.
Canada Alone?
The fragility of U.S. credibility when defending its European allies from foreign aggression stems in part from the fact that its interests in the region are, after all, quite artificial. An ocean separates America and Europe; the conquest of Berlin does not immediately endanger Boston. That is why President Trump’s remarks are so potent in their destructiveness: in his worldview, the United States hasdefended Europe because they wanted to, not because they had to. If there is no political will in Washington to sacrifice New York for Paris, then there is little security imperative to do so. Yet this is not the case for Canada.
Contrary to Europe, Canada shares a long border with the United States. Its bigger cities are close to some of U.S. most important urban centres. In the case of a large scale conventional (or nuclear) attack against Canadian cities, their proximity to their American neighbour means that it would be very difficult for the United States to know in real time if it is directly targeted. Indeed, any aggression against Canada could just as easy be aimed at the United States or, even, have ripple effects and negatively impact American lives. Furthermore, leaving Canada entirely in its corner would mean leaving the United States hugely vulnerable at its northern border and, thus, critically endangering the United States’ territorial integrity. That is why American decision-makers are eager to make Canada a part of the President’s ‘Golden Dome’ initiative, albeit at a steep price.
Whatever the state of the Canada-U.S. relationship, it is highly unlikely that the United States would let any adversary set up shop on its northern border. But it could, in the case of a missile attack against North America, opt to keep its limited capabilities focused on protecting American territory.
Nonetheless, regardless of American opinion toward Canadian defence spending, abandoning Canada to foreign aggression has consequences for American security that are simply not comparable to the abandonment of Europe. A much more likely scenario—and one that should concern any Canadian government—is that, if the White House has to step in due to Canadian vulnerabilities, the United States would defend Canada and use that defence as a way to transform it into a protectorate or, even, a mere satellite.
Although legitimate, concerns over the state of US extended deterrence in the case of Canada are somewhat misguided. They fail to address the country’s greatest vulnerabilities and misdiagnoses the real danger for the country’s sovereignty: the one that comes from the United States itself if the goal is to maintain Canadian autonomy. As such, while valid in the case of European countries, the discussions around a new nuclear umbrella are, for Canada, extraneous.
Joining European initiatives regarding rearmament is desirable, but diplomatic efforts toward extended deterrence considerations would be a distraction.
Failure to fully take stock of a changing threat environment and years of complacency towards defence spending leave Canada vulnerable. It would be appropriate for Canada to protect itself from conventional attacks, such as enemy missiles, and the Canadian government’s announcement that it would invest to meet the 2% of GDP spending goal makes it an attainable goal. Carney’s government has, for that purpose, three potential pathways: join President Trump’s Golden Dome, develop a sovereign anti-missile capability, or attempt both strategies at the same time. If the second or third options are selected, then Rearm Europe could be instrumental in setting up new necessary scientific and technological collaborations that would help reach the new 3.5% goal.
In conclusion, Trump’s attitude toward NATO represents a considerable challenge for the Alliance. It is unlikely that NATO members will seek to confront it openly or directly at the next NATO summit. Yet the threat it represents for Canada should not be ignored nor equated to the one it poses for Europe. The upcoming summit is an occasion for Canada to signal it is ready to up its defence spending and demonstrate its willingness to be a good and credible ally. Prime Minister Carney’s announcement that the 2% target would be met this fiscal year is, to that end, a positive and necessary first step. Rather than initiate vain attempts at joining a European nuclear shield behind the scenes, Canada would be better advised to shore up its conventional defences and its capacity to deter autonomously external threats. That is, in the end, the only true way it can alleviate its strategic dependence toward its southern neighbour.
Émile Lambert-Deslandes is a doctoral candidate and Joseph-Armand Bombardier (CGS-D) Scholar in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University, studying International Relations and Security.
